North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Implementation: The Future of Commercial Trucking Across the Mexican Border

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Implementation: The Future of Commercial Trucking Across the Mexican Border

North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) Implementation: The Future
of Commercial Trucking Across the
Mexican Border
John Frittelli
Specialist in Transportation Policy
June 1, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL31738
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

NAFTA Implementation: The Future of Commercial Trucking Across the Mexican Border

Summary
NAFTA set forth a schedule for implementing its trucking provisions that would have opened the
border states to cross-border trucking competition in 1995 and all of North America in 2000, but
full implementation has been stalled because of concern with the safety of Mexican trucks.
Congress first addressed these concerns in the FY2002 Department of Transportation
Appropriations Act (P.L. 107-87) which set 22 safety-related preconditions for opening the border
to long-haul Mexican trucks. In November 2002, the U.S. Department of Transportation
announced that all the preconditions had been met and began processing Mexican applications for
U.S. long-haul authority. However, a suit over environmental compliance delayed implementation
further. After the suit was resolved, in February 2007, the U.S. and Mexican Secretaries of
Transportation announced a demonstration project to implement the NAFTA trucking provisions.
The purpose of the project was to demonstrate the ability of Mexico-based motor carriers to
operate safely in the United States beyond the border commercial zones. Up to 100 Mexico-
domiciled carriers would be allowed to operate throughout the United States for one year and
Mexico would allow the same for up to 100 U.S.-based carriers. With passage of the U.S. Troop
Readiness, Veteran’s Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007
(P.L. 110-28), Congress mandated additional requirements before the project could begin. After
failing to defund the demonstration project in the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L.
110-161), Congress succeeded in terminating the demonstration project through a provision in the
FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8). Subsequently, Mexico announced it would
retaliate by increasing import duties on 90 U.S. products. The Obama Administration has
indicated it intends to propose a revamped program that will address the concerns of Congress.
The FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117) passed in December 2009 did not
preclude funds from being spent on a long-haul Mexican truck pilot program, provided the terms
and conditions stipulated in section 350 of P.L. 107-87 and section 6901 of P.L. 110-28 were
satisfied.
One truck safety statistic, “out-of-service” rates, indicates that Mexican trucks operating in the
United States are now safer than they were a decade ago. The data indicate that Mexican trucks
and drivers have a comparable safety record to U.S. truckers. Another study indicates that the
truck driver is usually the more critical factor in causing accidents than a safety defect with the
truck itself. Service characteristics of long-haul trucking suggest that substandard carriers would
likely not succeed in this market. As shipment distance increases, the relative cost of trucking
compared to rail increases, and thus shippers utilizing long-haul trucking are willing to pay more
because they require premium service, such as precise delivery windows or cargo refrigeration.
These exacting service requirements would seem to disqualify truckers with unreliable equipment
or incompetent drivers. In contrast, the short-haul “drayage” carriers that Mexican long-haul
carriers would displace, typically use older equipment because of the many hours spent idling
awaiting customs processing at the border. If Mexican carriers do eventually receive long-haul
authority, the short term impact is expected to be gradual as Mexican firms deal with a number of
stumbling blocks, including lack of prearranged back hauls and higher insurance and capital
costs, in addition to the customs processing delays. In the long run, use of drayage companies is
likely to decline as they lose part of their market share to Mexican long-haul carriers. The most
common trips for these carriers will probably be from the Mexican interior to warehouse facilities
on the U.S. side of the border or to nearby cities in the border states.

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NAFTA Implementation: The Future of Commercial Trucking Across the Mexican Border

Contents
NAFTA’s Commercial Trucking Provisions: Background and Implementation History ................ 1
Demonstration Project Results after One Year ....................................................................... 5
Truck Safety Linkage to Service Characteristics .......................................................................... 6
“Long-Haul” Trucking Defined ............................................................................................. 6
Short-Haul Trucking over the Border .................................................................................... 7
Determinants of U.S. Truck Safety and Applicability to Mexican Carriers ............................. 8
Mexican Truck Out-of-Service Rates Comparable to U.S. Trucks .......................................... 9
Cross-Border Trucking Operations: An Overview...................................................................... 11
The Scope of Cross-Border Truck Traffic ............................................................................ 11
Cross-Border Commercial Trucking: The Trade Flow Process ............................................. 13
Mexico-U.S. Crossings ................................................................................................. 13
U.S.-Mexico Crossings ................................................................................................. 14
The Maquiladora Exception .......................................................................................... 15
Hazardous Materials and Agricultural Trade.................................................................. 15
The Border’s Distinctive Institutions: Drayage and Mexican Customs Brokers .................... 16
Drayage: Deadheads and Bobtails ................................................................................. 16
Mexican Customs Brokers ............................................................................................ 17
Traffic Congestion .............................................................................................................. 18
Mexican Trucks Illegally Operating Beyond the Border Zone.............................................. 18
The Outlook for Commercial Trucking Under NAFTA............................................................. 19
The Short Term: Expectations and Limitations .................................................................... 19
The Short Term Prospects for Mexican Long-Haul Trucking in the United States .......... 19
The Short Term Prospects for U.S. Long-Haul Trucking in Mexico ............................... 21
The Short Term Outlook................................................................................................ 21
The Long Term: Business Structure and Competition .......................................................... 22
The Cross-Border Business Paradigm............................................................................ 22
The Low Cost Producer: Time and Distance Is Money .................................................. 24
The Distinctive Institutions ........................................................................................... 26
Caveat................................................................................................................................. 26
Congressional Issues ................................................................................................................. 27

Figures
Figure 1. Incoming Truck Movements from Mexico (thousands), 1987-2007............................. 11
Figure 2. Top Ports for Transborder Merchandise Freight by Truck: 2006 .................................. 12

Tables
Table 1. Roadside Inspections of Trucks Operating in the United States by Country of
Domicile: 2004 to 2008.......................................................................................................... 10

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NAFTA Implementation: The Future of Commercial Trucking Across the Mexican Border

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 28

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NAFTA Implementation: The Future of Commercial Trucking Across the Mexican Border

NAFTA’s Commercial Trucking Provisions:
Background and Implementation History
NAFTA set forth a schedule for implementation of its trucking provisions that would have opened
the border states to cross-border trucking competition on December 17, 1995, and all of North
America on January 1, 2000. However, because of known safety concerns with Mexican trucks,
the provisions were never implemented. The U.S. Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT)
decided that until safety concerns about Mexican trucks were resolved, the trucks would continue
to be restricted to the commercial zones just along the border. (These commercial zones generally
extend from about 3 miles to 20 miles into the United States at official ports of entry so that
Mexican trucks, after clearing customs, can continue on to make local deliveries).1 Mexican
trucks, inspected from January 1996 to December 1996, were put out of service 45% of the time
compared to a U.S. truck out-of-service rate of 28%.2 At the time, Mexican drivers operated
without hours-of-service limits and maintained no driver log books. In addition, Mexican trucks
reportedly were not required to have front brakes and were allowed a gross vehicle weight 17,000
pounds heavier than allowed on U.S. roads. The wage differential between Mexican and U.S.
long-haul drivers was also an issue of concern. Some labor unions and their supporters expressed
concerns that the wage differential would lead to a loss of jobs for U.S. commercial truck drivers,
especially in the border states and along the major highway trade corridors in the United States.
Despite ongoing bilateral consultations aimed at bringing the Mexican trucks and drivers up to
U.S. safety requirements, no agreement was reached and in 1998 Mexico protested the
postponement of NAFTA trucking provisions under NAFTA dispute settlement procedures. The
final report of the arbitration panel concluded that the blanket refusal to process the applications
of Mexican motor carriers was in breach of the NAFTA obligations of the United States and that
alleged deficiencies in Mexico’s regulation of commercial trucking did not relieve the United
States of its treaty obligations. The panel did, however, state that the United States could subject
Mexican carriers to different requirements than those that apply to U.S. and Canadian carriers.3
The Bush Administration originally set the end of 2001 as a goal for the U.S. Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to begin processing Mexican applications seeking
operating authority throughout the United States. Congress, however, included 22 preconditions
for opening the border beyond the commercial zone to Mexican trucking in the FY2002
Department of Transportation Appropriations Act (P.L. 107-87). Among the 22 preconditions in
the act were the following requirements:4

1 The commercial zone is defined at 49 CFR 372, subpart B. A map of the zones and further details are available at
http://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/International/border.asp?redirect=commzone.asp.
2 Roadside inspectors target trucks that appear to have a deficiency, so out-of-service rates would be higher than if
trucks were randomly chosen for a roadside inspection. U.S. General Accounting Office (now the U.S. Government
Accountability Office). Commercial Trucking: Safety Concerns About Mexican Trucking Remain. GAO/RECD 97-68.
Washington, GAO, 1997. p. 1-4. See also U.S. DOT, Office of the Inspector General, Motor Carrier Safety at the U.S.-
Mexico Border, Report Number: MH-2001-096, Washington, 2001. The IG found that the Mexican out-of-service rate
had improved to 37% for FY2000.
3 North American Free Trade Agreement Arbitral Panel Established Pursuant to Chapter Twenty in the Matter of
Cross-Border Trucking Services; Final Report of the Panel. Washington, NAFTA Secretariat, 2001. p. 81-82. Available
at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/app/DocRepository/1/Dispute/english/NAFTA_Chapter_20/USA/ub98010e.pdf.
4 U.S. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration final rules for implementation of the NAFTA trucking provisions
(continued...)
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• all Mexican motor carriers must undergo U.S. DOT safety examinations prior to
being granted provisional operating authority, with at least 50% of such carrier
examinations to be conducted on-site in Mexico;
• Mexican carriers applying to operate beyond the commercial zone must have a
distinctive U.S. DOT number (that distinguishes them from Mexican trucks
certified to operate within the zone only) and must undergo safety monitoring
initially and during an 18-month provisional period;
• Mexican motor carriers must all pass a full safety compliance review prior to
receiving permanent operating authority;
• federal and state inspectors must verify the validity of the license of every driver
carrying hazardous materials or undergoing a Level I safety inspection, as well as
the licenses of 50% of all other drivers;
• Mexican carriers, operating under provisional authority, and for three years after
receiving permanent authority, must display a Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance
inspection decal (which are good for 90 days), verifying satisfactory completion of
a safety inspection;
• weigh-in-motion scales must be installed at the ten highest volume crossings;
• Mexican trucks may only cross at border crossings where a certified motor carrier
safety inspector is on duty; and
• a number of other safety reviews and studies must take place.
These requirements are in addition to requirements that predate the enactment of P.L. 107-87,
including requirements that Mexican carriers meet all U.S. safety (hours of service and log book
rules, alcohol and drug tests, etc.) and insurance requirements.5
On November 27, 2002, then Secretary of Transportation, Norman Y. Mineta, announced that all
the preconditions mandated in the FY2002 Appropriations Act had been met and directed the
FMCSA to act on the applications of Mexican motor carriers seeking authority to transport
international cargo beyond the U.S. border commercial zones.6 On January 16, 2003, however,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Public Citizen v. Department of Transportation, delayed
implementation pending completion of a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
environmental impact statement (EIS) and a Clean Air Act (CAA) conformity determination.
FMCSA began the EIS process and has also filed a petition asking the Supreme Court to review
the Ninth Circuit Court decision in Public Citizen v. DOT.7 On June 7, 2004, the Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit Court’s decision.8

(...continued)
may be found at http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/rulesregs/mexican/Part_365.pdf; http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/rulesregs/fmcsr/
final/Safety_certification.pdf; and http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/rulesregs/mexican/Parts_368_and_387.pdf.
5 Mexican carriers, planning only to operate in the commercial zone along the border, had to apply by October 20,
2003, for provisional Certificates of Registration. FMCSA made efforts to publicize this deadline to new and existing
Mexican commercial zone certificated carriers. The provisional Certificate cannot be made permanent for at least 18
months, until the carrier has passed a safety audit.
6 U.S. Department of Transportation. U.S. Transportation Department implements NAFTA Provisions for Mexican
Trucks, Buses. Available at http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/rules-regulations/administration/nafta/nafta-fact-sheet.htm.
7 See U.S. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. NAFTA Environmental Analysis. Available at
(continued...)
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In January 2005, the U.S. DOT Inspector General (DOT IG) issued a report that the FMCSA had
sufficient staff, facilities, equipment, and procedures in place to substantially meet eight of the 22
requirements which Congress had requested the DOT IG to review as specified in section 350 of
the DOT FY2002 Appropriations Act (P.L. 107-87).
In February 2007, the U.S. and Mexican Secretaries of Transportation announced a demonstration
project to implement certain NAFTA trucking provisions. As stated in the Federal Register on
May 1, 2007,9 the project was to demonstrate the ability of Mexico-based motor carriers to
operate safely in the United States beyond the commercial zones. This would be accomplished by
the Mexican-based carriers adopting certain safety programs and by the monitoring and
enforcement activities established by U.S. DOT. Up to 100 Mexico-domiciled carriers would be
allowed to operate throughout the United States for one year and Mexico would allow the same
for up to 100 U.S.-based carriers. The Mexican carriers and truck drivers were required to comply
with all U.S. regulations applicable to trucking, including those related to safety, customs,
immigration, vehicle registration and taxation, and fuel taxation. These trucks were to be
carefully monitored by FMCSA and state law enforcement, a joint U.S.-Mexico monitoring
group, and an independent U.S. evaluation panel. Data would be collected and evaluated at the
end of the demonstration project before considering further implementation of NAFTA trucking
provisions.
On April 30, 2007 the U.S. DOT announced that the demonstration project would not start until
Mexico was ready with its reciprocal program to allow U.S.-trucks into Mexico.10
On May 24, 2007, with passage of the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery,
and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 110-28, section 6901), Congress
mandated additional requirements before the project could begin. Among them was the
requirement that Mexico have its program to allow U.S. trucks to cross into Mexico ready to
proceed, that the FMCSA first seek public comment on five aspects of the demonstration project,
that the demonstration project meet the same requirements of a “pilot program” as defined at 49
U.S.C. 31315(c), and that the DOT IG review the U.S. DOT’s program as to whether sufficient
measures were in place to ensure the safety of Mexican trucks.11 This act also prohibited Mexican
carriers of hazardous materials and buses from participating in the demonstration project. On
August 17, 2007, the FMCSA announced its intent to proceed with the project, once the DOT IG
issued its review.12 On September 6, 2007, the DOT IG issued his report and U.S. DOT issued a
letter to Congress addressing the issues raised by the DOT IG. The demonstration project began
the same day.

(...continued)
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/intl-programs/EIS/default.htm?printer=true; U.S. Department of Justice. Office of the
Solicitor General. United States Department of Transportation, et al., Petitioners v. Public Citizen, et al., on Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Docket no. 03-358. Washington, the
Department. 27 p. Available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2003/2pet/7pet/2003-0358.pet.aa.pdf; See also DOJ
Supreme Court Appeal in Mexico Truck Case Puzzles Activists. INSIDE Cal/EPA. Sept. 12, 2003. p. 14.
8 The Supreme Court’s decision reversing the Ninth Circuit Court’s decision is available at http://supct.law.cornell.edu/
supct/pdf/03-358P.ZO.
9 72 FR 23883.
10 U.S. DOT Press Release, DOT 43-07, April 30, 2007.
11 See 72 FR 31877-31894, June 8, 2007 for the request for public comment.
12 See 72 FR 46263-46289, August 17, 2007.
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On September 27, 2007, U.S. DOT announced that it would outfit long-haul Mexican trucks
operating in the United States with GPS devices (as well as U.S.-based long-haul carriers
operating in Mexico) in order to enforce hours-of-service and cabotage13 prohibitions, as well as
to time and date stamp border and state crossings. The U.S. DOT entered into a contract with the
DOD for $500,000 to install these devices and as of October 2008, almost all of the Mexican
trucks participating in the demonstration project had been outfitted. The U.S. DOT did not pay for
full GPS capability; the GPS units provide periodic (every 30 minutes or more) tracking “pings”
instead of continuous tracking.
In December 2007, Congress passed the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161)
which included a provision prohibiting any funding from being used “to establish” a cross-border
trucking program. The Administration concluded that the demonstration project could continue
because it had already been established. The Teamsters Union and environmental groups filed suit
in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco and in oral arguments in February 2008
argued that the demonstration project should end, but a decision is still pending.
On March 11, 2008, marking six months of the project, the U.S. DOT testified before the Senate
Commerce Committee regarding the demonstration project and stated that FMCSA was
“checking”14 100% of the long-haul Mexican carriers as they crossed the border to check that the
vehicles have the proper safety decals (as a result of passing a pre-authority safety audit), the
driver has a valid license, and that the driver is proficient in English.15 (Statutorily, the FMCSA is
only required to check 50% of the drivers at the border for a valid license). A Mexican driver’s
English proficiency is tested by asking a series of questions in English and requiring the driver to
answer in English. The driver is also shown a set of U.S. road signs and the driver must explain
their meaning in either English or Spanish. The U.S. DOT also stated that since 1995, the
FMCSA had spent more than $500 million to improve border inspection stations and hired 125
federal safety inspectors, 149 auditors and investigators, and that the southern border states had
hired an additional 349 inspectors. The DOT IG also issued a six month interim report.16
On August 4, 2008 the U.S. DOT announced a two year extension of the project because only 29
Mexican carriers had participated thus far.
In October 2008, an independent evaluation panel (IEP) appointed by the FMCSA released its
report evaluating the demonstration project after one year.17 The panel consisted of a former U.S.
Representative, a former U.S. DOT Deputy Secretary, and a former DOT IG.
In March 2009, Congress passed the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8), which
included a provision with unequivocal language terminating the demonstration project. In
response to the abrupt end of the program, the Mexican government announced that it would

13 Mexican-based carriers are not allowed to transport cargo from a U.S. origin to a U.S. destination, i.e. engage in U.S.
domestic transport of cargo.
14 The FMCSA used the word “checking” to describe this process because it is different than the process associated
with an “inspection” which is defined in regulations.
15 Written statement of Mary E. Peters, Secretary of Transportation, before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, March 11, 2008.
16 DOT IG, Report # MH-2008-040.
17 Independent Evaluation Panel (IEP) Report to the U.S. Secretary of Transportation, U.S.- Mexico Cross-Border
Trucking Demonstration Project, October 31, 2008. The report is available at http://www.dot.gov/affairs/
PanelReport.pdf.
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retaliate by increasing duties on 90 U.S. products with an import value of $2.4 billion. The tariffs,
effective as of March 19, 2009, range from 10% to 45% and cover a range of products that
include fruit, vegetables, home appliances, consumer products, and paper.18 The Obama
Administration has stated it is working on a new program to satisfy the concerns of Congress and
the country’s NAFTA commitments.19
In December 2009, Congress passed the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117),
which did not preclude funds from being spent on a long-haul Mexican truck pilot program,
provided the terms and conditions stipulated in section 350 of P.L. 107-87 and section 6901 of
P.L. 110-28 (see above) were satisfied.
Although the Mexican trucking issue was discussed at a meeting between President Obama and
Mexican President Felipe Calderón on May 19, 2010, the issue was not resolved.
Demonstration Project Results after One Year
At the close of the first year of the demonstration project (September 6, 2008), 29 Mexican
carriers had received long-haul authority to operate in the United States and 118 Mexican trucks
were pre-inspected on-site in Mexico as part of the pre-approval process. These 29 Mexican
carriers indicated they intended to use about 110 different drivers for long-haul moves into the
United States. Two of the Mexican carriers subsequently withdrew from the program and two
carriers never sent any trucks to the border. During the year, the participating firms’ trucks
crossed the border 12,516 times to make U.S. deliveries. To put this number in perspective, in
2007, 4.8 million Mexican trucks crossed the border, about 20,000 crossings per weekday.
About 775 Mexican carriers submitted applications to participate in the project, of these:
• 340 applications were rejected because they were incomplete;
• 138 carriers were rejected after initial review because of alleged security issues,
they intended to carry hazardous material or passengers, or because they had
unpaid FMCSA penalties or other unresolved safety issues;
• 297 applications were put on hold because the carrier could not be reached at the
contact information provided or because when contacted the applicant had decided
not to further pursue long-haul authority; and
• of the 100 carriers that had undergone the Pre-Authorization Safety Audit (PASA),
32 failed the audit.
As of August 6, 2008, ten U.S. carriers were participating in Mexico’s reciprocal project. These
carriers were operating 55 trucks making 2,245 trips into Mexico.20

18 For further information on the U.S.-Mexico trade relationship, see CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic
Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
19 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, March 16, 2009.
See also, Lisa Caruso, “Jump Starting Mexico’s Trucks,” The National Journal, March 28, 2009; and “LaHood To
Share Mexico Trucking Proposal With Congress Soon,” Inside U.S. Trade, May 1, 2009.
20 73 FR 45797, August 6, 2008.
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Truck Safety Linkage to Service Characteristics
The average value of the cargo in a truck from Mexico is about $50,000. The cost of transporting
that cargo is a small fraction of the cargo’s value. While price is important when choosing a
trucker, the buyer or seller of the cargo (the Mexican exporter or U.S. importer) is equally
concerned with the trucker’s reliability and performance. To save a few dollars in trucking costs,
a shipper is not likely to risk loss of the cargo or damage to it because the truck crashed, nor risk a
missed delivery because the trucker was put out of service at a roadside safety inspection.
Because long-haul truck cargo is typically higher value and time sensitive, reliability and
performance is even more critical for long-haul truckers. While trucks carrying any type of cargo
can be involved in an accident, the safety record of different categories of trucks indicate
tendencies which are useful in evaluating the safety risk posed by Mexican trucks.
“Long-Haul” Trucking Defined
Although opening the border to Mexican long-haul trucks conjures up images of encounters with
these trucks anywhere in the United States, the economics of long-haul trucking will limit most
Mexican trucks to the border states. Results from the demonstration project bear this out. Of the
12,516 trips made by Mexican project participants, only about 11.5% of these trips (1,439 trips,
about 6 per weekday) were actually for “long-haul” deliveries—that is, for destinations beyond
the commercial zone. Moreover, the Independent Evaluation Panel’s (IEP) review of FMCSA
data indicate that only 4% of the 1,439 long-haul trips (80 trips) over the course of the year were
to destinations beyond a border state.21 Almost all (95%) of the “long-haul” trips were to
destinations within Texas and California. Only a handful of long-haul trips were to destinations to
the two other border states, New Mexico and Arizona. The IEP also reported that more than 30
states had not encountered a Mexican project participant at a roadside inspection.22
Because of the cost, relatively few trucks haul loads for long-distances. For example, in the
United States, about one-half of all trucks typically travel within 50 miles of their home base and
almost three-fourths stay within their home state.23 Only 3% of the total tons that U.S. trucks
carry as a single mode shipment are hauled 750 miles or greater (750 miles is about the distance
between El Paso, TX and Wichita, KS).24 Conversely, nearly 80% is hauled less than 100 miles
(about the distance between Baltimore and Philadelphia). Railroads are often a cheaper
alternative for shipments over 500-750 miles and in the United States they capture an increasing
share of the truck/rail market as the distance and volume of freight increases in a particular
corridor. Truckload carriers are among the largest customers of the railroads, putting their trailers
on the railroad for the line-haul portion of a move. Kansas City Southern Railroad, which markets
itself as the “NAFTA railroad,” has a particularly large stake in Mexico-U.S. cross-border traffic.
It and other U.S. railroads have been making infrastructure improvements on routes to Mexico to
better compete with trucks for cross-border freight. Railroads carry about 15% of the cargo units

21 IEP Report to the U.S. Secretary of Transportation, U.S.- Mexico Cross-Border Trucking Demonstration Project,
October 31, 2008, p. 13.
22 IEP report, p. xvii.
23 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Office of Freight Management and Operations,
Freight Facts and Figures 2007, Table 3-6, p. 25.
24 U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics and U.S. Census Bureau, 1997 Commodity
Flow Survey (Washington, DC, 1999), Table 3, pp. 11-13. Includes for hire trucks and private trucks.
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and value of imports from Mexico by land modes (truck and rail) and 25% of the weight.25 Thus,
competition from railroads is one limiter of the market potential for long-haul trucking across the
border.
The market characteristics of long-haul trucking suggest that carriers with substandard equipment
or unreliable drivers would not compete successfully for this business. As shipment distance
increases, the relative cost of shipping by truck rather than by rail increases. Consequently, truck
freight that is hauled long-distances tends to be higher-value, requiring expedited delivery, and
often requiring refrigeration. Trucks carry about 95% of refrigerated (“reefer”) cargo, even over
distances that otherwise would be rail competitive, because trucks have proven to be more
reliable than railroads in keeping the cargo at the required temperature. Fruits, vegetables,
beverages, confectionary and other products requiring either refrigeration or temperature
protection account for over a quarter of the total weight of cargo imported in trucks from
Mexico.26 Auto parts are another major commodity group that is imported from Mexico in trucks.
Auto manufacturers are credited with inventing the concept of “just-in-time” shipping schedules
and have since advanced to the concept of “just-in-sequence” deliveries. This requires trucks to
deliver some parts just as they are needed on the assembly line, requiring a delivery window that
may be measured in minutes. Because of the more demanding service requirements associated
with long-haul truck cargo, it seems plausible that shippers of such cargo would choose carriers
with modern equipment, reliable drivers, and a track record of on-time performance.
Short-Haul Trucking over the Border
The short-haul truck market, “drayage” as it is called, exhibits characteristics that raise safety and
security concerns. Drayage carriers pull the trailers through the customs processing lanes and can
spend hours idling and inching forward as they wait for their turn in the customs booth.27 This
puts strain on truck engines and thus drayage carriers typically purchase older equipment.
Drayage firms charge low rates and operate on very slim profit margins. Their drivers are
generally the lowest paid in the industry. Once they have cleared U.S. customs,28 the drayage
carrier will continue on to make final delivery if the receiver is located within the border zone or
will drop the trailer for a U.S. long-haul carrier if the receiver is located beyond the zone and the
Mexican carrier does not have U.S. long-haul authority.
The extra trucking segment at the border, particularly at the location where the trailer is
exchanged between the long-haul and drayage carrier, could create additional opportunity for
infiltration by smugglers. The drayage carrier and driver are also additional entities that U.S.
customs must screen for certification into the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT) program and the Free And Secure Trade (FAST) program.

25 DOT, BTS North America TransBorder Freight Data. Vehicles account for 75% of the value of cargo imported by
railroads.
26 Based on 2008 data. DOT, BTS, North America TransBorder Freight Data.
27 Drayage carriers are also found at U.S. seaports for the same reason; long wait times to be processed through the
port’s entry gate.
28 In this report, “U.S. customs” refers to U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
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Determinants of U.S. Truck Safety and Applicability to
Mexican Carriers
To better target its safety enforcement activities toward those carriers that pose a greater safety
risk, the FMCSA has studied the safety performance of different categories of trucking. These
studies indicate that safety performance does vary depending on the type of cargo hauled, which
can be useful for evaluating safety statistics of Mexican trucks cited below. As hypothesized
earlier, one study found that refrigerated trucks do have a better vehicle safety record compared to
several other segments of the trucking industry.29 This study also found that U.S. drayage carriers
have a relatively poor vehicle safety record, but this finding may not be applicable to Mexican
drayage carriers because of an important difference in the trailer equipment used. U.S. drayage
carriers predominantly haul international shipping containers at seaports or at inland rail terminals
which use a separate piece of equipment—a chassis that is an I-beam frame with wheels, to pull
the container over the road. The chassis are owned and maintained by the ocean carriers but their
proper maintenance has been a widely recognized problem and is likely a contributing factor to
the poor vehicle safety performance of U.S. drayage carriers. At the Mexican border, truck trailers
(the wheels and “container” are inseparable) are predominantly the equipment being pulled.
Studies also indicate that drivers of refrigerated cargo are found with safety violations more often
than drivers in several other categories of trucking.30 This may be because refrigerated cargo is
time sensitive and hauled longer distances so drivers may be more prone to falsify hours-of-
service log books. One study found that while there was little difference between refrigerated and
non-refrigerated trucking in terms of number of accidents and moving violations, drivers of
refrigerated trucks had more logbook violations.31 This study found that drivers that graduated
from college or had some college were 27% more likely than high school graduates to violate
their logbook. The study authors reasoned that as education level increased, drivers became more
sophisticated in manipulating the logbook or felt more confident that they could do so without
being caught.
While U.S. drayage carriers receive low scores for vehicle safety, their drivers generally receive
higher safety scores than other segments of the trucking industry.32 Hours-of-service violations
and falsifying log books are the most common violations found among U.S. truck drivers but
since drayage carriers predominantly make short-haul trips, it seems logical that this violation
would be less common among these drivers. Since Mexican truckers in the United States are
predominantly making short-haul trips one could expect that they too would have relatively good
driver safety scores, which the data in Table 1 do indicate.

29 Thomas M. Corsi, Marius Stefan, “Motor Carrier Safety Performance Profile,” prepared for FMCSA, February 2004.
Available at http://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/CarrierResearchResults/PDFs/MCSafPerfProfile.pdf.
30 Thomas M. Corsi, Marius Stefan, “Motor Carrier Safety Performance Profile,” prepared for FMCSA, February 2004;
and William C. Horrace, Thomas P. Keane, “Ranking and Selection of Motor Carrier Safety Performance by Segment,”
August 2003. Available at http://www.horrace.com/AAP%20Horrace%20Keane%20August%202003.pdf.
31 Kristen Monaco, Emily Williams, “Assessing the Determinants of Safety in the Trucking Industry,” Journal of
Transportation and Statistics, April 2000.
32 Thomas M. Corsi, Marius Stefan, “Motor Carrier Safety Performance Profile,” prepared for FMCSA, February 2004;
and William C. Horrace, Thomas P. Keane, “Ranking and Selection of Motor Carrier Safety Performance by Segment,”
August 2003. Available at http://www.horrace.com/AAP%20Horrace%20Keane%20August%202003.pdf.
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A congressionally mandated study of the causation of accidents in the United States involving
large trucks that resulted in at least one fatality or injury found that the driver is a more critical
factor than the vehicle.33 The study reports that in those incidents in which the truck was
determined to be primarily responsible for the crash (as opposed to a passenger vehicle), in only
about 10% of the cases was the critical factor related to a problem with the truck; in 87% of the
incidents the driver was considered the critical factor in the crash.
Mexican Truck Out-of-Service Rates Comparable to U.S. Trucks
According to one indicator of safety performance, the safety of Mexican trucks has improved
from a decade ago and is now comparable with U.S. trucks. “Out-of-service” violations are those
that are serious enough to keep the truck from continuing its journey until the violation is
resolved. Common vehicle out-of-service violations include defective brakes, inoperative turn
signal or lamps, a flat tire or tire leak. Common driver out-of-service violations include an hours-
of-service violation, failure to keep or falsifying a log book, operating without a license or the
wrong license for the type of vehicle. In 1998, the Mexican vehicle out-of-service rate was found
to be 59%.34 This compares with U.S. truck vehicle out-of-service rates that are typically about
22%. Mexican carriers that participated in the demonstration project had vehicle out-of-service
rates of about 12% and driver out-of-service rates of about 0.25% (versus 7% for U.S. drivers).
However, one would suspect these rates to be low given that Mexican project participants were
assured of being at least “checked” at the border while the typical U.S. trucker shipping
domestically can expect only a chance of being inspected.
However, recent data provided by the FMCSA and summarized by the IEP and the DOT IG
indicate that other Mexican trucks are as safe as U.S. trucks and that the drivers are generally
safer than U.S. drivers. For instance, another group of Mexican trucks operating in the United
States are those operating within the border commercial zone. There are 7,134 Mexican carriers
with 28,533 trucks that have authority to operate within the border commercial zone.35 Between
FY2004 and FY2008, these Mexican trucks had vehicle out-of-service rates that were slightly less
than U.S. trucks (about 21% versus 22%) and driver out-of-service rates that were significantly
lower than U.S. drivers (1% versus about 7%).36 For the one year period between September 2007
and September 2008, the IEP found very similar results.37
Perhaps more significant, Mexican carriers that have been legally operating beyond the border
commercial zone, outside the demonstration project, also have comparable out-of-service rates to
U.S. carriers. These Mexican trucks obtained their long-haul authority under U.S. provisions pre-
dating NAFTA, between 1982 and 1994. Most of them have Certificates of Registration to carry
certain exempt commodities between specific points (as indicated on the certificate). They are
Mexican-domiciled trucking companies but majority U.S.-owned (more than 51%) and can be
private carriers or for-hire carriers. In addition, a handful of Mexican-domiciled carriers are

33 U.S. DOT, FMCSA, Report to Congress on the Large Truck Crash Causation Study, November 2005. Available at
http://www.ai.volpe.dot.gov/ltccs/data/documents/reportcongress_11_05.pdf.
34 Written statement of Mary E. Peters, Secretary of Transportation, before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, March 11, 2008, p. 5.
35 IEP report, p. 52.
36 DOT IG, Report # MH-2009-034, pp. 12-13.
37 IEP report, p. xiii.
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legally operating throughout the United States as a result of being grandfathered into the 1982
moratorium on Mexican and Canadian-domiciled carriers operating in the United States.38
According to the Independent Evaluation Panel, in 2008, about 861 Mexican-domiciled carriers
representing 1,749 trucks were legally operating in the United States under these authorities. The
safety of these trucks is on par with the safety of U.S. trucks according to the FMCSA’s database
of roadside truck inspections occurring in the United States.39 While operating in the United
States from FY2004 to FY2007, these long-haul Mexican carriers had an out of service rate for
the vehicle of roughly 20%, matching U.S. vehicle out of service rates during the same years.
With respect to the drivers, Mexican drivers of certificated or grandfathered carriers had a much
lower out-of-service rate than did U.S. drivers (about 1% versus 7%). Similar results were
obtained by the Independent Evaluation Panel when they reviewed FMCSA data for a subsequent
year (September 7, 2007 through September 6, 2008).40
Table 1 shows the out-of-service rates resulting from roadside inspections while operating in the
United States for U.S., Mexican, and Canadian domiciled trucks over the last five years. As the
figures indicate, Mexican trucks have lower driver out-of-service rates and slightly lower vehicle
out-of-service rates than U.S. trucks.
Table 1. Roadside Inspections of Trucks Operating in the United States
by Country of Domicile: 2004 to 2008
Average # of
Out-Of-Service
Inspections
Rates (OOS)
per Year
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Driver OOS Rates:

-
U.S.
Driver
2,838,534 6.9% 6.9% 7.4% 7.2% 6.7%

-
Mex.
Driver
176,286 1.7% 1.2% 1.3% 1.0% 1.3%

-
Can.
Driver
96,888 6.6% 6.1% 7.2% 6.3% 6.1%
Vehicle OOS Rates:

-
U.S.
Truck
2,089,265 23.9% 23.7% 23.3% 22.6% 22.7%

-
Mex.
Truck
161,141 22.7% 22.6% 21.2% 21.8% 20.9%

-
Can.
Truck
56,111 14.2% 13.6% 13.6% 12.9% 14.1%
Source: FMCSA Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS) December 19, 2008, snapshot.
Notes: 2008 data as of December 19, 2008. Driver OOS rate is based on inspection levels I, II, III, and VI.
Vehicle OOS rate is based on inspection levels I, II, V, and VI.

38 The moratorium was imposed by section 6 of The Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982. For a legislative history of
these two long-haul authorities, see Appendix D of the IEP report, pp. 71-72.
39 DOT, IG, Status Report on NAFTA Cross-border Trucking Demonstration Project, Report No. MH-2009-034,
February 6, 2009, pp. 12-13.
40 Independent Evaluation Panel Report, U.S.-Mexico Cross-Border Trucking Demonstration Project, October 31,
2008, p. 19.
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Cross-Border Trucking Operations: An Overview
The Scope of Cross-Border Truck Traffic
The chart in Figure 1 shows the trend in incoming truck movements across the border with
Mexico since 1985. Cross-border truck movements accelerated in the mid-1980s following
Mexico’s accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and then again in the mid-
1990s under NAFTA. Trucks carry roughly 80% of the cargo, by value, across the border and
trends in cross-border truck movements track closely with trends in Mexico-U.S. trade. Under
NAFTA the value of trade between the two nations crossing the border by truck increased from
$74 billion in 1994, to $235 billion in 2008. In the year 2007, over 4.8 million truck crossings
were made from Mexico into the United States.
Figure 1. Incoming Truck Movements from Mexico (thousands), 1987-2007
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
1995 1996 1997 19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
The link between economic growth and truck crossings is important because once the two
countries’ economies rebound, the growth in cross border shipping will increase the stress on the
border’s physical infrastructure, as well as the capacity of the U.S. federal agencies that staff the
Ports of Entry (POE) (e.g. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration, among others).
The distribution of commercial traffic among the 25 POEs that handle commercial traffic is
uneven. The map in Figure 2 illustrates the relative volumes of imports and exports by truck
across U.S. land borders. In 2007, the top ten POEs handled 97% of the value of truck freight
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crossing into the United States from Mexico and the top four ports: Laredo, El Paso, and Hidalgo,
Texas, and Otay Mesa, California, handled nearly 80%.41 The busiest POEs are the ones expected
to experience the most growth in traffic.
Figure 2. Top Ports for Transborder Merchandise Freight by Truck: 2006

Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Innovative Technology Administration, Bureau of
Transportation Statistics, TransBorder Freight Data, as of March 2007. Prepared by BTS Geospatial Information
Program.
In 2008, the top five commodities imported by value from Mexico in trucks were electrical
machinery, equipment, and parts (38%); computers, industrial machinery, and parts (16%); motor
vehicles and parts (8%); measuring and testing instruments (5%); and furniture and lamps (4%).42
By weight, the top five commodities imported from Mexico in trucks were edible vegetables
(12%); electrical machinery, equipment, and parts (11%); computers, industrial machinery, and
parts (10%); edible fruit and nuts (7%); and motor vehicles and parts (7%).
Nearly all carriers of cross border freight by truck, as well as nearly all major Mexican long-haul
carriers, are “truckload” (TL) carriers. TL carriers haul larger shipments, averaging over 20,000
pounds, that are moved most economically in one truck directly from the origin to the destination.
“Less-than-truckload” (LTL) carriers specialize in smaller shipments (an average is 1,000
pounds) that can be hauled most economically by consolidating them with other shipments to the

41 U.S. DOT, BTS, North American Transborder Freight Data.
42 DOT, BTS, North American Transborder Freight Data.
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same destination city and using warehouses to consolidate/deconsolidate shipments. Trucking
firms in the United States are generally either TL or LTL carriers, and most of the members of the
Teamsters Union are drivers for national LTL carriers while regional LTL and TL drivers are
predominantly non- union. Some see LTL as a market niche that U.S. carriers could develop in
Mexico.
Cross-Border Commercial Trucking: The Trade Flow Process
The speed and impact of NAFTA implementation will be greatly influenced by the institutional
and procedural environment experienced and/or created by shippers and trucking firms involved
in cross-border freight shipments. The roughly 10 million truck crossings (northbound and
southbound crossings combined) occurring annually at POEs along the Mexico-U.S. border
undergo documentation procedures and inspections which can vary greatly but typically include
the steps outlined in the following four subsections.43
Mexico-U.S. Crossings
Traditional cross-border shipping by truck from the interior of Mexico to the interior of the
United States can involve over 20 separate steps. These steps are described in some detail because
one of the envisioned benefits of NAFTA implementation is that it will encourage the
streamlining of cross border truck movements. In simplified form, the movement of truck cargo
for import into the United States is as follows.
• The Mexican carrier picks up the shipment, prepares the bill of lading, and hauls
the shipment to the border region.
• At POEs where allowed, U.S. customs brokers may maintain small offices, where
they may prepare U.S. entry documents and file them electronically. The entry
must be accompanied by evidence that sufficient bond is posted with U.S. customs
to cover any potential duties, taxes, or penalties.
• A Mexican broker prepares Mexican export “pedimentos” (a paper form similar to
U.S. export declarations) after inspecting the vehicle’s cargo.
• A Mexican “validator” files the pedimento electronically into the Mexican
Customs Broker Association database and a validated pedimento is created to
release the shipment to Mexican customs.
• Mexican export duties are paid.
• A drayage vehicle (a short-haul truck used to shuttle truck trailers back and forth
across the border) picks up the load and hauls it to the Mexican customs facility.
• At the Mexican customs facility the export pedimentos are checked against the
electronic forms and then about 2% of the trucks are pulled aside for closer
inspection by Mexican customs agents.

43 A detailed account of the steps of cross-border trade flows by truck can be found in the Binational Border
Transportation and Programming Study, Task 3.1: Description of Commercial Motor Vehicle Trade Flow Process—
Final Report, May 8, 1996. Washington, U.S. Department of Transportation and Secretaria de Comunicaciones y
Transportes. 1998. [CD ROM]
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• The truck crosses the border, paying bridge tolls if required, and enters the U.S.
customs primary inspection station.
• At the primary inspection station the U.S. customs inspector determines
citizenship of the driver and any passengers and then questions the driver for
declarations of any agricultural goods, narcotics, merchandise or currency in
excess of $10,000. Once the agent verifies the paperwork and computer
information, the vehicle is either sent on to the final U.S. customs checkpoint or is
selected for secondary inspection (all hazardous materials loads are inspected and
most agricultural, food product, pharmaceutical and medical equipment shipments
are sent to the agricultural inspection docks, where the Department of Agriculture
inspectors and the Food and Drug Administration inspectors inspect the goods). It
is at the primary inspection station or in the queue that K9 units patrol around the
vehicles and if the dog reacts to a truck the vehicle will be sent to secondary
inspection. Agents also send vehicles to secondary inspection if they see anything
suspicious about the vehicle, driver, or paperwork.
• After completing primary or secondary inspection as required, the truck proceeds
to the U.S. customs final check point where all the paperwork is submitted and the
truck leaves the compound.
• Safety inspection at POEs that have permanent safety inspection facilities usually
take place outside the final check point.
• A drayage company delivers the shipment to a U.S. broker, carrier or freight
forwarder’s facility.
• A U.S. driver picks up the load for delivery to the interior.
U.S.-Mexico Crossings
Traditional cross-border truck shipping from the interior of the United States to the interior of
Mexico may also involve many separate processing steps, truck movements, and inspections. A
simplified sequence of steps that are supposed to take place for the movement of cargo by truck
for import into Mexico is as follows.
• The U.S. exporter prepares bill of lading and certificate of origin for load.
• The U.S. carrier picks up the shipment and hauls it to the carrier’s terminal, broker
or freight forwarder’s facility. In some cases the forewarder is by-passed and the
exporter deals directly with a Mexican customs broker.
• The U.S. freight forwarder/broker fills out the Shipper’s Export Declaration and
verifies the load. (The U.S. broker is liable for the accuracy of the form.)
• The Mexican customs broker fills out the Mexican Import Pedimentos, facilitates
the payment of duties, and verifies the load. (The Mexican broker is legally
responsible and liable for the contents of shipments across the border.) The broker
makes sure that the required prepayment of Mexican duties, taxes or fees has been
made at the banking module. The Pedimentos are submitted electronically to
Mexican customs.
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• Generally the Mexican broker then arranges for a Mexican “drayage” company to
provide a truck or truck tractor to haul the shipment across the border.
Maquiladoras, however, may use their own trucks.
• At U.S. customs, export loads requiring inspection (most often firearms,
computers, specialized electronic equipment and hazardous materials) are
inspected and registered with U.S. customs.
• Load is hauled across the border.
• At Mexican customs, paperwork is checked against the electronically filed version.
For trucks whose paperwork is in order, 90% of trucks go to final checkpoint and
10% are subjected to random selection for inspection.
• At the final check point, all the paperwork is collected and the truck may leave the
import compound.
• The shipment is taken to either the Mexican broker’s facility or to a truck corral
where the drayage tractor is disconnected and the trailer is stored until a long-haul
carrier’s tractor arrives to transport the shipment to the Mexican interior.
The Maquiladora Exception
A maquiladora or maquila is a manufacturing plant, located in Mexico (usually near the U.S.
border) under foreign ownership, that typically has a sister plant on the U.S. side of the border
supplying parts to be assembled at the Mexican plant, that are then shipped back to the U.S.
Shipments to and from maquiladora facilities benefit from systems established by both U.S. and
Mexican customs to speed the processing of maquiladora shipments. These changes eliminate
both the U.S. and Mexican broker processing time. In effect, most maquiladora cargo is pre-
cleared for crossing. Some maquiladora trucks, however, are selected for inspection. As
mentioned earlier, maquiladoras may also use their own trucks and thereby eliminate any delays
waiting for drayage operator pick up. Basically this means that unless they are selected for
regulatory inspection or are caught in traffic congestion, most trucks operating in the maquiladora
trade may cross the border with virtually no delay.44
Hazardous Materials and Agricultural Trade
The movement of hazardous materials (hazmat) is governed by stricter regulation and as per
section 6901 of P.L. 110-28, Mexican truckers carrying hazmat are not permitted in the
demonstration project. Advance notice is required by both U.S. and Mexican customs prior to
moving hazardous material over the border. The authenticity of the licenses of all drivers whose
trucks carry hazardous materials must be checked. Under NAFTA, any by-products from the use
of hazardous materials must be returned to the country of origin for proper disposal. This rule has
increased the movement of hazardous wastes across the border.
Agricultural trade has some characteristics of traditional trade, but may be pre-cleared as in the
maquiladora trade.45 It is also subject to special inspection requirements. For example, inspection

44 Ibid., p. 4-6.
45 Traditional trade is defined in the Binational Study as non-maquiladora, non-agricultural, or non-hazardous materials
trade.
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for pest infestation varies depending on whether the agricultural product is considered high or low
risk. Low risk products are often precleared and only one load in twenty may be randomly
inspected. High pest-risk loads may all be inspected and receive pest control treatment.
The Border’s Distinctive Institutions: Drayage and Mexican
Customs Brokers
The predominant use of drayage for cross border hauling of freight and the role of the Mexican
customs broker are distinctive institutional characteristics of the Mexico-U.S. border.
Drayage: Deadheads and Bobtails
With the major exception of trucks serving the maquiladora trade, truck cargo crosses the
Mexican border under a “drayage” system. Under this system truck cargo is delivered to the
border where a drayage company provides a truck that picks up the load on one side of the border,
crosses the border, and drops it off to be picked up by a long haul domestic carrier in the
destination country. The predominance of this characteristic of the Mexico-U.S. border of
commercial cross border traffic leads to an unusually large percentage of “deadhead and bobtail”
crossings. A deadhead crossing is any truck crossing with an empty trailer and a bobtail crossing
is a truck tractor crossing without a trailer. Over a third of the truck trailers that enter the United
States from Mexico are empty compared to about 15% from Canada.46 This peculiarity of the
Mexican border traffic has two important results that are significant to any discussion of post-
NAFTA implementation scenarios: first, drayage is a big business for the Mexican trucking firms
in the border region; and second, deadheader and bobtail crossings are a major component of the
traffic congestion that impedes the cross border flow of freight.
Despite the arguments that fully implementing NAFTA and thereby allowing Mexican and U.S.
trucks to pick up and drop off international loads anywhere in each other’s territory will lead to a
major reduction in the use of drayage services across the Mexico-U.S. border, there are reasons to
expect that the drayage system will not contract quickly or as much as some have argued.
Although, on its face, drayage would seem to be inefficient and costly, given extensive
processing, inspection, and traffic delays, drayage actually makes more economic sense to some
motor carriers than having their equipment held up for a day or more awaiting crossing.
Reportedly, drayage adds roughly $100 to each cross border shipment.47 Although the overall
aggregate cost that the drayage system adds to cross border trade is staggering, for many carriers
$100 is much less than a carrier would lose if it has a truck and driver idle for a day or more
awaiting clearance (even efficient traditional shippers can expect paperwork delays of 4 to 5
hours). Second, not only is drayage big business for Mexican carriers based in the border region,
but it is also a major formative factor in the border region economy of warehouses, truck corrals,
and related service industries. Local interests may support the status quo for fear that the demise
of drayage would lead to job losses in the Mexican border towns and, in some U.S. border towns,
from fear of being by-passed.48 Third, drayage companies often have operating agreements with

46 U.S. Customs data; some believe that these data undercount the number of Canadian border empty crossings.
However, even using other sources, the Mexican rate is twice the Canadian rate.
47 Giermanski, James R. A Fresh Look at NAFTA: What’s Really Happened? Logistics Management and Distribution
Report, vol. 9, Sept. 1, 2002, 43pp.
48 Yardley, Jim. Truck-Choked Border City Fears Being Bypassed. New York Times, Mar. 15, 2001, pp. A1, A20.
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Mexican customs brokers (who often have a financial interest). Some argue that this provides a
strong incentive for the brokers to keep the processing times long enough to keep drayed freight
competitive with single vehicle cross border trucking. Although, most observers expect NAFTA
implementation would probably reduce the number of deadhead and bobtail crossings over time,
few expect that they will fall to the level experienced on the Canadian border.
Descriptions of the drayage system are often oversimplified. A truck dedicated to drayage can
cross the border roughly two to four times each day or up to 1,000 times a year. Trucks used for
drayage may also be used for domestic carriage. Following NAFTA implementation, these trucks
may continue to provide drayage services. It is also likely that more of these trucks will operate
more deeply, either legally or illegally, in the border states. Some believe, however, that in the
post-implementation environment, the risk of getting caught will be much higher than before.
Mexican Customs Brokers
The degree of control that the Mexican customs broker has on the cross border movement of
cargo could have major implications for the scope and speed of impact of the implementation of
NAFTA’s trucking provisions. Customs brokers are businesses or individuals that assist in
preparing the required documentation for the cross border movement of goods. Mexican customs
brokers are active on both sides of the border, processing the paperwork and verifying the shipped
goods for both U.S. exports to Mexico and Mexican exports to the United States. Whereas in the
United States a broker or freight forwarder is only liable for the accuracy of the form, in Mexico
the broker is liable for the accuracy of the paperwork and the content of the shipment. Because of
this, Mexican brokers generally actually take a look at the cargo. This, along with the paperwork
process, adds a significant amount of processing time to cross border shipments. The Binational
Border Planning and Programming Study found that for frequent southbound shippers the
preparation of paperwork by the Mexican broker took 4 to 5 hours and for infrequent shippers up
to three days. Northbound into the United States, the Mexican broker processing time was 4 to 5
hours. If anything is wrong with the paperwork used to compile the Mexican pedimentos, it takes
longer. The study found that the minimum total crossing time southbound was just over 8 hours
and northbound was just over six hours.49 Thus, under the best of conditions (i.e. minimum
Mexican broker processing time, no traffic delays, no narcotics inspection or customs secondary
inspections, etc.), the Mexican broker’s role was responsible for nearly half the crossing time
southbound and nearly two-thirds northbound. Mexican broker processing time could therefore be
sufficient to deter some carriers from engaging in cross border carriage of cargo.
As mentioned earlier, Mexican brokers are often affiliated with drayage companies and most
observers believe that they will resist changes that could reduce the attractiveness of cross border
drayage. Some believe that the confluence of interest between these two institutions is so
powerful that drayage will dominate the movement of cargo across the border for the next 15 to
20 years.50 This is a powerful alliance for the status quo. Many feel that potential U.S. entrants
into cross border trucking will not be able to bypass the customs brokers, which in effect will
make them opt for an alternative to direct competition with Mexican carriers. Many of the
brokerage firms are family-run firms that have been in the business for generations. Both the

49 Binational Study. Task 3.1. p. 3-6.
50 Whitten, Daniel L. “Mexican Freight Handlers Warily Eye U.S. Competition: Carriers, Brokers Seek to Protect
Paperwork-Preparation fee, Long-Time Ties to Shippers,” Transport Topics, June 3, 2002, p. 13.
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brokers and the Mexican carriers have significant clout through their professional organizations
and have heavily lobbied the Mexican government against opening up the border to U.S. trucks.
Traffic Congestion
Traffic congestion is not uncommon at commercial border crossings and can be caused by a wide
variety of processing and inspection activities that occur in POEs as well as traditional causes of
traffic congestion such as infrastructure limitations, excess traffic volume, and vehicle
breakdowns. Different POEs have differing levels of congestion and differing reasons for its
occurrence. Most POE congestion occurs during certain peak periods, usually mid afternoon.
Post-September 11 security concerns, have at times increased delays for northbound traffic.51
Once economic growth picks up and traffic volumes increase, the cost of traffic delays to long-
haul trucking firms could make them less willing to commit their equipment to crossing the
border and make it likely that drayage will retain a significant share of cross border haulage. A
case can be made, however, that for some operators, the location of the next available load will
have more influence on the use of drayage than border delays or avoiding the fee.
Mexican Trucks Illegally Operating Beyond the Border Zone
Some Mexican carriers are operating illegally beyond the commercial zone. The DOT Office of
the Inspector General (IG) reported that, based on FMCSA safety inspection data, Mexican trucks
in significant numbers were already operating beyond the border zone. The IG expressed that he
was not concerned about
the trucks, the long-haul trucks that tell the truth that they’re going to be long-haul, and have
a sticker displayed on their windshield. I’m more concerned about the trucks that come
across, that are, by law, confined to the commercial zones, who just drive on. And I think it’s
important that the state police ... have the authority to say, ‘you’re stopping in your tracks’
and that’s going to cause economic pain and that will be a hindrance to that type of
behavior.52
The IEP found that 20 zone carriers had been inspected in 12 non-zone states from September
2007 through September 2008.53

51 Karaim, Reed. “On Both Sides Now, the Costly Consequences of Vigilance,” Washington Post, March 10, 2002, p.
B3. See also GAO, NAFTA: Coordinated Operational Plan Needed to Ensure Mexican Trucks’ Compliance With U.S.
Standards. GAO-02-238, Dec. 2001. p. 8.
52 U.S. Senate. Joint Hearing of the Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Subcommittee of the Senate
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee and the Transportation Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations
Committee. Hearing held June 27, 2002. As reported by the Federal News Service, Inc. The distance of the limit of the
border zone varies depending on the size of the municipality involved and can extend substantially farther into the
United States than the often quoted 3 to 20 miles. See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 372.241. This variability of border zone limits
could be an enforcement issue after implementation.
53 IEP report, p. 54.
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The Outlook for Commercial Trucking
Under NAFTA
Most observers agree that the full impact of NAFTA implementation will take time to manifest
itself. There is considerable agreement on the probable short-term impact as well as a general
expectation that the resulting changes in cross-border commercial trucking will be gradual. In the
longer term, stake holders interested in the opening of the Mexican-U.S. border to long haul
trucking are less willing to make predictions about the impact of implementation and are more
tentative, many preferring to take a wait and see attitude before committing to a change in
business practices.
The Short Term: Expectations and Limitations
Once it happens, nearly all observers expect that the opening of the Mexico-U.S. border will
begin with a whimper rather than a bang.54 Few expect a major surge of either Mexican long-haul
trucking into the United States or U.S. long-haul trucks into Mexico during the first couple of
years of implementation. Because of the safety concerns about Mexican trucks, most of the
discussions have focused on the likelihood that Mexican trucks would begin operating deep into
the United States. Much less has been written or said about the likelihood of U.S. domiciled
trucking firms operating in Mexico, however.
The Short Term Prospects for Mexican Long-Haul Trucking in the United
States
There are a number of reasons that few Mexican carriers are expected to operate beyond the
commercial zone in the short term, if the border were to be reopened for long-haul deliveries.
Mexican trucking firms will face a number of competitive disadvantages when carrying
international cargo into the U.S. interior.55 These disadvantages include:
• Beyond the commercial zone, few Mexican-domiciled carriers have developed
business relationships that could provide them with the return loads needed to
make operating deep in the United States profitable;
• Border delays push up costs and discourage Mexican long-haul carriers from
committing their vehicles to international trade with the United States. Reportedly
northbound delays at the border have increased significantly since the September
11 attacks;56

54 Delgado, Claudia Patricia. Prozzi, Jolanda. Harrison, Robert. Opening the Southern Border to Mexican Trucks Will
Have a Negative Impact on the US Transportation System—Where Is the Evidence? Austin, TX, University of Texas at
Austin. 18 p. See also Whitten, Mexican Freight Haulers Warily Eye U.S. Competition, p. 13.
55 For the best description of difficulties faced by Mexican carriers see, General Accounting Office. North American
Free Trade Agreement: Coordinated Operational Plan Needed to Ensure Mexican trucks’ Compliance With U.S.
Standards. Report no. GAO-02-238, December 2001. pp. 2-3, 7-12.
56 Ibid. GAO reported that “Mexican and private sector officials stated that delays in crossing the border have increased
since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.”
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• Initially, the cost of insurance for Mexican carriers operating to the U.S. interior
will be set at the highest U.S. insurance risk level until the Mexican firms have a
track record for operating safely beyond the commercial zone. As time passes the
rates would likely be adjusted to reflect experience;
• The English language requirement will limit the number of federally licensed
Mexican truck drivers that can operate legally in the United States;
• Mexican carriers have less access to financial resources and pay much higher
interest rates than U.S.-based companies. In addition, new trucks cost more in
Mexico than in the United States;57
• One unusual possibility is that some Mexican carriers are concerned that some of
their drivers may be tempted to abandon their trucks deep inside the United States
and seek work in the United States;
• The presence of a more active safety and regulatory enforcement effort in the post-
implementation environment will discourage some long-haul Mexican motor
carriers from entering the United States.
Mexican carriers, on the other hand, do have some advantages that could eventually give them a
competitive edge in certain U.S. markets. These advantages include:
• Lower labor costs—although there is disagreement on the size of the wage
advantage, it is probable that federally licensed Mexican drivers’ wages are less
than half that of U.S. drivers and may be as low as one-third of U.S. drivers’
wages;58
• Mexican carriers, and in particular Mexican drivers, currently dominate cross
border trade within the border zone. Some trucking companies in Mexico that
provide drayage service also handle domestic carriage. These firms could test the
market by hauling cargo to border cities close enough to the border for a day trip;
• Mexican carriers, in press reports, have complained that in Mexico excess trucking
capacity has forced down rates for domestic carriage, this could make haulage
beyond the commercial zone attractive to some Mexican firms. A decline in
drayage could, for example, have the effect of freeing up even more Mexican
capacity;

57 Whitten, p. 13.
58 See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2007 National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates: 53-3032 Truck
Drivers, Heavy and Tractor-Trailer. At http://www.bls.gov/oes/2007/may/oes533032.htm. The median wage is
estimated at $17.41 per hour for a tractor trailer driver in the U.S. Benton, James C. “Transportation Bill Set to Clear as
Bush Wins Key Provision Opening U.S. to Mexican Trucks,” CQ Weekly, Dec. 1, 2001, p. 2846. Quotes Michael
Belzer of Wayne State University’s estimate that Mexican drivers earn two thirds less than U.S. drivers. An Associated
Press Article, “New Policy Troubles U.S., Mexican Truckers, Nov. 29, 2002, estimates that U.S. truckers on average
earn 32 cents per mile and their Mexican counterparts earn about half that amount. Delgado, Perozzi, Harrison’s survey
of Mexican trucking firms found that long-haul drivers incomes varied greatly—from $800 to $1,600 per month.
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• Mexican drivers know the border region well and some have knowledge of the
U.S. road system beyond the commercial zones;59
• Some of the disadvantages faced by Mexican trucking firms (i.e., insurance, state
registration fees, lack of back-hauls) will become less constraining as these firms
establish an operating history or possibly lease their services to U.S. firms and/or
establish interline partnerships.
The Short Term Prospects for U.S. Long-Haul Trucking in Mexico
The likelihood of significant numbers of U.S. trucking firms directly providing long-haul
international trucking services deep into Mexico is very low. As of this writing, the Mexican
government has not begun accepting applications from U.S. trucking companies for operating
authority in Mexico. Once the Mexican government accepts and processes applications for
operating authority, some U.S. firms will apply, but the number is expected to be small. The 10
U.S. trucking firms contacted by CRS all stated that they had no plans to use their U.S.-based
trucks or U.S.-based drivers to haul international cargo into the Mexican interior soon. U.S. firms
have, however, been investing in Mexican trucking firms that specialize in international cargo and
many observers expect U.S. firms to expand their business in the Mexican market through
Mexican subsidiaries or partners.
U.S. firms cite a variety of reasons for not being interested in using their own drivers and
equipment to provide long-haul trucking services to the Mexican interior. Once a U.S. truck and
driver cross the border they are at a labor cost disadvantage relative to Mexican firms. U.S.
equipment is built for U.S. road conditions and could probably only operate on the best Mexican
roads (many of which have significant tolls) without risking damage. Most U.S. drivers,
especially those not based beyond the border region, do not speak Spanish. U.S. firms do not
want to risk having their equipment and drivers delayed by paperwork and inspection activities or
by the congestion that occurs as part of the cross border flow of goods. U.S. carriers also believe
that Mexico is a dangerous place to operate and hesitate to place their drivers, equipment, and
cargo at risk.60 In addition, even if the Mexican government begins accepting applications from
U.S. carriers for operating authority in Mexico, there is a great deal of uncertainty as to how soon
NAFTA implementation will take place in a meaningful way on the Mexican side of the border.
The Short Term Outlook
Gradualism will probably be the predominant characteristic for at least the first couple of years of
NAFTA implementation. It could be 2005 before Mexico agrees to terms for the on-site
inspections of Mexican carriers required under U.S. law. Once this occurs, Mexican firms that are
certified to operate beyond the commercial zone will likely begin testing the waters for deliveries

59 U.S. Department of Transportation. Office of the Inspector General. Audit Report: Mexico-Domiciled Motor
Carriers. Report no. TR-2000-013. Washington, DOT, 1999. 25 p.
60 Cargo theft and especially fear of hijacking and the related endangerment of their drivers and potential loss of
equipment were mentioned by U.S. trucking firms as a major reason for not operating in Mexico. A 1999 U.S.
Department of State report, Trucking Services:[Mexico], by Javier Flores at http://www.tradeport.org/ts/countries/
mexico/isa/isar0029.html, stated that the “lack of security on Mexican highways is, by far, the largest problem affecting
this industry. The soaring cost of insurance is the result ... as a result, transportation companies and their customers lose
business opportunities.” The report also discusses other difficulties faced by U.S. trucking service providers who are
interested in operating in Mexico.
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to destinations close enough to the border that allow them to have at least a prospect of breaking
even without having a prearranged back-haul. Where back-hauls can be arranged, Mexican
carriers will operate farther into the United States, but most observers expect the vast majority of
truck loads will be to destinations in the border states. As long as there are significant delays at
the border, however, the majority of truck freight crossing the border into the United States will
continue to be brought in by drayage operators. Despite this short term gradualism, the limited
activity is important because it will be a time of testing of different business patterns or models.
One feature of this period may be the evolution of cooperative agreements between Mexican and
U.S. haulers, which could have a major impact in the long-term outlook for international trucking
in the United States and Mexico.61
The Long Term: Business Structure and Competition
In the long run, the outlook for international trucking across the border is less a function of
regulation than of business practices and the economics of international trucking. Within this
context there are a number of factors that will influence the shape and scope of NAFTA
implementation. Most discussions of the likelihood or extent of Mexican or U.S. trucks entering
the long-haul trucking market within each other’s borders focus on the difficulties that would be
faced by a Mexican trucking firm going it alone in the U.S. market or a U.S. firm going it alone in
the Mexican market. Only a few companies on either side of the border are expected to provide
direct trucking services deep into the other country, but many are expected to operate cross-
border through a subsidiary or parent corporation or in cooperation with an affiliate business on
the other side of the border. Virtually all observers agree that Mexican drivers will continue to
dominate the cross-border carriage of cargo by truck for some time.62 The one area, however,
where Mexican trucking companies fear direct competition with U.S.-based companies is for the
trucking serving the maquiladora trade concentrated near the border. There continues to be
disagreement on how common it will be for Mexican drivers to operate deep within the United
States in the long term. It is important to remember that the main factor in the growth of truck
crossings has been the growth in trade, which determines the amount of freight that must be
moved across the border.63 Consequently, it is doubtful that eventual implementation of the
trucking provisions of NAFTA, by itself, will lead to a major increase of the amount of freight
shipped. It will, however, have an impact on how and by whom the freight is moved across the
border.
The Cross-Border Business Paradigm
Despite having been banned for many years from delivering cargo in each other’s countries
beyond the border zones, U.S. and Mexican trucking firms have offered “seamless delivery”
throughout each other’s territory to their customers through working arrangements with

61 See Delgado, et al.
62 Some U.S. firms, headquartered in the border region, with their lower than the U.S. average driver wages and
Spanish speaking workforce, may try to send their drivers and trucks into Mexico, but are not expected to gain much of
a market share. It is likely that, once the Mexican government begins accepting applications, some U.S. firms will
apply for operating authority simply for the flexibility of being able to send some of their drivers and trucks into
Mexico if required.
63 See Appendix I in, General Accounting Office. U.S.-Mexico Border: Better Planning, Coordination Needed to
Handle Growing Commercial Traffic. Report no. GAO/NSIAD. Washington, GAO, 2000, pp. 42-43.
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counterparts across the border.64 These arrangements are commonly referred to as partnerships,
but are generally interlining or interchange agreements. Interline agreements provide for joint line
transborder shipments by transloading freight at the border between U.S. and Mexican trucking
firms. Interchange agreement generally has the U.S. firm also providing the loaded trailer for
delivery to the final destination.
Prior to NAFTA, U.S. firms could not invest in Mexican trucking firms and Mexican firms were
not allowed to hold a controlling interest in U.S. trucking firms. NAFTA phased in the allowable
ownership for U.S. investors in Mexican trucking companies: 49% ownership after December 17,
1995, 51% ownership on January 1, 2001, and 100% ownership on January 1, 2004.65 Major U.S.
trucking firms doing business in Mexico began investing in Mexican trucking firms beginning in
the mid-1990s, often in effect creating subsidiary firms in Mexico. The investment link is
significant in that the profits of the U.S. parent firm are affected by the profits of its Mexican
subsidiary. U.S. investment in Mexican motor carriers is limited to firms that carry international
loads only. This significantly limits the number of existing Mexican carriers that are subject to
controlling interest investment by U.S. investors. With 100% ownership now allowed it should be
even easier for U.S. firms to set up new Mexican subsidiaries dedicated to cross-border trucking.
Mexican investors were to be allowed to invest up to 100% in U.S. trucking firms providing
international freight services beginning December 18, 1995; however, it wasn’t until June 2001
that U.S.-domiciled Mexican-owned firms were allowed to obtain operating authority to provide
truck services for the transport of international cargo between points in the United States.66
Within the context of NAFTA implementation, cross-border investment is expected to alter the
cross-border trucking business paradigm for some companies and allow U.S. firms to take
advantage of their Mexican subsidiary or affiliate partner’s labor cost advantage and knowledge
of the Mexican market. At the same time the new paradigm will help their Mexican subsidiaries
or partners navigate the complexity of operating beyond the border zones in the United States. In
short, the strengthened business paradigm will reduce some of the non-labor disadvantages faced
by Mexican firms operating in the United States. Mexican firms that are subsidiaries of large U.S.
trucking firms may be able to benefit from their parent firm’s ability to assist them with
navigating U.S. state registration fee requirements, acquiring insurance at reasonable rates,
getting loans at reasonable rates, and arranging for back-haul loads for return trips. The U.S. firm
benefits from the potential cost savings that the subsidiary provides for its international trucking
business. Over time, however, the wages of Mexican drivers would be expected to rise relative to
U.S. truck drivers.
Celadon Group, Inc., which claims to be the leading truckload carrier to and from Mexico, has
briefly outlined its post-implementation plans, in its September 2002 10K filing:
The opening of the border... will for the first time, permit Mexican drivers to move loads
without restrictions between Mexico and points in the United States. We have extensive
experience with the management of drivers in Mexico, through our ownership of Jaguar, our

64 Office of International Affairs, American Trucking Association. South of the Border: U.S. Trucking in Mexico.
Washington, 1992. pp. 17-19.
65 North American Free Trade Agreement. Annex I, Schedule of Mexico. In U.S. Congress. North American Free
Trade Agreement, Texts of Agreement, Implementing Bill, Statement of Administrative Action, and Required Supporting
Statements. U.S. House of Representatives Document 103-159, vol. 1, p. 1,590.
66 Bush, George W. Memorandum for the Secretary of Transportation: Determination Under the Interstate Commerce
Commission Termination Act of 1995. Washington, White House. June 2001.
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Mexico City-based subsidiary. We expect to take advantage of the border opening by
utilizing lower cost drivers on shipments to and from Mexico.67
If and when the NAFTA trucking provisions take effect, Celadon’s business model may succeed
in giving it a cost advantage and its competitors will have to adjust. Such an adjustment, however,
might put a downward pressure on the wages of U.S. drivers vis-à-vis their Mexican counterparts.
As mentioned earlier, an area where Mexican companies have expressed concern over possible
direct competition with U.S. carriers is in the provision of trucking services to the maquiladoras.
The location of their factories near the border and the expedited processing of maquiladora freight
at the border might attract U.S. competition, especially from companies headquartered near the
border.
An alternate business plan, reportedly raised by some Mexican carriers as a possibility, would be
to lease their equipment and drivers to U.S. firms, who it is hoped could then deal with insurance
and regulatory requirements, and provide knowledge of the market on the U.S. side of the border.
Another business plan being considered by some Mexican firms that would require less
dependence on a U.S. partner would focus on long haul delivery direct to the warehouse districts
in or near the border zones on the U.S. side and to direct long-haul delivery back into Mexico,
thus eliminating the drayage hauler. Over time, these carriers might gradually expand service to
border state inland ports such as San Antonio, Texas.
The Low Cost Producer: Time and Distance Is Money
Two of the basic precepts of making money in trucking are minimizing the time that trucks and
drivers are idle and reducing the miles that empty trailers are hauled or tractors are driven without
a load. For an independent Mexican carrier operating in the United States, its significant cost
advantage is limited to its lower driver costs. Its main disadvantages are the aforementioned
probable lack of a back-haul, higher insurance rates, increased inspection costs, higher state
registration fees, and more expensive financing of its equipment. Over the long run, the effect of
these disadvantages will probably be reduced but will not go away entirely. Mexican firms that
are closely affiliated with, or are subsidiaries of, major U.S. firms will probably get help from
their U.S. partner or parent firm to assist them in reducing their non-labor costs. In either case, the
key to profitability may be that the labor cost differential is enough to overcome the cost of being
delayed at the border and/or returning without a back-haul.
The Wage Differential
Estimates of the wage differential vary substantially for a federally licensed Mexican truck driver
engaged in international carriage of cargo to the United States versus the cost of a U.S. driver, but
they generally range from one third to one half the cost of the U.S. driver.68 Using the 2007

67 Celadon Group, Inc. Form 10-K, Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15 (d) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Washington, U.S. Security and Exchange Commission. (September 2002) p. 3.
68 See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2007 National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates: 53-3032 Truck
Drivers, Heavy and Tractor-Trailer. Internet address http://www.bls.gov/oes/2007/may/oes533032.htm. Schulz, John.
A Race to the Bottom. Traffic World, Mar. 4, 2002, p. 22. Quotes Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association
(OOIDA) estimates that Mexican drivers earn 13 cents per mile versus U.S. truckload drivers earning 31 cents to 40
cents. Benton, James C. Transportation Bill Set to Clear as Bush Wins Key Provision Opening U.S. to Mexican Trucks.
CQ Weekly, Dec. 1, 2001, p. 2,846. Quotes Michael Belzer of Wayne State University estimate that Mexican drivers
(continued...)
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Bureau of Labor Statistics figure for the median hourly truck driver wage of $17.41, roughly
three times the U.S. minimum wage, and the estimates that Mexican drivers would cost one third
to one half of a U.S. driver, the cost savings for using a Mexican driver for long-haul carriage into
the U.S. would range from $7.63 to $10.17 per hour.69 Estimates of the differential on an
earnings-per-mile basis pegged Mexican driver earnings in one case at 13 cents per mile versus
31 to 40 cents for a U.S. driver and in another case 16 cents per mile versus 32 cents per mile.
With overall truck operating expenses reportedly ranging from $1.10 to $1.70 per mile, the
majority of the labor cost advantage is quickly lost on any job without a revenue earning back-
haul.70 The labor cost benefit would probably be lost within the first third of a return run to the
border without a back-haul load.71 Most observers believe that the border states will be the main
zone of competition, with only the Mexican companies with connections for back-haul loads
operating beyond the border states with any regularity.
Cabotage: Legal and Illegal
One way Mexican trucking firms could avoid hauling an empty trailer all the way back to Mexico
would be to use the tractor to pick up and make a domestic U.S. delivery on the way back to
Mexico. In the language of the trucking industry, such domestic movements are referred to as
cabotage. NAFTA does not allow Mexican trucks to engage in domestic trucking in the United
States or vice versa. U.S. customs has made an exception for Canadian vehicles, which may also
be allowed for Mexican carriers.72 The exception is for a domestic movement of merchandise that
is “incidental” (defined as in the “general direction of an export move or as part of the return
movement [of trucks] to their base country”).
Cabotage is a contentious side issue in NAFTA implementation regarding Mexico. Opponents of
implementation see the “incidental” exception as an enormous loophole on the prohibition against
foreign carriers competing against U.S. truckers in the domestic market. The “incidental”
exception is part of a much larger concern. Trucking unions and truck owner-operators are
concerned that once Mexican trucks are commonly operating deep within the United States,
Mexican carriers will be tempted to routinely engage in illegal cabotage in general and, in doing
so, will take jobs away from U.S. drivers and businesses.73 The installment of GPS devices on

(...continued)
earn two thirds less than U.S. drivers. An Associated Press Article, New Policy Troubles U.S., Mexican Truckers, Nov.
29, 2002, estimates that U.S. truckers on average earn 32cents per mile and their Mexican counterparts earn about half
that amount.
69 Some believe Mexican trucking firms would be under pressure to pay their drivers well for fear that some of their
drivers might abandon their equipment deep in the United States and seek better paying work in the United States.
70 Case, Brendan M. “Mexican Rigs Get Go-Ahead; Bush Gives OK to Open Up U.S. Roads.” Dallas Morning News,
Nov. 28, 2002, p. 1D.
71 Getting information on costs can be difficult due to the proprietary nature of business information. However, using
the cost-per-mile estimate of $1.10 to $1.70, and the estimate that federally licenced Mexican drivers earn one third to
one half what U.S. truckload drivers earn can provide a rough estimate that the labor cost savings are lost in the first
third of a deadhead return. Near the border this does not mean a great deal, but the farther into the United States a
Mexican truck travels, the more important a back-haul or cabotage load becomes to the profitability of the operation.
72 See 19 CFR 123.14.
73 The Department of Transportation Inspector General reported in 1999 that some Mexican trucks were operating
beyond the border zones and to a lesser extent beyond the border states, see Mexico-Domiciled Motor Carriers
[Operating Beyond the Border Zone] Washington, Office of the Inspector General. Nov. 4, 1999. Report no. TR2000-
013.
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demonstration project participants was, in part, meant to address this concern. Another concern is
that Mexican trucking firms will lease their trucks and drivers to U.S. partners or parent
companies who might arrange for a work visa for the leased driver and then provide both
international trucking services as well as cabotage within the United States.74
The Distinctive Institutions
As mentioned earlier, there is a common view that the Mexican customs brokers and drayage
companies will do what they can to maintain the status quo. There are reasons to believe,
however, that resistance is overstated. To begin with, it is not only the drayage operators that have
developed working relationships with the Mexican customs brokers over the years but also the
long-haul companies that will be providing single-truck service to the U.S. side of the border. A
second reason is that in the long run, Mexican brokers’ profits are determined by the amount of
freight they process. This will eventually provide them with an incentive to work with the long-
haul carriers and also to streamline and automate their procedures. Although it is likely that the
share of cargo hauled by the drayage operators will decline over the next ten years, it is unlikely
that drayage will decline to the 15% share drayed across the Canadian border. The quality of
trucks used for drayage reportedly is improving, in part, because of the increased safety and
environmental scrutiny they will face at the border.75 As the drayage share declines, some of these
operators may change their business strategy and seek more business in local haulage in Mexico
and some will also probably try operating beyond the border zones in the United States.
This is not to say that these institutions will not resist change but just that estimates that nothing
will change for ten to fifteen years can probably be viewed as overly conservative. Should the
two countries’ economies grow more rapidly, the resulting increase in trade will probably provide
plenty of business for both long haul and for drayage operators. The irony for the drayage
companies is that the threat to their dominance of cross-border trucking is going to come from
Mexican long-haul carriers, not from U.S. trucks.76 Also, regular shippers have a model for
expedited cross border trucking in the processing of the trucks used in the maquiladora trade.
Mexican trucking companies that begin to regularly serve the warehouse districts and nearby
cities in the border states will be especially attracted to the maquiladora model.
Caveat
Cross-border carriage of goods is a complicated activity with many elements that could change
the outlook discussed above. Anything that significantly adds time to the paperwork process on
either side of the border or to the duration and frequency of inspection of cargo could
significantly delay the impact of NAFTA implementation. Heightened concerns about security,
drug smuggling, safety, pollution, illegal immigration and terrorism, could lead to more intensive

74 The Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-159) prohibited the use of leases as a means of having
Mexican trucks operate beyond the border zones, until implementation of NAFTA’s land transportation provisions.
75 U.S. Department of Transportation. Office of the Inspector General. Interim Report on Status of Implementing the
North American Free Trade Agreement’s Cross-Border Trucking Provisions. Report no. MH-2001-059. Found that
out-of-service rates for Mexican trucks has been declining and that the condition of Mexican trucks correlate with the
level of inspection at the border.
76 The point where these companies interline or interchange with their Mexican partners may move deeper into the U.S.
border states.
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inspection of goods and driver documentation. This could increase border crossing delays and
perhaps reduce the Mexican labor cost advantage and limit the impact of implementation.
Congressional Issues
The Obama Administration has stated that it intends to introduce a revamped demonstration
program and thus an issue for Congress will be reviewing that new plan. The DOT IG and the IEP
noted some areas where modifications could be made to the Bush Administration’s demonstration
project.
As noted above, during the first year of the demonstration project (September 6, 2007 through
September 5, 2008) only 29 Mexican carriers were admitted into the program while the original
intent was to have 100 carriers participate. Both the IEP and DOT IG have suggested that more
Mexican firms would participate if the FMCSA could be more selective in checking at the border
and pre-inspecting on-site in Mexico only those trucks that intend to haul beyond the commercial
zone, rather than checking and inspecting every truck from a participant carrier, including those
intended only for commercial zone use. One Mexican carrier withdrew from the program because
it found the checking process was creating too much delay. This carrier did not obtain any
business that required it to operate beyond the commercial zone during the time it participated in
the demonstration project. Nevertheless, its drivers were being checked at every crossing even
though they would be making deliveries within the commercial zone because the carrier was
flagged as a demonstration project participant.77 The company’s trucks were inspected much less
frequently before it entered the program. Since many of the Mexican carriers seeking long-haul
authority also have much business within the commercial zone, a more targeted inspection
program by the FMCSA could ease Mexican carriers’ concerns about jeopardizing their
commercial zone business. The IEP also reported that several Mexican carriers did not join the
project because their older rigs used only for commercial zone drayage would also need to be
inspected along with their newer rigs used for long-haul movements.78
The rationale of eliminating the truck drayage segment at the border, and of NAFTA in general, is
to reduce the cost of trade between the two countries, thus raising each nation’s economic
welfare. However, the cost to federal taxpayers of ensuring Mexican truck safety, estimated by
the U.S. DOT to be over $500 million as of March 2008, appears to be disproportionate to the
amount of dollars saved thus far by U.S. importers or exporters that have been able to utilize
long-haul trucking authority. Beyond the hindrances to greater utilization of long-haul operations
associated with the demonstration project, delays associated with customs processing are
significant and a long-term obstacle to efficient trucking across the border. Any accumulated
savings in trucking costs enjoyed by shippers therefore should be weighed against the public cost
of funding the safety inspection regime for Mexican long-haul carriers.
If the role of Mexican customs brokers and drayage operators becomes an impediment to the
efficient flow of freight across the border, it would raise the issue of whether these particular
institutions have a role in preventing U.S. firms from operating directly in Mexico. If after
implementation, these institutions continue to have a degree of control over cross border trucking

77 DOT IG Report # MH-2009-034, p. 22-23.
78 IEP report, p. 11.
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NAFTA Implementation: The Future of Commercial Trucking Across the Mexican Border

that is deemed detrimental to U.S. trucking firms, some may view them as a non-tariff trade
barrier to U.S. trucking services.79
Another issue is the number of trucks that have operating authority restricted to the border zones
and that operate illegally beyond those zones. This includes concerns about the fate of Mexican
drayage trucks after implementation. If implementation reduces the demand for drayage services,
some operators may try to use their drayage equipment to haul loads to destinations beyond the
border zone. The drayage trucks would not simply disappear and some would undoubtedly risk
going beyond the commercial zones. The case can be made, however, that the combination of
increased enforcement (the FMCSA alone has 252 personnel assigned to the Mexican border and
state police and safety inspectors will also be on the look-out for Mexican trucks operating
beyond their authority) and penalties (placing a Mexican truck, far from the border, out of service
is a very expensive proposition for a Mexican carrier; in addition, fines can be imposed) should
reduce this kind of cheating.80 However, it will be worth watching the numbers of Mexican-
domiciled trucks that are caught operating beyond their authority.
The leasing of Mexican trucks and drivers by U.S. firms may become a major implementation
issue. The ban on using leases to circumvent the prohibition on Mexican trucks from operating
beyond the border zones ends with NAFTA implementation. Leasing may become an important
element in the post-implementation business environment. If a U.S. firm also arranges for work
visas for leased Mexican drivers, it could make them available for more cabotage loads and could
have Mexican drivers competing more often against U.S. drivers in the United States. Should this
happen, Congress may want to revisit the leasing issue.

Author Contact Information

John Frittelli

Specialist in Transportation Policy
jfrittelli@crs.loc.gov, 7-7033

79 Whitten, p. 13.
80 FMCSA officials.
Congressional Research Service
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