Price Deflation and Zero Interest Rates: Could It Happen in the United States?

Price Deflation and Zero Interest Rates: Could It Happen in the United States?

Order Code RL31632
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Price Deflation and Zero Interest Rates:
Could It Happen in the United States?
Updated October 30, 2003
Marc Labonte
Analyst in Macroeconomics
Gail Makinen
Economic Policy Consultant
Government and Finance Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Price Deflation and Zero Interest Rates:
Could It Happen in the United States?
Summary
Some analysts have raised the specter of the U.S. economy sinking into price
deflation (a general decline in prices over time) and persistently stagnant growth.
Although the United States has not experienced deflation since the Great Depression,
the Japanese economy has now suffered from deflation for several years. These
analysts argue that Japan cannot escape deflation because its monetary policy has lost
its effectiveness, with short-term market interest rates that have fallen to zero. Since
short-term interest rates in the United States are at their lowest level in decades and
some prices have fallen, some commentators foresee the United States soon facing
a similar problem.
Although interest rates are an important mechanism by which changes in the
money supply affect the pace of economic activity, monetary policy would not
become impotent when short-term interest rates were near zero. Long-term interest
rates would likely still be positive, as is the case in Japan, and these could be lowered
to expand aggregate spending. Even if long-term interest rates reached zero, newly
created money could be injected into the economy in two other ways. First, it could
be used to directly finance government budget deficits. Second, it could be used to
purchase foreign exchange, which would boost output by making exports and import-
competing industries more price competitive, independent of the state of domestic
demand. In sum, even if external forces set a country’s deflationary spiral into
motion, its persistence is primarily the outcome of central bank policy.
The main drawbacks to using unconventional methods of monetary policy are
of a political, not economic, nature. There is a fear that unconventional methods
could undermine a central bank’s reputation and independence. It is also feared that
the manipulation of the foreign exchange rate to undertake monetary expansions
could lead to diplomatic tensions, since import-competing industries in the nations
that received the increase in exports would be harmed. It could also harm third
countries who are linked to one of the appreciating currencies.
In any case, similarities between economic conditions in the U.S. and Japan are
questionable. At present, the U.S. economy is operating below its potential, but
growth is positive. Inflation is low and has fallen, but is still well above zero. In
2002, prices rose 1.6% and, through September, they rose at an annual rate of 2.7%
in 2003. To put this rate in perspective, the European Central Bank is mandated to
prevent the inflation rate in the Euro Area from exceeding 2.0%. If the Federal
Reserve had a similar mandate, it would presumably be tightening monetary policy
at present because inflation was too high. The federal funds rate is currently low, but
still has a way to go to zero. Adjusted for inflation, it is lower than overnight rates
in Japan, despite the fact that the Japanese rate is near zero in nominal terms. The
U.S. banking system is healthy.
Unless the United States experiences some
unexpected economic calamity beyond its control, it is difficult to see how deflation
could emerge in the United States under current conditions. This report will be
updated as events warrant.

Contents
What Is Deflation? Why Is It an Issue? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
How Does Monetary Policy Work? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Monetary Options When the Conventional Method Fails . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Drawbacks to Using Unorthodox Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Differences Between the U.S. and Japanese Economies Today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Does Increased Competition and Globalization Create Price Deflation? . . 10
Conclusion: Could Deflation Occur in the U.S.? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
List of Tables
Table 1: Inflation Rates in the U.S. and Japan, 1998-2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Price Deflation and Zero Interest Rates:
Could It Happen in the United States?
Shortly after the U.S. economy entered a recession in March 2001, several
commentators raised the specter of Japanese-style deflation (a general decline in
prices over time) wreaking havoc on the United States. They pointed to rising
unemployment, a falling stock market, the collapse of the high-tech sector, and the
negative influence of 9/11 and corporate scandals on consumer and business
confidence as forces present in the U.S. economy that could push down prices at a
time when inflation was already low.
Although the U.S. economy has not
experienced persistent price deflation since the Great Depression, these
commentators pointed to Japan as an example of the threat they claimed the United
States faces. Even after the recession ended in November 2001, fears of deflation in
the United States have continued.1
Since 1992, the Japanese economy has stagnated (although growth is projected
to rebound to 2.6% in 2003). A particularly troubling aspect of this slump has been
the persistence of price deflation. As measured by the consumer price index (CPI),
Japan has experienced deflation since 1999, and is forecasted to continue
experiencing deflation in 2003. As measured by the GDP deflator, it has experienced
price deflation every year but one since 1995. This experience with persistent price
deflation is unprecedented among the major world economies in the past three
decades. Indeed, the problem most major economies had experienced during that
period was the opposite: harmful bouts of high inflation. One would have to look
back to the Great Depression to find a similar period of prolonged deflation.
The current Japanese experience is not comparable to the Great Depression.
Growth in Japan has been sluggish, but still positive in most years. Unemployment
has risen to unprecedented levels, but is still lower than in the Euro Area. The annual
deflation rate has never exceeded 1% as measured by the consumer price index. The
banking system is troubled, but has not collapsed. Nonetheless, all of these problems
suggest that although deflation need not be lethal, it is hardly desirable. It has been
associated with an economy that operates below its full potential, creating
unnecessary waste of its human and physical assets and misery for some segments
of its population, until price expectations adjust. When unanticipated, it threatens the
solvency of the banking system by increasing the real value of debt, making default
1 See Matthew Lubanko, “Is Deflation in the Wind? Economy Bears Ominous Resemblance
to Japan’s in Mid-‘90s,” Hartford Courant, Oct. 26, 2002, p. E1; Barbara Hagenbaugh,
“Dallas Fed Chief Has Deflation On His Mind,” USA Today, Oct. 1, 2002, p. B1; Noam
Neusner, “Fear of a Free Fall; The Federal Reserve Fights an Unknown: The Specter of
Deflation,” U.S. News and World Report, Aug. 26, 2002, p. 22; Greg Ip, “Specter of
Deflation Looms: Evoking a Parallel With Japan,” Wall Street Journal, July 22, 2002, p. A2.

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more likely. As the case of Japan illustrates, the adjustment period can last for
several years. The U.S. Congress, dedicated to promoting public welfare, has a
strong desire to avoid such outcomes.
Yet persistent inflation or deflation is, and must be, a monetary phenomenon
that results from inappropriate central bank policy. Commentators who predict
deflation in the U.S. need a credible explanation for why the Federal Reserve (Fed)
would not act to offset the fall in demand caused by the various forces noted above.
Monetary policy is frequently portrayed as the setting of interest rates by the central
bank. Those who fear that deflation could take hold in the U.S. point out that
nominal interest rates in Japan are very close to zero. Short term interest rates
targeted by the Bank of Japan have been below 1% since 1995 and 0.1% since
September 2001. They conclude that monetary policy in Japan has become an
ineffective tool against deflation because market interest rates cannot be lowered any
further. They argue that the same scenario could prevail in the United States, where
the federal funds rate was lowered to 1% in July 2003.
This report will begin with a fairly detailed explanation of how monetary policy
works. Once this process is understood, it will become clear that deflation can be
avoided even when market interest rates have fallen to zero. Monetary policy, it will
be argued, may become less effective in a depressed economy, but it does not become
powerless. Thus, even if external forces set Japan’s deflationary spiral into motion,
its persistence is primarily a policy decision of the central bank. Avoiding deflation
when interest rates fall to zero entails some risks, but these risks seem trivial
compared to the economic risks caused by deflation.
What Is Deflation? Why Is It an Issue?
Deflation is defined as a sustained or continuous fall in the general price level.
It is an absolute decline in the price level, not a decrease in the rate at which the price
level is rising, which is called disinflation. As seen in Table 1, during 2002 the
United States experienced disinflation according to all three price indices. This trend
was reversed, with rising inflation in two of the measures during the first three
quarters of 2003. None of the 50 forecasters surveyed by Blue Chip is forecasting
deflation in 2004.2 Much of the fluctuation in inflation rates in recent years has been
due to changes in energy prices. When food and energy prices are removed, the
resulting core rate of inflation has been remarkably stable in recent years.
Nonetheless, prices in some components of the GDP deflator (the consumption
goods, nonresidential investment, foreign, and government sectors) experienced
deflation for some quarters in the past three years. Deflation is a generalized
phenomenon, however, and the components that have experienced price declines
have been more than offset by price increases in other components (the services and
residential sectors).
In 2003, prices in the durable consumption goods and
nonresidential investment sectors continued to decline.
2 Blue Chip, Economic Indicators, October 2003.

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Table 1: Inflation Rates in the U.S. and Japan, 1998-2003
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
U.S.
(Q1-Q3)
CPI (overall)
2.2%
3.4%
2.8%
1.6%
2.7%
CPI (core)
2.1%
2.4%
2.6%
2.4%
1.0%
GDP deflator
1.4%
2.1%
2.4%
1.1%
1.6%
Japan
(forecast)
CPI (overall)
-0.3%
-0.9%
-0.7%
-0.9%
-0.3%
GDP deflator
-1.5%
-1.9%
-1.6%
-1.7%
-2.5%
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Blue Chip
Economic Indicators (October 2003), International Monetary Fund.
The last period of generalized deflation in the United States ran from 1929 to
1933. During that 4-year period, the consumer price index (CPI) fell in excess of
24% while the implicit deflator for gross domestic product (GDP) fell in excess of
25%. Every major component of the CPI and price deflator fell. The fact that this
episode occurred during the Great Depression is not coincidental. Yet deflation has
not always coincided with economic contractions. In only one year between 1864
and 1902 did the price level rise (1880) and prices fell by nearly 50% over the period
as a whole. This long period of deflation was not, however, one of continuous
depression. On the contrary, it was one of substantial cyclical activity, including long
periods of economic growth. At least history tells us that deflation is not always
associated with depressed economic activity.
Economic theory, in discussing the implications of a changing price level,
makes a distinction between those changes that are anticipated and those that are not.
Those that are not anticipated are likely to be problematic because of the presence of
sticky prices and wages in the economy. There are menu costs,3 information costs,
expectations, and contracts in our economy that make prices and wages sticky. Such
rigidities in the face of deflation lead to a fall in real output and a rise in
unemployment. Since prices do not fall quickly on their own in our economy,
unemployment and falling output must temporarily occur before expectations adjust
sufficiently to the new price environment. In addition, unanticipated deflation (or
inflation, for that matter) can negatively affect the efficient functioning of an
economy, and it can alter the distribution of a country’s wealth and income in ways
that undermine its social cohesiveness. For example, unanticipated deflation can
3 Products with high “menu costs” are those which are costly to re-price, and therefore have
sticky prices. Restaurant menus, periodicals, and catalog items are examples of products
with high menu costs.

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redistribute wealth from debtors to creditors by raising the real cost of servicing
debts, thereby causing more debtors to default.
But what causes deflation? Persistent inflation or deflation is, and must be, a
monetary phenomenon that results from central bank policy. Prices are nothing more
than a measurement system that defines the value of a good or service in terms of a
monetary unit. While many factors influence the money supply, the central bank
alone can systematically manipulate its size. Persistent inflation can only occur when
the central bank makes more money available; persistent deflation can occur only
when the central bank reduces the amount of money available. Thus, in gauging the
potential threat of deflation, it is useful to look more closely at how monetary policy
operates.
How Does Monetary Policy Work?
The following discussion explains how monetary policy works in the United
States.4
Although some of the terms involved have different names in other
countries, the process is essentially the same. In the United States, an expansionary
monetary policy requires the Federal Reserve to buy additional U.S. Treasury
securities.5 These purchases either directly or indirectly expand the reserves or
lending power of the banking system. Lending out these reserves both increases the
supply of money (by a multiple of the increase in reserves) and lowers market interest
rates. The lower market interest rates expand spending in two different ways. First,
domestic spending that is sensitive to interest rates is encouraged (this is spending
for capital goods, structures, and inventories by businesses and for durable goods and
homes by households). Second, lower interest rates in the United States relative to
those of other countries, encourages Americans to purchase foreign assets. Before
they can do this, they must acquire foreign currencies and this means supplying more
dollars to the foreign exchange market. As a result, the dollar will fall in price or
depreciate. Dollar depreciation will lower the cost of American goods and services
in foreign countries, encouraging foreigners to spend more money in America; and
it will raise the price of foreign goods and services in the United States, encouraging
Americans to switch their foreign purchases to American produced substitutes. Both
of these actions will increase spending in the United States.
Clearly, changes in
market interest rates play a crucial role in this conventional explanation of the so-
called transmission mechanism of monetary policy (or the explanation of how
monetary policy works).
So important are interest rates in this view of the transmission mechanism, that
the Federal Reserve calibrates monetary policy in terms of a special interest rate, the
federal funds rate. This is the interest rate in a private market that exists among
financial institutions in which they buy and sell reserves on an overnight basis. Since
this interest rate is determined in a private market by supply and demand, the Fed
4 For more information, see CRS Report RL30354, Monetary Policy: Current Policy and
Conditions, by Gail Makinen and Anne Vorce.
5 The law permits the Federal Reserve to buy a variety of financial assets in addition to
Treasury securities. Treasury securities are purchased for a variety of reasons including the
size of the market and the riskless nature of securities.

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cannot change the rate by decree. Rather, it alters the rate by intervening in this
market by buying (selling) Treasury securities to expand (contract) the reserves
available to banks. When it wishes to ease monetary policy, it reduces the target rate
for federal funds and, then, supplies as many dollars of additional reserves as are
required to maintain the new target rate. However, it is not changes in the federal
funds rate that directly lead to changes in investment spending and aggregate
demand. Longer term interest rates are a more important determinant of investment
spending since companies borrow at longer term rates to make investments.
Typically, a reduction in the federal funds rate will stimulate investment spending
because of the positive correlation between the federal funds rate and longer term
rates. Thus, the federal funds rate is best thought of as a gauge of monetary policy.
It does not change aggregate spending directly, but it is the best measure of money
and credit market conditions for the Fed under normal circumstances. However,
there is nothing unique about the federal funds rate, and if it lost its usefulness, a
number of alternatives exist against which monetary policy could be gauged.
Monetary Options When the Conventional Method
Fails
There are a number of places in the conventional transmission mechanism
outlined above when monetary expansion can fail to stimulate aggregate spending.
First, the additional reserves given to banks through the purchase of Treasury
securities by the Federal Reserve may be held by the banks rather than being lent out.
This could happen if interest rates were very low (perhaps verging on zero) at the
time the additional reserves were supplied to the banks, making it unprofitable for
banks to lend them out. If the banks have little incentive to lend out the additional
reserves, the money supply will not increase, interest rates will not fall, and aggregate
demand will not be stimulated. Such a situation characterized the U.S. banking
system during the mid- to late-1930s. With the yield on short term U.S. Treasury
securities near zero, banks held reserves nearly twice as large as those legally
required. Second, if interest rates are already at or near zero, additional increases in
the money supply might not be able to lower them further, in which case demand will
not be stimulated. Third, an increase in the money supply might be willingly held by
the public and not used for additional spending. In conventional economic theory,
this is known as the “liquidity trap” and it prevents the additions to the money supply
from pushing down interest rates.
It is thought to characterize situations where
interest rates are very low and, thus, so is the cost of holding money.6 Some
observers thought that such a situation characterized the U.S. economy during the
1930s. Considerations such as these caused some economists to become pessimistic
about the efficacy of monetary policy as a stabilization tool. For them, monetary
policy did not work when interest rates were low.
6 More precisely, when a country is experiencing price deflation, holding money earns a
positive rate of return since the same dollar bill buys more goods and services next year than
it buys today. As long as the rate of deflation, which is the rate of return on money, is
higher than the rate of return on investments, there is no incentive to invest one’s money in
financial securities or physical capital.

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The bleak picture painted by conventional monetary theory on the effectiveness
of monetary policy when interest rates are very low has been amended by subsequent
thinking and empirical work.7 These modifications restore some of the effectiveness
to monetary policy even in a low interest rate environment. First, even in the U.S.
during the 1930s and in Japan today, while short term interest rates were and are
close to zero, this was and is not true for longer term rates. In the third quarter of
2003, 10-year government bond yields in Japan averaged 1.42%, 10-year local
government bond yields were 1.49%, and 12-year corporate bond yields were 2.03%,
all higher than the previous year.8 There are no impediments to central bank
purchases of longer dated securities in an effort to reduce those rates and stimulate
demand. It is less likely that long-term interest rates could be pushed down to zero
without stimulating aggregate spending since at a low enough cost of borrowing more
and more investment projects become profitable. Thus, overnight interest rates that
have fallen to zero pose no impediment to expansionary monetary policy reducing
longer-term interest rates. The only drawback to this approach is that long-term
interest rates offer less information about the stance of monetary policy since they are
affected by other forces in addition to monetary policy.
Second, central banks can expand aggregate demand by buying foreign currency
or assets denominated in foreign currencies.
To do this, they must supply local
currency to the foreign exchange market to buy the foreign currency. This leads to
a fall in the price of local currency (it depreciates) and, as explained above, it
stimulates the demand for exports and causes local individuals to switch their
purchases from imports to domestically produced substitutes. The appeal of this
method of stimulus is that, unlike investment spending, it occurs regardless of the
state of the domestic economy; instead, it relies on foreign demand.
Third, if the banks will not lend out the reserves they get from the central bank,
this does not foreclose increases in the money supply. For example, the central bank
can use money to finance government budget deficits. Those who receive this money
will spend it because they will feel wealthier as a result. This “wealth effect” from
monetary policy is an overlooked alternative to the interest rate route stressed in the
conventional view of the monetary transmission mechanism highlighted above.
While some observers point out that money-financed budget deficits are frequently
the route taken in countries that suffer severe inflation, it should be noted that it has
a respectable academic heritage in the United States. During the 1930s, a prominent
group of economists at the University of Chicago advocated that the federal
government run budget deficits as a means of getting new money into the hands of
the public and, thus, stimulating additional spending.9
7 Economist Ben Bernanke recommends the following three options to end Japan’s deflation
in Ben Bernanke, “Japanese Monetary Policy: A Case of Self-Induced Paralysis?”, in
Ryoichi Mikitani and Adam Posen, ed., Japan’s Financial Crisis and Its Parallels to U.S.
Experience, Institute for International Economics, (Washington: 2000), Ch. 7.
8 Bank of Japan, Financial Statistics,[URL:www.boj.or.jp/en/siryo/siryo_f.htm].
9 These economists included Frank Knight, Jacob Viner, Lloyd Mints, and Henry Simons.
See Don Patinkin, “The Chicago Tradition, the Quantity Theory, and Friedman,” Journal
of Money, Credit, and Banking, v. 1, n. 1, Feb. 1969.

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Although policy options exist when interest rates reach zero, the task facing a
central bank in a deflation is still a difficult one. It is likely that when economic
activity becomes depressed, choosing the correct monetary stance would become
more difficult for policymakers. When choosing the proper interest rate level to
target, the central bank needs reliable estimates of how sensitive investment and
consumer durable spending will be to a change in the interest rate. These estimates
will be determined in part by historical data. Yet the responsiveness of spending to
changes in interest rates during normal periods of physical activity is unlikely to be
a reliable guide to how spending will react to changes in interest rates during times
of severe economic contraction.
Similarly, money demand and inflationary
expectations are likely to change unpredictably as economic conditions change.
Thus, policymakers would find themselves more “in the dark” than usual. While
there still remains a proper monetary stance for increasing aggregate demand and
eradicating price deflation in nearly any economic environment, it be may more
difficult and take longer to determine that stance than under normal circumstances.
This does not mean that monetary policy has become ineffective; it means that
human error in an atmosphere of uncertainty could make finding the proper monetary
stance a longer process than usual.10
Drawbacks to Using Unorthodox Methods
The drawbacks to using more unorthodox methods to expand the money supply
are not economic in nature. As explained above, it is increases in the money supply
that affect output and prices. While the conventional gauge of monetary policy
(overnight interest rates) may become uninformative, other gauges can be used
instead.
The drawbacks to using unorthodox methods are political. First, reputation is
crucial to effective central banking. The high inflation experiences of the 1970s and
before are associated in the minds of policymakers and the public with reckless
behavior. Hence, in building solid reputations in recent years, the world’s central
bankers have stressed their prudence and caution. Major departures from standard
practice, even if only symbolic in nature, clash with the prevailing persona of an
effective central banker. If their reputation was tarnished, central bankers fear that
10 Economist Paul Krugman argues that Japan faces a special problem with deflation that
requires a very specific solution. He argues that deflation is the manifestation of the large
mismatch between Japanese saving and investment demand (prices must fall because people
value future consumption over present consumption). For this reason, he argues, Japan
cannot escape its current troubles by temporarily boosting inflation through monetary
policy. Since that would not resolve people’s preference for future consumption, deflation
would re-emerge when the monetary expansion ended. He argues that deflation can only
be vanquished if the central bank makes a commitment to permanently expand the money
supply. He argues that the best way to do this would be through the adoption of an inflation
target, preferably a fairly high target. This would make holding cash costly (since inflation
erodes its purchasing power), forcing people to spend or invest their wealth instead. Given
the low personal saving rate in the U.S., this problem seems unlikely to emerge here. See
Paul Krugman, “It’s Baaack: Japan’s Slump and the Return of the Liquidity Trap,”
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2, 1998.

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monetary policy would become less effective. On the other hand, one can question
the effect persistent deflation is having on the Japanese central bank’s reputation.
Second, some of these methods could threaten the central bank’s political
independence. In particular, if the central bank began to use direct financing of the
government’s budget deficit as the vehicle for monetary policy, it could lead to
political pressures to re-orient monetary policy away from maintaining
macroeconomic stability and towards maximizing government revenues. This is the
path that has led countries all over the world and throughout history to hyperinflation.
Finally, using foreign currency as the primary vehicle for implementing
monetary policy could lead to diplomatic tensions. If an economy were revived by
boosting the export sector through a lower exchange rate, it would come at the
expense of import-competing sectors in the nations that received the expansion in
exports.11 Although the benefits to foreign countries of a revival in the economy are
likely to exceed the costs to these countries’ import-competing industries, the costs
may nevertheless make the approach politically untenable.12
Differences Between the U.S. and Japanese
Economies Today
So far, this report has accepted at face value the claim that the United States
could experience Japanese-style deflation and explained how monetary policy could
be used to prevent it. It is useful at this point to evaluate the credibility of this claim.
There are some similarities between the two countries experiences, and the one that
has attracted the most attention is that both experienced a bursting of a stock market
bubble prior to their recessions.
Still, there seem to be far more differences than similarities between the two
countries. First and foremost, the rhetoric about U.S. deflation is at odds with the
data. As the United States has moved into the expansion phase of the business cycle,
the inflation rate has risen, not fallen (although some of the rise is due to food and
energy prices). Through the first nine months of 2003, the CPI increased at an
annualized rate of 2.7%. To put this rate in perspective, the European Central Bank
is mandated to prevent the inflation rate in the Euro Area from exceeding 2.0%. If
11 In the case of the Asian crisis, yen depreciation in the mid-1990s was also problematic for
competitors in East Asia because many East Asian countries had fixed their exchange rate
to the dollar. When the yen depreciated, countries with their currencies fixed to the dollar
were increasingly priced out of the Japanese market and could no longer compete with
Japanese exports because their own exchange rate could not be adjusted. This created
deflationary pressures in East Asia that ultimately contributed to the currency collapses and
economic crises. Most countries in the region operate floating exchange rates today, so yen
depreciation would now be less problematic for them. See CRS report RL31204, Fixed
Exchange Rates, Floating Exchange Rates, and Currency Boards: What Have We Learned?,
by Marc Labonte.
12 It should be noted that the purchase and sale of foreign currency is already a well-
established method of executing monetary policy. The only thing unconventional about this
proposal would be the scale on which it would undertaken.

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the Federal Reserve had a similar mandate, it would presumably be tightening
monetary policy at present because inflation was too high. (Another measure of
inflation, the GDP deflator, tells a more pessimistic story, with inflation rising by an
annualized 1.7% in the first three quarters of 2003. There have been price declines
in some components of the deflator, but they have been offset by price increases in
other components.) The U.S. economy is not yet operating at full potential, but it has
now grown for eight straight quarters.
Second, the claim that expansionary monetary policy can become ineffective
based on the Japanese experience is questionable. While the interest rates cited
above seem very low and indicative of a highly expansionary monetary policy in
Japan, these interest rates are nominal interest rates, unadjusted for inflation. When
deciding to make an investment, businesses are concerned with the real interest rate,
which is the nominal rate adjusted by the expected inflation rate. Since the deflation
rate in Japan has been about 1% in recent years, one percentage point should be
added to each interest rate to measure the relevant rate faced by businesses and
investors. Adjusting for inflation, one can see that the real basic bank discount rate
in Japan is actually higher (0.1%-(-1)=1.1%) than the U.S. equivalent, the real federal
funds rate (1%-2%=-1%) assuming a 2% rate of inflation in the U.S. Thus, to the
extent that this interest rate is a relevant gauge of the stance of monetary policy,
monetary policy is currently tighter in Japan than in the U.S.
Third, while stock markets fell in both countries through 2002, the U.S. has not
experienced a decline in real estate prices similar to Japan, where prices have fallen
by more than 50% since their peak in the early 1990s. To date, real estate prices have
continued to rise in the U.S. Finally, problems in the Japanese banking system play
an important role in explaining monetary policy’s ineffectiveness. In March 2002,
Japanese banks held a total of $417.7 billion in non-performing loans, 8.7% of total
loans according to official estimates. The official estimates are thought by some to
be too low, however.13 As explained above, the ultimate increase in the money
supply is a multiple of the central bank’s increase in bank reserves. The size of the
multiple depends in part on banks lending out the increase in their reserves. When
bank lending is weak, a given addition to bank reserves by the central bank will lead
to a smaller increase in the money supply. If Japanese banks are unwilling to take on
new lending, a large change in reserves may lead to a relatively small change in the
money supply. To date, the U.S. banking system has remained healthy, so it is
unlikely that U.S. banks would be unwilling to lend out increases in their reserves.
13 See CRS Report RL31609, Japan’s Economic and Security Challenges, by Dick Nanto.

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Does Increased Competition and Globalization Create Price
Deflation?
Some commentators have observed the growing competitiveness and
globalization of U.S. product markets. They point to a few well-known examples
to make this case, including the rapidly falling price of information-technology,
cost-cutting management techniques, the rise of “big box” retailers, and out-
sourcing of production to foreign labor. In each of these cases, prices of affected
products have fallen; if these cases were aggregated across the entire economy,
they reason, general price deflation would be the result.
These changes are examples of changes in relative prices rather than overall
prices, which is a monetary phenomenon. Economists refer to the reasoning in the
above paragraph as partial equilibrium analysis, for it does not take into account
how these changes affect the broader economy. Holding the money supply
constant, when prices of specific products fall, individuals have more income left
over to spend on all other products. If the production of these other products does
not undergo similar efficiency gains, then the increased demand will push up their
price. Indeed, prices of certain products, such as housing, health care, and
education have risen much more rapidly than overall inflation in recent years.
And even if one assumed that all products were affected by these cost-cutting
factors, as long as money spending is adjusted, the additional production
generated by these changes will be translated into additional income to match it,
so that the overall price level would not fall. Indeed, productivity increases every
year without causing price deflation.
Furthermore, heightened competition or cost-cutting leads to a one-time
decrease in prices, whereas deflation is an ongoing phenomenon where prices fall
continuously.

Conclusion: Could Deflation Occur in the U.S.?
At present, economic growth in the U.S. is below potential, but positive.
Inflation is low and has fallen, but is still well above zero. The federal funds rate is
low, but still has a way to go to zero. The banking system is healthy. Unless the U.S.
experiences some unexpected economic or political calamity beyond its control, it
is difficult to see how deflation could emerge in the United States under current
conditions.
Nevertheless, the experience of Japan in the last decade illustrates that deflation
can emerge in an economy, even when nominal overnight interest rates are lowered
to zero. Does this mean deflation is unavoidable? It does not.
Deflation is unavoidable only if a central bank refuses to use unconventional
methods for monetary policy when conventional ones lose their effectiveness. In
Japan, the conventional gauge for monetary policy, overnight interest rates, has lost
its usefulness. Using unconventional methods may have political ramifications, but
they are economically indistinguishable from conventional methods. Indeed, the only
reason conventional methods became well-established is because they are highly
effective under normal conditions.
Choosing the proper monetary stance that
promotes price stability in a recessionary environment may be difficult and take time,
but such a stance exists. Thus, deflation would only take root in the United States
if the Fed were unwilling to adopt unconventional methods of monetary policy when
faced with an economy that has been shocked by extraordinarily negative events.
How the Fed would react to such events is a political question that is beyond the
scope of this report.