House and Senate Committee Organization and Jurisdiction: Considerations Related to Proposed Department of Homeland Security

House and Senate Committee Organization and Jurisdiction: Considerations Related to Proposed Department of Homeland Security

Order Code RL31449
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
House and Senate Committee Organization and
Jurisdiction: Considerations Related to Proposed
Department of Homeland Security
June 10, 2002
name redacted
Specialist on the Congress
Government and Finance Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

House and Senate Committee Organization and
Jurisdiction: Considerations Related to Proposed
Department of Homeland Security
Summary
The creation of a Department of Homeland Security, along the lines proposed
by the Administration, would affect the jurisdiction of numerous House and Senate
committees. In addition, the expansiveness of the proposal may cause Congress to
consider using alternative procedures and structures to review the proposal and to
monitor the implementation of such a new department.
This report discusses the current legislative jurisdictions of House and Senate
committees with responsibility over terrorism, homeland security, and the agencies
affected by the proposed new department. It also examines alternative procedures
and structures Congress might employ in studying the proposal, such as creating a
select committee. Finally, it identifies options for committee organization to monitor
a Department of Homeland Security after its creation.

Contents
House and Senate Committee Organization and Jurisdiction:
Considerations Related to Proposed Department of Homeland Security1
Determination of Committee Jurisdiction and Referral: Rules and Practice 1
Senate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Committees with Jurisdiction over Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
To Consider Proposals to Create a Department of Homeland Security:
Options for Congressional Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Present system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Informal Task Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Specialized subcommittee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Select committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Ad hoc committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Joint committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Standing committee (new) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Options for Congressional Organization and for Legislative and Oversight
Jurisdiction over a New Cabinet Department of Homeland Security . . 8
Retain current structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Reorganize entire system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Realign committee jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Change referral system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Create new standing committee over homeland security . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Create select committee over homeland security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Realign Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittees . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Create a joint committee on homeland security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
List of Tables
Table 1. House Committees with Rule X Language and Jurisdiction Over Issues and
Agencies Related to Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Table 2. Senate Committees With Rule XXV Language and Jurisdiction Over Issues
and Agencies Related to Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

House and Senate Committee Organization and
Jurisdiction: Considerations Related to Proposed
Department of Homeland Security
Decentralization is the most distinctive characteristic of the congressional
committee system. Due to the high volume and complexity of its work, Congress
divides it legislative, oversight, and internal administrative tasks among numerous
standing and select committees. The House and Senate each have their own
committees and related rules of procedure, which are similar, but not identical.
Within their respective areas of responsibility, committees generally operate rather
independently of each other and of their parent chambers. The difficult tasks of
aggregating committees’ activities, and of integrating policy in areas where
jurisdiction is shared, fall largely to the chambers’ party leadership.
Determination of Committee Jurisdiction and Referral: Rules
and Practice
In considering jurisdiction, a distinction needs to be made between legislative
and oversight jurisdiction. The former denotes the authority to report measures to the
full chamber; the latter, to review or investigate. Although oversight jurisdiction may
be the product of a specific legislative enactment, it also accrues when committees
accept responsibilities for broad topical areas. Hence, there are more likely to be
broader and more frequent overlaps in oversight jurisdiction than in legislative
jurisdiction. Legislative jurisdiction, however, has occasioned the majority of open
conflicts between committees.
Senate. Senate Rule XXV generally identifies broad issues handled by each
standing committee, although not all issues within a committee’s purview are
specified. Further, these jurisdictional descriptions do not explicitly identify each
committee’s jurisdiction over particular measures, or over (1) executive branch
departments and agencies, (2) particular offices within these departments and
agencies, or (3) programs operated by these departments and agencies. A
committee’s jurisdiction over an executive department or agency generally is implied
by its jurisdiction over the issues the department or agency handles.
Measures introduced in the Senate, or passed by the House and sent to the
Senate, are referred to Senate committees in accordance with Rule XXV jurisdiction
and with precedents established by prior referrals. Formal agreements between
committees reached over time can supplement Rule XXV, and are regarded by the
Parliamentarian as setting precedent for future referrals. An ad hoc agreement may
be made to govern the consideration of a particular measure, but such an agreement
is not binding on future referrals.

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Under Senate Rule XVII, each measure is referred to a single committee based
on the “subject matter which predominates” in the legislation. Predominance is
usually determined by the extent to which a measure deals with a subject. However,
there are exceptions; notably, a measure containing revenue provisions is likely to be
referred to the Finance Committee, even when the subject does not predominate.
Senate Rule XVII further allows a measure to be referred to multiple committees
for consideration. The Senate typically makes multiple referrals by unanimous
consent after negotiations among interested parties. A measure may also be multiply
referred by joint motion of the majority and minority leaders or their designees;
however, this motion has never been used.
House. Paramount in determining committee jurisdiction in the House is
House Rule X. The formal provisions of the rule are supplemented by an intricate
series of precedents and formal and informal agreements governing the referral of
legislation. In general, based on precedent, once a measure has been referred to a
given committee, it remains within the jurisdiction of that committee. If the measure
is enacted into law, amendments to the law are presumed to be within the originating
committee’s jurisdiction. Bills that are more comprehensive than the measure they
amend or supersede are presumed to be within the jurisdiction of the committee
reporting the more comprehensive measure.
Written agreements, drafted among committees to stipulate their understanding
of jurisdictional boundaries, have been used in recent years. If legislation is
considered on the House floor, such agreements are traditionally inserted into the
Congressional Record. House parliamentarians, in advising the Speaker, have
generally considered themselves bound by such an agreement when it is supported
by all the committees concerned and when the House, usually by unanimous consent,
has given its assent to the agreement.
In 1974, with the adoption of the Committee Reform Amendments, the House
authorized the Speaker to refer measures to more than one committee, in a joint, split,
or sequential manner. In 1995, with the rules changes adopted in the 104th Congress,
the Speaker’s authority to multiply refer measures was changed. The Speaker no
longer could refer measures jointly; he was authorized instead to designate a primary
committee. Split and sequential referrals were still allowed. Further, the Speaker
could impose time limitations on any committee receiving a referral.
Committees with Jurisdiction over Homeland Security
The following tables identify House and Senate committee jurisdiction over
homeland security issues. Included is language from the official chamber rules,
notation of issues often cited as relating to homeland security whether or not they are
included in the scope of the new department, and designation of jurisdiction over
agencies proposed by the President for transfer to a new Department on Homeland
Security. Although extensive, these tables are intended to be representative, rather
than comprehensive.

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Table 1. House Committees with Rule X Language
and Jurisdiction Over Issues and Agencies Related
to Homeland Security
Agriculture
Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service; Plum Island Animal Disease
Center; Food Safety and Inspection
Service
Appropriations
“appropriation of the revenue for the
support of the Government”
Armed Services
“Department of Defense, generally...”;
“military applications of nuclear
energy”; “national security aspects of
merchant marine...”; “strategic and
critical materials necessary for the
common defense”
Energy and Commerce
“biomedical research and
development”; “public health...”
bioterrorism; public health and
environment; national pharmaceutical
stockpile; all aspects of energy,
including nuclear energy;
telecommunications; Nuclear
Regulatory Commission
Financial Services
“...defense production...”
Government Reform
“Overall economy, efficiency, and
management of government
operations and activities...”;
“Reorganization in the executive
branch of government”
House Administration
oversight over physical security,
information security, and emergency
preparedness for the House and
Capitol complex
Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency;
intelligence and intelligence related
activities of all agencies and
departments; organization of
government at it relates to intelligence

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Table 1. House Committees with Rule X Language
and Jurisdiction Over Issues and Agencies Related
to Homeland Security
International Relations
“relations of the United States with
foreign nations generally”
Department of State; international
security; non-proliferation and
disarmament; international crime
Judiciary
“...mutiny, espionage...”; “subversive
activities affecting the internal
security of the United States”
Immigration and Naturalization
Service; Federal Bureau of
Investigation ; Drug Enforcement
Agency; Secret Service; Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms;
Border Patrol
Resources
National Park Service; dams; public
lands; water and power
Science
non-defense federal scientific research
and development; FEMA (shared);
National Institute of Science and
Technology (NIST); DOE
laboratories; DOE science activities
Transportation and Infrastructure
“Coast Guard...”; “federal
management of emergencies...”
FEMA (shared); Transportation
Security Administration; Federal
Aviation Administration; Federal
Highway Administration
Veterans Affairs
backup medical provider to
Department of Defense
Ways and Means
trade, including trade aspects of the
Customs Service

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Table 2. Senate Committees With Rule XXV
Language and Jurisdiction Over Issues and
Agencies Related to Homeland Security
Agriculture
Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service; Plum Island Animal Disease
Center
Appropriations
“appropriation of the revenue for the
support of the Government”
Armed Services
“Department of Defense”; “national
security aspects of nuclear energy”;
“military research and development”;
“strategic and critical materials
necessary for the common defense”
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs
“...defense production”
Commerce, Science, and
“Coast Guard...”; “highway safety”;
Transportation
“...consumer products...including
testing related to toxic substances”;
telecommunications; federal research
and development
Energy and Natural Resources
“energy policy”; DOE national
laboratories; national parks; public
lands
Environment and Public Works
“environmental effects of toxic
substances”; “public buildings and
grounds”
Foreign Relations
“national security”; “treaties...”;
“diplomatic service”; “relations of
U.S. with foreign nations”
Finance
trade
Governmental Affairs
“organization and reorganization of
the executive branch”
Health, Education, Labor, and
“public health”
Pensions
Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency

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Table 2. Senate Committees With Rule XXV
Language and Jurisdiction Over Issues and
Agencies Related to Homeland Security
Judiciary
“...espionage...”
Secret Service; Immigration and
Naturalization Service; Border Patrol;
computer security
Rules and Administration
oversight over physical security,
information security, and emergency
preparedness for the Senate and
Capitol complex
Veterans Affairs
backup medical provider to the
Department of Defense
To Consider Proposals to Create a Department of Homeland
Security: Options for Congressional Organization
Dispersed responsibility over specific topics of public policy has identifiable
benefits and costs. When several committees in both chambers can claim some share
of responsibility for a policy area, competition for legislative and oversight
prominence serves to spur committee activity among all the panels asserting
jurisdiction. House and Senate rules encourage such competition, especially in the
area of oversight, by granting specified committees oversight jurisdiction that is far
broader than their legislative authority. Such grants of power may encourage
overlapping efforts among committees and may guarantee that a specified policy area
is not ignored by congressional committees. Dispersed policy responsibility,
conversely, may also inhibit the development of a comprehensive policy. When no
single committee can claim exclusive legislative jurisdiction over a specific subject,
it may be difficult or impossible to enact comprehensive legislation.
This section addresses ways the Congress could organize itself to consider the
proposal to create a Department of Homeland Security.
Present system. Congress could decide to make no alteration to its
established procedures or to the established roles and jurisdictions of its current
committees. It could be argued that dispersed congressional authority over this broad
subject assures that many different perspectives will be brought to bear on
congressional action in this area. The House committee with jurisdiction over
executive organization, the Committee on Government Reform, would presumably
receive the primary referral of legislation to create a new Cabinet department. In the

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Senate, the Governmental Affairs Committee has predominant jurisdiction and has
already reported related legislation on the subject.1
Informal Task Force. Task forces are normally used when committee
jurisdiction is divided among several panels, or when partisan intensity appears likely
to delay or prevent committee action. Task forces have no independent staffing
resources nor do they have institutional powers granted to committees. However, task
forces are able to work quickly because they can work informally. Party leaders or
party caucuses typically create such task forces. In appropriate circumstances,
bipartisan or bicameral task forces could be created, but task forces typically have
been single-party and single-chamber organizations. If a task force were to be
created to review the proposal to create a Cabinet department, questions would exist
about it. For example, would the task force have the authority to draft and report
legislation? Would it be bipartisan? Bicameral? Would its work product need to be
reviewed by one or more established committees with the authority to report
legislation?
Specialized subcommittee. The House and Senate have occasionally made
use of special subcommittees with augmented authority to handle specific issues on
a short-term basis. Although such subcommittees would have expanded authority,
they still must operate as part of their parent committees. They lack the perceived
authority that comes with being a stand-alone committee.
Select committee. The House and Senate have long made use of select
committees to review policies that do not fit neatly into the jurisdictions of any single
House or Senate committee. However, it is rare for select committees to be granted
legislative jurisdiction. The Senate most recently created a Select Committee on
Y2K and the House created a Select Committee on U.S. National Security and
Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China. Both panels
were created by resolution with a fixed termination date. With the exception of the
House and Senate Intelligence Committees, Congress has been reluctant in recent
years to establish permanently authorized select committees.
If a select committee with legislative jurisdiction were to be established, issues
exist whether the chamber creating it would give the select committee exclusive
jurisdiction to work on the proposal, or whether the new panel would share
jurisdiction with standing committees. Alternatively, a select committee could be
established to study an issue and to submit its findings to the appropriate legislative
committees of its parent chamber for further action.
Ad hoc committee. House rules permit the Speaker to appoint an ad hoc
committee to coordinate legislation on specified subjects. Typically, the House
1 The measures to create the Departments of Transportation, Veterans Affairs, Education,
HHS, and HUD, all were referred to the House Committee on Government Reform and the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. The measure to create the Department of
Energy was jointly referred to the Committee on Government Reform and the Committee
on Post Office and Civil Service, a panel abolished in 1995; its jurisdiction was absorbed
by the Committee on Government Reform.

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establishes such an ad hoc committee by resolution, and draws committee members
largely from the House standing committees having legislative jurisdiction over a
subject area. Such ad hoc committees typically review legislation reported from
standing committees before such bills are considered by the House. This allows the
ad hoc committee to enforce some degree of policy coherence on a subject that falls
within the jurisdiction of a number of House panels. The House used such ad hoc
committees twice in the 1970s, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Outer Continental
Shelf and the Ad Hoc Committee on Energy. The Senate has never established an
ad hoc panel, but nothing in its rules would prohibit it from doing so.
Joint committee. The House and Senate could agree, typically by concurrent
resolution or bill, to establish a joint committee. Joint committees typically are
named to study or coordinate policy review. Only one joint committee in recent
years has been granted legislative jurisdiction, the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, 1947-1977. Joint committees have the advantage of establishing one focal
point within Congress on a specific subject area. However, unless legislative
jurisdiction were granted to a joint committee, its ability to streamline legislative
action would likely be minimal. Alternatively, the House and Senate could establish
their own individual select committees, which could conduct joint hearings or other
activities. 2
Standing committee (new). Either or both chambers could create a new
standing committee with legislative jurisdiction over the proposal. Such an action
would require a change in chamber rules and possibly a realignment of existing
legislative jurisdictions among the standing committees. Congress has historically
found it difficult to reapportion committee jurisdictions, especially in the middle of
a Congress or in the midst of intense policy concern. The committee might not
absorb jurisdiction from existing committees, but could comprise members from
relevant committees.
Options for Congressional Organization and for Legislative
and Oversight Jurisdiction over a New Cabinet Department
of Homeland Security
If a new department is created, regardless of how the proposal was handled to
establish the new department, Congress might still need to address the issue of which
House and Senate committees would have legislative and oversight responsibility
over its activities. Several outside groups have recently provided recommendations
on the appropriate organization of House and Senate committees over issues related
to terrorism and homeland security.
2In the absence of formal action by either chamber, House and Senate standing
committees could be encouraged by chamber leaders to conduct studies and hold
hearings jointly in the interest of efficiency.

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The National Commission on Terrorism (“Bremer Commission”) recommended
congressional reform and found that “Congress should develop a mechanism for
reviewing the President’s counterterrorism policy and budget as a whole....”3
The Center for Strategic and International Studies Working Group on Homeland
Defense stated, “The objective would be for each legislative body to have only one
authorization and one appropriations committee for cyber threats, [chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear] terrorism, and critical infrastructure
protection.”4
The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (“Hart-Rudman
Commission”) recommended that Congress “form a special select committee for
homeland security to provide congressional support and oversight...”5
The Advisory Panel to Assess the Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (“Gilmore Commission”) stated, “We
recommend the establishment of a Special Committee for Combating Terrorism-
either a joint committee between the Houses or a separate committee in each House-
to address authority and funding, and to provide Congressional oversight, for Federal
programs and authority for combating terrorism.”6
Retain current structure. Congress could decide that the current system is
sufficient to monitor the work of the new department. No changes would be made
in either jurisdiction or referral procedures. The programs, activities, and units of
the Department of Energy, for example, are within the jurisdiction of more than one
committee in each chamber. Retaining the current committee structure in either or
both chambers could create jurisdiction struggles among committees claiming to be
the primary (House) or predominant (Senate) committee.
Reorganize entire system. Either or both chambers could undertake an
extensive reorganization of the committee system. Both chambers have done so in
recent years, although in varying degrees. The Joint Committee on the Organization
of Congress in the 103rd Congress considered numerous options for such a
3National Commission on Terrorism. Countering the Changing Threat of International
Terrorism: Report of the National Committee on Terrorism. 105th Cong., 2nd sess.,
[http://www.terrorism.com/documents/bremercommission/index.shtml].
4Center for Strategic and International Studies Working Group Reports on Homeland
Defense, Combating Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism: A
Comprehensive Strategy. [http://www.csis.org/homeland/reports/defendamer21stexec
summ.pdf].
5U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map for National Security:
Imperative for Change. 2001., p., ix.
6Advisory Panel to Assess the Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Second Annual Report: Toward a National Strategy for
Combating Terrorism.

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reorganization. 7 Either chamber could reorganize without the approval of the other.
One option would be for a parallel committee structure between the chambers. 8
Realign committee jurisdiction. Within the existing system, either or both
chambers could choose to realign their committee jurisdictions within the existing
structure. This would entail changing chamber rules. Past experience indicates that
Members generally have been loathe to overhaul the committee system, especially
in the middle of a Congress. However, rules changes are traditionally adopted at the
beginning of a new Congress, and changes could be drafted after the adjournment of
the 107th Congress and included in the package of rules changes voted on at the
convening of the108th Congress.
Change referral system. Both chambers generally refer measures to a single
committee, by determining primary jurisdiction in the House and predominant
jurisdiction in the Senate. In the House, sequential referrals do occur. In the House
especially, joint, simultaneous referrals were allowed until 1995. Changing the
referral system could enable all interested committees to maintain legislative and
oversight jurisdiction. For example, the Speaker of the House, who has the authority
to impose time limits on referrals, could be required to impose them on all
committees involved in a multiple referral. In addition, for legislation on homeland
security, the House could allow joint referrals. In the Senate, which generally
requires unanimous consent for multiple referral absent a formal agreement, the party
leadership could invoke its authority to make joint referrals.
Create new standing committee over homeland security. A new
standing committee could be created in either or both chambers. Such a panel could
have legislative responsibility over all aspects of a new Department of Homeland
Security. Questions regarding whether the new committee would absorb jurisdiction
from existing panels or overlap with them would need to be decided. Would special
oversight authority be granted to a new committee? Creating a new standing
committee would require a change in chamber rules.
Create select committee over homeland security. Members in both the
House and Senate have introduced resolutions to create select committees. In the
House, Representative J.C. Watts (R-OK), introduced H.Res. 52, which states that
Congress “should establish a panel to examine the adequacy of its committee
structure to deal with issues related to domestic terrorism and to consider the creation
of more effective structures, including a Select Committee on Domestic Terrorism.”
Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS), introduced S. Res. 165 to create a Select Committee on
Homeland Security and Terrorism, with the panel having “primary and preeminent”
jurisdiction over homeland security and terrorism.
7Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, Background Materials: Supplemental
Information Provided to Members of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress.
103rd Cong., 1st sess. pp, 608-788.
8Such a restructuring would enable the chambers to also address other committee
jurisdiction and organization issues. For example, reports have indicated the possibility
of re-creating a House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

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Select committees generally are not granted legislative jurisdiction. If such a
new panel were created, would it have legislative authority? If so, would other
committees receive sequential referrals of their legislative product? If such a select
committee were created without legislative jurisdiction, its finding and
recommendations would need to be transferred to a standing committee.
Realign Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittees. The only panels
in Congress with closely parallel structures are the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees. Each could create a 14th subcommittee on homeland defense, which
would have responsibility over the funding for the new department and the entities
transferred to it. This subcommittee could be created irrespective of any legislative
or oversight jurisdictional changes.
Create a joint committee on homeland security. The House and Senate
could create a joint committee to oversee the work of a new department. However,
only one joint committee in the last half-century has been granted legislative
jurisdiction. If such a joint panel were created, the question of sequential referrals
to existing standing committees could still be raised

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