Fair Use on the Internet

Fair Use on the Internet

Order Code RL31423
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Fair Use on the Internet
May 21, 2002
Christopher Alan Jennings
Legislative Attorney
American Law Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Fair Use on the Internet
Summary
The originating objective of copyright, as stated in the Constitution, was to
promote the progress of science and the useful arts. Rewarding the labor of authors
is viewed as furthering that objective. The Copyright Act serves this two-tier
purpose by vesting in authors of protected works certain exclusive rights. The
unauthorized use of copyrighted material constitutes an infringement of these rights,
unless the use is excused by a statutory exception. By limiting these rights, the
Copyright Act attempts to strike a fair balance between an author’s exclusive rights
and the public’s interest in using copyrighted material. The fair use defense, a
statutory exception to a copyright holder’s exclusive rights, is integral to obtaining
this balance, as it permits courts to avoid rigid application of a copyright holder’s
exclusive rights, when, on occasion, it would undermine the primary purpose of the
Copyright Act.
The advent and spread of Internet technologies pose new challenges to Congress
and the courts in maintaining a balance between the free flow of information over the
Internet while still protecting intellectual property rights. The application of the fair
use doctrine is one way courts endeavor to strike a proper balance.
In assessing whether a use of a copyrighted work is a “fair use,” courts weigh
four statutory factors – (1) the purpose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole, and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for the copyrighted work.
A bright line approach to fair use is difficult, if not impossible to formulate, as
courts examine fair use on a case by case basis. However, it appears that the new
digital environment has not caused the courts to abandon or significantly deviate
from traditional fair use analysis. Courts appear to be applying the fair use factors
in a technologically neutral manner.
Specifically, courts have held web sites and other internet service providers
liable for copyright infringements conducted through various internet-related
functions, such as posting, linking, file sharing and storage, the maintenance of
electronic bulletin boards, and video streaming. Fair use was successfully invoked
in a case involving the creation and display of thumbnail images. This report reviews
the development of fair use on the Internet, and will be updated as circumstances
warrant.

Contents
I. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. Fair Use in a Nutshell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
A. The Purpose and Character of the Work – 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) . . . . . 2
B. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work – 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) . . . . . . . 3
C. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used –
17 U.S.C. § 107(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
D. Effect on the Market Value for the Original – 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) . . 4
III. Fair Use on the Internet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
IV. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Fair Use on the Internet
I. Introduction.
Copyright owners enjoy exclusive rights over the use of their protected work,
but not without certain exceptions.1 These rights include the right to reproduce and
distribute copies, prepare derivative works, and publicly perform and display the
work.2 The unauthorized use of copyrighted material constitutes an infringement of
these rights, unless the use is excused by a statutory exception. “Fair use,” one of
these exceptions, is designed to permit the use of copyrighted works by the public
“for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, . . . scholarship,
or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”3
In assessing whether a use of a copyrighted work is a “fair use,” courts weigh
four statutory factors – (1) the purpose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole, and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for the copyrighted work.4 A bright line approach to fair use is difficult, if not
impossible, to formulate, as courts examine the fair use defense on a case by case
basis.
Courts have ruled against fair use and have found copyright liability for
infringements conducted through various Internet-related functions, such as posting,
linking, file sharing and storage, the maintenance of electronic bulletin boards, and
video streaming. Fair use, however, was successfully invoked in a case involving the
creation and display of thumbnail images.
This report provides an overview of each fair use factor and analyzes them in
the context of particular Internet technologies.
1The Copyright Act protects original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of
expression. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
2 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 106A.
3 17 U.S.C. § 107 (these examples are illustrative rather than exclusive).
4 Id. These factors were first articulated judicially in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348
(D. Mass. 1841) (Story, J.).

CRS-2
II. Fair Use in a Nutshell
Fair use is an affirmative defense to a claim of copyright infringement.5 It is a
privilege, not a right. More specifically, it is “an equitable rule of reason, which
permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion,
it would” undermine the purpose of copyright.6 “The primary objective of copyright
is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.’ . . . To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original
expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information
conveyed by a work.”7 Courts apply the four fair use factors with this over arching
purpose in mind.
A. The Purpose and Character of the Work – 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
The first factor in the fair-use analysis, the purpose and character of the
infringing work, has two primary facets, whether the use serves a commercial
purpose, and whether the new use is transformative.
Commercial Use. Commercial use of copyrighted material cuts against a
finding of fair use. According to the Supreme Court “the crux of the profit/nonprofit
distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain, but whether the
user stands to profit from the exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying
the customary price.”8 This standard does not require courts to make a clear-cut
choice between two absolute choices – i.e., making a dispositive decision of whether
a use is a “commercial” or “non-profit” per se. Rather, “the commercial nature of
a use is a matter of degree, not absolute.”9 This places the question of commercial
use on a continuum between two extremes: (1) a use that serves a non-commercial
purpose by a non-commercial entity charging no fee whatsoever, and (2) a use that
serves a commercial purpose by a commercial entity deriving its revenue directly
from a fee charged for the copyrighted material.

Transformative Use. “The goal of copyright, to promote science and the
useful arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.”10 For this
reason, “the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of
other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”11
What constitutes a “transformative work” is not subject to exacting definition.
5To make out a prima facie case for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must show ownership
of a valid copyright and unauthorized copying by the defendant. The copying must be
substantially similar to the “expressive” aspects of the copyrighted material. Ideas,
processes, and facts are not copyrightable.
6 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990).
7 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50, quoting U.S. CONST.
ART. I, sec. 8, cl. 8.
8 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, Inc., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
9Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1262 (2d Cir. 1986).
10 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
11Id.

CRS-3
However, as a general rule, if the new work “merely supersedes the objects of the
original creation,”12 it is not transformative, but if it “adds something new, with a
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message,” it is transformative.13 Transformative uses add new
information, new aesthetics, new insights and new understandings. Such uses may
include criticizing the copyrighted work, “exposing the character of the original
author, proving a fact,” or representing the original work in order to defend or rebut
it.14
B. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work – 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
The second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, recognizes that there is
a hierarchy of copyright protection in which original, creative works are afforded
greater protection than derivative works or factual compilations.15 Also, the fact that
a work is published or unpublished is a critical element of this factor.16 The use of
published works is more likely to qualify as fair use because the first appearance of
the artist’s expression has already occurred.

Thus, a finding of fair use will be couched between two extremes. Use of an
unpublished, creative work weighs against fair use, while use of a published work
relating factual material weighs in favor of fair use.
C. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used – 17 U.S.C.
§ 107(3).
The third fair-use factor considers the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole. “There are no absolute rules as
to how much of a copyrighted work may be copied and still be considered a fair
use.”17 Rather, this factor has both quantitative and qualitative components, under
which courts have found a use to be unfair where the material used formed a
“substantial percentage” of the copyrighted work or where the material was
“essentially the heart of” the copyrighted work.18 In applying this standard, the
Supreme Court has held that this factor “must be examined in context,” focusing on
whether the extent of copying is “consistent with or more than necessary to further
the purpose and character of the use.”19
12 Marsh, 9 F. Cas. at 348.
13 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
14 Pierre Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990).
15 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
16 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564 (noting that the scope of fair use is narrower with
respect to unpublished works because the author’s right to control the first public
appearance of his work weighs against the use of his work before its release).
17 Maxtone-Graham, 803 F.2d at 1263
18 See New Era Publications v. Carol Publishing Group, 904 F.2d 152, 158 (2nd Cir. 1990).
19 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.

CRS-4
D. Effect on the Market Value for the Original – 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
While courts frequently identify this as the most important element of a fair use
analysis,20 the legislative history cautions that it “must almost always be judged in
conjunction with the other three criteria.”21 In addressing this factor, courts “consider
not only the extent of market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged
infringer, but also whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged
in by the defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential
market.”22 The Supreme Court has stated, “the only harm to derivatives that need
concern us . . . is the harm of market substitution.”23 While a “work that merely
supplants or supersedes another is likely to cause a substantially adverse impact on
the potential market of the original,” courts have held that “a transformative work is
less likely to do so.”24
III. Fair Use on the Internet
The advent and spread of Internet technologies challenges Congress and the
courts to maintain a balance between the free flow of information and the protection
of intellectual property rights. Application of the fair use doctrine is one way courts
endeavor to strike the proper balance.
Merely browsing a web site containing copyrighted material may, theoretically,
constitute copyright infringement. As one court has stated, “when a person browses
a web site, a copy of the website is made in the computer’s random access memory
(RAM), to permit the viewing of the website’s material. And in making a copy, even
a temporary one,” copyright’s reproduction, distribution, and public display rights are
20 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 (finding, in a case involving copyright infringement
of unpublished material, that the fourth factor “is undoubtedly the single most important
element of fair use”); Wright v. Warner Books, 953 F.2d 731, 739 (2d Cir 1991)(involving
infringement of unpublished material), citing 471 U.S. at 566; Association of Medical
Colleges v. Cuomo, 928 F.2d 519, 525 (2d Cir 1990)(involving infringement of published
material), citing 471 U.S. at 566; Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, 142 F.3d 194, 206 (4th Cir
1998)(involving infringement of unpublished material), citing 471 U.S. at 566; Princeton
University Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1385 (6th Cir 1996)(involving
infringement of published material), citing 471 U.S. at 566; United Tel. Co. v. Johnson Pub.
Co., 855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir 1988)(involving infringement of published material), citing 471
U.S. at 566; Hustler Magazine v. Moral Majority, 796 F.2d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir
1986)(involving infringement of published material), citing 471 U.S. at 566. See also,
Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d
Cir 1983)(“the fourth factor . . . is widely accepted to be the most important”).
21 H.R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong.,1st Sess. 33, 35 (1967).
22Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567.
23Id.
24 Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir. 2000),
citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591, and Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567-69.

CRS-5
potentially violated.25 However, courts have acknowledged that while browsing may,
on its face, infringe on copyright, it will, in most foreseeable cases, be a fair use.26
Courts have held web sites and other Internet service providers liable for
infringements conducted through various Internet-related functions such as linking,
media streaming, file sharing and storage, the maintenance of electronic bulletin
boards, and posting. Fair use, however, was successfully invoked in a case involving
the use of low resolution, “thumbnail” copies of photographic images.
Notwithstanding the low number of successful fair use claims, courts appear to be
applying the fair use factors in a technologically neutral manner. That is, the new
digital environment has not caused the courts to abandon or significantly deviate
from traditional fair use analysis.
A. Linking and Framing
“Linking,” a ubiquitous Internet function, comes in two varieties: outline links
and inline links. When a user clicks on an outline link, the browser displays a new
web site. When a user clicks on an inline link, the browser pulls content – e.g., an
image file, textual material, or audio stream – from another web site into the linking
site for performance or display. “Framing” is substantially similar to inline linking
and occurs when material from a link is displayed within a “frame” or window border
of a page on the linking web site. The use of these technologies to appropriate
copyrighted material raises a number of issues.
Outline Links. An outline link that connects a user to a site containing
infringing material may further infringing reproductions, performances, distributions,
and displays by others.27 If a linked site contains infringing material, the link may
give rise to secondary liability for contributory or vicarious infringement on the part
of the linking site, particularly if the linking site is promoting the copying,
transmission, public display or public performance of material at the linked site. To
the extent that the linked material is not infringing in itself, the reproduction,
distribution, performance, or display that results from the link may not be authorized,
and therefore may constitute an infringement in its own right.28
25 Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah
1999).
26See Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1378 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (acknowledging in dicta that much of digital browsing
constitutes infringement, but would, in most cases, qualify as a fair use or an innocent
infringement).
27 17 U.S.C. § 512 provides a safe harbor to online service providers who set up out links
to infringing material without knowledge of the infringement.
28 See, e.g., Intellectual Reserve, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 1290 (granting preliminary injunction
under a theory of contributory copyright infringement against a web site that provided
outline links to infringing material at another web site), and compare with, Bernstein v. JC
Penney, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)1063 (C.D. Cal. 1998)(denying a preliminary injunction
against a non-infringing outline link to infringing material).
It is unclear whether an outline link might also be considered the creation of an unauthorized
(continued...)

CRS-6
The fair use doctrine may apply to many outline links, because it is likely the
case that many site owners will want their material disseminated as widely as
possible. However, where a link causes harm, fair use may not be appropriate. For
example, unauthorized links may burden the linked site’s server by increasing traffic
to the web site. To the extent that the links pull in users that the linked site is not
targeting, the owner of the linked site could argue that such traffic is unwanted and
prevents the distribution of copyrighted material to its desired audience. Specific
kinds of outline links, such as deep linking, may raise other issues.
Deep Linking. Most web sites have a “home” page to which all subsidiary pages
are linked. A home page is akin to a front door that users open to gain access to the
web site’s contents. Often, a web site’s commercial applications, such as advertising
and other commercial solicitations, are displayed as the user enters the site’s front
door and proceeds through the first few subsidiary pages. A deep link can bypass a
web site’s introductory pages, and therefore its commercial applications, sending a
user directly to the site’s content or particular service
.
In Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corporation,29 the lower court, in dicta, commented on
the use of deep links by a “visual search engine.” The court noted that deep links
provided by a search engine specializing in finding, indexing, and referring users to
images on the Internet would not violate the reproduction or public display rights of
a photographer, whose photographs were made available by the search engine. The
court acknowledged that the search engine’s links allowed users to bypass the
plaintiff’s “front page” and thereby made it less likely that users would see all of the
plaintiff’s advertisements and promotional messages. However, this, the court noted,
was insufficient evidence of harm or adverse market impact for an otherwise fair use
of the plaintiff’s copyright material.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the material issues of
this case, which involved the search engine’s practice of inline linking to and framing
of the photographs, as well as its use of low resolution, thumbnail images to depict
the photographer’s images. These aspects of the case are discussed immediately
below.
Inline Links and Frames. Inline links and frames appear more problematic
than outline links, in general, and deep links, in particular. As this technology allows
a web site to appropriate copyrighted material by pulling content from another site
into its own, an unauthorized inline link or frame may infringe on the right of
reproduction, display, or performance, or may constitute the creation of an
unauthorized derivative work.
28(...continued)
derivative work. Viewed in one way, an outline link merely “references” another work, and
does not constitute a derivative work. On the other hand, the linking site could be viewed
as a virtual collective work, where links incorporate the material from the linked site into
its own. Insofar as the linked content enhances the linking site content, it is arguably the
case that the linking site is “based upon” the linked site and therefore constitutes a derivative
work.
29 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 1999).

CRS-7
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp,30 discussed above, involved inline linking and framing by
a visual search engine of copyrighted photographs. In response to a user’s query,
Arriba, the search engine, displayed the results of its search as a series of “thumbnail”
images. As discussed above, Arriba would then deep link its users to the full sized
images. However, before Arriba had initiated this practice, a user could click on the
thumbnail and view the full version within the context of the Arriba’s web site.
The Ninth Circuit parsed the case into two distinct issues. The first, which is
discussed in subsection B, concerned the reproduction of the photographs as
thumbnail images. The second involved the use of inline links and frames to display
those images within the context of the search engine’s web site.
The search engine’s display of the full-sized images was held not to be a fair
use.31 Under the first analytical factor, the court stated that pulling the images into
the search engine’s web site did not serve a different purpose or add new expressive
elements to the photographs. The practice harmed the photographer’s existing
market by discouraging traffic to his web site, where he sold advertising space as
well as books and travel packages. In addition, the use harmed the photographer’s
derivative markets. For instance, he could sell or license his photographs to other
web sites or to a stock photo database, which then could offer the images to its
customers. Accordingly, the court held that the unauthorized inline linking to or
framing of copyrighted photographic images was not a fair use, but constituted an
infringement of a copyright holder’s public display right.
B. Thumbnails.
“Thumbnails,” imprecise copies of low resolution, scaled down images, are
widely exploited by web sites. Generally, a website will use a thumbnail as a
reference device, and embed a link in the image, which will, in turn, send a user to
a high resolution, full scale version of the image. When used for this purpose, a
thumbnail of an image may potentially infringe on a number of exclusive rights,
including the reproduction, distribution, public display rights, and, arguably, the right
to make derivative works. As of the date of this report, only one reported case, Kelly
v. Arriba, has addressed copyright issues related to the creation and use of thumbnail
versions of copyrighted images.
In Kelly, the court found that the use of thumbnail images implicated the
photographer’s reproduction right, but was, nonetheless, a fair use.32 While the use
of the images served a commercial purpose, the search engine neither used the
images to directly promote its web site nor tried to profit by selling them. As the
search engine did not directly benefit from the images and did not use them in a
“highly exploitative way, the commercial nature of the use only slightly weighed
30 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
31 See id. at 940 - 947.
32 See id. at 941 - 944.

CRS-8
against a finding of fair use.”33 The thumbnails also served a transformative use,
since they “were much smaller, lower-resolution images that served an entirely
different purpose than [the] original images, [functioning] as a tool to help index and
improve access to images on the Internet ... .”34 For similar reasons, the court found
that the thumbnails did not have an adverse impact on the photographer’s market, but
would enhance his market by creating a demand for the larger images.
C. Streaming Media
Streaming provides access to a wide variety of visual and musical works,
allowing users to listen to retransmissions of radio programs, concerts and other
musical events and services, as well as view music videos, television shows, movies,
cartoons, and other transmissions of visual content. A single transmission of music
or video can simultaneously infringe on a copyright holder’s reproduction,
distribution, public display and performance rights, in addition to the right to make
derivative works.
In Video Pipeline v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment,35 the defendant, Video
Pipeline, created and streamed movie trailers to its clients, video retailers, for
exhibition to their customers. The court held that this practice infringed on the
plaintiff’s reproduction, public performance, and distribution rights, as well as its
right to make derivative works. The streams were not defensible under the fair use
doctrine. The court found that the use furthered a commercial purpose, since the
service derived a direct financial benefit from the streams – its sole purpose was to
advertise and promote video rentals. Moreover, the use was not transformative, since
no new “creative ingenuity” was involved in preparing the previews, aside from
“snipping and clipping.”36 Even though the length of the previews were usually less
than two minutes, whereas the length of the motion pictures was over one and a half
hours, the small amount used did not sway the court to find in favor of fair use. From
a qualitative perspective, the court found the previews relied too heavily upon the
“expressive value” of copyrighted works – e.g., their themes, plots, character, and
overall premise. In doing so, the clips went to the heart of the copyrighted works,
coopting their essence. Accordingly, despite an indeterminate finding on the
question of market impact,37 the court rejected Video Pipeline’s fair use argument.
33 Id. at 941.
34 Id.
35 192 F. Supp. 2d 321(D.N.J. 2002).
36 Id. at 324 (finding that creating motion picture previews “involved no new creative
ingenuity, apart from snipping and slicing that undoubtedly occurred in selecting the
excerpts to be viewed”).
37On the one hand, the previews had a negative market impact since the presence of the
previews on the Internet undermined the copyright holder’s right to determine how, when,
where and to whom to market its motion pictures. On the other hand, the streams helped
promote video rentals and sales of the copyright holder’s motion pictures.

CRS-9
D. Peer-to-Peer File Sharing
File sharing refers to a process in which devices controlled by end users, known
as peers, interact directly with each other to transfer files between them, rather than
using an intermediary, such as a central server, to transfer files. Music, literature,
motion pictures, photographs, and other examples of copyrightable content can be
traded over a file sharing, or “peer-to-peer” network. These networks are
architecturally diverse. The design of some file-sharing networks employs a central
server to house a publicly accessible and searchable index of files available over the
network. Other designs eliminate centralized servers altogether. In these systems, a
user joins an immediate community of peers and searches within that community.
The user’s query goes through the immediate community first, and if it is not
satisfied, the query then goes to another community of peers.
When peers engage in the unauthorized trade of copyrighted material, the
copyright holder’s reproduction and distribution rights are implicated. The Internet
service that provides for the functionality of these networks may be held secondarily
liable for the infringing acts of its users, even though it does not reproduce, store, or
directly distribute copies of the infringing files on its servers.
In A&M Records v. Napster,38 various record companies brought an
infringement action against Napster, an Internet service that facilitated the sharing of
digital music files among its users. The files themselves–the infringing
material–always remained on user systems and never passed through Napster’s
system. However, Napster maintained a central server that indexed the contents of
the network. This feature allowed users to search for particular files of interest and
to initiate a peer-to-peer transfer of those files. This functionality was the basis for
holding Napster secondarily liable for the infringing acts of its users.
Rejecting Napster’s argument that the users were making fair use of the record
companies’ copyrighted material, the court emphasized that the use was commercial
because the users of the network received for free what they normally would have to
buy, namely, compact discs. It was not transformative, since the service added no
new creative or expressive elements to the copyrighted material. Moreover, the court
held that the service not only harmed the copyright owner’s existing market for the
sale of musical compact discs, but also raised barriers to the copyright owner’s entry
into the same market.39
E. Posting and Storage
Making copyrighted works publicly available over the Internet raises obvious
copyright issues. The most common means of doing this is by storing copyrighted
works on publicly accessible servers or by posting copyrighted material on Internet-
related services, such as bulletin board services or web sites. These uses can violate
38 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001).
39See id. at 912 - 913, aff’d 239 F.3d at 1017 (noting further that “lack of harm to an
established market cannot deprive the copyright holder of the right to develop alternative
markets for the works”).

CRS-10
a host of exclusive rights, but may, in some circumstances, constitute a non-
infringing fair use.
Storage of Digital Files. In UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, various record
companies sued an Internet company, MP3.com, for storing personal MP3 music
files created from personal copies of compact discs sold by the plaintiffs.40 By
opening an account with MP3.com, an individual could store his or her MP3 music
files on MP3.com’s central servers for play at a later time and place. MP3.com
argued that the copying necessary to provide this service was a “fair use.” Rejecting
this argument, the court found that copying the recordings to facilitate their
retransmission through another medium was not a “transformative” use, nor was it
a time-shifting transformative use (e.g., video taping a television program for
viewing at a later time). The court also held that the recordings at issue were at the
core of intended copyright protection and the amount copied was excessive. Most
importantly, the court concluded that MP3.com’s business model had an adverse
impact on the recording companies’ market for selling compact music discs as well
as on other derivative markets.
Web Site Postings. In Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress
International,41 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an unauthorized posting
of copyrighted “model codes” for municipalities and localities infringed on the
owner’s reproduction and publication rights. Without the defendant’s permission,
plaintiff posted defendant’s copyrighted model building codes on plaintiff’s nonprofit
web site.42 Regarding the plaintiff’s fair use argument, the court noted that when “use
of a copyrighted work is noncommercial, defeating a fair use defense requires ‘proof
either that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it
would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.’”43 The
potential harm to the defendant precluded plaintiff’s asserted noncommercial fair use
of the copyrighted codes, since the “posting of the codes on the Internet could prove
harmful by reducing the defendant’s market and depriving it of income used in its
socially valuable effort of promulgating and revising model codes.”44
Bulletin Board Services (BBS). A number of early infringement cases on the
Internet involved the unauthorized posting of copyrighted material on electronic
bulletin board services.45 A bulletin board service (BBS) is a computerized version
40 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
41 241 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2001)
42 Plaintiff asserted that copyright protection was not warranted after some of the towns
enacted the model codes into law. The court held that defendant’s codes did not enter the
public domain merely by being enacted into law, and no due process or policy concern
excused plaintiff’s infringement.
43 Id. at 410, quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
44 Veeck, 241 F.3d at 410.
45 See, e.g., Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Texas
1997); Playboy Enterprises v. Russ Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997);
Marobie-Fl, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Fire & Equip. Distribs., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1176-79 (N.D.
(continued...)

CRS-11
of bulletin boards found in stores and other public places where people can leave
messages. Generally, BBSs are run by local computer user groups. Essentially, a
BBS is a host computer that is accessible by direct dial and can operate independent
of the Internet. However, many BBSs also have web sites which connect the BBS
to other similar services and interested users.
Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic,46 a recent case, involved a bulletin board
that posted the entire text of many news articles originally published on two
newspapers’ web sites. The purpose of the posting was to encourage BBS members
to add commentary and criticism. The newspapers sued for copyright infringement.
The BBS operator sought summary judgment on its fair use defense, which the court
rejected. The court found that the market for viewing articles online, for selling
copies of archived articles, and for licensing others to display or sell the articles
would be adversely affected by the availability of verbatim copies on the defendant’s
web site. Although the web site was non-commercial and promoted critical
comment, the defendant failed to show that verbatim copying of the articles was
necessary to achieve its purposes.
In a related issue, the court in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Services determined, on summary judgment, whether an Internet
service provider (ISP) that allowed a BBS to reach the Internet was liable for the
infringing activity of the BBS’s users.47 While the court rejected a theory of direct
copyright infringement, it held that the ISP may be held secondarily liable for the
infringing BBS postings it stores and disseminates over its servers. On the question
of whether the ISP had a valid fair use defense, the court determined that while the
provision of Internet access is commercial, it “also benefits the public in allowing for
the functioning of the Internet and the dissemination of other creative works, a goal
of the Copyright Act.”48 The court went on to conclude that because the Internet
service provider’s “use of copyrighted materials served a completely different
function than that of the [copyright holder], [the first] factor weighs in [the Internet
service provider’s] favor.”49 Turning to the third prong, the court found that the
service provider “copied no more of the plaintiffs’ works than was necessary to
function as an Internet service provider.”50 It “had no practical alternative to carry
out its socially useful purpose, since the prescreening of [Internet traffic through its
routing servers] for potential copyright infringement” was not feasible.51 However,
there remained a material issue of fact as to the extent to which the ISP’s use
45(...continued)
Ill.1997); Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996); and
Playboy Enterprises v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1558 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
46 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
47 Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1378 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
48 Id. at 1379.
49 Id. at 1380.
50 Id. at 1381.
51 Id.

CRS-12
displaced the copyright holder’s market. Therefore, the court refused to grant
summary judgment on the fair use issue to the ISP.
IV. Conclusion
Although the Internet has not caused the courts to abandon or significantly
deviate from traditional fair use analysis, the law is still developing. As the courts
develop this law, this report will be updated.