Education Finance Incentive Grants Under ESEA Title I

Education Finance Incentive Grants Under ESEA Title I

Order Code RL31256
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Education Finance Incentive Grants
Under ESEA Title I
January 28, 2002
David P. Smole
Analyst in Social Legislation
Domestic Social Policy Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Education Finance Incentive Grants
Under ESEA Title I
Summary
Throughout the United States, there exists substantial variation — both across
and within states — in per-pupil expenditures on elementary and secondary education.
Perceived inadequacies in the amount of funding provided for education, and concerns
about the equity of its distribution, have led to education finance systems being
challenged in the courts in many states, mostly on state constitutional grounds. While
much of the responsibility for resolving education finance policy issues has been
relegated to the states, the Congress has identified a federal role in influencing the
amount and the distribution of education expenditures across school districts.
Education finance incentive grants are allocated according to one of the four
allocation formulas authorized under ESEA Title I, Part A for providing federal
education funding to the states for the education of disadvantaged pupils. The
education finance incentive grant formula is unique in that it accounts for various
characteristics of a state’s elementary and secondary education finance system in
determining a state’s grant allocation. In addition to the number of disadvantaged
children, funds are awarded under the formula according to variables that account for
the average level of per-pupil expenditures in the state and the degree to which the
state’s education finance system minimizes disparities in the distribution of
expenditures across local educational agencies.
For FY2002, $793,499,000 has been appropriated for the allocation of education
finance incentive grants under Title I-A. This report estimates the amount of funds
that will be awarded to each state according to the formula, and also describes how
the grants reward states that have education finance systems with characteristics
favored by the formula. This is accomplished by comparing estimated education
finance incentive grant awards to states with what states otherwise might have
received had the funding appropriated for allocation according to the education
finance incentive grant formula been awarded proportionally under the other three
Title I-A formula grants. Our estimates show a distinct, but modest reward, or
incentive, to states having education finance systems with characteristics favored by
the education finance incentive grant formula.

Contents
Education Finance Incentive Grants, ESEA Title I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Education Finance Incentive Grant Formula: State Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Population Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Expenditure Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Effort Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Equity Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Education Finance Incentive Grant Formula: LEA Subgrants . . . . . . . . . . 4
Estimates of State Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
List of Tables
Table 1. Weights for Determining LEA Subgrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Table 2. Education Finance Incentive Grant Expenditure, Effort,
and Equity Factors; and Estimated State Grant Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Table 3. Estimated Incentive Effect of Education Finance
Incentive Grant Formula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Education Finance Incentive Grants
Under ESEA Title I
Throughout the United States, there exists substantial variation — both across
and within states — in per-pupil expenditures on elementary and secondary education.
Much of this variation has to do with the disparate systems employed by the states for
organizing and funding local educational agencies (LEAs) or school districts. The
number and type of districts vary from one state to another, with some states having
only one district and others over a thousand; some states have only unified districts
(elementary and secondary combined), while others have a mix of unified, elementary-
only, secondary-only, and other special purpose districts. States also differ in how
they derive and allocate funding for elementary and secondary education. Some states
rely heavily on locally derived funding for education, primarily generated from
property taxes. Others provide a substantial amount of state funding, usually derived
from income or sales taxes. Typically, locally derived funding is retained within the
district from which it is generated, with the amount of funding per pupil tending to
vary from one district to another according to locally approved tax rates and property
values. State funding tends to be allocated either evenly across districts on a per-pupil
basis, or used to provide proportionately more funding to poorer districts. Funding
disparities in many states’ school finance systems have resulted in the legality of such
systems being challenged on state constitutional grounds, though not always with
success.1
While much of the responsibility for resolving education finance policy issues has
been relegated to the states, the Congress has identified a federal role in influencing
the amount and distribution of education expenditures across school districts. ESEA
Title I — Improving the Academic Achievement of the Disadvantaged, authorizes the
appropriation of federal funds to be distributed to states and LEAs for purposes to
include ensuring “that all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to
obtain a high-quality education and reach, at a minimum, proficiency on challenging
State academic achievement standards and state academic assessments”; and
“distributing and targeting resources sufficiently to make a difference to local
educational agencies and schools where needs are greatest.”2 To accomplish these
purposes, the Congress has authorized four formula-based grants under ESEA Title
I, Part A: basic grants, concentration grants, targeted grants, and education finance
incentive grants.
1For an overview of issues concerning disparities in public elementary and secondary
education expenditures, see CRS Report 96-51, Public School Expenditure Disparities: Size,
Sources, and Debates Over Their Significance, by Wayne Riddle and Liane White. Also,
descriptions of state education finance systems can be accessed via the Internet on the
National Center for Education Statistics website at:
[http://nces.ed.gov/edfin/state_finance/statefinancing.asp].
2P.L. 107-110, The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, ESEA, Section 1001.

CRS-2
Education Finance Incentive Grants, ESEA Title I
The 103rd Congress authorized the allocation of education finance incentive
grants under P.L. 103-382, the Improving America’s Schools Act (IASA) of 1994,
which amended and extended the ESEA; however, the Congress had never
appropriated funding for the allocation of grants.3 The 107th Congress amended and
extended the authorization to allocate education finance incentive grants under P.L.
107-110, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, and appropriated $793,499,000 for
the allocation of grants during the 2002-2003 school year.4
Education finance incentive grants are to be allocated to states according to a
formula that rewards states with higher per-pupil expenditures and less disparity in the
distribution of expenditures across districts. It penalizes states that have lower per-
pupil expenditures and greater disparity in the distribution of education expenditures.
The formula for awarding grants to states accounts for state per-pupil expenditures
as a portion of state per-capita income (adjusted relative to national averages) and the
equity of expenditures across LEAs within a state; as well as state average per-pupil
expenditures and the number of disadvantaged children residing within the state (as
is done in the basic, concentration, and targeted grant formulas). Subgrants are
awarded to LEAs within the states according to a formula with weights applied to
either the number or the proportion of disadvantaged children enrolled in a district.
Weights are greater in states with greater disparities in their school finance systems.
Education Finance Incentive Grant Formula:
State Grants
The education finance incentive grant formula is distinguished from the other
Title I-A formulas in that a state’s grant allocation is determined not only by the
number of eligible children in the state and a state expenditure factor, but also by
characteristics of its elementary and secondary education finance system. The state
grant formula contains four variables: a population factor, an expenditure factor, an
effort factor, and an equity factor. Funds are allocated to states proportionally
according to the product of the population factor, the expenditure factor, the effort
factor, and 1.30 minus the equity factor, after accounting for minimum state grant
amount.5 Each variable is described below.
3For a discussion and analysis of the education finance incentive grant program as authorized
under P.L. 103-382, see CRS Report 94-968, Education for the Disadvantaged: Analysis of
1994 ESEA Title I Amendments Under P.L. 103-382, by Wayne C. Riddle; and CRS Report
96-51, Public School Expenditure Disparities: Size, Sources, and Debates Over Their
Significance, by Wayne Riddle and Liane White.
4P.L. 107-116, the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, provides for $793,499,000 in advance FY2003
funding for the Education Finance Incentive Grant program.
5The minimum grant amount for states is the lesser of 0.35% of the total amount appropriated
for the program, or the average of 0.35% of the total amount appropriated and 150% of the
national average grant per eligible child, multiplied by the state’s number of eligible children,
(continued...)

CRS-3
Population Factor. The population factor is the number of children, aged 5
to 17, as counted in the ESEA Title I basic grant formula. This includes children from
families below the poverty line; children in families receiving temporary assistance for
needy families (TANF) payments in excess of the poverty income threshold for a
family of four; and children in institutions for neglected and delinquent children, or
who are being supported in foster homes with public funds, whether or not they are
from a family below the poverty line. This factor has the greatest effect of the four
in determining the size of each state’s grant.
Expenditure Factor. The expenditure factor is defined as 40% of the average
per-pupil expenditures in the state, but is constrained between 34% and 46% of the
average per-pupil expenditures in the United States.6 The expenditure factor is a
measure of the level of per-pupil expenditures in the state, and is unadjusted for state
or regional economic conditions. Constraining the expenditure factor between these
bounds limits its effect in determining a state’s grant award for those states whose
expenditure factor otherwise would be beyond these bounds.
Effort Factor. The effort factor is calculated using state and national data and
is a measure of average per-pupil state and local expenditures for elementary and
secondary education as a proportion of state per-capita income, relative to national
averages of per-pupil expenditures as a proportion of per-capita income. This factor
is calculated using data averaged over the 3 most recent years, with the result limited
by the bounds of 0.95 and 1.05. An effort factor greater than 1.0 indicates that a
state’s per-pupil education expenditures as a proportion of state per-capita income are
greater than the national average, while an effort factor less then 1.0 indicates that the
state’s education expenditures are less than the national average.
The effort factor is distinguished from the expenditure factor, in that for each
state, the effort factor depicts the portion of each individual’s income devoted toward
the education of each child, relative to the national average; whereas the expenditure
factor merely depicts per-pupil expenditures on average. Bounding the effort factor
between 0.95 and 1.05 limits its effect in determining a state’s grant allocation for
those states whose effort factor otherwise would be beyond the bounds. For instance,
the effort factor in the state with the highest effort factor, West Virginia, is reduced
from 1.38 to 1.05; and the effort factor in the state with the lowest effort factor, Utah,
is increased from 0.785 to 0.95. The bounds of 0.95 and 1.05 reduce the effort factor
to 1.05 in 17 states and raise it to 0.95 in 17 states. The effort factor for Puerto Rico
is set at that of the lowest state.
5(...continued)
without applying any weighting factors.
6The bounds under this formula are marginally narrower than for the other three Title I-A
formulas (where they are 32% and 48%). For FY2002, the expenditure factor for Puerto Rico
is set at 34% of the percentage that Puerto Rico’s per-pupil expenditures is of that of the
lowest state’s, except that this percentage shall be at least be 77.5% (this percentage is set to
increase annually, reaching 100% in FY2007). For FY2002, the expenditure factor for Puerto
Rico is 26.35% of the national average.

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Equity Factor. The equity factor is a measure of how evenly per-pupil
elementary and secondary education funding is distributed across LEAs within a state.
This factor is determined by taking the coefficient of variation in LEA per-pupil
expenditures, with LEAs weighted according to total enrollment, and with Title I-
eligible pupils weighted by a factor of 1.4.7 The coefficient of variation is a measure
of dispersion and is calculated for a set of observations by dividing the standard
deviation by the mean. It is useful for comparing relative dispersion across sets of
observations, each with a different mean (as in this instance, with LEA per-pupil
expenditures in each state dispersed around a different mean). A lower coefficient of
variation reflects greater equality. In order for the effect of the equity factor variable
to be greater in states with lower disparities than in those with greater disparities, the
equity factor is subtracted from 1.3 when included in the education finance incentive
grant formula. Under the formula, the equity factor is calculated using expenditure
data only for school districts with enrollments greater than 200 to eliminate distortions
that might be caused by very small districts, which in many cases have very high per-
pupil expenditures. In our calculations, we also excluded expenditure data for
vocational and special education districts that might have exceptionally high per-pupil
expenditures.8
Education Finance Incentive Grant Formula:
LEA Subgrants
Education finance incentive subgrants to LEAs are to be allocated according to
a formula that increasingly weights Title I-eligible pupils as either their total number,
or their proportion of LEA total enrollment, increases. In addition, there is a greater
rate of increase in the weights applied to Title I-eligible pupils in states where
expenditures per pupil are more equal across LEAs than in states where per-pupil
expenditures are less equal. LEA subgrants are to be determined using the greater of
the weighted number of Title I-eligible pupils, as determined according to a scale
based on number of eligible pupils constituting various proportions of total
enrollment, or according to a scale based on the count of eligible pupils in an LEA.
The coefficients used to weight Title I-eligible pupils in the allocation of LEA
subgrants according to both methods are presented in Table 1.
7This weighting factor is employed to reduce the measured level of disparity from what
otherwise would be the result in instances where spending on behalf of high-need pupils from
poor families is higher than spending for other pupils. Otherwise, there would be a
disincentive for states and LEAs to spend more on high-need pupils from poor families than
on other pupils and this would counterbalance the intended effect of the education finance
incentive grant.
8A special rule applies to the equity factor, in that for states that meet the disparity standard
described in 34 CFR 222.162 (essentially, if disparities in current expenditures or revenues
per pupil are no more than 25%, excluding LEAs above the 95th and below the 5th percentiles)
as of the day preceding the enactment of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, and for states
with only one LEA, the equity factor shall not be greater than 0.10. In such instances, we
have assumed that the equity factor shall be the lesser of a state’s calculated equity factor or
0.10. The equity factor was set at 0.10 for three states meeting the disparity standard
(Alaska, Kansas, and New Mexico), and at 0.0 for three single-LEA jurisdictions (District of
Columbia, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico).

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Table 1. Weights for Determining LEA Subgrants
Based on number of eligible children as % of total enrollment
Eligible children
State equity factor
in LEA
<.10
.10 to .20
>=.20
# less than
15.58%
1.000
1.000
1.000
# between
15.58% and 22.11%
1.750
1.500
2.000
# between
22.11% and 30.16%
2.500
3.000
4.000
# between
30.16% and 38.24%
3.250
4.500
6.000
# greater than
38.24%
4.000
6.000
8.000
Based on count of eligible children
Eligible children
State equity factor
in LEA
<.10
.10 to .20
>=.20
# less than
691
1.000
1.000
1.000
# between
691 and 2,262
1.500
1.500
2.000
# between
2,263 and 7,851
2.000
2.250
3.000
# between
7,852 and 35,514
2.500
3.375
4.500
# greater than
35,514
3.000
4.500
6.000
An example will help illustrate how LEA subgrants would be calculated. If a
state had an equity factor of 0.15, the weights in the center column would be used for
calculating LEA subgrants for all LEAs in that state. To determine a particular LEA’s
subgrant, one would first calculate the weighted pupil count based on the proportion
of Title I-eligible children in the LEA. If for example, there were 1,000 pupils in the
LEA, and 310 were eligible for Title I, then a weight of 1.000 would be applied to the
first 155 pupils (i.e., the first 15.58% of Title I-eligible pupils), a weight of 1.500
applied to the next 66 pupils (those between 15.58% and 22.11% of all eligible
pupils), a weight of 3.000 applied to the next 80 pupils (those between 22.11% and
30.16% of eligible pupils), and a weight of 4.500 applied to the remaining nine pupils
(those constituting between 30.16% and 38.24% of eligible pupils). This would result
in a weighted pupil count of 534.5 pupils. Next, the weighted pupil count would be
calculated based on a count of the number of eligible children. Under this method, a
weight of 1.000 would be applied to each of the 310 pupils (i.e., those constituting
less than the first 691 Title I-eligible pupils) for a weighted pupil count of 310. The
greater of these two pupil counts, 534.5, would be used to determine the LEA
subgrant. If this hypothetical LEA were in a state with an equity factor either less
than 0.10 or greater than or equal to 0.20, then the weights in the other respective
columns would be used.
Estimates of State Grants
We now turn to estimating the education finance incentive grants to be provided
to each state for FY2002, after reserving 1% of the appropriated funds for the

CRS-6
outlying areas and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. These estimates are presented in
Table 2, along with each state’s expenditure, effort, and equity factors, as well as per-
pupil grant amounts. As previously noted, while each state’s grant is dependent
largely upon the number of Title I-eligible pupils in the state, the expenditure, effort,
and equity factors determine the amount of a state’s incentive according to
characteristics of its education finance system. For several small states, however, the
small state minimum effectively determines the size of a state’s grant, irrespective of
a state’s expenditure, effort, or equity factors.9
While Table 2 displays the expenditure, effort, and equity factors, and estimated
grant allocation for each state, it is difficult to perceive how the interaction of the
variables in the education finance incentive grant formula determines each state’s
grant allocation. To illustrate what might be termed the incentive effect of the
formula, we estimate the difference between the amount of funds that will be awarded
to the states as education finance incentive grants and the amount that otherwise
might have been be awarded to the states (hypothetically), had the same amount of
funds been allocated proportionally across the other three Title I grants (basic,
concentration, and targeted grants), which as previously mentioned, do not account
for relative effort or equity in a state’s education finance system. This resulting
difference may be considered the incentive provided through the grant allocation
formula for states to maintain elementary and secondary education finance systems
with relatively higher levels of per-pupil expenditures, and greater evenness in the
distribution of per-pupil expenditures across LEAs. These estimates are provided in
Table 3.
As can be seen in Table 3, there is wide variation from state to state in the
difference between what will be allocated under the education finance incentive grant
formula and what otherwise would be allocated were such funds awarded instead
under the other three Title I grant allocation formulas. For instance, the estimated
grant amount is 32.4% higher than it might otherwise have been for South Dakota,
while it is 14.5% lower than it might otherwise have been for Illinois. However, while
the incentive effect for South Dakota is large, this grant amount, and that for eight
other small states, is determined by the small state minimum rather than by the
incentive effects of the grant formula.10 Of the states for which the small state
minimum is not applicable, the greatest incentive effect is for Iowa, at 17.9%. Table
3 clearly indicates that the education finance incentive grant formula is redistributative
in nature, providing more funding than otherwise might be available to those states
with moderate to high per-pupil expenditures and those with lower disparities across
LEAs in the level of state and local per-pupil expenditures, at the expense of those
states that fund elementary and secondary education at a lower level, or with greater
disparities across LEAs.
9The small state minimum applies to nine states: Alaska, Delaware, Idaho, Montana, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming.
10The state minimum is up to 0.35% for all funds allocated under the education finance
incentive grant formula, but is only up to 0.25% for a substantial majority of the funds
allocated under the other three Title I-A formulas.

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Table 2. Education Finance Incentive Grant Expenditure, Effort, and Equity Factors;
and Estimated State Grant Allocations
Expenditure
Effort
Equity
State g rant
$/Title I pupil
State
factor
factor
factor
(e s t imate d)
(e s t imate d)
A labama
$2,254
0.950
0.096
$12,005,000
$67
A laska**
$3,050
1.050
0.100
$2,691,000
$118
Arizona
$2,254
0.950
0.123
$13,343,000
$66
Arkansas
$2,254
0.950
0.128
$7,336,000
$65
California
$2,320
0.950
0.092
$108,509,000
$69
Colorado
$2,374
0.950
0.105
$7,493,000
$70
Connecticut
$3,050
1.012
0.124
$8,293,000
$94
Delaware
$3,050
1.050
0.083
$2,464,000
$130
D istrict of Columbia
$3,050
1.050
0.000
$2,844,000
$108
Florida
$2,395
0.950
0.059
$38,623,000
$73
Georgia
$2,497
0.958
0.106
$23,766,000
$74
Hawaii
$2,558
0.986
0.000
$2,771,000
$85
Idaho
$2,254
0.952
0.139
$2,749,000
$70
Illinois
$2,914
0.961
0.259
$29,271,000
$76
Indiana
$2,748
1.050
0.123
$13,666,000
$88
Iowa
$2,412
1.011
0.073
$5,294,000
$78
Kansas**
$2,542
1.026
0.100
$6,277,000
$81
Kentucky
$2,402
1.050
0.100
$12,354,000
$79
Louisiana
$2,254
1.008
0.096
$15,587,000
$71
Maine
$2,961
1.050
0.134
$2,988,000
$94
Maryland
$2,988
1.026
0.105
$12,687,000
$95
Massachusetts
$3,050
1.034
0.165
$16,779,000
$93
Michigan
$3,050
1.050
0.155
$32,204,000
$95
Minnesota
$2,714
0.950
0.141
$8,972,000
$78
Mississippi
$2,254
0.950
0.102
$8,382,000
$67
Missouri
$2,376
0.963
0.172
$11,776,000
$67
*Effort factor set to 0.95, that of the lowest state.
**Equity factor reduced to 0.10 because state meets disparity standard described at 34 CFR 222.162.

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Expenditure
Effort
Equity
State Grant
$/Title I Pupil
State
Factor
Factor
Factor
(Es timate d)
(Es timate d)
Montana
$2,454
1.050
0.180
$2,749,000
$78
Nebraska
$2,516
1.016
0.098
$3,065,000
$80
Nevada
$2,254
0.950
0.098
$3,118,000
$67
New Hampshire
$2,609
0.950
0.169
$2,506,000
$128
New Jersey
$3,050
1.050
0.139
$20,470,000
$97
New Mexico**
$2,254
0.959
0.100
$6,491,000
$67
New York
$3,050
1.050
0.197
$74,306,000
$92
North Carolina
$2,313
0.950
0.087
$16,446,000
$69
North Dakota
$2,254
0.957
0.145
$2,481,000
$129
Ohio
$2,705
1.048
0.173
$26,213,000
$83
Oklahoma
$2,254
0.964
0.103
$9,679,000
$68
Oregon
$2,918
1.050
0.108
$8,218,000
$95
Pennsylvania
$3,050
1.050
0.174
$31,593,000
$94
Puerto Rico*
$1,747
0.950
0.000
$28,271,000
$56
Rhode Island
$3,050
1.050
0.086
$2,883,000
$101
South Carolina
$2,254
1.003
0.104
$10,982,000
$70
South Dakota
$2,254
0.950
0.116
$2,749,000
$106
Tennessee
$2,254
0.950
0.131
$11,085,000
$65
Texas
$2,307
0.950
0.106
$61,541,000
$68
Utah
$2,254
0.950
0.109
$3,539,000
$66
Vermont
$3,048
1.050
0.208
$2,094,000
$168
Virginia
$2,320
0.950
0.177
$12,522,000
$64
Washington
$2,480
0.950
0.079
$11,567,000
$75
West Virginia
$2,721
1.050
0.055
$6,567,000
$93
Wisconsin
$3,050
1.050
0.105
$13,120,000
$100
Wyoming
$2,814
1.050
0.134
$2,184,000
$156
*Effort factor set to 0.95, that of the lowest state.
**Equity factor reduced to 0.10 because state meets disparity standard described at 34 CFR 222.162.

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Table 3. Estimated Incentive Effect of Education Finance Incentive Grant Formula
Proportionate allocation
Estimate d e ducation
Estimate d
Estimate d
unde r othe r thre e Title I
finance incentive grant
ince ntive
ince ntive
State
formulas
allocation
amount
e ffect
Alabama
$11,640,000
$12,005,000
$365,000
3.1%
Alaska^
$2,226,000
$2,691,000
$465,000
20.9%
Arizona
$13,270,000
$13,343,000
$73,000
0.6%
Arkansas
$7,232,000
$7,336,000
$104,000
1.4%
California
$113,095,000
$108,509,000
-$4,586,000
-4.1%
Colorado
$7,424,000
$7,493,000
$69,000
0.9%
Connecticut
$8,183,000
$8,293,000
$110,000
1.3%
Delaware^
$2,017,000
$2,464,000
$447,000
22.2%
District of Columbia
$2,682,000
$2,844,000
$162,000
6.0%
Florida
$39,959,000
$38,623,000
-$1,336,000
-3.3%
Georgia
$24,577,000
$23,766,000
-$811,000
-3.3%
Hawaii
$2,582,000
$2,771,000
$189,000
7.3%
Idaho^
$2,480,000
$2,749,000
$269,000
10.8%
Illinois
$34,235,000
$29,271,000
-$4,964,000
-14.5%
Indiana
$12,100,000
$13,666,000
$1,566,000
12.9%
Iowa
$4,491,000
$5,294,000
$803,000
17.9%
Kansas
$5,728,000
$6,277,000
$549,000
9.6%
Kentucky
$11,515,000
$12,354,000
$839,000
7.3%
Louisiana
$15,214,000
$15,587,000
$373,000
2.5%
Maine
$2,738,000
$2,988,000
$250,000
9.1%
Maryland
$12,165,000
$12,687,000
$522,000
4.3%
Massachusetts
$16,928,000
$16,779,000
-$149,000
-0.9%
Michigan
$31,271,000
$32,204,000
$933,000
3.0%
Minnesota
$8,769,000
$8,972,000
$203,000
2.3%
Mississippi
$8,030,000
$8,382,000
$352,000
4.4%
Missouri
$12,284,000
$11,776,000
-$508,000
-4.1%
^Grant allocation based on small state minimum.

CRS-10
Proportionate allocation
Estimate d education
Estimate d
Estimate d
unde r othe r thre e Title I
finance ince ntive grant
ince ntive
ince ntive
State
formulas
allocation
amount
e ffect
Montana^
$2,621,000
$2,749,000
$128,000
4.9%
Nebraska
$2,724,000
$3,065,000
$341,000
12.5%
Nevada
$3,247,000
$3,118,000
-$129,000
-4.0%
New Hampshire^
$2,022,000
$2,506,000
$484,000
23.9%
New Jersey
$19,677,000
$20,470,000
$793,000
4.0%
New Mexico
$6,376,000
$6,491,000
$115,000
1.8%
New York
$81,122,000
$74,306,000
-$6,816,000
-8.4%
North Carolina
$16,539,000
$16,446,000
-$93,000
-0.6%
North Dakota^
$2,019,000
$2,481,000
$462,000
22.9%
Ohio
$24,840,000
$26,213,000
$1,373,000
5.5%
Oklahoma
$9,169,000
$9,679,000
$510,000
5.6%
Oregon
$7,154,000
$8,218,000
$1,064,000
14.9%
Pennsylvania
$30,389,000
$31,593,000
$1,204,000
4.0%
Puerto Rico
$25,894,000
$28,271,000
$2,377,000
9.2%
Rhode Island
$2,676,000
$2,883,000
$207,000
7.7%
South Carolina
$10,637,000
$10,982,000
$345,000
3.2%
South Dakota^
$2,048,000
$2,749,000
$701,000
34.2%
Tennessee
$10,865,000
$11,085,000
$220,000
2.0%
Texas
$64,164,000
$61,541,000
-$2,623,000
-4.1%
Utah
$3,192,000
$3,539,000
$347,000
10.9%
Vermont^
$1,781,000
$2,094,000
$313,000
17.6%
Virginia
$13,445,000
$12,522,000
-$923,000
-6.9%
Washington
$10,936,000
$11,567,000
$631,000
5.8%
West Virginia
$5,890,000
$6,567,000
$677,000
11.5%
Wisconsin
$11,444,000
$13,120,000
$1,676,000
14.6%
Wyoming^
$1,857,000
$2,184,000
$327,000
17.6%
^Grant allocation based on small state minimum.