{ "id": "RL31183", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL31183", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 101001, "date": "2001-11-12", "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:19:24.428941", "title": "China's Maritime Territorial Claims: Implications for U.S. Interests", "summary": "The relatively shallow and resource-rich waters surrounding the People's Republic of China\n(PRC)\nare of growing economic and strategic importance, yet they often remain invisible in the American\nforeign policy process. The United States, along with most of the international community, regards\nthese as international waters, through which approximately half of the world's sea-going commercial\nshipments pass each year. Consequently, a primary U.S. economic and strategic objective in the\nregion has been the maintenance of freedom-of-navigation through these waters.\n But apart from their economic and strategic importance, the semi-enclosed South and East\nChina Seas are filled with political and diplomatic complexities. Nine surrounding states have\ncompeting territorial claims to the hundreds of various islets, shoals, reefs, and maritime zones in\nthese waters. The common claimant in all cases is the PRC, which increasingly has sought to define\nits sovereignty and economic exclusivity here in the broadest possible way hundreds of miles from\nits shores, to include the Spratly Islands, Pratas Islands, Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and\nSenkaku Islands. Successful prosecution of these wide-ranging maritime claims by the PRC could\ngreatly change the economic and strategic make-up of the region. Other claimants of these islands\nand maritime zones include countries with which the United States has defense commitments, such\nas Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines, making peaceful resolution of these claims an important\nU.S. interest.\n In addition to claims of sovereignty over the islands and reefs in these waters, the PRC\nincreasingly is narrowly interpreting provisions of international law that govern activity in the\n200-mile maritime zone -- the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) -- off its coast. As demonstrated by\nthe April 2001 U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane incident, the PRC now appears to be arguing\nthat its 200-mile maritime jurisdiction extends to the airspace over its EEZ. Moreover, the PRC is\nclaiming that the freedom of navigation and overflight in EEZs provided under the U.N. Convention\non the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) should be subordinate to the broad jurisdiction of the\nsovereign state -- not, as the LOS Convention is generally read, subject only to the economic and\nresource-related rights of the sovereign state. \n In addition to their economic implications, competing regional maritime claims and\ndisagreements over provisions of international law have far-ranging security implications. The PRC\nviews its southern coast as fairly vulnerable, particularly to U.S. naval forces. Although PRC\nmilitary forces are still limited, the PRC is steadily expanding its presence in the South China Sea,\npre-positioning supplies and equipment and building up outposts on various islands. Some believe\nthat over the longer term, continued PRC expansion and assertiveness in these maritime regions will\nput Beijing in a position to more effectively challenge U.S. economic, political, and security interests\nin the region.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL31183", "sha1": "d196d88b6fb391d800fa28fde4d8a465fee91937", "filename": "files/20011112_RL31183_d196d88b6fb391d800fa28fde4d8a465fee91937.pdf", "images": null }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20011112_RL31183_d196d88b6fb391d800fa28fde4d8a465fee91937.html" } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "American Law", "Economic Policy", "Foreign Affairs", "National Defense" ] }