Peacekeeping: Military Command and Control Issues

Peacekeeping: Military Command and Control Issues

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CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Peacekeeping: Military Command
and Control Issues
Updated November 1, 2001
name redacted
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
name redacted
Specialist in International Security Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Peacekeeping: Military Command and Control Issues
Summary
Coalition warfare and the leadership of foreign commanders has played a part in
U.S. history since the War for Independence, when the commander of the troops of
the predecessor colonies, George Washington, entrusted a key mission and command
of 2,000 Continental soldiers to a French Major General, the Marquis de Lafayette.
Since 1900, there have been at least seventeen military operations in which the United
States has placed U.S. troops under a foreign commander.
As of November 1, 2001, some 6,515 U.S. troops serve under a French general
in the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR). Some 865 troops also serve in the
Multinational Force in the Sinai (MFO), an ad hoc coalition, under a Canadian
commander. As of August 31, 2001, the United States had 43 U.S. troops serving
under commanders from various nations in seven U.N. operations.
During the last decade, some Members of Congress have expressed concern
about the placement of U.S. troops under a foreign commander; in general, this
concern has centered on such placement in U.N. operations. Until the end of the Cold
War, U.S. support for U.N. operations had been generally limited to air lift, even
though Congress in 1949 had granted the President the authority to detail up to 1,000
personnel in a non-combatant capacity for U.N. peacekeeping activities. But
controversy arose in the early 1990s, when the United States began to place U.S.
troops under U.N. commanders. Since then, Members of Congress have made
various legislative attempts to restrict the placement of U.S. troops under U.N.
command. The first, in 1995, was included in the Contract for America legislation,
which passed the House (H.R. 7), but not the Senate. The second was contained in
the FY1996 DOD authorization bill vetoed by President Clinton (H.R. 1530), in part
due to this provision. Congress deleted the provision from the version that became
law, and since then has not passed such a restriction.
Although troops from other nations have served under U.S. commanders, some
Members of Congress are troubled by several issues raised by ceding even some
level of control over U.S. troops to foreign commanders. These revolve around
questions about whether placing U.S. soldiers under a foreign commander in any way
impinges on U.S. sovereignty, and whether U.S. troops face greater danger under a
foreign commander. Those who favor such placement put forth various procedures
and arrangements that are taken to avoid such problems, for instance, U.S. troops are
placed under a foreign commander only for a specified time and a specific mission.
The foreign commander’s authority over U.S. troops is limited to the authority
necessary to organize, coordinate, and direct the mission-related tasks of those units
provided to him, in order to accomplish the assigned mission. In addition a variety
of safeguards are recognized as needed to protect U.S. troops, many of which were
spelled out in former President William Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive
(PDD) 25 of May 1994. In particular, the United States participates actively in the
policymaking bodies that oversee the military operation, seeks the clear delineation
of operational missions in governing agreements, and limits the authority of foreign
commanders.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Definition of Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
President’s Constitutional and Statutory Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Historical Precedents and Issues in Ceding Control to Foreign Commanders . . . 3
The Michael New Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Lessons for Collective Security Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Appendix A: Examples of International Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix B: U.S. Troops Currently Serving Under Foreign Commanders . . . . 11

Peacekeeping: Military Command and
Control Issues
Introduction
Military forces are a unique symbol of national sovereignty and pride. For
various reasons, however, nations often combine their forces in common effort. The
national military strategy of the United States has long recognized the value of allies
and coalition warfare. Success on the battlefield may depend on a unified command
and control system with one senior officer in charge. The United States has often
been in a leadership position and provided the senior commander; Desert Storm is a
recent example. Sometimes, however, other countries have led coalitions and U.S.
forces have been placed temporarily under foreign commanders.
Congressional concerns have centered primarily around the United Nations’ role
in command of U.S. forces. Concerns are less evident with NATO officers, with
whom the United States has longstanding ties and training experience, more so with
those outside this longstanding alliance. Until the United States began to place U.S.
troops under U.N. commanders with the expansion of U.N. peacekeeping operations
in the early 1990s, there were few complaints that the United States had suffered a
loss of control over its forces or a compromise of its sovereign will.
Since 1995, with House passage of the “Contract for America” legislation (H.R.
7), Members have made a number of attempts to prohibit or limit the placement of
U.S. troops under U.N. command. [H.R. 7 was referred to the Senate, but not
reported out of committee.] Also in 1995, Congress included restrictions on such
placement in a FY1996 DOD authorization bill (H.R. 1530). This bill was vetoed by
President Clinton for a variety of reasons, among them this provision, which was cited
as an infringement on the President’s constitutional authority as Commander in Chief.
Congress deleted the provisions from its subsequent version of the FY1996 DOD
authorization bill, which was signed by the President. Since then, Congress has not
approved any restrictions on DOD funding regarding the participation of U.S. troops
in U.N. peacekeeping operations.
Some Members of Congress remain concerned about this issue. In the 107th
Congress, the American Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2001, H.R. 1146, introduced
by Rep. Paul, would, among other actions, withdraw the United States from the
United Nations, and prohibit the use of funds for the participation of any member of
the U.S. armed forces in a U.N. peacekeeping operation or force.

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Definition of Command and Control
The term command has several applications. The power of command usually
given to the leader of a multinational force is called operational control or operational
command (in NATO).1 For a specified time and specified mission, the designated
leader has authority to organize, coordinate, and direct the mission-related tasks of
those units provided to him, in order to accomplish a given mission. This leader
cannot interfere with their internal activities or many other command functions
normally retained within national military structures. Thus, he cannot separate units,
divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change their internal
organization. Typically, this type of command arrangement has raised limited concern
about loss of national control or compromise of sovereignty.
The broadest command includes the total range of responsibilities exercised by
the National Command Authority [the President and the Secretary of Defense] over
its units and soldiers. Besides operational activities, full command includes logistics,
training, and all aspects of personnel discipline, morale, and welfare. In the U.S. case,
this command ultimately resides with the President as Commander-in-Chief and much
is non-transferable from the highest echelons of DOD. Although some logistics and
training responsibilities could be shared by agreement, another nation would be
reluctant to assume responsibility for pay, promotions, courts martial, individual
assignments, replacements, and long-term medical care even if they could. U.S.
soldiers serving in multinational commands always retain their ultimate allegiance to
the United States of America: they wear their national uniforms and insignia; and, no
oaths are given to other powers or organizations. They may, however, also wear
other mission-specific insignia and headgear. For instance, in U.N. operations, U.S.
troops may wear a U.N. patch and blue beret in order to identify clearly their role and
status in a possibly ambiguous situation.
President’s Constitutional and Statutory Authorities
Article 2 of the U.S. Constitution designates the President as Commander in
Chief. Although specific duties are not delineated, it is traditionally assumed that the
President may organize for military operations – to include approving command
arrangements – as he sees fit. Congress has, however, made two laws to govern some
recurring, noncombat uses of U.S. military forces within international entities as noted
below.
Since 1949, the President has held standing authority under Section 7 of the
U.N. Participation Act (P.L. 79-264) to detail up to 1,000 personnel, in a non-
combatant capacity, at one time for U.N. peacekeeping activities. Besides outlining
fiscal and logistical arrangements, the law states “That while so detailed, such
personnel shall be considered for all purposes as acting in the line of duty, including
1 U.S. Department of Defense. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. JCS Pub 1-02,
1 December 1989. Washington, pp. 77 and 262-263. Also see JCS Pub 0-2 and Title 10,
USC, Chapter 6, Section 164.

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the receipt of pay and allowances as personnel of the armed forces of the United
States....”2
The Administration also can and has detailed specialized military personnel to
international units under the authority of Section 628 of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), as amended. Section 628 provides that whenever the
President determines that it serves U.S. foreign policy interests, any officer or
employee of any U.S. government agency can be made available to any international
organization “to serve with, or as a member of, the international staff of such
organization, or to render any technical, scientific, or professional advice or service
to, or in cooperation with, such organization.”3
Historical Precedents and Issues in Ceding Control
to Foreign Commanders
U.S. military history provides many precedents for placing troops temporarily
under foreign commanders. The precedents date back to the United States’ colonial
history, when General George Washington entrusted a key mission to French Major
General, the Marquis de Lafayette, and appointed him as commander over 2,000
Continental soldiers rebelling against the British Crown. During World War I, some
2 million U.S. soldiers served under the coordination of the French Commander-in-
Chief of the Allied Armies in France. During World War II, U.S. units served under
British commanders in several areas. During the Cold War period, there were a few
instances of U.S. military personnel serving under foreign commanders in
multinational operations, mostly in ad hoc coalitions as the United States usually
provided only air lift and supplies to U.N. operations. During the 1991 Desert Storm
campaign in the Persian Gulf, a U.S. brigade was placed under operational control of
a French commander. [For more information on these and other instances of such
placements, see Appendix A, which details such instances from 1900 till the present.]
In the Balkans, U.S. troops serve under commanders from NATO nations, who
rotate every six months. As of November 1, 2001, some 6,515 U.S. troops are
serving under a French general in the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR). (In Bosnia,
some 3,132 U.S. troops in NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) are serving under the
American general who commands that operation, Lt. General John B. Sylvester.)
Some 865 U.S. troops also serve in the Multinational Force in the Sinai (MFO), an
ad hoc coalition, under a commander from Canada. As of August 31, 2001, the
United States had 43 U.S. troops serving under commanders from various nations in
seven U.N. operations.
The placement of U.S. troops under foreign commanders only became
controversial in the 1990s, when the U.S. involvement in multilateral peacekeeping
2 P.L. 79-264, 59 Stat. 619, approved December 20, 1945, as amended by P.L. 81-341,
approved October 10, 1949.
3 Section 628 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195) as amended. 22 U.S.C.
2388.

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operations became more frequent. Of particular concern was the placement of troops
in two U.N. peacekeeping operations, under commanders from countries other than
longstanding U.S. military allies. Another concern has been the cumulative effect of
such placements with the commitment of a significant number of troops to NATO
operations.
Since that time, the issue of placing U.S. troops under foreign “command” often
has been posed as a symbolic one, reflecting larger issues about U.S. leadership in the
world and concerns about whether the United States cedes any degree of sovereignty
when it participates in collective security mechanisms. The pragmatic question also
persists: whether the United States should trust its citizens’ lives to the judgment of
foreign officers, particularly in those from countries whose military standards may be
questioned.
To most officials and analysts, no substantial injury to the sovereignty of the
United States, control over, or long-term effectiveness of the U.S. armed forces
appear evident. Most such arrangements have balanced the military advantages of a
clear chain of command and greater mass on the battlefield with the political need to
recognize the national pride and competence of sovereign allies. Some, however,
were not particularly successful, and all had difficulties that provide future cautions.
Still, some Members and military officers are reluctant to relinquish any authority
to foreign officers, whose judgment may differ from that of a U.S. officer. Military
analysts note that training and cultural differences may create differences in approach
and style; thus, foreign officers might put U.S. troops at risk where U.S. officers
would not. Some also note that cultural and language difficulties can make combined
operations too cumbersome for the quick responses needed in the more difficult
“peace enforcement” operations.
Some analysts also point out that decisions on the use of U.S. soldiers in
peacekeeping missions involve different criteria than the use of soldiers of other
countries. When U.S. soldiers are involved, the prestige of the world’s sole
superpower is on the line. Although in some circumstances this could confer greater
authority, in others it might make U.S. soldiers more tempting targets, particularly
in conflictive peacekeeping missions. It also may complicate the response of U.S.
soldiers: for instance, where a soldier from another country would be praised for
negotiating his unit’s way through a roadblock, a U.S. soldier must consider whether
that would make it appear that the U.S. could be intimidated and was backing down.
Practical considerations and standard arrangements are cited to counter these
objections. Most importantly, the United States takes precautions that U.S. troops
serve under respected foreign officers and that U.S. officers are positioned to look
after U.S. troops. U.S. officials have a virtual veto power over the selection of top
commanders for U.N. operations in which U.S. troops participate. In addition,
commanders of U.S. military units participating in multilateral operations will monitor
the actions and orders of foreign commanders, and question them if necessary.4 The
4 Responding to questions whether U.S. troops are able to refuse to obey or question what they
(continued...)

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United States also reserves the right to take any action necessary to protect U.S.
forces. In addition, military analysts note that under U.S. and international law,
soldiers are obliged to refuse illegal orders.
The temporary nature of operational command and control arrangements ensures
that participating subunits retain national characteristics and allegiances. Even in
relatively permanent multinational formations – such as the MFO in the Sinai and
NATO’s Standing Naval Force Atlantic – U.S. units rotate every six to 12 months.
Although U.S. brigades and divisions are assigned to NATO multinational corps for
exercises and operations, the bulk of their time is spent within their permanent U.S.
chains of command.
The Michael New Challenge
No challenge was raised to the constitutional authority of the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, to enter into multinational command arrangements and to the
practice of placing U.S. troops under foreign commanders, until 1996. That year,
U.S. Army Specialist Michael G. New challenged his January 1996 court-martial
and bad-conduct discharge, which was upheld by his commanding general in June
1996. New, who refused to obey an order to wear the designated U.N. patch and
blue beret when his unit was assigned to the U.N. Preventive Deployment Force in
Macedonia, argued that he owes allegiance to the United States, not to the U.N., that
the insignia are not authorized, that the chain of command was not constitutional, and
that the operation was not legal.
New has appealed his case to several appeals fora which either have refused to
reconsider the case or have upheld the initial decision. In March 1996, the U.S.
District Court of the District of Columbia rejected New’s civil suit of Habeas Corpus
challenging the court-martial’s finding and sentence; in November 1997, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the District Court’s
dismissal on the grounds that civilian courts must await the final outcome of military
court proceedings on a court martial before considering an action brought by a service
member. The U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals heard the case on May 28,
1998, and affirmed the court martial in April 1999. On February 4, 2000, New
appealed the decision before the final military appeals venue, the Court of Appeals of
the Armed Forces, which affirmed the U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals decision
on June 13, 2001.
On September 10, 2001, New’s attorneys petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to
review and overturn the military courts’ decisions. On October 5, 2001, the Supreme
Court declined to hear the case. According to New’s website
[http://www.mikenew.com/], New is considering whether to take further action.
4 (...continued)
may regard as illegal or unwise orders from foreign commanders, the Clinton Administration’s
Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) states that commanders of U.S. military units
participating in U.N. operations can “report separately to higher U.S. military authorities” and
“will refer to higher U.S. authorities orders that are illegal under U.S. or international law, or
outside the mandate of the mission to which the U.S. agreed with the U.N.”

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Lessons for Collective Security Actions
Occasional placements of U.S. forces under foreign commanders within
multinational commands for agreed purposes appear likely to continue in the future.
World War I established a de facto guideline for U.S. forces that coalition integration
only extends so far; in fact, during that war the United States attempted to retain total
command at the highest, or army, level. Exigencies, however, often required U.S.
divisions to be under the tactical command of French and British corps commanders.
Since then, the United States has relinquished partial command at much lower
echelons. As noted above, full command is never relinquished at the individual soldier
level, and all soldiers placed within a multinational structure are commanded by a U.S.
officer. One duty of the U.S. commander is to ensure his troops are linked to the U.S.
chain of command, particularly for such essential responsibilities as pay and discipline.
The proper echelon, i.e., the level of military organization, for integrating U.S.
forces into a multinational formation will probably continue to be a major point of
negotiation. For combat, larger national units are more self-sufficient and can be
integrated more quickly and with fewer logistical problems than smaller units. For
conventional ground warfare, the corps is currently the most comprehensive or
independent element. Corps frequently take tactical command or control of divisions
from allied nations; multinational corps are rapidly becoming the norm for NATO.
Since corps and divisions are large, expensive formations, future multinational
operations may well, depending on the mission, integrate at lower levels, particularly
for specialized and supporting units.
Potential safeguards to acknowledge and protect the sovereign control of those
forces are suggested by precedent, practice, and law – many now are spelled out in
the Clinton Administration’s Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25). These
include:
! Participating actively in the policy making bodies that oversee the
military operation, e.g., U.N. Security Council;
! Clearly delineating operational mission in governing agreements;
! Limiting foreign command authority to operational command,
operational control, tactical control, or similar formulation;
! Ensuring the temporary nature of personal involvement by rotation
of U.S. units or individuals, even though the national commitment
may be to long-term support of a standing multinational force;
! Providing active support and oversight through a permanent
command chain for those U.S. units and individuals committed to
multinational operations, to usually include the regional U.S.
Commander-in-Chief (CINC);

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! Placing U.S. officers on multinational unit staffs; if appropriate, the
foreign commander could be provided a U.S. deputy, e.g.,
UNOSOM II;
! Maintaining U.S. unit integrity at the highest practical echelon.
! Reserving the President’s right to terminate participation at any time
and to protect endangered U.S. forces with whatever actions are
deemed necessary.

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Appendix A: Examples of International Command
Since 1776, military units from the United States or the predecessor colonies
have engaged in numerous conflicts, many in concert with allied nations. France, for
example, contributed to winning the final battle of the American War for
Independence at Yorktown. During that campaign, General George Washington
entrusted a key mission and command of 2,000 Continental soldiers to a French
Major General, the Marquis de Lafayette. The list below reflects a survey of U.S.
military activities from 1900 to the present, looking for distinct instances when U.S.
forces were placed under temporary command of a foreign officer.5
1900. International Relief Force in China, Boxer Rebellion. An eight-nation
force, led by a British general and later a German, included U.S. units comprised of
2,000 soldiers and marines. Loose coordination of operations was achieved through
meetings of a Council of Generals.
1918. Allied Armies in France, World War I. Some 2,000,000 Americans
served alongside and within French and British armies under the overall coordination
of a Frenchman, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France, Marshall
Ferdinand Foch. A precedent was set that U.S. soldiers should remain in large units
under U.S. command. The French and British originally argued that U.S. soldiers
should be placed in Allied units as individual and small-unit replacements as soon as
they arrived in theater, a concept successfully vetoed by the senior U.S. commander,
General Pershing.
1918. Allied Intervention in Russia, vicinity of Murmansk in the Far
North. Some three U.S. battalions joined British, Canadian, Italian, Finnish, and
Serbian units under command of a British general at the end of World War I during
the Bolshevik Revolution. Similar activities in Siberia were not formally integrated
with allies, due to disagreement on political goals.
1942. Allied operations in World War II. Due to the combined nature of
Allied operations against Axis powers, U.S. and U.K. commands and staffs were often
inter-layered. U.S. units were subordinated to British commanders a number of times,
for example, in Italy, Normandy, Arnhem, and in the China-Burma-India Theatre.
This experience, in general, made the U.S. military a proponent of coalition warfare
and a world leader in its practice.
1948. United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in
Palestine. Longest-lived UN peace observing mission. The United States has
contributed various numbers of observers and support personnel through time, from
5 Numerous sources. For small involvements see David W. Wainhouse, International
Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1973. For
larger operations, see U.S. Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War;
1917-1919, Volume 1, Washington, 1948 and United States Army in World War II, The War
Department, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, Volume for 1941-1942 and Volume
for 1943-1944, published in Washington in 1999 and 1959, respectively.

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an early peak strength of 327 officers and enlisted men to 3 in 2001. Some 17 nations
have participated, successive commanders coming from Sweden, the United States,
Belgium, Denmark, Canada, Norway, and Finland. Many precedents, agreements,
and laws have derived from this experience. The mission continues.
1949. United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
(UNMOGIP). One of 14 nations participating, the United States contributed up to
28 military observers and an air crew until 1954. The group has been headed
successively by generals from Belgium, Canada, Australia, and Austria.
1950. United Nations Command (UNC), established for the Korean War
and maintained. The overall UNC commander has always been an American, but
subordinate command levels have changed. The ground component of the U.S.-
Republic of Korea (ROK) Combined Forces Command (CFC) has today one U.S.
division (-) and 22 ROK divisions. Since 1992, it has been commanded by a South
Korean general with a U.S. deputy. CFC command arrangements become effective
in wartime, and CFC planning and exercise activities in peacetime help deter attacks
by North Korea.
1951. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). An integrated command
structure was created to defend against any external aggression against the territory
of member states, in particular the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The Supreme Allied
Commander has always been American, but senior intermediate commanders from
Germany and the United Kingdom would command major U.S. formations in
wartime. Since 1967, a U.S. ship has operated in the multinational Standing Naval
Force Atlantic under an annually rotating command; since 1992, a similar force
patrols the Mediterranean. NATO envisions all corps being multinational. Through
continuous association, planning, and exercises, members of NATO have achieved
levels of military interoperability that set the standards and procedures for modern
coalition warfare. U.S. personnel on NATO staffs often work under foreign officers.
NATO continues military operations and conducted combat operations in the Balkans
in 1999.
1962. United Nations Security Force (UNSF) for the UN Temporary
Executive Authority (UNTEA) in West New Guinea. A U.S. Air Force Task
Force of 115 men and 10 aircraft provided in-country support for operations
commanded by a Pakistani general.
1965. Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) in the Dominican Republic.
First peacekeeping force of the Organization of American States. After the initial
U.S. intervention, six Latin American nations sent small forces to join some 21,500
U.S. troops – soon reduced to 12,000 – in a multinational force commanded by a
general from Brazil.
1982. Multinational Force in Beirut (MNF). About 1,200 U.S. troops joined
contingents from France, Italy, and U.K. to assist in departures of PLO, Syrian, and
Israeli troops from Beirut, Lebanon. No central command structure was established,
although coordination was effected through a Liaison and Coordination Committee.
A terrorist attack killed 241 U.S. Marines and 58 French soldiers on October 3, 1983;
the MNF withdrew in March 1984.

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1982. Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai (MFO). A ten-nation,
independent force empowered by Egypt and Israel to supervise truce provisions in the
Sinai Peninsula. The United States provides support troops and an infantry battalion
rotated every six months; Congress limits participation to 1,200 personnel. The
military commander is a Canadian general, and the Director General is an American
operating from Rome. This mission continues.
1991. Desert Storm Coalition in the Persian Gulf War. Over 23 nations
joined to eject forces of Iraq from Kuwait. U.S., U.K., and French forces were under
the Commander-in-Chief (CINC), U.S. Central Command, while Arab forces were
under the Saudi Commander of the Joint Forces Theater of Operations; the two
entities were linked in the Coalition Coordination, Communication and Integration
Center. Within that structure, a U.S. brigade from the 82d Airborne Division was
placed under operational control of the French 6th Light Armored Division.
1992. United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in former
Yugoslavia. Some 21 nations protected humanitarian relief and attempted to aid
peacemaking in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. The United States sent a 342-man
Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) to Zagreb, Croatia for use by UNPROFOR
soldiers under French command. In 1993, some 600 U.S. soldiers were sent to patrol
the Macedonian border under a Swedish commander.
1993. United Nations Operation in Somalia after U.S. humanitarian
intervention of December 1992 – UNOSOM II. The U.N. force of 25,000 from
28 nations was commanded by a Turkish general, assisted by a U.S. deputy – 3,000
U.S. logistics forces were under their operational control. U.S. combat forces of
9,000 remained solely under a U.S. chain of command (see CRS Report 93-959).
U.S. operations ended in March of 1994, and the number of U.S. troops serving in
UNOSOM II was reduced to 12 members of the operation’s staff.
1995. NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. The first IFOR
commander was American, but U.S. ground forces reported to the ACE Rapid
Reaction Corps, commanded by a British lieutenant general. The allied force initially
was 54,000 strong, of which 13,000 were American. The contingent name has been
changed to Stabilization Force (SFOR). (See CRS Issue Brief IB93056 for current
details). The operation continues, with commanders of various NATO nations
serving six month tours.
1999. NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo, Former Republic of
Yugoslavia. Following NATO air operations, KFOR entered the Province of Kosovo
to supervise peace between its Serbian and Kosovar populations. It consisted of some
50,000 soldiers from NATO and other nations, including about 6,000 from the United
States. The first commander was a British lieutenant general; the command now
rotates every six months. (See CRS Issue Brief IB10027 for current details). The
operation continues.

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Appendix B: U.S. Troops Currently Serving Under
Foreign Commanders
Total #
# U.S.
Troops/
Troops/
Force Commander’s
Operation
Auspices
Military
Military
Name and Nationality
Observers
Observers*
Kosovo, Joint
NATO
Approx.
6,515
Lieutenant General Marcel
Guardian (KFOR)
37,000
M. Valentin of France
U.N. Truce
United
153
3
Major General Franco
Supervision
Nations
Ganguzza of Italy
Organization
(UNTSO)
U.N. Iraq-Kuwait
United
1,099
11
Major General John A.
Observer Mission
Nations
Vize of Ireland
(UNIKOM)
U.N. Interim
United
37
2
Hans Haekkerup, a Danish
Administration
Nations
civilian, who is the Special
Mission in Kosovo
Representative of the U.N.
(UNMIK)
Secretary General and
head of the mission.
U.N. Observer
United
106
2
Major General
Mission in Georgia
Nations
Anis Ahmed Bajwa
(UNOMIG)
of Pakistan
U.N. Transitional
United
9,614
3
Lieutenant General
Administration in
Nations
Winai Phattiyakul
East Timor
of Thailand
(UNTAET)
U.N. Mission for
United
263
15
Brigadier General Claude
the Referendum in
Nations
Buze of Belgium
Western Sahara
(MINURSO)
U.N. Mission in
United
3,870
7
Major General
Ethiopia and
Nations
Patrick C. Cammaert
Eritrea (UNMEE)
of the Netherlands
Multinational Force
Ad hoc
1,836
865
Major General
and Observers
coalition
Robert Meating
(MFO) in the Sinai
of Canada
Sources: Data on U.N. troops/observers and U.S. troops serving in those operations is current
as of August 31, 2001. The name and nationalities of commanders are the latest available
information from various U.N. websites, which are current within two to four months. Data
on U.S. troops in NATO operations was provided by the Department of Defense, November
1, 2001. Data on the MFO was provided by the Department of State, November 1, 2001.
* Note that the totals for U.N. operations and for U.S. participation in U.N. operations do not
include civilian police or civilian observer components of the operations.

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