Middle East: Domestic Politics and the Peace Process – Proceedings of a CRS Seminar

Middle East: Domestic Politics and the Peace Process – Proceedings of a CRS Seminar

Order Code RL30766
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Middle East: Domestic Politics and the Peace
Process – Proceedings of a CRS Seminar
December 13, 2000
Joshua Ruebner
Analyst in Middle East Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Middle East: Domestic Politics and the Peace Process –
Proceedings of a CRS Seminar
Summary
On Friday, October 20, 2000, CRS held a seminar, entitled “Domestic Politics
in the Middle East and the Peace Process.” This seminar was made possible in part
by a grant from the Charles H. Revson Foundation. The main purpose of the seminar
was to examine in depth the nexus between Israeli, Palestinian, Syrian, and Lebanese
domestic politics on the one hand and the formulation of foreign policy in these
countries, especially regarding the Middle East peace process, on the other.
To address this issue, CRS assembled a panel of distinguished scholars and
experts. Mr. Aaron David Miller, Deputy Special Middle East Coordinator at the
United States Department of State, presented some of his personal observations on
the Oslo peace process based upon his years of experience in helping to coordinate
the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Dr. Don Peretz, Professor Emeritus at the State
University of New York-Binghamton, surveyed the Israeli domestic political scene
with an emphasis on the consequences of the fragmentation of political power in
Israel. Dr. Glenn Robinson, Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, examined
the Palestinian domestic political scene and stressed the asymmetry of the Israeli-
Palestinian power relationship, which, in his view, has contributed to the rise of
authoritarianism in the Palestinian Authority. Dr. Patrick Seale, an independent
Middle East analyst, critiqued U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East and also
analyzed the Syrian domestic political scene in the aftermath of Bashar al-Asad’s
ascent to the presidency. Mr. Frederic Hof, a partner at Armitage Associates,
addressed the Lebanese domestic political scene and argued that the phrase “others
will decide” epitomizes Lebanon’s position regarding the peace process. The seminar
was moderated by Joshua Ruebner, CRS Analyst in Middle East Affairs.
This CRS report is based on a transcript of the proceedings of the seminar. It
relies on both prepared remarks and spontaneous discussion edited for grammatical
construction and clarity. The diverse opinions expressed by the invited speakers do
not necessarily reflect the opinions of CRS. This report will not be updated. For a
brief summary of this seminar, see CRS Report RS20751, Middle East: Domestic
Politics and the Peace Process–Summary of a CRS Seminar, by Joshua Ruebner.

Contents
Introduction of Keynote Speaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Keynote Address–Mr. Aaron David Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Questions and Answers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Introduction of Subject and Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Israeli Politics–Dr. Don Peretz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Palestinian Politics–Dr. Glenn Robinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Syrian Politics–Dr. Patrick Seale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Lebanese Politics–Mr. Frederic Hof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Questions and Answers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Middle East: Domestic Politics and the Peace
Process–Proceedings of a CRS Seminar
Introduction of Keynote Speaker
MR. RUEBNER: Our keynote speaker is Aaron David Miller. Mr. Miller is the
Deputy Special Middle East Coordinator for Arab-Israeli Negotiations at the U.S.
Department of State. Since 1985 he has served as an advisor to four Secretaries of
State, helping to formulate U.S. policy on the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli peace
process. Before assuming his current position, Mr. Miller served on the State
Department’s Policy Planning Staff, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the
Office of the Historian. Mr. Miller received his Ph.D. in American Diplomatic and
Middle East History from the University of Michigan in 1977. During 1982 and 1983
he was a Council on Foreign Relations fellow and a resident scholar at the
Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies. Mr. Miller has written
three books on the Middle East and lectured widely at universities and Middle East
symposia across the country. His articles have appeared in the New York Times, the
Washington Post, Orbis, and numerous other publications.
Keynote Address–Mr. Aaron David Miller
MR. MILLER: I’d like to start with a personal observation so that there’d be no
misunderstanding about my perspective. Over the last 20 years I’ve had the honor and
privilege to play a very small role, and I underscore that, in a very large enterprise.
That enterprise is an American effort to help Israelis and Palestinians and Arab-Israelis
bring to an end a very difficult and bitter conflict. During the course of the last 20
years, I have developed what I could only describe to you as a profound faith in both
the logic and power of diplomacy to resolve this problem on a basis that is both
equitable and enduring. I’m not prepared to speak on whether or not other conflicts
in the world can be resolved, but based on what I’ve seen and, more important
frankly, based on what the Israelis and Palestinians and the Arabs and Israelis have
accomplished, I do believe that there is a solution to this conflict that is both
sustainable and fair. Now, that solution must strike a very difficult balance between
the way the world is on one hand and the way we all may want it to be on the other.
And it is that balance which is very difficult to achieve that I would argue is the goal,
not only of any fair analysis of the Israeli and Palestinian conflict, but of a credible
basis on which a policy, in this case U.S. policy, should be based.
The last two to three weeks have witnessed the worst violence and confrontation
between Israelis and Palestinians since the Oslo process began. It has left in its wake,
and unfortunately it’s still ongoing, a series of political and psychological traumas
which have profoundly influenced the limits of what is possible, at least for now, in

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terms of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. And like most traumatic events, which
may or may not constitute turning points, the consequences of the last three weeks
will take time to unfold. You cannot have a trauma of this magnitude and somehow
reach immediate or conclusive judgements on what its impact will be. Unfortunately
I would argue, and it’s only my opinion, that there has been too much authoritative
pronouncement, both in the media and from analysts, about reaching those definitive
and conclusive judgements based on what is and is not possible as a consequence of
the last three weeks. And I’m simply reporting here. I’ve heard and read
pronouncements such as the peace process is dead. I’ve read pronouncements that it
is no longer possible to reach a permanent status agreement between Israelis and
Palestinians. I’ve read that Prime Minister Barak’s political situation is so eroded that
he no longer has the political base. I’ve heard pronouncements that Yasser Arafat
orchestrated and manufactured the crisis or alternatively that it was totally out of his
control. And I’ve heard, perhaps most seriously of all, that any sense of Israeli-
Palestinian partnership which had developed over the last seven years has been
fundamentally shattered and irrevocably damaged.
I would only urge you and caution you based on my limited experience to be
flexible in terms of reaching conclusive judgements in the wake of such a momentous
three-week period. And I would only remind all of us, including myself, that not more
than two months ago we all stood at Camp David in two quite extraordinary weeks
of Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, only to see within two months the worst Israeli-
Palestinian violence in seven years. So my question is: who knows? Who really knows
given the roller coaster of Israeli-Palestinian politics and Mid-East politics where in
fact we could be two months from now. So I’m not here to make predictions and
sound authoritative because I’ve been around the process too long to know or to
believe that such conclusions and authoritative judgements are possible right now.
What I would like to do, briefly, so as to leave some time for questions, is to offer you
six observations about the nature of Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli peacemaking
which I think are relevant to understanding where we may be going.
First and foremost, I would argue that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not a
morality play. It is not a conflict between the forces of good on one hand and the
forces of darkness on the other. It is a century old conflict being played out in a very,
very difficult neighborhood. It involves religious identification. It involves incredibly
volatile political issues. And it is, unfortunately, from the perspective of those who
wage it, perceived as an existential conflict. Literally. A conflict over physical and
political existence. To see it as a morality play and to take sides seems to me to limit
what any mediator can do in terms of ultimately resolving it. All of the progress that
has been made in the last 15 years from the Camp David of 1978 to the present, has
been made as a consequence of looking at the Arab-Israeli conflict not as a zero-sum
game, which produces one winner and one loser; but rather as a terribly complicated
conflict in which both sides, whether it’s Egypt, it’s Jordan, it’s Syria, it’s
Palestinians, has a set of needs and requirements that need to somehow be reconciled
if in fact there’s going to be an agreement. In fact all of the agreements that have been
concluded reflect a measure of this balance. There is no perfect justice with respect
to this conflict, and it seems to me any policy has to reflect that reality.

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Second, during the past several weeks we have seen each side, Israelis and
Palestinians, reflect their own narrative as to what actually has transpired: who’s to
blame, what went wrong, why things didn’t work the way they should have worked.
As Israelis see it, the last several weeks have been about a calculated effort on
the part of the Palestinians...Israel having made historic concessions at Camp David
was greeted with a carefully calibrated effort on the part of Palestinians, who were
unhappy over compromises that didn’t go far enough, to use violence in the streets,
to essentially change the rules of the game. The Israelis feel that they have been under
siege. They watch Palestinian guns and rifles trained at their soldiers and civilians.
They have watched their holy sites desecrated. They have watched the international
community engage in what they believe is a one-sided effort to blame the Israelis for
the use of overwhelming force against Palestinians. That’s their narrative and by and
large that’s the way many Israelis have watched and interpreted recent events.
Palestinians, of course, have a different perspective. For Palestinians, Camp
David didn’t go far enough, but they were willing to continue to negotiate to convince
the Israelis that these were the sets of needs and requirements to produce a solution
to the conflict. But Sharon’s visit to al-Haram ash-Sharif/ Temple Mount was a
provocation; and Israel over reacted on that Friday when five Palestinians were shot
to death. And when Palestinians demonstrated with rocks, Molotov cocktails, and
guns, they were met with overwhelming Israeli force, including the use of helicopter
gun ships, tanks, and missiles.
Therefore, Israelis feel as victims and not aggressors, and Palestinians feel as
victims and not aggressors. These are the two competing narratives, and the difficulty
involved in trying to mediate an end to the violence was that each side has a very
difficult time recognizing the reality of the other’s narrative.
Thirdly, these narratives and the ensuing brutality and violence which has
characterized the last three weeks have persuaded many that Oslo was founded on
fundamentally flawed assumptions. And that in fact Oslo, or the pursuit of Israeli-
Palestinian peace is simply dead. Now this argument that Oslo has run its course is
based on all kinds of empirical evidence. The reality, it seems to me, is that this
analysis frankly misses the point. The issue is not whether Oslo has run its course as
a consequence of the violence. The issue is whether the legacy of Oslo over the last
seven years has provided any kinds of enduring change or basis for an Israeli-
Palestinian negotiation and a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
I would argue that it has in three respects. The legacy of Oslo has already
impacted in a way that is irreversible. So whatever peace process is constructed in the
wake of this violence, the legacy of Oslo will have to be confronted and dealt with.
First, there is the legacy of Israeli-PLO recognition which changed an existential
conflict which could never be resolved–a conflict over existence–into a political
conflict that could be resolved. The fact that the Israelis and the Palestinians recognize
one another’s identity and claims is irreversible. Once you recognize and go through
that sort of process you can’t unrecognize it. Israel and the Palestinians are partners,
whether by necessity or design. Second are the realities on the ground. However
imperfect the Oslo accords were, and they were very imperfect, they have
fundamentally changed a reality on the ground between Israelis and Palestinians. The

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vast majority of Palestinians are now governed by Palestinians. Israel is in the process
of shedding an occupation it never sought, and which has complicated its national life
ever since, and a negotiation has been underway in order to resolve the issues of
permanent status. Three, Israel and the Palestinians are characterized by what you
could call a proximity problem. Their lives are inextricably linked together by the
forces of history and geography. And unless there has been a change which has
somehow undermined those two basic realities that Israel and the Palestinians don’t
share a common history and a common geography then it seems to me the basis for
recreating a Israeli-Palestinian relationship is simply a necessity– it’s reality which
cannot be fundamentally changed.
Fourth is the issue of resiliency. And I think by way of perspective it’s important
to point out that over the last 10 years we’ve seen innumerable ups and downs in the
pursuit of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Had anyone in this room, including myself, known
that the day after Rabin and Arafat shook hands on the White House lawn, that within
five years of that signature Rabin would be murdered by an Israeli, 29 Palestinians
would have been machine gunned by an Israeli settler in a mosque in Hebron, 60
Israelis would have been killed in four suicide terror attacks in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv
in the spring of 1996, and a Likud Prime Minister would have signed not one but two
agreements with the PLO; and in the face of that we would have gone to Camp David
and then descended into this sort of violence. No one would have believed it. The fact
is that the process has demonstrated remarkable resiliency. And it’s not only the
consequence of the forces of history and geography which committed Israelis and
Palestinians to working out some sort of future together. It also has to do with the
recognition that trying to determine how to get out of a protracted conflict has
become a matter of national interest for both the Israelis and Palestinians. It is not
some artificial creation which is forced upon the region from outside by a well
intentioned mediator or some altruistic notion of what peace may be; it is a
fundamental choice that Israelis and Palestinians have made and stuck to. Now, the
question of course remains: Has that choice been fundamentally affected by the events
of the last three weeks?
Fifth, I would argue that at some point there will be an effort to resume a
negotiation and that ultimately, unless the future Israelis and Palestinians want for
themselves and their children is one of unending confrontation and violence, they will,
in fact, find a way to come back to a negotiation. In this regard I want to make two
points about Camp David, simply to provide some sense of perspective. There are two
issues circulating in the press and elsewhere these days about the Camp David
initiative. The first is that it was an overreach. That is to say, some agreement might
have been possible, but certainly not a comprehensive agreement on all the issues. The
second is that Camp David somehow paradoxically led to the current crisis and the
current violence. Both of those charges have been made. I would only say this to each
notion. The search for comprehensive agreement was not an American idea. It was,
in fact, a response to both Israeli and Palestinians needs. On the part of the Israelis,
selling the difficult decisions involved in Israeli-Palestinian peace meant one thing: It
meant convincing most Israelis that, in fact, there was the possibility of ending the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict meant a
comprehensive settlement. It meant tackling, even though it was excruciatingly painful
and difficult, issues such as Jerusalem, refugees, territory and security–the four core
issues that were negotiated at Camp David.

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For Palestinians, anything short of a comprehensive agreement also would not
have been possible. Frustrated by the consequences of seven years of Oslo,
Palestinians, and for that matter Israelis, wanted some certainty that in fact there was
something called an end down the road. And they wanted to know what it was. So
the notion that Palestinians could somehow settle for an agreement that eliminated any
of the four basic issues, and have it be politically marketable, was simply not possible.
So Israelis and Palestinians both wanted comprehensiveness.
Second, with respect to the notion that Camp David somehow, in raising
expectations, not being well thought out, leaving the Israelis and Palestinians with no
agreement, led to the violence, I can only say this. In going to Camp David the United
States sought to confront two realities. One was the historic opportunity that Israelis
and Palestinians themselves recognize that there was in fact the possibility of reaching
an accord; the other reality was the impending fear on the part of both that without
an agreement there would almost certainly be deterioration and violence. Had the
United States not gone to Camp David and had the violence ensued, the same people
who have been incredibly persistent in criticizing the Americans for their role would
have criticized us for acting irresponsibly, missing an historic opportunity, and not
doing everything that we possibly could in order to preempt or avert that violence.
And frankly, they would have been right.
Finally, let me close with two observations. My concern, and I’ll speak
personally here, is not that there will not be agreements between Israelis and
Palestinians. We’ve seen agreements reached. My concern lies more on the issue of
the psychology of what in fact they are trying to achieve. And there’s a very serious
problem here with the gaps that separate Israeli and Palestinian realities, particularly
on the issue of socialization of attitudes that underscore peace and reconciliation. And
here I will offer an editorial comment, and it is not that I’m not cognizant of the
realities with which Palestinians deal on a day to day basis. They are very difficult and
bitter realities. However, efforts to socialize hatred, let alone condition the
environment to the use of violence as an appropriate or useful tool to be used to
influence negotiation, has no place in the process. And there is a serious problem with
respect to conditioning and socializing a younger generation toward attitudes, toward
changing attitudes toward peace, and it is not symmetrical. In part it flows from the
environment in which Palestinians find themselves. Nonetheless it’s a very serious
problem. It’s reflected in the school texts, in news broadcasts, in radio and television
commentary. There has to be some way to address it. Now there are organizations,
NGOs [non-governmental organizations], that have been remarkably successful. And,
maybe in fact, given the realities, governments have too difficult a time, but they must
provide support and encouragement to change attitudes. There are organizations,
Seeds of Peace is one of them, which have had remarkable results in changing the
attitudes of Israelis and Palestinians toward this conflict. And these are not kids from
upper-middle class backgrounds. They’re kids who deal with the bitter realities on the
ground, and yet their attitudes and values and views can change. Without giving up
their principles they can learn to respect, they can learn to listen, and ultimately they
can learn to understand.
Finally, let me just close with one brief comment about the United States. We are
not perfect, and our policy is not perfect. At the same time, despite all of the
imperfections, and I’ve watched this now for 20 years, we still enjoy, for a variety of

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reasons, more confidence and more trust. And I’m well aware of all the accusations
about the American role, about the American credibility, and about American policy
that are even now being launched. Throughout the region, at the same time, 20 years
later, Israelis, Palestinians, and Arabs still look to Washington for support, all kinds
of support. And it seems to me, and here I will provide perhaps the only other
editorial comment, we have an obligation and responsibility in this regard. We do not
live in the neighborhood, on one hand. I live in Chevy Chase. There’s no cross-border
shelling in Chevy Chase. There are no refugee camps in Chevy Chase. There’s no
terrorism, no check points. So we are not a party to this conflict. We can’t impose.
We cannot make these decisions. At the same time, we have a responsibility and an
obligation to help.
Rarely do American national interests come together in three critical ways with
respect to any problem in the world today. Number one, it is in our objective national
interest to try to broker and to do everything we possibly can to facilitate an end to
this conflict. Second, morally and because our foreign policy is in fact, or should be,
a reflection of our values, who we are and what we believe in, working for Arab-
Israeli peace is also the right thing to do. And thirdly, we have the capacity, in a
constructive way, to influence, to help and to assist, people who want our help. I’m
not sure there is a problem in the international arena today in which there is a more
compelling case to be made for an American role as a consequence of those three
factors. But at the same time we have to understand that every decision for peace or
war in this region has been taken initially by the Israelis and the Palestinians, and
ultimately by the Israelis and the Arabs. It will be up to them to determine whether the
future they want for their children is a future based on unending confrontation and
violence. And I give you the last three weeks as an example. Or alternatively, over
time, a future based on accommodation, a future based on negotiation; ultimately one
day, a future based on real peace.
Questions and Answers
MR. RUEBNER: At this point, Mr. Miller will take a few questions. [Audience
members were requested not to identify themselves when asking questions, in keeping
with CRS policy to protect the anonymity and confidentiality of questions posed to
CRS by Members of Congress and their staff.] Please do not identify yourself. Any
takers? Dr. Peretz, I can identify you.
DR. PERETZ: This might be a difficult question, but to what extent do domestic
political considerations and the American inclination to be more accepting of the
Israeli narrative than the Palestinian and Arab narrative affect this situation? For
example, look what’s happening in the New York senatorial race. Each candidate is
attempting to outbid the other in their support of Israel. Look at the recent proposal
for a Congressional resolution to withhold funds from Arafat. To what extent do these
domestic considerations affect the whole situation?
MR. MILLER: There are certain questions which are more difficult than others
to answer. This, of course, is a very difficult question. I would no more comment on
Israeli internal domestic politics or Palestinian domestic politics than I would offer a

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judgement on our own internal politics. I don’t think it’s appropriate for a government
official to do that. I will only say this. Politics is a reality. Every nation has distinctive
political realities. Sweden has them. Switzerland has them. The United States has
them. Palestinians have them. The Israelis have them. And clearly, any sustainable
foreign policy, certainly in a democracy, has to in fact reflect certain political realities.
At the same time we have a remarkably close relationship with Israel which exists
independently, frankly, of the pursuit of peace. For a variety of reasons, that
relationship is quite extraordinary and has remained remarkably consistent and
constant regardless of what administration–and I’ve now been through five
administrations–has worked on American Middle Eastern policy.
At the same time, and I offered this judgement earlier, I think we have gotten to
the position where we have secured the trust and confidence of key Arab states and
over the last several years, our relationship with the Palestinians has also evolved in
a way that we have gained a remarkable degree of trust and confidence from
Palestinians. Our policy’s not perfect and our effort, to find the balance that I talked
about between the way the world is and the way we want it to be is a very difficult
balance to strike. Sometimes we succeed, sometimes we do not. We’ll continue to
look for that balance and hopefully we will be able to preserve our role as an affective
mediator in the Arabs-Israeli conflict.
QUESTION: You made a very strong case that Oslo is institutionalized and
durable. I think that was one of the centerpieces of your presentation. But I think one
could rightly ask with all the accomplishments of Oslo, and all the work that’s been
done, how could the violence have escalated to such a degree? And, given the
violence as it escalated, does that lead you to question the assumption that Oslo is as
durable and institutionalized as you make the case that it is?
MR. MILLER: That’s a very important question and I’m not so sure I have an
answer. Oslo was, in essence, a reflection of a very imperfect relationship that exists
between Israelis and Palestinians. The logic of Oslo was based on separation through
cooperation. It was based on postponement of difficult decisions that could not be
negotiated in 1993, such as Jerusalem, with the assumption that the trust and
confidence that would flow from incremental step-by-step arrangements, interim
arrangements, to use the precise word, would in fact, increase the reservoir of trust
and confidence which would enable Israelis and Palestinians to address those
incredibly difficult issues at some point. Now, two things have happened, and they
were paradoxical. On one hand, the trust and confidence reservoir never increased.
The years 1996 to 1999 were a terrible period. In fact in shrinking the amount of trust
and confidence available, those years directly reflected on the realities, current realities
between Israelis and Palestinians on both sides. This was not the fault of one side or
another. But at the same time I could only be stunned by the amount of progress and
the number of openings that existed–both in talks in Sweden in May and in Camp
David in July on the very issues that were presumed to be so impossible to negotiate.
So the reality on the ground was difficult and very bitter. The realities up here were
somehow more advanced and the whole notion perhaps was a race against the clock.
What would win: the fears, suspicions, bitterness in which Israelis and Palestinians
were locked as a consequence of a set of very imperfect relationships and agreements
over the past seven years? Or the more enlightened vision that Israelis and Palestinian

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negotiators had of the possibilities of an agreement? And perhaps those factors were
in competition during the last four or five months.
Second, Oslo was in fact founded on one fundamental reality which I believe has
not changed and that is the notion that in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship there is
no status quo. Patrick Seale will talk, perhaps, about Syria and Israel and I will only
use this as a contrast. Look at the difference between the Israeli-Syrian relationship
in which arguably there was a status quo, which perhaps could be preserved,
(Lebanon, of course, sees it as a potential flash point, and would argue against that
fact), as compared to the Israeli-Palestinian equation in which there was real urgency
on the part of Israelis and Palestinians to find a way out of a very bitter confrontation.
Urgency is why people take difficult decisions. Every agreement that has been reached
between Israelis and Arabs ultimately flowed from the calculation that the status quo
was no longer sustainable. And Oslo was premised on that basic reality. Israelis and
Palestinians are living like this. And Oslo was premised on separation through
cooperation. History and geography have not changed. And I cannot tell you right
now, I would be misleading you and I would be less than honest, and I refuse to be,
to suggest somehow that it’s inevitable that Israelis and Palestinians will have to
return to the same kind of process. I don’t know because I don’t know what the
impact of the last three weeks have been. However, what I do know is this. There still
is no status quo that is sustainable from the perspective of the Israelis and
Palestinians. Their history and geography has not fundamentally been altered as a
consequence of this. In fact you could argue that there’s even more urgency now.
Therefore, I draw the conclusion, perhaps it’s naive and unrealistic, that somehow
these facts which are unalterable will lead Israelis and Palestinians back to an effort
through negotiation rather than protracted confrontation.
QUESTION: You mentioned NGOs. Many of them are having a kind of crisis
in confidence. My question concerns whom they represent, what their future goal can
be, what assumptions have changed that reflect their work, and how they can find
allies and more strength and assistance perhaps in the United States government to
carry out their work. I was wondering if you have any sort of interim conclusions
about the kind of role NGOs can play after these past three weeks.
MR. MILLER: I can only say, honestly, that I don’t know, but that the role of
NGOs, the role of people to people programs, however modest they may appear,
however incremental, may, I would argue provide part of the bridge to transform the
psychology of confrontation which is where we are right now - into the psychology
of accommodation, of peacemaking, which is where we have to go. NGOs cannot do
it all because governments, which hold power and to which constituencies look for
support, guidance, and leadership must play a critical role in this. But the NGOs may
in fact be part of the bridge that is required to get back and then to ultimately move
forward.
QUESTION: The Israeli military is fighting the Palestinian rebels, but yet I see
the United States media insist that the Palestinians must pull back instead of asking
the Israeli military to stop firing weapons on people who are throwing rocks and
bottles. What is your insight on that situation?

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MR. MILLER: Well, I forgot to mention, and it was inappropriate of me, what
the last three days at Sharm el-Sheikh were all about. What was produced at Sharm
offered Israelis and Palestinians a way out of this, or at least a bridge. Because at
Sharm certain understandings were reached, brokered by the United States. Certain
responsibilities were laid out on the part of each in an effort to break the cycle of
violence and escalation and to recreate what Palestinians and Israelis had, particularly
on the security level. One of the other anomalies about the Oslo relationship: Israelis
and Palestinians have cooperated in extraordinary ways on the ground between
professionals with respect to security problems, particularly over the last 18 months.
And there were certain obligations which related to reducing points of friction, to not
firing on Israeli positions, to separating demonstrators from IDF positions. Certain
obligations and commitments with respect to the redeployment of Israeli forces and
of course, certain Israeli obligations with respect to lifting both the internal closure
which exists, and the external closure. All of these were laid out at Sharm, and this
is clearly the objective: to implement what was agreed. And there are responsibilities
and obligations on each side. I can’t, in view of events yesterday and even today
which appears to be quieter, particularly in the wake of Friday prayers...we won’t
know for days whether or not this is going to hold and become routinized. And even
if it does, it’s going to be extremely difficult, but possible to preserve.
QUESTION: My question goes to U.S. presidential leadership and the peace
process. I very much agree with your assessment that President Clinton is kind of in
a unique position because he has earned the trust of both the Israelis and the
Palestinians over these many years of his administration, but we’re coming to a
situation where there’s only a few more months left in his administration and of
course, the new president will have to take some time, whoever he may be, to sort of
re-establish or develop links. So, and I agree also with your assessment that the peace
process has resiliency, but at a certain point you do need that presidential leadership
to get things back on track. How do you see that playing out over say the next three
or four months as we come to a new administration?
MR. MILLER: I think the President and Secretary of State will do everything
they possibly can right up until the final day, to create a new reality both on the
ground and with respect to the prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace making. I have
some experience with transitions. I’ve been through three or four. I think the basic
realities that I laid out, the three reasons, I find them compelling, maybe I’m too
invested in this, but I still find them compelling, as to why any administration is going
to have to deal with the realities that exist on the ground, both in terms of how painful
they may be for our friends, our Israeli friends, our Palestinian friends, our friends in
the region on the one hand, and because it’s in our national interests on the other. And
because in effect we have a credible, still, a credible role to play. Different presidents
and secretaries approach problems differently, but the basic bipartisan character of our
approach to the Arab-Israeli issue that has in fact been maintained for the 20 years
that I’ve been involved in this process, I suspect will continue.
QUESTION: You made a comment on the United States, at least the United
States Congress, support of the Israeli narrative, and yet there is the United Nations
support of the Palestinian narrative. What do you as see as the challenges to the U.S.
role in the United Nations, how do you see this playing out vis a vis our diplomatic

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relationship inside the United Nations, and what possibly could be your advice to
Congressional staff on how to advise leadership on the Hill?
MR. MILLER: Again, I can only share with you observations based on my
limited experience. The only thing frankly that has ever changed the reality on the
ground between Arabs and the Israelis, the only thing, has been the process of
negotiation. Whether it was bilateral or whether it was facilitated by the Americans.
That’s what fundamentally changes things. Resolutions in New York and in Geneva
do not. Now maybe that’s too narrow a view. Maybe it doesn’t take into account
issues such as international legitimacy and international law, a grievance process and
the like, but based on my experience, what really changes things are the practical
consequences of negotiations between people who have a vested interest in those
negotiations and by people who are prepared to make the decisions that change
realities.
I will give you a case in point: the recent U.N. Security Council Resolution on
which the United States abstained. Why did we abstain? We could not vote for that
resolution. It was far too unbalanced. With modification and corrections it became
less unbalanced. So as a consequence of our determination not to move one way or
the other in response to an extraordinarily volatile situation, we decided to abstain.
In the explanation of the vote, it was made very clear that realities on the ground
could not be changed by rhetoric. Realities on the ground could be changed by
hammering out either on their own or with the help of the United States a set of
understandings which would somehow break the cycle. That’s what Sharm el-Sheikh
was all about. Whether it will succeed or not is frankly another matter, but certainly
the prospects for changing realities on the ground will flow from direct involvement
of the Israelis and Palestinians with the help of the United States or others, if they
both by mutual agreement choose to involve others. Not by rhetoric and resolution,
however well-intentioned some may be.
QUESTION: After Camp David, U.S. officials and the media seemed to suggest
that the huge obstacle to a resolution at Camp David was Jerusalem or specifically
sovereignty over the holy sites in Jerusalem. That would leave one to infer that other
final status issues were on the verge of being resolved, previously huge ones:
refugees, water, border, security. Is that conclusion accurate?
MR. MILLER: Let me just share an observation. What happened at Camp David
was remarkable by any standard. Israelis and Palestinians had discussions on the four
core issues that went well beyond any discussion that they had ever had on any of
these subjects in an authoritative setting. It’s not track two diplomacy. This was
occurring in the presence of the Prime Minister of Israel, the Chairman of the PLO,
and the President of the United States. So it’s not that the things that were said didn’t
count. They counted a great deal. That’s number one. Number two, on the four core
issues–water was not discussed in the kind of detail as the other four–but on security,
borders or territory, refugees, and Jerusalem, discussions at Camp David were
unprecedented both in scope and in detail. Point number three: Were we on the verge
of an agreement? Was it that we simply needed one additional point from one side or
the other? No. No. That would not be accurate. But, the openings on each of the
issues, the appearance of common ground on each of the issues, and the potential for
creating common ground where they differed on each of the issues convinced Israelis

CRS-11
and Palestinians, and I would argue Americans, that an agreement on permanent
status on the four core issues was possible. That, I think, is about as fair and accurate
a rendering as I can give without getting into the details of what actually was agreed
and what was not agreed. But what was equally clear was that it was too difficult for
the reasons I laid out earlier for either Israelis or Palestinians to accept an incremental
approach to the negotiation. What was required was a comprehensive agreement. Did
that comprehensive agreement mean that every single facet of every single issue
would have to be resolved? No. That is going to take a long time. The interim
agreement of September 28, 1995, was over 200 pages. We were talking about an
agreement on the core issues which would have convinced normal people that in fact
Israelis had given up whatever claims they had and Palestinians had given up whatever
claims they had. In short, an end to the conflict–by any, any reasonable standard–that
was basically the objective on the four core concerns.
QUESTION: Some commentators have suggested that if the agreement had
happened at the second Camp David talks, that Barak’s political future would have
been in jeopardy because it would have been a hard sell for the Israelis. And an
observation also might be that Chairman Arafat would also have a hard sell to the
Palestinians if such an agreement was reached without a comprehensive agreement
on Jerusalem. Would Arafat also have to sell such an agreement to the rest of the
Arab community, and if so, how would that affect the peace talks or any peace talks
in the future?
MR. MILLER: Well on the four core issues at Camp David or any Israeli-
Palestinian agreement, three of them were probably within the purview of a
Palestinian leader to make decisions on, including refugees–although as you know,
refugees would have a resonance beyond the West Bank and Gaza because of refugee
constituencies elsewhere, but it was still within the purview of legitimate Palestinian
decision making. The fourth was Jerusalem. This was the one issue that resonated not
just beyond the Arab world, but throughout a community of a billion Muslims
worldwide. This issue would be extremely difficult for any Palestinian leader unless
of course, a perfect solution to the Jerusalem issue were offered. And a perfect
solution was simply not possible, because it would not take into account the needs
and interests of the other side. Arab support, Islamic support, for such a solution
would be required. And we, of course, have been criticized for not understanding that
reality. Well, everyone was aware of that reality. Then why, the argument goes, didn’t
you simply bring the Arabs to Camp David as well? And how could you have gone
to Camp David knowing full well that Arafat couldn’t make a decision on Jerusalem?
Well, the answer is quite simple. Only Arafat and Barak knew before Camp David
started what in fact each was prepared to offer on this issue. Only they knew. Not
even their negotiators knew. It wasn’t readily apparent to us, even though there was
some indication that there would have been common ground. So the logic was to
determine what common ground existed and then to find a way to create a basis of
support if in fact the discussion of Jerusalem was advanced enough in order to reach
an agreement. And that was extremely difficult at a summit that for political reasons
understandably was kind of hermetically sealed to the outside world. So it does
present a chicken and egg problem. And it is one of which we were aware and with
which the Palestinians and the Americans would ultimately have had to deal.

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QUESTION: There’s going to be an Arab summit in two days. I was wondering
if you could comment on that and what it will do to the peace process or the violence
on the ground.
MR. MILLER: I don’t know. I would hope that whatever declaration emerges
avoids two issues. Number one, it does not create a hard and fast consensus which
undermines any capacity for future negotiations, undermines any flexibility or
creativity that will be required in future negotiations. Number two, I truly hope that
it does not have an undermining effect, because events on the ground are working in
their own pernicious fashion to undermine already what has already been achieved
between Arabs and Israelis. One of the more extraordinary aspects of this peace
process, even among the critics, if they’re prepared to acknowledge it, is the stunning
fact that with the exception of Sudan and Iraq, over the last eight years, every single
Arab state, every single one, in the Levant, in the Gulf, and in North Africa, either
maintained or maintains some form of contact with Israel, either through the donor
effort, the multi-national, multilateral negotiations, or the Middle East-North African
Summit. That is remarkable. That’s a transformative development. And that
accomplishment obviously was a lot more alive and healthy in 1996 than it is in the
year 2000, but it is still something that is worth paying attention to. And I, again I
think, frankly out of the Arab Summit should not come declarations that limit what
is possible in the future and out of the Arab Summit should not come declarations that
make impossible what had been possible in the past.
Introduction of Subject and Panel
MR. RUEBNER: In almost all countries, whether their regimes are democratic
or authoritarian, populist or elitist, the end results of foreign policy decision-making
tend to reflect the outcome of a long and complex balancing process that accounts for
the preferences of various domestic interest groups, institutions, and public opinion.
In short, domestic politics often plays a pivotal role in the formulation of foreign
policy. Domestic interest groups, institutions, and public opinion can influence the
course of foreign policy decision-making by setting the parameters of debate and by
articulating their preferences on various foreign policy issues. By extension, these
same actors can constrain the options available to the head of state in his or her
foreign policy decision-making apparatus when circumstances change and a
reorientation of a country’s position on a foreign policy question is called for.
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that Israeli, Palestinian, Syrian, and
Lebanese domestic politics have played and continue to play an important part in the
formation of these countries’ foreign policy decision-making regarding the Middle
East peace process. However, this fact is often overlooked or downplayed. Many
reports assume that the Prime Ministers and Presidents of these countries are or
should be able to make significant concessions in the peace process without consulting
their public’s opinion or taking into account the varied interests of political institutions
and interest groups in these countries. Such assumptions that domestic politics do not
influence or do not constrain the decisions of the leaders involved in the peace
process–namely, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, Palestinian Authority President
Yasser Arafat, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, and Lebanese President Emile

CRS-13
Lahoud–these assumptions can lead observers to inflate expectations that these
leaders can execute a political about-face and reorient their country’s position on such
a crucial issue as the peace process.
Recent Israeli-Palestinian clashes were triggered by Likud party head Ariel
Sharon’s provocative visit to al-Haram ash-Sharif/Temple Mount (and I’m going to
use both terms so as not to prejudge the disposition of that area). His visit to this
religious site in the Old City of Jerusalem on September 28, sparked clashes that have
now left over one hundred people dead, and dramatically illustrate how domestic
politics affects the course of the peace process. The timing of Sharon’s visit coincided
with the decision by Israel’s Attorney General and Comptroller not to pursue charges
against former Likud Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, who was under
investigation for allegedly committing acts of corruption and graft when he was prime
minister. The decision not to prosecute Netanyahu reportedly strengthened his
chances for making a political comeback and unseating Sharon in future Likud
primaries for the leadership of the party.
In addition, there are reports in the Israeli media that Sharon’s refusal to join
Barak in a national unity government stems at least partially from electoral
considerations. By not joining the government, Sharon can try to bring down Barak’s
government by a vote of no confidence when the Knesset reconvenes shortly on
October 29. If successful, this would trigger early elections and if held soon enough
might forestall Netanyahu’s comeback, leaving Sharon in control of the Likud Party.
Therefore, it is possible to suggest that Israel’s response to the Sharm el-Sheikh
summit and the fate of the peace process depends in part on Israeli domestic political
considerations.
Palestinian domestic politics have factored into Arafat’s response to these clashes
as well. These clashes which the Palestinians have termed the “al-Aqsa Intifadah” or
the “Jerusalem Intifadah,” have revealed a growing gap between the leadership of the
Palestinian Authority and its commitment to the step by step Oslo peace process on
the one hand, and the leadership of Fatah, Arafat’s own wing of the PLO, and its
stated commitment to pursuing the intifadah until achieving its goals on the other
hand. Fatah’s apparent willingness to forgo the Oslo process and attempt to achieve
Palestinian goals through other means, has resonated among other Palestinian political
groups and among Palestinian public opinion as well, which tends to be disappointed
and frustrated with the results of the seven year long Oslo peace process. The
situation has placed Arafat in a precarious situation. He can call for a halt to the
intifadah only at the risk of alienating large sections of his domestic constituency.
However, by not issuing a clear call to end the violence, Arafat risks a total break with
Barak on the peace process and exposes himself to possible Israeli and American
counter measures. Here again we see how domestic politics influence the options
available to the leaders of the countries involved in the peace process.

Although most attention is currently focused on the Israeli-Palestinian track of
the peace process, it is imperative that we not overlook domestic political
developments in Syria and Lebanon as well. Over the past few months, with the death
of the Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad in June and Lebanese parliamentary elections
in August and September, both Syria and Lebanon have experienced dramatic changes
on the domestic political level. These changes could have profound implications for

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the course of the Israeli-Syrian track of the peace process and the Israeli-Lebanese
track of the peace process, even if these implications are not yet clearly discernable.
In order to address these and other issues in depth, we have assembled a panel
of scholarly experts to address how Israeli, Palestinian, Syrian, and Lebanese domestic
politics influence decision-making regarding the peace process.
First, Dr. Don Peretz will speak on Israeli domestic politics. Dr. Peretz is
Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the State University of New York at
Binghamton and is a highly regarded authority on Israeli and Palestinian politics as
well as the Middle East peace process. His many publications include acclaimed books
such as Israel and the Palestine Arabs, Government and Politics of Israel, and
Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising. Recently Dr. Peretz co-authored an article in the
Spring 2000 addition of Middle East Journal, entitled “Sectarian Politics and the
Peace Process: The 1999 Israeli Elections.” He has also worked in the Middle East
as a correspondent for NBC and as a representative with the American Friends
Service Committee with the U.N. Relief for Palestine Refugees.
Next, Dr. Glenn Robinson will speak on Palestinian domestic politics. Dr.
Robinson is an Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey,
California, and is also a Research Fellow at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at
the University of California-Berkeley. He is the author of the highly acclaimed book
Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution and has published several
articles on Palestinian, Jordanian, and Syrian politics as well. Recently Dr. Robinson
published an article in the Autumn 2000 edition of The Washington Quarterly,
entitled “Palestine After Arafat.” He has also conducted research projects for the
Department of Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
Following Dr. Robinson, Dr. Patrick Seale will speak on Syrian domestic
politics. Dr. Seale is an independent Paris-based analyst of Middle East affairs.
Among his many publications, he has written two seminal books on Syrian domestic
politics, entitled Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958,
and Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East. Recently, Dr. Seale published
an article in the Winter 2000 edition of Journal of Palestine Studies, entitled “The
Syria- Israel Negotiations: Who Is Telling the Truth?” He has also recently published
an article in the influential pan-Arab daily newspaper al-Hayat, in which he devised
a compromise solution for the Israeli-Syrian territorial dispute over the northeastern
corner of the Sea of Galilee. Dr. Seale has also worked as a foreign correspondent for
Reuters and for The Observer.
Finally, Mr. Frederic Hof will speak on Lebanese domestic politics. Mr. Hof is
currently a partner with Armitage Associates, a consultancy specializing in
international business. He is the author of several definitive books and monographs
on various aspects of the Syrian and Lebanese tracks of the peace process, including
Galilee Divided: The Israel-Lebanon Frontier, 1916 to 1984; Line of Battle, Border
of Peace?, The Line of June 4, 1967; and Beyond the Boundary: Lebanon, Israel,
and the Challenge of Change. Recently Mr. Hof published an article in the January-
February 2000 edition of Middle East Insight, entitled “The Line of 1967– Revisited,”
which dealt with the Israeli-Syrian border. He retired from government in 1993 as a
member of the Senior Executive Service of the United States, having held many

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positions, including U.S. Army Attaché in Beirut, Lebanon, Country Director for
Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestinian Affairs in the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs, and senior-level mediator in the
Department of State. Mr. Hof also serves on the National Advisory Committee of the
Middle East Policy Council and as a contributing editor for Middle East Insight.
Israeli Politics–Dr. Don Peretz
DR. PERETZ: Israeli politics have always been characterized by a diversity of
political parties, coalition governments composed of several different factions, and
certain unwritten agreements such as the protection of the Orthodox religious
minority through a more or less guaranteed role in any of the Israeli governments.
Until recently this system seemed able to accommodate the many interest groups from
which Israel’s civil society is composed, i.e., religious versus secular, free enterprisers
versus socialists, Ashkenazi, Sefaradi and other ethnic groups, and even, to a large
extent, the country’s non-Jewish Arab community. Another cleavage in the system
emerged as a result of Israel’s conquests in the 1967 war, i.e., whether or not to keep
the conquered territory, or how much of it to keep, these differences traditionally have
been mediated through the political system–through parliamentary procedures and
through the creation of the broad coalitions that included territorialists and those who
favored a return to the 1967 borders in exchange for peace.
Recently, however, cracks have begun to appear in the edifice that kept this
system together, marked by increasing tensions within Israeli society among some of
the groups that formerly were able to accommodate their differences. These tensions
are exacerbated by both domestic and foreign factors. Most obvious, of course, are
the events of the past few weeks– first, Prime Minister Barak’s extensive
“concessions” at the Camp David summit; concessions far greater than those
proposed by any previous Israeli government or even greater than those proposed by
the peace lobby in Israel. To many in Israel it appeared that Barak had adopted the
program, not only of the left of center Meretz party but of the Peace Now movement,
an NGO at the left fringe of Israeli civil society. When it appeared that there might be
some possibility of agreement between Israeli and PLO negotiators on such far-
reaching ideas as withdrawal from 90 percent of the West Bank and Gaza and the
return to Israel of a small number of Palestinian refugees, the gap widened within
Israel between hawks and doves, between the right of center nationalist parties led by
Likud and Barak’s small left of center coalition; debate and accusations reached a
feverish pitch. It appeared that there was little room for accommodation between the
nationalists and the peace blocs. When the Camp David talks collapsed last month, the
acrimony became even sharper than usual and the nationalists cried out, “See, we told
you so,” overlooking the fact that it was the Likud government, led by the hawkish
Netanyahu, that in fact had implemented many previous provisions of the Oslo
agreement which they blamed for Israel’s recent troubles. Indeed, one Israeli
commentator observed that Netanyahu himself had emasculated the Likud party by
agreeing to abandon the traditional claims of Likud to a “Greater Israel.”
It was opposition to the concept of “land for peace” that was the glue that
traditionally held Likud together from 1967 until Netanyahu accepted the basic

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premise of Oslo, i.e., that the Palestinians do have national as well as individual rights,
and that they are a distinctive people with whom Israel must share the land west of
the Jordan River.
Although there were many reasons for fragmentation of the Likud Party prior to
the last, 1999, election, one of them was the perception among the party’s most
militant nationalists that Netanyahu had abandoned Likud’s most fundamental
platform, i.e., maintaining the territorial integrity of the Land of Israel. Likud hawks
like Benny Begin, the son of former Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and former
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir accused Netanyahu of abandoning the party ethos and
they left Likud to form their own National Union party which they insisted was the
true heir to Menachem Begin’s old Herut movement.
On the other hand, a dovish wing split from Likud just before the 1999 election.
It included several leading party members who accused Netanyahu of dragging his
feet by failing to implement parts of the Wye River Plantation agreement, and by
failing to withdraw from sections of the West Bank called for in the Oslo process.
Although Netanyahu personally alienated many of his closest colleagues, several of
Likud’s leaders believed he threw away the possibility for peace and thus they
abandoned the party. For example, Foreign Minister David Levy left Likud to join
the opposition, Barak’s new One Israel Party; Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai,
former Finance Minister Dan Meridor, and the Likud Mayor of Tel Aviv Ronni Milo
all left Likud and formed the core group that established the new Center Party.
Another factor was Israel’s new election law. This election law, passed by the
Kneset in 1992 and first implemented in the 1996 election, also was a major
contribution to fragmentation and polarization of the political system. Under the
system prevailing until the 1996 election each voter cast one ballot, for the party of
his or her choice; the leader of the party receiving the most votes became prime
minister. Even under this system there were several dozen parties and as many as a
dozen represented in parliament. Since their single ballot determined who would
become prime minister, voters exercised caution: most placed their parochial interests
second to their larger national interests thus, they voted for the party whose leader
they thought would make the best prime minister. Under the new system, where each
voter casts two ballots, one for Prime Minister and one for the party of his choice,
voters can select the person they consider best suited for Prime Minister while at the
same time backing another political party which represents their parochial interest.
The result of this has been a proliferation of small parties representing very parochial
interests and a sharp decline in Knesset representation of the two major parties, Labor
(or the One Israel Party) and Likud, i.e., a decline of the center left and of the center
right to the advantage of a variety of special parochial interest groups.
During the last 1999 election, in addition to the three traditional large electoral
blocs– Labor, the Orthodox religious, and the nationalist-right–a host of new special
interest parties developed and the Knesset electoral list had more parties than ever
before. They represented a women’s group, men’s family rights, Green
environmentalists, advocates of casino gambling, opponents of income taxes, those
demanding larger pensions for retired folks, several different ethnic factions including
Russians, Romanians, Sephardi Jews, and several Arab factions. A former beauty
queen and beauty product entrepreneur started her own Pnina Rosenbaum party and

CRS-17
nearly obtained 1.5 percent of votes required for Knesset representation. Fifteen of
more than thirty election lists obtained the 1.5 percent of votes, the minimum required
for Knesset representation. Only once before had so many parties or electoral lists
passed the 1.5 percent threshold required for Knesset representation. These fifteen
lists represented more than 20 different parties: Barak’s One Israel included three
parties–Labor, the Levy brothers’ Gesher, and the moderate Orthodox religious
Meimad. Benny Begin’s National Union included three right wing nationalist
factions–Herut, Moledet, and Tekuma.
The peace process was one of, if not perhaps the most important issue in the
1999 election. In this respect Barak had the advantage over Netanyahu. Barak’s
reputation as Israel’s most decorated army officer who, although favoring the peace
process, was known for having a rather a cautious attitude, and this seemed to attract
many middle roaders among the Israeli electorate. Barak was hand picked by former
Primer Minister Rabin as his protégée after Barak left the army where he had achieved
the highest rank of Lieutenant General and had also been Chief of Staff. Even though
he had been Rabin’s protégée, Barak had voted against or abstained in the Knesset
vote on the Oslo agreement. Unlike Shimon Peres who had conceived a “New
Middle East” linked through economic ties, Barak was a firm believer in separation
between Israel and the Palestinians and the Arabs generally. During the election
campaign he had even proposed some form of a barrier between Israel and the
projected Palestinian state–a fence or a wall to prevent cross border infiltration. As
for Gaza, he envisaged a bypass highway linking it with the West Bank, thus avoiding
any Palestinian trespass on Israeli soil. Barak even went out of his way to court the
settlers hoping to gain support from a moderate fringe among the settlers in the event
of a very close election. Rather than alienate the settlers as Rabin did, Barak sought
to divide the moderates among them from the unreconstructed zealots by opening a
dialogue with the former.
A major thrust of Barak’s campaign was to achieve an honorable peace with
Syria and the Palestinians while not ignoring other domestic concerns, although these
were to come in second among his priorities. He promised to withdraw Israeli forces
from the security zone in south Lebanon and sign final status agreements with Syria
and the Palestinians within a year or so. Once concluded, he promised to submit these
agreements to a national referendum, a procedure that would be the first in Israel’s
history.
However, Barak circumscribed these proposed agreements by four red lines and
these four red lines apply to the four key issues in the Arab-Israel dispute. First of all,
he said that Jerusalem was to remain, as he put it, and as Israelis generally put it,
Israel’s “united, eternal capital.” Second: no Palestinian or any other foreign army was
to be positioned west of the Jordan River. Third: no return to the 1949 armistice
borders which Israel had extended during the 1967 war. Fourth: most Jewish
settlements were to remain under Israeli rule. As for the return of the Palestine
refugees, this was out of the question across the whole political spectrum from right
to left. However, as part of a comprehensive peace settlement, the Israeli government
stated that it was willing to pay compensation for property that the refugees left in
1947-1948 as part of an overall peace settlement ending the conflict. A peace
settlement with these qualifications was generally acceptable to most of the Israeli
electorate according to public opinion polls last year.

CRS-18
However, since assuming office, the hard red lines that Barak had underscored
during the 1999 elections have somewhat faded away, and polls seem to indicate
considerable weakening of support for his peace program. This weakening is
underscored by the collapse of the coalition Barak established after he took office.
Although the coalition included no militant hawks, it was built with several parties
that had previously been part of Netanyahu’s nationalist government. These included
Natan Sharansky’s Israel B’Aliyah, the ultra-Orthodox Shas party, the National
Religious Party and the United Torah Judaism Party. The new Center Party, which
was formed just before the election, also included several former Likud members like
former Chief of Staff Yitzhak Mordechai, Dan Meridor, and Ronni Milo. However,
this coalition began to disintegrate soon after Barak took office as one party after
another within the coalition started to defect. First of all, two of Sharansky’s six
Knesset members defected and left the coalition. Leaders of both Shas and the Center
Party shortly after the election were discredited over personal fraud and other
malfeasance. The United Torah Judaism party quit the coalition over a dispute a few
months after it was formed over a dispute about Sabbath observance. And Barak’s
One Israel lost the support of two of its 26 seats when David Levy and his brother did
not actually withdraw from the coalition but stated that they were no longer satisfied
with the Barak government, and David Levy quit as foreign minister because of his
objection to Barak’s revised peace initiatives.
Until the recent upheaval, following Sharon’s visit to al-Haram ash-
Sharif/Temple Mount, Barak was hoping to count on support in the Knesset from the
10 members of the so-called Arab political parties. Parenthetically, I say so-called
because Hadash, or the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, dominated by the
Communists, is not strictly Arab. One of its three seats is held by a Jewish Member
of Knesset and the DFPE receives a few thousand Jewish votes. However, since the
new intifadah in the territories and within Israel, Barak seems to have lost almost all
Israeli-Arab support. In the last election, when it was possible to separate the vote for
Prime Minister from support for a political party, more than 94 percent of Israel’s
Arab electorate had voted for Barak. But the number of Arabs who voted for Jewish
political parties in the last election dropped from 36 to 30 percent. Labor, the party
that in the past had received the largest number of Arab votes, received only 10
percent of the Arab votes in the last election, about half the percentage it received in
1996. In addition to the ten members of the so-called Arab parties, four Arabs were
on the lists of Zionist parties–Labor, Center, Meretz, and Likud. (Likud and Center
Party Arab Members of Knesset were Druzes, usually listed as a separate community
in Israeli government statistics.) If an election were held today, probably most Israeli-
Arabs would cast a blank ballot for Prime Minister and the so-called Arab political
parties would probably greatly increase their support.
Despite recent talk about formation of a wide coalition from right to left that
would include Likud, Israeli politics today is in great disarray. In the past, when Labor
and Likud formed a broad coalition, the two parties were able to muster a majority
of Knesset seats. Their combined Knesset membership enabled them to form a
powerful coalition. For example, in 1981, when their electoral strength peaked, the
two political parties, when they formed a coalition government were able to control
95 out of the 120 Knesset seats. Since then, however, both parties have steadily
declined where today they have only a combined strength of 45 out of 120 seats in the

CRS-19
current Knesset. In the last two elections this decline was attributed to the new two
ballot system.
In the current situation Barak has actually been unable to determine which
direction to move Israel’s political future, which direction to move the ship of state.
On the one hand, does any possibility remain for a successful peace agreement? If not,
then in which direction should he move? In the past few weeks he’s devised an
alternative course focusing on major internal issues which he’s called a civil revolution
based on the secularization of many of the state institutions and including major
programs for rehabilitating the underprivileged Arab sector of the economy. If the
focus does remain on the peace process, a coalition will have to include one set of
political parties. If the focus is on internal reconstruction, an entirely different
coalition will have to be patched together. And I think that leaves room for discussion
as to which is the most likely of these coalitions to be formed. At present, I think all
of it is up in the air. It depends on both internal and external events.
One of the wild cards in this deck is Israel’s third largest party, Shas, which
emerged as the most successful list in the 1999 election. Shas became the fastest
growing party, from 4 seats in 1984, 6 in 1988, ten in 1996, to 17 in 1999. Shas has
been ambivalent about the peace process, but adamantly opposed to any tampering
with the prerogatives of the Orthodox religious establishment. As a member of
Netanyahu’s coalition, Shas supported his foreign policies, but nevertheless agreed
to become part of Barak’s coalition last year. The party’s mentor and spiritual guide,
former Sephardi Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yosef has blown hot and cold on the peace
process. On the one hand, he proclaimed that Jewish law permits surrender of
occupied territory if Jewish lives are saved; on the other, he excoriated Barak for his
peace proposals and characterized all Arabs as untrustworthy sub-humans. The
general belief is that if the government makes large enough grants to support Shas
institutions like its network of schools and social services, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef will
back a Barak government.
A few words about public opinion as it affects the peace process in Israel.
According to Asher Arian, one of the country’s leading pollsters, Israeli public
opinion is malleable and reputable politicians can lead it. Events in the past year
underscore this malleability and the extent to which it is influenced by events. Before
the peace treaty with Egypt, opinion was almost evenly divided about the return of
Sinai in exchange for peace. Yet, when Begin signed the first Camp David
agreements with Sadat he received overwhelming Knesset approval and the public
enthusiastically supported him. Less than a decade ago, no Israeli leader dared call
for negotiations with the PLO and Arafat was Israel’s number one villain. A year or
two ago the vast majority of the public supported the Oslo agreements conditioned
by Barak’s four red lines. As the red lines began to waver, public opinion gradually
moved in his direction. Although the results of a Gallup poll a few days ago indicated
growing disappointment with Barak and the peace process, if external events change,
opinion could well move back toward Barak’s new concept of settlement, a concept
that only a few months ago seemed as improbable as recognition of the PLO and a
Netanyahu-Arafat handshake less than a decade ago. Arian’s thesis is that in matters
of foreign policy the Israeli public follows the leader; and the leader’s direction will
be largely determined by, not only external events, but his or her own capacity to take

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risks and to innovate, to make decisions that only yesterday were considered
inconceivable.

Palestinian Politics–Dr. Glenn Robinson
DR. ROBINSON: This talk was arranged prior to the last few weeks, so at the
time I thought I was just going to come here and be the voice of doom and gloom of
things to come. The last three weeks have pretty much laid it out on the table, so I
don’t have to go into great detail, I think. I should say since I’m a professor at the
Naval Postgraduate School and have done a fair amount of work with USAID on
their Middle East projects that my remarks of course are only my own, and don’t
represent anybody else.
Josh had mentioned this piece that I had written in The Washington Quarterly,
the current edition. What I’d like to do is to read very briefly the last page of it, the
conclusion which brings out the three points that I want to make by way of
introduction, and then to expand on them. But the basic point, of course, is that the
violence that you’ve seen in the last three weeks was both predictable and predicted.
Predicted by a lot of people as late, in fact, as late as June of this year. Azmi Bishara,
who’s a path-breaking Israeli-Arab member of the Knesset–the first Arab to run for
the Prime Ministership in Israel, so he’s a man of quite good stature–he was quoted
to that effect, for example, and this is not something new. He’s been saying this for
a long time, but was quoted in June of this year saying, “The maximum Israel is
prepared to compromise won’t reach the minimum expectation of the Palestinians. I
do not think it is either war or peace, but there is a confrontation coming.” That kind
of remark, again, has been quite common for a long time. So when you hear
comments in the press about how unexpected this violence was, how it came out of
the blue–that’s not true. Those comments are being made by people who haven’t been
paying attention. So let me then read this one page conclusion and then expand on the
three points that it makes. This was written in June and published in early September.
So it’s written before the Camp David meeting, but when the deal, if you will, not all
the details but the grand outlines of the deal that was going to be discussed and
perhaps agreed to, were becoming more and more clear.
“Three political certainties loom on Palestine’s horizon. First, no matter what
photo-ops emerge from the White House lawn, the nature of any peace agreement
between Israel and Palestine, like the agreements of the past seven years will be one-
sided, accurately reflecting the imbalance of power between the two parties. A
hegemonic peace is an unstable peace that necessarily leads to wide social unrest.
“Social turmoil in Palestine is the second certainty. The exact nature of the unrest
and how successful it might be contained can only be guessed, but an increase in
terrorism and other forms of political violence is likely. These acts will wrongly be
dismissed in Washington as the sour grapes of those inherently opposed to peace.
Social unrest in its violent expression in and around Palestine will, in fact, broadly
reflect the deep rejection by most Palestinians, not of peace but of the hegemonic
terms of the agreement.

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“The need by the Palestinian regime to clamp down on social unrest, in
combination with the distributive nature of Palestine’s political economy, will produce
the third certainty: authoritarianism, not democracy, will be the governing politics in
Palestine regardless of the leader. Although Palestine has many of the attributes of
democratic polities, including a vibrant civil society, a highly educated populace, and
a long ideological commitment to democracy, the realities in Palestine today strongly
suggest that hopes for democracy will be overwhelmed by political necessity.
“Ironic in this gloomy forecast is the fact that succession itself would likely not
be the underlying cause of disorder. Assuming that Arafat survives a few more years,
a succession ought to go rather smoothly–even as Palestine seethes. In the worst case,
in the immediate aftermath of a peace agreement, succession would exacerbate extant
tensions resulting from an inevitably hegemonic peace. Violence may then erupt, but
it would be the peace accords and not Arafat’s passing that would be primarily
responsible.”
All right, now I’d like to, for a few minutes, expand on these three issues,
beginning with this notion of hegemonic peace. When I use that term, I don’t use it
in a normative sense. I mean, it sounds, I don’t know, somewhat spooky perhaps.
Hegemonic peace. It’s not supposed to be a value judgement. What it is is an
analytical statement of the imbalance of power between Palestine and Israel. Israel is
a regional super power. It is as Prime Minister Barak has often noted, by far the most
powerful country in the region. And the Palestinians, on the other hand, are not even
a country yet, and are a very weak party by comparison. So there is an imbalance in
power between the two sides.
So then the question becomes, what are the practical consequences of a deal, or
a near deal, as we are at this point or were at Camp David, what are the practical
consequences of a deal struck by two parties that are vastly, not sort of narrowly
imbalanced or out of balance, but vastly out of balance in terms of their own power?
Now the near agreement, the possible agreement, at Camp David drove home to the
Palestinians something that the critics of the Oslo accords have been predicting for
years. And that is those things that are seen by Palestinians as fundamental rights will
not be realized in the final status negotiations. In particular, the three biggies, if you
will, for Palestinians. One is the issue of Palestinian refugees. The whole passion play,
if you will, of Palestinian existence. Its conception of its own history, and its own
nationhood, really begins in a fundamental way in 1948 with expulsion and exile from
Palestine. It’s very clear, Camp David made very clear, that at most a fairly nominal
number of these refugees will be allowed to return to their homes or where their
homes used to be in what is now Israel. And again, something like three quarters of
Gaza’s population and about half of the West Bank’s population is refugees. These
are people and their descendants, who were living in what is now Israel, who became
refugees in the 1948 war. Not all the refugees are in Lebanon, Jordan, or Syria. Many
remain in the West Bank and Gaza. This represented something of almost treason, if
you will, on the streets in the West Bank and Gaza and even more so outside of
Palestine. So refugees and the sort of international legitimacy born of U.N. resolutions
and what have you regarding refugees were not going to be recognized and were not
going to be dealt with in the final status solution.

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Second are the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza that have been illegally
built. The U.S. used to call it illegal, but now we just call it a hindrance to peace I
think. The settlements that have been illegally built in the territory that was occupied
in the 1967 war–it was also very clear in the Camp David agreements that only a
relative few of these would be dismantled. The vast bulk of settlements and settlers
would remain where they were–approximately 10 percent of the West Bank, where
the settlements predominate, was going to be annexed by Israel. And so, the belief of
Palestinians on the street that a final status solution would remove these settlements
and the settlers, was shown not to be the case.
And thirdly, it was shown that Israel would maintain control of at least most of
East Jerusalem, with the whole issue of al-Haram ash-Sharif and the Temple Mount
being part of that. But even above and beyond that, this sort of annexation of East
Jerusalem, the great expansion of its municipal boundaries following the 1967 war and
the 130,000 or so Israelis that now live in that area of East Jerusalem that was taken
in 1967–all that would remain.
So U.N. Resolution 242 which was supposed to be the basis of these
negotiations called for the withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967. I know
there’s a discussion about the word “the” there. But the very basis of 242 was not
going to be implemented. So the promise from a Palestinian perspective, the promise
of the peace process was that it would lead to a situation, not just of statehood, but
the refugee issue would be solved according to international law, the settlements
would be removed according to international law, and the territories occupied in 1967
including East Jerusalem would be returned according to 242–these all promised to
be illusory according to Camp David. And of course this has been the critique of the
opposition, not just of Hamas, but within Fatah itself, the main party of the PLO,
Yasser Arafat’s party. The opposition has always critiqued the peace process by
saying that this will not deliver these fundamental rights. You know, this will not get
to where we want to go as a nation. So again, it’s not so much the people, I mean
clearly there are some Palestinians like there are Israelis who are fundamentally and
determinedly opposed to any peace whatsoever who view this process in Ambassador
Miller’s terms as an existential conflict. There are those people, don’t get me wrong,
but very many Palestinians, especially the ones that you’ve seen out on the streets the
last few weeks–I know Marwan al-Barghouthi has been prominent in this regard–
these are people that support, if you will, a peace, but not this peace. Not the kind of
peace that has come to pass over the last seven years and was seen to be nearly
completed at Camp David.
So the first point then is, the nature of the peace is hegemonic in that it is
imbalanced, it is one-sided, and again, this is not something that can really change
because the parties themselves are so out of balance in terms of their own power.
Where does that lead?
It leads to the second point that I’m trying to make and that is, in terms of
Palestinian politics, it leads to wide social turmoil. Had this discussion been held four
weeks ago and I made that statement you’d probably reject it as overly pessimistic,
and I can only point to the events of the last three weeks. There is a broad rejection
of the terms of this peace. And that broad rejection does not come from, again, those
inherently opposed to peace. It comes from very mainstream Palestinians. One of the

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most outspoken and reasonable critics of Oslo is Dr. Haydar Abdul-Shafi. Here’s a
man who was elected to the Palestinian parliament with the most votes of any person
who ran in the West Bank and Gaza. Here’s a man who led the Washington talks
between Madrid and Oslo. He led the Palestinian delegation. Here’s a man who gave
the opening talk at the 1991 Madrid Summit on the peace process. This is not
somebody you can dismiss as just opposed to peace. This is a person who’s actively
been involved in the peace process over the years. And yet he has been a very vocal
critic of the terms of Oslo and its implications in terms of Palestinian politics. And I
think in large measure he and people like him have proved to be right. And part of
what they have suggested, (and again I quoted Azmi Bishara; there are many others
I could quote) is that the result of trying to implement this kind of an agreement, this
kind of hegemonic peace, will in fact be wide social turmoil.
Then of course the question becomes: what will be the Palestinian regime’s
response to this turmoil? Can it, will it, try to suppress it? Will it allow it to go on to
some degree as a kind of a steam release, if you will? My guess is that what you’ve
seen in the last three weeks is not going to go away. It may not take this form, but
there’ll be other forms of political violence, acts of terrorism, this kind of rage...[this
kind of] violence set into the institutions that will be established in a Palestinian state.
The regime will feel compelled, and is feeling compelled, to restrict public voice by
Palestinians knowing that the opposition to the terms of the near agreement are so
strong. It’s kind of interesting, because what it does is in a very direct way, it pits
peace versus democracy. The Palestinian regime can’t have both. If it democratizes,
it is going to undermine the peace because the peace is so strongly and widely rejected
by Palestinians. So if it wants peace, it can’t have democracy. If it wants democracy,
it can’t have peace. Incidentally, I make this argument for Jordan as well–I know
we’re not supposed to talk about Jordan too much since it’s already at peace–but
you’ve seen a very similar process in Jordan where the democratization campaign that
was begun in 1989 when Jordan went bankrupt, many of the advances that were made
in the first three years of that process had to be, in affect, rolled back by the regime
if it wanted to conclude a peace treaty with Israel. There was a very direct correlation
between the lessening of democracy or democratization in Jordan and its conclusion
of a widely unpopular peace treaty in Jordan. And of course it is even more so within
the West Bank and Gaza. I’ll also add, incidentally, that peace has been very
destabilizing in Israel. But I think Professor Peretz has covered that already.
The third point that I’d like to expand upon very briefly is the authoritarianism
that has been developing in Palestine for, I think, very particular reasons. It is clearly
not only linked to the Middle East peace process, but I think the Middle East peace
process has in fact encouraged the rise of authoritarianism within Palestine. Again,
there are other things, and we could talk about those if you like, that have to do with
the way power gets consolidated or has gotten consolidated within Palestine: the
social pillars of the regime that have not a great deal of interest in opening up the
political process to others, the particular form of the political economy in Palestine
that oddly enough resembles oil states more than it does other states. So there are a
number of reasons, and we can talk about them if you’d like, as to why
authoritarianism has increased, and I think continues to increase, in Palestine. But
clearly the Middle East peace process is one of the elements that encouraged the
growth of authoritarianism in Palestine because of the need of the Palestinian regime
to control dissent, to limit the Palestinian voice.

CRS-24
In crude terms, it has become basically a situation of state versus society. You’ve
seen this in the attacks on the institutions of civil society that the PA has undertaken
over the years, and I think will continue to undertake. Someone who has worked with
NGOs can probably speak with authority on some of the attacks that the PA has made
on its own institutions of civil society. The birth, if you will, the potential birth of
democratization in Palestine has been under constant attack the past seven years. But
this authoritarianism is not born of strength. It is born of weakness. It is because the
Palestinian regime in effect is cutting a deal, in part, cutting a deal that is highly
unpopular, but it feels the need to crack down. It doesn’t feel that it can cut this kind
of a deal through a position of strength and allow a wide Palestinian voice,
democratization, to occur.
I find it very interesting that so many of the journalists in this country get it
wrong. They have what I call the switch theory of political violence. That is, Yasser
Arafat can just flip the switch. You know, he flips it on, and everybody’s out on the
street throwing rocks. He flips it off, and they all go home happy, as though
Palestinians are somehow automatons that, you know, just get controlled this way.
The real danger and I think more people in the last couple of days–Shlomo Ben-Ami,
Israel’s Acting Foreign Minister and others–have recognized that in fact, the violence
is evidence of Arafat’s weakness and of the PA’s weakness not of its strength. And
the danger from the viewpoint of the PA is losing control altogether. They’re trying
to do something that in affect their population doesn’t want. And if they take the next
step, they may loose control altogether. This is the dilemma that they’re in. And it’s
a dilemma that is born of weakness not of strength.
Syrian Politics–Dr. Patrick Seale
DR. SEALE: Thank you for inviting me here. I’m a voice from across the
Atlantic and I’m therefore not influenced by American domestic politics. As a result,
some of the things I have to say may not be very palatable, but I hope you will agree
with me that it is, nevertheless, important for me to say them.
You’ve asked me to talk about Syria. Some of you will have read the works of
the late Professor Albert Hourani. I remember that he used to say that, for small
countries, the only really important problems were the problems of foreign policy.
That is why I would argue that it is pointless to talk about Syrian domestic politics
without considering the regional context in which these politics and policies have
worked themselves out since the death of Hafiz al-Asad last June.
As you all know, the Middle East is a system, it’s a highly interconnected system,
perhaps the most interconnected system in the whole world, more so at any rate than,
say, Latin America or even Europe. The countries of the system influence each other
to the extent that you cannot look at one country on its own, cut off from its regional
environment–and certainly not from the environment that has emerged in the last few
weeks and months. I make no apology, therefore, for diverging a little from Syria
itself in order to sketch in what I think are some of the important developments which
have taken place in the region recently.

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I believe that there has been a radical change in the strategic environment. One
component is, of course, the Palestinian revolt again Israeli occupation, which I
believe will continue in one form or another, either violently or peacefully. Israel’s
response is likely to be violent and involve the use of military force.
In this connection, I think it’s important to note the explosion of anger among
the Arab public across the region at the killings–110 or so dead and over three
thousand wounded at the latest count. This anger is something which Arab regimes
have to respond to or ignore at their peril. Professor Robinson mentioned the
difficulty of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in suppressing dissent, but this is true of
every Arab regime in every Arab country. You may have seen on your television
screens demonstrations in Morocco where over half a million people took to the
streets; or the demonstrations in Egypt, for example, especially at the universities.
Egyptian public opinion is now violently anti-Israeli and anti-American.
All of you will have seen what happened to the USS Cole. Coming from the
other side of the Atlantic, I was very struck when turning on my television set last
night to hear pundits trying to explain what happened to the Cole. They blamed
Usama Bin Laden in Afghanistan, or they blamed Iraq, if you read Mr. Jim Hoagland.
He wrote an article suggesting Iraq was behind it all. Nobody, so far as I can see, is
saying that what happened to the Cole is the result of American policy in the Arab-
Israeli conflict.
But this is why, I believe, the United States now faces a very grave crisis in the
Arab and Muslim world. U.S. citizens, U.S. embassies, troops and interests are at risk
everywhere. I heard the other day that the American Ambassador in Riyadh, of all
places, was now living in a bunker! The threat of terrorism is certainly there. But why
has this happened? Contrary to what we heard this morning from Mr. Aaron Miller,
I would argue that the United States has failed in its management of the peace
process.
I will explain to you why I think the United States has failed. The United States
bears a heavy responsibility in this matter. In my view, the Americans have made two
major mistakes over the last several decades. First of all, they allowed Israel to remain
in Lebanon for 22 years. It’s worth nothing that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in
1982 was far more brutal than Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Some 20,000
people, Palestinians and Lebanese, were killed in the first weeks of Israel’s
invasion–and Israel remained in Lebanon for 22 years! The other major American
mistake was, of course, to allow the settlement building in the Palestinian occupied
territories. You may question “allowed.” Well, the United States allowed, funded,
armed Israel and provided it with diplomatic and political protection for these
activities.
In Lebanon, the result of the invasion and the continued occupation of the south
was the creation of the Lebanese resistance movement, Hizballah. As you all know,
Hizballah has now scored a victory. That is the reality on the ground–a reality to
which Aaron Miller referred. But, contrary to his view, this reality was not changed
by negotiations. It was changed by violent action, by Hizballah’s success, which
showed up Israeli vulnerability and forced it out of Lebanon.

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The violent Palestinian uprising is also changing the reality on the ground and has
to be noted. It is no longer enough to say: let the parties negotiate, let them go back
to the table. Things have changed. I don’t think it’s my role here to talk too much
about the Palestinian situation because others have done so already. But it may,
nevertheless, be worth giving you one or two statistics. Since Oslo, Arafat has
secured control of only 70 percent of Gaza, while the remaining 30 percent is
occupied by some five thousand settlers. On the West Bank, Arafat has managed to
secure real control of only 13.1 percent of the territory, and nothing at all so far in
East Jerusalem. Altogether, he has secured about 20 percent of the occupied
territories–and the occupied territory represent only 22 percent of the whole of
historic Palestine. As you all know, the Palestinians living in urban “bantustans” under
Israeli military occupation suffer grave repression and hardship.
Let me turn to the Syrian track, but what I have to say applies also very much
to the Palestine problem. You can’t really separate these tracks. The American failure
has been one of failing to insist on the implementation of deals, which America itself
had brokered. I don’t have to remind you how timetables have constantly slipped,
how the agreements of Oslo II, in particular, have not been implemented. Anyway,
in the Syrian case, you will recall that certain pledges were given by Yitzhak Rabin
to withdraw from the Golan to the June 4, 1967 borders– this was the so-called
“deposit in the American pocket,” which we can go into later if you are interested.
But, at the end of the day, when Barak came to power and refused to endorse the
“deposit,” the Americans did not insist upon it, although they had brokered the deal
in the first place.
As a result of these failures, I would say that the United States and Israel are
today facing grave challenges in the region. They are facing a revival of Arab
solidarity, even of pan-Arabism. They are facing the unification of Palestinian forces,
which is in itself quit unusual. They are facing a new Arab generation, which has more
confidence, which is better educated, a generation interested in modernization and
reform, and a generation which is somewhat comforted, I would say, by the increase
in the oil price.
Let me now focus on Syria as such, in the changing strategic environment, which
I have tried to sketch in, and which Bashar al-Asad, Syria’s new young leader,
certainly cannot ignore. He has been in power for only a little more than three months,
so it is too early to make a real judgement about what he’s been doing. But I think
that there are one or two noteworthy new departures, which I would like to
emphasize and which spring from what I’ve been saying.
Take, for example, his relations with Iraq. This is really very important and often
overlooked in the West. Syria and Iran are very concerned about Anglo-American
policy towards Iraq. They don’t want a change of regime in Iraq, which would
damage their interests, so we have been seeing close coordination between Syria and
Iran over Iraq, and better relations between these two powers and Iraq. If you’ve been
reading the press, you may have seen, for example, that Dr. Bashar al-Asad had a
meeting with Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz in Damascus recently. And, at
his press conference in Cairo with President Mubarak, Dr. Bashar made several
friendly references to Iraq–how Iraq was Syria’s strategic, economic and scientific
depth. “We never wanted to win Kuwait and lose Iraq,” he declared.

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At the same time, you may have noticed that Iran’s Foreign Minister Kharrazi
visited Baghdad and, after talks with Saddam Hussein, announced that Iraq and Iran
were reviving the 1975 Algiers Agreement. There is a good deal of talk now of
enhanced cooperating between Damascus, Bagdad, and Teheran. In my view, this is
a very important development.
In Lebanon, many people would argue that the recent elections have damaged
Syria’s position. There has been a debate going on in Syria about how to handle
relations with Lebanon. Some say that Syrian should continue its old policy of divide
and conquer–of retaining total control over every aspect of Lebanese life. This policy
is generally associated with the name of General Ghazi Kana’an, Syria’s intelligence
chief in Lebanon who has been a sort of Syrian overlord there for very many years.
Another view, however, which is being advanced quite forcefully, and which is
reflected in the election results, is that Syria should have a more balanced relationship
with Lebanon. This appears to be the view of President Dr. Bashar al-Asad. As I
understand it, he believes the relationship between Syria and Lebanon should be one
of equals. But it doesn’t mean that Syria will totally relinquish its grip on Lebanon.
The Syrians are very concerned about two things. They are anxious that there should
not be a separate peace between Lebanon and Israel. And they don’t want to see a
consensus emerge in Lebanon calling for the withdrawal of Syrian troops. They feel
that on both of these vital issues, their interests are fairly safe. Indeed, I think that Dr.
Bashar would argue that a new relationship between equals would be a more
respectable relationship, one easier to defend in front of international opinion and less
likely to arouse opposition in Lebanon itself.
Another striking change is taking place in Syria’s relations with the Palestinians,
and in the way the Syrian press and television have been handling the uprising in the
Palestinian territories. You may recall that the late President Hafiz al-Asad had a very
poor relationship with Yasser Arafat. He believed that the Palestinian problem was
far too important to be left to the Palestinians, that it involved all the Arabs. And he
believed that Arafat had sabotaged the joint Arab position by his separate deal at
Oslo, secretly arrived at. Asad was totally opposed to that.
Bashar, however, now seems on somewhat better terms with the Palestinians,
and the union of Palestinian forces, which I mentioned earlier, is part of the new
strategic environment. I think we may see some developments there because the
Syrians have always dreamed of drawing the Palestinians, Lebanon and Jordan into
a common front with themselves as the only way to create a sort of counter weight
to Israeli power.
So, to sum up, I think that President Bashar al-Asad, in his relations with Iraq,
Jordan, and Lebanon, is trying to consolidate the economic underpinnings of Syria’s
relations with these countries in order to confirm or to strengthen his father’s strategic
vision of the relationship with them. Some “higher committees” have been reactivated
between Syria on the one hand and Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq on the other. Trade
between Syria and Iraq is very brisk, estimated at about $500 million a year. They talk
about doubling it next year. And of course Syria would like its ports to be the conduit
for trade with Iraq, particularly once Iraq is rehabilitated and once its reconstruction
begins to generate huge contracts and huge imports.

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Let me now say a word about the peace process and about developments inside
Syria affecting the peace process. I think we can be pretty confident that there is not
going to be any fundamental change in Syria’s attitudes towards the peace process.
The Syrians feel very much the same as I’ve suggested other people in the region feel.
They feel disillusioned with the United States and with its handling of the peace
process.
The late President Hafiz al-Asad had a close relationship with President Clinton.
They spoke a lot on the telephone. Asad thought of him as a friend. He probably
established closer relations with Clinton than with any other American president, and
he had dealings with several of them. He received many pledges from U.S. presidents
about the Golan–how the United States would never recognize Israel’s annexation–
but, at the end of the day, and particularly at the Geneva summit last March, he felt
that Clinton had in a sense betrayed him. When Clinton called him from India to
summon him to Geneva, Asad thought that this was at last the big breakthrough he
had been expecting. He thought that Barak would at last endorse the commitment
made by his predecessors, Rabin and Peres, to withdraw from the Golan to the June
4, 1967 line.
Asad arrived in Geneva with a huge delegation of 130 people, reflecting his great
expectations. He was told by Clinton that Barak not was not prepared to withdraw
to the June 4th line, and, moreover, that he wanted to push back the 1923
international frontier several hundred meters to the east, in order to protect not just
the Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias), but also the road that runs around the lake. Asad
found this totally unacceptable. Many people would argue that this disappointment
contributed to his death.
There is no way that his son is going to more flexible on this territorial issue than
Asad was himself. If Israel wants peace with Syria, it will have to pull back to the
June 4th line. It will have to acknowledge Syria’s sovereignty over the northeastern
shoreline of the Sea of Galilee, where Syria was before the war. And the same thing
will apply to the Palestinians. Something like an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967
borders will be necessary. This is what international legality demands. The idea that
200,000 settlers can somehow continue to live on the West Bank and that the
Palestinians will accept to make peace under such conditions–a hegemonic peace, as
we heard–is totally unreasonable. On the other hand, what Israeli government will be
strong enough to remove large numbers of armed settlers, organized as they are in
an underground army of the settlements? Many of them are fanatical and many
believe they are there by divine right.
Let me now say a few brief words about the structure of power in Syria. There
has been very little change so far in the structure of power, except that whereas Hafiz
al-Asad totally dominated the men around him, in fact created them, the men around
Bashar have in a sense created him. We are therefore likely to see a more collegiate
leadership than before. Dr. Bashar is a young man, relatively untried. His first instinct
on coming to power was to consolidate his security apparatus. He’s done this at the
cost, I would say, of disappointing some expectations that he would inaugurate a
more liberal regime. Many people would say that he has given too much power to the
security services, and also to the army, which are after all the underpinnings of his
regime. Three names tend to crop up in Damascus conversations–those of General Ali

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Aslan, the armed forces chief of staff; of General Bahjat Suleiman, head of internal
security; and of General Asif Shawqat, Bashar’s own brother-in-law, married to his
sister Bushra, number two in the military security, but who is in fact a very important
person.
So, as I said, Dr. Bashar’s initial instinct to strengthen the security basis of his
rule has meant disappointing expectations of greater liberalization and democracy, at
least for the moment.
There are certain real obstacles to the emergence in Syria of democracy on the
Western model. One major obstacle has to do with the mosaic nature of Syrian society
and its sectarian divisions. Another is the fact that the Ba’th revolution of 1963, which
was the starting point of what we are witnessing today, was largely a revolution of
country boys, from the Alawi, Druze and Ismaili communities, but also from the
Sunni community, young men from small towns and villages, whose names were
unknown, but who supplanted and drove from power the urban families and notables
who had ruled Syria since Ottoman times. These people, who have formed the new
elite of the past twenty-five or thirty years, have no intention of handing power back
to their class or sectarian enemies. They will want to retain their grip on power. So
we are very unlikely to see the adoption of a democratic representational system on
the Western model.
What we may well see, however, what many people hope and what the Syrians
expect, is liberalization in other areas. We may see a more independent judiciary than
at present; moves towards a liberal market economy; an end to censorship and a freer
press. These changes would not necessarily challenge the basis of the regime, but they
have been slow in coming.
Let me race through, if you like, some of the measures Dr Bashar has taken in
the last few months since coming to power.
Hafiz al-Asad gave little attention to domestic affairs, especially in the last
decade. His mind was overwhelmingly taken up with the struggle against Israel and
the relationship with the Powers. The 1990s were a bad decade for him, beginning
with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Oslo accords of 1993 undercut his
diplomacy. The death of his son Basil in January 1994 was a very bitter personal
blow. The emergence of Netanyahu in Israel, the Israeli-Turkish alliance, the crisis
with Turkey over the PKK leader Ocalan, all these developments hit him hard, as did
his disappointment with American handling of the peace process.
So busy was he with regional issues that he neglected a lot of things on the
domestic front. Decrees piled up unsigned on his desk. One of the things Dr. Bashar
is now doing is signing decrees almost daily in an attempt to work off this backlog.
For example, the Syrian authorities are trying to reduce the number of
government cars. This might sound ridiculous, but in fact a sizeable proportion of the
state budget is taken up with the expense of providing and maintaining cars for
ministers, officials and other dignitaries. Some individuals are said to have at their
disposal as many as 30 or 40 cars with drivers, petrol and maintenance provided at the

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state’s expense. This is an abuse the government is now anxious to reduce, if not
eliminate altogether.
More seriously, Dr. Bashar is anxious to improve the country’s human rights
record. A security committee has been touring jails and detention centers to review
the cases of long-term prisoners. An amnesty for political prisoners is under study. [It
was announced in mid-November 2000 that 600 political prisoners had been released.]
Trade in agricultural products with Lebanon has been liberalized. About 100,000
Syrians who went abroad to escape military service can now regularize their situation
by paying $5,000, and in some case $10,000. Students who, on completing a first
degree in Syria, want to go abroad for higher education can now collect their
diplomas immediately from Syrian universities. Hitherto they have sometimes had to
wait for months, which has compromised their ability to gain acceptance at academic
institutions abroad. The salaries of state employees, of whom there are about 1.4
million have been increased by 25 per cent, in the hope that this will reduce the level
of petty corruption in the government bureaucracy. There is a committee working on
the question of unfreezing rents, which is a major problem, and there has been a lot
of discussion about allowing foreign banks to operate in Syria. Three Franco-
Lebanese banks have been granted a license to operate offshore, in the free zone.
One has to say, however, that in spite of the flow of decrees, the new regime has
not yet clarified its fundamental economic direction. No one yet seems to know to
what extent the semi-bankrupt public sector will be reformed and slimmed down, and
the private sector given a freer hand.
A few key questions will have to be addressed by Dr. Bashar. Can he truly
reform the political and economic system he inherited? He says he is committed to
democracy, although not on the Western model. What form will this democracy take?
Is it possible to carry out economic and social reform without reviving political life?
These are some of the questions he will have to face.
But, to return to what I was saying at the beginning, it is important to remember
that every Arab ruler, Dr. Bashar included, will have to take note of what has been
happened in the Palestinian territories in the past few weeks. There has been a
hardening, not just of Palestinian opinion, but of Arab opinion. There cannot be a
return to a search for accommodations as in the past. Realities have changed on the
ground, and I think we may see this reflected in the resolutions at the Arab summit
this weekend. It will be extremely difficult for the Saudi rulers, the Egyptian rulers,
the Jordanian rulers, and even the Syrian rulers, to revert back to cozying up to the
United States. Accordingly, it would be a grave mistake for the United States to take
for granted such allies as President Mubarak of Egypt, King Abdallah of Jordan or the
ruling princes of Saudi Arabia. These people are now under enormous pressure from
their own populations.
So what is the answer to all of this? Are we likely to see a change in Israeli
policy–a change which I, for one, think necessary? Can an Israeli government emerge
which can say: “We have to make further concessions to the Palestinians and to the
Syrians. We have to give back Arab territory occupied in 1967.” One should not
think only of Israeli security. Security is indivisible. There can be no security for Israel

CRS-31
at the cost of the insecurity of its neighbors–whether its neighbors are Palestinians or
Syrians. What about a return to international legitimacy? To the principle of land-for-
peace? To Security Council Resolution 242? I think I’ll leave you with these
thoughts.
Lebanese Politics–Mr. Frederic Hof
MR. HOF: Ladies and gentlemen, I want to be perfectly honest with you. If there
is a more exquisite torture than listening to someone drone on about Lebanese politics
just before lunch, I don’t know what it is. I’ve got a mission here today, so I’ve got
to say something about Lebanese politics but for those of you who are taking notes,
let me give you my bottom line up front—you can write this down—Lebanon: others
will decide. That is the bottom line.
Sixteen years ago exactly I was drafting the preface to a soon-to-be-published
book entitled “Galilee Divided”. I’d like to frame my very brief remarks today by
quoting the opening lines of that preface. “Ten years have passed since the
independent Lebanese state born in 1943 died violently in the streets of downtown
Beirut. Alive, Lebanon was too weak and too militarily inconsequential to be
categorized as a confrontation state in the Arab-Israeli context. Yet dead, Lebanon
was drawn into the very center of the Arab-Israeli vortex, an abyss from which it has
yet to emerge.” I would argue that Lebanon has not yet fully emerged from the abyss,
even though the shooting phase of the civil war ended ten years ago, and even though
the Israeli occupation of the south ended five months ago.
Lebanon is trying to find its balance in a turbulent region where Israeli-
Palestinian violence and Israeli-Syrian tension completely overshadow the ability of
the people and the government of Lebanon to have a political life independent of or
unaffected by these struggles. The weakness of the state and the nature of political
discourse are affected by the perpetuation of political sectarianism, which itself
reflects the fact that some 15 years of often vicious fighting and widespread
destruction failed to instill anything resembling a sense of Lebanese nationalism,
anything transcending the primordial attachments of Lebanese to sect, neighborhood,
clan, and the leaders thereof. What we are left with in the year 2000 is a Lebanese
republic still trying to find its’ sea legs, a state in which the government and much of
the citizenry plays the role of an interested onlooker.
The horrors of the civil war seem to have produced one element of political
consensus which even if minimal is nevertheless something. Virtually all Lebanese
believe that, for better or worse, they need to co-exist within the boundaries of
Lebanon, that the consequences of renewed fighting would be far worse than having
to endure a failing economy and a very uncertain future. In the recent elections,
Lebanese voters mustered the energy to say, in effect, we know that the government
of the current prime minister has failed. We desperately want change. And, because
Syrian suzerainty exists side-by-side with our frustration and anger, perhaps the
change we need should extend to the terms and conditions of the Lebanese-Syrian
relationship.

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Yet, if the majority of Lebanese voters wanted to borrow the phrase of George
Wallace to “send them a message,” look at the way the message is being massaged by
Lebanon’s political cognoscenti. The victory of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri
is seen by some commentators as the elevation by Sunni voters of someone strong
enough to counter-balance the demographic weight of the Shi’a. The victories of
Pierre Gemayel and Nassib Lahoud are ascribed to the alleged failure of President
Emile Lahoud to represent the interests of the Maronites. The Maronite Patriarch has
called for a national discussion about the future of Syrian forces in Lebanon. And the
secretary general of Hizballah, an organization that seeks to represent Lebanon’s
largest sect, has countered with the observation that if Lebanon had no sectarianism
it would have no Syrians. Sensing the punitive danger posed by the demographic
weight of Lebanon’s Shi’a, Druze chieftain Walid Jumblat has entered into an alliance
with al-Hariri, the Gemayels, and even the National Liberal Party of Dori Chamoun
to counter-balance the Shi’a and keep them from encroaching on his home turf, the
Shuf.
Sunni, Shi’a, Maronite, Druze. Twenty-five years after the start of a deadly civil
war, only the military academy at Faiyadiyah teaches the virtue and the necessity of
one Lebanon. This is perhaps why the president, notwithstanding all of the criticism
to which he has been subjected internally, remains, because of his military background
and his refusal to act as a political Maronite, a symbol of hope for those Lebanese
who actually want to transcend sectarianism. Yet President Emile Lahoud also seems
to embody a foreign policy approach not unlike that of a predecessor, Elias Sarkis,
who tried to hold Lebanon together during the darkest days of the civil war. This
approach may be summarized in the three words I mentioned at the outset: others will
decide.
The others, in the view of President Lahoud, are those who possess the power
to determine Lebanon’s fate: Syria, Israel, the United States. Although Lebanon’s
president has more than once aroused the anger and the frustration of the U.S.
government and the U.N. Secretariat, and although some in both places may argue
that he possesses more freedom of action than he pretends to have, he clearly sees his
role as one of trying to preserve the basic structure and the admittedly weak
institutions of the Lebanese state until the major players contrive to bring the peace
process to fruition. Even though the recent elections were widely portrayed as a
popular rebuff to the president, my sense is that most Lebanese, regardless of sect or
political orientation, accept the notion that Lebanon’s fate is essentially in the hands
of others.
A recent incident illustrates quite strikingly the role of the government of
Lebanon in matters of great national security import to the country. Last Sunday, in
Beirut’s Carlton Hotel, Hizballah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah told a stunned
audience, including the prime minister of Lebanon, that the Islamic resistance had
captured an Israeli colonel. Turning to the shocked and disoriented prime minister,
Salim al-Hoss, Nasrallah extended his most fulsome sympathies, saying “God help the
premiere today in dealing with the many telephone calls he will get from Albright.”
Now this may well have been an attempt at humor, and it no doubt reflected the
jubilation of an increasingly important Lebanese political figure, who is seeking, after
all, to obtain the release of Lebanese citizens held for years without due process in
Israeli jails. Yet the public humiliation of the prime minister, no matter the difficulties

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of his incumbency, and no matter that he’s on the way out, cannot add to the political
legitimacy of the struggling Lebanese republic.
It’s worth noting that Secretary General Nasrallah granted an interview earlier
this year in which he had the following to say about the role of Hizballah if and when
Israeli forces would evacuate the South. “Let it be understood that once the region
is freed, Hizballah will not exercise any security measures there. That is indisputable
because the region will be under the sovereignty of the Lebanese government.
Hizballah will be present in the South, but it will not have any security power because
Hizballah is a resistance movement that aims at liberating the occupied territories and
is not a substitute for government.”
In order for this commitment to be nullified, after May 24 when Israel did the
unthinkable by unilaterally withdrawing its forces from Lebanon, the government of
Lebanon was obliged, presumably at the direction of Damascus, to lay claim to a 25-
square kilometer patch of territory on the occupied Golan Heights, consisting of
orchards and small, cultivated plots known collectively as the Sheba’a Farms. The
Lebanese claim to the Sheba’a Farms, like the previous claim to seven villages
assigned to Palestine by the British and French in 1923, is in my view the result of the
government’s desire to accommodate both Hizballah and Syria. Instead of deploying
its army to the international boundaries in the wake of Israel’s withdrawal, as
specifically mandated by the 1989 Ta’if Accord, the Lebanese government has been
obliged by others to maintain that the Israeli occupation continues. Most Lebanese
have little understanding of or interest in the territorial status of remote and lightly-
populated plots on the windy slopes of Mt. Hermon. They fear that Israel may react
violently to a provocation staged from Lebanese territory, and they know that they
are powerless to prevent these attacks and utterly unable to have an influence on
events. Others will decide.
Although the prestige of the president has suffered along with the Lebanese
economy over the past nearly two years, it is clear that his view that others will decide
resonates strongly throughout Lebanon. The president, himself, may have an overall
strategy, and as far as I know he may be pursuing tactics appropriate to that strategy.
But at the grassroots level in Lebanon, there is a sense of hopelessness and
resignation, combined with a feeling of victimization and a belief that the outside
world owes to Lebanon nothing less than salvation itself. Popular sentiments such as
these, combined with the all-too-recent memories of civil war, have drained from
Lebanon any semblance of meaningful political discourse about Lebanon’s role in the
Middle East peace process. As Lebanon’s suzerain, Syria cannot escape, in my view,
a good deal of the responsibility for the country’s demoralization. On the other hand,
there is no shortage of Lebanese politicians seeking Syrian patronage, and calls for a
national discussion about the Syrian role in Lebanon are not coupled with a demand
that there also be a national discussion about the political role of Lebanese in
Lebanon.
I would close by observing that what seems to unite Lebanese today, at least in
the context of the peace process, is the sense that Palestinian refugees residing in
Lebanon must not be permanently implanted in Lebanon; that the peace process must
ultimately find a way to remove the refugees from the country. A peace treaty leaving
the Palestinians, especially the camp dwellers, marooned in Lebanon would create

CRS-34
trouble; a conclusion on which Israel and Lebanon can find agreement in the context
of frontier security. Last spring when it appeared that the Syrian-Israeli discussions
might progress to the point where Lebanese-Israeli peace talks might commence,
President Lahoud and the government made it clear that Lebanon would sign no
peace treaty leaving the Lebanese dimension of the Palestinian refugee crisis
untouched. Some American officials seemed at the time to be surprised, and not
exactly pleased, by this unexpected show of Lebanese assertiveness, assuming no
doubt that the role of Lebanon at a peace conference would be to sign when and
where it is instructed to do so by Syria. I don’t have enough information about the
specific nature of the Syrian-Lebanese relationship to speculate as to whether or not
there could be a Lebanon-Israel track of the peace process independent of the Israel-
Syria tract. Yet we seem in any event to be far from peace negotiations.
In the meantime, one may conclude that the Republic of Lebanon which emerged
from 15 years of civil war is still very much a work in progress. Although the republic
has the trappings of parliamentary democracy, a lively critical press, and a literate,
highly-skilled populace, the government itself is not the focus of domestic politics.
Although virtually all Lebanese are happy that the Israeli occupation is over, very few
had anything to do with ending it. Those who did remain in charge of the Lebanese
side of the Israel-Lebanon frontier. And although Hizballah may evolve into a full-
time participant in a democratic system, and may even emerge as a force for a more
secular Lebanon, for the moment it stands apart from the state in direct confrontation
with Israel. By focusing that confrontation at least in terms of the recent capture of
three Israeli soldiers on the remote Sheba’a Farms area, Hizballah may be seeking to
keep any prospective Israeli military response away from the more heavily populated
areas of southern Lebanon, where its’ own constituents have returned by the
thousands to villages abandoned since the 1970s. Hizballah is, in this sense, very much
a part of the “others will decide” mentality that animates, or perhaps more accurately
freezes, Lebanese domestic political opinion with respect to the peace process. Thank
you.
Questions and Answers
QUESTION: Dr. Seale, please address the economic aspects of a peace deal as
well as the territorial aspects. And anyone can feel free to add as well.
DR. SEALE: Economics never really figured very much. They started to figure
more prominently when Shimon Peres took over as Prime Minister after Yitzhak
Rabin’s assassination. If you recall, Peres’s whole idea of a “New Middle East” was
one based on economic cooperation. What alarmed the Syrians when the negotiations
were resumed was that the Israelis came up with a long list of joint projects, including
the integration of the two countries’ power grids. The Syrians took fright. They felt
this was some sort of a takeover.
The main discussions were over withdrawal, security arrangements,
normalization, and the timetable for inter-phasing withdrawal and normalization.
These were the ‘four legs of the table’ which Rabin used to refer to. So economics
didn’t really enter into it.

CRS-35
I myself have proposed, as one of the speakers here kindly suggested, that the
contested area on the northeastern shore of the Sea of Galilee could become a joint
tourist zone or “peace park,” once it is returned to Syrian sovereignty with the rest
of the Golan. It could be the start of greater cooperation. In a context of peace, Israeli
tourists will want to visit Syria, or to transit through Syria on their way to Turkey and
Europe beyond. Tour companies in Israel and Syria will have to cooperate, so why
not begin with cooperation on a few hundred meters on the northeastern shore of the
lake.

To be fair to Prime Minister Barak, he seemed ready to do something which
Rabin only spoke about. Rabin gave a verbal commitment to withdraw to the 1967
borders, but he never actually implemented it. In fact some people suspect, myself
included, that when he gave the commitment to withdraw in August 1993, just before
the Oslo accords were announced, he did so not because he actually intended to honor
the commitment but rather to blunt Syria’s attack on Oslo which he knew was
inevitable.
If you recall, after the peace process was launched in Madrid in 1991, there was
no progress on the Syrian track, the Syrians refused to discuss anything substantive
until they secured from Israel a commitment to full withdrawal from the Golan.
Eventually, in August 1993, Rabin conceded the principle of full withdrawal. But
Asad was still not satisfied. He wanted to know from Warren Christopher, the U.S.
Secretary of State at the time who conveyed the Israeli commitment to Syria, whether
full withdrawal meant withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 borders, and whether Israel laid
claim to any Syrian territory captured in 1967. Finally, in July 1994, Rabin gave his
commitment to withdraw to the 4 June 1967 line. We can discuss this further if you
like.
DR. ROBINSON: Actually, Patrick, I’ve been allowed a follow-up question to
you, and that is in your many conversations with Hafiz al-Asad and Bashar al-Asad,
how have they responded to your proposal?
DR. SEALE: The Syrian answer has been two-fold. First, they’ve said that they
want to recover their territory before discussing joint projects. The second answer,
which I inferred from recent conversations in Damascus, is that the Syrians would like
the United States, the main peace-brokers, to sponsor the “peace park” proposal. If
the notion were taken up and proposed by the United States, I think the Syrians
would give it very careful study.
DR. PERETZ: Patrick, I have a follow-up question. Is there any significance to
the fact that in all of these discussions, in the press and in your reportage on it, there
was never any mention of the Palestinian refugee problem. Is the implication that
Syria was willing to accept the 200,000 or 300,000 refugees who were within its
border? What is the significance of that?
DR. SEALE: The question of relations between Syria and the Palestinians is a
long and complicated one. You may recall that from the 1967 war to the Oslo accords
of 1993, the Syrians always put the Palestine problem and the recovery of Palestinian
rights at the top of their agenda. But when the Palestinians went their own way at

CRS-36
Oslo, the Syrians felt betrayed. From then on their view was that seeing that the
Palestinians had made their own bed, they should lie in it.
From then on, the Syrians didn’t want their own track to be held hostage to
progress or lack of progress on the Palestinian track. They felt it was time to address
their own issue of the Golan. Things were envenomed by Asad’s strong antipathy for
Yasser Arafat, his contempt for Arafat’s negotiating style, for his concessions and
betrayals, as Asad would see it. I believe this was one reason why the Syrians for a
long time did not raise the question of the Palestinian refugees.
I think most observers are agreed that the Palestinians in Lebanon pose a far
graver problem than do the Palestinians in Syria. In Lebanon, no political party or
faction is prepared to accept their long-term presence in the country. Moreover,
several of the refugee camps are in the unruly south of Lebanon, which is not properly
policed by anyone. There is always the danger of cross-border incidents, which could
trigger a violent Israeli response.
In Syria, in contrast, the Palestinian refugees are far more integrated into society.
They serve in the armed forces, they are allowed to work–whereas in Lebanon there
is a long list of jobs, which they are not allowed to hold.
No doubt, at the end of the day, the Syrians will demand some form of
compensation for having given house-room to some 350,000 Palestinian refugees.
They will also want compensation for the 100,000 refugees driven out of the Golan
by the Israelis, whose numbers have now swollen to about half a million. This is an
aspect of the Golan water problem. Wanting to resettle these refugees once Israel
withdraws, the Syrians will want a share of the water, which flows from the Golan
into Lake Tiberias. But I’ve digressed somewhat from your question.
QUESTION: Where do they stand on the right of return?
DR. SEALE: They stick to the formula enshrined in UN Resolutions, which is
that there has to be return and compensation. When you press Arab leaders on this
question they tend to say return or compensation. I think it is regrettable that the
international community has not given more thought to the question of compensation
for Palestinian refugees. That part of the world – Syria, Lebanon, Palestine – has not
always been able to support its populations, especially at times of crisis, drought or
famine, as have occurred in the 19th and 20th centuries. As a result, large emigré
communities took shape in Brazil or West Africa, for example.
No one really believes that four million Palestinian refugees can be returned to
their former homes. What they are seeking from the Israelis is an acknowledgment of
Israeli responsibility for the creation of the problem, and what they are looking for
from the international community is adequate compensation to allow the refugees to
start a new life.
So long as Israel continues to be ringed by refugee camps, peace will always be
fragile. The camps will have to be dismantled and the families resettled. A number will
no doubt want to return, but the capacity of absorption of a future Palestinian state
will be limited. Certainly, Israel will be very reluctant to take back any significant

CRS-37
number. But the first step to solving the problem would be an acknowledgment of
responsibility by Israel. It is not unlike the question of establishing responsibility for
the Armenian genocide, which has been preoccupying your Congress recently.
QUESTION: This is a question for both Professors Robinson and Peretz. I’d like
to talk about the sort of clash of perceptions here between the Israelis and the
Palestinians at this point. Because from Professor Robinson’s outline of things,
Palestinians will not be satisfied unless they get all of the territory up to the 1967
borders, including East Jerusalem. And it seems from the Israeli perspective, Barak
sort of gave as much in concessions as he could in the peace process. In fact, he was
even criticized by Leah Rabin on the question of Jerusalem after certain leaks came
from the press on the issue of Jerusalem. So given these two clashing perceptions,
how do you see things or are things just going to continue to deteriorate?
DR. ROBINSON: Let me just begin that by saying for a number of years, as you
may recall, there was this grand debate epitomized on the one hand by Ian Lustick at
the University of Pennsylvania and on the other by Meron Benvenisti, the former
deputy mayor of Jerusalem, about whether the occupation was reversible. Benvenisti’s
argument was—and this was back in the early 1980s—that as soon as the number of
settlers in the West Bank hit about 100,000 the domestic considerations would be too
great for any prime minister of Israel to stage a full withdrawal from the West Bank.
And now of course the number of settlers in the West Bank is double that number.
With Oslo, it appeared that the sort of Lustick camp of reversibility was right, that in
the end it’s all political. And if it’s political you can do something about it. I’m not so
sure he was right. And I think Benvenisti 20 years ago may have been more prescient
in that while Barak clearly made concessions as Don Peretz said, that went far beyond
any other concessions or concessions made by any other prime minister in Israel’s
history, it was not even clear he could sell it to the Israeli polity, that he could get the
votes either in a straight referendum or in terms of a re-election campaign that would
support it. That was going to be an iffy proposition and that still did not meet what
the minimum Palestinian requirements really have been, and this is across the political
spectrum.
So my own sense is that I do think there will be an agreement. I don’t know if
that makes me an optimist or a pessimist. I think the sides have too much at stake not
to have an agreement. But I think the agreement will be deeply troubling, deeply
troubled, and deeply destabilizing for both sides.
DR. PERETZ: My perception is that both Barak and Arafat went as far, or
maybe even further, than their respective constituencies would permit them to go;
neither could go further. The purpose of the American so-called bridging proposals
was to close the gap, although it didn’t work. Part of this problem is due to the
completely different historical narratives of each side. The Israeli historical narrative
differs from the Arab historical narrative generally and from the Palestinian historical
narrative in particular; what Israelis call their war of liberation, Arabs and Palestinians
call the Nakba [catastrophe in Arabic]. While Israelis consider the Temple Mount
their holiest site, Arabs often disregard this claim and consider it as their third holiest
site. I don’t think I’ve ever met an Arab Zionist. Arabs don’t accept Israel’s historical
narrative. The narratives are so different that they are impossible to bridge.

CRS-38
DR. SEALE: In my estimation, the Arabs have certainly accepted Israel, its right
to exist and so forth, within its 1967 borders.
DR. PERETZ: It’s right to exist?
DR. SEALE: Absolutely. Within its 1967 borders. They have not accepted its
conquests, nor have they accepted Israel as the dominant power in the region.
They’ve accepted Israel as an important player in the Middle East system, but not as
a dominant player.
What we are witnessing now is an attempt by the Arabs to reduce Israel to what
they consider to be its natural size. They think it’s too big: it has to be shrunk a little
bit. But this is not an existential problem anymore. Israel is not in danger of
extinction, except perhaps by its own actions. But certainly, the Arab world as a
whole has accepted Israel within its 1967 borders.
DR. PERETZ: I doubt that the average refugee in a refugee camp would say that
Israel has a right to exist. They’re there, we accept it, but not by right.
DR. SEALE: I’m talking, of course, of Arab governments. The immediate
victims of the creation of Israel are unlikely ever to accept it. That is why they have
to be treated fairly. That is why we talk of the need to acknowledge the suffering and
misery they have endured. And of course the need for compensation. The matter of
compensation is an extremely important subject. The international community should
create a special body, a fund of several billion dollars, to be handled with great
transparency. But nothing of the sort has happened. We hear of compensations for
other victims, but not for the Palestinians.
DR. ROBINSON: There’s been a huge bru-ha-ha over the phrase “right to
exist,” and I think it is unfortunate because it’s nonsensical. Does any state have a
right to exist? Does the United States have the right to exist? I mean I don’t know
what that means. It’s a moral plaint that has to do with the discourse and the sort of
stories people tell about themselves and their own history. The question is not the
right to exist; the question is does it accept existence. In other words, do states accept
the existence of other states and their right to live in security, as opposed to their right
to exist, if you will. And so to get caught up on the phrase “right to exist” I think is
misleading. I think Patrick is absolutely right that Arabs as a whole have accepted that
Israel exists, will continue to exist, and has some expectation to exist within secure
boundaries that are recognized by the international community. Don is also right that
Palestinian refugees and Palestinians as a whole, and Arabs as a whole, when they
write their history in a hundred years, 200 years, will never suggest that the
establishment of Israel in 1948 was somehow just, moral, and legitimate. It will
always be seen as a colonial conquest by Europeans of an indigenous population and
their subsequent expulsion. Palestinian history will always be written that way because
that is the way Palestinians view their history. And so you have to differentiate the
stories that people tell and the history they tell about themselves with the political
context and the acceptance by governments of other governments and other states and
that sort of thing. So don’t get caught up in the word “right” here.

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MR. RUEBNER: I’d like to add something about this notion of the perceptions
of what a final status agreement would look like. And I’d like to respectfully disagree
with what Mr. Miller said earlier this morning, that both sides went voluntarily to
Camp David. In the weeks leading up to Camp David, there were reports that it was
very much a Barak initiative. Some analysts speculated that it was very much Barak’s
idea to get Arafat in this kind of situation where they could meet face-to-face with
Clinton supporting Barak’s version of what a final status agreement would look like.
On his part, Arafat was widely reported to believe that neither side had bridged the
gaps enough to go to a summit like this and that it was bound to fail and/or provoke
a violent reaction because they weren’t going to reach an agreement with the gaps so
wide–as in fact happened. In this interpretation, Arafat’s perception of the time frame
for actually getting an agreement done appeared more realistic.
Mr. Hof, Hizballah’s looking pretty good right now, sitting pretty with four
Israeli soldiers. How do you foresee the negotiations that are likely to take place? Are
they likely to take place? And what is Hizballah looking for in these negotiations?
MR. HOF: I believe what Hizballah’s looking for is the final plank of the
Lebanese position concerning the complete withdrawal of Israel from Lebanese
territory, which is to say the return of Lebanese prisoners, members of the so-called
Islamic Resistance, who have been in Israeli jails…some of whom for many, many
years. I think this is what Hizballah’s looking for, and it was obviously in search of
some trading material. In terms of how this will work out, who knows. I suspect there
will be a deal. I don’t think we’ll see anything like a Cold War exchange at
Checkpoint Charlie with one group of people headed in one direction and another
group headed in the other. I think there will be a time lag built into the exchange that
will enable some people not to have to make a big political sacrifice up front.
And I would like to comment just briefly on the issue of summit diplomacy. I
think Aaron said something this morning that is really worth focusing on. I won’t put
quotes around this but this is the gist: only Arafat and Barak knew before the summit
what their positions were on Jerusalem. In the State Department where I once
worked, that would be an insufficient basis to convene a summit. Something similar
happened, I think, back in March in Geneva involving the President of the United
States and the President of Syria. Having been in government, I’m used to people on
the outside trying to give me rudder direction, trying to tell me what to do, and
critiquing me through the rear-view mirror, so I’m very sensitive to that. But I think
in dealing with summit diplomacy, a great deal of caution has to be used. A great deal
of homework has to be done. In my personal experience, when I was a military officer
in the Pentagon, just getting ministers of defense together required that these agendas
be coordinated. And quite frankly, the principals were not left with a whole lot of
room to be extemporaneous. You can’t nail down a hundred percent in advance, but
95 percent isn’t a bad target. I’m just a little bit concerned, and I know I don’t have
all the facts, but to the extent that a summit conference becomes an extemporaneous
bull session, you know, let’s talk it out, let’s see if we can do this…I don’t like it. I
have a strong prejudice against it. I don’t think that’s the way to do business.
DR. SEALE: Could I ask Frederic Hof a question? In his excellent presentation,
his motto was that others would decide Lebanon’s future. I’d like to ask him this:
isn’t Hizballah now taking the initiative? Hizballah has emerged as the representative

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of the single largest community in Lebanon. It has forced Israel out. It has established
a deterrent capability vis-à-vis Israel. By kidnapping four Israelis, it is almost certainly
going to secure the release of its own leaders who were kidnapped in Lebanon by the
Israelis. Isn’t this Lebanon deciding?
MR. HOF: Yes, in my comments I lumped Hizballah into the general category
of “others.” I do want to acknowledge that Hizballah is, for all intents and purposes,
a Lebanese movement. It obviously has connections outside the country, connections
to Iran, connections to Syria. These are important connections, but I think most of the
academic and policy community has come to the conclusion that Hizballah is pretty
much a Lebanese institution. The question I would ask about the future of Lebanon
is what’s going to happen if we get past all of this current turmoil. What sort of role
will Hizballah play then? And I think that for the foreseeable future, one would have
to say that Hizballah would run into the same obstacles of Lebanese sectarianism and
confessionalism that have bedeviled everyone since the beginning of the Lebanese
Republic. But I would also keep in mind that in terms of “others will decide” the
majority of the Lebanese are basically along for the ride here. It may be that Hassan
Nasrallah and his executive directorate are making some decisions and are dragging
the Republic along. But bear in mind, most Lebanese played no role in the ouster of
the Israelis in the south. Most Lebanese are playing no role in events that are taking
place now.
QUESTION: [Paraphrase] To what extent have recent events reversed the tide
toward regional economic integration and will that make the Middle East less of a
priority among global policymakers?
DR. ROBINSON: Let me take the first crack at that because I think that’s a
fantastic question. The way I would answer it is that the countries in the region are
undertaking parallel but not integrated paths. The thing that’s striking about Jordan,
Israel, Palestine, and to some degree Syria, is that they’re really following a very
similar kind of path that you outlined. Over the last 20 years, each of these countries
has moved to—and people use different words—socialist, capitalist, state-center to
private sector marketization, what is the term the IMF uses, structural adjustment. In
various ways, each of these states has moved toward a state business alliance, if you
will, with private sector development. Peace can be seen in many ways. I mean
obviously things like the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War played into it to a
large degree. The Middle East peace process in many ways can be seen as an
outgrowth of this marketization in the region of the state-business alliance because
obviously peace is good for business, and if you’re talking about private sector
development, what’s good for business is good for the country. So peace in effect has
followed this change in the political economy in every one of these countries. Syria,
less so, but the other three are very clear. And as a result, again, if you follow the
logic or agree with the logic of my argument, it’s undermined either democratization
in the case of Jordan, the West Bank, and potentially in the future Syria, or in the case
of a consolidated democracy like Israel, it’s undermined the stability of the democracy
where the people that brought you the business, state-business alliance or
marketization, what have you, were voted out of office, if you will, and may well
again in the near future.

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This has all gotten played out, at least on the Arab side, in resistance to
normalization. Resistance to normalization with Israel. Be that trade, trade
agreements, labor unions, professional associations, exchanges, and all of these sorts
of things. In Jordan, for example, this is the way that the very strong anti-peace
sentiment gets expressed–through an anti-normalization campaign. So I think you’ve
seen these countries take parallel paths, but they’re not integrating. They’re just
following the same steps side-by-side with each other, at different rates.
QUESTION: Professor Robinson, you had mentioned the switch theory. That
was actually a very interesting comment because CNN several days ago, they actually
had one of the lead negotiators from Israel and one of the lead negotiators from
Palestine, Palestinians, hoping to meet at the same time. And the lead negotiator from
Israel actually tended to believe the switch theory. I think actually some Members
believe it as well, that, you know, Arafat has the ability to stop the violence in the
Middle East, and nothing will happen…nothing further will happen unless he does.
And in fact, the negotiator from Israel suggested that if Arafat can’t stop the violence,
perhaps they’re talking to the wrong people. Maybe they should talk to somebody
else. I was wondering if you had any comments about that, and in fact perhaps they
should be talking to somebody else instead of Arafat to have peaceful results.
DR. ROBINSON: Yes, it’s such an interesting question, frankly. And it was
really epitomized...there was an interview with Shlomo Ben-Ami, the acting foreign
minister of Israel, this morning on CNN. And in the course of two sentences, he
advocated this contradiction, if you will, without I think recognizing that he was
saying things that are contradictory. On the one hand, he said, and this has been very
commonly reported in the Israeli press, the switch theory. That Arafat controls it and
it’s his decision, and it’s been organized by Arafat. And he said that, when the
moment of truth had come, the Americans were going to make these proposals to
bridge the final gaps that Camp David left, and Arafat didn’t want to be faced with
that so he organized this violence to make sure that these American proposals would
never get off the ground. In the very next breath, he used the phrase—as he’s been
using for three weeks now—that Arafat was riding the back of a tiger that he doesn’t
control. That here’s a tiger that’s going very different ways, very strongly, and he’s
holding on for dear life. Well, you can’t have it both ways. And that is the tension. It’s
clear that there’s not a political switch, and it’s also clear that Arafat’s authority has
eroded deeply.
Israelis are the most polled people in the world. And since Oslo, Palestinians
have become the second most polled people in the world. And even before these last
three weeks, the level of approval for Arafat in these various Palestinian polls
undertaken by CPRS and JMCC, they’re both respected and U.S.-supported
institutions, have shown that Arafat’s approval rating had dropped to about 31
percent. Well here’s a guy that won 88 percent of the vote for the presidency in 1996,
who’s been Mr. Palestine, has worn all the institutional hats, has an enormous sort of
gravitas and legitimacy because of his history. And yet because of the peace process
and corruption and authoritarianism and all these problems, less than a third of the
Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza thought he was doing a decent job.
So there is no switch, and he is kind of riding a tiger, I wouldn’t want to be in
his position right now. He is, on the one hand, trying to maneuver the Palestinian

CRS-42
public to accept what I think will be signed eventually. But at the same time, he can’t
be seen as forcing an agreement that is unacceptable down the throats of his people
because that’s probably not good for life expectancy, and it’s certainly not good for
political legacy. So he’s in a very difficult predicament now, and for the press and
others to say that here’s a guy that just flips the switch on and off, it’s just utterly
ridiculous, frankly.
MR. RUEBNER: Let me pose a follow-up question to all the panelists that goes
to the heart of what we’ve been talking about all morning. Is Israel miscalculating in
its approach to the peace process? And by miscalculating, I mean expecting that
Arafat has this level of control. Or that Bashar al-Asad can suddenly not adhere to the
line that his father did? Or that Syria and/or Lebanon will rein in Hizballah? Are they
miscalculating?
MR. HOF: I’ll start on the Hizballah part. I don’t think that there is any
expectation in Israel that the Lebanese government will rein in Hizballah. And to that
extent, the Israelis are not miscalculating.
MR. RUEBNER: It certainly seems to be a pre-condition for holding a donor’s
conference for the reconstruction of Lebanon.
MR. HOF: I don’t expect there’s going to be a donor’s conference for the
reconstruction of Lebanon. I spoke with a group of Lebanese journalists about this
last week. Lebanese tend to see this in terms of a heavy-handed threat by the United
States, by Europe, and by the international financial institutions. What I tried to
explain to these journalists is that it’s really a matter of dollars and cents. If you want
to mobilize several hundred million dollars to go into the south of Lebanon, you’re
going to have to take control of that region. And you’re going to have to take control
of the borders. Otherwise, you can’t ask American, Japanese, British, French, Italian
taxpayers to put up that kind of money. So even if there is a donor’s conference, I
would predict it would have the conditionality along the lines I just mentioned, that
there would be no disbursements until the south is governed by the Lebanese
government.
DR. SEALE: I would argue that Prime Minister Barak did miscalculate. As you
will recall, he came to power with a very strong personal mandate. He was the most
decorated soldier: no one could question his military decisions. Although his position
was very strong, he acted very slowly. He was slow to form his government, slow to
make the moves that were required. He refused to endorse Rabin’s “deposit in the
American pocket”–the commitment to withdraw from the Golan to the June 4, 1967
line. He has been very cautious in implementing agreements with the Palestinians. On
the contrary, he has approved settlement building at a faster rate than under the
Netanyahu government. So he has made a lot of mistakes.
It’s instructive, I think, to look for a moment at the crucial summit between
Clinton and Asad in Geneva in March. Why did Barak and Clinton imagine that Asad
would break at the last minute? Some people must have persuaded Clinton that Asad
was very sick–which he was–and that the Syrian economy was on its knees. I think
Barak and Clinton were also influenced by Henry Kissinger’s account of his
negotiations with Asad. He wrote that Asad was a very tough negotiator, that he

CRS-43
would go to the very edge of the abyss, even over the edge and cling on with his
finger nails, but would then yield when he felt he could not get better terms. I think
this, too, was a miscalculation, a failure to understand Asad’s mind-set, and that of
his successor.
Could I take half a minute to answer a question about the Barcelona process,
which I don’t think we’ve properly answered? This was essentially a European
initiative, taken because the Europeans were worried about two things. They were
worried that violence in the Middle East–from North Africa and from the Arab-Israeli
conflict–would be imported into Europe. They were also worried at the prospect of
large-scale immigration from countries to the south of the Mediterranean.
So the Barcelona process was launched to settle the population issue.
I don’t think Americans understand what a difficult problem immigration has
become in Europe. Let me give you an example. So far this year, some 250
Moroccans have been drowned trying to cross the Straits of Gibraltar in little boats
to get to Spain. You may have read in the press of how 50 Chinese died of
asphyxiation in a container lorry coming into Britain. In Germany, there are already
over 2.5 million Turks, quite a few of them of Kurdish origin.
So the idea was to spend money south of the Mediterranean to create jobs and
settle the population there and reduce the flow of immigrants into Europe. But it
hasn’t really worked.
The need in capital alone is enormous. Billions of dollars are required to fund
water, energy, telecommunications and other projects in all the countries concerned.
Only private money can meet the need. But private investment will not go in unless
there is more democracy, more transparency, less corruption, a better and a friendlier
investment climate. There also has to be a bigger market. The Arab countries need to
create a common market so as to attract foreign investment to their region. They have
a project to do so, but progress has been slow. Many problems remain to be solved.
In my view, the Barcelona process has more or less failed to deliver what it promised.
MR. RUEBNER: Dr. Peretz, do you think that Prime Minister Barak
miscalculated at Camp David? Do you think that he believed Arafat would buy into
his vision of a final status agreement?
DR. PERETZ: My impression is that Barak went to Camp David with that
calculation in mind. He thought Arafat would agree to what he considered major
concessions. But again, coming back to the historical narrative, what Israelis consider
concessions, Palestinians and Arabs don’t consider concessions at all. Israel said we’re
willing to give up 60, 70, 80, 90 percent of the West Bank or Gaza, Palestinians say
what do you mean give up! It belonged to us in the first place. So you’re not giving
up anything, you’re giving back what belonged to us in the first place. This leads to
miscalculation on both sides.
DR. ROBINSON: I’d like to share something very quick on the last question.
I think it really has to be answered at two levels, and the first level is sort of the
tactical decisions that are made, mistakes that are made, strategy going into Camp
David and out of, etc., etc., that the players themselves have made. And I think the

CRS-44
colleagues on both sides of me have made that point very, very well. But there’s a
second level, a bigger level if you will, a structural level, and it’s not helpful in my
mind to talk about good guys and bad guys, white hats and black hats. And this gets
to this notion I mentioned earlier of a hegemonic peace and my pessimism is more
structural, and that is it really makes no sense for Israel as the power that it is to make
concessions that it really doesn’t have to. The Palestinians and the Arabs have no
power to compel it to make concessions, above and beyond what perhaps the
domestic constituency in Israel will accept. I mean just logically it wouldn’t make a
whole lot of sense for them to do it.
At the same time, the Palestinians being so weak by comparison just don’t have
the power to compel Israel to do things that it doesn’t want to do. I mean the peace
process as a whole has been basically internal Israeli decisions about how much to
give back at what rate on what issues. The Israelis have been the ones, since they hold
all the cards, that have been making these decisions, and the Palestinians, as the weak
party, have had to accept them, as they go along. I think that is just a predicament of
their power and balance, and it’s not because one side’s the good guys and the other
side’s the bad guys. It has to do with the strength of one party and the weakness of
the other.
MR. RUEBNER: Does the new intifadah change this power balance?
DR. ROBINSON: No. At the end of the day when things calm down, you’re
still going to have a powerful Israel and a very weak Palestine. And that’s really not
going to change very much. I think Patrick Seale was right, though, in that the biggest
impact is in how the various authoritarian governments in the Arab world respond to
their own populations. These governments, by and large, are not particularly
legitimate; by and large were not popularly elected. And by and large, they take
positions on this issue that are more accommodating than their publics would want.
I think this, in effect, radicalization of the Arab street, if you will, is going to be a
problem for a number of Arab governments in the region.
QUESTION: We’ve had peaceful transitions in Jordan and Syria and arguably
in Lebanon lately. So the next play obviously is in the Palestinian area. Could you
paint some scenarios of possible Arafat successors and where they would stand on the
peace process?
DR. ROBINSON: Again, it’s not so much a matter in my mind of individual
players, and there are people we can talk about–Mahmoud ‘Abbas and Marwan al-
Barghouthi and others–it’s more a matter of the factors that go into this succession.
And there are a number of factors that have to do with the timing of when it happens,
the circumstances under which it happens, things like the inside/outside cleavage of
Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza and those that have returned, the hundred
thousand or so that have returned from the outside after Oslo. And who basically hold
all the key power positions in the PA. You know, the sort of foreign power
interference, there’s going to be a lot of interested parties—Israel, Jordan, Egypt
among them—trying to influence succession. So there are a lot of questions, if you
will, that go into it.

CRS-45
My sense, though, is I ask the question a little bit differently, not so much who
is going to come into power, but will Palestinian politics look a whole lot different
under a successor to Arafat? And my answer to that is no. That I think the kind of
creeping authoritarianism that you’re seeing in Palestine is pretty durable. I think it’s
pretty durable for a number of reasons, again, having to do with the political economy
of Palestine, how revenues are raised by the government, for example. I think it has
to do with the social basis of power, that again the police and security forces (the
mukhabarat), the state bureaucracy that’s a source of patronage, and the a’yan is still
sort of an old notable class, that are the pillars of the regime, they’re not particularly
open to democratization. I think the logic of the peace process also, as I’ve argued,
suggests an enhancement of authoritarianism. My own sense is that Palestinian
politics, by and large, at the regime level, are not going to look a whole lot different
ten years from now than they do now.
QUESTION: Any parallels to Algeria, do you think?
DR. ROBINSON: You know, that’s an interesting question. And the Palestinians
themselves use Algeria, the women’s’ movement, in particular, as an example. Can
that kind of authoritarian regime in effect last against a society that has a long
democratic tradition? By Arab world standards, Palestine perhaps has the strongest
civil society and certain traditions of democracy. So in effect, who wins in the
end…does the authoritarian state…is it able over a number of years to withstand
societal pressures having to do with democracy and corruption and other issues, or
is it…does it cave in. Do you have popular riots after some number of years that bring
down the government? My own short answer to that would be as long as international
rents, strategic rents, outside sources of money continue to flow into the Palestinian
treasury, I suspect authoritarianism in Palestine is durable and not temporary.
DR. SEALE: May I add a word to what Dr Robinson has said? Of course there
is an imbalance of power, a huge imbalance. But, nevertheless, I think one of the
lessons of recent events is that force cannot solve these problems. Indeed, the use of
force arouses fierce passions, which are very, very difficult to control. What is striking
in recent events is the readiness of the perpetrators of these events on the Arab and
Palestinian side to sacrifice themselves, to face death. I think President Clinton called
the attack on the Cole cowardly, and Secretary Cohen described it as senseless. Well,
whatever we may think of their action, the men who carried it out showed great
courage. Apparently they stood to attention before blowing themselves up. The stone-
throwers are also showing great courage in the Palestinian territories. I think we have
to accept this.
We should perhaps also understand that Hizballah’s victory in Lebanon created
a model, which many, many Arabs relate to and want to follow. There has been a
change. Of course, Israel remains supreme in conventional military power. It also has
a monopoly of unconventional weapons, of weapons of mass destruction. But can it
face a guerrilla movement? The Palestinians can make life very difficult for the
Israelis. They can make life very difficult for the settlers. Stone throwing and violent
attacks can be very potent weapons in those societies, and Israel is vulnerable to them.
Israel does not want to take casualties. Israel has, to some extent, lost the will to
fight.

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Let me tell you an anecdote, which I heard in Israel. During the 1991 war, when
Iraq was firing scuds at Israel, Yitzhak Rabin in Tel Aviv noticed that several of his
neighbors had fled the city. He realized then that Israel was no longer the same Israel
as before. It was no longer ready for the sacrifices of the past. This was one of the
reasons he converted to a more “dovish” position. So I think things are not quite as
straightforward regarding the balance of power as Professor Robinson would have us
believe.
MR. RUEBNER: I’d like to thank all of our panelists very much, and we’re very
appreciative that they’ve contributed their wonderful expertise and insights into what
was I think an excellent discussion. Thank you very much.