Arms Control After START II: Next Steps on the U.S.-Russian Agenda

Arms Control After START II: Next Steps on the U.S.-Russian Agenda

Order Code RL30660
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Arms Control after START II: Next Steps on the
U.S.-Russian Agenda
Updated June 22, 2001
Amy F. Woolf
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Stuart D. Goldman
Specialist in Russian Affairs
Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Arms Control after START II: Next Steps on the U.S.-
Russian Agenda
Summary
The U.S.-Russian arms control process has stalled. The Russian parliament
approved the ratification of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II)
in April 2000, shortly after the newly elected president, Vladimir Putin, expressed his
support. Russia will not, however, allow START II to enter into force until the
United States approves agreements signed in 1997 that would extend the elimination
period in START II and clarify the 1972 ABM Treaty. The Russian Federal Law on
Ratification also said that Russia could consider withdrawing from the START II
Treaty if the United States withdraws from the ABM Treaty. This latter provision
responds to the U.S. interest in developing and deploying missile defenses that could
go beyond the limits in the ABM Treaty and Russian concerns that such a system
might eventually undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent.
The Clinton Administration did not submit the 1997 agreements to the Senate
for its advice and consent to ratification, in part out of concern that the Senate could
reject them because many Members strongly oppose the ABM Treaty. The Clinton
Administration could have submitted all of the agreements, or it could have submitted
only the Protocol to START II, which extends the time frame for reductions under
that Treaty. But, if the Senate approved only that single agreement, Russia’s Federal
Law on Ratification would have to be changed to permit START II to enter into force
without approval of the ABM-related agreements. The Bush Administration has taken
no action on the 1997 agreements. As an alternative, the United States and Russia
could set aside START II and the 1997 agreements and seek to negotiate a START
III Treaty that reduced offensive forces to levels favored by Russia and an agreement
modifying the ABM Treaty to permit the United States to deploy a limited NMD
system. But discussions towards this end have stalled as Russia is unwilling to modify
the ABM Treaty and the United States is unwilling to reduce its offensive forces to
the lower levels preferred by Russia. Furthermore, more than 20 Senators have
objected to this negotiating strategy and have vowed to block any agreement that
permitted the deployment of only a limited NMD system.
In the future, the United States and Russia could continue to negotiate arms
control treaties, reduce their forces through informal agreements, or forgo
coordinated arms control and size their forces according to their own economic and
security interests. Supporters of this latter path acknowledge that the United States
would lose the transparency and predictability of formal arms control, but believe the
formal arms control process has become less important in the post-Cold War era.
Others argue that, regardless of the changes in the international security environment,
it would be politically unwise to abandon the formal arms control process at this time.
Many in Russia may prefer to continue with arms control, to ensure reductions in U.S.
offensive forces, to retain limits on U.S. defenses, and to garner favorable opinions
in the international community. But, if the United States continues to pursue limited
defenses, Russia, too, may have to pursue alternatives to the formal arms control
process.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Russian Approval of START II Ratification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Arms Control and Other Priorities of President Putin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Factors Leading to the Duma’s Approval of START II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Military/economic arguments for force reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Effort to lock in continued U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty . . . 6
Putin’s political influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
An eye toward’s Russia’s international image . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Conditions included in Russia’s Federal Law on Ratification . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Linkage to U.S. ratification of START II Protocol, ABM Treaty
Demarcation Agreements, and Memorandum of Understanding on
Succession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Linkage between U.S. Withdrawal from ABM Treaty and Russia’s Possible
Withdrawal from START II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Resolution calling for stable financing
of strategic offensive nuclear forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Alternative Approaches for the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Submit the START II Protocol/MOU on Succession/Demarcation Agreements
Package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Submit just the START II Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Withhold the 1997 Agreements and Complete the “Grand Compromise” . 12
Difficulty reaching agreement with the Russians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Difficulty winning approval in the U.S. Senate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Change in the U.S. Approach to Arms Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
What Future for the U.S.-Russian Arms Control Process? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
U.S. Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Pursue Formal Arms Control Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Cooperate without Formal Arms Control Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Pursue Unilateral Force Structure Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Congressional Views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Russian Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Russia’s preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
The European Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
The Military Countermeasures Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Constraints on Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Decision in Moscow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Arms Control after START II: Next Steps on
the U.S.-Russian Agenda
Introduction
The United States and Russia signed the second Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START II) on January 3, 1993.1 Both parties delayed action on ratifying this
Treaty for several years. In the interim, they worked with Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakhstan to bring the START I Treaty into force, which occurred in late 1994.
The U.S. Senate further delayed its consideration of START II during 1995, in part
due to a dispute between the Clinton Administration and some Members of the Senate
over plans to reorganize the Department of State. The Senate eventually gave its
advice and consent to START II ratification on January 26, 1996.
The Russian parliament began its consideration of START II in 1995, but
concerns about the substance of the Treaty; political and policy disputes between the
Duma, Russia’s lower house of parliament, and the Yeltsin government; and negative
reactions to U.S. defense and foreign policy actions served to delay consideration of
the Treaty for five years.2 During this time, the United States repeatedly urged Russia
to move forward with START II, arguing that the Treaty would serve both nation’s
security interests. This reinforced the perception of many Duma Deputies that they
could use the Treaty that Washington valued so highly for leverage on other
contentious national security issues, such as NATO enlargement, U.S. bombing in
Iraq, and NATO actions in Yugoslavia.
The Russian domestic political dynamics blocking ratification of START II
changed dramatically in December 1999. Parties associated with then Premier
Vladimir Putin won control of the Duma in parliamentary elections that month. On
New Year’s Eve, Boris Yeltsin resigned, naming Putin acting President. Putin handily
won election as President in March 2000, and strongly urged the new Duma to
approve START II. The Duma voted to approve its ratification on April 14, 2000.
The upper chamber of the parliament, the Federation Council, followed suit on April
19, 2000.
The delay in the Duma’s vote on START II essentially stalled the U.S.-Russian
arms reduction process. The Clinton Administration was unwilling to begin formal
1For a description of the provisions in the Treaty, and for a review of the ratification process
in each nation, see Nuclear Arms Control: The U.S.-Russia Agenda, by Amy F. Woolf. CRS
Issue Brief IB98030. Updated regularly.
2For a discussion of the issues that stalled Duma approval of START II, see, START II
Debate in the Russian Duma: Issues and Prospects, by Amy F. Woolf. CRS Report 97-359
F. Updated April 17, 2000.

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negotiations on further reductions in a START III Treaty until START II entered into
force, in part because it wanted to make sure that further negotiations did not alter or
eliminate some of the provisions in START II. In addition, according to the FY2000
Defense Authorization Act, the United States must maintain its strategic offensive
nuclear weapons at START I levels until START II enters into force.3 Supporters
argued that this would provide Russia with an incentive to approve START II
because ratification would be the only way to ensure that U.S. forces declined to
levels equal to those that Russia might maintain as economic constraints forced it to
reduce its nuclear weapons. Consequently, START II ratification became the door
that Russia had to walk through before United States would continue on the path of
nuclear arms reduction.
But the Duma’s vote on START II did not break the stalemate on the U.S.-
Russian arms control agenda. The Duma approved an article in its Federal Law on
Ratification that states that Russia will not exchange the instruments of ratification for
START II, so the Treaty cannot enter into force, until the United States approves
several agreements, signed in 1997, that modify and clarify the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty.4 The Clinton Administration never submitted these
agreements to the Senate for its advice and consent; if it had done so in its final
months in office, the Senate would likely have rejected them. Furthermore, although
many analysts hailed the Duma’s vote on START II as a stepping-stone to START
III,5 and some expected that agreement to be concluded quickly, the United States
and Russia remained at odds over several elements of START III at the end of the
Clinton Administration.
START III discussions were also linked to discussions about modifications to
the ABM Treaty. The Clinton Administration wanted to deploy a National Missile
Defense (NMD) system in Alaska; Russia rejected any changes to the ABM Treaty
that would have permitted this deployment. Even if the United States and Russia had
worked out their differences, Senator Jesse Helms stated that he would have blocked
consideration of any new arms control agreements presented to the Senate by the
Clinton Administration; specifically, he stated that “any modified ABM Treaty
negotiated by this administration will be DOA – dead on arrival – at the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.”6
3The FY2001 Defense Authorization Act contains a similar provision, but it would permit
reductions in strategic offensive forces, without START II in force, if a Nuclear Posture
Review conducted by the Defense Department recommended such reductions.
4On the Ratification of the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the United States of
America on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Russian Federal
Law No. 56. Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (Moscow) May 6, 2000.
5Analysts at the Monterey Institute for International Studies have stated that “the central
importance about START II ratification is that it opens the gates for negotiations on START
III.” See START II Ratification: More Than Meets the Eye, Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies, April 17, 2000.
6Congressional Record. April 26, 2000. P. S2895.

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Hence, the Duma’s vote on START II may had little effect on the arms control
agenda and the United States and Russia must sort through several issues that are
bound together in the “web” of arms control. This report will review these issues and
identify possible alternatives for paths through the web. It begins with a discussion
of Russia’s approval of START II. It then reviews the alternatives that were available
to the Clinton Administration if it had tried to move the arms control process forward,
and the possible outcomes if the Administration had pursued each alternative.7
Finally, the report looks more broadly at alternative futures for the arms control
process from the U.S. and Russian perspectives. These futures reflect alternative
views on questions such as whether formal arms control negotiations should continue
to play a role in U.S. and Russian national security policies and how Russia might
respond to a U.S. decision to deploy an NMD system.
Russian Approval of START II Ratification
Arms Control and Other Priorities of President Putin
There is considerable debate among both Russian and western observers about
President Vladimir Putin’s “true” political orientation and priorities.8 Many of
Putins’s critics portray him as an authoritarian threat to Russia’s fragile democracy
and an anti-western nationalist and militarist. As evidence they cite, inter alia: 1)
Putin’s 15 year-long career as a KGB foreign intelligence officer; 2) prosecution of
the war in Chechnya; 3) appointment of many intelligence and security officers to key
government posts; 4) strengthening of the military and defense industries; 5)
curtailment of press freedom; 5) curtailment of regional autonomy, and; 6) pressure
on opposition political parties and political dissidents.
On the other hand, many Russian and western analysts portray the new president
as a serious economic reformer, determined to see Russia succeed in its transition to
a market economy. Proponents of this view note that Putin: 1) effectively promoted
free enterprise in St. Petersburg in the early 1990s; 2) regularly gives the Russian
people sober assessments of the country’s economic weakness and the urgent need
to create a functioning market economy; 3) declares economic revitalization to be
Russia’s top priority; 4) appointed a liberal economic reform team that has put
forward an economic plan that has won strong support from key international
financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank,
and; 5) successfully pushed some key economic structural reform measures through
the Duma.
Other observers say that these two faces of Putin are not mutually exclusive and
that both are accurate. In this view, Putin aims to strengthen the power and authority
of the central government, by authoritarian means when necessary; to rebuild as much
as possible Russia’s stature as a major power, in opposition to U.S. “global
7The report will not track progress in specific arms control negotiations; this information can
be found in CRS Issue Brief IB98030, Nuclear Arms Control: The U.S.-Russian Agenda.
8See CRS Report RS20556, Russian President Putin's Prospective Policies: Issues and
Implications, Apr. 17, 2000.

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hegemony;” and also, to strengthen and modernize Russia’s economy, bringing it into
the mainstream of the global market economy, and win large-scale debt forgiveness
from the advanced industrial democracies. There is a good deal of evidence to
support this view. Many of Putin’s supporters see these policies fitting together in an
overarching plan to strengthen Russia against internal and external threats, reversing
the calamitous decline in state power and authority during the Gorbachev and Yeltsin
years. Some skeptics, however, argue that while these may indeed be Putin’s
intentions, they are contradictory. In this view, Putin’s emphasis on strengthening the
armed forces and defense industries and the anti-American thrust of his foreign and
defense policies tend to undercut his liberal economic reform plans and dependence
on large-scale economic assistance from the West in the form of debt forgiveness,
investment, and favorable terms of trade.
There is general agreement among Russian and western observers that Putin is
a statist, i.e., that one of his core values is a determination to strengthen the Russian
state politically, economically, and militarily. It is unclear, however, how he would
respond if elements of that program came into conflict with one another, as suggested
in the preceding paragraph. Such a situation is quite possible, if the Putin government
maintains its uncompromising opposition to U.S. NMD plans.
Despite Putin’s success in securing parliamentary approval of START II, his
arms control agenda clashes at many points with that of the United States. The
central conflict revolves around NMD and the ABM Treaty, where Putin has
continued the Yeltsin regime’s vigorous opposition to U.S. plans. Moscow feared
that the Clinton Administration’s proposed limited NMD might eventually have
become a nationwide system. The Bush Administration’s talk of a more robust
missile defense further heightens Russian concerns. Moscow also may fear that it
lacks the financial, and perhaps also the technological, means to match or counter
U.S. NMD.9 Because of the great quantitative and qualitative decline in their
conventional armed forces in the past 10-15 years, Russian leaders perceive their
country to be highly dependent militarily on nuclear forces for deterrence and, in
extremis, to repel aggression from a quantitatively and qualitatively superior foe, such
as NATO. NMD might degrade Russia’s crucial nuclear capability. Many Russians
believe that their country’s only residual claim to great-power status is as a nuclear
superpower, and that NMD might undermine or negate that. Moscow may also fear
that even a limited U.S. NMD would cause China to expand greatly its small strategic
nuclear force, which would in turn adversely affect Russia’s strategic position. Many
in Moscow also view the ABM Treaty as a major bulwark against U.S. NMD and are
opposed to modifications that would permit NMD.10
Russian and U.S. experts agree that Russia’s present strategic nuclear forces,
totaling some 6,000 nuclear warheads, will contract dramatically in the next ten years.
9Russian officials say they are confident they can thwart or overcome any U.S. NMD. This
may reflect genuine confidence, or it may be propaganda aimed at discrediting U.S. NMD
efforts, or a mixture of both. Proponents of NMD say the Russian claim is irrelevant, as
NMD is not intended to block a large sophisticated nuclear force such as Russia’s.
10This summary of Russian perceptions is based on Russian and U.S. press reports and CRS
discussions with Russian officials.

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The majority of this force is already 20-30 years old and will soon exceed its projected
service life. Some service-life extension may be possible, but most experts agree that
for these aging weapons, this becomes increasingly costly and questionable
technologically over time. These assumptions are part of the logic behind Putin’s
decision to reduce Russia’s strategic nuclear forces to 1,500 warheads in the coming
years.11 Based on expected bloc obsolescence of most of the existing inventory and
on projections of new strategic weapons procurement, some Russian experts predict
that their country could have as few as 1,000 strategic nuclear warheads in ten years
that could be delivered with high confidence. Therefore, many in Russia have placed
a high priority on concluding a START III Treaty with the United States that lowers
the ceiling on strategic nuclear weapons to a level close to 1,000.12 Many in Russia
would also like to reverse START II’s ban on multiple warhead ICBMs (MIRVed
ICBMs), especially if the United States resists a very low START III ceiling, because
it would be economically less burdensome for Russia to increase its strategic nuclear
forces by deploying a smaller number of new missiles with more warheads per
missile.13
Some analysts suggest that a possible U.S.-Russian “grand compromise” might
include agreement on limited NMD together with a very low START III ceiling
(discussed in more detail, below). Aside from the political problems on both sides
inherent in such a deal, it poses a military-strategic conundrum for Moscow. As the
ceiling on strategic nuclear forces gets dramatically lower, the consensus is that the
perceived strategic value of NMD increases.
Factors Leading to the Duma’s Approval of START II
For five years, the Russian Duma resisted President Yeltsin’s intermittent
attempts to get it to approve START II. Putin succeeded in winning parliamentary
approval of the Treaty three weeks after being elected president. Many factors
combined to account for the Duma’s eventual approval of the Treaty.
Military/economic arguments for force reductions.
F r o m t h e
beginning, the United States attached greater political importance to ratifying and
implementing START II than did Russia. This was due in large part to the treaty’s
provision eliminating all MIRVed ICBMs, the core of Russia’s Strategic Rocket
Forces. Most U.S. observers viewed this as a great achievement because they saw
these missiles as particularly threatening and destabilizing. Ironically, as the years
passed without ratification and Russia’s economic and military-strategic position
deteriorated, START II became militarily more important to Russia than to the United
States. Absent START II, the United States could maintain a force of some 6,000
strategic nuclear warheads permitted under START I. As noted above, Russia,
11Details of this plan were not immediately made public, but the decision was widely reported
by Russian and western news media on August 12-13. See Daniel Williams, “Russia to Cut
Nuclear Arsenal,” Washington Post, August 13, 2000, p. A 16.
12President Putin reiterated this proposal in talks with President Clinton in Brunei on
November 15, 2000.
13Russian and U.S. press reports and CRS discussions with Russian officials..

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however, could not afford to maintain forces at anywhere near that level. START II
would require the United States to eliminate a significant portion of its land-based
missiles and ballistic missile submarines, whereas age and economics were going to
eliminate many of Russia’s land-based and sea-based systems with or without START
II. In his address during the Duma’s ratification debate, Putin told the Deputies that
the extended 2007 START II elimination timetable matched Moscow’s planned
retirement timetable for its aging missile force. He also reminded them that their heavy
MIRVed ICBMs had been built in Ukraine and that it would be prohibitively
expensive for Russia to develop and produce new missiles to replace them.14 The
military and economic logic of these arguments undoubtedly played an important role
in winning Duma approval of the Treaty.
Effort to lock in continued U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty.
For years, a majority of Duma Deputies, aware of American eagerness to implement
START II, held up action on the Treaty as a way of expressing disapproval of
elements of U.S. policy. Moscow was, however, determined to keep the United
States committed to the ABM Treaty. The Putin government argued that by ratifying
START II, with the provision that Russia would abide by it only so long as the
United States honored the ABM Treaty, they could get the Americans to stick to
the ABM Treaty by giving them something valuable that they would lose if they
abandoned it. Some critics of Russian policy argue that Moscow waited too long to
play this card, as it is questionable whether Congress and the Bush Administration
now would trade compliance with the ABM Treaty (if that meant foreswearing
NMD), for implementation of START II. Nevertheless, this idea of linkage is
believed to have played a significant role in winning Duma approval of START II.
Putin’s political influence. The Duma’s approval of START II in April
2000 was due in large part to changes in Russia’s domestic political calculus. In the
late 1990s, Duma opposition to START II was reinforced by its opposition to Yeltsin.
In the spring of 2000, newly elected President Putin had a strong majority in a newly
elected Duma. The political stage for ratification of START II was entirely different.
An eye toward’s Russia’s international image. Another consideration
that is believed to have influenced Duma approval of START II is the matter of
international prestige. Russians are acutely aware of their country’s loss of status and
prestige since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In view of the U.S. Senate’s rejection
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1999, and the generally high level
of support in the international community for CTBT, the START Treaties, and the
ABM Treaty, some in Moscow reportedly concluded that Russia’s international image
would be enhanced, and that of the United States diminished, if Moscow assumed the
role of defender of nuclear arms control agreements. The Duma pointedly ratified the
CTBT a week after approving START II. Some Russian politicians reportedly
believe that the United States will ultimately be compelled to stick to the ABM Treaty
14Jamestown Monitor, April 24, 2000.

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and abandon NMD by the force of international opinion.15 Few in Washington
express this view.
Conditions included in Russia’s Federal Law on Ratification
On April 14, 2000, after a closed debate on the Treaty in which President-elect
Putin addressed the chamber, the Duma voted to approve START II. Five days later,
the upper chamber, the Federation Council, approved the Treaty. The Duma attached
a number of conditions to its approval of START II, discussed below.
Linkage to U.S. ratification of START II Protocol, ABM Treaty
Demarcation Agreements, and Memorandum of Understanding on
Succession. Perhaps the most immediately significant of these conditions links
ratification and implementation of START II to U.S. ratification of several U.S.-
Russian agreements signed in New York on September 26, 1997 that are not currently
in force: a Protocol to START II, a Memorandum of Understanding on Succession
to the ABM Treaty, and two Agreed Statements on Demarcation between theater
missile defense and strategic missile defense systems.
•
The START II Protocol extends the end of the time period for the parties to
reduce their forces to START II levels from January 1, 2003 to December 31,
2007.
•
The Memorandum of Understanding on Succession names Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan as the successors to the Soviet Union for the ABM
Treaty. Together, these nations are limited to the single ABM site permitted by
the Treaty – the site that is currently deployed around Moscow.
•
The Agreed Statements on Demarcation define the characteristics which
distinguish between theater missile defense (TMD) systems, which are not
limited by the ABM Treaty, and strategic ballistic missile defense systems, which
are limited by the Treaty.
Article IX of the Russian Law on Ratification of START II declares that the
treaty will not enter into force until the United States ratifies the three September
1997 agreements. President Clinton never submitted these agreements to the Senate
for its advice and consent to ratification. Many believe President Bush is unlikely to
do so.16
Linkage between U.S. Withdrawal from ABM Treaty and Russia’s
Possible Withdrawal from START II. Russian lawmakers attached a non-
binding amendment to their Law on Ratification of START II declaring Russia’s right
15On April 15, 2000, President Putin told a domestic audience that the United States would
have to renounce its NMD plans in order to preserve START II and the Conventional Forces
in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and if it did not, it would “become in the eyes of the world the party
that is guilty of destroying the foundations of strategic stability.” New York Times, April 15,
2000, p. 1.
16See discussion below, p.8-10.

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to withdraw from the START II Treaty if the United States withdraws from or
violates the ABM Treaty. This underlined Putin’s statement to the Duma during its
debate on ratification, that if the United States abandoned the ABM Treaty, Russia
would “withdraw not only from the START II Treaty, but from the whole system of
treaties on the limitation and control of strategic and conventional weapons." Putin
reiterated this threat in an interview with U.S. journalists two days after his meeting
with Bush in Slovenia in June 2001.17
Resolution calling for stable financing of strategic offensive
nuclear forces. Throughout the debate and delay on START II ratification, Duma
Deputies had expressed concern about the age and condition of Russia’s strategic
nuclear forces. Many feared that these forces would continue to decline in capability,
with or without START II, because of financial constraints. Deputies frequently
questioned the Yeltsin government about its plans for maintaining and modernizing
these forces, but received few complete answers. As a result, the Duma included a
provision in its Law on Ratification that called for stable financing for strategic
offensive nuclear forces, to ensure that Russia could retain the forces permitted by
arms control agreements.
Alternative Approaches for the United States
Because Article IX of the Russian Federal Law on START II Ratification ties
that Treaty’s entry into force to U.S. actions on the 1997 Agreements, Russia claimed
to have tossed the “ball into the U.S. court.”18 Although the Bush Administration is
unlikely to press for START II ratification, it could submit these agreements to the
Senate for its advice and consent to ratification to move the arms reduction process
forward. This section identifies four alternative approaches, and assesses the possible
outcomes if the United States were to employ each approach.
S u b m i t t h e S T A R T I I P r o t o c o l / M O U o n
Succession/Demarcation Agreements Package
As is noted above, the September 1997 START II Protocol extends the time
period for the parties to reduce their forces to START II levels; the Memorandum of
Understanding on Succession names Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan as the
successors to the Soviet Union for the ABM Treaty; and the Agreed Statements on
Demarcation establish dividing lines between theater missile defense (TMD) systems
and strategic ballistic missile defense systems. The United States pursued these
demarcation agreements to ensure that its advanced TMD programs would not be
covered by the Treaty’s limits on the numbers and locations of deployed anti-ballistic
missile systems.19
17New York Times, June 19, 2001, p. 1; Washington Post, June 19, 2001, p. 1.
18Russia’s Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, used this phrase in interviews after the Duma
approved START II. See “Russia: Ivanov Awaits U.S. Response to START II Ratification,”
Interfax. Moscow. April 14, 2000.
19These agreements do not directly limit the capabilities of U.S. TMD systems. They state
(continued...)

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The START II Protocol must be approved by the Senate as an amendment to the
START II Treaty because it alters the terms of the original Treaty. The Clinton
Administration argued that the MOU on Succession and the Agreed Statements on
Demarcation do not alter the ABM Treaty, but Congress has, nonetheless, insisted
that they be submitted to the Senate.20
For several years, Clinton Administration officials stated that they would submit
these agreements together, as a package, after the Russian parliament approved
ratification of START II. This strategy was designed, in part, to reduce the likelihood
that the Senate would reject the ABM Treaty modifications. The Administration
believed that rejection was possible because several Senators were concerned that the
United States would limit the capabilities of its TMD systems to meet the terms of the
ABM/TMD Demarcation Agreements. Others had targeted the MOU on Succession,
in particular, for defeat. These Senators, argued that the ABM Treaty was no longer
in force after the demise of the Soviet Union, and that the Senate would have to
approve the MOU on Succession to revive the Treaty. If the Senate rejected the
MOU, the Treaty would not be in force and the United States could deploy robust
national missile defenses without concern for treaty limits.21
The Clinton Administration apparently hoped that, by packaging the ABM
modifications with the START II Protocol, members who were not strongly opposed
to the ABM Treaty might support the whole package so that the popular START II
Treaty could enter into force. This strategy might have been effective if the package
had come to the Senate in 1997 or 1998 when support for START II was strong.
However, since that time, support in the Senate for a robust missile defense system
has grown deeper and wider as intelligence estimates have postulated an emerging
ballistic missile threat to the United States from such nations as North Korea, Iran,
and Iraq. The negative attitudes toward the ABM Treaty’s limits on NMD may now
be stronger than the positive attitudes toward START II. As a result, critics of the
ABM Treaty might be able to find more than 33 Senators who would vote against the
19(...continued)
that, as long as these systems are not tested against targets with strategic ballistic missile
characteristics, the systems with lesser capabilities are automatically not covered by the ABM
Treaty and systems with greater capabilities will be subject to each nation’s own internal
decision process to determine whether they are covered by the Treaty. For more details see
Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
Demarcation and Succession Agreements: Background and Issues. CRS Report 98-496F, by
Amy F. Woolf. Updated April 27, 2000.
20For details on the debate between the Administration and Congress see Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty Demarcation and Succession Agreements: Background and Issues. CRS Report 98-
496F, by Amy F. Woolf. Updated April 27, 2000.
21See, for example, “Senate Declares ABM Treaty Null and Void; Blasts White House
Position.” Inside the Pentagon. October 8, 1998. p. 1. See, also, “Helms Calls on Clinton
for Evidence that ABM Treaty is Legally in Force.” Inside the Pentagon. March 4, 1999.
p. 1.

CRS-10
1997 agreements, even if it meant that the United States and Russia would not
implement the reductions in START II.22
If the Senate were to defeat any or all of the 1997 agreements, START II could
not enter into force without further action by the Russian parliament to amend its Law
on Ratification. However, Russia might not be amenable to changes in the law if it
viewed the Senate’s vote as an assault on the ABM Treaty. Russia continues to view
this Treaty as the “cornerstone of strategic stability” and a central element of the
U.S.-Russian arms control agenda. Consequently, if the Bush Administration were to
submit these agreements to the Senate, it might result in stalemating or derailing the
formal arms reduction process.
Submit just the START II Protocol
The Bush Administration could submit the START II Protocol to the Senate, for
its advice and consent to ratification, without the MOU on Succession and Agreed
Statements on Demarcation. The United States and Russia signed this Protocol after
the U.S. Senate had given its consent to ratification of START II, so the Senate has
not yet reviewed it or considered it for ratification. But the Protocol was included
with the Treaty documents that the Russian parliament approved in April 2000. As
a result, the United States and Russia have approved two different Treaties, and the
Senate would have to consent to the ratification of this Protocol as an amendment to
the Treaty before START II could enter into force, even if the Duma had not
conditioned its approval of START II on U.S. approval of this Protocol.
Because this Protocol simply changes the elimination time-lines in START II, it
is unlikely to be controversial on its own merits. Most analysts agree that this change
became both necessary and sensible as the Duma delayed its consideration of START
II. When the Treaty was signed in January 1993, it provided the parties with nearly
10 years to reduce their forces to the START II limits. But, as the years slipped by
without ratification, the amount of time available was reduced. By 1997, some
Russian analysts were noting that it would be difficult for Russia to comply with
START II by January 2003 because it lacked the funds to eliminate large numbers of
missiles in the shorter period of time.23 Some also noted that many of the systems that
Russia would eliminate under START II would reach the end of their service lives
later in the decade. Hence, some in Russia argued that an extension in the elimination
deadline was not only practical, but it would also help the government sell START
II to the Duma because the government could argue that Russia would not have to
eliminate any missiles that would not have been retired anyway.24
22An affirmative vote on advice and consent to ratification requires a vote of two-thirds of the
Senators, or 67 Senate Members. Hence, if more than 33 Senators vote against a Treaty, the
Senate does not consent to its ratification.
23The Arms Control Reporter, Strategic Arms Reduction II, Chronology, September 26, 1997,
Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, p. 614.B.99.
24 "Russia-United States: Five Points of Accord. Summit Meeting in Helsinki: Success or
Failure?" Sergey Rogov, director of the Russian Academy of Sciences United States and
(continued...)

CRS-11
However, if the Bush Administration submitted the START II Protocol without
the MOU on Succession and the Agreed Statements on Demarcation, it may create
a controversy that could undermine approval of the Protocol. Some Senators
repeatedly asked the Clinton Administration to submit the agreements related to the
ABM Treaty to the Senate. But the Administration argued that it made no sense to
submit the START II Protocol until Russia approved START II and, because it
viewed the agreements as a combined package, it would not submit any until it could
submit all of them. If President Bush were to separate the package now, some might
argue that he only did this to avoid a direct confrontation over the ABM-related
agreements. Consequently, some Members of the Senate might vote against the
Protocol to voice their opposition to the Administration’s approach. Others might
oppose the Protocol, even if they would not vote against the ABM agreements,
simply because they believe the Senate has the right to address the ABM agreements
as well. Others, however, may welcome the opportunity to review and approve the
START II Protocol, without having it attached to the far more controversial ABM
agreements.
Furthermore, even if the Senate were to consider and consent to the ratification
of the START II Protocol, it might not be enough to bring START II into force.
Russia’s law on ratification clearly states that the United States must complete the
ratification process for the Protocol and the agreements related to the ABM Treaty.
On the other hand, Article IX of the Russian law on ratification reflects concerns
expressed by Duma members and Russian analysts when the law was drafted in 1998.
At the time, the 1997 ABM Treaty demarcation agreements were a high priority for
Russia because they offered assurances that the United States would not develop
theater missile defense (TMD) systems that would undermine Russia’s strategic
nuclear deterrent. Russian officials are now far more concerned about the effect that
U.S. NMD deployment might have than the effect that U.S. TMD deployments might
have on Russia’s deterrent forces. Hence, the statement that Russia could withdraw
from START II if the United States withdraws from the ABM Treaty, when combined
with President Putin’s statement that Russia would withdraw from a range of arms
control treaties if the United States withdraws from the ABM Treaty,25 becomes
relatively more important than the conditions in Article IX. Consequently, the Putin
government and the Duma may be amenable to changes in the law so that START II
could enter into force without U.S. approval of the MOU on Succession and the
Demarcation agreements if the United States were to accept limits on its NMD
system and agree to remain within the confines of the ABM Treaty.
24(...continued)
Canada Institute. Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 26, 1997. Translated in
FBIS-SOV-97-059
25President Putin reportedly told the Duma “If ... the United States dismantles the 1972 ABM
Treaty, we will pull out of the system of treaty relations on the limitation of and control over
strategic and conventional arms. We may also think of revising our commitments on tactical
arms.” See “Russia to Pull Out of Arms Treaties if U.S. Reneges on ABM.” Interfax. April
14, 2000.

CRS-12
Withhold the 1997 Agreements and Complete the “Grand
Compromise”
During the last years of the Clinton Administration, the United States and Russia
held discussions on two new arms control agreements – a START III Treaty that
would require further reductions in U.S. and Russian strategic offensive nuclear
weapons and U.S. proposals to modify the ABM Treaty so that the United States
could deploy a limited missile defense system. The framework for START III, which
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin adopted in March 1997, would have reduced U.S. and
Russian strategic offensive forces to between 2,000 and 2,500 warheads. Russia has
since proposed that the treaty reduce each side’s forces to 1,000-1,500 warheads, a
number consistent with the number of weapons that Russia is likely to retain by the
end of this decade. On the defensive side, the Clinton Administration proposed a
Protocol to the ABM Treaty that would permit the United States to deploy a single
NMD site in Alaska, a location that is not permitted under the Treaty. The United
States also plans to upgrade several early warning radars so that they could be used
in the NMD system. This, too, is not permitted by the Treaty.
The Clinton Administration would not accept the lower numbers proposed by
Russia for a START III Treaty. It argued that those numbers, along with several
other provisions in the Russian proposal, would undermine the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
Russia refused to accept the U.S. proposals for modifying the ABM Treaty. It
believed that, once Washington is freed from the present confines of the ABM Treaty,
the United States would expand its NMD system so that it could intercept Russian
missiles and undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent. However, many analysts believed
that the nations might have agreed on a “grand compromise.” If the United States
were willing to accept lower limits in START III, then Russia might have been willing
to accept some modifications to the ABM Treaty that would permit the deployment
of an NMD site in Alaska.
The Bush Administration has indicated that it probably will not pursue a similar
arms control strategy. However, if these agreements were determined to be feasible
and desirable, the President could withhold the 1997 agreements from the Senate and
submit a new package for the Senate’s advice and consent that included a START
III Treaty and modifications to the ABM Treaty. Presumably, it would hope that this
package would attract the needed votes for ratification by winning the votes of those
who support both deeper reductions in offensive forces and those who support the
deployment of a limited NMD system. Several factors, however, mitigate against the
success of this approach.
Difficulty reaching agreement with the Russians. Since the United
States announced in January 1999 that it planned to negotiate with Russia to modify
the ABM Treaty, Russian officials have stated that they do not believe changes to the
ABM Treaty would be in Russia’s national security interests. They note that the
Treaty forms the “cornerstone of strategic stability” and that any changes to it that
would permit the deployment of a nationwide ballistic missile defense would
undermine this stability. Russia also questions the U.S. contention that it needs an
NMD to defend against emerging threats from nations such as North Korea, Iran, and
Iraq, citing doubts that these nations would have the technical capability or political

CRS-13
will to pose such a threat.26 Furthermore, Russian officials doubt that U.S. missile
defenses would remain limited in their capabilities or in the numbers of interceptors.
They have heard many Members of Congress and President Bush call for more robust
defenses. Even the Clinton Administration had stated that the United States could
return to the negotiating table in 2001 to seek further modifications that would permit
the deployment of additional interceptors and space-based sensors. Hence, many
Russians remain convinced that the U.S. NMD system could eventually undermine
Russia’s nuclear deterrent. At the Bush-Putin meeting of June 16, 2001, the Russian
President suggested some flexibility on possible changes to the ABM Treaty. In his
interview with U.S. journalists on June 18, however, Putin indicated that he saw such
changes in the context of a theater missile defense for Europe, with Russian
participation. He also repeated his skepticism about ballistic missile threats to the
United states.27
Many analysts and officials in the Clinton Administration believed that Russia
would eventually agree to modify the ABM Treaty because, if it did not, the United
States might withdraw from the Treaty. In this circumstance, Russia would lose all
the limits and protections afforded by the Treaty, and the United States would be free
to deploy more robust missile defenses. Some argued that Russia would become
more willing to negotiate changes when the United States began construction on
ABM facilities in Alaska. Furthermore, some have noted that Russia should have
been willing to negotiate modifications with the Clinton Administration rather than
risk negotiating with a Bush Administration that might prefer to deploy a more robust
NMD system and to have the U.S. withdraw from the ABM Treaty.28 But some
Russian analysts take an opposing view; they argue that Moscow believes the United
States would not withdraw from the ABM Treaty because this would damage the
entire arms control agenda and tarnish the U.S. image in the international community.
Hence, they argue that Russia’s continued refusal to agree to ABM Treaty
modifications will stop the United States from deploying an NMD site in Alaska.
Others believe that Russia may simply stall the process, hoping that technological
difficulties or political change in Washington may stop the U.S. NMD program.
The two sides may also find it difficult to reach agreement on the limits in a
START III Treaty. Those who foresee a “grand compromise” believe it will occur
when the United States agrees to reduce its forces to numbers below the 2,000-2,500
warheads agreed to in Helsinki in 1997. But it could be difficult for the Bush
Administration to alter the U.S. position. Several press reports indicated that, in
preparation for the June 2000 summit between Presidents Clinton and Putin, the
White House asked the Pentagon to evaluate the U.S. position in the START III
26See, for example, “Russia Rejects U.S. Proposals to Amend Missile Treaty,” Dow Jones
and Company Wire Services. May 4, 2000. Putin’s visit to North Korea in July, 2000, and
his presentation of Pyongyang’s vague offer to halt its missile program in exchange for
international assistance in launching satellites reinforced Russia’s rebuttal of the U.S.
rationale for NMD.
27See note 17 above, and the analysis in the Jamestown Monitor, June 21, 2001.
28The President’s National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, made this point during a meeting
with the press. See “Russia has Offer on Missile Defense.” Washington Post, April 29,
2000. P. A1.

CRS-14
negotiations and the implications of deeper cuts and that the military recommended
against any changes to the U.S. position.29 Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
stated, at a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, that they would be
comfortable with reductions to 2,500 warheads, but that they had not studied the
implications of lower numbers and would not recommend deeper reductions until such
an analysis were completed. They also warned against the tyranny of numbers, noting
that lower numbers of warheads would not necessarily enhance stability and improve
U.S. security.30
Consequently, if U.S. flexibility is limited in both the offensive and defensive
negotiations, then Russia would have to do much of the compromising needed to
reach a “grand compromise.” But Putin may not be willing to compromise on
modifications to the ABM Treaty. He has stated clearly, on numerous occasions, that
the U.S. proposals for changes in that Treaty are not in Russia’s interests.
Furthermore, at the summit in June, 2000, he and President Clinton signed a Joint
Statement on Principles for Strategic Stability. In that statement, the Presidents
agreed that the international security environment had changed with the emerging
threats caused by the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. And
they agreed that the ABM Treaty already contained provisions that acknowledged it
could be modified to respond to changes in the international security environment.31
But President Putin did not agree that the emerging threats from proliferation justified
modifications to the ABM Treaty. Instead, Russia has proposed the deployment of
a theater missile defense system for Europe and renewed political efforts to stem
missile proliferation.32 Moscow has been slow to elaborate these proposals, and many
analysts see them as aimed primarily at stalling U.S. NMD.
Difficulty winning approval in the U.S. Senate. Even if the United States
were to accept somewhat lower limits in a START III Treaty, in exchange for
Russia’s acceptance of modifications to the ABM Treaty, it is possible that the U.S.
Senate would not provide its advice and consent to the components of this “grand
compromise.” Several Members of Congress have stated that they do not believe the
United States should reduce its offensive forces below the 2,000-2,500 warheads
outlined for START III in Helsinki in 1997. When Senator John Warner, then
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, held a hearing with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Command, he outlined
29“Pentagon Feels Pressure to Cut Out More Warheads,” New York Times, May 11, 2000.
See also Gertz, Bill. “Joint Chiefs Oppose Russian Plan to Cut 1,000 U.S. Warheads; White
House Agrees with Moscow.” Washington Times, May 11, 2000, p. 1.
30Landay, Jonathan S. and Steven Thomma. “U.S. Military Rejects Moscow Call to Cut to
1,500 Warheads.” Philadelphia Inquirer. May 24, 2000.
31The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. Joint Statement by the Presidents of the
United States of America and the Russian Federation on Principles of Strategic Stability.
June 4, 2000. See also, CRS Report RS20604, U.S.-Russia Moscow Summit, June 3-5,
2000: Outcome and Implications, June 19, 2000.
32Ivanov, Igor. “A Challenge from Russia.” New York Times, April 24, 2000, p. A27. See
also, Grier, Peter. “Putin’s “Star Wars” Lite: Could it Fly?” Christian Science Monitor, June
8, 2000, p. 2.

CRS-15
detailed questions about the implications of deeper reductions and received testimony
from the Members of the Joint Chiefs that demonstrated their concerns about deeper
reductions.33 Hence, although a majority of the Members of the Senate probably
support reductions in U.S. forces to the levels outlined at the Helsinki summit, it
could be difficult to find 67 Members who would support reductions below that level.
Furthermore, it might have been difficult for the Clinton Administration to find
67 Members who would support an agreement that outlined modest modifications to
the ABM Treaty. Many Members believe that the United States should no longer be
bound by the Treaty and that it should deploy more robust missile defenses to deal
with a wider range of threats. Twenty-five Members of the Senate took this position
in a letter they sent to Clinton in April 2000. They told him that they “oppose in the
strongest terms the effort to conclude an agreement that would purchase Russian
consent to the U.S. NMD system in exchange for U.S. reaffirmation of a new, very
limiting, legally binding accord.” They noted that an agreement that incorporated the
Administration’s approach probably would not receive the Senate’s consent to
ratification.34
It would have been difficult for the Clinton Administration to build a coalition
among Members who support the arms control process and Members who support
the substance of the new agreements when growing numbers of Members see little
value in the offensive arms control process and many may strongly oppose the
substance of the agreements. Moreover, even if the Administration could have won
enough votes to gain Senate approval for these agreements, it may not have had the
opportunity to do so. As was noted above, Senator Helms stated that the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee would not consider any new agreements that the
Clinton Administration submitted to the Senate. This set of circumstances virtually
ensured that progress on arms control was unlikely in the last months of the Clinton
Administration.
Change in the U.S. Approach to Arms Control. Finally, it seems
extremely unlikely that the Bush Administration would pursue either of the two
agreements contemplated for the “grand compromise.” President Bush has said that
he would like to reduce U.S. offensive nuclear weapons below START II levels, but
he and his advisors appear to prefer a unilateral approach to negotiated reductions and
a formal START II Treaty. Supporters of this approach argue that the reductions
would occur more quickly if both sides simply adjusted their forces to meet their own
national security others. Some have also noted that, with this approach, the United
States would retain the flexibility to increase its forces in the future.
In addition, the Bush Administration has shown little interest in modifying the
ABM Treaty so that it could remain largely in place. In a speech on May 1, 2001, the
President underlined his support for more robust missile defenses than had been
pursued by the Clinton Administration. He noted that the United States would have
33The Federal Document Clearing House. Transcript. U.S. Senator John Warner Holds
Hearing on U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, May 23, 2000.
34“Senate Leaders Tell Clinton ABM Deal With Russia Won’t be Ratified.” Inside the
Pentagon. April 20, 2000. P. 17.

CRS-16
to move beyond the constraints in the ABM Treaty to develop and deploy those
defenses. He indicated that he would be willing to consult with Russia about a new
strategic framework that would include missile defenses in the deterrence equation.
But his Administration has not indicated that the United States would approach these
discussions with the intention of negotiating a new, formal agreement limiting missile
defenses.
Many observers believe that if the Bush Administration pursues this approach
to arms control and missile defenses, the Russians might be more willing to reach an
agreement than they had been with the Clinton Administration, on modifications to
the ABM Treaty. Not only would Russian officials welcome further reductions in
U.S. offensive forces, they might also become convinced that the United States would
withdraw from the ABM Treaty and pursue defenses that could undermine Russia’s
offenses if they did not accede to U.S. requests for a new framework.
What Future for the U.S.-Russian Arms Control
Process?
The U.S.-Russian arms control process did not move forward during the last few
months of the Clinton Administration. The United States and Russia remained far
apart on many issues for a START III Treaty and Russia continued to reject U.S.
proposals to modify the ABM Treaty. In November, President Putin did announce
a new proposal for deep reductions under a START III Treaty, but he continued to
link the reductions to U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty.35 The United States has
shown little interest in negotiating reductions to the level proposed by Putin, and the
Bush Administration has stated that the United States would move beyond the limits
in the ABM Treaty with its missile defenses programs.
There are several alternative possibilities for the United States and Russia to
move beyond the current stall in the arms control process. First, the two sides could
continue to hold discussions and negotiations, in an effort to reach agreement on
formal arms control agreements. Second, the two sides could continue to hold
discussions about nuclear weapons and ballistic missile defenses and to cooperate in
reducing their offensive nuclear forces, but they could do this without signing any
more formal treaties that might never be ratified. Third, the United States and Russia
could leave formal arms control efforts behind and, instead, each deploy those forces
that each believes will serve its own national security interests. The following sections
evaluate these alternatives from the U.S. and Russian perspectives.
U.S. Perspective
Pursue Formal Arms Control Agreements. The Clinton Administration
believed that the United States and Russia should hold discussions and negotiations
that could result in agreement on formal arms control treaties. This effort may have
been prompted by a desire to resolve the outstanding issues in the discussions, or
35Russia: President Putin Unveils New Strategic Arms Reduction Proposal. Interfax.
Moscow. November 13, 2000.

CRS-17
simply because the process is in place and the participants continue to schedule and
attend meetings. Either way, Clinton Administration officials continued to meet with
Russian officials in an effort to resolve the outstanding issues associated with START
II and ABM Treaty modifications.36 Presidents Clinton and Putin also discussed
these issues at several multilateral meetings during the last few months of the Clinton
Administration, but they failed to reach agreement. The Bush Administration has not
continued with these discussions in its first few months, but it could alter its policy
and approach to arms control in the future. Following the Bush-Putin meeting in
Slovenia on June 16, 2001, follow-up meetings were planned for the countries’
foreign and defense ministers.
Analysts highlight several reasons why the formal arms control process remains
valuable to U.S. national security interests. First, they note that the negotiations
themselves can help build confidence and reduce tensions between the parties because
they provide a forum in which each side can gain information about the other nation’s
plans and programs. Furthermore, supporters argue that arms control agreements
contain a range of confidence building measures and verification provisions that
provide each side with information about the forces on the other side. They also
allow for predictable and transparent reductions in nuclear weapons. Finally, they
note that ongoing negotiations and efforts to reach formal agreements serve both U.S.
and Russian interests in contributing to efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. Both nations are committed, through the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,
to move toward deep reductions and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.
Many non-nuclear weapons states measure progress on the U.S.-Russian arms control
agenda through the signing and implementation of formal arms control agreements.
Some critics, however, have begun to question whether the formal arms control
process actually adds anything to the relationship between the United States and
Russia. They note that arms control is often a victim of stresses in that relationship,
as when the Russian Duma delayed action on START II in response to U.S. and
British bombing in Iraq and the NATO air campaign in Kosovo. Furthermore, some
question whether the United States needs these agreements to benefit from reductions
in Russian nuclear weapons. They argue that economic pressures are likely to reduce
Russian nuclear forces to perhaps no more than 1,000 deployed warheads over the
next 10 years, with or without arms control treaties. Finally they argue that the
parties no longer need to rely on the formal arms control process to gain information
about nuclear weapons plans and programs or to build confidence in their
understanding of those forces. The two nations now cooperate on weapons issues in
a number of ways, such as through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
(CTR) program, without the aid of formal, detailed arms control agreements.
Cooperate without Formal Arms Control Treaties. Many analysts argue
that the United States and Russia can continue to cooperate in reducing and
36 For example, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott met with Russia’s arms
control negotiator Georgy Mamedov in Oslo, Norway, on June 19, 2000, to follow-
up on the discussions from the Clinton-Putin summit in early June. See “US-Russia
Nuclear Meeting Ends Without Immediate Comment,” Dow Jones Newswires, June
20, 2000.

CRS-18
eliminating nuclear weapons without formal arms control agreements. The United
States and Soviet Union used this type of unilateral, reciprocal approach in late 1991
when they withdrew large portions of their non-strategic nuclear forces. Similarly,
some have suggested that the United States and Russia begin reductions in their
strategic offensive forces to START II levels without the formal treaty limits in place.
They recognize that these reductions would occur without the formal verification
provisions called for in the Treaty, but they argue that the hands-on experience gained
through the CTR program would provide many of the same confidence-building
benefits. They also note that, if they occurred informally, the reductions could take
place more quickly than they would under START II’s extended time-lines. Finally,
they note that this type of arms control could meet U.S. and Russian arms control
obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by demonstrating their
commitment to the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons.
Some critics of this approach argue that informal reductions would not offer the
same benefits as reductions under formal arms control treaties because the parties
would lose the transparency mandated by the START Treaties’ verification regime.
In addition, without START II in place, Russia might reduce its total number of
deployed forces, but retain the multiple-warhead ICBMs that would be banned by
START II. Some analysts would oppose this outcome, and would seek to retain the
formal arms control process as a way to “shape” the reductions in Russia’s forces.
Pursue Unilateral Force Structure Decisions. A growing number of
arms control analysts from across the political spectrum, including many who are now
hold positions in the Bush Administration, believe that the arms control process may
have run its course and that the United States may have little to gain from continuing
to seek formal agreements.37 They believe that Russian forces will decline as older
weapons are retired and new weapons are limited by a lack of financing. Although
some believe the United States may want to retain a greater number of weapons to
meet emerging threats to its security, most agree the United States can also reduce
its forces to START II levels or lower. But they believe that the United States and
Russia could each pursue their own paths to reductions, without waiting for the
completion of formal arms control treaties.38 Some who support a unilateral approach
argue that the ongoing negotiating process is actually locking the U.S. and Russia into
higher force levels and diverting attention away from more pressing nuclear safety and
proliferation issues.
Some analysts who favor unilateral decisions on offensive force structures
support this approach because they believe it would also make it easier for the United
States to pursue its own goals on ballistic missile defenses. Russia could not threaten
to withdraw from START II or START III were the United States to withdraw from
the ABM Treaty, if the treaties were not in force to begin with. In this case, the
37See, for example, Robbins, Carla Anne. “Politics and Policy: Bipartisan Thinkers Look Past
Traditional Arms Control.” The Wall Street Journal. May 18, 2000.
38As was noted above, this appears to be the approach supported by President Bush. He has
stated that he would reduce U.S. forces below START II levels, after an assessment by the
Department of Defense confirmed that this would not undermine U.S. security, regardless of
what the Russians did with their forces.

CRS-19
opponents of national missile defense would not be able to claim that the United
States had to choose between the deployment of NMD and offensive arms control
agreements. Some supporters of unilateral offensive reductions reject this view,
however, arguing that Russia would still be more likely to implement its own force
reductions if the United States did not deploy robust missile defenses.
Critics of this approach react with many of the same points that were noted in
the previous section. They argue that a unilateral approach would deprive the United
States of the benefits of formal treaties, such as predictable force structure changes
and the transparency offered by formal verification provisions. They also note that
a nation that reduces its forces unilaterally could also increase its forces unilaterally,
which could raise concerns in both Russia and other nations. Many nations, including
the non-nuclear weapons states in the NPT and U.S. allies in Europe, believe that the
predictability of the formal arms control process enhances all nations’ security and
precludes misunderstandings that could trigger arms races. Some believe that the
United States would anger or alienate many of its allies if it were to walk away from
the formal arms control process, even if it outlined plans to reduce its offensive forces.
Congressional Views. Although many Members of Congress continue to
support the formal arms control process, recent debates indicate that a growing
number may agree with the precept that the United States does not need formal arms
control agreements to secure its national interests. Nearly ten years after the collapse
of the Soviet Union, many have concluded that the “Soviet” threat has disappeared
and, therefore, the urgency and attention paid to arms control is gone. This trend also
stems, in part, from the growing interest in NMD and declining support for the ABM
Treaty. But, even some who support the arms control process have questioned
whether the United States should wait for formal treaties to reduce its forces. For
several years, Congress has precluded reductions in U.S. forces below START I
levels until START II enters into force. But support for this language has ebbed, and
many members may now be willing to allow the Bush Administration to implement
unilateral reductions in offensive forces. Some Democrats have sought to lift the
restriction on U.S. reductions for several years; they have argued that the Russians
were going to reduce their forces for economic reasons and that the United States did
not have to bear the costs of a larger START I force. They have also argued that the
United States could maintain its security with 2,500 or fewer nuclear weapons.
Democrats were joined by Republicans who would like to alter the existing legislation
so that President Bush would have the flexibility to “right size” U.S. forces.
Russian Perspective
Although President Putin is a relatively new and untested leader, the objective
reality of Russia’s economic and geostrategic situation would seem to dictate certain
aspects of Moscow’s perspective on next steps in the arms control process.
Russia’s preferences. First of all, Putin’s government will almost certainly
want to continue negotiating START/ABM/NMD issues as long as possible. Russia
seeks to portray itself as the defender of the arms control process and of global
strategic stability. It hopes to marshal international opinion, especially among
America’s European allies and important nonaligned states such as China and India,

CRS-20
in opposition to a possible unilateral U.S. decision to deploy NMD and/or renounce
the ABM Treaty.
Beyond considerations of public opinion and propaganda, Russia’s economic and
geostrategic weakness probably causes it to place a higher value on arms control
treaties now than does the United States. Moscow wants and needs a START III
agreement to bring U.S. offensive force levels down to something near the level
toward which their forces are projected to be shrinking in the coming decade.
Moscow wants arms control agreements to block – or at the very least, to limit – U.S.
missile defense programs. Moscow wants arms control agreements to make future
U.S. decisions on strategic nuclear forces more predictable. And Moscow may now
be less confident than the United States in relying on national technical means and
data from CTR programs to substitute for the verification provisions of arms control
agreements in monitoring the other side’s nuclear forces. Absent START II,
simultaneous nuclear force reductions without treaties would give Russia the
opportunity to retain old and/or deploy new MIRVed ICBMs. Given the choice,
however, Russia would almost certainly prefer to give up MIRVed ICBMs in order
to keep the ABM Treaty intact and get low START III ceilings.
Although Russia will probably seek to continue negotiations on the
START/ABM/NMD nexus as long as possible, if and when Moscow concludes that
the United States is definitely going to deploy an NMD system with or without
Russian agreement on modifying the ABM Treaty, Moscow will face a grave
dilemma. How will it respond? Several courses of action are outlined below.
The European Option. President Putin has already revealed that one of his
tactics will be to try to use a unilateral U.S. decision on NMD and the ABM Treaty
as a wedge to split the United States from its NATO allies. Immediately after his
inconclusive June summit with Clinton, Putin announced a brand new counter plan,
a joint Russian-European-U.S. missile defense program for Europe, and flew to Spain
and Germany to promote it. The Russians did not raise this idea with the Americans
during the summit. U.S. officials view it more as a propaganda ploy than a serious
proposal. Many European governments reportedly view it in much the same light.39
Nevertheless, Moscow continued to actively promote this notion in the succeeding
year, up to and following the Bush-Putin meeting of June 2001. That the
preponderance of European opinion, including that of many NATO member
governments, is generally opposed to U.S. NMD plans and highly values the ABM
and START Treaties as the basis of global strategic stability was demonstrated during
President Bush’s June 2001 European trip. Many of the allies also assert that NMD
would encourage proliferation. This is precisely Moscow’s position. Thus, if it
appeared that the United States caused a crisis with Russia over NMD, Moscow has
positioned itself to use that to try to undermine NATO unity and perhaps even to
fracture the alliance. Disrupting NATO has been a goal of Moscow for fifty years,
of course, but it has taken on added significance since the collapse of the Warsaw
Pact, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and NATO enlargement. A prominent
Russian strategic analyst gave this assessment in 1997:
39CRS discussions with European officials, June-August 2000.

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As recently as 1988, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies held a
quantitative edge over NATO of about 3-1 in the main weapons of conventional
ground and air forces. But ... today Russia is quantitatively weaker than NATO
by a ratio of from 1-2 to 1-3. With NATO first phase enlargement this will
change to a 1-4 imbalance.... Given the ability of NATO and the West to mobilize
superior economic and technological resources, the discrepancy is even more
alarming from a Russian perspective. Chillingly, in the case of revived hostilities,
only nuclear weapons can be relied upon to negate this gaping imbalance.40
Since then, Russian alarm has increased, especially in light of the expanded
doctrine of military intervention that NATO adopted in April 1999 and applied during
the Kosovo crisis. NATO may appear more threatening to Moscow now than ever
before, making disruption of the alliance a very high Russian priority. The Putin
government might well believe that if the United States abrogated the ABM Treaty,
deployed NMD, and as a result, gave Moscow the leverage to divide the alliance, this
would be a net gain for Russia. Most western analysts would probably conclude that
despite NATO allies’ opposition to NMD, Russia would not be able use a unilateral
U.S. decision to deploy NMD to break up the alliance. But from Moscow’s
perspective, it might well be worth trying. The European option would be most
effective if Russia’s direct response to the United States on NMD was relatively
restrained, allowing Moscow to cast itself as the victim of reckless, arrogant, U.S.
unilateralism.
The Military Countermeasures Option. President Putin and other senior
Russian officials have repeatedly threatened that if the United States deploys NMD
and/or abrogates or violates the ABM Treaty, Russia will withdraw from other arms
control agreements, including START, INF, and CFE, and will pursue other
asymmetrical responses. Such responses, they say, could include deploying theater
nuclear missiles (TNF) in Russia and Belarus, increasing the number of MIRVed
warheads on its ICBMs and SLBMs, and enhancing their missiles’ ability to penetrate
U.S. defenses. Russia might also sell anti-NMD technology to other states, further
undermining the utility of NMD. Russian spokesmen state that it is both cost effective
and technologically simpler for Russia to introduce counter measures to thwart NMD
than to try to match a U.S. NMD with a missile defense of its own. Even if that were
true, however, the military counter measures option could be prohibitively expensive
for Moscow economically and politically. Many of the military measures that Russian
officials have mentioned as possible responses to U.S. deployment of NMD and/or
abrogation of the ABM Treaty are inherently threatening to NATO Europe and would
tend to undermine the European option for Russia.
Constraints on Russia. Russia is presently producing one new type ICBM,
the single-warhead SS-27. Serial production began in 1998 and continues at the rate
of 10 per year. Moscow has said it intends to accelerate production to 20 or 30 per
year – though it has yet to do so – and has said that it could MIRV them with three
warheads per missile. Accelerated production and MIRVing might double or treble
present costs. Service-life extension programs for obsolescent MIRVed ICBMs are
40Alexei Arbatov, The Russian Military in the 21st Century. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, Carlisle, Pa., June 3, 1997, p. 9-10. Arbatov is the Deputy Chairman
of the Defense Committee of the Russian State Duma.

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also very expensive and would grow more so as the already old missles aged further.
Moscow’s threat to renounce the INF and CFE Treaties implies Russian deployments
of theater nuclear forces in its western regions and also conventional forces in excess
of CFE ceilings. All SS-20s were destroyed in compliance with the INF Treaty. The
production complex that produced the SS-20 is now making the SS-27.41 It is the
only production facility in Russia capable of manufacturing either missile. A
simultaneous large-scale build up of strategic and theater nuclear forces and
conventional forces would be a great strain on Russian productive capacity and on the
budget. The total Russian Federal budget for 2001 is about $40 billion, of which the
defense budget is $7.3 billion,42 about the size of the U.S. national missile defense
program by itself. The U.S. defense budget in FY2001 is $309 billion.
Even allowing that dollar valuation of the Russian budget further understates its
size because of the 4-to-1 ruble devaluation in 1998, and that Putin has already
substantially increased defense spending, very large additional increases in Russian
defense spending at this time could have grave economic and social costs. Putin has
declared reviving the economy to be an urgent objective and outlined economic
priorities in his State of the Federation speech in July 2000 and his address to the
nation in June 2001. Since late 1999, the economy has begun to recover from its
decade-long collapse. Many analysts question whether Putin could pursue an
ambitious program of structural economic reform simultaneously with a military build
up and perhaps confrontation with the United States. In addition, as is noted above,
some of the military countermeasures that Russian officials have mentioned, such as
renouncing the INF and CFE Treaties, redeploying TNF, and expanding western
deployments of conventional forces, could arouse alarm and anger in Europe, and
undermine Moscow’s apparent strategy to use U.S. policy on NMD and the ABM
Treaty as a wedge between the United states and NATO.
Furthermore, Russia is presently negotiating with the Paris Club of government
creditors, seeking forgiveness for some 50% of the $42 billion in Soviet debt that
Russia assumed when the U.S.S.R. was dissolved.43 This is a very high priority for
Moscow, which is widely believed to be incapable of servicing this debt. Absent any
debt relief (rescheduling and forgiveness), the cost of servicing Russian Federation
foreign debt would more than double, approaching half the current Russian Federation
budget, which would be unsustainable. Default on this debt would have grave
financial and economic consequences for Russia. If Moscow were to pursue the
military confrontation option in response to a U.S. decision to deploy NMD or
renounce the ABM Treaty, the United States and some of its allies might seek to
41The SS-27 is produced at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, which earlier produced the
SS-20. It is Russia’s only ICBM production facility. Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems,
Issue 32, Duncan Lennox, ed., London, 2000, p. 136.
42Keith Bush, The Russian Economy in April 2001-Highlights, Center For Strategic and
International Studies, Washington D.C., April 23, 2001.
43The total rises to over $50 billion if a separate Soviet debt to East Germany, now owed to
the FRG, is included, as Berlin says it should be.

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block Russia’s attempt to win debt forgiveness from the Paris Club.44 Similarly, an
atmosphere of military confrontation might discourage foreign direct investment in
Russia from many of the advanced industrial democracies, which Russia urgently
needs to help revive its capital-starved economy.
Despite Russian officials’ talk of cost-effective asymmetrical military counter
measures, they must also consider the possibility that if they adopt, or appear to
adopt, a policy of military confrontation, that step might provoke a further, perhaps
disproportionate U.S. response. Given the overwhelming economic and technological
superiority of the United States at this time, a vigorous U.S. response might further
upset the military balance, leaving Russia even further behind.
Decision in Moscow.
With Putin in the Kremlin, decision-making is
likely to be more disciplined than it was in the Yeltsin era. There is still evidence,
however, of sharp differences among key actors and institutions in national security
decision making, for example, between the Foreign and Defense Ministries, and
within the military between the Defense Ministry and the General Staff. Nevertheless,
given the President’s constitutional prerogatives and Putin’s reputation and record as
a careful decision maker and his career as a foreign intelligence officer, he is likely to
play the decisive role in Russia’s policy on NMD and ABM Treaty issues.
A likely course would be for Putin to try the European option first. As long as
Moscow appeared to be making progress toward the goal of splitting NATO, Putin
might foreswear aggressive-looking military counter measures. If the European
option faltered, military counter measures – or the threat of such measures – might
be a logical next step. The big question is: if the European option were unproductive
and if Putin concluded that the United States was determined to go ahead unilaterally
with NMD regardless of Russia’s objections and threats, would Putin go all out with
military countermeasures and risk even a limited military confrontation (e.g., renewed
arms race) with the United States, or would he seek some political-military
compromise acceptable to Washington, permitting limited NMD?
It is difficult to predict what Putin’s decision would be in this case. Putin has
steadfastly prosecuted a brutal military campaign in Chechnya despite international,
especially European, criticism. And he has vowed to strengthen the military. But he
overruled his hardline generals’ resistance (in March 2000) to resuming political and
military relations with NATO after the Kosovo crisis had passed. Most observers
believe he means it when he says it is essential for Russia to join the mainstream of the
global economic marketplace, and he has begun some difficult structural reforms.
Some analysts argue that Putin believes it is possible, and even desirable, to build up
Russia’s military and take strong stands on key international issues in opposition to
the United States, and at the same time to reform and strengthen the economy and
win debt forgiveness. Others question whether this is really Putin’s policy, and if so,
whether it is achievable.
Putin has taken a very prominent, personal position in opposing the United
States on NMD and modification of the ABM Treaty. It might be politically difficult
44 See CRS Report RS20636, Russia's Paris Club debt: U.S. interests. July 18, 2000.

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and costly for him, as a new leader trying to maintain his reputation at home as a
strong leader and vigilant defender of Russian interests, to appear to back down to
Washington on such a crucial issue – as Yeltsin regularly did. On the other hand, the
economic and political costs to Putin and to Russia of prolonged high-level military-
political confrontation with the United States could be ruinous. If faced with this
dilemma, Putin might try to steer a course between the seemingly contradictory
options of confrontation or concession. Such a course might include the following
elements:
! no compromise on NMD or modification of the ABM Treaty
! no implementation of START II
! limited military countermeasures, such as MIRVing the SS-27 and enhancing
strategic missiles’ penetration capabilities
! continued dialogue and limited cooperation with the United States on selected
issues of common interest
! pursuit of the European option and integration into the global economic
marketplace
! reliance on the defense industries as the locomotive to get the economy
moving.
While a “mixed” approach such as this may seem plausible, in the final analysis,
Putin remains a relatively new and untested leader whose decision on this issue cannot
be predicted with confidence.