Missiles for Standoff Attack: Air-Launched Air- to-Surface Munitions Programs

Missiles for Standoff Attack: Air-Launched Air- to-Surface Munitions Programs

Order Code RL30552
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Missiles for Standoff Attack: Air-Launched Air-
to-Surface Munitions Programs
Updated October 17, 2000
(name redacted)
Analyst in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Missiles for Standoff Attack: Air-Launched Air-to-Surface
Munitions Programs
Summary
Increasing the standoff range of air-delivered munitions and improving their
accuracy and lethality have become matters of major emphasis in U.S. defense plans
since the 1991 Gulf War. The 1999 conflict in Kosovo especially highlighted the value
of air-to-surface munitions that could be launched from safe standoff ranges and
guided to their targets with precision.
Since cancellation in late 1994 of the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile
(TSSAM) program, various alternatives have been proposed, including development
of a new missile or a derivative of currently operational missiles. This report focuses
six air-to-surface munition programs: the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile
(JASSM) the Standoff Land Attack Missile Expanded Response (SLAM-ER), the
Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW), the Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile
(CALCM), and the AGM-142 and AGM-130 missiles. All of these weapons are
launched from aircraft, in contrast ships and ground-based missile launchers.
The Defense Department’s FY2001 budget included requests of $122.3 million
for JASSM and $27.9 million for SLAM-ER as well as requests for other standoff
munition programs such as JSOW ($284.7 million) and AGM-130 (about $100
thousand). Appropriations conferees recommended funding SLAM-ER as requested,
reduced the JASSM request by $4 million and increased the JSOW request by $6.4
million. These standoff munitions programs were funded in FY1999 and FY2000
essentially as requested, with minimal differences between the House and Senate in
regard to these programs; however, there are continuing differences between the Air
Force and the Navy as to funding priorities and military requirements for JASSM,
SLAM-ER, and JSOW.
Issues before Congress include the relative cost and performance of these missile
systems; tradeoffs between performance and cost that may be acceptable; perceptions
of inventory requirements; emphasis on development of standoff munitions at the
expense of other defense programs; and whether derivatives of current munitions
should be procured pending development and production of more advanced standoff
missiles that may be needed in post-2010 threat scenarios.
The quest for capable and affordable standoff air-to-surface missiles poses a
number of interrelated issues for Congress in evaluating the proposed alternatives: (1)
the advantages of an entirely new design versus a derivative of currently operational
munitions or designs in full-scale development; (2) acceptable tradeoffs between
perceived performance requirements in regard to range, payload, accuracy, and
stealth; (3) projected inventory requirements for future combat scenarios; (4) the
development and production costs and the delivery schedules of proposed
alternatives; and (5) reliance on interim standoff munitions pending development of
new systems.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Current Precision-Guided Munition (PGM) Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
JASSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
SLAM-ER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
JSOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
CALCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
AGM-142 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
AGM-130 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Congressional Action in 1995-1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Congressional Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Comparing Standoff Munitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Recommended Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
List of Figures
Figure 1. Estimated Range of Standoff Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
List of Tables
Table 1. FY1997 Funding for Air-to-Surface Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Table 2. FY1998 Funding for Air-to-Surface Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Table 3. FY1999 Funding for Air-to-Surface Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Table 4. FY2000 Funding for Air-to-Surface Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Table 5. FY2001 Requests for Air-to-Surface Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Missiles for Standoff Attack: Air-Launched Air-
to-Surface Munitions Programs
Introduction
Increasing the standoff range of air-delivered munitions and improving their
accuracy and lethality have become matters of major emphasis in U.S. defense plans
since the 1991 Gulf War and its aftermath of sporadic air attacks on Iraq, which
highlighted the value of air-to-surface munitions that could be launched from safe
standoff ranges and guided to their targets with precision. The value of such
munitions was further demonstrated by operations in the Balkans in 1995 and 1999.
During NATO’s 78-day air campaign against Yugoslavia (March 24-June 10, 1999)
35 percent of the munitions delivered were precision-guided munitions (PGMs),
compared to 10 percent of those used in the 1991 Gulf War.1
The downsizing of U.S. forces in the 1990s also underlined the need for more
effective and accurate standoff weapons for a smaller force structure in high-threat
situations, where the advent of more effective air defenses is expected to make
delivery of air-to-surface munitions increasingly difficult. Moving some of the tasks
of weapons delivery from the aircraft to its munitions is seen as an effective way to
attack a well-defended enemy with reduced risks to U.S. and allied forces.2 Similar
results can be achieved with sea-based or land-based missile systems that are not
considered in this report on air-launched air-to-surface munitions.3
Standoff missiles with high accuracy and lethality raise the possibility of precision
strikes deep in enemy territory with less risk of U.S. and allied casualties and less
likelihood of collateral damage to civilians. Advocates of programs to develop such
weapons have emphasized their greater standoff launch range – intended to keep U.S.
and allied forces out of harm’s way – as well as their joint use by two or more services
– expected to reduce unit cost via shared development and high-volume procurement.
In general, however, the greater the standoff range, the more expensive the missile.
1 U.S. Reliance on Precision-Guided Munitions Grows Dramatically. Aerospace Daily,
April 19, 1999. p. 98-99; Nordeen, Lon. NATO’s Arsenal. Air Forces Monthly, June
1999. p. 28-34.
2 Goodman, Glenn W. Mining Silver Bullets – Navy and Air Force Pursue longer Range,
Autonomous Standoff Weapons. Armed Services Journal International, July 1997. p. 26.
3 The Navy’s sea-based Tomahawk missile is discussed by Ronald O’Rourke in CRS
Report RS20162, Cruise Missile Inventories and NATO Attacks on Yugoslavia: Background
and Information, April 20, 1999. 6 p. The Army’s land-based ATACMS is discussed by
Robert Shuey in CRS Report 96-427 F, Smart, Precision-Guided, and Other Guided
Conventional Weapons: Information on U.S. programs, May 10, 1996. 40 p.

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Moreover, improvements in the accuracy and lethality of precision-guided munitions
(PGMs) also entail more cost and complexity, although the procurement cost is
somewhat offset by the smaller number of PGMs needed to destroy a target.4
Efforts to develop munitions with greater range, accuracy, and lethality have
faced many obstacles, including competing budgetary priorities, major technological
problems, and differing perceptions of service requirements in regard to types and
inventories of munitions. Maintaining program continuity to develop workable and
affordable systems has thus been a major challenge. Commonality of munitions to be
launched by air/sea/land-based platforms has often been frustrated by conflicting
service requirements for weight, safety, guidance, and communications. For example,
weight is more critical for air-delivered munitions than land- or ship-based munitions;
safety factors are more critical aboard ship than on airbases; and the services often use
different guidance and communications systems. Effectiveness in adverse weather or
darkness and resistance to jamming or other countermeasures also pose serious
technological challenges to the development of standoff munitions.5
The development and procurement of precision-guided air-launched standoff
munitions has been linked to the issue of buying more than the currently projected
number of B-2 stealth bombers (long-range strategic aircraft). Based on an Institute
of Defense Analyses (IDA) study of future bomber requirements, the Defense
Department concluded in May 1995 that it would be more cost-effective to develop
and procure more accurate standoff munitions than to buy more B-2 bombers.
Advocates of continued procurement of the B-2 challenged the conclusions of this
study, however, arguing that munitions programs have generally been underfunded
in the past and are not likely to be adequately supported in future years. Some
General Accounting Office (GAO) analysts have also questioned the affordability of
currently projected inventories of standoff missiles and precision-guided munitions
(PGMs), arguing that these may not be as inexpensive to develop and procure as
predicted and questioning projected inventory requirements.6
It has also been argued that standoff missiles and PGMs, if procured in adequate
quantities, could reduce requirements for stealth technology in new aircraft, such as
the F-22 and F/A-18E/F and the proposed Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). According to
this view, munitions with greater standoff range would not require as much stealth
(radar evasion features) in the launch aircraft, yielding considerable savings in aircraft
cost. Proponents of next-generation combat aircraft argue, however, that stealth
aircraft programs assume the use of more advanced standoff PGMs and that more
4 Braybrook, Roy. Surgical Precision from a Safe Distance. Armada International, May
1994. p. 8-10; Morrocco, John. PGM Strategy Faces Budget, Technical Traps. Aviation
Week & Space Technology, February 27, 1995. p. 44-47; Nash, Trevor. Stand-off and
Deliver. Armada International, August/September 1996. p. 48-49.
5 Cooper, Pat and Hitchens, Theresa. GPS Jamming Dulls U.S. Smart Bombs. Defense
News, June 19-25, 1995. p. 1, 52.
6 DOD Won’t Buy More B-2s; Will Start TSSAM Follow-on, B-2 Upgrade. Aerospace
Daily, May 4, 1995. p. 185-186; U.S. General Accounting Office. “Weapons Acquisitions:
Guided Weapon Plans Need to Be Reassessed. GAO/NSIAD 99-32. December 9, 1998.
p. 20-26.

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advanced fighter/attack planes will be needed for the most combat-effective use of
whatever standoff munitions may be available, given the problems of technology and
cost in acquiring PGMs. The numbers of PGMs procured have often been reduced
in the face of questionable performance, rising costs, or competing budgetary
priorities that tend to favor aircraft over munitions.
Finally, it must be noted that the focus of this paper (precise air-to-surface
missiles) should not be interpreted as either advocacy for, or an indication of a
movement totally away from “dumb bombs” in the U.S. arsenal. It is expected that
unguided or less than precisely guided air-to-surface weapons will continue to be the
weapons of choice well into the foreseeable future for a variety of target sets. In
general, military planners wish to destroy a given target with the least expensive
weapon possible (i.e. seeking to avoid “killing a fly with a sledge hammer.”). “Dumb
bombs” cost less (in some cases much, much less) than PGMs, and will remain as
effective or even more effective than PGMs against stationary, un-hardened targets
where collateral damage is not likely. Also, area munitions such as bomblets and
combined effects munitions will long remain effective against highly mobile targets
such as infantry and armor.
Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) Program
The AGM-137 Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) was to have been
a stealthy cruise missile launched from Air Force and Navy aircraft as well as Army
launchers. Weighing about 2,300 lb with a 1000-lb warhead, it could have attacked
heavily defended targets at ranges of over 100 miles, and its all-aspect stealth features
would have made radar detection from any direction difficult if not impossible.7 When
the TSSAM program was canceled it was in full-scale development by the Northrop
Grumman Corporation.
Development began in 1986 as a classified tri-service program for the Air Force,
Navy, and Army, with these services then planning to procure some 9,000 missiles
over five years. In 1994, however, the Army withdrew from the TSSAM program,
stating that its requirements for a long-range surface-to-surface missile would be
better served by the MGM-140 ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System), which was
used in the 1991 Gulf War. By 1994, the TSSAM program’s projected quantity was
down to 4,156 missiles (3,631 for the Air Force; 525 for the Navy), which would be
procured over 11 years.
With development and test problems delaying the program about three years, the
estimated program cost rose from $8.9 billion in 1986 to $13.9 billion by late 1994
($4.9 billion for development and $9 billion for procurement and military
construction). The procurement cost of each missile rose from an estimated $728,000
in 1986 to an estimate of more than $2 million in 1994. Some $3.5 billion had been
7 Zaloga, Steven J. AGM-137 TSSAM. In his World Missiles Briefing. Teal Group Corp.,
December 1994.

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spent in full-scale development when the TSSAM program was terminated by the
Defense Department on December 9, 1994.8
Current Precision-Guided Munition (PGM) Programs
Defense analysts generally agree that some future combat scenarios will require
better air-to-surface munitions than those currently available.9 Since cancellation of
the TSSAM program, Air Force officials have emphasized that the service still needs
a standoff attack missile with similar characteristics that can be procured at lower
costs. According to this view, such a missile would enable launch aircraft to attack
high-value and well-defended targets while staying beyond the range of enemy
defenses, which are expected to be more robust than those of Iraq in the1990s, given
the availability of Russian air defense capabilities such as the SA-10 surface-to-air
missile system as well as some advanced European and Chinese air defense systems.
The search for affordable and effective standoff missiles has involved derivatives
of operational or developmental missiles that can provide some of TSSAM’s promised
performance at an acceptable cost. Such derivatives would be used in the interim
prior to successful development and fielding of a new Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff
Missile (JASSM) for the Air Force and the Navy. Air-launched standoff munitions
that can be used in this way include the Navy’s Standoff Land Attack Missile
Expanded Response (SLAM-ER), the Navy/Air Force Joint Stand-Off Weapon
(JSOW), and the Air Force’s AGM-86C Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile
(CALCM), AGM-142 Have Nap missile, and AGM-130 rocket-powered bomb –
all of which were used effectively during NATO operations against Serbian forces in
Yugoslavia in 1999.10 None of these except CALCM have the standoff range that
JASSM is expected to provide; however, the Defense Department has cited SLAM-
ER, JSOW, CALCM, and AGM-130 as programs that will correct some of the
shortcomings noted by the General Accounting Office in its critique of U.S. weapons
used during the 1991 Gulf War.11 JASSM and other air-launched standoff PGMs that
have been discussed and supported by Congress and the Defense Department since
the mid-1990s are reviewed below. For additional information on these missiles, see
CRS Report 96-427 F by Robert Shuey.12
8 U.S. General Accounting Office. Missile Development – Status and Issues at the Time of
the TSSAM Termination Decision. GAO/NSIAD 95-46. January, 1995. p. 5-7.
9 Sweetman, Bill. Dossier: CASOM. International Defense Review, April 1995. p. 69-70.
10 Arkin, William M. Kosovo Report Short on Weapons Performance Details. Defense
Daily, February 10, 2000. p. 2.
11 U.S. General Accounting Office. Operation Desert Storm – Evaluation of the Air War.
GAO/PEMD 96-10. July 1996. p. 20.
12 U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Smart, Precision-Guided,
and Other Guided Conventional Weapons: Information on U.S. Programs. CRS Report 96-
427 F, May 10, 1996. 40 p.

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JASSM
The Air Force hopes to find an affordable alternative to TSSAM through the
AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) program, which got
underway in April of 1995, when Air Force and Navy officials met with industry
executives to develop plans for a missile costing about a fourth of TSSAM’s
estimated procurement unit cost. In April 1996, the Air Force projected a JASSM
program of 2,400 missiles with an average unit procurement price of $400,000 to
$700,000 (FY1995 $).13 In December 1998, GAO analysts estimated the total
production cost of 2,400 JASSMs at $1,288.8 million current or then-year dollars
($537,000 per missile).14

The Defense Department’s quarterly Selected Acquisition Report of June 30,
2000, projected a total cost of $2,101.4 million (current or then-year $) for 2,482
JASSMs, including development and production versions ($815,000 per missile).
Funding for the program in FY1996-FY2000 totaled some $645 million, including an
estimated $166.4 million in FY2000 ($164.4 million in Air Force R&D funds and $2
million in Navy R&D funds). The FY2001 defense budget requested $122.3 million
(including $2 million in Navy R&D funding) for the program.
Led by the Air Force, the JASSM program is a joint-service effort to develop a
missile to be carried initially by Air Force F-16s and B-52s and later by such aircraft
as Air Force B-1s, B-2s, F-15Es and F-117s and possibly by Navy F/A-18E/Fs. The
F/A-18E/F was originally expected to use JASSM, but the Navy has not funded the
necessary modifications for the missile to be launched by the F/A-18E/F.15
The Navy’s lack of interest in the JASSM program is due to the fact that the
Navy has an alternative in an ongoing upgrade of its Standoff Land Attack Missile
(SLAM), known as the SLAM-ER (Expanded Response) version. After TSSAM’s
demise the Navy shifted its funding for TSSAM into the SLAM-ER program,
although since FY1998 Navy funds earmarked for TSSAM have been used in the
JASSM program. The Navy’s procurement of JASSMs was projected in 1996 as just
under 1,000 missiles, with the SLAM-ER being used to meet near-term requirements.
(SLAM-ER is discussed in the next section below.)

On June 17, 1996, the Air Force selected Lockheed Martin and McDonnell
Douglas (now part of Boeing) for a two-year competition for the JASSM program
in which to define their proposed missiles in terms of performance, technology, and
13 The procurement price refers to the missile’s production cost but does not include
research/development and other program costs.
14 U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons Acquisitions – Guided Weapon Plans Need
to Be Reassessed. GAO/NSIAD 99-32. December 1998. p. 40.
15 Burgess, Lisa. DoD Advances JASSM Despite Navy’s Lack of Enthusiasm. Defense
News, November 16-22, 1998. pp. 4, 36; DoD Sees Options If JASSM Costs Grow.
Aerospace Daily, November 23, 1998. pp. 300-301.

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cost.16 On April 9, 1998, Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems in Orlando, FL was
selected for development and production of its version of JASSM, beginning in
FY1999 with a 40-month engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase
approved on November 9, 1998, and expected to lead to initial production by
FY2002. Air Force officials described Lockheed Martin’s entry as superior in every
respect, and its bid of $275,000 per unit in a buy of 1,165 missiles was well below
Boeing’s bid of some $390,000 for each of 195 missiles.17 Some officials in the
Defense Department’s Cost Analysis and Improvement Group (CAIG) have estimated
the missile’s unit cost at around $375,000, which would still be less than the 1996
procurement price goals of $400,000 to $700,000 per missile.18
The Air Force views affordability as important as capability in the JASSM
program, with the three most critical performance features being the missile’s range,
its mission effectiveness, and its ability to be launched from numerous and varied
aircraft. Operational requirements have been described as including: standoff launch
range outside the enemy’s area defenses (over 100 miles and reportedly 150-180
miles), precision accuracy (e.g., within about eight feet), autonomous guidance with
automatic target recognition, ability to destroy fixed and relocatable targets (including
“hard targets” such as hardened aircraft shelters, underground command posts, and
some port facilities as well as “soft targets” such as buildings, railways, and roads),
and delivery by different types of fighter/attack aircraft. TSSAM’s all-round stealth
features (reducing radar detection from all directions) are not regarded by the Air
Force as a critical requirement for JASSM, although its design involves extensive use
of stealth technology in regard to shaping and materials to reduce the missile’s radar
cross-section.19
GAO analysts have questioned JASSM’s projected cost and schedule, citing the
technical difficulties of autonomous guidance protected by antijamming devices and
automatic target recognition in all-weather conditions as well as the complexity of
integrating JASSM with different aircraft. The GAO report of June 28, 1996, voiced
concern “that procurement reforms will not be sufficient to overcome the technical
challenges of producing a viable and affordable system in the desired time frames,”
adding that developing and deploying such an advanced precision-guided munition “in
16 Lockheed Martin, McDonnell Douglas Winners in JASSM Contest. Aerospace Daily,
June 18, 1996. pp. 449, 451. Other contractors in the 1996 competition were Hughes, Texas
Instruments, and Raytheon. Hughes Files GAO Protest on JASSM. Aerospace Daily, July
1, 1996. p. 3; GAO Denies Hughes JASSM Protest. Aerospace Daily, October 32, 1996. pp.
167, 169.
17 Bender, Bryan. Lockheed Martin Takes the JASSM Prize. Jane’s Defence Week, 22 April
1998. p. 8.
18 Snyder, Jim. CAIG Predicts JASSM Production Costs Will Be Higher Than Expected.
Inside the Air Force, October 16, 1998. pp. 1, 7-8; Castelli, Christopher J. JASSM
Expected to Be Approved to Enter 40-Month EMD Phase. Inside the Navy, November 2,
1998. p. 11.
19 JASSM’s range is reported to be about 180 miles, with accuracy within about 8 feet.
Zaloga, Steven J. JASSM. In his World Missiles Briefing. Teal Group Corp., April 1999.
p. 1-2.

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5 years for no more than $700,000 a missile ... seems optimistic when compared to
the cost experience for other less-capable precision-guided munitions.”20
In March 1998, the Panel to Review Long-Range Air Power, established by
congressional direction (FY1998 Defense Appropriations Act, Sec. 8131), applauded
the current plans to develop and procure large numbers of new-generation precision-
guided munitions as a way to increase the combat effectiveness of U.S. aircraft. An
executive summary of the panel’s conclusions stated that “the planned buy of the Joint
Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile should be substantially increased and the JASSM
should be a high priority for integration on each of the bomber types.”21
In a letter to Congress on April 9, 1998, Secretary of Defense William Cohen
stated that based on the Defense Department’s congressionally-directed analysis of
alternatives he believed JASSM would be more “survivable, lethal, and cost-effective”
than a SLAM derivative against “high-priority, highly defended targets during the
first phases of war.” Accordingly, he made available to the JASSM program about
$40 million of the funds provided in FY 1998 to pursue development of a SLAM
derivative known as JSLAM to be used by both Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps
aircraft. Secretary Cohen added that both the JASSM program and the Navy’s
SLAM-ER program would continue in the near term, since SLAM-ER “is proven and
has demonstrated performance against many JASSM targets,” and because JASSM
is not yet available, may be too heavy (weighing about 2,300 lb) to be carried safely
in carrier-landings, and lacks SLAM-ER’s pilot-in-the-loop avionics capability.22 In
approving JASSM’s entry into engineering and manufacturing development (EMD)
on November 9, 1998, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
Jacques Gansler stated that if JASSM should become unaffordable other alternatives
could be considered, including SLAM-ER, JSOW, and other air-launched missiles.23
20 U.S. General Accounting Office. Precision-Guided Munitions – Acquisition Plans for the
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile. GAO/NSIAD 96-144. June, 1996. pp. 4-8; Some
analysts note that current U.S. and British missile programs comparable to JASSM generally
involve unit costs of at least $1 million. Zaloga, Steven J. JASSM. In his World Missiles
Briefing. Teal Group Corp., April 1999. p. 6.
21 Summary of the Principal Findings and Recommendations of the Panel to Review Long-
Range Air Power, March 1998. p. 6; U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research
Service. B-2 Bomber: Current Debate and Future Long-Range Airpower Issues for
Congress. CRS Report 98-625F, July 14, 1998. pp. 6-7, 30-31.
22 Conferees on FY1998 defense appropriations provided $43 million for a JSLAM program,
directing that these funds not be obligated until the Defense Secretary “notifies the
congressional defense committees regarding the acquisition strategy the Defense Department
chooses to pursue based on results of the JASSM AOA [Analysis of Alternatives],” when this
funding would be available “for the option recommended by the Secretary of Defense.” H.
Report. 105-265, September 27, 1997. p. 129. Snyder, Jim. Cohen Says JASSM More
Survivable, Cost Effective in Early Stages of War. Inside the Air Force, April 10, 1998. p.
17. “Pilot-in-the-loop capability” refers to the ability of the pilot/navigator to correct the
guidance of the missile for more precise impact on the target.
23 DOD Sees Options If JASSM Costs Grow. Aerospace Daily, November 23, 1998: 300-
301; Snyder, Jim. Gansler Approves JASSM for EMD; Supports Air Force Extension
Proposal. Inside the Air Force, November 13, 1998: 1, 7-8. On November 10, 1998,

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As of October 2000, the JASSM program was engaged in EMD flight testing on
B-1Bs, F-16s and B-52s. If all test gates are met, the Air force should make a low rate
initial production (LRIP) decision in November 2001. Approximately 200 JASSMs
would be produced in two lots from FY 2001 to FY 2002. A Milestone III decision
in June 2003 would clear the way for full rate production of 250 missiles in the fall of
2003.24
SLAM-ER
The Navy’s preferred alternative to TSSAM is the AGM-84H Standoff Land
Attack Missile – Expanded Response (SLAM-ER), an upgraded version of the air-
launched AGM-84E SLAM system produced in 1988-1997 by McDonnell Douglas
(part of Boeing since mid-1997). A derivative of the sea-launched Harpoon anti-ship
missile, SLAM was first used in the 1991 Gulf War, prior to completing operational
testing and evaluation. SLAM is the Navy’s only air-launched precision-guided
standoff weapon system, and because of its “pilot in the loop” feature, which allows
operators to make final aimpoint selections as the missile approaches the target, the
SLAM system is the Navy’s most accurate standoff weapon. The SLAM-ER variant
was also used effectively in the 1999 Kosovo campaign, launched by Navy P-3C
Orion maritime patrol aircraft against fixed and mobile air-defense targets and Serbian
infrastructure and communications facilities.25
Major improvements in the SLAM-ER version since its development began in
1994 have significantly enhanced the effectiveness of the missile in regard to warhead
penetration, range and altitude, mission planning, jamming immunity, and automatic
targeting. The first SLAM-ER was launched on March 18, 1997, beginning a series
of generally successful flight tests in which the missile met all performance thresholds
as well as cost and schedule goals.26 Operational testing and evaluation of SLAM-
ERs was completed in February 2000. On June 29, 2000 the Navy announced that the
SLAM-ER had entered into full rate production.
The SLAM-ER program would meet most of TSSAM’s requirements through
an affordable and low-risk approach, according to Navy officials. They state that
SLAM-ER provides essentially the same lethality as TSSAM through the use of a new
penetrating warhead derived from the 700-lb warhead of the Tomahawk Block III
cruise missile, which might also be used by JASSM; a Tomahawk-derivative wing
extends SLAM’s range from over 50 nmi to at least 150 nmi; improved aerodynamic
performance yields better survivability and maneuverability; and major software
Lockheed Martin was awarded a $132.8-million contract for a 40-month EMD phase of
JASSM to be produced at Lockheed Martin’s plant in Troy, AL.
24 de France, Linda. JASSM, in test, fails to fly entire route. Aerospace Daily. September 21,
2000.
25 Burgess, Richard R. Orion + SLAM, “A Match Made in Heaven.” Sea Power, October,
1999. p. 49.
26 SLAM ER Evolves into an Advanced Multirole Missile. Jane’s International Defense
Review, June 1998. p. 17; Zaloga, Steven J. AGM-84E SLAM. In his World Missile
Briefing. Teal Group Corp., April 1999. p 2-3, 6-7.

CRS-9
changes provide better pilot-in-the-loop performance and enhanced target-seeker
effectiveness, with accuracy within about three meters (9.75 feet versus JASSM’s
projected 8 feet).27 SLAM-ER proponents argue that it is a low-risk program based
on the successful Harpoon/SLAM evolution, which can provide improved capabilities
by upgrading existing inventories of a missile already in production. Its critics argue
that SLAM-ER has less range than JASSM’s projected range (reportedly 150-180
miles) and has a smaller warhead than CALCM, which can carry a 3,000-lb
equivalent fragmentation warhead over a range of about 750 miles.28
The Navy procured some 800 SLAMs through FY1996, including 75 missiles
funded in FY1996 as SLAMs but configured as SLAM-ER versions that were
delivered during 1998. In FY1997, the Navy began upgrading its SLAM inventory to
the Expanded Response (ER) configuration, with 60 missiles upgraded to SLAM-ERs
in FY1997, 42 in FY1998, and 54 in FY1999. Congress added funding to the Navy’s
FY1997 request of $45.2 million for SLAM-ER, appropriating $75.3 million for the
program. In FY1998, the $50.6 million requested was appropriated, as were the
FY1999 request of $46.7 million in procurement and R&D funding and the FY2000
request of $39.7 million in procurement and R&D funding.
The Administration’s FY2001 defense budget requested $27.9 million for
procurement of 30 SLAM-ERs. Moreover, Navy officials listed SLAM-ER as one
of the many programs that they considered inadequately funded by the proposed
FY2001 budget, stating in their February 9, 2000 “Unfunded Requirements List”
that an additional $30 million in FY2001 could be used to “procure an additional 60
SLAM-ERs to reduce the risk for 2 MTW [Major Theater Wars] and contingency
operations,”29 by replacing SLAM-ERs expended in the 1999 Kosovo campaign.
SLAM-ER was identified in JASSM’s Milestone II Acquisition Decision
Memorandum of November 9, 1998, as an alternative weapon system if JASSM does
not proceed as currently planned. Some DOD officials view Boeing’s SLAM-ER
program and Lockheed Martin’s JASSM program as competing in regard to
acceptable performance capabilities and affordable acquisition costs, with competitive
pressures expected to restrain the production costs of these systems. As Defense
Secretary Cohen stated in April 1998, when announcing his decision to continue both
programs, “This acquisition strategy allows us to maintain competition between the
JASSM and SLAM-ER programs.”30
27 Abel, David. SLAM-ER Missile To Enter Full-Rate Production. Defense Week, July 26,
1999. p. 3.
28 SLAM ER Evolves into an Advanced Multirole Missile. Jane’s International Defense
Review, June 1998. p. 17; SLAM-ER Will Provide Enhanced Hardened Target Defeating
Capability. Inside the Navy, December 2, 1996. p. 15; Arkin, William M. Kosovo Report
Short on Weapons Performance Details. Defense Daily, February 10, 2000. p. 2.
29 U.S. Department of Defense. News Release, February 9, 2000. Letter from Adm. Jay
Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations, to Rep. Floyd Spence, Chairman of House Armed
Services Committee. Enclosure 1, p. 4.
30 Snyder, Jim. Cohen Says JASSM More Survivable, Cost Effective in Early Stages of
War. Inside the Air Force, April 10, 1998. p. 17.

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SLAM-ER has found strong support in Congress, with the House
Appropriations Committee in 1997 opposing FY1998 funds for JASSM while
recommending funding for development of a joint version of SLAM-ER – termed
JSLAM – that could be used by both Navy and Air Force planes. House and Senate
conferees agreed to appropriate some $43 million to be used for either JSLAM or
JASSM, depending on the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense. In April
1998, Defense Secretary Cohen recommended that most of this amount should be
allocated to the JASSM program.
JSOW
The AGM-154 Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW) program is a Navy-led joint
effort by the Navy and Air Force to develop an air-launched unpowered glide vehicle
that will dispense precision-guided submunitions to attack a variety of surface targets
at day or night and in adverse weather conditions.31 The AGM-154 can be launched
by Navy F/A-18s, Marine Corps AV-8Bs, and Air Force F-16s as well as other
aircraft (e.g., the F-15E, B-52, B-1 and B-52). JSOW is a mid-range standoff weapon
system guided by INS/GPS (inertial navigation and global positioning systems), with
a range of some 40 nautical miles and accuracy within about 35 feet.32 First used in
combat on January 24, 1999, when launched by a Navy F/A-18 against an Iraqi air
defense site, JSOWs were also used against Yugoslav targets during Operation Allied
Force (March 24 - June 10,1999).
Raytheon Missile Systems in Tucson, AZ is the prime contractor for the JSOW
program, which began in the late 1980s when Texas Instruments (part of Raytheon
since 1997) won a competition with several other firms to develop this submunitions
dispenser. JSOW’s submunitions are the BLU-97, made by Aerojet of Sacramento,
CA, and the BLU-108, made by Textron of Wilmington, MA. The program includes
three JSOW variants: the baseline AGM-154A version, delivering 145 BLU-97
bomblets to attack fixed area targets; the anti-armor AGM-154B version, delivering
submunitions to attack armored targets and mobile surface-to-air weapons; and the
unitary AGM-154C version, which would deliver a single 500-lb warhead (BLU-111)
with more lethality and better target discrimination and accuracy for attacking
hardened fixed targets. The Navy is the lead service in the program, buying more
units and getting them earlier. The Air Force will procure the baseline A version and
the anti-armor B variant but does not expect to buy the unitary C variant, which
would be used only by the Navy.33 The program entered full-scale development in
1992, with low-rate initial production deliveries of the A version completed in 1999
31 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JCS Pub 1-02,
December 1, 1989) defines submunition as “Any munition that, to perform its task, separates
from a parent munition.” As used in this report, submunitions are warheads dispensed from
a parent munition-delivery vehicle above targets to which the warheads are guided by various
techniques.
32 Seigle, Greg. AGM-154 JSOW Enters USAF Arsenal. Jane’s Defence Week, 24
February 1999. p. 8.
33 Zaloga, Steven J. AGM-154 JSOW. In his World Missiles Briefing. Teal Group Corp.,
March 1999.

CRS-11
and with full-rate production of AGM-154As to begin in 2000, when delivery of
low-rate initial production of the AGM-154B version would start.34
As of June 30, 2000 the Defense Department estimated the development and
procurement cost of a 19,124-missile JSOW program at about $6 billion, with a unit
cost of about $315,000 per missile. The number of missiles to be procured was
reduced by 4,800 in this estimate, which also lowered the projected program cost by
almost $1.3 billion. There is some uncertainty about how many JSOW-B anti-armor
variants the Air Force will buy, since it is competing for funding with the service’s
Sensor-Fuzed Weapon (SFW) program.35 Production of the Navy’s JSOW-C unitary
variant, which is still in development, has also been at issue, with the Navy now
expected to buy only 3,000 instead of the 7,800 originally projected.36 Recent
improvements to the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), have increased its range
to almost 40 km.37 This growth in capability has caused some analysts to wonder
whether the cheaper, smaller JDAM could now compete with JSOW-A for some
targets.

The Administration’s FY1999 budget requested $265.4 million for the program
in Navy and Air Force procurement and R&D funding to procure 328 JSOWs for the
Navy and 100 for the Air Force. The Navy’s JSOW-C unitary variant was criticized
in the House Appropriations Committee report, which recommended termination of
this part of the program, arguing that the single-warhead variant “as currently
designed is more expensive and significantly less capable than other weapon systems,”
such as SLAM-ER and JASSM.38 House and Senate conferees agreed to fund the
JSOW program at $232.9 million of the $265.4 million requested in FY1999.
The FY2000 defense budget requested $275.9 million in Navy and Air Force
procurement ($235 million) and R&D ($40.9 million) funding for JSOW. Congress
provided somewhat less than the amounts requested, procuring 518 of the 615
JSOWs requested for the Navy and 74 of the 193 requested for the Air Force. The
House Appropriations Committee criticized the JSOW-B anti-armor variant, citing
“GAO reports that current technology does not allow strike aircraft sensors to target
moving vehicles at long ranges.”39
34 Raytheon’s JSOW Contract Includes Provisions for Follow-on Production. Aerospace
Daily, January 15, 1999. p. 79; Castelli, Christopher. Navy Says JSOW Program on Track,
As Air Force Reduces BLU-108 Buy. Inside the Navy, December 28, 1998. p. 14-15.
35 USAF Compares Cost, Effectiveness of SFW, JSOW. Aerospace Daily, March 9, 1998.
p. 350; SFW, JSOW Consolidation Seen as Problematic. Aerospace Daily, March 17,
1998. p. 396.
36 JSOW Unitary Buy May Be Cut by More Than 50%. Aerospace Daily, April 3, 1998.
p. 21; Pentagon Cuts Down U.S. Navy Buy of JSOWs. Defense Week, December 6, 1999.
p. 2.
37 Bender, Bryan. JDAM’s Range is Trebled. Jane’s Defense Weekly. May 3, 2000.
38 House Appropriations Committee. FY1999 Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 4103). H.
Report 105-591, June 22, 1998. p. 210.
39 House Appropriations Committee. FY2000 Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2561). H.
Report 106-244, July 22, 1999. p. 177. See also p. 149.

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For FY2001, the Administration requested $284.7 million in Navy and Air Force
procurement ($262.4 million) and R&D ($22.3 million) funds for the program,
procuring 810 JSOWs – 636 for the Navy and 174 for the Air Force. Navy officials
also included JSOW in their 9 February, 2000 “Unfunded Requirements List,” which
stated that an additional $36 million in FY2001 could be used to “accelerate
procurement of 180 JSOW baseline [A versions] to reduce risk for contingency
operations and 2 MTW [Major Theater Wars] requirements,”40 by replacing those
JSOW-A missiles expended in the 1999 Kosovo campaign.
CALCM
The AGM-86C/D Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM),
produced since the late 1980s by Boeing, is a conventionally armed version of the
nuclear-armed ALCMs carried by B-52 strategic bombers. Since these ALCMs are
now augmented by the nuclear-armed AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile and
because of reductions in the B-52 force structure, the Air Force decided in the mid-
1990s that some 300 ALCMs could be modified as CALCMs without reducing U.S.
strategic missile capabilities. Later the Air Force decided to convert additional
ALCMs into conventional cruise missiles as well as to upgrade some of the earlier
CALCM versions. Some of these upgraded CALCMs will be the AGM-86D Block
II configuration, which has a hard-target penetrating warhead provided by Lockheed
Martin.41
First used in the 1991 Gulf War against high-value targets in northern Iraq,
CALCMs were again used against Iraqi targets in September 1996, and some 90
CALCMs were launched by B-52 bombers during the December 17-20, 1998, attacks
on Iraq in Operation Desert Fox.42 At the start of Operation Desert Fox there were
reportedly 238 CALCMs in the inventory. When NATO air operations against
Yugoslavia began (March 24,1999), some 148 CALCMs were available for use by
B-52H bombers based in England, and up to 75 CALCMs were reportedly expended
in that conflict.43
The B-52H can carry eight CALCMs in its bomb bay and up to 20 CALCMs by
using under-wing pods and with in-flight refuelings.44 These derivatives of the ALCM
40 U.S. Department of Defense. News Release, February 9, 2000. Letter from Adm. Jay
Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations, to Rep. Floyd Spence, Chairman of House Armed
Services Committee. Enclosure 1, p. 1.
41 Tirpak, John A. The State of Precision Engagement. Air Force Magazine, March, 2000.
p. 27; Zaloga, Steven J. AGM-86 ALCM. In his World Missiles Briefing. Teal Group
Corp., March 2000; Lockheed Martin To Make CALCM Warhead. Aerospace Daily,
December 3, 1999. p. 350.
42 Lennox, Duncan. ‘Fox’: The Results. Jane’s Defense Week, January 13, 1999. p. 25.
43 Arkin, William M. Kosovo Report Short on Weapons Performance Details. Defense
Daily, February 10, 2000. p.2.
44 B-1B, Enhanced CALCM See First Operational Use Against Iraq. Aerospace Daily,
December 21, 1998. p. 441; Successful Campaign Highlights Cruise Missile Need.
Aerospace Daily, December 22, 1998. p. 447.

CRS-13
strategic missile have a standoff range of about 700 miles, with a 3,000-lb equivalent
warhead and a subsonic speed of 550 mph. Current treaty provisions on conventional
versions of nuclear missiles could affect CALCM’s use by aircraft other than the B-52
bomber. The START I treaty, in effect since December 5, 1994, considers all types
of air-launched cruise missiles with ranges over 600 km (323 n mi) that were flight-
tested for heavy bombers before 1989 to be nuclear-armed. Thus, any long-range air-
launched cruise missile derived from the ALCM, such as CALCM, would be
considered nuclear-armed, and any U.S. aircraft equipped to carry such missiles
would count as 10 nuclear warheads under START I limits, regardless of the number
of missiles carried and their type of explosive, unless that treaty were renegotiated.
The inventory of these cruise missiles was significantly reduced in the course of
the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia (March 24-June 10,1999), which has
been a matter of some concern in Congress.45 Sec. 132 of the FY2000 Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 106-65, Oct. 5, 1999) directed the Secretary of the Air Force
to determine the requirements met by CALCM and to submit to the armed services
committees “a report on the replacement options for that missile.” The report would
consider options for continuing to meet the requirements for CALCM as its inventory
is depleted, including (1) resumption of production of /the missile, (2) acquisition of
a new weapon with equivalent or superior lethality, and (3) use of existing or planned
munitions or such munitions with appropriate upgrades. In late 1999, Boeing
proposed production of a follow-on variant of the current CALCM with a unit
procurement price of under $700,000 (FY2000 $) for 1,000 missiles.
CALCM has been viewed as a low-cost way to convert excess nuclear weapons
into conventional standoff missiles. For FY1995, Congress provided $37.4 million
for the CALCM program, with the Senate Armed Services Committee calling for
conversion of up to 300 ALCMs at less than $200,000 per missile. For FY1996,
Congress provided $15 million for conversion of 100 ALCMs ($150,000 per missile),
followed by conversion of another 100 ALCMs in FY1997. Congress appropriated
$18 million for the program in FY1997 ($15 million in procurement; $3 million in
research-development funds), with no funding in FY1998 and only $10 million for
CALCM in FY1999. In February 1999, Gen. Michael Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff,
listed the conversion of ALCMs to CALCMs as first among the service’s twenty
modernization priorities not included in the Administration’s FY2000 budget. During
1999, funding was provided for 322 CALCMs to replace those used against Iraqi and
Yugoslav targets: $41.5 million in April for 95 and $81.2 million in July for 227
missiles.46
Although funding for CALCM was not included in the Administration’s FY2001
budget, the Air Force requested $178 million in FY2001 supplemental funds to
convert 322 ALCMs into CALCMs. Further evolution of this cruise missile may
also be funded through another program. In a February 9, 2000 list of unfunded
45 U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Cruise Missile Inventories and
NATO Attacks on Yugoslavia: Background and Information. CRS Report RS20162 by
Ronald O’Rourke, April 20, 1999. 6 p.
46 Whitley, Gigi. Air Force Moves To Restock Air-Launched Cruise Missile Inventory.
Inside the Air Force, July 23, 1999. p. 15.

CRS-14
priorities in FY2001-FY2005, General Michael Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff,
included some $690 million in R&D and procurement funds to start a new “extended
range cruise missile” program costing $86.1 million in FY2001 and peaking at $163
million in FY2003, with delivery of missiles in FY2004 if this program gets underway
in FY2001.47 As envisioned by the Air Force, this program would produce 618
missiles, with a program unit cost of $1.1 million and a projected unit production cost
of $650,000 ( about half the cost of earlier CALCM conversions). Termed CALCM-
ER (Extended Range), the new missile is to have about twice the 700-mile range of
the current CALCM. Air Force officials stated in early 2000 that in addition to a
next-generation CALCM, a longer-range version of Lockheed Martin’s JASSM (with
a projected range of 150-180 miles) as well as a conventional version of the long-
range nuclear-armed AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile (produced by Hughes, now
owned by Boeing and Raytheon) would also be considered in this program for
competitive reasons. 48
AGM-142
Based on Israel’s Popeye missile, the AGM-142 (also known as Have Nap) has
been co-produced by Rafael Armament in Israel and Martin Marietta (now part of
Lockheed Martin) since the late 1980s. Since 1998 production has been shifted to
Lockheed Martin facilities in Troy, AL, and Orlando, FL, producing AGM-142s for
the U.S. Air Force as well as Israel and other allies.49 U.S. procurement began in
FY1989, and through FY1998 the Air Force funded procurement of some 260 of
these medium-range precision-guided missiles to equip the B-52G bomber for air-to-
surface attack missions.
Effective against such high-value targets as missile sites, power plants, bridges,
bunkers, or ships, the AGM-142 has standoff ranges of up to about 50 miles,
depending on altitude and trajectory, which allows it to be launched outside of enemy
point defenses. It delivers an 800-lb hardened-target penetrator warhead or a 750-lb
blast/fragmentary warhead, with terminal guidance by TV or Imaging Infra-Red (IIR)
sensors for day or night operations. A smaller and lighter version can be launched
by the F-16.50 When the AGM-142 was first used in combat on May 11, 1999, during
the Kosovo conflict, two missiles missed their targets, which reportedly was due to
47 Letter from Gen. Michael Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff, to Rep. Floyd Spence, Chairman
of House Armed Services Committee, February 9, 2000; USAF Plans for Converting
CALCM to Longer Range Variant. Aerospace Daily, March 21, 2000. p. 436.
48 Hebert, Adam J. Extended Range Missile To Double CALCM Range – Air Force Seeking
New, Rapid Solution to Cruise Missile Shortages. Inside the Air Force, March 3, 2000. p.
1, 16-17.
49 Opall, Barbara. Popeye Missile Production Will Shift to U.S. Facility. Defense News,
January 12-18, 1998. p. 26; Whitley, Gigi. Foreign Military Sales Revive AGM-142
Precision Weapon Program. Inside the Air Force, September 4, 1998. p. 3.
50 Zaloga, Steven J. AGM-142. In his World Missiles Briefing. Teal Corp., March 1999.

CRS-15
software problems that were later resolved, as demonstrated by successful test
results.51
Although the Air Force has not regarded the AGM-142 as a major budgetary
priority, the program has found support in the Congress. In 1995, the House National
Security Committee supported procurement of AGM-142s as an interim replacement
for TSSAM, while the House Appropriations Committee supported the AGM-142 as
a near-term precision-guided weapon for the B-52 bomber. Although funding for
procurement of the missile was not requested in the FY1996 defense budget;
Congress appropriated $38 million for procurement of 54 AGM-142s in FY1996.
This funding was rescinded in early 1996, but most of it was later provided. The
FY1997 and FY1998 defense budgets also included no procurement funding for
AGM-142s, but procurement was again recommended by the defense committees, and
$34.9 million was appropriated for procurement of AGM-142s in FY1997 as was $25
million in FY1998. In 1998 the Air Force combined congressional funding in FY1997
and FY1998 to award a $68 million contract for production of about 90 U.S. and
Israeli AGM-142s.52 Since 1998, funding for procurement of the AGM-142 has not
been requested by the Air Force or provided by Congress.
AGM-130
The AGM-130 standoff attack missile is a rocket-powered version of the GBU-
15 glide bomb, with a standoff attack range of up to 40 miles and a 2,000-lb warhead
or a hard-target penetrator, guided by TV or Imaging Infra-Red (IIR) sensors.
Produced for the Air Force since 1990 by Rockwell International (now part of
Boeing), the AGM-130 is launched from F-15E fighter/attack planes. It could also
be used by the F-16 and could be adapted for use by long-range bombers (B-52, B-1,
and B-2) against high-value targets such as air defense sites, command/control
centers, airfields, and bridges, although there would be significant integration costs.
The Air Force considers the AGM-130 a successful and cost-effective program
that can provide standoff precision-guided munitions pending delivery of JASSM
(probably around 2005). Modifications proposed by Boeing promise to double the
current range of the AGM-130, which was first used against Iraqi targets in early
1999 and later used in larger numbers against Yugoslav forces in March-June 1999.53
The Administration’s FY1996 and FY1997 budgets included no funding for AGM-
130 buys, but in FY1996 Congress funded procurement of 100 AGM-130s for $109.3
million, and for FY1997 Congress appropriated $35 million for procurement of AGM-
130s. The Air Force procured 702 AGM-130s in FY1990-FY1997. The small
51 Whitley, Gigi. Software Glitch Caused Have Nap Missiles To Miss During Allied Force.
Inside the Air Force, October 29, 1999. p. 6; Bender, Bryan. USAF Tests AGM-142 with
New Software. Jane’s Defense Week, December 1, 1999. p. 6.
52 Whitley, Gigi. Foreign Military Sales Revive AGM-142 Precision Weapon Program.
Inside the Air Force, September 4, 1998. p. 3.
53 Snyder, Jim. Boeing Modified AGM-130 Offers Double the Standoff of Current Fleet.
Inside the Air Force, September 25, 1998. p. 15-16; Bender, Bryan. US Weapons Shortages
Risked Success in Kosovo. Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 6, 1999. p.3.

CRS-16
amounts of procurement funding provided for the AGM-130 program since FY1997
have funded modifications and upgrades of missiles in the inventory. The FY2001
defense budget requested $100,000 in Air Force procurement funding for the AGM-
130 program, for which FY2000 funding was estimated at $700,000. 54
Congressional Action in 1995-1999
In 1995, Congress provided funding in the conference report on the FY1996
defense appropriations bill (H.Rept. 104-344, November 16, 1995) for procurement
of three current types of standoff munitions: 100 CALCMs ($15 million), 100 AGM-
130s ($109.3 million), and 54 AGM-142s ($38 million); continued development of
the Navy’s SLAM-ER ($53.5 million) and the Navy and Air Force JSOW ($152.1
million); and development of a new Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM),
for which $25 million was appropriated in FY1996. The funding of these programs
reflected congressional interest in both near-term readiness and long-term
modernization of air-launched standoff munitions. The Administration’s original
FY1996 budget requested funds only for SLAM-ER and JSOW; however, during
hearings in 1995, the Air Force requested additional funding to initiate the JASSM
program and for procurements of CALCM, AGM-130, and AGM-142.55
In 1996, Congress authorized FY1997 funding as requested for JASSM and
JSOW and more than was requested for SLAM-ER as well as for conversion of 100
CALCMs and procurement of 100 AGM-130s and 50 AGM-142s. Conferees on the
FY1997 defense appropriations bill (H. Rept. 104-863, September 28, 1996) provided
less than was authorized for JASSM ($168.6 million), AGM-130 ($35 million), and
AGM-142 ($34.9 million) and more than was authorized for SLAM-ER ($75.3
million), JSOW ($197.9 million), and CALCM ($18 million), as shown in Table 1
below.
In 1997, the conferees on the FY1998 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 2266
P.L. 105-56, October 8, 1997) agreed in H.Rept. 105-265 to provide funding as
requested for SLAM-ER ($50.6 million) but less than the $203 million requested for
JASSM ($128 million) and more than was requested for JSOW ($189 million), AGM-
130 ($25 million), and AGM-142 ($25 million), as shown in Table 2 below. The
conferees also provided $43 million for either JSLAM, a proposed joint Navy-Air
Force variant of SLAM-ER, or JASSM, depending on the recommendation of the
Secretary of Defense, who decided in April, 1998, to allocate $40.3 million of this
amount to the JASSM program instead of developing a JSLAM variant.56 FY1998
defense authorization legislation (H.R. 1119/P.L. 105-85, November 18, 1997)
54 U.S. Department of Defense. Procurement Programs (P-1), FY2001. February, 2000.
p. F-4.
55 For House and Senate action on FY1996 defense authorizations and appropriations, see
Missiles for Standoff Attack: Alternatives to the TSSAM Program by Bert Cooper. CRS
Report 95-889 F, December 6, 1995.
56 Defense Appropriation Act FY1998; Conference Report to accompany H.R. 2266. H.
Rept. 105-265: 129.

CRS-17
approved funding for these programs as appropriated. The conferees on the
authorization bill also directed the Secretary of Defense to review the JASSM and
SLAMER-ER programs and relevant alternatives and report to Congress within sixty
days of enactment of the FY1998 Defense Authorizations Act (P.L. 105-85,
November 18, 1997).57
In 1998, the conferees on the FY1999 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 4103
P.L. 105-262, October 17, 1998) agreed in H. Rept. 105-746 to fund JASSM at $135
million ($129.9 million of the $132.9 million requested in Air Force R&D funds and
$2.1 million in Navy R&D funds requested for”TSSAM” but now available for
JASSM). JSOW was funded at $232.9 million of the $265.4 million requested in
Navy and Air Force procurement and R&D funds. Funding was provided as
requested for SLAM-ER ($46.7 M), CALCM ($10 M), and AGM-130 ($341,000).
Congress combined the amounts requested in Navy procurement and R&D funds for
“Harpoon modifications” and “unguided conventional air-launched weapons” to fund
the SLAM-ER program, which in previous years was funded through these two line
items in the defense budget. Except for the criticism of JSOW’s single-warhead
unitary variant in the House Appropriations Committee report, there was no critical
discussion of these standoff munition programs in the FY1999 authorizations and
appropriations reports. See Table 3 below for more details on FY1999 funding for
these programs.
In 1999, FY2000 funding was authorized and appropriated as requested for most
standoff munition programs; e. g., JASSM — $168.4 million ($166.4 million in Air
Force R&D and $2.0 million in Navy R&D funding, referred to as “TSSAM”);
SLAM-ER — $39.7 million ($38.1 million in Navy procurement funds for 56 missiles
and $1.6 million in Navy R&D funds); and AGM-130 — $220,000 in Air Force
procurement funds. In the case of JSOW, however, the conferees on the FY2000
defense appropriations bill (H.R. 2561, enacted as P.L. 106-79, October 28, 1999)
agreed in H.Rept. 106-371 to less than the amounts requested and authorized in Navy
and Air Force procurement funds, providing $115.6 million for procurement of 518
Navy JSOWs and $40.7 million for procurement of 74 Air Force JSOWs (instead of
the requested and authorized $154.9 million for 615 Navy JSOWs and the requested
and authorized $79.9 million for 193 Air Force JSOWs) and providing $30.6 million
in Navy R&D and $10.3 million in Air Force R&D funds as requested and authorized.
Table 4 below depicts FY2000 funding for these programs.
In 2000, FY2001 funding was requested for JASSM ($122.3 million, including
$2 million in Navy R&D funds), SLAM-ER ($27.9 million for procurement of 30
missiles), and JSOW ($284.7 million), as shown in Table 5 below. Other air-launched
munitions may also be funded in the course of congressional action on the FY2001
defense budget. For example, the Air Force requested $178 million in supplemental
FY2001 funds for conversion of 322 CALCMs, and Air Force officials have also
indicated a desire to start a new CALCM-like program in FY2001, as noted above (p.
13). The Navy’s Unfunded Requirements List of February 9, 2000, included an
additional $30 million for 60 more SLAM-ERs and an additional $36 million for
57 National Defense Authorization Act FY1998; Conference Report to accompany H.R. 1119.
H. Rept. 105-340, October 23, 1997: 632-633.

CRS-18
accelerated procurement of JSOW-As to replace missiles used during the 1999
Kosovo campaign, as noted above (pp. 9 and 11).
Appropriations conferees met the administration’s FY2001 request for SLAM-
ER funding. Conferees recommended increasing the administration’s overall request
for JSOW funding by $6.4 million. Appropriators agreed with House
recommendations to reduce the JSOW-B anti-armor variant, although their
recommended $35.2 million cut was less than the House proposal. This reduction
was offset by the conferees’ $41.6 increase in the baseline JSOW-A variant.
Appropriation conferees recommended a $4 million reduction in the JASSM program.
Table 1. FY1997 Funding for Air-to-Surface Missiles
($ Millions)
System
Requested
Authorized
Appropriated
JASSM
198.6
198.6
168.6
SLAM-ER*
45.2
65.2
75.3
JSOW**
182.3
182.3
197.9
CALCM***
0
15.0
(100) 18.0
AGM-130***
0
40.0
(100) 35.0
AGM-142***
0
39.0
(50) 34.9
Note: Quantities funded, if specified, are in parentheses.

* SLAM-ER request comprised $22.9 M in Navy procurement funds for “Harpoon modifications”
and $22.3 M in Navy R&D funds for “unguided conventional air-launched weapons;” authorizations
and appropriations conferees added funding to retro-fit additional SLAM-ER missiles.
** JSOW request comprised $109.9 M in R&D funds (Navy, $86.3 M; Air Force, $23.6 M); and
$72.4 M in procurement funds (Navy, $64.4 M; Air Force, $8.0 M); appropriations conferees added
$15.6 M in Navy procurement funds.
*** As in prior and later years, Congress funded procurements of these currently in-production
missiles that were not requested by the Defense Department.
Table 2. FY1998 Funding for Air-to-Surface Missiles
($ Millions)
System
Requested
Authorized
Appropriated
JASSM
203.3
128.0*
128.0*
SLAM-ER**
50.6
50.6
50.6
JSOW***
156.0
189.0
(150)
CALCM
0
0
0
AGM-130
1.5
25.0
25.0
AGM-142
0
25.0
25.0
Note: Quantities funded, if specified, are in parentheses.

CRS-19
* An additional $40.3 M of the $43 M provided for JSLAM, a House-proposed program to develop
a joint SLAM variant for both Navy and Air Force instead of developing JASSM, became available
for JASSM when this issue was resolved in April, 1998. See p. 7 above.
** SLAM-ER request comprised $21.7 M in Navy procurement funds for “Harpoon modifications”
and $28.9 M in Navy R&D funds for “unguided conventional air-launched weapons.” Congress also
provided $43 million in Air Force R&D funds for a House-proposed JSLAM program, but most of
this amount went to JASSM, as noted in the footnote above.
*** JSOW request comprised $96.2 M in R&D funds (Navy, $71.5 M; Air Force, $24.7 M); and
$59.8 M in procurement funds for 113 missiles (Navy, $58.7 M; Air Force, $1.1 M). Congress
provided $105.2 M in R&D funds (Navy, $80.5 M; Air Force, $24.7 M); and $83.8 M in
procurement funds for 150 missiles (Navy, $63.7 M; Air Force, $20.1 M).
Table 3. FY1999 Funding for Air-to-Surface Missiles
($ Millions)
System
Requested
Authorized
Appropriated
JASSM*
135.0
135.0
132.0
SLAM-ER**
46.7
46.7
46.7
JSOW***
265.4
265.4
232.9
CALCM
10.0
10.0
10.0
AGM-130
0.3
0.3
0.3
*Amount requested and authorized includes $132.9 M in Air Force R&D funds for JASSM and $2.1
M in Navy R&D funds requested for TSSAM but available for JASSM; amount appropriated
includes $129.9 M in Air Force funding and $2.1M in Navy funding for JASSM.
** SLAM-ER funding ($46.7 M) comprises $39.5 M in Navy procurement funds and almost $2
million in Navy R&D funds for “Harpoon mods” and some $5.2 M in Navy R&D funds for
“unguided conventional air-launched weapons.”
*** JSOW funding ($232.9 M) comprises $117.7 M in Navy and $52.1 M in Air Force procurement
funds and $48 M in Navy and $15.1 M in Air Force R&D funds. Congress appropriated $7.5 M less
than was requested in Navy procurement and $25 M less than requested in Navy R&D funds.
Table 4. FY2000 Funding for Air-to-Surface Missiles
($ Millions)
System
Requested
Authorized
Appropriated
JASSM
168.4
168.4
168.4
SLAM-ER
39.7
39.7
(56) 39.7
JSOW
275.7
275.7
(592) 197.2
AGM-130
0.2
0.2
0.2
Note: Quantities funded, if specified, are in parentheses.

CRS-20
Table 5. FY2001 Requests for Air-to-Surface Missiles
($ Millions)
System
Requested
Authorized
Appropriated
JASSM
122.3
116.2
118.3
SLAM-ER
(30) 27.9
27.9
27.9
JSOW
(810) 284.7
(864) 269
291.1
Note: Quantities requested, if specified, are in parentheses.
Congressional Issues
The quest for capable and affordable standoff air-to-surface missiles poses a
number of interrelated issues for Congress in evaluating the proposed alternatives: (1)
the advantages of an entirely new design versus a derivative of currently operational
munitions or designs in full-scale development; (2) acceptable tradeoffs between
perceived performance requirements in regard to range, payload, accuracy, and
stealth; (3) projected inventory requirements for future combat scenarios; (4) the
development and production costs and the delivery schedules of proposed
alternatives; and (5) reliance on interim standoff munitions pending development of
new systems.
Perceptions of threat situations that might require standoff munitions affect
considerations of these issues. It can be argued that near-term threats require large
inventories of affordable and readily available munitions with acceptable degrees of
standoff capability, precision guidance, and warhead lethality. It can also be argued
that it is necessary to invest in the development and acquisition of more advanced
weaponry that may be needed over the longer term, which would include standoff
munitions able to resist jamming and electronic interference and with stealth features
to reduce detection by radar as well as greater range and speed capabilities than are
currently available.
In addition to defense needs, other considerations will be the budgetary impact
and the effects of proposed alternatives on the U.S. industrial base. In some cases,
the selection among competing proposals and the awarding of development and
production contracts may involve regional economic effects as well as transatlantic
economic interests. Each of these proposals will need to be evaluated in light of the
best “guestimates” about future threat environments, combat requirements, and
budgetary priorities.
In evaluating contractor proposals and service plans for standoff munitions,
Congress may consider some of the following lines of inquiry:
! When and in what threat scenarios and combat conditions would the
proposed standoff munitions be needed by U.S. military forces?
! What kinds of targets could be most cost-effectively destroyed by the
proposed munitions?

CRS-21
! What types of U.S. aircraft could deliver these munitions and with
what payloads?
! What countermeasures to prevent accurate guidance of these
munitions to their targets could potential enemies take and how
could such countermeasures be frustrated?
! What are the estimated costs of developing and producing the
proposed standoff munitions (total acquisition costs and unit
production costs)?
! When would these munitions be available in sufficient quantities for
use in a major regional conflict?
! What types and inventories of standoff munitions would be needed
for specific conflict scenarios?
! How would the development cost and delivery schedule of a standoff
attack missile that could be used by both Air Force and Navy planes
compare with that of one to be used by only one of these services?
! What standoff munitions now in production could be relied on while
something better is being developed and produced in quantities that
might be needed?
! What would be the regional economic implications of developing and
producing the proposed munitions in regard to employment and the
defense industrial base?
! What would be the most cost-effective mix of air-, land-, and sea-
based platforms for the delivery of standoff munitions in various
combat scenarios? Navy ships and submarines can launch both the
SLAM and TLAM missiles, which are applicable to the same target
sets as air-launched weapons. These launch platforms enjoy some
advantages over land-based aircraft but have negative aspects as
well. What is the best overall mix of weapons?
Comparing Standoff Munitions
Every standoff missile program, whether a new start or an upgrade of a current
model, faces an array of conflicting forces; e.g., competing contractor interests,
different service priorities, divergent perceptions of military threats and combat
requirements, and conflicting predictions of costs and capabilities. Much of the
technical information and data needed for objective and meaningful comparisons of
performance capabilities and program costs are classified or proprietary – restricted
for security reasons or regarded by contractors as confidential for competitive
reasons. Moreover, the data available in open sources are generally based on
information provided by proponents or opponents of particular missile systems,

CRS-22
which may preclude or impair objective analysis of the relative capabilities and costs
of these missiles.
Given such problems, this report does not attempt to provide a rigorous
comparison of specific performance and cost differences among the missiles
discussed, although some performance features are compared in general terms. All
of these munitions are subsonic – traveling at less than the speed of sound, Mach 1,
which varies with altitude; e.g., 762 miles per hour (mph) at sea level and 664 mph
at 35,000 feet. Range is obviously a critical performance factor in comparing standoff
munitions. Effective range varies, however, with the altitude of the launch aircraft.
Depending on launch altitudes, the stated ranges of the systems discussed here would
be as follows: some 700 miles for CALCM, up to 180 miles as projected for JASSM,
up to about 150 miles for SLAM-ER, and about 40 or 50 miles for JSOW, AGM-
142, and AGM-130. Depending on available basing options for launch aircraft as well
as specific combat scenarios and targets, each of these standoff munitions could be
used effectively, with longer range being better in regard to flexibility and targeting.
Figure 1. Estimated Range of Standoff Weapons
800
700
600
500
400
Statue Miles
300
200
100
0
CALCM
JASSM
SLAM-ER
JSOW
AGM-142
AGM-130
The combat effectiveness of standoff munitions is largely dependent on such
performance factors as the lethality of the warhead and the probability of target
penetration. Although numerous factors can contribute to lethality and the ability of
a missile to reach its target, two simple formulas might serve as useful ways of
comparing standoff munitions.
Lethality may be measured by the following formula: Payload/CEP (Circular
Error Probability) = Lethality. In general, the most lethal missile, for instance, would
be one with a very small CEP and a large payload. A formula for measuring the
probability of target penetration would be: Flight Profile/RCS (Radar Cross Section)

CRS-23
= Penetration Probability. The flight profile refers to the altitude and speed of the
missile and the altitude, speed, and maneuverability of the launch aircraft. A missile
with a large flight profile, for instance would be able to fly at a variety of altitudes, be
maneuverable, and able to fly very fast.
Given the rising cost of munitions and aircraft and prevailing budgetary
constraints, cost has now become as critical a factor as performance. Reflecting this
view, the concept of cost as an “independent variable” equates cost with performance
as a criterion in the choice of a missile system or its launch platform. Thus, tolerable
cost is comparable to the price that the market will bear, and the greater the
perception of threat requirements, the higher the tolerance of cost.
Conclusions
There are several interim solutions to requirements for air-launched standoff
munitions that can be delivered by U.S. fighter/attack planes and longer-range
bombers. In the short term, some of these munitions could be funded while the
services are developing more advanced precision-guided standoff missiles that may
be needed in post-2010 conflict scenarios. If such future munitions can be developed
and procured at affordable prices, there may be less need to buy as many combat
aircraft as currently projected. Thus, there may be tradeoffs between funding
requirements and perceptions of the cost-effectiveness of various aircraft/munition
combinations.
Whether U.S. strike capabilities from the air should be based on cheaper
platforms with more expensive missiles than are now available or on some
combination of each has been posed by some as a basic issue. For instance, following
the effective use of the B-2 during the Kosovo conflict, many in Congress and
elsewhere are wondering which combination of aircraft and weapons would be most
cost effective against the preponderance of targets U.S. warfighters are likely to face:
a relatively expensive, penetrating bomber like B-2 armed with relatively inexpensive
weapons like JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition)or a relatively inexpensive, stand-
off bomber like the B-52 armed with relatively expensive weapons like the CALCM.
For now, the DoD procurement and R&D programs described above seem to provide
U.S. warfighters with some flexibility of choice in launching precision strikes from
manned aircraft.

CRS-24
Recommended Reading
Abel, David. SLAM-ER Missile To Enter Full-Rate Production. Defense Week, July
26, 1999. p. 3.
Arkin, William M. Kosovo Report Short on Weapons Performance Details. Defense
Daily, February 10, 2000. p. 2.
Beal, Clifford and Sweetman, Bill. Bolt from the Blue – Stand-off Weapon
Developments. International Defense Review, August 1992. pp. 757-762.
Braybrook, Roy. Surgical Precision from a Safe Distance. Armada International,
May 1994. pp. 8-10, 12, 14, 16, 18.
Cooper, Pat and Hitchens, Theresa. GPS Jamming Dulls U.S. Smart Bombs.
Defense News, June 19-25, 1995. pp. 1, 52.
Duffy, Thomas. Navy Will Contribute $46 Million in POM-98 for JASSM Research
Work. Inside the Navy, July 8, 1996. pp. 1, 12.
Fulghum, David A. TSSAM Follow-on To Take Shape This Year. Aviation Week
& Space Technology, February 27, 1995. p. 49-51.
Goodman, Glenn W. Mining Silver Bullets – Navy and Air Force Pursue Longer
Range, Autonomous Standoff Weapons. Armed Forces Journal International,
July 1997. pp. 26-27.
Grimes, Vincent P. Is There Life after TSSAM? Military Technology, March 1995.
pp. 74-76.
Hebert, Adam J. Extended Range Missile To Double CALCM Range – Air Force
Seeking New, Rapid Solution to Cruise Missile Shortages. Inside the Air Force,
March 3, 2000. p. 1, 16-17.
Morrocco, John. PGM Strategy Faces Budget, Technical Traps. Aviation Week &
Space Technology, February 27, 1995. pp. 44-47.
SLAM-ER Evolves into an Advanced Multirole Missile. Jane’s International
Defense Review, June 1998. p.17.
Snyder, Jim. Cohen Says JASSM More Survivable, Cost Effective in Early Stages
of War. Inside the Air Force, April 10, 1998. p. 17.
Successful Campaign Highlights Cruise Missile Need. Aerospace Daily, December
22, 1998. p. 447.
Tirpak, John A. The State of Precision Engagement. Air Force Magazine, March,
2000. pp. 24-30.

CRS-25
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. B-2 Bomber: Current
Debate and Future Long-Range Airpower Issues for Congress. CRS Report 98-
625F, July 14, 1998. 41 p.
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Cruise Missile
Inventories and NATO Attacks on Yugoslavia: Background and Information.
CRS Report RS20162 by Ronald O’Rourke, April 20, 1999. 6 p.
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Missile Survey: Ballistic
and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries. CRS Report RL30427 by (name red
acted), February 10, 2000. 40p.
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Smart, Precision-
Guided, and Other Guided Conventional Weapons: Information on U.S.
Programs. CRS Report 96-427 F, by Robert Shuey. May 10, 1996. 40 p.
U.S. General Accounting Office. Missile Development – Status and Issues at the
Time of the TSSAM Termination Decision. GAO/NSIAD 95-46. January 1995.
16 p.
U.S. General Accounting Office. Precision-Guided Munitions – Acquisition Plans
for the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile. GAO/NSIAD 96-144. June 1996.
22 p.
U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons Acquisitions: Guided Weapon Plans
Need to Be Reassessed. GAO/NSIAD 99-32. December 1998. 64 p.
Zaloga, Steven J. World Missiles Briefing. Teal Group Corp., 1999. This annually
updated source contains data and analyses on each of the missiles discussed in
this report.

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