The Department of Energy's Tritium Production Program

The Department of Energy's Tritium Production Program

Order Code RL30425
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The Department of Energy’s
Tritium Production Program
Updated November 8, 2001
Richard E. Rowberg
Senior Specialist
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

The Department of Energy’s
Tritium Production Program
Summary
Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen used to enhance the explosive yield
of every thermonuclear weapon. Tritium has a radioactive decay rate of 5.5% per
year and has not been produced in this country for weapons purposes since 1988. To
compensate for decay losses, tritium levels in the existing stockpile are being
maintained by recycling and reprocessing it from dismantled nuclear weapons. To
maintain the nuclear weapons stockpile at the level called for in the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START) II (not yet in force), however, a new tritium source
would be needed by the year 2011. If the START I stockpile levels remain the target,
as is now the case, tritium production would be needed by 2005.
On December 6, 1995, the Department of Energy (DOE) issued a Record of
Decision to pursue a dual-track approach to develop the two options it considered
most promising. The first was to investigate the purchase of the services of an
existing commercial reactor or the reactor itself to supply radiation for transforming
lithium into tritium (CLWR). The second was to design, build, and test a particle
accelerator at Savannah River to drive tritium-producing nuclear reactions (APT).
Both options could meet the 2011 deadline but only the CLWR option could be ready
by 2005. If tritium is needed sooner, an interim source may be necessary. One
possible source, the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) in Hanford, WA, is no longer an
option because of nuclear proliferation concerns.
The DOE selected the purchase of radiation services from existing reactors
owned by the Tennessee Valley Authority. Further, DOE will reimburse TVA for
actual costs under terms of the Economy Act, which TVA agreed to. DOE estimates
total costs for this option to range from $1.2 to $2.9 billion over a 40-year period.
The TVA Board recently approved the contract with DOE, which should be signed
soon. Work was to continue on the accelerator option for a period of time as a
backup. The 106th Congress ratified this decision through the FY2000 defense
authorization act (P.L. 106-65). This act also requires DOE to continue work on
the APT option as a backup.
Even though the decision has been made, several issues exist that are not totally
resolved and that might arise again as the time for tritium production approaches.
These issues include the target date when production is needed, the costs of the
various options, environmental and safety concerns, regulatory concerns, and possible
nuclear nonproliferation concerns. At present, none of these issues appears to be
serious enough to halt use of the TVA reactors for tritium production, although a
license amendment by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to allow such production
has yet to be issued.
For FY2002, DOE requested $124.5 million. DOE also proposes to closeout
the APT project. Congress appropriated $123.5 million and directed that no funds
be provided for the APT project. In the defense authorization bill, the House (H.R.
2586) authorized an additional $15 million to complete APT efforts while the Senate
authorized the requested amount and made no comment on the APT project.

Contents
Role of Tritium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Why It Is Needed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
What Is Tritium and How Is It Made? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Tritium Production Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Congressional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
DOE Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Tritium Program Budget Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
FY2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
FY2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Program Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Target Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Technology Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Schedule and Flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Environmental and Safety Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Regulatory Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Nonproliferation Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

The Department of Energy’s
Tritium Production Program
Role of Tritium
Why It Is Needed
Tritium is a crucial component of thermonuclear weapons. Tritium gas is used
in every U.S. nuclear warhead to enhance its explosive yield. A typical thermonuclear
device consists of two stages, a primary where the explosion is initiated, and a
secondary where the main thermonuclear explosion takes place. The yield of the
primary stage, and its effectiveness in driving the secondary to explode, is increased
(boosted) by tritium gas which undergoes a nuclear fusion reaction with deuterium,
and generates a large amount of neutrons to ‘boost’ the nuclear burn up of the
plutonium or highly enriched uranium.1
Tritium is radioactive and has a relatively short half-life of a little over 12 years.
As a result, the supply of tritium in a newly manufactured weapon would decay by
5.5% per year to less than 1% of its original amount in seven half-lives or 87 years
without replenishment. In the past, tritium for replenishment in existing weapons was
produced in a nuclear reactor, called the K reactor, at the U.S. Department of
Energy’s (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina.2 In 1988, the reactor
was shut down for safety reasons, and no additional tritium has been produced in the
United States for weapons purposes. Replenishment of tritium in the stockpile has
continued, however, by recycling tritium from existing nuclear weapons as they are
dismantled. In 1991, President George Bush signed the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty II (START II) which committed the major nuclear powers to a large reduction
in their nuclear weapons stockpiles. As a result of this reduction, the stockpile’s
tritium levels have been maintained primarily by recycling the tritium from deactivated
warheads without new tritium production.
By 1993, based on the annually updated Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan
(NWSP), DOE and DOD determined that tritium production would need to be
resumed by 2011 if the United States were to maintain its weapons stockpile at the
levels set by START II.3 The NWSP is the blueprint by which DOE proposes to
manage the nation’s nuclear weapon’s stockpile in the absence of testing. Because
1 U.S. Department of Energy, Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Production of
Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor, DOE/EIS-0288 (March 1999), S-6.
2 U.S. Department of Energy, Final Environmental Impact Statement, S-7.
3 U.S. Department of Energy, Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for
Tritium Supply and Recycling; Executive Summary, DOE/EIS-0161 (October 1995), ES-7.

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of the long lead time required to set up a tritium production facility, it was advisable
that development of preferred production options begin immediately. In the
1996-2001 NWSP, the President directed DOE to fully support the higher START
I nuclear weapons level until START II is ratified by all parties and implemented. The
United States Senate gave its advice and consent to ratify the treaty in January 1996
and the Russian Duma ratified the treaty in April 2000. The instruments of
ratification, however, have not been exchanged and amendments attached by the
Duma may preclude U.S. acceptance of the Russian ratification.4 The START I level
requires that new tritium production begin in 2005.5
What Is Tritium and How Is It Made?
Tritium is a radioactive form — an isotope — of hydrogen. Tritium atoms
have a half-life of 12.43 years. When tritium undergoes radioactive decay, it converts
to a stable, non-radioactive form (isotope) of helium, helium-3. The half-life is the
time it takes for half of a given number of radioactive nuclei to be converted to
helium-3.
Although tritium occurs naturally in the environment, the amount is too small for
practical recovery. Therefore tritium for nuclear weapons must be produced
artificially. There are two ways of producing tritium, both involving nuclear reactions
using neutrons. In the first way, neutrons are made to strike a target consisting of a
lithium/aluminum material. The neutrons react with the lithium, producing tritium and
other byproducts. This technology has been used to produce small quantities of
tritium for several decades at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina. In
the second method, neutrons react with helium-3 to produce tritium and normal
hydrogen as byproducts. Although this process has been demonstrated, the helium-3
method has not yet been used in any tritium production system.
Tritium Production Technologies
The production of tritium requires the generation of energetic neutrons. There
are two suitable ways of producing such neutrons: nuclear reactors and accelerators.
In an accelerator, neutrons are produced by a process called spallation. Protons,
accelerated in a particle accelerator to very high energies, strike a target made of
tungsten. The energetic protons then knock neutrons and more protons off the
tungsten atoms like billiard balls. These neutrons and protons then knock off more
neutrons in a cascade fashion. In a nuclear reactor, energy is produced by nuclear
fission, or splitting, of uranium and plutonium atoms. Neutrons are used to produce
the fission in the first place, and a byproduct of this reaction is more neutrons. Most
of these neutrons are used to create more fission reactions — a chain reaction — but
some neutrons leave the reaction region — the reactor core — without initiating a
4For further information about START II, see, Congressional Research Service, Nuclear
Arms Control: The U.S.-Russian Agenda, by Amy Wolf, CRS Issue Brief IB98030.
5 U.S. Department of Energy, Final Environmental Impact Statement, S-7. For Start I, about
3 kilograms (kg) of tritium would be needed each year. For START II, about 1.5 kg per year
would be needed.

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fission reaction. These neutrons are available for other nuclear reactions including
those that produce tritium. In either case, the quantity of neutrons produced can be
controlled by adjusting parameters inherent to the accelerator or nuclear reactor.
Congressional Considerations
Introduction
In this section, a review is presented of DOE activities from the demise of tritium
production in 1988 to the present time. Following that is a discussion of the FY2000,
FY2001, and FY2002 budget actions on the DOE tritium program. The section
concludes with an description and analysis of the various issues that arose during the
period DOE was considering options for the long-term production source. These
issues include the target date when production is needed, the costs of the various
options, environmental and safety concerns, regulatory concerns, and possible nuclear
nonproliferation concerns.
DOE Activities
The responsibility of maintaining the country’s nuclear weapons stockpile is
assigned to the Department of Energy (DOE). The signing of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by President Clinton on September 24, 1996, banning
further testing of nuclear weapons, contemplates that the U.S. nuclear weapon
stockpile is to be maintained primarily with a science based approach using laboratory
experiments and computer simulations. Weapons activities fall within DOE’s Office
of Defense Programs6 and consist of two major components: stockpile stewardship
and stockpile management.7 The first of these is charged with research and
development on ways to ensure the safety and reliability of the existing stockpile, and
to preserve a core of weapons-related technical and scientific expertise. The stockpile
management component is responsible for stockpile surveillance activities — those
activities designed to ensure the safety, reliability and performance of the existing
stockpile, including remanufacture of existing weapons, and for all tasks related to the
production of nuclear weapons. Tritium activities lie within the stockpile management
program.
Historically tritium was produced at the K Reactor and other reactors at the
Savannah River Site. As noted, tritium production declined and halted altogether in
1988 when the K Reactor was shut down for safety upgrades. In the same year, DOE
started the New Production Reactor (NPR) project to develop a long-term source of
tritium to replace the aging K Reactor. In September 1992, the Bush Administration,
under pressure from 102nd Congress and citing reduced tritium demands, decided to
6The nuclear weapons activities of the Office of Defense Programs were recently transferred
to the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) created by the FY2000 Defense
Authorization Act, P.l.106-65.
7 U.S. Department of Energy, Stockpile Stewardship Program: 30-Day Review, November
23, 1999, 2-1, [http://www.dp.doe.gov/dp_web/public_f.htm].

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defer any further work on the NPR until 1995 and stopped all the reactor design
efforts. With the signing of START II by President Bush in 1993, the number of
active nuclear warheads and the need for tritium were dramatically reduced.8 At that
time, the Department of Defense (DOD) and DOE concluded that recycling the
existing tritium from the deactivated warheads could supply the needed tritium until
a new source was ready.
During the FY1993 budget process, the 102nd Congress directed DOE to
prepare and submit a report on tritium supplies and the necessary schedule to resume
tritium production.9 Again in the FY1994 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 103-160),
the 103rd Congress directed DOE to study tritium production and identify the selected
technology by March 1995.10 In October 1995, DOE released its final Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) on tritium production although it did not, at
that time, make a decision on the selected technology.11
Based on the analysis of the PEIS and other considerations, on December 5,
1995, the DOE issued the Record of Decision, Tritium Supply and Recycling
Facilities, which committed DOE to pursue a dual track strategy to ensure an
adequate tritium production capability.12 The dual-track approach (1) initiated the
purchase of an existing commercial reactor or the lease of irradiation services from
an existing reactor with an option to purchase the reactor and convert it to a defense
facility; and (2) initiated design, construction and testing of critical components of an
accelerator system for tritium production (called Accelerator Production of Tritium
or APT).
According to DOE, the reactor approach would be available by 2005 while the
accelerator would be operational by 2007. The Savannah River Site is to be the
location for an accelerator, should one be built. Furthermore, the tritium recycling
facility at SRS will be upgraded and consolidated to support both options. On
September 5, 1996, the Secretary of Energy selected Burns and Roe Enterprises, Inc.,
to demonstrate the APT concept at Los Alamos National Laboratory, and to design
the accelerator at the SRS site.
On February 7, 1997, DOE selected the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant of the
Tennessee Valley Authority, on a sole-source contract, for the commercial reactor
test. This plant has been operating since 1996. The purpose of the test was to
demonstrate that tritium can be produced in the plant’s fuel assembly without
8Congressional Research Service, Nuclear Arms Control.
9Conference Report, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993,
102nd Congress, 1st Session, H.Rept. 102-311, 302.
10Conference Report, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, 103rd
Congress, 1st Session, H.Rept. 103-357, 410-11.
11U.S. Department of Energy, Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS)
for Tritium Supply and Recycling, DOE/EIS-0161 (October 1995).
12U.S. Department of Energy, “Record of Decision: Tritium Supply and Recycling
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement,” Federal Register 60, no. 238 (December
12, 1995): 63878.

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affecting the plant’s ability to produce electricity. On September 15, 1997, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) granted its approval to the project. During
a refueling that was completed on October 16, 1997, 32 of the neutron absorber rods
were replaced by rods containing lithium. When the 18-month fuel cycle was
completed early in the summer of 1999, those rods were removed. They were sent
to Argonne National Laboratory for testing and removal of the tritium formed by the
reaction of the reactor’s neutrons with the lithium. Some of the rods were sent to
DOE’s Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) for destructive testing. A final report
on the test is due in FY2002. About one ounce (29 grams) of tritium was produced.
None of that tritium will be used in a nuclear weapon.
On June 4, 1997, DOE issued a request for proposals for a fixed-price contract
to provide a commercial reactor for sale or lease for production of tritium. Only
pressurized water reactors with a thermal rating of 2400 megawatts or more and
which will be operating at full power by 2003 were to be considered. The only
responsive bid received was from the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), and it
originally included two options. One was to use the existing Watts Bar and Sequoyah
plants and the other was to use its uncompleted Bellefonte plant plus the existing
plants as needed. In the original bid, the latter option would have required
government assistance for completion of the Bellefonte plant for its use as a tritium
source at an estimated cost to DOE of about $2 billion. Operation costs for tritium
production from that plant were estimated at $28 million per year. If the Bellefonte
plant were to be selected, DOE would also have received revenue from the sale of
electricity. DOE estimated that such payments could amount to a significant portion
of the $2 billion. Under the bid, the Watts Bar/Sequoyah option would have cost
DOE about $12 million per year for irradiation services those two reactors (basically
to use neutrons produced by the reactor during their normal operations to irradiate
lithium supplied by DOE to produce tritium). TVA allowed that bid to expire when
it was not acted upon, keeping only the Bellefonte option on the table.
In November 1998, TVA modified its Bellefonte offer by reducing the cost to
DOE to $1.35 billion. At the same time, DOE would no longer have received any
revenues from the sale of any electricity from a completed plant. TVA also offered
Watts Bar as a backup in the event Bellefonte could not be completed. The existence
of this backup would have effectively capped the cost to DOE for this option at $1.35
billion plus whatever operating costs were necessary to process the tritium produced
in the reactor. TVA also submitted a variant on the Bellefonte proposal by stating
that it would accept shipments of uranium fuel from DOE in lieu of payments totaling
up to $474 million.
Then DOE Secretary Bill Richardson also asked TVA to resubmit a Watts Bar
irradiation services bid. The new bid, received early December, 1998, provided such
services from both the Watts Bar and Sequoyah plants for $85 million per year.
According to the TVA proposal, however, tritium production from this option would
have been only about 54% of the completed Bellefonte option and would have lasted
for 25 years compared to 40 years for Bellefonte.
On December 22, 1998, DOE announced its decision to contract with the TVA
for the Watts Bar and Sequoyah plant option. DOE stated that this would be the least
costly option for providing U.S. tritium needs, and would offer the most flexibility for

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changes in tritium demand that may result from new weapons treaties. On May 7,
1999, DOE released its Consolidated Record of Decision (ROD) for the Tritium
Supply Program.13 In that document, DOE affirmed its December 22, 1998, selection
of Watts Bar Unit 1, and Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 as the Department’s long-term
source of tritium production, announced that the tritium extraction facility will be
constructed at the Savannah River Site (SRS), and that the APT option will serve as
a backup tritium supply technology, and, should construction be required, be located
at the SRS site. In the ROD, DOE announced that the life-cycle cost of the CLWR
selection would range from $1.2 billion to $2.9 billion over the 40-year life of the
contract with TVA. The range depends on the arrangements to be made for the
increased uranium enrichment required for reactor fuel to produce the tritium.
In December, 1999, the TVA Board of Directors voted 3-0 to accept the DOE
contract. The contract was signed by TVA on December 14, 1999 and by DOE on
December 21, 1999. The effective date of the contract is January 1, 2000.
In November 1999, DOE issued a request for proposal (RFP) for fabrication and
production of the TPBARs that would be used in the Watts Bar and Sequoyah power
plants. According to the RFP, the selected contractor would assemble, fabricate, and
ship up to 6000 TPBARs for Phase I of the contract and develop the capacity to
manufacture up to 4000 TPBARs per year for Phase II.14 The RFP stated that a firm
delivery date for the delivery of the Phase I TPBARs would be set after the contract
was awarded, but that the contractor should be capable of delivering the TPBARs by
March 1, 2003. At the present time, DOE expects to have the production capability
and operations systems needed to produce tritium in the two plants in place by
FY2003. In order to meet the 2005 deadline for having tritium available for the
weapons stockpile, the rods must be in the reactor 18 months prior to that date. In
the summer of 2000, WesDyne International, a subsidiary of BNFL, was selected to
perform the contract.
Construction of the tritium extraction facility began in the first quarter of
FY2000. According to the FY2002 DOE budget justification, the facility is to be
completed in the fourth quarter of FY2004 at a total project cost of $401 million.
Integrated system testing with tritium is scheduled to begin in FY2005 with project
completion and start of facility operations scheduled for FY2006.
In February 2000, DOE held a vendor’s forum for transportation services to ship
irradiated TPBARs from the Watts Bar and Sequoyah power plants to the tritium
extraction site at the Savannah River Site. According to DOE, 14 to 20 shipments
a year of no more than 300 TPBARs per shipment will be required. The proposed
contract calls for shipments to begin in 2006 for an initial ten-year period.
13U.S. Department of Energy, “Consolidated Record of Decision for Tritium Supply and
Recycling,” Federal Register 64, no. 93 (May 14, 1999):26369.
14U.S. Department of Energy, “Tritium Producing Burnable Absorber Rod (TPBAR)
Fabrication Solicitation: Commercial Light Water Reactor (CLWR) Production of Tritium
Solicitation No. DE-PR02-99DP00229,” November 17, 1999,
[http://www.dp.doe.gov/dp-62/default.htm].

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Tritium Program Budget Actions
FY2001. For FY2001, DOE requested $152.0 million, a reduction of 10.3%
from FY2000. The reduction resulted from a decline in engineering development and
demonstration for the APT and a suspension of design work on the APT plant. Both
actions reduced funding by a total of $68.7 million from FY2000. DOE is asked for
increases of $9.2 million for procurement of TBBARs and $42.1 million to begin
construction of the tritium extraction facility.
The FY2001 defense authorization act (P.L. 107-398; H.R. 106-945) authorizes
$177 million for tritium readiness. The increase, $25 million, is for continuation of
preliminary design and engineering activities associated with the APT project. DOE
has not requested any funds for that effort. The authorization also includes $75
million for the tritium extraction facility being built at Savannah River. In the
conference report, the 106th Congress expressed its belief that the APT project should
be managed and funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration and not the
Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology as proposed by DOE in the budget
request.
The FY2001 Energy and Water Development appropriations act provides $167
million for tritium readiness. The additional $15 million is for the APT project. The
latter funds are to be used only for design activities.
FY2002. The DOE budget justification shows a request of $124.47 million for
the tritium readiness program for FY2002. Included is $42.35 million for the CLWR
activity, $1 million for the APT activity, and $81.125 million for construction of the
tritium extraction facility. No construction funds are being requested for APT
construction activities. In the narrative, DOE states that the APT project will be
closed out, having completed its engineering development and demonstration and
preliminary design. Funding for FY2002 will be used to document and archive the
results of that design effort and to complete closeout.
The funding requested for the CLWR activity will be used to begin assembly of
the TPBARs being produced by WesDyne International and complete documentation
of the extraction tests and destructive testing of the TPBARs irradiated in the Watts
Bar experiment. In addition, funds will be used for modifying the reactor sites for
handling the TPBARs, and for the process to amend the reactor’s operating licenses.
On June 28, 2001, the House approved its version of the Energy and Water
Development Appropriations Bill, 2002 (H.R. 2311, H.Rept. 107-112), which
provides the requested amount for tritium readiness. Included in the appropriation
are $42.35 million for tritium readiness, $1.0 million for APT efforts, and $81.12
million for construction of the tritium extraction facility. On July 19, 2001, the Senate
approved its version of the bill (S.1171, S.Rept. 107-39) which provides $138.47
million, $14.0 million or 11.2% above the request. In addition to funding the tritium
readiness and construction activities as requested, the Senate version provides a total
$15.0 million to close out the APT activities. The Senate also directed that those
activities be transferred to the Advanced Accelerator Applications (AAA) program
which it directed should be located in DOE’s Nuclear Energy. While directing that
DOE close down its APT program in FY2002, the Senate also stated that DOE

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should continue research on tritium production using accelerator technology in the
new AAA program. It specifically suggested that the LANSCE facility at Los Alamos
could be used for such research.
On November 1, 2001, Congress approved the conference report (H.Rept.107-
258) of the Energy and Water Development Act, 2002. The act provides $123.5
million for tritium readiness for FY2002, $1 million below the request. No language
appeared in the report about the reduction. Congress did, however, specify that no
funds were to be provided for the accelerator production of tritium project.
On September 25, 2001, the House passed its version of the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2002 (H.R.2586, H.Rept. 107-194). That bill recommends
authorization of appropriations of $139.8 million, $15.0 million above the request.
The additional funds are to complete preliminary design and engineering development
and demonstration work on the backup APT technology. The House urged DOE to
complete this work as soon as it could so that the resources could be used for other
needs. The House also noted that the current tritium production schedule calls for
irradiation to begin in 2003 and first extraction to begin in 2006. It there are no
further reductions in the nuclear weapons stockpile, this schedule would require a
one-year draw down of the five-year tritium reserve. The House believes that this
draw down could be made up in subsequent years.
On October 2, 2001, the Senate passed its version of the defense authorization
bill (S.1438, S.Rept.107-62). The bill authorizes $124.5 million for tritium readiness,
the requested amount. The Senate did not comment further about the authorization,
and made no mention of the APT project.
Program Issues
The principal controversy about the DOE tritium production program has been
the choice of long-term production technology. For the few years leading up to the
December 22, 1998, decision, the choices had narrowed to the purchase of radiation
services from an existing commercial light water reactor (CLWR), or the construction
of a linear accelerator dedicated to the production of tritium (APT). DOE has now
decided to proceed with the CLWR option and the 106th Congress ratified that
decision. Nevertheless, some of the issues that formed the debate have not been
completely resolved, and may come up again in the 107th Congress as actual
implementation of the production process nears. In addition, there may be questions
about the decision by DOE to end work on the APT backup option.
Target Date. Although current policy is set to meet the 2005 target for a new
tritium production source, there are those who believe that completion of that source
can be extended well beyond that deadline. If START II enters into force, the need
for new tritium production would be delayed to 2011 because the number of strategic
warheads allowed in the stockpile would be much lower than the START I limits

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defining the 2005 target. START II calls for a stockpile of 3,500 nuclear strategic
warheads compared to 6,000 warheads under START I.15
Many argue that further nuclear weapons reduction beyond the START II limits
is possible with the result that additional years would be available to recycle tritium
from dismantled warheads because the tritium production schedule included an
additional 5-year reserve. Some nuclear arms control advocates have argued for
further reductions to around 1,000 deployed warheads. In that case, the need for new
tritium production could be pushed back to 2035 by the recycling of the tritium from
the deactivated warheads. The Clinton Administration, however, rejected further
unilateral cuts in U.S. nuclear weapons until the START II entered into force, and
there was no official proposals, either from the 106th Congress or the Clinton
Administration, for additional nuclear weapons stockpile reductions. It is unclear at
this time what the policy of the Bush administration will be on further reductions in
strategic nuclear weapons. Considerations about the ABM treaty and missile defense
systems may complicate further attempts at arms reduction.
Technology Issues. Commercial light water reactors contain burnable
absorber rods (BAR) in the reactor core which control the production and distribution
of heat in the core by absorbing excess neutrons that would otherwise produce fission
reactions. To produce tritium in the reactor, the normal absorbing material, boron,
would be replaced by an isotope of lithium, requiring a redesign of the rods. That
isotope of lithium is an absorber like boron, but the nuclear reaction it undergoes
during the absorption process also produces tritium. Such rods are called tritium-
producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs).

Unlike the boron BARs, however, the TPBARs lose little of their ability to
absorb neutrons during their stay in the reactor core. Therefore, there is a limit on the
number of such TPBARs that can be inserted in the core if the 18-month refueling
cycle is to be maintained. Too many TPBARs would result in shutting down the
reactor before refueling could take place because there would be an insufficient
number of neutrons to sustain the chain reaction. For the Watts Bar reactor, that
upper limit is 3,400 TPBARs.16 Furthermore, even within that TPBAR limit, the fuel
that is loaded must have a higher concentration of enriched uranium than if boron
BARs are used. And, if the number of TPBARs exceeds a certain number — 2,000
for the Watts Bar reactor — a higher number of fuel assemblies must be replaced
during refueling. All of this is necessary to ensure enough of the uranium isotope
required for the fission reaction (U-235) is available to sustain a chain reaction for the
18-month life of the fuel cycle. One potential consequence of these changes is that
15Congressional Research Service, Nuclear Arms Control.
16 United States Department of Energy, Final Environmental Impact Statement for the
Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor, DOE/EIS-0288, Summary,
March 1999, S-24. In its November 1998 revised proposal to DOE, TVA stated that it was
prepared to operate Watts Bar with any number of TPBARs up to a maximum of 2,496, and
would continue to operate the plant with an 18-month refueling cycle. TVA also stated that
it would be prepared to operate Bellefonte up to a maximum of 3,000 TPBARs and with a 12-
month refueling cycle.

CRS-10
the amount of spent fuel to be stored on site would increase because of the larger
number of fuel assemblies replaced during each refueling.
This TPBAR-number limitation constrains the amount of tritium that can be
produced in any one reactor operating with an 18-month refueling cycle. To produce
3 kilograms (kg) per year, the amount needed to maintain a START I stockpile, 4,000
TPBARs per year (6,000 over 18 months or 76.5% more than the 3400 limit) would
be required. To produce tritium to maintain a START II stockpile, 1.5 kg per year,
would require 2,000 TPBARs per year or 3,000 over 18 months.
If DOE should decide it needs to produce enough tritium to meet START I
levels, it could place more TPBARs in the reactor, or it could use a second (or third)
reactor. Although the Watts Bar reactor is capable of holding more than 3,400
TPBARs, it would not be possible to sustain a chain reaction over 18 months under
those conditions. Therefore, a shorter refueling cycle would be required. If a 12-
month cycle is selected, 4,000 TPBARs would be required. Watts Bar is capable of
holding that number of TPBARs, and, under those conditions, could sustain power
output over that period. That 33% shorter cycle, however, would require more
frequent refueling outages that would significantly reduce the plant’s average annual
energy output, forcing an adjustment by TVA in order to ensure an adequate power
supply to meet its load.
It is not likely that DOE will ask TVA to change the refueling cycle for Watts
Bar. In the August 1998 draft environmental impact statement for the CLWR option,
DOE stated that it did not foresee the need to change the fuel cycle period, and no
mention was made of this possibility in the December 22, 1998 announcement.17
Presumably, if DOE needed to produce 3 kg per year of tritium, the START I levels,
it would use one or both of the Sequoyah units as well and live with the 18-month
refueling cycle in both plants. If DOE also wanted to ensure that no additional spent
fuel were produced, the Watts Bar unit and both of the Sequoyah units would need
to be used to meet START I levels, while START II levels could be met with Watts
Bar and one Sequoyah unit. DOE is now planning for the full complement of 3 kg or
6000 TPBARs to meet the 2005 target for tritium. The contract for fabrication of the
TPBARs, however, gives DOE the flexibility to lower the number to be produced if
a smaller quantity of tritium is needed. TVA expects a binding commitment from DOE
by the fall of 2001 as to how much tritium it will need TVA to produce.18
As noted above, DOE placed 32 TPBARs in the Watts Bar reactor in July 1997
to test the assemblies under actual operating conditions. The design of the test
assemblies was overseen by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which issued a
license to Watts Bar permitting the test. The purpose of the test was to develop and
install a TPBAR assembly and to examine its tritium production capabilities and
durability. Because the number of TPBARs used in the test was very small compared
to the number that would have to be used for significant tritium production, the test
could not examine the effect of such production on reactor operations. According to
17 United States Department of Energy, Final Environmental Impact Statement for the
Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor, S-24.
18 Private communication, Jeanette M. Pablo, TVA, January 12, 2001.

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DOE officials, examination of the test assembly to date shows that it operated as
expected and there were “no surprises.” 19 Final results on the test, however, will not
be available until sometime in FY2002.
The second option in DOE’s dual-track approach, accelerator production of
tritium (APT), would be a significant departure from previous approaches. Existing
DOE particle accelerators are capable of producing only a small amount of tritium.
The research accelerators were designed for pulsed, and not continuous, operation at
low power levels (about 800 KW). A production accelerator would be required to
deliver a high power proton beam at 170 MW, or more than 200 times greater.20
While the APT process has yet to be demonstrated on anything approaching the scale
required for the stockpile, research and development is being conducted at Los
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to demonstrate its feasibility. Several
subsystems including a prototype of the superconducting radiofrequency (RF) cavity
that will provide the proton acceleration are under construction. Early results in the
development of the initial stages of the accelerator have been promising. Also,
prototypes of the RF power supplies that will drive the cavities have been operating
continuously for an extended period, building confidence in the ability of the
accelerator to run steady state (continuously). Cavities of this type are now
operating at the DOE Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility in Newport
News, VA. The accelerator facility which is part of the Los Alamos Neutron Science
Center, is being used for this R&D.
There are several potential advantages of APT. It does not create high-level
nuclear waste, and safety concerns are not a major problem since it does not use
fissionable material. The quantity of tritium to be produced can be adjusted by the
schedule of operation. In addition, the accelerator could be available for scientific
experiments and possibly production of medical isotopes, because tritium production
is not likely to demand all of its continuous output. A major disadvantage is that the
APT would require a substantial amount of electrical power to produce the high
energy proton beam. A machine to reach tritium production required by START I
levels will require 450 MW while an accelerator designed for START II levels (see
below) will require 385 MW.
Costs. One of the most contentious issues between the two options concerned
their costs. Supporters of the CLWR option argued that it would be significantly less
costly than the APT option. Supporters of the APT, however, claimed the cost
estimates made to date grossly overstated the cost of the APT option.
According to DOE, TVA has agreed to supply irradiation services under the
terms of the Economy Act, which states that services supplied by one federal agency
to another would be reimbursed at actual cost. In its May 7, 1999 ROD, DOE
announced its estimates of the life-cycle costs for the irradiation services from TVA
19Private communication, Lewis Steinhoff, DOE, April 11, 2001.
20 The proposed accelerator at Savannah River is approximately 0.7 mile long, and would be
part of an APT complex covering approximately 173 acres of land.

CRS-12
to be $1.2 billion to $2.9 billion over a 40-year period.21 The costs include a capital
cost of $580 million to establish tritium production capabilities at the TVA reactors
and to complete the tritium extraction facility to be built at Savannah River. The
annual operating costs would range from $20 million to $60 million depending on
how DOE supplied the enriched uranium for the reactor fuel needed for tritium
production in the TPBAR assemblies. At the lower cost, DOE would supply the
uranium from blended-down highly enriched uranium from its stockpiles, while at the
higher cost, DOE would pay for the additional enrichment.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) had estimated CLWR irradiation
service costs in a report issued in 1998.22 The CBO estimate for operating costs was
$1.32 billion over 40 years in 1999 dollars. In addition, CBO estimated $460 million
for design and construction costs, also in 1999 dollars, that would be borne by DOE.
The funds include manufacture and irradiation of the first array of absorber rods
producing tritium, construction and startup of the tritium extraction facility, and
delivery of the first unit of tritium gas. Including those costs gives a CBO estimate
for total costs of the CLWR irradiation services option of $1.78 billion for 40 years,
falling within the DOE cost estimate range for the TVA contract.
The DOE cost estimate for the APT option, also provided in the May 7, 1999,
ROD, is $3.4 billion to complete, in constant 1999 dollars, with $135 million in annual
operating costs over 40 years for a START I-level machine. The 40-year life-cycle
cost estimate for this option was given by DOE to be $9.2 billion.23 A recent effort
led by Los Alamos National Laboratory reported a plan to reduce the cost of the APT
facility by using a modular design. DOE stated in the ROD that this option would
have an investment cost of $2.8 billion. The DOE ROD reported that the life-cycle
cost of the START II-capable APT option would be $7.5 billion. For a comparable
CLWR option, it reported a life-cycle cost of $2.2 billion or less. The APT estimates
do not include any allowance for offsetting revenues that might accrue from the sale
of medical isotopes produced by the APT facility.
Researchers at LANL believe they can reduce the cost of the APT options to
$3.0 billion for a START I machine and $2.6 billion for a START II machine, again
in constant 1999 dollars.24 Lower construction costs and reduced contingency funds
were the major sources of the lower costs. They also suggest a lower operating cost
for the START I machine of $114 million per year. Using those figures gives total
cost estimates, in constant 1999 dollars, of $7.6 billion and $6.1 billion respectively
for the two production levels. Again, no potential offsetting revenues have been
included.
21Federal Register, 60, no.93, 26373.
22 Congressional Budget Office, Estimated Budgetary Effects of Alternatives for Producing
Tritium, Letter Report, August, 1998, 2.
23Federal Register, 60, no.93, 26373.
24Letter from Paul Lisowski, APT National Project Director, Los Alamos National
Laboratory, to Ray Hall, Congressional Budget Office, August 31, 1998.

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Those recent APT estimates, however, may be low. DOE has a recent history
of cost overruns on major projects, although there are some notable exceptions.
Indeed, the facility that comes closest to the APT in technology terms, the Thomas
Jefferson National Laboratory, was constructed under budget and on schedule. The
existence of other overruns, however, has forced DOE to be extra cautious about
making project cost estimates. It included a 20% contingency factor which is typical
of the overruns experienced by DOE on some other accelerator projects.
Nevertheless, an accelerator with all of the requirements of the APT has never been
built before, and even though much of the technology has been used elsewhere, the
risk of cost escalation remains.
The other reactor option, completion of the Bellefonte plant, was originally
estimated to cost DOE $1.8 to $2 billion in capital costs plus about $28 million per
year in operating costs over the 40-year life of the plant.25 In that proposal, DOE
would also have received a portion of the revenues from the sale of electricity. TVA
estimated that those revenues flowing to DOE would eventually offset a significant
portion of DOE’s outlay to finish plant construction. The CBO analysis estimated
those offsetting receipts would be somewhat more than total DOE operating costs
over the 40-year life.
One concern that was raised about this proposal was the possibility of cost
overruns in completing the plant. The Bellefonte plant consists of two units, one 60%
complete and the other 90% complete according to TVA, and no work has been done
on these plants for several years. While those percentages suggest that most of the
plant cost has been spent, that might not be the case. The history of nuclear power
construction in the United States has been replete with large cost overruns, much of
which have occurred when a plant was near completion. Furthermore, in 1994,
Southern Company estimated completion costs for Bellefonte at $2.5 to $4.5 billion,
although TVA disputes those estimates.
The revised Bellefonte option delivered in November 1998, however, would
have put a cap on those costs for DOE regardless of the total cost of completing the
reactor. TVA stated that it would be responsible for costs above the $1.35 billion it
is asking of DOE.26 In its May 7, 1999 ROD, DOE announced that if it were
necessary to use Bellefonte for tritium production, the investment cost would range
from $1.2 to $1.8 billion.27 The total cost of completing Bellefonte would remain
about $2 billion, and could go higher, but the ratepayers of the TVA system would
be paying any difference. Indeed, they are now paying for the approximately $4.3
billion that has already gone into the Bellefonte plant. Of course, if the plant is
completed, it would produce electricity for use by those ratepayers.
25 Letter proposal from Craven Crowell, Chairman, Board of Directors, Tennessee Valley
Authority to the Honorable Bill Richardson, Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy, December
8, 1998.
26 Letter proposal from Craven Crowell.
27Federal Register, 60, no.93, 26373.

CRS-14
There is reason to believe that the APT option might have been comparable in
capital cost terms to the original Bellefonte proposal, but probably not to the revised
proposal. In any event, it appears that Bellefonte would have had a significant
operating costs advantage because of the high electricity costs of the accelerator.
Compared to the Watts Bar/Sequoyah option selected by DOE, the APT option
appears to be at a decided cost disadvantage.
There are, however, some uncertainties that might affect this conclusion. First,
TVA stated in its Watts Bar/Sequoyah proposal that tritium production capability
would end 25 years after its start in 2004. Further, it stated that the Sequoyah
backup would not be available after 2021, 17 years after tritium production startup.
Those periods were determined by the expiration dates of the two plants’ licenses.
While Watts Bar, alone, could supply the amount of tritium needed for START II
levels, the availability of a backup in case something happened to Watts Bar could be
important. Those ending dates, however, are likely to be excessively conservative.
The plants themselves may be capable of operating far longer than their existing
license duration. Most nuclear utilities expect that license extension should be
possible. Indeed, DOE assumes in its May 7, 1999 ROD that nuclear power plants
will be available for the entire 40 years of the TVA contract, either through license
extension or from other plants. Even with an extension, however, there may be added
costs for DOE if significant plant modifications are required as a condition for license
extension. There has been no experience with license extension to date, so it is
difficult to tell what it would entail for either Sequoyah or Watts Bar. If such
extension does not happen, DOE could be facing added costs in securing a
replacement tritium source.
The possibility of producing medical isotopes in the APT accelerator has raised
the possibility of generating offsetting revenues for that option from the sale of such
isotopes.28 A group of medical researchers held a workshop in May about using the
ATP for the production of radionuclides for medical purposes. The workshop
participants concluded that the APT facility could be a major source of such
radionuclides resulting in substantial biomedical research opportunities. The large
target volume and high beam power of the facility would be major reasons for the
large medical isotope production potential. Additional costs would be incurred, if this
capability is added, to modify the target area and build the infrastructure needed to
extract and process the medical isotopes. Officials from LANL state that using the
APT for this purpose would reduce tritium output by about 1%.
The amount of revenues from this option would depend heavily on the success
of many of the radionuclide therapies and diagnostic techniques, now in the research
stage, that were reported on at the May workshop. For the purposes of its analysis,
the CBO assumed a revenue stream of about $15 million per year. In a cost analysis
by LANL, a market of $150 million per year was assumed. That level would
28 U.S. Department of Energy, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Medical Isotope
Production at the Fast Flux Test Facility - A Technical and Economic Assessment, PNNL-
SA-29502 (November 1997) 7.1. See also Congressional Research Service, Tritium
Production for the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Program: An Analysis of Key Issues, Richard
Rowberg, et al., RL30129, April 12, 1999, 15.

CRS-15
completely compensate for APT facility operating costs. The market is highly
uncertain, however, and could be much greater if a significant portion of the research
reported on is successful. DOE appears interested in this option, but has not put any
funds into developing it further. While discussions have taken place with the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) about this possibility, NIH has been noncommittal about
providing any support at this point.
Schedule and Flexibility. Currently, U.S. policy is to have tritium production
capacity in place by 2005 in order to meet the requirements of a START I stockpile
level. If the START II is put into force, the need for new tritium production would
be delayed to 2011 because the number of strategic warheads allowed in the stockpile
would be much lower than the START I limits.
Under the DOE selection, tritium production could begin at the start of the next
refueling cycle — in October 2003 — assuming construction of the necessary TPBAR
assemblies. It could also be delayed for an indefinite period without incurring
additional cost. Therefore, if START II were put into force, DOE would not have
to begin use of the Watts Bar plant until 2011 and would not incur any production
costs until then. If greater reductions in nuclear arms were agreed to, production
startup and costs could be postponed even further.
The APT option appears to have less flexibility. The facility could not be
completed in time to meet START I requirements, and an interim source would be
needed. This fact was clear about the APT from the beginning. It could be ready,
however, by 2007, well in advance of the 2011 START II requirement date. The
modular approach would give the APT some flexibility in that DOE would not have
to commit to a START I level machine at the beginning of construction.
Nevertheless, some level of commitment would be needed leading to construction
expenditures from now until the machine is completed regardless of the level of
tritium production eventually required.
Environmental and Safety Concerns. Important factors that might have
influenced the decision about tritium production technology are the potential impact
of the candidate technologies on the environment, and the safety level of the
production facility. Common to all the reactor options are concerns about reactor
safety and the generation and management of radioactive waste. Since the early
1970s, no new commercial nuclear reactor has been ordered in the United States. The
major reasons have been the high cost of nuclear power compared to other electric
power generation technologies and the slowdown in the growth of electric power
demand which left substantial excess generation capacity. In addition, there have been
concerns about reactor safety. While the U.S. nuclear power industry has a generally
excellent safety record and there is evidence of a substantial improvement in power
plant safety in the last several years, the memory of Three Mile Island and foreign
accidents has contributed to public resistance toward more nuclear power plants.
Some of the environmental impacts of the CLWR option selected by DOE would
not be significantly greater than those already experienced due to the operation of the

CRS-16
reactor alone.29 There could be some additional air and water releases of
radioactivity, primarily tritium, and some additional waste generation at the reactor
site because of the existence of the TPBARs. Radiation exposure for the population
in the vicinity of Watts Bar due to those emissions increases would still be well within
regulatory limits. In addition, a significant increase in spent fuel would result if
tritium production is confined to one (in the START II case) or two (in the START
I case) reactors, and more on-site storage capacity might be needed.
The APT is not a reactor and would not generate any spent fuel nor would there
be any significant safety concerns. A DOE environmental impact statement on the
project states that the impact would be “minor and consistent with what might be
expected for any industrial facility.”30 Because nuclear reactions would take place in
the APT facility, some radioactive waste material would result. It would be a small
amount, however, and all of it would be low level waste (waste whose radioactive
byproducts are low energy and far less dangerous than byproducts from nuclear
reactors). The principal environmental consequence of an APT facility would likely
be the large amount of electric power which would be required. This power would
very likely be generated by the burning of fossil fuels which contribute to air quality
concerns and produce carbon dioxide. At this point, however, DOE believes that
existing electric power capacity in the region where the accelerator would be located
is capable of supplying all of the APT needs.
Regulatory Concerns. Regulation is also an issue for the choice of
production technology since any reactor option would be subjected to the current
nuclear power plant regulatory process. Presently commercial reactors are licensed
and regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). DOE assumes that
Watts Bar and Sequoyah, if used to make tritium for the department, would remain
licensed by the NRC, with license amendments for insertion of tritium target absorber
rods. TVA intends to submit request to NRC in February 2001 to amend the licenses
of these two plants to permit production of tritium.31 It expects NRC to act on the
amendment in advance of October 2003, the date now planned to begin irradiation.32
For the Watts Bar test described above, the NRC permitted an amendment of
the operation license in September 1997, a few months after the request. NRC
approval to insert the lithium rods was necessary because that constituted a
modification of the original reactor license.
29 United States Department of Energy, Final Environmental Impact Statement for the
Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor, S-34.
30U.S. Department of Energy, Environmental Impact Statement: Accelerator Production of
Tritium at the Savannah River Site, DOE/EIS-0270 (March 1999), S-13.
31Private communication, Jeanette M. Pablo, TVA, January 12, 2001.
32Federal Register, 60, no.93, 26372.

CRS-17
The APT option would not be subject to NRC licensing under current law. The
accelerator would be solely a DOE defense production facility, which would be
regulated for health and safety by Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.33
Nonproliferation Concerns. Another issue is the possible nuclear
proliferation consequences of using civilian facilities for weapons tritium production.
U.S. commercial nuclear power production has traditionally been independent of the
nation’s weapons program, and some nuclear nonproliferation interests have cited the
separation as important to U.S. nonproliferation efforts. The policy has developed
over time, however, and the separation has not always been complete. Perhaps the
most notable merging of the two was the N-Reactor at Hanford, WA, which produced
weapons-grade plutonium and sold by-product steam to the Washington Public Power
Supply System, which used the steam to generate electricity for the commercial
market. That situation ended in the late 1980s when the N-Reactor was shut down.
In the conference report for the FY1998 National Defense Authorization Act,
the 105th Congress requested that DOE lead an interagency review of the nuclear
nonproliferation issues associated with tritium production.34 That report was released
on July 14, 1998.35 The review concluded that the nonproliferation policy issues
connected with the CLWR option were “manageable.” It also concluded that the
APT option “raised no significant nonproliferation policy issues.” In that review,
DOE concluded that existing law does not prohibit the use of commercial facilities to
produce tritium for use in nuclear weapons. In particular it stated that the provision
in the Atomic Energy Act that prohibits the production of special nuclear materials
(fissile materials, mainly uranium-235 and plutonium-239) in commercial facilities for
“nuclear explosive purposes” is not applicable in this case because tritium is not a
special nuclear material but rather a byproduct material as defined by the Act. DOE
also argued that the practice of separating civil and defense nuclear facilities has not
been absolute. It cited the Hanford N–Reactor example described above. Finally, the
review concluded that no international treaty prohibits tritium production in a nuclear
reactor. The inspections provision, to which the United States voluntarily adheres,
of the Nonproliferation Treaty has only been applied to materials that can be used
directly in nuclear weapons or transformed into such materials. It has not been
applied to tritium and the International Atomic Energy Agency, which administers the
inspections, has stated that it will not include tritium in the future.
The review also concluded that a number of mitigating factors existed to reduce
any proliferation danger from producing tritium in commercial reactors. Among these
are that TVA, which is the sole organization interested in supplying the CLWR
option, is an instrumentality of the U.S. government, and use of TVA reactors would
be extending a long practice of using government-owned facilities for both civilian and
33Federal Register, 60, no.93, 26372.
34Conference Report, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, 105th
Congress, 1st Session, H.Rept. 105-340, .
35 U.S. Department of Energy. Interagency Review of the Nonproliferation Implications of
Alternative Tritium Production Technologies under Consideration by the Department of
Energy. A Report to the Congress (July 1998), p. 5.

CRS-18
defense purposes. Also, any reactor used for tritium production would be fueled with
uranium fuel having an uranium-235 enrichment level of less than 5%.36 Nuclear
weapons require uranium enriched to significantly higher levels.
Although the DOE review does not consider the production of tritium in a
commercial reactor a proliferation issue, controversy remains.37 A principal concern
of nonproliferation proponents, which was not addressed in the review, is that the use
of U.S. civilian nuclear reactors for the production of weapons material may set a bad
precedent. While there are no legal prohibitions against producing tritium for
weapons use in a commercial facility, doing so might make other nations believe that
the United States was not serious about nuclear nonproliferation and take steps to use
their own commercial facilities for weapons purposes.
Separation of commercial and weapons programs in other countries has been a
factor in U.S. nonproliferation policy. In the recently concluded agreement for
peaceful nuclear cooperation with China, for example, one of the most important
issues was assurance that nuclear technology and facilities supplied by the United
States would not be used or mixed with China’s nuclear weapons program. In
addition, U.S. aid to Russia to improve the safety of nuclear power reactors there has
been made difficult by the fact that plutonium produced in those reactors has been
involved in the weapons program. Further, U.S. objections to the Russian project to
build a power reactor at Bushehr in Iran are based on evidence that Iran is using the
civilian project as a cover to develop weapons. Nonproliferation proponents argue
that U.S. criticism of other weapons states’ failure to keep civilian and weapons
programs separate will lose force in the future if the United States does not follow the
same separation policy.
Proliferation concerns received attention at the NRC public meeting on the Watts
Bar test. Opponents argued that once Watts Bar is operating with the lithium rods
and is producing tritium for later extraction, it becomes a “bomb plant.” Although
DOE officials pointed out that tritium has other purposes besides its use in nuclear
weapons, is not a special nuclear material, and is not covered by the Atomic Energy
Act, opponents pointed out that the sole purpose of the test is to demonstrate the
feasibility of producing tritium for nuclear weapons. They noted that Egyptian
officials had cited the Watts Bar experiment in justifying that country’s decision to
proceed with construction of a nuclear power plant. Therefore, while the letter of the
law is met, the spirit of the law is not according to these opponents.
The DOE proliferation review concluded that the APT option would not pose
any proliferation risks. It has been noted, however, that because the accelerator
36Naturally occurring uranium consists of about 0.7% U-235, the rest being U-238. Because
the latter does not produce a self-sustaining fission reaction while the former can, uranium in
the reactor fuel must be enriched by adding U-235. For commercial light water reactors, an
enrichment of about 2-4% — the fuel contains 2-4% U-235 — is sufficient to sustain the
reaction. Nuclear weapons require a much higher concentration of U-235 and reactor fuel
would not be useable for weapons without additional enrichment.
37For a more extended discussion of this issue, see, Congressional Research Service, Tritium
Production for the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Program, 28.

CRS-19
would involve technology capable of producing special nuclear materials, export of
any of those technologies would be controlled under relevant federal regulations.
There should be no concern about a civilian/weapons separation for the APT facility
because it would be a dedicated defense facility when operating in its tritium
production mode. If it were also used for scientific research, however, it is possible
that such concerns would be raised, particularly to the degree there was international
access to the technology used in the accelerator. Similarly, concerns could arise if the
facility were to be used for medical isotope production.
A concern has recently emerged that is indirectly related to the nonproliferation
issue.38 When attempting to purchase a new steam generator for its Sequoyah power
plant, the TVA was told by Mitsubishi in Japan that it would not sell anything to TVA
to be used on that plant because it was to be involved in producing tritium for the
U.S. nuclear weapons program. While TVA believes that it will eventually be able to
purchase a steam generator, the fact that foreign suppliers might be unwilling to sell
TVA nuclear power plant equipment because of the tritium production connection is
troubling. Over 90% of the replacement equipment for a nuclear power plant must
be obtained from foreign suppliers because there are no domestic suppliers. If a
significant fraction of those suppliers will not sell parts to TVA for either Sequoyah
or Watts Bar, then TVA could be forced to pay substantially higher prices for those
parts than if the reactors were not part of the tritium production program. Such an
occurrence might result in higher payments by DOE to TVA.
38Jeanette M. Pablo, Tennessee Valley Authority, private communication, October 1999.