State Governance of Elementary and Secondary Education

State Governance of Elementary and Secondary Education

Order Code RL30402
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
State Governance of Elementary and Secondary
Education
December 31, 1999
Richard N. Apling
Specialist in Social Legislation
Domestic Social Policy Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

ABSTRACT
This report discusses state governance of elementary and secondary education. It provides
an overview of the diversity of state governance structures — especially how state boards of
education and chief state school officers are selected. It also discusses some broader
differences in the state policymaking arena and how federal education legislation deals with
the diversity of state governance structures. This report has been prepared as background for
the consideration of the reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
(ESEA) and will not be updated.

State Governance of Elementary and Secondary Education
Summary
The 106th Congress is considering the reauthorization of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act (ESEA). In recent debates over education legislation,
Congress often wants to know how states govern their education systems. These
questions sometimes arise because of concerns about the interaction of federal
education and state governance structures.
This report discusses state education governance structures. It concentrates on
the more formal aspects of these structures, especially how state boards of education
and state superintendents (generically called the chief state school officer or CSSO)
are selected. It also deals with some broader aspects of state educational
policymaking, such as the political environments within which state education policies
are made and implemented.
Most state governance structures fit one of four models:
! The Governor appoints the state board, and the board appoints the
CSSO (12 states).The Governor appoints the state board, and the
CSSO is elected (11 states).
! The state board is elected and appoints the CSSO (8 states).
! The Governor appoints both the board and the CSSO (8 states).
The governance structures in the other 11 states do not fit these models.
State governance structures change over time. Arguably the most important
change in recent years has been the increasingly activist role Governors play in setting
the education agenda. One result of this more active role is the move away from
elected CSSOs to CSSOs appointed by the Governor, with a view to coordinating and
consolidating state educational decision making and reform.
Because of the complex variations in state educational governance systems,
federal education legislation traditionally has used very general terms to refer to state
agencies and officials. For example, statutes often list extensive requirements for
states “desiring to receive funds under this Act” but do not specify who or what
entities must conform to these requirements. A common entity identified in federal
education statutes is the state educational agency or SEA. But this is a generic term
referring to “the agency primarily responsible for state supervision of public
elementary and secondary education.”
This report has been prepared to provide background information for the
consideration of ESEA and will not be updated.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Federal Legislation and State Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The U. S. Department of Education and State Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Selection of State School Boards and Chief State School Officers . . . . . . . 4
Stability and Change in State Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Roles of State Boards and CSSOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Governance Structure and Policy Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
List of Tables
Table 1. Selection of State Boards and CSSOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Table 2. Other State Governance Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Table 3. Changes in Methods of Selecting Chief State School Officers
1972 to 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

State Governance of Elementary and Secondary
Education
Introduction
The 106th Congress is considering the reauthorization of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and other legislation that would affect elementary
and secondary education. During consideration of education legislation, Congress
often wants to know details of how states govern their educational systems. These
questions sometimes arise because of concerns that federal legislation might override
or conflict with state and local educational governance. There is also, at times, the
desire to target funds to or away from certain state entities or to make sure that
certain state entities are or are not involved in decisions affecting the administration
of federal funds.
Debate sometimes focuses on how best to respond to the changing policy
environment at the state level without “negating or superseding” state legal authority.
One important change in the state policy environment is increased contentiousness,
in part because of the higher visibility of education issues and the greater political
stakes involved. As one observer has noted, “Education used to be a bipartisan issue.
The arguments were over which districts would receive how much money. Now it’s
about ‘What is the best way to reform schools?’ It’s much more polarized.”1 In the
past, state legislatures and Governors often paid relatively little attention to education
issues. According to Michael Kirst of Stanford University, past president of the
California state board, “Many Governors were totally detached from education well
into the 1980s. Now, Governors are not just paying attention to education policy, but
how it’s implemented.”2
This report begins with an overview of how federal education statutes typically
address the variety of state educational governance systems to avoid conflict with
them. The report concentrates on governance structure — especially regarding who
is elected and who is appointed (and by whom) in various states’ structures. It also
discusses some other aspects of governance, such as the broader political environment
of educational policy decisions. This report has been prepared to provide background
information for the consideration of ESEA and will not be updated.
Federal Legislation and State Governance
1 Alan Rosenthal of Rutgers University, quoted in Sandham, Jessica L. “Partisan Politics Lend
New Twist to State Debates.” Education Week. June 9, 1999, page 1 of 5 (downloaded from
[www.edweek.org]). (Hereafter cited as Sandham, Partisan Politics.)
2 Johnston, Robert C. “Governors Vie with Chiefs on Policy, Politics.” Education Week.
May 12, 1999, page 3 of 5 (downloaded from [www.edweek.org]). (Hereafter cited as
Johnston, Governors Vie with Chiefs.)

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States vary in how they oversee and administer elementary and secondary
education. For example, although all states have a chief state school officer (this
individual has different titles in different states) and all states except Wisconsin have
state boards of education,3 states differ in how the chief and board are selected. In
some states, one or the other is elected; in other states one or the other is appointed
by the Governor; and still other states use other selection methods.
Traditionally, federal education legislation takes into account the diversity in
state governance structures by using very general references to state agencies and
officials. For example, Title I, Part A of ESEA, Section 1111(a) simply states that
“any state desiring to receive a grant under this part shall submit to the Secretary [of
Education] a plan ... that satisfies the requirements of this section. ...” Although there
are extensive requirements about the content of the plan and requirements for who
should be consulted in the plan’s development (for example, local educational
agencies (LEAs), teachers, and parents), there are no specifics about who at the state
level develops or approves the state plan.
Federal education legislation often assigns responsibilities to state educational
agencies (SEAs), but again this is not a specific state entity or individual.4 For
example, Title XIV Part A of ESEA defines state educational agency as “the agency
primarily responsible for state supervision of public elementary and secondary
schools” (Section 14101(28)).5
Another general legislative strategy to avoid contradicting or conflicting with
state governance structures is a blanket statement that nothing in the statute or parts
of a statute is meant to do this. For example, the House-passed bill to reauthorize
parts of the ESEA (H.R. 2, Section 7406), provides that, with respect to Education
of Limited English Proficient Children and Emergency Immigrant Education:
3 Minnesota has enacted a law that will abolish its state board as of December 31, 1999.
4 McCarthy, et al., note that most state educational agencies are composed of “a policy-
making state board of education, a chief state school officer, and a support staff” of the state
department of education. McCarthy, Martha, Carol Langdon, and Jeannette Olson. “State
Education Governance Structures.” ERIC number ED 369 167 (November 1993) p. 30.
(Hereafter cited as McCarthy, State Education Governance Structures.)
5 Congress has used a similar definition of SEA for decades. For example, the original Impact
Aid statute (64 Stat. 1124), enacted in 1950, defined SEA as “the officer or agency primarily
responsible for the state supervision of public elementary and secondary schools” (Section
9(7)). Many federal education statutes simply refer to the current ESEA definition. Other
statutes provide their own, somewhat different, definitions. For example, the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) defines state educational agency as “the state board of
education or other agency or officer primarily responsible for the state supervision of public
elementary and secondary schools, or, if there is no such officer or agency, an officer or
agency designated by the Governor or by state law” (Section 602(28)).

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Nothing in this title shall be construed to negate or supersede the legal authority,
under State law, of any State agency, State entity, or State public official over
programs that are under the jurisdiction of the State agency, entity, or official.6
Despite the strategy to use general language to refer to state governance
structures, some federal education legislation specifies who at the state level should
be involved in federal educational programs. For example, the Carl D. Perkins
Vocational and Applied Technology Education Act of 1998 requires states to consult
with the Governor (among others) in the development of the state plan, regardless of
the role the Governor generally plays in educational governance. The School-to-
Work Opportunities Act requires states applying for competitive implementation
grants to describe how the Governor and various state agencies, such as those dealing
with economic development, job training, and vocational rehabilitation, collaborated
in the development of the grant application. In evaluating these applications, the
federal government is to “give priority to applications that describe the highest level
of concurrence among these required collaborators,” regardless of whether any of
these agencies are generally involved with state education policy or programs.
In some legislation providing grants to states, Congress does specifically identify
which state entity should have control of federal program funds because states differ
significantly with respect to who has this control. At one end of the spectrum, some
state courts have ruled that federal funds under grant-in-aid programs must be spent
only as directed by federal law and that state legislatures have no authority over these
funds. At the other end of the spectrum, other state courts have held that federal
funds are like any other funds at the state level and are subject to the legislative
appropriations process, just as any state funds are. These differences in state practice
can be overridden by federal statute. For example, the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 specifies that funds provided under
certain provisions of the law are subject to appropriation by the state legislature.7 The
power of Congress to make such provisions is firmly established by its constitutional
power to tax and spend for the general welfare. States then have the right to accept
or reject the federal grant. If they accept the funds, they must comply with federal
requirements or face the loss of federal funding. Congress does not have to specify
which individual, entity, or agency at the state level has authority of a particular
6 Essentially identical language is contained, for example, in the Teacher Quality Enhancement
Grants for States and Partnerships program (Title II of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as
amended). In addition, this legislation defines ‘state’ as the Governor, unless the state
constitution or state law designates another individual, entity, or agency as responsible for
teacher certification.
7 P.L. 104-193, Section 901. Congress recognized that in some states the executive, not the
legislature, has authority over certain federal funds. Nevertheless the conference report states
that:
xxquotebeginIn the States in which the Governor previously had exclusive control over
Federal block grant funds, the State legislatures now would share control through the
appropriations process. However, States would continue to spend Federal funds in accord
with Federal law. (H.Rept. 104-725 to accompany H.R. 3734, p. 489)xxquoteend

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program. But if Congress makes no specification, state practices (which may differ
from state to state) may apply.8
The U. S. Department of Education and State Governance
Although a comprehensive review of the practices of the U.S. Department of
Education (ED) toward the states is beyond the scope of this report, at least one ED
office that oversees the largest ESEA program –– ESEA Title I –– appears to have
little difficulty in determining who is responsible at the state level for such decisions.
According to staff in the Title I office, Title I funds are distributed to states by means
of grant award documents, which usually specify the “Chief State School Officer of
the State of _______,” as the recipient of the funds. This person is deemed to be “the
administrative head of the state agency with primary responsibility for supervising
elementary and secondary education.”9
The Title I office also seems to have no trouble determining who or what is in
charge when a statute only specifies the “State” as having responsibility for fulfilling
federal requirements. The Title I office apparently views “State” and “SEA” as
synonymous. Title I monitoring visits are conducted at the SEA, which is seen as the
state department of public instruction or some similarly named state agency.
Selection of State School Boards and Chief State School Officers
With the exception of Wisconsin (and shortly, Minnesota), all states have state
boards of education. Many state boards focus only on elementary and secondary
education; some have additional jurisdiction over vocational education, postsecondary
education, or other education and education-related areas. All states have chief state
school officers (CSSOs), although the titles of these individuals differ — some are
secretaries of education, others are commissioners of education, still others are state
superintendents of education or state superintendents of public instruction. In
addition, some states have both a state superintendent and a secretary of education.
The latter may be a member of the Governor’s cabinet and have additional authority
over other areas, such as the arts and humanities.
A central question concerning state boards and CSSOs is how they are selected:
Are they elected or appointed, and if appointed, who appoints them? Table 1 below
categorizes states by whether the state boards are elected, appointed by the Governor,
or selected by some other means, and whether the CSSO is elected or appointed by
the state board or by the Governor. The selection of the state board is shown in the
columns of the table. In general, Boards are appointed by the Governor (31 states),
elected (10 states), or selected in some other manner (nine states, as explained in
Table 2). The selection of CSSOs is shown in the rows of the table. In general, the
8 See for a discussion of these issues: Smentkowski, Brian. “Legal Reasoning and the
Separation of Powers: A State-Level Analysis of Disputes Involving Federal Funds
Appropriations.” Law & Policy, v. 16, no. 4, October 1994. p. 395-419.
9 Telephone interview with Paul Brown of the Office of Elementary and Secondary Education
(OESE) at ED, November 24, 1999.

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CSSO is appointed by the Governor (10 states), appointed by the state board (25
states), or elected (15 states).10
Governance structures in 39 states can be described by 1 of 4 general models:
! The Governor appoints the state board, and the state board appoints
the CSSO (12 states).The Governor appoints the state board, and the
CSSO is elected (11 states).
! The state board is elected and appoints the CSSO (8 states).
! The Governor appoints both the state board and the CSSO (8
states).11
10 The categorization of states was obtained from a number of sources. Data from a recent
tabulation by the National Association of State Boards of Education (NASBE–obtained from
their website at www.nasbe.org, revised January 1999) and January 1999 data from the
Education Commission of the States (ECS) were compared with data from two earlier studies:
McCarthy, “State Education Governance Structures,” and Gary W. Badarak. “Recapturing
the Policymaking Function of State Boards of Education.” ERIC number ED 325 947
(August 1990) (Cited hereafter as Badarak, “Recapturing the Policymaking Function”.) In
cases where these sources disagreed, state constitutions, state statutes, and state websites were
consulted, and in some cases telephone calls were made to states.
11 According to the NASBE 1999 data, the District of Columbia elects its board in a
nonpartisan election, and the board appoints the CSSO. The Governor of Puerto Rico
appoints both the board and the CSSO.

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Table 1. Selection of State Boards and CSSOs
State Board of Education
Appointed by
Governor
Elected
Other
(31)
(10)
(9)
Delaware
Iowa
CSSO
Maine
Appointed
Minnesota*
by
New Jersey
Governor
South Dakota
(10)
Tennessee
Virginia**
Texas
Pennsylvania
Alaska
Arkansas
Connecticut Kentucky**
CSSO
Illinois
Alabama Colorado
Appointed
Maryland
Hawaii
by State
Massachusetts**
Kansas
Louisiana
Board (25)
Missouri
Michigan
Mississippi
New Hampshire***
Nebraska
New Mexico
Rhode Island Vermont
Nevada
New York
West Virginia
Utah
Ohio
Arizona
California
Georgia
Idaho
CSSO
Indiana
Elected
Montana
(15)
North Carolina
North Dakota Oklahoma
South Carolina
Oregon
Washington
Wyoming
Florida****
Wisconsin (no board)
*State board to be abolished after December 31, 1999.
**States that also have secretaries of education appointed by the Governor, in addition to a CSSO.
***Governor and a statewide elected council appoint state board.
****Board members are elected state officials: Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General,
Comptroller, Treasurer, Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer Services, and Commissioner
of Education. Structure will change to a governor-appointed board and board-appointed CSSO in
2003.
Eleven states do not fit any of these models. In Texas, the state board is elected,
but the Governor appoints the CSSO. In Florida, the CSSO is elected, and the state
board is composed of the Governor and six elected state officials.12 The remaining
nine states have different governance structures (particularly with respect to the
selection of the state board). These state structures are described in Table 2.
12 In 2003 Florida’s governance structure will change to one in which the Governor appoints
both the board and the CSSO, according to ECS data.

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Table 2. Other State Governance Structures
State
Governance structure
Louisiana
Board is partially elected, partially appointed by the
Governor; board appoints the CSSO.
Board is partially appointed by the Governor, partially by the
Mississippi
Lieutenant Governor, and partially by the legislature; board
appoints the CSSO.
New Mexico
Board is partially elected, partially appointed by Governor;
board appoints the CSSO.
New York
Legislature appoints the board; board appoints the CSSO.
Ohio
Board is partially elected, partially appointed by Governor;
board appoints the CSSO.
Governor appoints (and the Senate confirms) 17 members of
board (including the CSSO and the chairs of the Basic
Education Council and of the Higher Education Council);
four members come from the legislature (the majority and
Pennsylvania
minority chairs of the House and Senate Education
Committees or their designees); one member (nonvoting) is
the chair of the Professional Standards and Practices
Commission. The Governor appoints the CSSO.
The legislature appoints 16 board members; Governor
South Carolina
appoints one board member; the CSSO is elected.
The board is elected by local school boards and one member
Washington
is elected by private schools; the CSSO is elected
Wisconsin
There is no state board; CSSO is elected.
Perhaps the most notable characteristic of Tables 1 and 2 is Governors’
influence on education governance. In 22 states, he or she either appoints both the
CSSO and the state board (10 states), or appoints the state board, which in turn
appoints the CSSO (12 states). In four states, the Governor has some role in
appointing the state board, which then appoints the CSSO. In 11 states, the Governor
appoints the state board, but the CSSO is elected. The Governor apparently has no
formal role in only 13 states in state governance of education.
Stability and Change in State Governance
State educational governance does change (albeit relatively slowly) over time.
For example, Minnesota has recently enacted legislation to abolish its state board,13
13 The abolition of the Minnesota state board appears to be part of social program
consolidation, which resulted in the creation of the Department of Children, Families and
Learning in 1995. The 1998 legislation abolishes the state board at the end of 1999 and
(continued...)

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and Florida will change its structure in 2003 to one in which the state board and the
CSSO are appointed by the Governor. Table 3 shows changes in the selection
method for CSSOs since 1972. Since the 1970s, the clearest trend has been change
from elected CSSOs to CSSOs appointed by the Governor.
Table 3. Changes in Methods of Selecting Chief State School Officers
1972 to 1999
Year
Method of
selection
1972
1986
1988
1999
Elected
38%
30%
32%
30%
Appointed by State
Board
52%
56%
54%
50%
Appointed by
Governor
10%
14%
14%
20%
Sources: Badarak, “Recapturing the Policymaking Function,” p. 12 and NASBE and ECS data.
Observers disagree on whether the trend toward appointed boards and CSSOs
is a good thing. Bill Honig, a former elected California state superintendent, who
fought over education issues with that state’s Governor (who was not a member of
his political party), believes that the Governor should appoint the CSSO. “It’s better
to have the Governor on the hook. He or she has a program. It gets implemented.
You have accountability. With split governance, it gets too wishy-washy.” Others
disagree. The current Wisconsin Superintendent of Public Instruction (like Honig,
elected on a nonpartisan ballot) argues that a separate election of state school officials
“keeps partisan politics far away from children in the school. I don’t report to anyone
but the public. If they don’t like you, they throw you out.”14
Roles of State Boards and CSSOs
In discussing the roles of state boards and CSSOs, it is important to remember
that state constitutions generally authorize legislatures to provide for public schooling.
Thus the role of state boards and CSSOs is always legally secondary to the role of the
legislature. In addition, in recent years Governors have played an increasingly active
13 (...continued)
transfers most of its responsibilities to the commissioner of that department. According to the
chief fiscal analyst for the Minnesota House of Representatives, there were additional reasons
–– besides centralizing and consolidating social programs –– for the demise of the board.
“The board’s downfall in 1998 ... seemed to be triggered by the reaction of legislators and the
Governor to the board’s willingness to take on some very controversial issues — rewriting
state rules on school desegregation and integration and student diversity.” Marx, Bill.
“Minnesota Education Governance Undergoes Structural Changes.” State Education Leader,
v. 17, no. 1, Winter 1999. p. 18.
14 Both quotes are taken from the article in Johnston, Governors Vie with Chiefs. p. 3.

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role in setting education agendas, irrespective of what formal arrangements states
have for setting and implementing educational policy.15
According to McCarthy, although state boards’ power and authority vary from
state to state,
most have some quasi-legislative and/or quasi-judicial authority. For
example, they usually adopt rules and regulations and formulate policies that
supplement those prescribed by the legislature, and they often serve as the
final stage in the administrative appeals process regarding education
controversies.16
In addition, state boards make recommendations for funding levels and other
legislation to the Governor and legislature.
A 1987 study quoted by McCarthy lists six authorities that most state boards
have:
! Establish certification standards for teachers and administrators,
! Establish high school graduation requirements,
! Establish state testing and assessment programs,
! Establish standards for accreditation for local school districts and
preparation programs for teachers and administrators,Review and
approve the budget of the state education agency, and
! Develop rules and regulations for the administration of state
programs.17
As noted above, state boards in 25 states have the authority to appoint the CSSO.
Apparently no more recent comprehensive study of state boards’ roles has
been done, although boards’ roles have changed since the 1980s. Perhaps the most
notable change involves teacher certification. Nearly all states have established
separate teacher standards boards. Some of these boards serve in an advisory
capacity, but others have taken over policy setting for teacher certification.18
While the CSSO’s duties and authority vary from state to state, according to
McCarthy, they may include:
! Heading the state department of education and directing the activities
of its staff,Adjudicating educational controversies,
! Proposing and influencing legislation and policy setting, and
15 This point is illustrated by numerous current and former Governors – of states as diverse
as South Carolina and Wisconsin – who have built their statewide and even national
reputations, in part, on their accomplishments in elementary and secondary education.
16 McCarthy, State Education Governance Structures, p. 11.
17 Ibid.
18 ECS Information Clearinghouse, 1996. See: [www.ecs.org].

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! In some states (mostly those in which the CSSO is elected), serving
as a voting or nonvoting member of the state board.19
Governance Structure and Policy Making
In addition to this broad description of governance structures, state structures
differ in other respects. In fact, if each state structure were described in full, it would
be clear that no two structures are identical. But even a full description of each
state’s education governance structure would only suggest how state educational
policy is actually made.
For one thing, these structures do not indicate the degree to which educational
decision making is centralized or decentralized in various states. In some states,
curriculum, textbook decisions, teacher salaries, and other basic issues are decided
mostly at the state level. In addition, in some states a great deal of the funding for
elementary and secondary education is provided at the state level. In other states,
many of these decisions and much of the funding for education may be left more to
local school boards and local general governments.20 Badarak points out that
centralization vs. decentralization tends to follow regional patterns and traditions. In
the New England states, with a tradition of strong local government, educational
decisions have traditionally been more locally centered. Decentralized decision
making is also more typical in the Rocky Mountain states. In the South, educational
decisions have traditionally been more centralized at the state level. Other states fall
somewhere in between these alternatives.21
A major difference in formal governance structures, as Table 1 shows, is
whether the state board or the CSSO is elected or appointed. Elected boards and
elected chiefs are sometimes thought to be more independent actors because they
have their own political base of support. This is not always the case, however. In
1995, North Carolina, which has an elected state school superintendent, saw the
power of that individual removed by the legislature and given to the state board
(which is appointed by the Governor). The state board, in turn, hired a deputy
superintendent, who actually ran the department of public instruction. The state
superintendent became essentially a figurehead. Within 2 years, the situation had been
basically reversed. A new state superintendent was elected (one presumably more
acceptable to the state board), and the powers that had been removed from his
predecessor were restored.22
19 McCarthy, State Education Governance Structures, p. 19.
20 For example, nearly all (99.6%) of the nonfederal funding for public elementary and
secondary education in Hawaii is provided by the state; while only about 7% of the nonfederal
education funding in New Hampshire comes from the state. U.S. Department of Education.
National Center for Education Statistics. Digest of Education Statistics, 1998. Washington,
1999. Table 158 (data for school year 1995-1996).
21 Badarak, Recapturing the Policymaking Function, p. 8.
22 See Education Week. “N.C. Posed to Slash Size, Power of State Education Agency.”
March 8, 1995 and Education Week. “N.C. Board Votes to Restore Power to State
(continued...)

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Another assumption is that boards or chiefs elected in nonpartisan elections
may be less likely to reflect political leanings in their administration of state education
policy. But again, this is not always the case. One example involves a grant to
California under the Goals 2000 program. ED had accepted California’s Goals 2000
application (submitted by the state superintendent, who is elected in a nonpartisan
election) and awarded $42.1 million to the state. The Governor, however, blocked
the use of the grant on the grounds that he “just wanted to know what” strings were
attached to the money.23 The Governor finally agreed to accept the funds, although
on the condition that the state board of education act as the oversight panel.24
The formal structures of educational governance also do not recognize the
broader political context within which state educational policy is set. It is sometimes
assumed that conflict over education policy is more likely if various actors in the state
policy arena belong to different parties. If the Governor is of one party and the other
party controls the legislature or if the Governor and the chief have different party
affiliations, education (and other policy) debates may be more contentious. On the
other hand, under this supposition, if all actors are in the same party, there are likely
to be fewer policy disputes. The table in the appendix displays the party of each
state’s Governor, the majority party in each state senate and house, the party
affiliations of state board members (if elected on partisan ballots), and the party of the
chief (if elected by party). As of January 2000 (excluding Nebraska, which has a
unicameral legislature elected on a nonpartisan basis), 25 states have Governors and
one or both houses of the state legislature that are of different parties.
Of course having different party affiliations among primary education policy
makers does not necessarily mean that policy making will be contentious. Nor does
having all policy makers in the same party guarantee harmony. Sometimes rivalry
between the Governor and the legislature overshadows party unity and party
differences. For example, disagreements over educational reform in Pennsylvania
reportedly have arisen between the Governor and the legislature more than among
legislators from different parties. According to Education Week,
Even as Gov. Tom Ridge, a Republican, has continued to push a school
reform agenda that would provide publicly financed tuition vouchers for
students in various school districts to attend private or religious schools,
members of both the Republican and Democratic leadership of the House and
Senate education committees have maintained a strong stance against
vouchers.25
22 (...continued)
Superintendent.” January 15, 1997. Available from: [www.edweek.org].
23 Education Daily. “California Governor Puts Goals 2000 Grant on Ice.” October 10, 1995.
(The quote is attributed to the California assistant secretary for child development and
education.) Note that while the chief state school officer is elected on a nonpartisan ballot,
she was not a member of the Governor’s party.
24 See Education Week. “In Change of Heart, Wilson to Accept Goals 2000 Funds.” May
1, 1996. p. 13.
25 Sandham, Partisan Politics, p. 3.

CRS-12
Another example in which other considerations overrode party affiliation
reportedly occurred recently in Georgia. According to Education Week,
Democratic Gov. Zell Miller launched a purge of the [state school] board in
October [1996], in hopes that new members could get along with Linda C.
Schrenko, the state schools superintendent. Mr. Miller asked all of his
appointees to the board to resign — a last-ditch effort to end months of
bickering between Ms. Schrenko, a Republican, and the board, which was
controlled by Democrats.26
Finally the courts are sometimes the final arbitrators of conflicts over state
education governance. A recent article in Education Week27 gives several examples.
! In 1993, the California state board won the right, over the state
superintendent, to determine educational priorities for the state
system.The Wisconsin state supreme court overruled a 1996 state
law that would have stripped most of the elected superintendent’s
power and would have allowed the Governor to appoint a state
commission of education.
! In Michigan, a suit is still pending regarding the Governor’s 1996
executive order, which would shift power from the elected state
board to the Governor-appointed CSSO.
Conclusions
State educational governance structures are diverse. While four models can
describe the broad outlines of formal structures in 39 states, a comprehensive
description of how each state governs its elementary and secondary educational
system would reveal that no two states are identical. In addition, broader state policy
and political arenas add to the difficulty in understanding educational governance. An
important change in these arenas over the last 10 or 15 years has been the increased
role of Governors in determining educational agendas and in setting and implementing
educational policy. Governors’ increased involvement can be attributed, in part, to
the growing visibility and importance of educational issues. In turn, the growth in
visibility and importance of these issues has led, in some states, to conflicts between
the Governor and other state-level actors and has made educational policy making
more complex and often more contentious.
Congress has responded to the diversity and complexity of state educational
governance in several ways. Traditionally federal education legislation has employed
very general language in referring to state educational structures. Federal legislation
often makes the state, in general, or the SEA responsible for fulfilling statutory
requirements and implementing federal education programs at the state level without
specifying which individuals or entities will be held accountable.
26 Jacobson, Linda. “Ga. Governor Purges Board to End Bickering with Schrenko.”
Education Week, January 15, 1997, p. 1. Obtained from: [www.edweek.org].
27 Johnston, Governors Vie with Chiefs. p. 4.

CRS-13
More recently, in part in response to the increased involvement of Governors
in setting and implementing state education policy, Congress sometimes specifies a
role for the Governor or other state entities (in addition to or instead of the SEA) in
implementing federal education programs. In some cases, statutes require that the
Governor (and others) be consulted in developing the state plan to implement a
federal program. In other cases, Congress provides incentives for collaboration
between the SEA and the Governor (and other state agencies). In still other cases,
Congress makes the Governor responsible for implementing the federal program,
unless the state constitution or state law specifically establishes some other entity,
agency, or individual as responsible.
Another way federal education legislation recognizes the diversity of state
governance structures is the use of a general provision that nothing in the statute shall
be interpreted as negating or superseding state legal authority over programs under
the jurisdiction of state officials or entities. This language sometimes accompanies
statutory language that specifically defines a role for the Governor or other state
entities.
Statutes that contain provisions that both define new state roles and avoid
“negating or superseding” state law illustrate the difficult decisions Congress faces in
crafting education legislation. One the one hand, there is the desire to support change
in state governance structures, most notably the increased role of Governors. On the
other hand is the desire to emphasize the secondary role that the federal government
plays in determining educational policy and to leave most educational decisions
(including who is in charge of elementary and secondary education) to state and local
decision makers. It can be argued that the traditional legislative approach is a useful
strategy for achieving both goals. Broad references to the state and to “the state
agency or official primarily responsible for the state supervision of elementary and
secondary education” recognize that a variety of state authorities (including the
Governor) may be involved in educational policy making, while recognizing that it is
each state’s right and responsibility to determine the specific agencies and officials
who oversee public elementary and secondary education.

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APPENDIX
Party Affiliations of Governors, State Legislatures, and State Boards of
Education and Chief State School Officers (if elected on partisan ballots) as
of December 1999
Senate
House
(majority (majority
State
Governor
party)
party)
Board
Chief
Elected: Dem. 4,
Rep. 4, Gov. breaks
Alabama
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
tie
Board Appt.
Alaska
Dem.
Rep.
Rep.
Gov. Appt.
Board Appt.
Arizona
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Gov. Appt.
Elected: Rep.
Arkansas
Rep.
Dem.
Dem.
Gov. Appt.
Board Appt.
Elected:
California
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
Gov. Appt.
Nonpart.
Elected: Rep. 6,
Colorado
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Dem. 1
Board Appt.
Connecticut
Rep.
Dem.
Dem.
Gov. Appt.
Board Appt.
Delaware
Dem.
Dem.
Rep.
Gov. Appt.
Gov. Appt.
Cabinet (Rep. 3,
Dem. 3) and Gov.
Florida
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
sit as state board
Elected: Rep.
Georgia
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
Gov. Appt.
Elected: Rep.
Hawaii
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
Elected: Nonpart.
Board Appt.
Idaho
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Gov. Appt.
Elected: Dem.
Illinois
Rep.
Rep.
Dem.
Gov. Appt.
Board Appt.
Indiana
Dem.
Rep.
Dem.
Gov. Appt.
Elected: Rep.
Iowa
Dem.
Rep.
Rep.
Gov. Appt.
Gov. Appt.
Elected: Rep. 8,
Kansas
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Dem. 2
Board Appt.
Kentucky
Dem.
Rep.
Dem.
Gov. Appt.
Board Appt.
Louisiana
Rep.
Dem.
Dem.
Other
Board Appt.
Maine
Indep.
Dem.
Dem.
Gov. Appt.
Gov. Appt.
Maryland
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
Gov. Appt.
Board Appt.
Massachusetts
Rep.
Dem.
Dem.
Gov. Appt.
Board Appt.
Elected: Dem. 4,
Michigan
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep 4 no tie break
Board Appt.
Minnesota
Reform
Dem.
Rep.
Gov. Appt.
Gov. Appt.
Mississippi
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
Other
Board Appt.
Missouri
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
Gov. Appt.
Board Appt.
Montana
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Gov. Appt.
Elected: Dem.

CRS-15
Senate
House
(majority (majority
State
Governor
party)
party)
Board
Chief
Nebraska
Rep.
Unicameral– Nonpart. Elected: Nonpart.
Board Appt.
Nevada
Rep.
Rep.
Dem.
Elected: Nonpart.
Board Appt.
New
Hampshire
Dem.
Dem.
Rep.
Gov. Appt.
Board Appt.
New Jersey
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Gov. Appt.
Gov. Appt.
New Mexico
Rep.
Dem.
Dem.
Other
Board Appt.
New York
Rep.
Rep.
Dem.
Other
Board Appt.
North
Carolina
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
Gov. Appt.
Elected: Dem.
Elected:
North Dakota
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Gov. Appt.
Nonpart.
Ohio
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Other
Board Appt.
Oklahoma
Rep.
Dem.
Dem.
Gov. Appt.
Elected: Dem.
Elected:
Oregon
Dem.
Rep.
Rep.
Gov. Appt.
Nonpart.
Pennsylvania
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Other
Gov. Appt.
Rhode Island
Rep.
Dem.
Dem.
Gov. Appt.
Board Appt.
South
Carolina
Dem.
Dem.
Rep.
Other
Elected: Dem.
South Dakota
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Gov. Appt.
Gov. Appt.
Tennessee
Rep.
Dem.
Dem.
Gov. Appt.
Gov. Appt.
Elected: 9 Rep., 6
Texas
Rep.
Rep.
Dem.
Dem.
Gov. Appt.
Utah
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Elected: Nonpart.
Board Appt.
Vermont
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
Gov. Appt.
Board Appt.
Virginia
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Gov. Appt.
Gov. Appt.
Elected:
Washington
Dem.
Dem.
Tied.
Other
Nonpart.
West Virginia
Rep.
Dem.
Dem.
Gov. Appt.
Board Appt.
Elected:
Wisconsin
Rep.
Dem.
Rep.
No board
Nonpart.
Wyoming
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Gov. Appt.
Elected: Rep.
Sources: National Governors’ Association; National Conference on State Legislatures; McCarthy
“State Education Governance Structures;” telephone calls to selected states.