NATO Burdensharing and Kosovo: A Preliminary Report

NATO Burdensharing and Kosovo: A Preliminary Report

Order Code RL30398
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
NATO Burdensharing and Kosovo:
A Preliminary Report
January 3, 2000
Coordinated by (name redacted)
Specialist in International Relations
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

ABSTRACT
On March 24, 2999, NATO launched Operation Allied Force against Yugoslavia. Allied
Force, conducted almost entirely from the air, was intended to halt Yugoslavia's brutal,
systematic expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. The air war continued until June 10,
when Belgrade capitulated. Each NATO country that participated in Allied Force was
responsible for funding its own armed forces. U.S. aircraft flew the majority of missions, and
U.S. policymakers have argued that the United States paid too large a share of the conflict's
cost. The international effort to bring peace and stability to Kosovo, however, was more than
just an offensive military operation. Peacekeeping activities, humanitarian relief, refugee
assistance, and reconstruction aid will likely total in the billions of dollars, and European
nations have stated they intend to play a leading role. There is no single source of consistent
dataon how much each NATO member state contributed to the military and non-military
activities related to Kosovo. To gain an approximate idea of relative costs, CRS contacted
the embassies of NATO member states and requested they provide their expenditures
associated with Kosovo. Other data in the report have been derived from pledges announced
at two donor conferences held in Brussels. It should be emphasized that, unless and until more
complete information becomes available, the numbers presented in this report should be
regarded only as rough guides to contributions. This report will be updated as CRS receives
additional information.

NATO Burdensharing and Kosovo:
A Preliminary Report
Summary
On March 24, 1999 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched
Operation Allied Force against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. The military
operation, which the alliance conducted almost entirely from the air, was intended to
finally put a halt the Yugoslav government’s brutal, systematic expulsion of ethnic
Albanians from Kosovo, a province of Serbia. The air war continued until June 10,
when Belgrade capitulated to allied demands.
Allied Force was not paid for by a “NATO” budget. As in NATO exercises over
the past decades, each country that participated in Allied Force was responsible for
the expense of equipping and employing its own armed forces. U.S. aircraft flew the
majority of the combat, intelligence, and support missions. Many U.S. policymakers
have argued that the United States paid too large a share of the conflict’s cost.
The international effort to bring peace and stability to Kosovo, however, was
more than just an offensive military operation. Peacekeeping activities, humanitarian
relief, refugee assistance and reconstruction aid, in the form of bilateral, multilateral,
and private donations, will likely total in the billions of dollars over the long term, and
the European nations have indicated that they intend to play a leading roll.
There is no single, definitive source of consistent data on how much each NATO
member state contributed to the various military and non-military activities related to
Kosovo. To gain an approximate idea of relative costs, CRS contacted the embassies
of NATO member states and requested that they provide their expenditures associated
with Kosovo. Other data in the report have been derived from pledges announced at
the donor conferences that were held in July and November 1999 in Brussels.
It should be emphasized that, unless and until more complete information
becomes available, the numbers presented in the summary table at the conclusion of
this report should be regarded only as a rough guide to contributions. Any
comparison of these data can only be tentative, primarily because of the countries’
different national accounting practices. In addition, these numbers should not simply
be added together to reach a total, as they often cover different time periods.
This report was coordinated by (name redacted)
of the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and
Trade Division (FDT) of CRS; other FDT contributors include: Steven Bowman
(allied defense spending), Lois McHugh (refugee assistance), (name redacted)
(reconstruction), and Steven Daggett (U.S. defense budget). The report will be
updated as CRS receives additional information.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Costs of Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Non-military Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
NATO Humanitarian Assistance to Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Reconstruction and Development Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
List of Tables
Table 1. Incremental Costs of U.S. Kosovo-Related
Military Operations, FY1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Table 2. Estimated NATO Member State
Contributions to Kosovo Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

NATO Burdensharing and Kosovo:
A Preliminary Report
Introduction
On March 24, 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched
Operation Allied Force, the first combined military action in the alliance’s 50-year
history. In an effort to halt the Yugoslav government’s brutal, months-long ethnic
cleansing campaign against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo province, NATO aircraft
struck military targets in all regions of the country—Serbia, Kosovo, Voivodina, and
Montenegro.1
When Belgrade finally capitulated and the air war was halted 78 days later,
NATO aircraft had flown more than 37,000 sorties, of which 23,000, or 62%, were
made by American aircraft. The U.S. Department of Defense also stated that U.S.
planes flew the majority of intelligence (79%) and support (65%) missions for the
Kosovo operation.2
NATO, as an organization, did not pay for Operation Allied Force; that is, the
costs incurred were not financed by the alliance’s three common budgets.3 As has
been the case in NATO exercises over the past five decades, each country that
participated in Operation Allied Force was responsible for the expense of equipping
and employing its own armed forces; in other words, those costs were paid for by the
national budgets of member states.
Operation Allied Force was predominately an air operation, with some naval
support. Because the alliance wished to minimize civilian casualties, NATO preferred
to use high-tech, precision-guided ordnance — including cruise missiles and so-called
“smart bombs.” Since the United States is the only alliance nation that possesses
significant stockpiles of such weapons (most of which are far more expensive than
conventional gravity bombs) U.S. aircraft conducted the majority of the attack sorties.
1For background and a discussion of political issues, see: U.S. Library of Congress.
Congressional Research Service. Kosovo and U.S. Policy. By (name redacted) and (name
redacted). CRS Issue Brief IB98041. [updated regularly]
2U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Kosovo: U.S. and Allied
Military Operations. By (name redacted). CRS Issue Brief IB10027. p. 5. [updated
regularly].
3For a description of NATO’s common budgets, see: U.S. Library of Congress.
Congressional Research Service. NATO Common Funds Burdensharing: Background and
Current Issues. By Carl W. Ek. CRS Report RL30150. Updated April 27, 1999.

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Also, NATO command selected targets largely on the basis of information gleaned
from U.S. intelligence sources.4
Given this extensive use of U.S. military resources, many U.S. policymakers have
raised the issue of allied burdensharing. Indeed, some observers speculate that the
manner in which the allies shares costs for the Kosovo operation in its entirety may
affect future European security issues, such as the next round of NATO enlargement.5
The purpose of the air attacks in the former Yugoslavia was not simply to inflict
unacceptable losses on the enemy and compel surrender. Instead, the cessation of
hostilities was made contingent upon Serbian agreement to several interrelated
political conditions. In early May, while the bombing campaign was still underway,
the G-8 group of leading industrial states (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States, plus Russia) agreed upon several objectives:
an end to Serb military actions in Kosovo; the withdrawal of Serb forces from
Kosovo; the insertion of a U.N.-approved peacekeeping contingent; U.N.-approved
interim international administration of the province; refugee repatriation and safe
access for aid organizations; and economic redevelopment as well as a degree of
autonomy for Kosovo within the former Yugoslavia.
The Kosovo crisis, therefore, has had several components, both military and non-
military. In addition to Allied Force, allied armed forces participated in two other
major efforts: Operation Allied Harbor (aid to Kosovar refugees in Macedonia and
Albania), and Operation Joint Guardian (peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, also
known by the acronym KFOR). Non-military undertakings also have encompassed
a wide range of activities, including humanitarian aid, refugee assistance, institution
building (training in the general areas of justice and governance), and reconstruction.
Some Members of Congress have voiced concern that the large U.S. outlays for
Kosovo are diverting funding from armed forces readiness and equipment
procurement. Many have adamantly stated that Europe should assume a greater share
of costs for subsequent operations. The Clinton Administration has announced its
agreement with this principle. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright indicated in early
June that Europe should pay the majority of reconstruction costs, and, in a speech on
June 10, President Clinton said that “our European partners must provide most of the
4Some analysts argue that this imbalance in technological capabilities is a result of the large
disparity between the amount of funds that the United States and Europe devote to research
and development, and are concerned that it may lead to (or in effect already constitutes) a
“two-tiered” alliance of powers of greater and lesser capabilities. For more on this issue, see:
War Showed U.S.-Allied Inequality. By William Drozdiak. Washington Post. June 28,
1999. p. A1. And: After Kosovo, European Allies Discuss Modernizing Forces. By
Elizabeth Becker. New York Times. September 22, 1999. p. A11. And: Is More Fancy
Weaponry Really What the alliance Needs? By Flora Lewis. International Herald Tribune.
September 24, 1999.
5For a discussion of this issue, see: U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research
Service. NATO: Congress Addresses Expansion of the Alliance. By Paul E. Gallis. CRS
Report RL30192. May 24, 1999.

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resources” for restoring peace in Kosovo.6 And the NATO allies appear to concur.
The Washington Post in June reported that “European leaders, embarrassed by U.S.
domination of the air war and the fact that the United States again took the lead in
quelling a European conflict, vowed to carry their share of the burden in bringing a
program of reconstruction to Kosovo and the rest of the Balkans.”7
This CRS report, accordingly, examines the question of burdensharing based
upon total contributions to meeting the international community’s policy objectives
in Kosovo. It considers not only outlays for military actions, but also expenditures
for humanitarian and redevelopment assistance. This is consonant with recent
approaches to defense burdensharing; over the past decade, the term “security” has
been redefined to encompass more than simply military matters. Many policymakers
now accept the thesis that national and regional security may be enhanced through
economic and humanitarian assistance, as well as through the deployment of armed
forces.8 The Defense Department’s annual burdensharing report notes: “For the last
three years, ... Congress has recognized that there are multiple and diverse ways in
which allies may share the responsibility for achieving mutual security objectives.”9
Methodology
The data in this report are based primarily upon information that CRS gathered,
over a three-month period, from the Washington embassies of NATO member states
(several embassies did not respond to CRS’ request for information). In compiling
and attempting to correlate these numbers, some difficulties have arisen. For
example, changes in exchange rates may play a role. In many cases, countries
provided CRS their Kosovo contributions in U.S. dollars. Some submissions,
however, were reported in foreign currencies, and have been converted into U.S.
dollars based upon exchange rates prevailing shortly before this report was published.
There may therefore be relatively small discrepancies or variations among
contributions based upon exchange rate fluctuations.
Differences in national accounting practices may constitute a more significant
source of uncertainty. There is a great deal of variety in the structures and time
periods of the budgets of NATO members. This has created certain problems for
making direct comparisons. For example:
6Address to the Nation by the President. June 10, 1999. White House web page:
[http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/6/11/1.text.1]
7Yugoslavs Begin Kosovo Retreat. By Thomas W. Lippman. The Washington Post. June
11, 1999. p. A1.
8European analysts have argued that, under this definition, they have paid far more on regional
security in recent years — especially through generous assistance programs to Eastern Europe
and Russia — than has the United States. See: Sharing Common Risks: The EU View. By
Lionel Barber. Europe. March, 1998. p. 9.
9U.S. Department of Defense. Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense. A
Report to the United States Congress by the Secretary of Defense. March, 1999.
[http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied_contrib99/toc.html]

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! Some NATO members have combined military (especially peacekeeping
operations) and non-military (especially humanitarian) assistance.
! Some governments have provided the estimated amounts that they spent up to
the date of submission, while other governments have given estimates for
entire calendar years.
! Some countries have specifically identified incremental costs, that is, costs
over and above the normal operational and maintenance expenditures for their
militaries; however, the criteria used to define such expenditures may differ
from country to country.
! Some governments have not separated their bilateral assistance to Kosovo
from assistance provided through international organizations such as the EU
or various United Nations (UN) agencies.
! In some cases, funding refers to regional aid, including not only for Kosovo,
but for the rest of Yugoslavia and for neighboring countries such as Macedonia
and Albania.
Differences arising from these factors might alter somewhat the relative
contributions of the member states. Accounting differences notwithstanding, these
figures may provide a useful snapshot of the costs incurred by NATO allies in
responding to the latest Balkan crisis. The following sections describe the military
and non-military support that has been provided and/or pledged by members of the
alliance.
Costs of Military Operations
According to estimates provided by the Department of Defense (DOD)
Comptroller on December 3, 1999, U.S. costs of the air campaign, the KFOR
peacekeeping operation, and refugee assistance through September 30, 1999, total
$2.95 billion. These figures do not, however, include funds to replace munitions used
in the campaign, to improve munitions stockpiles, and to restore the readiness of units
affected by, but not directly involved in, operations against Yugoslavia. In all,
Congress appropriated $2.10 billion for these purposes, and senior Pentagon officials
have said that the Defense Department expects to use all, or almost all, of this
amount. When these figures are added, estimated U.S. costs of Operation Allied
Force, Operation Joint Guardian/KFOR, and DOD-provided refugee relief in FY1999
total $5.05 billion. Table 1 summarizes these, and some related costs.

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Table 1. Incremental Costs of U.S. Kosovo-Related
Military Operations, FY1999
(millions of dollars)
Operation Allied Force/KFOR
Operation Noble Anvil (Operation Allied Force – Air War)
1,775.7
Joint Guardian (KFOR)
1,050.2
Sustain Hope (DOD-Provided Refugee Relief)
124.6
Readiness and Munitions Contingency Reserve
1,100.0
Procurement of Munitions
697.9
Operational Readiness Response Account
300.0
Total
5,048.4
Pre-Allied Force Operations
Balkan Calm (Diplomatic Observer Mission Before Air War)
34.6
Eagle Eye (Air Verification Mission, October 1998-March 1999)
20.3
Sources: Department of Defense Comptroller, December 3, 1999; P.L. 106-31.
The Administration has not yet provided formal estimates of costs of
peacekeeping operations in Kosovo in FY2000, but officials expect to submit a
supplemental appropriations request in February, when the FY2001 budget request
is released. In a September 9 briefing for the House Appropriations Committee,
officials provided a preliminary estimate that the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo
will cost the United States $2.04 billion in FY2000.
NATO nations provided cost estimates for military operations in a variety of
formats, making direct comparison difficult. Some aggregated the costs for all
Kosovo-related operations carried out by their armed forces, whether military or
humanitarian in nature. Others identified the costs of specific operations. Hungary
and Greece did not contribute military forces to the NATO air offensive, but provided
logistical support (airbases and port facilities) for which there are no cost estimates.
The time-frame covered by these estimates also varies. For example, the United
Kingdom’s estimate included expenditures only through July 1999, and made no
projection for continuing peace-keeping operations; Italy projected peace-keeping
costs through December 1999, but did not provide costs for Allied Force; and France
provided a per annum projection for peace-keeping operations. Each nation’s
estimate reflected only incremental costs, i.e., those over and above normal operating
costs; however, nations vary in how they calculate these costs, and CRS has not been
provided the details of these calculations.
For command purposes, Kosovo-related military activities are divided into
discrete operations mentioned above. They are:

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! Operation Allied Force – Air offensive conducted in Serbia and Kosovo
(March 25-June 10).
! Operation Allied Harbor – Kosovar refugee assistance in Albania and
Macedonia (April 14-September 1).
! Operation Joint Guardian – Peace-keeping operations in Kosovo (June 11-
present).
To summarize the estimates received from the embassies:
Belgium. The Belgian government has not provided military cost information
for Kosovo operations.
Canada. The Canadian government has not provided military cost information
for Kosovo operations.
Czech Republic. The Czech Republic’s military did not participate in Operation
Allied Force, but provided a field hospital and established a refugee camp in Albania
at a cost of $8.5 million. The Czech government estimated that its participation in
Operation Joint Guardian through 1999 will cost $15.5 million.
Denmark. The Danish government estimated its total costs for military Kosovo-
related operations for 1999 to be $57-59 million, and provided the following cost
breakout: Operation Allied Force – $6.8-7.4 million; Operation Allied Harbor –
$4.0-4.8 million; Operation Joint Guardian – $46.2 million; Adriatic Sea mine-
clearing – $272,000.
France. The French government estimated that its total cost for Operation
Allied Force was $203.2 million, and that its participation in Operation Joint
Guardian will cost approximately $192 million per year.
Germany. The German government estimated that its Ministry of Defense spent
$454 million on Kosovo-related operations, both military and humanitarian, as of
September 1999, noting that additional incremental costs are still being determined.
The Ministry of Defense also estimated that 2000 Kosovo operations will cost $910
million.
Greece. Greek military forces did not participate in Operation Allied Force,
although Greece did provide logistical support through the use of its port facilities in
Thessaloniki. There were no estimates, however, of the costs of this contribution.
The Greek government estimated that its costs for participating in Operation Joint
Guardian will be $3.3 million a month, or about $40 million a year.
Hungary. Hungarian military forces did not directly participate in Operation
Allied Force. Logistical support was provided to NATO aircraft using Hungarian
airfields; however, a cost estimate for this support was not available. The Hungarian
government estimated that its participation in Operation Joint Guardian will cost
$18.7 million in 1999.
Iceland. Iceland has no military forces, and consequently no military costs
associated with Kosovo operations.

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Italy. The Italian government provided no cost estimate for its participation in
Operation Allied Force. It estimated that its costs for Operation Allied Harbor and
Operation Joint Guardian will be $222 million through 1999.
Luxembourg. Luxembourg has had no direct military participation in either
Operation Allied Force or Joint Guardian.
Netherlands. The Dutch government’s cost estimate for both Operation Allied
Force and Operation Joint Guardian (through August, 1999) totaled $107.5 million.
Norway. The Norwegian government estimated its costs of participation in
Operation Allied Force at $19.1 million, and forecast that participation in Operation
Joint Guardian will cost $94.9 million through 1999, and $164 million in 2000.
Poland. The Polish government estimated its military expenditures (1999) at $2
million for Operation Allied Harbor, and $9.6 million for Operation Joint Guardian.
Portugal. The Portuguese government estimated the cost of its participation in
Operation Allied Force to be $6.0 million, and an additional $65,000 on Operation
Allied Harbor. Costs for Operation Joint Guardian were expected to total $44.85
million through 1999.
Spain. The Spanish government’s cost estimate for its participation in
Operation Allied Force totaled $23 million, and its costs for Operation Joint
Guardian were expected to total $57.3 million through 1999.
Turkey. The Turkish government estimated its costs for Operation Allied
Force to be $26 million, and that its participation in Operation Joint Guardian will
cost $30 million annually.
United Kingdom. The British government estimated its costs for all Kosovo-
related military operations through July 1999 to total $136 million. Longer term cost
forecasts were not available.
Non-military Initiatives
NATO Humanitarian Assistance to Kosovo
U.S. assistance committed to Kosovo between March 1998 and November 1999
is an estimated $452.63 million. This amount includes $120.37 million from U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster funds,
$70.60 million in Food for Peace commodities, $12.48 million in USAID Office of
Transition Initiative funds, $201.24 million in Department of State refugee funds, and
$47.95 million in DoD humanitarian assistance funds.10 The total also includes U.S.
10U.S. Agency for International Development, Bureau for Humanitarian Response, Office of
(continued...)

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cash and material contributions to U.N. agencies and to bilateral and private voluntary
organizations. It does not include the cost of resettling refugees in the United
States.11
Several factors complicate the measurement of humanitarian contributions of
other NATO states to alleviating the Kosovo crisis:
! The needs are wide-ranging, often uncertain, and changeable. A request for
particular supplies may be rescinded on a closer needs assessment or changed
circumstances, or a crisis may develop requiring new assistance quickly.
! There is no single, timely source for reporting all humanitarian contributions.
In recent years, U.N. humanitarian assistance agencies instituted joint appeals
for funds, which allowed donors to report their U.N. contributions through the
U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), but this
information is several months out of date, and does not include bilateral aid.
! For a variety of reasons, pledges are not always matched by actual
contributions.
! Expenditures for humanitarian aid may extend to countries far from the
disaster.
! Some European countries channeled much of their assistance through
international organizations such as the U.N. or EU. Contributions to Kosovo
from those bodies may not be broken out by individual countries.
As noted above, data on NATO member humanitarian aid expenditures for
Kosovo were provided to CRS by the governments of those countries. The responses
have different levels of comprehensiveness; many, for example, did not include costs
for hosting Kosovar refugees. In addition, not all of the responses clearly separated
humanitarian contributions from reconstruction or military expenditures. Therefore,
the following information provides only a very rough estimate of the amounts and
types of humanitarian assistance provided.
Belgium. The Belgian government has not provided information on
humanitarian assistance for Kosovo.
Canada. The Canadian government has not provided information on
humanitarian assistance for Kosovo.
10(...continued)
U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance. Kosovo Crisis Factsheet #131. December 10, 1999. Note:
not all DoD expenditures are included.
11For information on the refugee resettlement in the United States, including the Kosovars, see:
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Refugee Admission and
Resettlement Policy: Facts and Issues. By Joyce Vialet. CRS Report 98-668 EPW.
Updated October 22, 1999.

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Czech Republic. In addition to the military medical assistance spending cited
above, Czech aid provided through June 10 included asylum for 1,000 refugees and
for their return valued at $9 million, and humanitarian assistance valued at $5.6
million. Additional assistance was provided by the government through non-
governmental agencies, but was not assigned a monetary value.
Denmark. The Danish government estimated its costs as of July 13 at $42
million for asylum, and $79-91.6 million for humanitarian and development aid; these
sums exclude contributions through the European Union, but include voluntary
contributions to U.N. agencies.
France. According to information provided on July 29, French humanitarian aid
to Kosovars throughout the Balkans totaled $216 million in 1999. In addition, private
aid from local governments, voluntary agencies, and companies totaled $23 million.
France also resettled 6,500 Kosovars in France at the request of the U.N. High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).
Germany. Germany on August 19 estimated its 1999 humanitarian and
reconstruction assistance at $158 million in bilateral expenditures (including $32.3
million from the Ministry of Defense), $5.4 million from the Government of Bavaria,
$161.4 million in multilateral contributions, and $162.2 million in private donations.
In addition, care of refugees and asylum seekers in Germany cost the government
approximately $256 million for 1998 and 1999.
Greece. According to April figures, Greece provided food, medical supplies,
tents, prefabricated houses, clothing, ambulances, and built three refugee camps,
valued at more than $10 million. This sum did not include Greek contributions to the
EU, nor did it include private assistance through non-governmental organizations,
local governments, and church groups. The government also noted that the war had
reduced trade, tourism, and investment income in Greece by an estimated 0.2% of
GDP.
Hungary. The Hungarian government estimated that, from April-July 1999, it
provided food and medical supplies valued at $1.7 million, and provided aid and
shelter to refugees for $990,000. The Hungarians also noted that they had supplied
a 35-member medical team which has not been valued.
Iceland. The Icelandic government has not provided information on
humanitarian assistance for Kosovo.
Italy. As of June 30, 1999, Italy had provided approximately $75 million in non-
military aid to Kosovo and about $91 million in aid by the military to a humanitarian
program called Operation Rainbow. The non-military costs included establishing
refugee camps and field hospitals in Albania and providing humanitarian assistance
using both military and leased ships and aircraft. Private Italian donations to
Operation Rainbow were over $84 million. An additional $6.1 million dollars worth
of food and medical supplies was provided through various channels. The
government also allocated $2 million in emergency aid for refugees in Macedonia, and
$5.5 million for humanitarian aid in Montenegro. At the time of the report, Italy was

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prepared to implement a $66 million project to provide assistance and shelter to
returning refugees.
Luxembourg. Luxembourg’s government estimated its humanitarian
contributions to the Balkan region (through May 25, 1999) at $7.32 million. This
includes contributions made through international organizations, bilateral aid, and
contributions through private voluntary agencies.
Netherlands. The Dutch government has not provided information on
humanitarian assistance for Kosovo.
Norway. As of July 30, Norway had contributed $73.5 million in bilateral and
multilateral humanitarian assistance and $8.5 million through the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 1999. In addition, the government
spent approximately $153.8 million for refugee and family reunification in Norway,
$5.8 million for repatriation of refugees to Kosovo, and $20.5 million for refugees
arriving in Norway on their own.
Poland. The Polish government estimated that, from the period April through
June 1999, its non-military Kosovo-related expenditures were: $1.4 million for
refugee asylum, emergency aid, and resettlement, and $1.5 million for humanitarian
assistance to Kosovars in the Balkans.
Portugal. According to information received from the embassy on July 6,
Portugal provided cash contributions to humanitarian agencies of $500,000; and food,
clothing, and transport for the Red Cross valued at $200,000. Portugal has also given
food and other assistance to other agencies, and has accepted 513 refugees for
temporary resettlement.
Spain. As of September 20, Spanish contributions to the humanitarian
emergency in Kosovo totaled $9.18 million; the sum was used to establish a refugee
camp in Albania.
Turkey. The Turkish republic contributed $8 million for non-military actions
for Kosovo through the end of the bombing campaign, and $6.6 million in
humanitarian assistance to Albania and Macedonia.
United Kingdom. As of August 23, British spending on humanitarian assistance
in Kosovo, Albania, and Macedonia–through U.N. agencies, non-governmental
organizations, and bilateral programs–totaled $45 million. This amount does not
include the costs of resettling Kosovars in Britain at the request of the UNHCR, nor
of giving asylum to those who came independently.
United Nations. NATO members also contribute to U.N. programs; in some
cases, these contributions were itemized in embassy responses. The U.N.
humanitarian appeal is a regional assistance program which includes Kosovo,
Montenegro, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Albania. The programs in Bosnia and
Croatia address needs that predate the Kosovo crisis, including programs under U.N.
responsibility through the 1995 Dayton agreement. As of September 30, the
combined appeal for the region was $939 million. This is the latest estimate of the

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cost of U.N. programs in the region. Contributions to the combined appeal for the
U.N. Balkans programs are recorded by the U.N. Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Activities (UNOCHA). Not all donors report their contributions.
However, according to the most recent UNOCHA report, dated September 30, the
United States had contributed or pledged nearly $234 million, or over 32%, of the
$712 million pledged or contributed to the multi-agency U.N. appeal at that time.
The 16 other donors that are NATO members contributed or pledged over $152
million, or 22 percent.
European Union. In addition to individual national assistance and multilateral
aid through the EU (see below, pp. 12-13 ), the NATO countries contributed to the
United Nations programs through the European Community Humanitarian Office
(ECHO). The ECHO contribution was $111 million, or 15.5%.
The NATO countries have contributed in other ways to the Kosovo humanitarian
emergency. Humanitarian assistance provided by NATO military personnel is not
included in any of the previously mentioned sources, and the information that NATO
itself provides often does not include the value of such aid. Other NATO country
responses to the Kosovo humanitarian emergency include giving asylum to those who
fled the country.12 Finally, responses to the disaster in Kosovo by NATO
governments also included providing staging areas such as airports, ports, and other
logistical facilities needed to deliver aid. This assistance, often provided at the
expense of domestic users, should also be considered as donations made by
governments. Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Hungary were the countries most often
mentioned in this context, but none of these countries has provided a monetary
estimate of the value of these contributions.
12Press coverage of the flight of some 780,000 Kosovars who sought refuge within the region
noted that Turkey volunteered facilities for 10,000 almost immediately; nearly 12,000
eventually entered Turkey. Between January 1998 and May 1999, an additional 146,000
sought asylum in other European countries. About one-third of these went to Germany, where
they received housing and financial aid. The nine NATO countries included in the UNHCR
list of asylum countries accepted 70 percent of the fleeing Kosovars. The state and local
governments of some NATO countries are providing direct assistance to homeward bound
refugees, either through individual stipends to refugees, or through grants to local voluntary
agencies in the Kosovo. Of the 91,000 additional refugees evacuated from Macedonia at the
request of UNHCR between April and July 1999, 65,000 were resettled in European NATO
countries, including 8,300 in Turkey. (The United States resettled about 13,000.) Many
refugees required expensive medical care. In addition, an unknown number of Kosovars have
been entering European countries illegally. Italy, a short boat ride from Albania, has a large
illegal population of Kosovars and Roma (Gypsies). This has had both economic and political
costs for the Italian government.

CRS-12
Reconstruction and Development Assistance13
Once the war ended, the international community turned its attention to
reconstruction and development. The war caused severe damage and disruption to
Kosovo’s housing, transport, power, and other public works infrastructure. It also
eliminated the legal and institutional structures that provided law and order, tax
revenues, and the like. Reconstruction assistance seeks to restore the essential
functions of government and vital infrastructure, but it also encompasses the creation
of governmental and private sector structures that may not have existed previously
in the same form. These would include efforts to assist Kosovo in establishing a non-
corrupt, free market economy, and an equitable system of governance.
Early efforts at reconstruction have sought to meet immediate needs–to support
the civil administration, including restoring essential services such as garbage
collection and public transport, training the police force, and instituting customs
collection. Funds are also expected to meet urgent housing repair needs (an estimated
half million people face insufficient shelter this winter), and promote peace, the
media, and democratization. Some of these efforts are difficult to separate from the
“pure” humanitarian programs that feed returning refugees and provide minimal
preparation for winter. As a result, there may be some overlap in counting donor
contributions for one purpose or the other.
On July 28, 1999, donors met in Brussels to discuss humanitarian aid and this
first effort at reconstruction – short term assistance providing for basic human needs
– and pledge contributions. Following submission of detailed assessments of long-
term needs by the European Commission and the World Bank, among others, a
second conference was held in Brussels on November 17, 1999, to discuss strictly
long-term reconstruction and development needs.
The first donor conference was attended by more than 100 countries and
international organizations. Only one third of the pledge total of $2.2 billion (i.e.
$756 million) was for reconstruction assistance, including support for a civil
administration. The remainder was for humanitarian aid. Further, of the total, $475
million in funds had already been expended or was “firmly pledged” for the first half
of 1999.
The U.S. contribution of $557 million (of which $278 million could be
characterized as reconstruction aid) was based, according to the Special Adviser to
the President on Kosovo, Ambassador James Dobbins, “on the assumption that others
also contribute proportionately.” With regard to the pending reconstruction and
development effort, the Ambassador said that the United States expected Europe “to
do more than their normal share” (July 28 press conference).
At the conference, the European NATO members and the European Union, to
which most contribute, pledged a total of $1.2 billion, of which $248 million was
13For more detailed discussion, see: U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research
Service. Kosovo: Reconstruction and Development Assistance. By (name redacted). CRS
Report RS20362. October 22, 1999.

CRS-13
reconstruction-related. The European Union has announced that it will provide
another $500 million in each of 2000, 2001, and 2002 for reconstruction purposes.
Initial conference pledges have changed since July, with some countries moving
their reconstruction funds to humanitarian uses. As of October 1999, the total
reconstruction pledge, based on the July conference, had fallen to $542 million.
At the second donor conference in November, a total of $1.1 billion was
pledged, almost all for reconstruction and development-related purposes. Of this
amount, the United States pledged $157 million. The U.S. pledge met a requirement
of the FY2000 foreign operations appropriations bill, H.R. 3422, that the United
States share of total costs be no more than 15 percent of total donations. The
European Community and its individual members together pledged $759.3 million.
In addition to efforts directed at Kosovo, the allies and others, including Russia,
are seeking to invigorate the whole of the Balkans through a Balkan Stability Pact that
will address security, democracy, and economic development issues. Although the
launching of this Pact at a conference held in Sarajevo on July 30, 1999, was not a
donors’ conference, the United States used the occasion to announce its contribution
to the region’s economic development. The U.S. effort would emphasize trade and
investment programs, providing $50 million in grants for technical assistance and an
unspecified amount in guarantees and credit to leverage several hundreds of millions
of dollars in the face value of private sector investment. The United States already
has provided about $100 million in balance of payments assistance to frontline states
hit hard by the war.
Although the European Union and its 15 individual member countries, of which
11 are also NATO members, are likely to announce their own regional initiatives
during the next several months, assistance in 1999 from the EU alone has amounted
to roughly $761 million. Humanitarian aid accounts for a little more than a third of
this sum, and the remainder, $488 million, is balance-of-payments support and
technical assistance.
Conclusions
The above summaries demonstrate that nearly all of the NATO member states
have made significant contributions to alleviating the crisis in Kosovo. The summaries
indicate a wide variety of activities aimed at helping Kosovars, particularly in non-
military matters. As noted above, statistics for humanitarian aid, refugee relief, and
reconstruction assistance are particularly difficult to collect and compare because the
numbers change frequently, because countries gather different data, and because the
majority of non-U.S. assistance is funneled through international organizations such
as the United Nations and the European Union.
Table 2 below presents, for military expenditures, the amounts provided by
NATO embassies to CRS. For non-military expenditures, the amounts shown
represent total pledges at the July 28 and November 17 donor conferences. Pledges
do not always match amounts claimed by the embassies; in some cases, contributing

CRS-14
countries did not report pledges at the conferences. Further, many embassy figures
do not count November pledges of future spending. Embassies may also have
counted their country’s contributions through the EU, which are separated out in the
conference tables. Pledge numbers, rather than those provided to CRS by the
embassies, have been used in this table because they represent the amounts that the
countries reported to a common source, using roughly the same definitional criteria,
and including funds expected to be spent in 2000. The amounts in this column include
bilateral humanitarian, reconstruction, and U.N. administration contributions. They
do not include individual countries’ contributions to the European Union. A separate
line has been provided for the European Union, as it is impossible to disaggregate
contributions to the EU by the NATO countries.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the numbers in this table should be regarded
only as a rough guide to contributions until more complete information becomes
available. These numbers should not simply be added together to reach a total, as
they often cover different time periods.
Table 2. Estimated NATO Member State
Contributions to Kosovo Crisis
State
Military Expenditures
Humanitarian/
Member
Reconstruction
Assistance
Belgium
N/A
0
Canada
N/A
62.5
Czech
Refugee assistance: 8.7
0
Republic
Joint Guardian (1999): 15.5
Denmark
Allied Force: 7.4
109.4
Allied Harbor: 4.8
Joint Guardian: 6.2
France
Allied Force: 203.2
59.3
Joint Guardian (p.a.)* : 192.0
Germany
All Operations (1999): 454.0
180.8
Joint Guardian (p.a): 192.0
Greece
Joint Guardian (p.a.): 40.0
0
Hungary
Joint Guardian (1999): 18.7
0
Iceland
No military participation
0
Italy
Allied Force: N/A
10.6
Allied Harbor/Joint
Guardian (1999): 222.0
Luxembourg
No military participation
17.0

CRS-15
State
Military Expenditures
Humanitarian/
Member
Reconstruction
Assistance
Netherlands
Allied Force/Joint
96.5
Guardian:107.5
Norway
Allied Force: 19.1
50.4
Joint Guardian (1999): 94.9
Poland
Allied Force: 9.6
0
Joint Guardian: 2.0
Portugal
Allied Force/Harbor 6.0
0
Joint Guardian (1999) 44.9
Spain
Allied Force: 23.0
22.4
Joint Guardian (1999): 57.3
Turkey
Allied Force: 26.0
40.0
Joint Guardian (p.a.) 30.0
United
All operations (7/99): 166.0
190.1
Kingdom
United States
Allied Force: 1,775.7 **
713.2
Refugee Assistance (1999): 124.6
Joint Guardian (1999): 1,050.2
European
–
1,060.4
Union
Sources: NATO governments; European Community/World Bank Economic Reconstruction and
Development in South East Europe Information Bulletin.
* p.a. = per annum
**U.S. military costs reported here do not include $2,097 million for munitions and to restore
readiness of units not directly involved. See Table 1 above.

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