Trade Legislation in the 106th Congress: An Overview

Trade Legislation in the 106th Congress: An Overview

Order Code RL30227
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Trade Legislation in the 106th Congress:
An Overview
Updated February 8, 2000
Raymond J. Ahearn
Specialist in Trade Relations
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

ABSTRACT
This report provides an overview of trade legislation introduced in the 106th Congress. The
first section describes the congressional role in the making of trade policy. The second section
discusses issues and legislation affecting trade negotiating authority and trade agreements. The
third and fourth sections analyze import and export-related legislation, respectively. The final
section provides a listing and summary of selective trade bills introduced to date. This report
will be updated on a regular basis. See the CRS home page for a wide variety of CRS
products on trade issues.

Trade Legislation in the 106th Congress:
An Overview
Summary
Congress is likely to vote on a number of major trade bills this year. The bills
affect laws and policies that are intertwined with all three components of U.S. trade
policy: trade agreements, imports, and exports.
Within 90 days of March 1, 2000, Congress is expected to vote on a joint
resolution aimed at terminating U.S. participation in the World Trade Organization
(WTO. The vote is triggered by Section 125 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act,
which requires the Administration to report on the “costs and benefits of the WTO
agreement on U.S. interests.” The debate over any resolution introduced may focus
on the U.S. success in the WTO dispute settlement process, the openness of WTO
procedures, and sovereignty-related issues under the WTO rules-based system.
A House-Senate conference is expected to take early action on the “Trade and
Development Act of 1999,” a substitute Senate amendment to H.R. 434 as passed by
the Senate on November 3, 1999. In addition to deciding on a number of amendments
adopted by the Senate, the conferees will have to reconcile differences in approaches
between the two chambers for promoting trade in apparel and textiles with the
countries of sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean. Most generally, the bills passed
or reported out by the House provide more expansive trade benefits for textile and
apparel products than the Senate-passed bill.
Sometime this summer Congress is expected to vote on China’s trade status. If
China is about to join the WTO this year, the vote likely would be on whether to grant
China permanent Normal Trade Relations status. A wide-ranging debate may
transpire, with many of the same interest groups that protested at last November’s
WTO Ministerial in Seattle expected to oppose China’s accession to the WTO.
Other legislative actions could involve efforts to reform U.S. sanctions policy,
as well as revamp the Export Administration Act of 1979 – the primary U.S. export
control law. More than 100 pieces of legislation have been introduced that impose
new sanctions, ease current sanctions, or overhaul the process that is used to impose
sanctions. Of these, H.R. 1244 and S. 757 seek to clarify and revise procedures that
both the Administration and Congress follow before enacting or imposing sanctions.
Other bills (S. 1771 and H.R. 3140) would exempt agricultural commodities and
medicine from unilateral sanctions. Deep divisions over existing sanctions imposed
against Cuba make coalition-building on sanctions reform difficult, although the
Senate leadership has indicated an intent to bring a reform bill to the floor this year.
The Senate Banking Committee reported out a bill (S. 1712) last September that
revamps the Export Administration Act of 1979. The bill, which could reach the
Senate floor for a vote this year, significantly reduces the number of items under
export control, increases penalties for violators, and streamlines the licensing process.
Bills (H.R. 850 and S. 798) that would significantly loosen export controls on
encryption software could also reach the floor of both chambers this year.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Congressional Role in Trade Policymaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Trade Negotiating Authority and Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Multiple Causes of Fast-Track Stalemate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Disputed Consequences of Fast-Track Stalemate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Outlook for Fast-Track Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Other Legislation Affecting Trade Negotiations and Agreements . . . . . . . . 7
Import-Related Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Protection for American Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Reform of the Trade Remedy Laws and Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Extension of Tariff Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Extension of Normal Trade Relations Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 1999 . . . . . . . . . . 14
Export-Related Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Export Promotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Export Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Economic Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix: Summary of Selective Trade Bills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Negotiating Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Trade Negotiations and Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Import-Related Legislation
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Trade Remedy Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Extension of Tariff Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Export-Related Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Export Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Economic Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Trade Legislation in the 106th Congress:
An Overview
Introduction
Congress is expected to vote on a number of major trade bills this year. The bills
affect laws and policies that are intertwined with all three components of U.S. trade
policy: international agreements, imports and exports. Most notably, these include
votes on an expected joint resolution aimed at ending U.S. participation in the World
Trade Organization, on an anticipated proposal to extend China permanent NTR
status, and on a probable House-Senate conference agreement that would expand
trade benefits for African and Caribbean countries. Bills that alter U.S. sanctions
policymaking and revamp the Export Administration Act of 1979 could also see floor
action in one or both chambers. In addition, a number of other bills affecting trade
negotiations, trade remedy procedures, tariff preferences, and export promotion could
also see some movement in the legislative process.
This report provides an overview of the trade legislation introduced to date. The
first section describes the congressional role in the making of trade policy. The second
section discusses issues and legislation affecting trade negotiating authority and
agreements. The third and fourth sections analyze import and export-related
legislation respectively. The final section provides a listing and summary of selective
trade bills introduced to date. This report will be updated on a regular basis.
Congressional Role in Trade Policymaking
U.S. trade policy encompasses a wide array of government policies and laws
that affect imports, exports, and negotiations to liberalize trade flows. Policies
affecting imports through the lowering or raising of tariffs, duties, or other barriers
determine the relative openness of the U.S. market to goods and services produced
by foreign producers. Export policies both increase and restrict the sales opportunities
of specific companies and industries. Negotiations to liberalize global trade are
intended to make the U.S. economy more efficient and productive.
With constitutional responsibility to “regulate commerce with foreign nations”
and “to lay and collect ...duties”, Congress played the key role in the formulation and
implementation of U.S. trade policy for the first 150 years of the Republic. This was
an era when the tariff was the overriding trade issue and Congress dominated trade
policymaking by periodically revising the tariff schedule, usually upward.
Since the passage of the highly protective Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930,
Congress began to delegate much of its trade authority to the executive branch and

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independent agencies. According to one scholar, this decision was based on the view
that the executive branch was better positioned to balance the competing pressures
of domestic companies and workers producing goods sensitive to import competition
against the interests of consumers and those producing goods primarily for the export
market.1
The willingness of Congress to continue to delegate its trade authority has
depended, in part, on presidential responsiveness to congressional sentiments. A
President who fails to enforce U.S. trade law or implement trade agreements as
vigorously as Congress wishes may invite legislation limiting future presidential
discretion in the trade arena.
Ingrained differences in institutional perspectives often make it difficult for the
two branches to see eye to eye on trade policy. A major difference is that the
disparate priorities of local constituents are generally the paramount concern of each
of the 535 elected Members of Congress, but U.S. international obligations and the
broad national interest are frequently accorded a higher priority by the President and
his cabinet. Although a Member of Congress is often pressed to promote specific
trade objectives, often in response to real economic hardship or perceived inequities
in his or her state, presidential actions can reflect broader foreign as well as
domestically focused interests.
Over the past 50 years, Congress has refrained from enacting laws that would
tightly insulate the U.S. market from foreign competition, and has actively
cooperated with successive Presidents in dismantling U.S. and foreign restrictions to
world trade. This cooperation has included approval of nearly all trade initiatives
submitted by the executive branch, together with active consultations and oversight
on the implementation of trade agreements entered into. At the same time, Congress
has also periodically modified various U.S. trade laws to increase incentives for the
President to take strong actions against foreign unfair trade practices and to provide
swift relief to those domestic producers hurt by import competition.
Cooperation between Congress and the President has depended on an implicit
bipartisan political consensus to support policies and programs that would help both
the “winners” and “losers” from international trade. As some workers benefit directly
from an expansion of exports and some workers lose from a rising level of imports,
this consensus has depended on policies and programs that would alleviate the pain
of those hurt by imports and increase opportunities for those helped by exports.
Generally, this has translated into agreement to support rigorous implementation of
fair and unfair trade practices laws in a manner that would help import sensitive
companies and workers adjust to increased international competition in return for
their political support for further trade liberalization by extending negotiating
authority.
The fact that no new negotiating authority has been passed by Congress since
1992 has led to much speculation that the consensus that has governed U.S. trade
1 Destler, I.M. American Trade Politics. Washington, D.C., Institute for International
Economics, 1995.

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policy for the past 60 years has frayed or evaporated. This questioning, in turn, is at
the heart of much of the debate surrounding legislation involving negotiating
authority, trade agreements, and imports in the 106th Congress.
Legislation pertaining to both the promotion and restriction of exports depends
on a substantially different set of policy considerations and mix of policymakers than
legislation concerning imports. Revelations concerning China’s effort to steal or
otherwise acquire militarily sensitive technology are likely to affect long-delayed
legislation to re-write U.S. export control laws.
The House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees are the central
actors on most all issues affecting trade negotiations and imports. Jurisdiction over
trade agreements, export policy, agricultural trade, and many specialized areas, such
as intellectual property or competition policy, are scattered among the agriculture,
appropriations, armed services, banking, commerce, international relations, and
judiciary committees of both chambers.
Because many contemporary trade barriers are intertwined with domestic
policies and because trade has accounted for a growing share of U.S. economic
activity in the last decade, instances of overlapping jurisdiction are not uncommon.
In the case of conferences on large omnibus trade bills, such as the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act of 1994, the list of standing committees not involved in some way
with trade issues is often shorter than those that are.
Trade Negotiating Authority and Agreements
Congress, beginning with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, has
authorized the President to negotiate reductions in trade barriers on a reciprocal
basis. The delegations of authority always have prescribed objectives and time
limitations. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, for example, authorized the President
to negotiate reductions in tariffs up to 50% for five years.
Since 1974, Congress has authorized the President on five different occasions
to negotiate reductions in tariffs, as well as nontariff barriers (NTB’s) subject to fast-
track authority. In return for regular consultations and timely notification on the part
of the executive branch, fast-track allows the Congress to consider legislation
implementing trade agreements negotiated by the President within a limited time
period and with no amendments.2
Many policymakers maintain that a tacit assurance Congress will not demand
changes in trade bargains and compromises struck by the President is indispensable
for persuading trading partners to engage in substantive negotiations. Although
foreign countries in the past have agreed to begin trade negotiations without fast track
in place, this viewpoint is that foreign countries are unlikely to make sensitive
concessions in trade talks if they are unsure that U.S. negotiators can fulfill their own
2 For full discussion, see CRS Report RS20039, Fast-Track Implementation of Trade
Agreements: The Debate Over Reauthorization, by George D. Holliday.

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market opening commitments. Legislation implementing major multilateral trade
agreements such as the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 and free trade
agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Act of
1993 were enacted by Congress under fast-track procedures.
Fast track implementing authority expired in 1994, and subsequent efforts to
renew the authority have been unsuccessful. In November 1997, then House Speaker
Newt Gingrich and President Clinton agreed to postpone a vote on a fast-track
proposal when it appeared the proposal lacked majority support in the House. In
September 1998, the House defeated by a vote of 243-180 a fast-track bill (H.R.
2621) that was supported by the Republican leadership.
The fact that fast-track negotiating authority has not been re-authorized for over
six years is puzzling to many observers in light of the robust performance of the U.S.
economy today. Historically, good economic times have been favorable for
undertaking trade liberalization initiatives because new job and business opportunities
are abundant.
Multiple Causes of Fast-Track Stalemate
A combination of substantive, partisan, and attitudinal differences help explain
why a bipartisan majority in favor of a fast-track bill has not developed. The
substantive divisions most prominently relate to the treatment of labor and
environmental standards in future trade agreements. Many union and environmental
leaders maintain that future trade agreements should contain strong labor and
environmental standards to ensure that U.S. companies are not enticed to move
overseas, particularly to developing countries, where labor and environmental
regulations are not as restrictive. These leaders particularly want enforceable
standards whereby governments can bar imports of products whose production
violates these standards.3
Many business leaders, on the other hand, believe that labor and environmental
standards should be addressed in different fora (e.g., the International Labor
Organization) and in different ways. They are worried that enforceable sanctions built
into future trade agreements could disrupt trade and investment relationships with
developing countries. They also suspect that demands for such sanctions are often
motivated by protectionist aims.
These substantive differences have become intertwined with partisan political
considerations. On the one hand, a large number of Democrats share the position of
labor and environmental groups. Some are also concerned, along with a segment of
the Republican Party, that increased competition with developing countries will
inevitably force American workers to lower their living standards (the so-called “race
to the bottom”) in order to compete against countries that have lower wages and
3 For background, see CRS Report 97-879, Environment in Fast-Track Authority: Summary
of the Clinton Administration Proposal, by Susan R. Fletcher and CRS Report 97-272,
Worker Rights and U.S. Trade Policy: WTO Singapore Ministerial and Fast-Track
Extension, by Mary Jane Bolle.

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standards. On the other hand, many Republicans have supported the position of
business that opposes such international rules and some regard any trade agreement
that includes them as worse than no agreement at all. Some also tend to believe that
differences between countries in wages and standards provide the basis for achieving
real gains from specialization in production and trade.
The fast-track controversy has also merged into the debate about what can be
done to allow the United States to reap the benefits of globalization while dealing
with some of the negative side-effects. Rapid flows of goods, capital, and technology
across borders may provide economy-wide benefits, but deeper integration has also
been accompanied by a sense of anxiety among a seemingly larger segment of the
American work force. Media reports about the large and growing trade deficits and
about free trade agreements with Latin America and Asia may be contributing to
public concern about trade and be reflected in the congressional debate on fast track
authority. Although the anxiety perhaps could be allayed by stronger retraining and
adjustment assistance programs, the concerns appear deeply intertwined with the way
a more globalized economy threatens job security and allegedly places downward
pressures on wages and benefits. One scholar suggests that these anxieties may also
be bound up with a variety of other forces that are transforming the employment
relationship in the United States, including de-regulation, de-unionization, and the
weakening of social safety nets.4
Disputed Consequences of Fast-Track Stalemate
The effects of the fast track stalemate on U.S. interests are controversial. One
school of thought judges that the absence of fast track is having serious and
immediate adverse effects on U.S. commercial interests and leadership. A second
school of thought maintains that the costs of not having fast-track at the current time
are greatly overestimated, particularly since the Administration has not been entirely
prevented from advancing its trade agenda over the past two years.5
Those who urge an extension of fast-track authority as soon as possible believe
that U.S. efforts to negotiate new market opening trade agreements worldwide are
being hurt by the absence of fast-track authority. They point to Chile’s decision in
1995 to walk away from negotiations to accede to NAFTA as evidence of this point.
They also fear that on-going negotiations to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) and an Asian Pacific Economic Community (APEC) are moving slowly
because foreign countries are reluctant to put tangible market opening offers on the
table when they do not have a high degree of assurance that the United States will
deliver on its market opening concessions. To the extent that the pace of these
negotiations is retarded by the absence of fast-track, they believe opportunities to
expand U.S. exports will be reduced.
Supporters for a quick renewal of fast-track are concerned about developments
that could negatively affect U.S. global trade leadership. They worry that failure to
4 Rodrik, Dana. Has Globalization Gone Too Far? Institute for International Economics,
Washington, D.C. 1997.
5 For further discussion, see Schott, Jeffrey J. Restarting Fast Track. Institute for
International Economics, Washington, D.C. 1998.

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pass fast-track is a powerful symbol of a U.S. retreat from global leadership in
opening markets worldwide and that this perception could encourage various forces
at home and abroad to seek an increased level of protection from foreign competition.
They also worry that if free trade arrangements mushroom worldwide without U.S.
participation, U.S. exports will be discriminated against by the proliferation of a web
of discriminatory and preferential trade rules.
A contrary perspective is that absence of fast-track has not affected the pace of
U.S. market opening negotiations in any decisive manner. In the case of the FTAA,
proponents of this view believe that although the U.S. ability to shape the negotiating
agenda may have been adversely affected by the absence of fast-track, other factors,
such as Brazil’s economic crisis and divergent country interests, best explain why
these negotiations are proceeding relatively slowly. In the case of APEC, which has
a 2010 target completion date, they argue that any significant market opening
negotiations are so far in the future that the absence of fast-track is pretty much
irrelevant. Regarding the effort to launch a new round of multilateral negotiations
under the auspices of the WTO, this viewpoint emphasizes that fast-track in the past
has been relevant to implementing the results, not in initiating a new round.
The “no urgency for renewal” perspective also argues that even if the absence
of fast-track has undermined negotiations with Chile and slowed down the FTAA
negotiations, the effects on U.S. exports are unlikely to be very significant since the
countries affected account for only 7% of U.S. exports. More generally, this
perspective judges that the gains today from additional trade liberalization are more
limited than commonly touted and that the risks of a serious increase in protection
overrated.
In addition, some Members and interest groups oppose fast-track procedures at
this time under any conditions. One reason for their opposition is a belief that fast-
track procedures are an abdication of the Congress’s constitutional responsibility to
regulate foreign commerce. Some holding this view basically oppose the establishment
of new free trade agreements fearing they will lead to a flood of new imports and
produce limited export opportunities.
Outlook for Fast-Track Legislation
To date, little has happened to indicate that the political stalemate will be
overcome any time soon. The Clinton Administration’s position on fast-track has
remained mostly passive, most business associations and organized labor and
environmental groups remain at loggerheads over the issue, and there is no clear-cut
or overwhelming immediate need for a fast-track renewal. Despite a strong economy,
the politics of this year’s presidential election cycle may further complicate efforts to
break the stalemate.
Although President Clinton called for renewal of fast-track in his January 1999
State of the Union Address ( and most recently in a June 12, 1999 commencement
address at the University of Chicago), the Administration did not follow up its stated
support for fast-track by actively trying to forge a consensus fast-track proposal
through systematic consultations with Congress or by submitting to Congress a fast-
track proposal of its own in 1999. While National Security Adviser Sandy Berger

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stated on January 6, 2000, that the White House is prepared to work with the
Congress to pass fast-track negotiation authority in 2000, he also noted that the
congressional vote to extend China permanent NTR status was the administration’s
top legislative priority in the trade arena this year.6
The Administration’s apparent decision not to make fast-track renewal a high
legislative priority again this year could reflect an assessment that it would be an uphill
struggle. For example, if the Administration decided to support a fast-track approach
that included enforceable labor and environmental standards in order to attract
Democratic votes, it could stand to lose many Republicans that voted for the 1998
bill (H.R. 2621). Or if the Administration chose to support a bill that excluded
enforceable standards in order to attract more Republican votes, it could be again
opposed by a majority of House Democrats as well as organized labor, a traditional
core support group of the Democratic Party. If fast-track is not a top legislative
priority of the Administration, even introduction of comprehensive bills in the
Congress remains problematical.
In the absence of comprehensive fast-track legislation being introduced in either
house to date, several free standing resolutions and bills have been introduced.
H.Res. 96 (Traficant) amends the rules of the House to require a two-thirds vote on
any bill or joint resolution that either authorizes the President to enter into a new trade
agreement or implements a trade agreement pursuant to fast-track procedures. S.
111 (Gramm) authorizes fast-track procedures for the negotiation of Chile’s accession
to NAFTA, and S. 112 (Gramm) authorizes fast-track procedures for negotiation of
free trade agreements with the countries of the Americas. S. 1065 (Dodd) authorizes
fast-track for the negotiation of Chile’s accession to NAFTA. In addition, three bills
introduced by Senator Baucus (S. 1869, S. 1870, and S. 1871) authorize the
negotiation of free trade agreements with Korea, Singapore, and Chile, respectively,
as well as provide expedited consideration of such agreements.
Other Legislation Affecting Trade Negotiations and Agreements
A number of bills also have been introduced that affect U.S. trade negotiations
and agreements in varied ways. Some require a larger congressional role and others
attempt to influence U.S. policy on a number of issues more indirectly.
Several bills introduced provide for a larger congressional role concerning
negotiations on China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). H.R.
884 (Gephardt) and S.743 (Hollings) would require congressional approval before
the United States could support the admission of China into the WTO. H.R. 884 and
S. 743 would also provide for the withdrawal of the United States from the WTO if
China is accepted into the WTO without the support of the United States.7 S. 742
(Grassley) would clarify the requirements for China’s accession to the WTO,
including enhanced consultation requirements with Congress. The Administration is
6 International Trade Reporter, “ Administration Willing to Discuss Fast Track If Consensus
Exists for Passage, Berger Says,” January 13, 2000.
7 For full discussion, see CRS Report RS20139, China and the World Trade Organization,
January 24, 2000, by Wayne M. Morrison.

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opposed to prior congressional approval of a WTO agreement with China but might
support some form of enhanced consultation requirements.
Two bills focus, in part, on agricultural trade negotiations. H.R. 817 (Ewing)/S.
101 (Lugar) and S. 566 (Lugar) seek, among other objectives, to prepare the United
States for future bilateral and multilateral agricultural negotiations. In addition, the
Senate-passed “Trade and Development Act of 1999” included an amendment
outlining U.S. objectives to include the elimination of export subsidies and increasing
opportunities for agricultural negotiations in the WTO.

Various Members of Congress remain concerned about the impact NAFTA is
having on U.S. jobs and the environment. H.R. 650 (Rivers) calls for assessing the
impact of NAFTA on the environment and jobs, and requires the President to submit
annual reports to Congress certifying that each NAFTA country is meeting obligations
under the labor and environmental side agreements.
Legislation has been introduced to affect the organization or process (or both)
by which the executive branch makes trade policy. S. 80 (Snowe) establishes the
position of Assistant United States Trade Representative for Small Business and S.
185 (Ashcroft) and H.R. 3173 (Hulshof) establish a Chief Agricultural Negotiator in
the Office of the United States Trade Representative – a provision that was adopted
as an amendment to the Senate-passed “Trade and Development Act of 1999.” S.
1395 (Baucus) would require the USTR to appear before certain congressional
committees to present the annual national trade estimate. S. 1585 (Baucus) would
establish a Congressional Trade Office.
In addition, a vote on a joint resolution calling for the U.S. to leave the WTO is
expected to be taken within 90 days after March 1, 2000. That is the date required by
Section 125 of the Uruguay Round implementing legislation for the Administration
to submit a report to Congress assessing U.S. costs and benefits under the WTO. If
passed, most observers believe the resolution would face a likely presidential veto,
which would require a two-thirds majority in both houses to override. Nevertheless,
this provision is likely to occasion a major congressional debate concerning U.S. trade
policy.8
Import-Related Legislation
U.S. policies affecting imports tend to be shaped largely by a mixture of
economic principles and practical political considerations. Unanticipated events and
broader foreign policy considerations also serve to influence the development of
specific policies from year to year.9
8 See CRS Report RS0422, United States’ Withdrawal from the World Trade Organization:
Legislative Procedures, December 28, 1999, by Vladimir Pregelj.
9 For full discussion, see Cohen, Stephen D., Paul, Joel R., and Robert A. Becker.
Fundamentals of U.S. Foreign Trade Policy. Westview Press, 1996.

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The case for maintaining a relatively open market for the purchase of foreign
goods and services rests on the view that imports provide multiple economic benefits.
For consumers, imports provide goods that are often available at lower prices or
simply not produced in the United States. Consumers may also buy imported goods
because they are perceived to be of higher quality than comparable U.S. produced
goods. Foreign goods also can benefit U.S. companies by providing needed inputs
at lower prices and by encouraging cost-cutting and innovation.
Decisions to deviate from the economic rationale for maintaining relatively open
policies towards imports usually rest on practical political considerations. Although
consumers and many producers benefit from having access to imported goods and
services, some workers can lose their jobs and some companies can go out of business
due to rapid increases in imports that compete head-to-head with domestic
production. Given that foreigners do not vote in domestic elections and that society
as a whole still benefits even when specific groups are hurt by imports, international
as well as domestic rules have been established to provide temporary relief to those
hurt or injured by import competition. These rules also stipulate various measures
or barriers governments may employ, depending in large part on whether the import
competition being curbed is considered “fair” or “unfair.”
U.S. government policies that affect the relative receptivity or openness of the
U.S. market to imports are also affected from year to year by unanticipated events and
broader foreign policy objectives. A large and growing U.S. merchandise trade
deficit, for example, may increase demands for protection from import competition
as the number of companies and workers hurt by imports increases relative to those
helped by exports. But efforts to forge closer economic and political ties with specific
regions or countries can also lead to more open or less restrictive policies via the
extension of preferential access to the U.S. market.
Congressional actions to date reflect the interaction of these basic forces in five
legislative categories: (1) protection of American industry from import competition;
(2) reform of the trade remedy laws; (3) extension of tariff preferences generally, as
well as for specific regions/countries; (4) extension of normal trade relations (NTR)
status to specific countries; and (5) miscellaneous tariff measures.
Protection for American Industry
Since the passage of the protective Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Congress
has shown reluctance to pass legislation that protects American industry across the
board or that directly protects specific U.S. industries. Historically, support for bills
that provide direct protection for U.S. industry has come against a backdrop of
surging imports and a perception that the Administration has not taken sufficient
actions to deal with the distress. For example, in 1985 congressional support
intensified for an across-the-board surcharge on imports and increased protection for
the textile and apparel industry amid a rising trade deficit and a non-interventionist
trade policy pursued by the Administration. In response to the threat of legislated
protection, the Reagan Administration engineered the Plaza Agreement to bring down
the value of the dollar and announced new actions designed to fight “unfair trade
practices.” These actions, in turn, diluted support for legislative remedies.

CRS-10
In the first session of 106th Congress, proposals to provide import protection for
the steel industry were actively considered. Fueled by a surge in steel imports and
perception that the Clinton Administration was not taking strong enough actions to
deal with unfair trade competition, the House by a vote of 289-141 approved on
March 19, 1999 a bill (H.R. 975) introduced by Representative Visclosky that would
impose quotas on steel imports for three years. Sen. John D. Rockefeller introduced
a nearly identical bill (S. 395) on the Senate side.10
On June 21, 1999, the Senate voted 57-42 not to limit debate on S. 395,
effectively killing further action on import quotas for steel. The Clinton
Administration had lobbied heavily against quotas, on the grounds that they would
violate U.S. international trade obligations.
Prior to the cloture vote on steel import quotas, the Senate on June 18 approved
by a vote of 63-34 a provision establishing a $1.5 billion loan guarantee program for
the steel, oil, and gas industries as part of H.R. 1664, a supplemental appropriations
bill. The bill, which was passed by the House on August 4 by a vote of 246-176
(H.R. 1664), provides for loans to individual steel companies of up to $250 million.
On August 17, 1999, President Clinton signed into law (P.L. 106-51) the loan
guarantee program.
A number of bills have have been introduced in the 106th Congress that would
impose additional country-of-origin labeling requirements on meat products, fruits,
and vegetables at the retail level. Bills covering meat products include H.R. 222
(Chenoweth), H.R. 1144 (Chenoweth), S. 242 (Johnson), and S. 251 (Enzi). A
separate bill affects fruits and vegetables (H.R. 1145 (Chenoweth.) The proposals
might provide U.S. beef producers with an advantage by increasing foreign marketing
costs and perhaps increase sales by bolstering consumer awareness of which meat
products are domestic and which are foreign. The House and Senate Agriculture
Committees respectively have held hearings on these bills, which are opposed by
processors and packers, on April 28, 1999 and May 26, 1999.

Reform of the Trade Remedy Laws and Programs
Saying “no” to constituent requests for assistance is never easy. Congress
generally directs pressures for import protection to one of two laws. Section 201 of
the Trade Act of 1974 , the so-called “escape clause”, provides relief for industries
injured by competition from “fairly” priced imports. When injury occurs as a result
of imports of subsidized or dumped goods (“unfair” trade practices), U.S. industries
are often directed to avail themselves of the countervailing duty and antidumping
statutes. As laws that provide limits to the damage or injury that can be inflicted by
both fair and unfair import competition, they are periodically amended by Congress
in an effort to provide more certain and expedited relief to U.S. industries that are
struggling due to increased foreign trade competition. Since 1962, a trade adjustment
10 For analysis of the quota bill and other steel-specific proposals, see CRS Issue Brief
IB10023, Steel Imports: Effects on U.S. Industry and Proposed Legislative Remedies, by
Gwenell L. Bass.

CRS-11
assistance program has also been available for workers and firms that have been
adversely impacted by import competition.
Several bills that have been introduced — H.R. 412 (Regula), H.R. 1120
(Levin), S. 1008 (Baucus), H.R. 1505 (English), S. 261(Specter), and S. 1254 (Roth)
— would make the provision of import relief easier under Section 201. Some of
these bills do this by lowering the so-called “causation standard” for finding cause of
injury in Section 201 cases, by limiting the flexibility of the President not to provide
import relief, and by narrowing the definition of what constitutes an industry for the
purposes of import relief.
Seven bills introduced — H.R. 842 Regula), H.R. 1505 ( English), H.R. 1201
(Regula), H.R. 3198 (English), S. 61 ( DeWine), S. 528 (Specter), and S. 1254
(Roth) —amend the countervailing and antidumping statutes. H.R. 1505, among
other provisions, would ease statutory criteria for the imposition of retroactive duties
and for making injury determinations. H.R. 3198 provides that the provisions relating
to countervailing duties apply to non-market economies. H.R. 842, H.R. 1201, and
S. 61 would distribute the money collected from antidumping and countervailing
duties to petitioners. S. 528 would allow private parties to launch court challenges
to stop unfairly priced imports. S. 1254 allows domestic industry, under certain
circumstances, to prevent the Department of Commerce from negotiating agreements
that suspend antidumping and countervailing duty cases.
During 1999 the Administration indicated that it would work with Congress
to arrive at some modifications of the trade remedy statutes. In a March 23, 1999
hearing before the Senate Finance Committee, USTR Barshefsky agreed that there
should be an examination of whether these statutes can be made more effective within
the framework of international rules. On August 4, 1999, President Clinton stated he
would work with the steel industry to pass trade law changes that are consistent with
the WTO.11 Yet, momentum for pushing ahead on trade law reforms appears to have
declined in the early months of 2000.
Congress in 1999 did extend for two years the three elements of the Trade
Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program. These include programs for workers and
firms, as well as a Transitional Program set-up under NAFTA. The extensions
through September 30, 2001 were part of an omnibus appropriations bill that passed
the House and Senate on November 18 and 19, 1999, respectively. In addition, the
Senate-passed “Trade and Development Act of 1999” incorporates two TAA-related
amendments. One extends the TAA program to farmers hurt by import competiton
and a second reduces the certification time allowed for textile workers.
Extension of Tariff Preferences
The 106th Congress has considered several proposals that would both extend
existing tariff preferences and grant new tariff preferences to specific regions.
Specifically, they include proposals to extend the U.S. Generalized System of
11 Inside U.S. Trade, “Clinton Signals Possible Support For Trade Law Changes To
Industry,” August 7, 1999.

CRS-12
Preferences (GSP), enhance the treatment of textiles and apparel under the GSP
benefits provided sub-Saharan African countries, and enlarge tariff benefits provided
under the Caribbean Basin Interim Trade Program.
The U.S. GSP program provides duty-free treatment to certain products that are
imported from designated developing countries. The primary purpose of the program
is to stimulate the economic development of these countries through an expansion of
their exports. In November 1999, Congress extended the program retroactively from
June 30, 1999 to September 30, 2001 at a total cost of $798. The legislation was
signed into law on December 17, 1999 (P.L. 106-170).12
As part of broader measures designed to expand the U.S. trade and investment
relationship with sub-Saharan African countries, Congress also considered several
proposals that would enlarge the GSP benefits provided these countries. H.R. 434
(Crane), the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and S. 666 (Lugar), a
companion bill, would allow the President to grant GSP treatment for more products
(including textiles and apparel). S. 1387 (Roth), the Africa Growth and Opportunity
Act, is similar in many ways to H.R. 434 and S. 666 except primarily for treatment of
textiles and apparel. H.R. 772 (Jackson), the HOPE for Africa Act, would provide
similar GSP treatment, but extend this benefit without eligibility criteria.
After being reported out by both the House International Relations Committee
and the House Ways and Means Committee early in 1999, H.R. 434 passed the House
(234-163) on July 16, 1999 with amendments. On the Senate side, S. 1387 was
reported out of the Finance Committee by voice vote on June 22, 1999, and was
incorporated into the Senate Majority Leader’s substitute amendment, which passed
the Senate on November 3, 1999 as a substitute amendment to H.R. 434.13
The major difference between House-passed bill and S. 1387 concerns treatment
of textiles and apparel. H.R. 434 provides for more liberal duty-free and quota-free
benefits by allowing beneficiary goods to be produced with regional fabric, while the
S. 1387 restricts trade benefits to goods produced with U.S. fabric. A House-Senate
conference will have to reconcile these differences in approaches for promoting trade
with Africa, along with similar differences in treatment of trade preferences for the the
Caribbean Basin countries.
On the House side, Title I of H.R. 984 (Crane), introduced as the Caribbean and
Central American Relief and Stabilization Act, would provide Caribbean Basin
countries with essentially the same tariff treatment that Mexico receives under
NAFTA. The House Ways and Means Committee reported out H.R. 984 on June 10,
1999, by voice vote with amendments.
On the Senate side, Title I of S. 371 (Graham) introduced as the Central
American and Caribbean Relief Act, provides somewhat more restrictive tariff benefits
than the House bill, particularly for textiles and apparel. The Senate Finance
12 See CRS Report 97-389, Generalized System of Preferences, by William H. Cooper.
13 See CRS Issue Brief 98015, African Trade and Investment Proposals in the 106th
Congress, by Theodore Dagne and Lenore Sek.

CRS-13
Committee reported out S. 1389 (Roth) on June 22, 1999, a bill that would extend
CBI benefits from October 1, 1999, to December 31, 2004, at a cost of $1.43 billion.
This bill was also incorporated into the Senate Majority Leader’s substitute
amendment to H.R. 434.
S. 1389 is more restrictive than H.R. 984 in that benefits would be extended for
cutting and assembly of textile and apparel products only made from U.S. fabrics and
yarn. H.R. 984, on the other hand, allows duty-free treatment for some items that are
made of regional fabric, as well as non-regional (e.g. Asian materials). S. 1389 has
more stringent eligibility conditions (such as adherence to WTO and intellectual
property standards) than H.R. 984 as condition for receiving benefits. These
differences will be dealt with in the House-Senate conference on H.R. 434 this year.14
Extension of Normal Trade Relations Status
The United States grants most its trading partners most-favored-nation
treatment. (The 105th Congress required that the term MFN be replaced by “normal
trade relations.”) This means that as a general rule any trade benefits or concessions
the United States gives to one trading partner, it automatically grants to all others.
For a variety of legal and historical reasons, every Congress considers some
legislation to restore, extend, or suspend NTR treatment to specific countries. In the
106th Congress, legislation has been introduced to authorize the extension of NTR
status to Mongolia (S. 354/Craig), to Kyrgyzstan (H.R.1318/Dunn and S. 332,
Brownback) and to Albania (H.R. 2746). Amendments to the Senate-passed “Trade
and Development Act of 1999” include authorization of permanent NTR status for
Albania and Kyrgyzstan. Bills affecting the temporary NTR status of China and
Vietnam’s access to government credits were acted on in 1999, while a bill providing
permanent NTR treatment for China is likely to be considered sometime this year.
Following President Clinton’s recommendation of June 3, 1999, to renew
China’s Jackson-Vanik waiver (and NTR status) for a year (Presidential
Determination 99-28), the House defeated H.J.Res 57 on July 27, 1999, by a vote of
260-170. H.J.Res. 57 and its identical Senate counterpart, S.J.Res. 27, would have
disapproved the president’s renewal of the waiver from the Jackson-Vanik provision
of the 1974 Trade Act. On July 20, 1999, the full Senate rejected by a vote of 87-12
an attempt to force a debate on the resolution on the Senate floor.15
The House on August 3, 1999, backed continuation of Vietnam’s access to U.S.
credit or investment guarantees for U.S. exports for one year by a vote of 297-130.
H.J.Res. 58 would have disapproved the President’s waiver of the Jackson-Vanik
provisions. Combined with the Administration’s conclusion on July 24, 1999 in
principle of a bilateral trade agreement with Vietnam, Congress later this year may
14 See CRS Report RS20174, CBI/NAFTA Parity Proposals: A Comparison, by Vladimir
Pregelj.
15 See CRS Issue Brief 91121, China-U.S. Trade Issues, by Wayne Morrision.

CRS-14
consider a resolution granting Vietnam temporary NTR status if Vietnam signs the
agreement.16
Congress is also likely later this year to consider legislation granting China
permanent NTR status. One bill introduced to date, H.R. 577(Bereuter) , removes
China from the Jackson-Vanik provisions of the 1974 Trade Act and provides
permanent NTR status. Other bills, H.R. 884 (Gephardt) and S. 743 (Hollings)
require prior congressional approval before China can be admitted as a member of the
WTO. The Administration supports permanent NTR status for China in the context
of a WTO accession package. Any vote is likely to be complicated by charges of
Chinese efforts to steal or otherwise acquire sensitive U.S. military technology as well
as continuing concerns about human rights violations within China.17
Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 1999
On February 9, 1999, the House passed by a vote of 414-1 a miscellaneous tariff
bill, H.R. 435 (Archer). A companion bill, S. 262 (Roth), had been reported out of the
Finance Committee without amendment on February 3, 1999, and passed by the
Senate on May 27, 1999. The House agreed to the Senate version of the trade bill
June 7, 1999, allowing President Clinton to sign the bill on June 25, 1999. The bill
makes numerous technical corrections to trade statutes, provides a number of duty
suspensions and reductions for specific products, and contains a provision aimed at
settling a dispute with the European Union over textile labeling.
Export-Related Legislation
U.S. export policy entails a contradictory mix of efforts to both promote as well
as restrict exports. Export promotion efforts are touted on the basis of their
contribution to job creation and a healthy economy. Administration officials and
export promotion advocates commonly emphasize the number of jobs associated with
the production of goods for exports and the fact that they tend to be higher-paying
and higher skilled jobs than average. The United States tries to promote or expand
exports through the provision of subsidized finance to potential customers of U.S.
goods, through financing and insuring U.S. overseas investments, through efforts to
reduce trade barriers that restrict access of U.S. exports to foreign markets, and
through provision of trade information and counseling.18
The objective of expanding U.S. exports collides constantly with a variety of
sanctions, restrictions, and controls placed on U.S. exports to achieve a wide range
of foreign policy and national security goals. The basic framework for restricting or
16 See CRS Report RL30416. The Vietnam-U.S. Trade Agreement, February 1, 2000, by
Mark Manyin.
17 See CRS Report RS20139, China and the World Trade Organization, January 24, 2000,
by Wayne Morrison.
18 For full discussion, see Cohen, Stephen D., Paul, Joel R., and Robert A. Becker.
Fundamentals of U.S. Foreign Policy. Westview Press, 1996.

CRS-15
controlling most commercial exports is the Export Administration Act (EAA) of
1979. The EAA has been employed to control goods and technology whose sales or
use abroad could be used by adversaries to harm the United States. It has also been
used to promote the protection of human rights, and to punish certain countries for
objectionable behavior (for example, state-sponsored terrorism and military
aggression.) Exporters whose economic interests are adversely affected by the
imposition of export controls and some Members of Congress have repeatedly
attempted to lessen the President’s discretion to impose export controls or exempt
certain categories of products from control lists.
Many of these export policy issues are the subject of legislative activity in the
106th Congress. U.S. export promotion efforts have attracted a limited amount of
legislation in the areas of export finance, insurance, and market access. The
restrictive component of export policy is the subject of considerably more legislative
activity, particularly in the area of economic sanctions.

Export Promotion
As the most important agencies involved in the extension of export finance and
the provision of insurance for U.S. overseas investments, the Export-Import Bank
(Eximbank) and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), respectively,
are often the subject of legislative proposals that seek to enlarge or contract U.S.
economic engagement with specific countries or regions. In addition to appropriating
funds, proposals to expand the programs these agencies have in Sub-Saharan African
countries are covered by H.R. 434/ S.666 and H.R. 772. Eximbank activities are also
affected differentially by more than a dozen specific bills to lift or increase sanctions
imposed on specific countries.19
OPIC activities were reauthorized through September 30, 2003 on December 9,
1999 by H.R. 3381 (P.L. 106-158). The 106th Congress has also entertained a
number of proposals (H.R. 332 (Andrews) and S. 691 (Allard) to terminate the
activities of OPIC.20
Funding for federal programs to promote exports is taken up annually in
appropriations legislation. The Departments of Commerce and Agriculture are the
main agencies that administer these programs.21
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 is the primary tool available for
negotiations designed to increase the access U.S. exports have to foreign markets.
Under this trade law provision, the United States Trade Representative is authorized
to retaliate against foreign trade practices that discriminate against U.S. exports. This
19 For background and analysis, see CRS Report, Export-Import Bank: Background and
Legislative Issues, by James K. Jackson.
20 For background, see CRS Report 98-567, The Overseas Private Investment Corporation:
Background and Legislative Issues, by James K. Jackson.
21 For details on the agriculture programs, see CRS Issue Brief IB98006, Agricultural Export
and Food Aid Programs.

CRS-16
provision has been the subject of numerous legislative efforts in recent Congresses to
make the operation of the statute more effective.22
In the 106th Congress, one proposal (H.R. 450/Camp and S. 566/Lugar) has been
introduced to establish procedures for identifying countries that deny market access
for U.S. agricultural products. Under a second proposal provided by the Steel Trade
Enforcement Act of 1999 (S. 1254/Roth), the U.S. Trade Representative would
investigate under Section 301 market-distorting practices insulating foreign steel
makers from competition in their domestic markets. A third proposal (H.R.
2612/Traficant) would expand U.S. exports of goods and services by requiring the
development of objective criteria to achieve market access in foreign countries. A
fourth proposal (H.R. 3393/ Levin) would strengthen Section 301 by providing a “hit
list” of countries that use health and safety regulations to block imports of agricultural
products and expand the ability of the U.S. Trade Representative to retaliate against
governments of countries who encourage anti-competitive practices.
Two amendments adopted in the Senate-passed “Trade and Development Act
of 1999” also affect Section 301. One amendment, offered by Senator Dorgan, would
clarify the applicability of Section 301 to state trading enterprises, such as the
Canadian Wheat Board. A second amendment, offered by Senator DeWine, would
force U.S. trade officials to rotate retaliatory tariffs against countries that do not
comply with WTO rulings. The fate of both amendments likely will be decided in the
House-Senate conference on H.R. 434 early this session.
Export Controls
The Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979, which provides a delegated
authority from the Congress to the executive branch, expired in 1994. During this
five-year interim, the President has administered the export control regulations under
authority of the International Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA).23
The EAA establishes export licensing policy for items detailed on the Commerce
Control List (CCL). The CCL currently provides detailed specifications for about
2400 dual-use items (those with both military and commercial value) including
equipment, materials, software, and technology likely requiring some type of export
license. The CCL is periodically updated to decontrol broadly available items and to
focus controls on critical technologies and on key items in which targeted countries
are deficient. Exports of defense articles are governed separately under the Arms
Export Control Act.
The Clinton Administration has supported the reauthorization of the EAA on the
grounds that U.S. controls on exports of sensitive technology need to be updated to
reflect changes in threats to the United States as well as advances in technology.
Administration officials have also argued that IEEPA lacks the statutory authority to
22 For full discussion, see CRS 98-454, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, As Amended:
Its Operation and Issues Involving Its Use By the United States, by Wayne M. Morrison.
23 For full discussion, see CRS Report RL30169, Export Administration Act of 1979:
Reauthorization, by Helit Barel, Robert Shuey, Craig Elwell, and Jeanne Grimmett.

CRS-17
properly enforce U.S. export controls through the imposition of stiff penalties for
violations of the law. Many private sectors representatives, however, have maintained
that continuing to operate under IEEPA would be preferable to tighter export
controls under a reauthorized EAA.
The 106th Congress is considering proposals to enact a new export control
authority. The Senate Banking Committee approved a bill (S. 1712) entitled the
Export Administration Act of 1999 by a vote of 19-0 on September 23, 1999. The
bill would significantly reduce the number of items under export control from about
10,000 to 1,000 and increase penalties for violators of export control laws. It would
also guide U.S. export controls by classifying countries based on their perceived
threat to national security. The bill could be placed on the Senate calendar this year.
No action has taken place in the House since a subcommittee hearing in March 1999.
Opposition to S. 1712 can be expected from some members who want to place
greater priority on national security considerations in implementing the controls.
Some members seek to have the Defense or State Departments as the lead agency in
export controls based on the perception that the Commerce Department is more
interested in promoting exports than national security. U.S. export controls towards
Cuba are also a contentious issue. Undersecretary of Commerce William Reinsch has
stated that the Administration was unhappy with some provisions of the Senate
Banking Committee bill but was generally supportive.
Revelations concerning China’s efforts to steal or otherwise acquire militarily
sensitive technology are likely to affect the debate on reauthorization, in addition to
generating legislative proposals directed at China per se. For example, the House on
June 9, 1999, approved legislation to tighten controls on exports of high-performance
computers and satellite exports to China. Approved by a vote of 428-0 as an
amendment to the Defense Department appropriations bill, the amendment would
implement some of the recommendations contained in the Cox Committee report.
The Senate approved legislation with similar aims on May 27, 1999.24 The Clinton
Administration has already tightened some controls in wake of the Cox Commission’s
allegations that China gained from lax controls. In addition, the Senate on June 22,
1999, approved legislation as an amendment to the State Department reauthorization
bill (S. 886) to tighten U.S. export controls of high-technology products to Hong
Kong and Macao.25
Legislation that would significantly liberalize controls on encryption software is
also being considered. H.R. 850, introduced by Representative Bob W. Goodlatte
and known as the “Security and Freedom Through Encryption Act,” (SAFE Act),
would ease export controls on hardware and software products (such as Netscape
Navigator and Lotus Notes) with strong encoding capabilities and would codify the
regulations for unrestricted domestic use and sale of encryption. The bill was reported
out by voice vote by the Committee on the Judiciary on April 17, 1999 (H.Rept. 106-
24 International Trade Reporter, “House Approves Tighter Limits on Exports of High-
Performance Computers to China,” June 16, 1999.
25 International Trade Reporter, Senate Clears Measure to Tighten Controls on High-Tech
Exports to Hong Kong, Macao,” June 30, 1999.

CRS-18
117) and by the House Commerce Committee (with amendments) on June 23, 1999.
The bill has also been referred to the committees on Intelligence, Armed Services, and
International Relations. With multiple referrals, the various versions of H.R. 850 differ
significantly.26
S. 798 (McCain), which is similar in a number of respects to H.R. 850, would
also loosen current export controls on encryption products. Key provisions of the
bill, which is titled the “Promote Reliable Online Transactions To Encourage
Commerce and Trade (PROTECT) Act of 1999,” would loosen export restrictions
on encryption software and other products up to 64 bits, and would establish a private
sector review board for encryption using bit lengths above 64 bits to determine
whether the product is readily available from foreign suppliers. The Senate
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee reported out the bill by voice
vote on June 23, 1999.27 The Committee report (S.Rept. 106-142) was filed August
5, 1999.
The computer industry, privacy, and consumer advocacy groups generally
support both bills, but H.R. 850 is considered more pro-industry because of its greater
liberalization of encryption export controls. The Administration has opposed both
H.R. 850 and S. 798 on national security and law enforcement grounds, fearing
efforts aimed at lawful electronic surveillance will be frustrated by worldwide use of
unbreakable electronic message encryption. However, in recent months the Clinton
Administration has announced changes to its encryption policy, making more products
exportable without a license to specific countries. It remains uncertain how these
actions will affect support for moving encryption legislation.
26 See CRS Issue Brief IB96039, Encryption Technology: Congressional Issues, by Richard
Nunno.
27 International Trade Reporter, “Senate Commerce Panel Clears McCain Bill to Ease
Controls on Encryption Exports,” June 30, 1999.

CRS-19
Economic Sanctions
The 106th Congress currently has under consideration more than 100 bills or joint
resolutions to impose new sanctions, ease current sanctions, alter current regimes, or
overhaul the entire process that the legislative and executive branches employ when
considering the use of sanctions. Of these, H.R. 1244 (Crane) and its counterpart,
S. 757 (Lugar) could change fundamentally how the United States uses sanctions as
a foreign policy tool. The bills seek to clarify the use of unilateral sanctions in U.S.
foreign policy imposed at the initiative of either the Administration or Congress. The
bills would revise procedures that both branches follow before enacting or imposing
sanctions, and would require extensive reporting as to the expected costs and benefits
of imposing sanctions.
The Administration has spoken in favor of some sort of sanctions overhaul, but
has a number of disagreements with specific provisions in the bills offered to date. In
general, while the Administration has expressed a willingness to work with Congress
in achieving a bill it can support, it wants to maintain considerable presidential
discretion in the sanctions process, particularly to issue waivers of new sanctions.
As a sub-set of the economic sanctions debate, much legislative attention is being
given to the exemption of food or agricultural products from U.S. unilateral sanctions.
S. 566 (Lugar) amends the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 to exempt commercial
sales of agricultural commodities from unilateral economic sanctions, but also gives
the President the authority under certain foreign policy and national security
circumstances to include these items in sanctions. The Senate Agriculture Committee
reported out this bill on May 26, 1999. A related bill, S. 425 (Ashcroft) prohibits,
with specified exceptions, the President from imposing new unilateral agricultural
sanctions, or a new unilateral sanction with respect to medical products, without
congressional consent.
The specific issue of selective agricultural embargoes is also being addressed
legislatively. H.R. 17 (Ewing) and S. 315 (Ashcroft) delineate congressional
procedures for the approval or disapproval of a future embargo on agricultural
products that is not part of an embargo on all products to a country. The House
passed H.R. 17 by voice vote under suspension of the rules on June 15, 1999. The
Administration has expressed concerns with the bill on the grounds that it would
restrict the President’s flexibility and would require termination of sanctions on a
certain date regardless of changes in the behavior of the country being embargoed.
Numerous country-specific bills that would remove food and agricultural
products from specific country embargoes or sanctions have also been introduced.
Several would waive the sanctions imposed against India and Pakistan after they
detonated nuclear devices in the spring of 1998. Among those introduced, H.R. 973
passed the House on June 15, 1999, and was referred to the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations. More than six bills affecting the current economic embargo against
Cuba have also been introduced, but none have so far received consideration beyond
referral.

CRS-20
Appendix: Summary of Selective Trade Bills
Negotiating Authority
S. 111 (Gramm)
A bill to authorize negotiation for the accession of Chile to the NAFTA, and for
other purposes.
S. 112 (Gramm)
A bill to authorize negotiation of free trade agreements with the countries of the
Americas, and for other purposes.
S. 1065 (Dodd)
A bill to authorize negotiation for the accession of Chile to NAFTA, to provide
for fast track consideration, and for other purposes.
S. 1869 (Baucus)
A bill to authorize the negotiation of a free trade agreement with the Republic
of Korea and to provide for expedited congressional consideration of such an
agreement.
S. 1870 (Baucus)
A bill to authorize the negotiation of a free trade agreement with the Republic
of Singapore and to provide for expedited congressional consideration of such an
agreement.
S. 1871 (Baucus)
A bill to authorize the negotiation of a free trade agreement with Chile, and to
provide for expedited congressional consideration of such an agreement.
Trade Negotiations and Agreements
China/WTO accession
H.R. 884 (Gephardt)/ S. 743 (Hollings)
A bill to require prior congressional approval before the United States supports
the admission of China into the World Trade Organization, and to provide for the
withdrawal of the United States from the World Trade Organization if China is
accepted into the WTO without the support of the United States.
S. 742 (Grassley)
A bill to clarify requirements for the accession to the World Trade Organization
of the People’s Republic of China.
Agricultural Trade Negotiations
H.R. 817 (Ewing)/ S. 101 (Lugar)
A bill to promote trade in U.S. agricultural commodities, livestock, and value-
added products, and to prepare for future bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

CRS-21
NAFTA
H.R. 650 (Rivers)
A bill to assess the impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement on
domestic job loss and the environment, and for other purposes.
USTR Organization and Trade Policy Process
S. 80 (Snowe)
A bill to establish the position of Assistant United States Trade Representative
for Small Business, and for other purposes.
S. 185 (Ashcroft)/H.R. 3173 (Hulshof)
A bill to establish a Chief Agricultural Negotiator in the Office of the United
States Trade Representative.
S. 1395 (Baucus)
A bill to require the USTR to appear before certain congressional committees
to present the annual national trade estimate report.
S. 1585 (Baucus)
A bill to establish a Congressional Trade Office.
Import-Related Legislation
Protection of American Industry
Steel
H.R. 502 (Traficant)
A bill to impose a 3-month ban on imports of steel and steel products from
Japan, Russia, South Korea, and Brazil.
H.R. 506 (Visclosky)
A bill to ensure that the volume of steel imports does not exceed the average
monthly volume of such imports during the 36-month period preceding July 1997.
H.R. 975 (Visclosky)
A bill to provide for a reduction in the volume of steel imports for three years to
the average monthly volume of such imports during the 36-month period before July
1997, and to establish a steel import notification and monitoring system. Passed the
House by a vote of 289-141 on March 19, 1999.
S. 395 (Rockefeller)
A bill to ensure that the volume of steel imports does not exceed the average
monthly volume of such imports during the 36-month period preceding July 1997
A Senate vote on this bill is expected on June 22, 1999.

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Food-labeling
H.R. 222 (Chenoweth)
A bill to amend the Federal Meat Inspection Act to require that imported meat,
and meat food products containing imported meat, bear a label identifying the country
of origin.
H.R. 1144 (Chenoweth)
A bill to amend the Federal Meat Inspection Act to require that all meat and
meat food products, whether domestic or imported, bear a label notifying the ultimate
purchaser of meat and meat food products of the country of origin of the livestock
that is the source of the meat and meat food products.
H.R. 1145 (Chenoweth)
A bill to require that all perishable agricultural commodities be labeled or marked
as to their country of origin and to establish penalties for violations of such labeling
requirements.
S. 242 (Johnson)
A bill require the labeling of imported meat and meat food products.
S. 251 (Burns)
A bill to amend the Federal Meat Inspection Act to require the labeling of
imported meat and meat food products.
S. 860 (Graham)
A bill to require country of origin labeling of perishable agricultural commodities
imported into the United States and to establish penalties for violations of the labeling
requirements.
Trade Remedy Reform
Section 201 (“fair trade”) of the 1974 Trade Act
H.R. 412 (Regula)/S. 261 (Specter)
A bill to amend the causation and injury standards of Section 201 of the Trade
Act of 1974, and for other purposes.
H.R. 1120 (Levin) /S. 1008 (Baucus)
A bill to modify the standards for responding to import surges under Section 201
of the Trade Act of 1974, to establish mechanisms for import monitoring and the
prevention of circumvention of United States trade laws, and to strengthen
enforcement of United States trade remedy laws.
H.R. 1505 (English)
A bill to amend the causation, captive production, and critical circumstances of
Sections 201 and 202 of the Trade Act of 1974, in addition to other provisions of
trade law, and to more effectively address import crises.

CRS-23
S. 120 (Snowe)
A bill to amend Title II of the Trade Act of 1974 to clarify the definition of
domestic industry and to include certain agricultural products for purpose of
providing relief from injury caused by import competition, and for other purposes.
S. 261 (Specter)
A bill that in part revises criteria the International Trade Commission must
consider in determining whether an industry has been injured by import competition.
Countervailing Duty And Antidumping Statutes
H.Res. 298 (Visclosky)
A resolution calling on the President to abstain from negotiating international
agreements governing antidumping and countervailing duty measure.
H.R. 842 (Regula)
A bill that in part distributes dumping or subsidy offsets to the affected producers
for qualifying expenditures on an annual basis.
H.R. 1201 (Regula)
A bill to provide for a private right of action in the case of injury from the
importation of certain dumped and subsidized merchandise.
H.R. 1505 (Regula)
A bill to amend Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 on provisions dealing with
captive production, cumulation, injury, critical circumstances, and other purposes.
S. 61 (DeWine)
A bill to amend the Tariff Act of 1930 to eliminate disincentives to fair trade
conditions. Among other provisions, the bill would distribute duties collected under
antidumping and countervailing duty orders back to the affected domestic producers
for qualifying expenditures.
S. 528 (Specter)
A bill to provide for a private right of action in the case of injury form the
importation of certain dumped and subsidized merchandise, among other provisions.
S. 1254 (Roth)
An original bill to establish a comprehensive strategy for the elimination of
market-distorting practices affecting the global steel industry, among other provisions.
Trade Adjustment Assistance
H.R. 1491(Matsui)
A bill to amend the Trade Act of 1974 to consolidate and enhance the trade
adjustment assistance and NAFTA transitional adjustment assistance programs under
that Act, and for other purposes.

CRS-24
H.R. 1728 (English)
A bill to reauthorize the Trade Adjustment Assistance program through fiscal
year 2003, and for other purposes.
H.R. 2406 (Rangel)
A bill to reauthorize the Trade Adjustment Assistance program (TAA) and the
North American Free Trade Adjustment Assistance program (NAFTA-TAA) through
fiscal year 2001. The bill resets the cap on NAFTA-TAA training expenditures at $30
million and increases the period of time for filing worker assistance petitions to two
years.
S. 220 (Moynihan)
A bill to amend the Trade Act of 1974 to consolidate and improve the trade
adjustment assistance and NAFTA transitional adjustment assistance programs under
that Act, and for other purposes.
S. 1386 (Roth)
A bill to amend the Trade Act of 1974 to extend the authorization for trade
adjustment assistance.
Extension of Tariff Preferences
Generalized System of Preference
S. 1388 (Roth)
An original bill to extend the Generalized System of Preferences. Report (S.Rept.
106-137) filed by Senate Finance Committee on August 4, 1999.
Africa Trade and Investment Acts
H.R. 434 (Crane)/ S. 666 (Lugar)
A bill to authorize a new trade and investment policy for sub-Sahara Africa. The
bills provide new tariff preferences, encourage partnerships with African nations
through a range of trade and investment initiatives in exchange for commitments to
continue market-oriented reforms. The Ways and Means Committee marked-up and
reported out H.R. 434 on June 10, 1999.
H.R. 772 (Jackson)
A bill to authorize a new trade, investment, and development policy for sub-
Saharan Africa that is mutually beneficial to the majority of people in sub-Saharan
Africa and the United States.
S. 1387 (Roth)
A bill to authorize a new trade and investment policy for sub-Sahara Africa.
Senate Finance Committee reported it out on June 22, 1999, by voice vote, and it was
placed on the Senate legislative calendar.

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CBI/NAFTA Parity
H.R. 984 (Crane)
A bill to provide additional trade benefits to certain beneficiary countries in the
Caribbean, to provide assistance to the countries in Central America and the
Caribbean affected by Hurricane Mitch and Hurricane Georges, and for other
purposes. The House Ways and Means Committee marked-up and reported out H.R.
984 on June 10, 1999.
H.R. 1834 (Lewis)
A bill to promote the growth of free enterprise and economic opportunity in the
Caribbean region, to increase trade between the region and the United States, and to
encourage the adoption by Caribbean Basin countries of trade and investment policies
necessary for participation in the Free Trade Area of the Americas. This bill is the
Administration’s approach to CBI parity.
S. 371 (Graham)
A bill to provide assistance to the countries in Central America and the
Caribbean affected by Hurricane Mitch and Hurricane Georges, to provide additional
trade benefits to certain beneficiary countries of the Caribbean, and for other
purposes.
S. 1389 (Roth)
United States-Caribbean Basin Trade Enhancement Act reported out as an
original bill by the Finance Committee on July 16, 1999, without written report.
Extension of Normal Trade Relations Status
H.J.Res. 57 (Rohrabacher)/ S.J.Res. 27 (Smith)
A joint revolution disapproving the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment
(normal trade relations treatment) to the products of the People’s Republic of China.
H.J.Res. 58 (Rohrabacher)/ S.J.Res. 28 (Smith)
A joint resolution disapproving the extension of the waiver authority contained
in Section 202(c) of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to Vietnam.
H.R. 577 (Bereuter)
The bill removes China from the Jackson-Vanik provisions of the 1974 Trade
Act and provides for permanent NTR status upon its accession to the WTO.
S. 354 (Thomas)
A bill to authorize the extension of nondiscriminatory trade status to Mongolia.
H.R. 1318 (Dunn)/ S. 332 (Brownback)
A bill to authorize the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment (normal trade
relations) to the products of Kyrgyzstan.

CRS-26
Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 1999
H.R. 435 (Archer)/ S.262 (Roth)
A bill to make miscellaneous and technical changes to various trade laws, and for
other purposes. Passed the House on February 9, 1999 and the Senate on May 27,
1999.
Export-Related Legislation
Export Promotion
H.R. 332 (Andrews)/ S. 691 (Allard)
A bill to terminate the authorities of the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation.
H.R. 1993 (Mazullo)
A bill to reauthorize the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and for other
export enhancement purposes.
S. 688 (Helms)
A bill to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to reauthorize the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation.
H.R. 450 (Camp)/S. 566 (Lugar)
A bill to amend the Trade Act of 1974 to establish procedures for identifying
countries that deny market access for agricultural products of the United States.
H.R. 2612 (Traficant and Visclosky)
A bill to expand U.S. exports of goods and services by requiring the
development of objective criteria to achieve market access in foreign countries, to
provide the president with reciprocal trade authority, and for other purposes.
H.R. 3393 (Levin and Houghton)
A bill to amend the Trade Act of 1974 to provide for identification of, and
actions relating to, foreign countries that maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures
that deny fair and equitable market access to U.S. food, beverage, or other plant or
animal products, and for other purposes.
S. 1619 (DeWine)
A bill to amend the Trade Act of 1974 to provide for periodic revision of
retliation lists or other remedial action implemented under Section 306 of such act.
Export Controls
H.R. 850 (Goodlatte)
A bill that eliminates export licensing for much encryption software and
streamlines licensing procedures for other products, among other provisions.

CRS-27
S. 798 (McCain)
A bill that establishes a panel of private industry executives to review specified
export control issues, among other purposes.
Economic Sanctions
H.R. 17 (Ewing)
A bill to amend the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 to require the President to
report to Congress on any selective embargo of agricultural products, to provide a
termination date for the embargo, to provide greater assurances of contract sanctity,
and for other purposes.
H.R. 212 (Nethercutt)
A bill to require the GAO to prepare a report assessing the impact and
effectiveness of economic sanctions imposed by the United States, to prohibit the
imposition of unilateral sanctions on exports of food, other agricultural products,
medicines, or medical supplies or equipment, and for other purposes.
H.R. 1244 (Crane)
A bill to provide a framework for consideration by the legislative and executive
branches of unilateral economic sanctions.
S. 262 (Roth)
This bill, in part, would amend the Tariff Act of 1930 to impose new sanctions
on drug trafficking states.
S. 281 (Harkin)
This bill, in part, would amend the Tariff Act of 1930 to clarify that forced or
indentured labor includes forced or indentured child labor.
S. 315 (Ashcroft)
A bill to amend the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 to require the President to
report to Congress on any selective embargo on agricultural commodities, to provide
a termination date for the embargo, to provide greater assurances for contract
sanctity, and for other purposes.
S. 327 (Hagel)
A bill to exempt agricultural products, medicines, and medical products from
U.S. economic sanctions.
S. 373 (Harkin)
This bill, in part, would prohibit the acquisitions of products produced by forced
or indentured child labor.
S. 425 (Ashcroft)
A bill to require the approval of Congress for the imposition of any new
unilateral agricultural sanction, or any new unilateral sanction with respect to
medicine, medical supplies, or medical equipment, against a foreign country.

CRS-28
S. 634 (Brownback)
This bill, in part, would extend sanctions exemptions toward India and Pakistan,
an particularly would require a modification of the sanctions as they apply to
prohibition of exports of CCL goods to certain entities in India or Pakistan. A version
of this bill (amendment 578) was added to S. 1122 (Defense Appropriations) in June
1999.
S. 757 (Lugar)
A bill to provide a framework for consideration by the legislative and executive
branches of unilateral economic sanctions.
S. 566 (Lugar)/H.R. 817 (Ewing)
A bill to amend the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 to exempt agricultural
commodities, livestock, and value-added products from unilateral economic sanctions,
to prepare for future bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations affecting U.S.
agriculture, and for other purposes.
S. 927 (Dodd)
This bill gives the President broad authority to delay, suspend, or terminate
economic sanctions it is important to the national interest of the United States to do
so.