{
  "id": "RL30188",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "RL30188",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 105390,
      "date": "2001-02-12",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:27:37.402941",
      "title": "South Korea: \"Sunshine Policy\" and Its Political Context",
      "summary": "Into his third year of rule, President Kim Dae Jung continues to receive high ratings in polls,\nexcept\nfor his handling of political matters. The political situation is volatile and uncertain, with his ruling\nMillennium Democratic Party (MDP) locked in a partisan standoff with the opposition Grand\nNational Party (GNP) led by Lee Hoi Chang. President Kim also has a tenuous relationship with his\nformer coalition partner, the United Liberal Democrats (ULD). This fluid situation has complicated\ndomestic support for the President's \"sunshine policy\"of engagement with North Korea. U.S.\nPolicymakers, including many in Congress, have mixed views on the efficacy of the engagement\npolicy and have a strong interest in South Korean political support for the policy and for President\nKim. \n The partisan strife is rooted in regionalism, a defining issue in South Korean politics. From\n1961 through 1997, power was associated with the southeastern Kyongsang region; but under\nPresident Kim's stewardship, it shifted to his political stronghold the southwestern Cholla region. \nSignificantly, this shift also marked the ascendency of a power elite with a liberal political outlook\nquite different from that of the conservative establishment associated with the GNP. The opposition,\nwith its previously dominant parliamentary majority, has tried to regroup to regain its strength. The\nongoing partisan struggle has complicated President Kim's effort to attain bipartisan support on\nvarious issues, including economic reform and policy toward North Korea.\n President Kim has tried to engage Pyongyang in a more conciliatory and more consistent\nmanner than was the case with his predecessors. The June 2000 inter-Korean summit seemed to\nvindicate this approach. Since 1998, President Kim has espoused a \"comprehensive\" approach to\nmeet Pyongyang's economic, security, and political concerns, with support from the United States\nand Japan. In return, Pyongyang is to mend fences with the South and, equally important, to halt its\nnuclear and missile programs. This approach is predicated on the provision of incentives to\nPyongyang by Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo; a solid allied united front in policy coordination; and\npatience in dealing with Pyongyang's penchant for contentiousness and duplicity. The underlying\nrationale is that, in time, North Korea will moderate and play by the rules of the international\ncommunity. If the history of negotiations with Pyongyang is any indication, the settlement of inter-\nKorean conflict seems certain to be thorny, depending on, among other things, whether the goals and\npriorities of the allied engagement policy can be consistent with North Korea's.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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          "encoding": null,
          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL30188",
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      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "Intelligence and National Security",
    "National Defense"
  ]
}