Social Security Reform: Bills in the 106th Congress

Social Security Reform: Bills in the 106th Congress

Order Code RL30138
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Social Security Reform:
Bills in the 106th Congress
Updated January 5, 2001
David Koitz
Geoffrey Kollmann
Domestic Social Policy Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Social Security Reform: Bills in the 106th Congress
Summary
The Social Security system is projected to have long-range funding problems.
Although its income currently exceeds its expenditures, the Social Security Board of
Trustees estimates that over the next 75 years the system’s expenditures would
exceed its income by 14% on average and by 2037 its trust funds would be depleted.
This adverse outlook is mirrored by public opinion polls where fewer than 50% of
respondents express confidence that Social Security can meet its future commitments.
Accompanying this skepticism is a growing perception that the system’s benefits will
not be as good a value in the future as they are today. These concerns and a belief
that the remedy lies partly in economic growth that could be bolstered by changes to
the system have led to a large number of reform plans. They range from restoring the
system’s long-range solvency with as few changes as possible to revamping it totally
toward private-sector pension models.
In his January 2000 State of the Union message, President Clinton renewed his
call for crediting the Social Security trust funds with general revenues equal to the
interest savings achieved by using Social Security surpluses to buy up publicly-held
debt. In his 1999 message, he had proposed a similar debt reduction course and
general fund infusions to Social Security equal to a little more than half of the next 15
years’ overall budget surpluses. Under both proposals part of the trust funds were to
be invested in stocks.
While no major reform action was taken in the 106th Congress, Social Security
remained an issue in the 2000 Presidential campaign. President-elect George W. Bush
favored allowing workers to put some of their Social Security taxes in personal
accounts where they could invest in stocks if they so desired. As with President
Clinton, Vice President Al Gore supported using budget surpluses in some fashion to
shore up system. He also endorsed the creation of personal retirement accounts with
government matching contributions, but not by using social security taxes.
Congressional leaders put particular emphasis in the 106th Congress on setting
aside the Social Security portion of the looming budget surpluses pending
consideration of reform legislation. While agreement could not be reached on a so-
called “lock box” measure to protect the set asides, budget actions taken during the
two-year period avoided dipping into the Social Security portion of the surpluses.
Legislation was brought up dealing with a number of other Social Security concerns
as well. Following a public statement by President Clinton that he would support
repeal of the Social Security earnings test, Congress passed H.R. 5, a bill to allow
recipients ages 65 to 69 to work without losing benefits, effective in 2000. The
President signed the bill into law on April 7, 2000 as P.L. 106-182. Also considered
was a measure to repeal a provision enacted in 1993 that subjected up to 85% of
Social Security benefits to income taxes. While passed by the House, the Senate did
not take up the repeal before adjourning sine die.
This report gives an overview of the reform issues and summarizes the bills
introduced in the 106th Congress to address them. Bills directed at other Social
Security concerns also are listed by subject in a summary table.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Projected Financing Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Past Financing Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Emerging Calls for Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The 1994/1996 Advisory Council on Social Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Reform Bills and Other Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Social Security Bills Introduced In 106th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Social Security Bills In 106th Congress On Which Action Has Been Taken 20
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Additional Relevant CRS Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
List of Figures
Figure 1. Social Security Trust Fund Balances, 1983 and 2000 Projections . . . . 6
List of Tables
Table 1. Measures Enacted in 1977 and 1983 to Shore Up Financial
Condition of Social Security System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Table 2. Major Assumptions Underlying Long-Range Social Security
Projections Made in 1983 and 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Table 3. Social Security’s Long-Range Financing Shortfall Addressed in
1977 and 1983 Compared to That Shown in 2000 Trustees’ Report . . . . . . 7
Table 4. Social Security Bills in 106th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Social Security Reform:
Bills in the 106th Congress
Introduction
The Social Security system is projected to have long-range funding problems.
Although the system’s income currently exceeds its outgo, its board of trustees
projects that over the next 75 years the system’s expenditures will exceed its income
by 14% on average and by 2037 its trust funds will be depleted.1 This adverse
outlook is mirrored by opinion polls where fewer than 50% of respondents express
confidence that Social Security will pay its promised benefits. Accompanying this
skepticism is a growing perception that Social Security will not be as good a value in
the future as it is today. Until recent years, a typical retiree could expect to receive
far more in benefits than he or she paid in Social Security taxes. However, because
Social Security tax rates have increased to cover the costs of a maturing system, it has
become increasingly apparent that the system will be less of a good deal for future
recipients.2 These concerns and a belief that the remedy lies partly in economic
growth that could be bolstered by Social Security reforms have led to a number of
major proposals, including ones to totally revamp the system toward private-sector
pension models.
Others suggest that the issues are not as serious as sometimes portrayed. They
point out that there is no imminent crisis, that the system is now running surpluses and
is projected to do so for two decades or more, that the public still likes the program,
and that there is considerable risk in some of the new reform ideas. They contend that
modest changes would resolve the long-range funding problem.
1 The Social Security Board of Trustees, comprised of three Cabinet Members, the
Commissioner of Social Security, and two members representing the public at large, annually
projects the long-range financial condition of the Social Security system. Traditionally, the
Board uses a valuation period extending 75 years into the future. Although the measure of
solvency was refined in 1991 to encompass shorter and more recent periods of valuation,
generally long-range solvency — or what is technically referred to as “close actuarial balance”
— is assumed to exist if the system’s average income over the 75-year period as a whole is
projected to be within 95% of its average costs.
2 To a large extent, the very favorable returns on taxes experienced by the first few decades
of Social Security recipients were artificial, stemming from policy decisions to pay relatively
large benefits early on while keeping tax rates low. As the system matured, with more people
becoming eligible with longer periods of paying taxes, and higher taxes becoming necessary
to cover the benefit costs of an expanding eligible population, the ratio of benefits-to-taxes
declined. The continued decline in the ratio of workers to retirees is projected to further erode
benefit-to-tax ratios for future recipients.

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Following a year of public forums on the issue sponsored by the White House,
President Clinton proposed in his State of the Union address in January 1999 using
$2.8 trillion of some $4.9 trillion in projected federal budget surpluses over the
following 15 years to shore up the system — 21% of this infusion (or nearly $.6
trillion) would be invested in the stock market, the rest would be invested in federal
government securities. The proposal was estimated to keep Social Security solvent
until 2059. He further proposed that recipients be allowed to work without losing
benefits — through elimination of the Social Security earnings test — and unspecified
measures to reduce poverty among elderly women. He also proposed that $.5 trillion
of the budget surpluses be used to create new Universal Savings Accounts (USAs)
— 401(k)-like savings accounts that individuals would own. These would be
intended to supplement Social Security benefits.
In June 1999, he raised his 15-year surplus projection to $5.9 trillion and revised
his Social Security proposal. It called for creation of a budget “lock box” to protect
the Social Security portion of the surplus, similar to approaches being considered by
Congress, and general fund infusions to the Social Security trust funds of $543 billion
in the FY2011-2014 period, followed by an indefinite $189 billion per year thereafter.
These were equal to the estimated interest savings to the Treasury from using the
“lock box” surpluses to reduce outstanding publicly-held federal debt. The infusions
were to be invested in stocks until the stock portion of trust fund holdings reached
15%. The plan was projected to keep the system solvent until 2053.
In October 1999, President Clinton sent draft legislation to Congress reflecting
yet another plan. It resembled the June plan, but omitted the part calling for
investment of the new infusions in stock. It called, instead, for crediting the trust
funds with $735.2 billion in federal securities in the FY2011-2015 period, followed
by $215.5 billion per year through 2044. The plan was projected to extend the life
of the system until 2050. It also called for reserving a of future budget surpluses for
Medicare reform. The draft legislation was introduced by Senators Moynihan (S.
1828) and Daschle (S. 1831) and Representative Gephardt (H.R. 3165).
In his State of the Union address on January 27, 2000 and his FY2001 budget
request, President Clinton again renewed his call to protect the projected Social
Security surpluses and that interest savings from eliminating publicly-held federal debt
be credited to the trust funds. Unlike his October 1999 proposal, this last one again
called for investment of part of the new infusions in stock. Some 50% of the infusions
would be invested in stocks until the stock portion of the trust funds’ holdings
reached 15%. In effect, this last plan was close to his June 1999 plan. The new trust
fund infusions were to begin in FY2011. The Social Security Administration’s
actuaries estimated that they would range from $98.7 billion in FY2011 to $204.9
billion in 2016 and thereafter (with all such infusions ending in 2050), and that the
plan would extend the life of the system until 2054.
Although no major reforms were enacted in the 106th Congress, steps were taken
to set aside the portion of the looming budget surpluses attributable to Social Security
pending consideration of reform legislation. This was done through both budget
resolutions enacted during the two-year period. Attempts, however, to bolster the
set-asides through procedural measures to discourage tax cuts or spending increases

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that would dip into the set asides — so-called budget “lock box” measures – failed
to garner Senate approval.
Following a public statement by President Clinton early in the year that he would
support repeal of the Social Security earnings test, Congress did pass H.R. 5, a bill
to allow recipients ages 65 to 69 to work without losing benefits effective in 2000.
Under the old law, recipients ages 65 to 69 who earned more than $17,000 in 2000
would have lost one dollar in benefits for each three dollars they earned above the
limit; there was no loss of benefits once a person reached age 70. Under the new law,
recipients ages 65 to 69 received full benefits beginning with the month they reached
age 65, or beginning with January 2000 if they had reached age 65 earlier. President
Clinton signed the measure into law on April 7, 2000 as P.L. 106-182 (see CRS
Report 98-789).
Congress also considered legislation to repeal part of the income taxation of
Social Security benefits that is now credited to the Medicare HI program. Legislation
enacted in 1993 had made up to 85% of benefits taxable for some recipients. H.R.
4865 as passed the House would have limited the taxable portion to 50%. However,
no action on the bill was taken in the Senate before it adjourned sine die (see CRS
Report RL30581).
This report summarizes the various reform bills and other legislation introduced
in the 106th Congress. For additional reading on the issues, see the Appendix to this
report. Many of the CRS products listed there and links to information from other
organizations can be accessed through an on-line Social Security “electronic briefing
book” located at the CRS website [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebssc1.html].
Background
Projected Financing Problem. Currently the Social Security system’s income
exceeds its outgo. However, the Social Security Board of Trustees projects that on
average over the next 75 years the system’s expenditures will exceed its income by
14%. The primary reason is demographic: an aging post-World War II “baby boom”
generation will begin retiring in 2008 and increasing life expectancy is creating an
older society. By 2025, the number of people 65 and older is projected to rise by
75%. In contrast, the number of workers whose taxes will finance future Social
Security benefits is projected to grow by only 13%. As a result, the ratio of workers
to Social Security recipients is projected to fall from 3.4 to 1 today to 2.1 to 1 in 2030
and ultimately to 1.9 to 1 in 2075 (the end of trustees’ projection period).3
Social Security revenues are paid into the U.S. Treasury and invested in federal
securities recorded to the Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) trust
funds maintained by the Treasury Department (OASDI being the formal title for
Social Security). Social Security benefits and administrative costs are paid out of the
Treasury and a corresponding amount of securities are written off the trust funds.
3 See the 2000 Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age, Survivors and
Disability Insurance Trust Funds, Intermediate projections.

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The tax surpluses the system is currently generating and the interest the
government “pays” to the trust funds on the securities they hold appear as growing
trust fund balances. On March 30, 2000, the trustees projected that the balances
would grow to a peak of $6 trillion in 2024. After 2024, the trust funds’ income
would be less than their outgo and the balances would fall. By 2037, the balances
would be totally depleted and the system would be technically insolvent.4
Although aggregate trust fund surpluses are projected through 2024, the point
at which Social Security taxes alone (ignoring interest credited to the funds) would
fall below the system’s outgo is 2015. Since interest “paid” to the trust funds is
simply an exchange of credits among governmental accounts, it does not represent a
source of receipts for the government. Only the portion of the trust funds’ income
represented by taxes provides receipts for the government. Hence, it is in 2015 that
surplus Social Security taxes would no longer be available to the government and
other resources of the government would be needed to help meet the costs of the
system. At that point, in the absence of surplus receipts from the rest of the
government’s operations, policymakers would have three basic choices: raise taxes,
cut spending, or borrow money from the public.5
Today, the cost of the system — approximately $410 billion in 2000 — is equal
to 10.34% of the total amount of national earnings subject to Social Security taxation
(referred to as taxable payroll). It is projected to rise slowly over the next decade,
reaching 11.55% of payroll by 2010. It would then begin a more precipitous rise to
16.24% in 2025 and 17.86% in 2035. This would be near the end of the baby
boomers’ retirement as those born in 1965 (the approximate end of the baby boom)
would be 70 years old in 2035. After that, the system’s cost would rise slowly to
19.53% of payroll in 2075. The system’s average cost over the entire 75-year period
would be 15.4% of payroll or 14% higher than its average income. However, the gap
between income and outgo would grow throughout the period and by 2075, income
would equal 13.34% of payroll, outgo would equal 19.53% of payroll, and the gap
would equal 6.18% of payroll. Simply put, by the end of the projection period, outgo
would exceed income by 46%.
Past Financing Problems. The current problem is not unprecedented. In 1983
and in legislation in 1977, Congress enacted a variety of measures to address financing
shortfalls similar to those now being forecast. Among them were benefit computation
changes, a gradual increase from 65 to 67 in Social Security’s “full” benefit age,
increases in payroll taxes, partial taxation of the Social Security benefits of higher-
income recipients, and extension of coverage to federal and nonprofit employees.
(See Table 1.) Since then, new long-term deficits have been forecast, resulting from
4 The reader should recognize that at that point the system is projected to still be receiving
taxes sufficient to cover about 72% of its ongoing costs.
5 Since the trust funds would still be credited with interest for the securities they hold, from
an accounting standpoint their “total” income (tax receipts and interest combined) would
exceed their outgo and the use of general governmental resources during the 2015-2024 period
would be “making good” on part of the interest due to the funds. Even more general
governmental resources would be needed in the 2025-2037 period as the balances of the trust
funds are drawn down.

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changes in actuarial methods and assumptions, as well as extensions of the 75-year
valuation period to later years (which added years of deficits at the back end of the
period, while subtracting recent years of surpluses). (See Figure 1 and Table 2.)
Table 1. Measures Enacted in 1977 and 1983 to Shore Up Financial
Condition of Social Security System
Measures enacted in 1983
Percent of projected 75-year
funding gap closed by measure
Raise full benefit age from 65 to 67
34%
Subject up to ½ benefits to income taxes
29%
Cover federal & non-profit employees
18%
Move COLAs from July to January
14%
Other
5%
Funding gap remaining after changes
-0-
Measures enacted in 1977
Changes in benefit computation rules
58%
Increase in Social Security tax rates
15%
Increase in taxable earnings base
7%
Other
2%
Subtotal of changes
82%
Funding gap remaining after changes*
18%
* The 1977 amendments did not fully resolve the long-range financing problem projected at that time.

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Figure 1. Social Security Trust Fund Balances, 1983 and
2000 Projections
Trust Fund Balance as % of Annual Outgo
600
1983 Projections
500
400
300
200
100
2000 Projections
0
1985 1995 2005 2015 2025 2037 2045 2055
Table 2. Major Assumptions Underlying Long-Range Social Security
Projections Made in 1983 and 2000
Long-range assumptions
1983 projections
2000 projections
Annual increase in:
—wages in covered employment
5.5%
4.3%
—consumer price index
4.0%
3.3%
Unemployment rate
5.5%
5.5%
Annual interest rate
6.1%
6.3%
Fertility rate (births per woman)
2.0
1.95
Life expectancy in 2060:
At birth (in years):
—women
84.4
84.1
—men
76.3
79.9
At age 65 (in years):
—women
23.6
22.0
—men
17.9
19.1
Annual net immigration
400,000
900,000
Source: 1983 and 2000 OASDI Trustees’ Report, Intermediate projections.

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Expressed as a percent of taxable payroll, the currently projected financing
problem of 1.89% of payroll (averaged over the next 75 years) is slightly less than the
size as the problem that Congress tackled in 1983 and only about one-fourth the size
of the problem addressed in 1977 (see Table 3). The more important difference
between the financing problems projected then and now is that the problems in 1977
and 1983 were immediate. The imminent “insolvency” of the trust funds gave
political impetus to act on the issue. Today, there is no near-term problem, only a
long-term one. In one sense, it makes dealing with the problem harder, because the
length of time before the problem emerges gives people a basis to doubt what the
projections show (the argument being that long-term projections will inevitably be
wrong). On the other hand, the longer time frame until the problem emerges allows
for gradual changes to be made to solve it, in lieu of precipitous benefit cuts or tax
increases that might be required if insolvency were imminent.
Table 3. Social Security’s Long-Range Financing Shortfall Addressed
in 1977 and 1983 Compared to That Shown in 2000 Trustees’ Report
Year of
Income
Outgo
Deficit
Deficit as Percent
Projection
of Income
(75-year average in % of payroll)
1977
10.99
19.19
-8.20
75%
1983
12.29
14.38
-2.09
17%
2000
13.51
15.40
-1.89
14%
Source: 1977 and 2000 OASDI Trustees’ Report, Intermediate projections, and projections provided
to House Committee on Ways and Means and Senate Committee on Finance, February 1983.
Emerging Calls for Reform
As far back as 1990, Social Security trustees of previous administrations
concluded that steps eventually would need to be taken to fix the system. Impetus to
move soon was triggered by the 1994/1995 Bipartisan Commission on Entitlement
and Tax Reform (better known as the Kerrey-Danforth Commission), which, while
failing to get agreement on a specific plan, did conclude that the earlier action was
taken the better. This perspective was echoed two years later by the 1994-1996
Social Security Advisory Council, a legislatively-mandated panel convened to study
Social Security’s long-term problem. It too was unable to agree on a specific plan,
but its members also concluded that action needed to be taken soon. Since then,
numerous other private and governmental entities, including a new permanent Social
Security Advisory Board, the General Accounting Office, the National Association
of Manufacturers, the Committee on Economic Development, and the American
Academy of Actuaries have come forward urging Congress to take action. Moreover,
opinion polls suggest that the public generally sees the need and is in favor of reform
soon. However, while a consensus has emerged that action is necessary, there is a
wide range of opinion over what should be done.

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The 1994/1996 Advisory Council on Social Security. The 1997 report of the
1994-96 Social Security Advisory Council contained three possible alternatives to
restore the system’s solvency.6 The first (the “maintain benefits” plan) would have
kept the system’s benefit structure essentially in tact by addressing most of the long-
range problem with revenue increases (including an eventual rise in the payroll tax)
and minor benefit cuts. To close the remaining gap, its proponents suggested that
Congress consider authorizing investment of up to 40% of the Social Security trust
funds in the stock market. The second (the “individual account” plan) addressed the
problem mostly with gradually growing benefit reductions. It also would have
required workers to make an extra 1.6% of pay contribution to new personal savings
accounts. The third (the “personal security account” plan) proposed a complete
redesign of the system that would have gradually replaced the current earnings-related
retirement benefits with flat-rate benefits based on length of service and personal
savings accounts funded with a 5% of pay contribution (carved out of the current
payroll tax). It would have covered the costs of transitioning to the new system with
an increase in payroll taxes of 1.52% of pay and government borrowing.
While Congress did not act on any of the Advisory Council’s plans, the Council’s
report and varied plans have served to stimulate public debate. The conceptual
approaches they reflect can be found in the many reform bills introduced in the 105th
and 106th Congresses as well as in other proposals suggested by private panels and
experts.
Reform Bills and Other Proposals. This section briefly summarizes some of
the more fundamental reform bills introduced in recent Congresses and proposals
suggested by others. A more general list of Social Security-related bills introduced
in the 106th Congress is provided in the succeeding section.
During the 103rd Congress, bills were introduced proposing to raise the system’s
full benefit age to 70, modify cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs), and make other
benefit reductions — H.R. 4275 (Pickle), H.R. 4372/H.R. 4373 (Penny), H.R. 5308
(Nick Smith). H.R. 4245 (Rostenkowski) of the 103rd Congress sought a mix of
benefit reductions and tax increases. In the 104th Congress, more far-reaching
proposals were introduced encompassing not only some of these changes, but also
seeking to privatize a portion of the program — S. 818 (Kerrey), S. 825 (Kerrey and
Simpson), and H.R. 3758 (Nick Smith). In the 105th Congress more than 30 reform
bills reflecting an even wider array of options were introduced.
As measured by the number of bills introduced, the most popular form of Social
Security change proposed in the 106th Congress were those designed to alter the
program’s treatment in the federal budget — more than 40 would have done so either
by changing how Social Security is viewed and treated in the congressional budget-
making process or through constitutional amendments to balance the federal budget
without counting Social Security. Included among them were the FY2000 and FY
2001 concurrent budget resolutions, H.Con.Res. 68 and H.Con.Res. 290, both of
which set aside the portion of projected budget surpluses attributable to Social
Security pending action to reform the system. Many others consisted of so-called
6 Report on the 1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social Security. Washington, GPO, 1997.

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“lock box” measures, including amendments to S. 557 (Thompson), which would
have set a statutory limit on publicly-held debt that would decline annually by the
amount of Social Security surpluses, and H.R. 1259 (Herger), H.R. 3859 (Herger),
H.R. 5173 (Fletcher), H.R. 5203 (Shaw), all of which were aimed at creating points
of order against bills that would use the Social Security or Medicare portions of
budget surpluses for spending increases or tax cuts. The latter four passed the House
but were not taken up in the Senate (See CRS Report RS20165 for further discussion
of Social Security “lock boxes.”)
Also prominent were measures to allow aged recipients to earn more without
losing benefits. As previously mentioned, following President Clinton’s statement that
he would sign a “clean” bill eliminating the earnings limit for recipients ages 65 to 69,
both Houses of Congress passed H.R. 5 (Representative Sam Johnson) unanimously
with no other amendments or alterations of the program. The President signed the
bill into law as P.L. 106-182, on April 7, 2000. Under the new law, the earnings limit
for this age group was eliminated beginning in the year 2000.
Congress also considered legislation to repeal part of the income taxation of
Social Security benefits that is now credited to the Medicare HI program. Legislation
enacted in 1993 made up to 85% of benefits taxable for some recipients. H.R. 4865,
passed by the House on July 27, 2000, would have repealed that measure, and thereby
limited the taxable portion of benefits to 50%. It too was not taken up in the Senate
(see CRS Report RL30581).
Most of the fundamental reform bills introduced in the 106th Congress and those
aimed at addressing the system’s long-range financing problems proposed alterations
of the system with some combination of benefit restraints and income-producing
measures. Most would have made some use of the nation’s financial markets, either
by permitting the creation of new personal savings accounts to supplement or take the
place of future Social Security benefits or by requiring or permitting the “collective”
investment of the Social Security trust funds in stocks and bonds. Some involving the
creation of personal accounts would have phased-in rapidly, giving workers so-called
recognition bonds for their past Social Security taxes, while others called for a long
transition.
H.R. 249 (Sanford) and H.R. 874 (Porter) of the 106th Congress would have
allowed workers to divert 8 and 10 percentage points, respectively, of the current
Social Security tax rate paid by employees and employers into new personal accounts.
Under H.R. 249, workers who did so would have received Social Security benefits
equivalent to those payable had they turned age 62 and retired in the year 2000 and
a minimum annual annuity from their new personal accounts (with any remaining
balance being available as a personal asset). For those who stayed in the existing
system, the bill would have gradually raised the full benefit age to 70, altered the basic
benefit formula to produce lower benefits (i.e., than current law), and reduced annual
COLAs and spousal benefits. It also would have extended Social Security coverage
to newly hired state and local government workers. Under H.R. 874, workers opting
for the new system would have received Social Security benefits (through recognition
bonds) based on their employment record before they joined and a minimum annuity
from their new personal accounts. For those remaining in the existing system, the bill

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would have gradually raised the full benefit age to 70 and altered the basic benefit
formula to produce lower benefits.
S. 1103 of the 106th Congress (Rod Grams) and H.R. 3683 (Sessions) of the
105th Congress would similarly have allowed workers to opt for a new system of
personal accounts. S. 1103, like H.R. 874, would have allowed workers to divert 10
percentage points of the current tax rate into the new accounts. Workers age 30 and
older were to receive recognition bonds for past Social Security taxes. Those
choosing the new system would have been permitted to opt back into the old one
within 10 years upon repayment of the taxes and any recognition bonds received.
Under H.R. 3683, once a worker opted out, his or her portion of the Social Security
tax — 6.2% of pay — were to be deposited into a new personal account. Employers
would have continued to pay their share of the tax to the existing system for 15 years,
after which they were to contribute to the worker’s personal account. There was to
be a 90-day period of dual coverage, after which the worker’s Social Security
coverage was to decline by 20% per year until all protections were forfeited in the 5th
year.
S. 21 (Moynihan/Kerrey) of the 106th Congress would have put the current
system on a pay-as-you-go basis by immediately reducing the tax rate by one
percentage point each on workers and their employers, and then raising it later in
tandem with the system’s future cost. Workers were to be given the option of using
the tax cut to create new personal accounts. If they did, their employers would have
had to match their contributions. The bill also reduced COLAs, increased and
extended the taxation of benefits to all recipients, repealed the currently scheduled
increase in the full Social Security benefit age while constraining the future growth in
benefits to reflect increasing life expectancy, lengthened the earnings “averaging
period” for computing benefits, eliminated the Social Security earnings test (allowing
recipients age 62 and older to receive benefits regardless of their earnings), raised the
maximum amount of earnings subject to taxation, extended Social Security coverage
to all newly hired state and local government workers, and created a new system of
personal savings accounts for children under the age of 6, referred to as kidsave
accounts, funded with contributions by the government.
Senator Phil Gramm suggested a plan under which workers would be allowed
to divert three percentage points of their tax rate into new personal accounts with the
government guaranteeing a higher retirement income than would be payable from
Social Security alone. The guarantee would apply when a retiree’s Social Security
benefits plus an annuity from the new personal accounts are less than 120% of current
law Social Security benefits. An amount equal to an additional two percent of
workers’ pay also would be contributed to personal accounts by the Federal
government, and the annuities from these contributions would be used entirely to
offset the cost of a worker’s eventual Social Security benefits. Federal budget
surpluses, a partial draw-down of the Social Security trust funds, and higher corporate
tax receipts resulting from the potential economic stimulus created by the plan were
suggested as ways of covering transition costs. The Senator suggested that the plan
would resolve Social Security’s funding problems since the personal account annuities
would fully or partially offset Social Security benefits. The plan was not introduced
in bill form.

CRS-11
H.R. 5659 (Kasich) would have created a new system of voluntary personal
accounts coupled with constraints on the growth of the existing Social Security
benefit formula such that benefits would rise only at the rate of inflation. Under
current rules, future retirees’ Social Security benefits are scheduled to rise at the rate
of average wages in the economy. Under the bill, their benefits were to rise at the rate
of inflation, which historically has risen at a slower pace than wages. This change
alone would be expected to bring the system into long-range balance. Under the new
personal accounts system, workers under age 55 in the year 2000 could have made
an irrevocable choice to divert a portion of their Social Security tax into the accounts,
and in return accepted a partial reduction in their eventual Social Security benefits.
The amount of the diversion was to vary with the level of a worker’s annual earnings;
the smaller the earnings, the larger the diversion rate (with a minimum of 1% of
earnings and a maximum approaching 3.5%). The bill also called for borrowing from
the general fund by the Social Security trust funds to help cover transition costs.
H.R. 3206 (Nick Smith) of the 106th Congress would have allowed workers to
put 2.5 percentage points of their Social Security taxes into new personal accounts
for the next 25 years, 2.75 percentage points from 2026 to 2038, and an amount
thereafter based on the yearly excess of aggregate Social Security revenue over
expenditures. At retirement, each participant’s Social Security benefits were to be
reduced by the amount of a hypothetical annuity derived from their new personal
accounts. The bill would have altered the existing system by accelerating the
scheduled increase in the full benefit age to 67 for those born in 1949, thereafter
increasing it by 1 month every 2 years, and made changes to the basic benefit formula
to produce lower initial benefits such that ultimately there would be nearly a single-
rate benefit formula. It also would have raised benefits for surviving spouses by 10%
beginning in 2001, increased the “delayed retirement credit” to 8% per year beginning
in 2000 (instead of in 2008 as scheduled under current law), extended Social Security
coverage to newly hired state and local government workers, eliminated the Social
Security earnings test for recipients age 62 and older, and made general fund infusions
to the trust funds equal to non-Social Security budget surpluses for FY2001-FY2009
and for a portion of the costs of Disability Insurance.
S. 588 (Bunning) of the 106th Congress would have allowed workers to initially
divert 2.5% of their taxes into new accounts with the diversion amount rising to up
to half of their taxes over 20 years. Workers opting to do so would have had to take
a 50% reduction in their eventual Social Security benefits. Retirees would have been
required to draw down at least 75% of their personal account accumulations in the
form of an annuity or other monthly payment based on their life expectancy.
Patterned after recommendations made by the National Commission on
Retirement Policy, an independent panel comprising Members of Congress, business
leaders, economists, and other experts in the pension field, S. 2313 (Gregg/Breaux)
and H.R. 4256/H.R. 4824 (Kolbe/Stenholm) of the 105th Congress would have
mandatorily diverted two percentage points of the workers’ tax rate into new
accounts (for those under age 55 upon enactment). They would have raised the
existing system’s income by extending Social Security coverage to newly hired state
and local government workers and crediting proceeds from the current income tax on
benefits that now go to the Medicare Hospital Insurance trust fund to the Social
Security trust funds. They would have reduced its outgo by raising the early and full

CRS-12
benefit ages gradually to 67 and 70, thereafter increasing them by 2 months every 3
years, altering the basic benefit formula to produce lower benefits, reducing the
dependent spouse’s benefit, lengthening the earnings averaging period for computing
benefits, and reducing Social Security COLAs. The bills also called for a new system
of minimum Social Security benefits, ending the Social Security earnings test for
recipients at or above the full benefit age, and creating new voluntary incentives for
personal savings.
Representatives Kolbe and Stenholm introduced a revised proposal in the 106th
Congress, H.R. 1793. While retaining many of the same provisions of H.R. 4256 and
H.R. 4824 (including the mandatory two percentage point tax “carve out” for new
personal accounts and a new but revised minimum benefit), the new bill did not
contain measures extending Social Security coverage to state and local government
workers and reducing the dependent spouse’s benefit. It also revised the provisions
of the previous bills affecting the early and full benefit age, such that after the full
benefit age rose to 67 in 2011, both it and the early benefit age would have risen more
slowly than under the previous bills (i.e., by one month every two years). It added
two new benefit formula constraints to the package: (1) limiting the future growth in
benefits to reflect increases in life expectancy (similar to approach taken in S.21) and
(2) constraining the growth of the middle and upper brackets of the formula (these
two constraints would be additive, not separate). It also revised voluntary savings
provisions in the previous bills by adding government matching contributions for low-
income workers. In addition, to assist with program financing, it called for general
fund infusions to the Social Security trust funds rising from amounts equal to 0.4%
of pay in 2000 to 0.8% in 2060 and thereafter.
Senators Gregg and Breaux (along with 5 other cosponsors) also introduced a
revised plan, S. 1383. It only raised the full benefit age to 67 (albeit somewhat faster
than current law and with greater reductions and increases for early and delayed
retirement) and did not increase the earliest eligibility age. In lieu of such changes
proposed in their previous bill, it contained a provision similar to that of S. 21,
constraining the growth of the system’s benefit formula to reflect increasing life
expectancy. It retained the mandatory two percentage point tax “carve out” for new
personal accounts, however, in contrast to their previous bill, some or all of the
annuities from these accounts was to cause a reduction in future Social Security
benefits. In addition, it did not create a new minimum benefit but instead revised the
basic benefit formula to tilt it more heavily toward low-wage workers. The new
package also called for creation of “kidsave” accounts similar to those of S. 21 (with
half of the eventual “kidsave” annuities causing a reduction in Social Security
benefits), and it revised voluntary savings provisions in the previous bill by adding a
government contribution and matching rate for low-income workers. To assist with
program financing, it would have raised the maximum amount of earnings subject to
Social Security taxation and authorized general fund infusions to the Social Security
trust funds rising from amounts equal to 0.6% of pay in 2000 to 1.2% in 2060 and
thereafter. As with H.R. 1793 (Kolbe/Stenholm), this new package excluded
provisions extending Social Security coverage to state and local government workers
and reducing the dependent spouse’s benefit. (Also see S. 2774, introduced by same
sponsors in the 106th Congress – similar bill with some modifications).

CRS-13
H.R. 250 and H.R. 251 (Sanford) of the 106th Congress would have mandatorily
diverted one percentage point of the workers’ share of the tax rate on into new
personal accounts (for those under age 55 upon enactment) managed by the Treasury
in the same manner as the federal workers’ Thrift Savings Plan (with the same
investment options) or by banking institutions. Future Social Security benefits were
to be scaled down to reflect the annuity value of the account accumulations. They
also gradually raised Social Security’s early and full retirement ages to 67 and 70,
respectively, for those born in 1967, thereafter increasing them by about 1 month
every 2 years, and reduced COLAs.
H.R. 4839 (Sanford) of the 106th Congress would have mandatorily diverted an
amount derived from annual Social Security surpluses into new personal savings
accounts (for those under age 55) with between 5 and 15 investment options to
choose from. Future Social Security benefits were to be scaled down to take account
of the growth of the accounts. It further provided for general fund infusions to the
DI trust fund if the fund balance falls below 20% of annual costs.
Economists Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick have suggested a personal
accounts system funded with federal budget surpluses allocated to workers at a rate
equal to 2% of their pay. Under their plan, withdrawals from the accounts would
cause a partial reduction in Social Security benefits; i.e., for every $1 withdrawn, $.75
in Social Security benefits should be forfeited. In this way, the build up of the
accounts would lead to an eventual reduction in the existing system’s cost while
enhancing future retirees’ income. They claimed the proposal would make the
existing system solvent in the long run.
A related approach suggested by Representatives Archer and Shaw would have
established a personal accounts system (referred to as Social Security “guarantee
accounts”) funded with indefinite government contributions equal to 2% of pay. The
government would have established the accounts for all workers who pay Social
Security taxes. However, workers’ Social Security taxes were to be unaffected, since
the funding of the accounts would be through refundable tax credits (the accounts
would be effectively funded with general revenues). The accounts were to be
managed by selected investment companies with portfolios containing a 60/40% split
of equities and corporate bonds. Upon entitlement to Social Security, an amount
equal to a “life annuity” was to be transferred monthly from each worker’s account
to the Social Security system, and the higher of current law Social Security benefits
or the life annuity would have been paid to the recipient (in effect, the annuity
payment was to fund a portion or all of the Social Security benefit depending on its
size). The account balances of deceased recipients were to be used to finance Social
Security benefits of any eligible survivors or would have otherwise reverted to the
Social Security trust funds. The account balances of workers who die before
entitlement with no eligible survivors were to become part of the worker’s estate. The
proposal also would have eliminated the Social Security earnings test for recipients
age 62 and older and liberalized Social Security survivor benefits for two-earner
couples (the Social Security benefits of the surviving spouse were to be equal to
2/3rds of the combined benefits they formerly received as a couple). The plan was not
introduced in bill form.

CRS-14
Following the theme of the “maintain benefits” plan of 1994-1996 Social
Security Advisory Council, three other approaches attempted to close the system’s
funding gap without altering Social Security benefits or creating new personal
accounts. Reflecting in part the original “framework” for reform proposed by the
President in January 1999, H.R. 1043 (Nadler) in the 106th Congress would have
credited the trust funds with $2.8 trillion of the then projected $4.9 trillion in federal
budget surpluses over the next 15 years as a general fund “infusion,” using 40% of
such amounts to buy stocks (about $1.1 trillion worth). It also would have raised the
maximum amount of earnings subject to Social Security taxation. H.R. 2039 (Stark)
would have credited the Social Security trust funds with annual general fund infusions
equal to 2.07% of taxable payroll (about $75 billion per year in 1999 dollars), an
amount equivalent to the average long-range funding gap projected in the 1999
trustees’ report. S. 1376 (Hollings) called for the creation of a new source of federal
revenue — a 5% value added tax — that was to be used to retire the federal debt and
help shore up the Social Security trust funds.
Other more limited approaches embody the concept of expanding the investment
policies of the program; more specifically, by creating a board empowered to invest
Social Security funds in stocks as well as federal bonds. The idea is that a managed
fund that took advantage of investment yields from stocks would raise the income of
the trust funds. This was incorporated in both President Clinton’s various proposals,
which as previously mentioned would have credited the trust funds with general fund
infusions, part of which was to be used to buy stocks. It also is similar to approaches
suggested in H.R. 633 and H.R. 990 (Bartlett), H.R. 871 (Markey), H.R. 1043
(Nadler), and H.R. 2717 (DeFazio) in the 106th Congress and H.R. 336 (Solomon)
of the 105th Congress, and to proposals of former Social Security commissioner,
Robert Ball, and Brookings economists, Henry Aaron and Robert Reischauer.
Not all proposals attempted to close the system’s funding gap. S. 263 (Roth)
of the 106th Congress and H.R. 3456 (Kasich) and S. 2369 (Roth) of the 105th
Congress would have created personal savings accounts funded with federal budget
surpluses that were to be considered supplements to Social Security. These proposals
assumed no changes to the existing system. The expressed view was that the Social
Security system will have to be changed at some point, and the creation of these
accounts could help fill the gap in benefits caused by those eventual changes. A
similar measure to create universal savings accounts (USAs) using a portion of the
budget surpluses was incorporated in President Clinton’s 1999 reform framework.
In a detailed plan announced on April 14, 1999, he proposed a progressive system of
automatic government contributions, with a further progressive government match
when a worker makes a voluntary contribution (progressive in the sense that the
lower a worker’s income, the larger the automatic contribution and matching rate).
Also embedded in President Clinton’s various plans and, to a more limited extent
in H.R. 147 (Ralph Hall) and H.R. 160 (Royce) in the 106th Congress and H.R. 2191
(Neumann) in the 105th Congress, was a proposal to buy up federal securities in the
financial markets (i.e., outstanding publicly-held federal debt) and credit an equivalent
amount of federal securities to the Social Security trust funds. The various bills
introduced simply called for replacement of the trust funds’ non-marketable securities
with marketable federal ones. The President’s January 1999 plan called for crediting
$2.2 trillion of such to the trust funds over the next 15 years as a general fund

CRS-15
infusion. His revised June 1999 plan would have credited the trust funds only with
interest savings from buying up federal securities, first in the form of stocks, and then
in the form of federal securities (i.e., once the trust funds’ holdings in stocks reached
15% of the total). In his October 1999 plan, all of the trust fund infusions (again
representing interest savings from retiring federal debt) would have been in the form
of federal securities. His January 2000 plan resembled the June 1999 plan calling for
50% of the “interest-derived” infusions to be invested in stock until the trust funds’
holdings in stocks reached 15% of the total.
Social Security Bills Introduced In 106th Congress
Table 4 lists many of the bills introduced in the 106th Congress affecting Social
Security. It is relatively comprehensive but not all-inclusive. The bills shown are
confined to those that would have reformed the system or otherwise addressed its
financing problems, changed its budget status, or had notable cost or revenue effects.
The table groups them into categories reflecting their general nature. Footnotes to
the table indicate CRS or GAO reports that discuss the bills or the subject matter.

CRS-16
Table 4. Social Security Bills in 106th Congress
General Nature of Bill
Attempts to restore solvency
Creates new voluntary or
Creates personal accounts,
of current systema
mandatory system of
but does not alter current
personal accounts in place of
system
part of current system
H.R. 1
Hastert
H.R. 249
Sanford
S. 263
Roth
(reserved for
President’s
bill)
H.R. 249
Sanford
H.R. 250
Sanford
H.R. 250
Sanford
H.R. 251
Sanford
H.R. 251
Sanford
H.R. 874
Porter
H.R. 1043
Nadler
H.R. 1793
Kolbe
H.R. 1793
Kolbe
H.R. 1897
Petri
H.R. 2039
Stark
H.R. 3206
Nick Smith
H.R. 2717
DeFazio
H.R. 4839
Sanford
H.R. 3206
Nick Smith
H.R. 5659
Kasich
H.R. 3165
Gephardt
S. 21
Moynihan
H.R. 5659
Kasich
S. 588
Bunning
S. 21
Moynihan
S. 1103
Grams
S. 588
Bunning
S. 1383
Gregg
S. 1103
Grams
S. 2740
Landrieu
S. 1376
Hollings
S. 2774
Gregg
S. 1383
Gregg
S. 3200
Kerrey
S. 1828
Moynihan
S. 1831
Daschle
S. 2774
Gregg
Alters system’s investment
Alters Social Security’s
Liberalizes or ends Social
policiesb
budget treatment (including
Security earnings testd
“lock box” bills)c
H.R. 147
Hall
H.R. 37
Livingston
H.R. 5
S. Johnson
H.R. 160
Royce
H.R. 74
Bilbray
H.R. 47
Stump
H.R. 219
Paul
H.R. 167
Klink
H.R. 107
Knollenberg
H.R. 633
Bartlett
H.R. 196
Minge
H.R. 288
Sweeney
H.R. 871
Markey
H.R. 343
Andrews
H.R. 519
Gilman
H.R. 990
Bartlett
H.R. 420
Nick Smith
H.R. 1084
Dunn
H.R. 1043
Nadler
H.R. 563
Adam Smith
H.R. 1793
Kolbe
H.R. 1268
Gary Miller
H.R. 656
Stearns
H.R. 2020
N. Johnson
H.R. 2717
DeFazio
H.R. 685
Moore
H.R. 2698
Dreier
S. 633
Ashcroft
H.R. 853
Nussle
H.R. 3206
Nick Smith

CRS-17
General Nature of Bill
Alters Social Security’s
Alters Social Security’s
Liberalizes or ends Social
disability provisions
budget treatment (including
Security earnings test —
“lock box” bills) — cont’d:
cont’d
H.R. 401
Mink
H.R. 863
Herger
H.R. 3599
Nick Smith
H.R. 545
N. Johnson
H.R. 1157
Herger
S. 21
Moynihan
H.R. 631
N. Johnson
H.R. 1259
Herger
S. 279
McCain
H.R. 1091
Hulshof
H.R. 1803
Kasich
S. 1160
Grassley
H.R. 1107
Watkins
H.R. 1927
Holt
S. 1168
McCain
H.R. 1180
Lazio
H.R. 3012
Barton
S. 1383
Gregg
H.R. 1601
Ehrlich
H.R. 3165
Gephardt
S. 1440
Gramm
H.R. 3280
Mink
H.R. 3175
Minge
S. 2074
Ashcroft
H.R. 5412
Deal
H.R. 3206
Nick Smith
S. 2085
Lugar
H.R. 5553
English
H.R. 3695
Toomey
S. 2086
Lugar
H.R. 5577
Lowey
H.R. 3859
Herger
H.R. 5578
Lowey
H.R. 4195
Schaffer
S. 86
Bunning
H.R. 4397
Nussle
S. 285
McCain
H.R. 4505
Bass
S. 331
Jeffords
H.R. 5173
Fletcher
H.R. 5203
Shaw
H.R. 5670
Kasich
H.Res. 18
Pascell
H.Res. 98
Ryan
H.Res. 302
Herger
H.Res. 306
Herger
H.J.Res. 40
Traficant
H.J.Res. 53
Istook
S. 8
Daschle
S. 27
Feingold
S. 359
Grams
S. 502
Ashcroft
Amendments
Thompson
to S. 557
S. 588
Bunning
S. 605
Hollings
S. 862
Lautenberg
S. 1097
Enzi
S. 1168
McCain
S. 1693
Grams
S. 1768
Abraham
S. 1828
Moynihan

CRS-18
General Nature of Bill
Repeals some/all of taxation
Alters Social Security’s
Addresses Social Security
of Social Security benefitse
budget treatment (including
“notch” issuef
“lock box” bills) — cont’d:
H.R. 48
Stump
S. 1889
Grams
H.R. 120
Emerson
H.R. 107
Knollenberg
S. 1962
Ashcroft
H.R. 122
Emerson
H.R. 291
Sweeney
S. 2001
Grams
H.R. 148
Hall
H.R. 688
Salmon
S. 2126
Grams
H.R. 538
Clement
H.R. 761
Forbes
S. 2220
Allard
H.R. 568
Wexler
H.R. 3437
Nadler
S.J.Res. 5
Gramm
H.R. 1771
Emerson
H.R. 3438
Nadler
S.J.Res. 13
Abraham
S. 390
Reid
H.R. 3857
Franks, Bob
S.J.Res. 38
Voinovich
H.R. 4865
Archer
S. 137
Kyl
S. 286
McCain
S. 482
Abraham
S. 488
Grams
S. 2180
Abraham
S. 2304
Shelby
Deals with treatment of
Expresses sense of Congress
Alters Social Security taxes
Social Security numbers and
about Social Security issue
for purposes other than to
privacy concerns
restore solvency
H.R. 220
Paul
H.R. 245
Sanford
H.R. 1099
Owens
H.R. 4611
Markey
H.Res. 34
DeLauro
H.R. 1316
Dreier
H.R. 4857
Shaw
H.Res. 48
Ryan
H.R. 4212
Minge
H.R. 4910
Ehlers
H.Res. 93
Nadler
H.R. 4260
Nussle
S. 2554
Gregg
H.J.Res. 32
Ryan
H.R. 4265
Paul
S. 2606
Hollings
H.C.Res. 101
Mark Green
H.R. 4325
Pitts
S. 2699
Feinstein
H.C.Res. 155
Schaffer
S. 2871
Shelby
S. 2876
Bunning
S. 3219
Feinstein
Liberalizes “windfall”
Liberalizes “government
Authorizes benefits for the
benefits provisiong
pension offset” provisionh
month of deathi
H.R. 742
Sandlin
H.R. 1217
Jefferson
H.R. 163
Holden
H.R. 860
Frank
H.R. 1590
Gejdenson
H.R. 287
Sweeney
S. 8
Daschle
H.R. 3890
Mink
S. 717
Mikulski
H.R. 4310
Hoekstra
S. 786
Mikulski

CRS-19
General Nature of Bill
Provides an income tax
Alters COLAs or Revises
Budget resolutions
deduction for payment of
Consumer Price Index (CPI)
Social Security taxes
for COLA purposesj
H.R. 105
Knollenberg
H.R. 1422
Sanders
H.Con.Res. 68
Kasich
H.R. 1458
Nethercutt
H.R. 2180
Weiner
S.Con.Res. 20
Domenici
S. 807
Ashcroft
H.R. 4551
Bass
S . C o n . R e s .
Kasich
290
H.R. 5373
Tancredo
S. 1247
Grams
Mandates coverage of state
Expands eligibility for lump
Restores benefits for college
and local government
sum death benefit
students
workersk
H.R. 249
Sanford
H.R. 3281
Mink
H.R. 4873
Andrews
H.R. 3206
Nick Smith
H.R. 5329
Wu
S. 21
Moynihan
Requires that Social Security
Establishes bi-partisan Social
Liberalizes benefits for
benefits be made a “legal
Security commission
divorced or surviving spouses
guarantee”
S. 1102
Grams
H.R. 5593
Portman
H.R. 5575
Lowey
H.R. 5576
Lowey
Source: Derived from on-line Legislative Information System; bills introduced in 106th Congress
as of December 31, 2000.
a For discussion, see CRS Issue Brief IB98048, Social Security Reform.
b For discussion, see CRS Report RS20607, Social Security: Trust Fund Investment Practices,
and CRS Report 91-129, Social Security: Investing the Surplus.
c For discussion, see CRS Report RS20165, Social Security, Medicare, and Public Debt
Reduction “Lock Boxes,” and CRS Report 98-422, Social Security and the Federal Budget:
What Does Social Security Being “Off Budget” Mean?
d For discussion, see CRS Report 98-789, Social Security: Proposed Changes to the Earnings
Test.
e For discussion, see CRS Report RL30581, Social Security: Taxation of Benefits.
f For discussion, see CRS Report 95-188, The Social Security Notch Issue.
g For discussion, see CRS Report 98-35, The Windfall Benefit Provision.
h For discussion, see CRS Report RS20148, Social Security: The Government Pension Offset.
i For discussion, see CRS Report 93-792, Social Security Benefits Are Not Paid For the Month
of Death.
j For discussion, see CRS Report RS20060, A Separate Consumer Price Index for the Elderly?
and CRS Report 97-33, The CPI and the “True”Cost of Living.
k For discussion, see GAO Report 98-196, Implications of Extending Mandatory Coverage to
State and Local Employees

CRS-20
Social Security Bills In 106th Congress On Which Action Has Been Taken
H.J.Res. 32 (Ryan, et al.) — A joint resolution expressing the sense of the Congress
that the President and the Congress should join in undertaking the Social Security
Guarantee Initiative to strengthen and protect the retirement income security of all
Americans through the creation of a fair and modern Social Security Program for the 21st
century. Passed by House, March 2, 1999, by vote of 416-1.
H.Res. 306 (Herger) — A resolution expressing the desire of the House of
Representatives to not spend any of the budget surplus created by Social Security receipts
and to continue to retire the debt held by the public. Passed House 417-2, September 28,
1999.
H.Con.Res. 68 (Kasich, et al.); S.Con.Res. 20 (Domenici, et al.) — A concurrent
resolution establishing the congressional budget for the United States Government for
FY2000 and setting forth appropriate budgetary levels for each of FY2001 through 2009.
Conference agreement on resolution (H.Con.Res. 68) passed House 220-208, April 14,
1999; passed Senate 54 to 44, April 15, 1999. (In addition to setting forth congressional
budget totals setting aside Social Security surpluses, includes provisions and sense of
House and Senate statements pertaining to treatment of Social Security surpluses in the
federal budget and other aspects of the program).
H.Con.Res. 290 (Kasich, et al.); S.Con.Res. 101 (Domenici, et al.) — A concurrent
resolution establishing the congressional budget for the United States Government for
FY2001 and setting forth appropriate budgetary levels for each of FY2002 through 2005.
Conference agreement on resolution (H.Con.Res. 290) passed House 220-208, April 13,
2000; passed Senate 50 to 48. (In addition to setting forth congressional budget totals
setting aside Social Security surpluses, includes provisions and sense of House and Senate
statements pertaining to treatment of Social Security surpluses in the federal budget and
other aspects of the program).
H.R. 1259 (Herger, et al.) A bill amending Budget Act of 1974 to protect Social
Security surpluses through strengthened budgetary enforcement mechanisms. Passed
House, May 26, 1999, by vote of 416-12.
H.R. 3859 (Herger, et al.) – A bill amending Budget Act of 1974 to protect Social
Security and Medicare surpluses through strengthened budgetary enforcement
mechanisms. Passed House, June 20, 2000, by a vote of 420-2.
H.R. 4865 (Archer, et al.) – A bill repealing legislation enacted in 1993 making up
to 85% of Social Security benefits taxable for some recipients. Passed House, 265-159,
July 27, 2000.
S. 331 (Jeffords, et al.) — A bill to amend the Social Security Act to expand the
availability of health care coverage for working individuals with disabilities, to establish
a Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency Program in the Social Security Administration to
provide such individuals with meaningful opportunities to work and for other purposes.
Approved and ordered to be reported by Senate Finance Committee on March 4, 1999;
passed by Senate, June 16, 1999, by vote of 99-0. Also see H.R. 1180 (Lazio, et al.) —
similar legislation jointly referred to House Ways and Means and Commerce Committees
on March 18, 1999; approved and reported from Subcommittee on Health and the

CRS-21
Environment of Commerce Committee on April 20, 1999; approved and ordered reported
from Commerce Committee on May 19, 1999. Passed by House, October 19, 1999 by
vote of 412-9 (including additional provisions of H.R. 3070 (Hulshof, et al.), reported
from Committee on Ways and Means, October 18, 1999). Conference report passed by
House, November 18, 1999 by a vote of 418-2; passed by Senate, November 19, 1999 by
vote of 95-1. Signed into law by President Clinton, December 17, 1999 as P.L. 106-170.
H.R. 5 (Sam Johnson, et al.) – A bill to repeal the Social Security earning test at ages
65-69, effective in 2000. Approved by Social Security Subcommittee of House Ways and
Means Committee, February 16, 2000. Approved by full Committee, February 29, 2000.
Passed House, March 1, 2000, by a vote of 422-0. Passed Senate, March 22, 2000, by a
vote of 100-0. Bill with Senate technical amendment passed House, March 29, 2000, by
a vote of 419-0. President Clinton signed the bill into law as P.L. 106-182, April 7, 2000.
H.R. 5173 (Fletcher) – A bill to provide for reconciliation pursuant to sections
103(b)(2) and 213(b)(2)(C) of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2001
to reduce the public debt and to decrease the statutory limit on the public debt. Approved
by House Ways and Means Committee, September 14, 2000. Passed House, September
18, 2000, by a vote of 381-3.
H.R. 5203 (Shaw) – A bill to provide for reconciliation pursuant to sections
103(a)(2), 103(b)(2) and 213(b)(2)(C) of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal
year 2001 to reduce the public debt and to decrease the statutory limit on the public debt,
and to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide for retirement security.
Passed House, September 19, 2000, by a vote of 401-20.

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Appendix
Additional Relevant CRS Products
CRS Report 95-543, The Financial Outlook for Social Security and Medicare.
CRS Report 94-622, Social Security: Raising the Retirement Age - Background and
Issues.
CRS Report RL30558, Social Security: A Discussion of Some Issues Affecting the Early
Retirement Age.
CRS Report 98-195, Social Security Reform — How Much of a Role Could Private
Accounts Play?
CRS Report RL30397, Social Security Reform — Individual Account Proposals.
CRS Report RL30571, Social Security Reform: The Issue of Individual Versus Collective
Investment for Retirement.
CRS Report RL30380, Social Security Reform: Assessing Changes to Future Retirement
Benefits.
CRS Report 98-961, Social Security Reform: Projected Contributions and Benefits Under
Three Proposals (S. 1792 and S. 2313/H.R. 4256 in the 105th Congress, and a Plan
by Robert M. Ball).
CRS Memorandum, President Clinton’s Social Security Reform Proposal. March 10,
1999.
CRS Report 97-990, Social Security in the United Kingdom: A Model for Reform?
CRS Report 95-839, Social Security - the Chilean Example.
CRS Report 97-116, Social Security – Eliminating the Taxable Earnings Base.
CRS Report 97-81, Social Security: Recommendations of the 1994-1996 Advisory
Council on Social Security.
CRS Report 97-77, The Long Range Social Security Projections.
CRS Report 94-791, Means-Testing Social Security Benefits: An Issues Summary.
CRS Report 97-741, Social Security Financing Reform: Lessons From the 1983
Amendments.
CRS Report 94-593, Social Security Taxes: Where Do Surplus Taxes Go and How are
They Used?
CRS Report 95-149, Social Security: The Relationship of Taxes and Benefits for Past,
Present, and Future Retirees.
CRS Report 94-803, Social Security: The Cost of Living Adjustment in January 2000.
CRS Report 95-206, Social Security’s Treatment Under the Federal Budget: A Summary.
CRS Report 94-27, Social Security: Brief Facts and Statistics.