The Exchange Stabilization Fund of the U.S. Treasury Department: Purpose, History, and Legislative Activity

The Exchange Stabilization Fund of the U.S. Treasury Department: Purpose, History, and Legislative Activity

Order Code RL30125
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The Exchange Stabilization Fund of the U.S.
Treasury Department:
Purpose, History, and Legislative Activity
Updated September 20, 1999
Arlene Wilson
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

ABSTRACT
In late 1998, as part of an international support package, the United States agreed to provide
contingent financing from the U.S. Treasury Department’s Exchange Stabilization Fund of
$5 billion for Brazil. This report provides a brief history of the ESF (which was established
in 1934) as well as the statutory authority (31 U.S.C. 5302) cited by the Treasury Department
for making loans to foreign governments from the ESF. To provide perspective, the amounts,
loan and repayment dates of all ESF loans to foreign governments since 1980 are given.
Recent legislative actions to limit the amount of ESF loans are summarized. This product,
which supercedes CRS Report 98-583 E, will be updated when legislative activity occurs or
ESF funds are committed or disbursed to foreign governments.

The Exchange Stabilization Fund of the U.S. Treasury
Department:
Purpose, History, and Legislative Activity
Summary
As part of an international support package, the United States agreed, in
November 1998, to provide contingent financing of $5 billion to Brazil. Funds would
come from the Department of the Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF).
Some congressional concern has been expressed about the ESF’s ability to make
foreign loans without congressional approval. Appropriation legislation in the 104th
Congress imposed limitations on the use of the ESF (P.L. 104-52, Section 632 and
P.L. 104-208, Section 628), but the limitations expired at the end of fiscal year 1997.
Seven bills were introduced in the 105 Congress which would have impose
th
d
restrictions on the amount of ESF loans, but did not receive floor action. Amendment
No. 16 (to H.R. 4104) restricting the amount of ESF loans was defeated in a House
vote on July 16, 1998. In the 106 Congress, H.R. 1540 (ESF Transparency an
th
d
Accountability Act), which would impose limitations on ESF loans, was introduced
on April 22, 1999, but has not received floor action.
The Exchange Stabilization Fund was established by Section 20 of the Gold
Reserve Act of January 30, 1934 (48 Stat. 337, 341) to stabilize the exchange value
of the dollar. At that time, the ESF received an appropriation of $2 billion from the
revaluation of U.S. gold holdings. Since then, no money has been appropriated; its
income has come largely from interest on investments and loans, as well as net gains
made in transactions in the foreign exchange market. As of late September 1999, the
ESF had about $30 billion available to lend.
The ESF engages in monetary transactions in which one asset is exchanged for
another, such as foreign currencies for dollars. It is under the control of the Secretary
of the Treasury, subject to approval of the President. The Treasury Department cites
31 U.S.C. Section 5302 as its statutory authority for providing financing to other
countries through the Exchange Stabilization Fund.
One use of the ESF has been to provide resources for intervention in the foreign
exchange market. The ESF also has been used to finance short-term loans to both
developed and developing countries and, since 1980, has provided loans to 18
countries. From 1980 to 1994, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina were by far the largest
borrowers. Since 1995, Mexico has been the only recipient of ESF loans. After the
1994 Mexican peso crisis, ESF loans to Mexico totaled $12 billion, which were repaid
by January 1997.
The argument in favor of restricting the use of the ESF is that the Congress
should have a voice in how billions of dollars are spent. The argument against
restrictions is that the ESF provides the Treasury Department with a much-needed
quick and flexible tool to respond to international financial crises.

Contents
Brief History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Income and Resources of the ESF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
ESF Financing from 1980 through March 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Legislative Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
104 Congress
th
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
105 Congress
th
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
106 Congress
th
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Pros and Cons of Limiting the ESF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
List of Tables
Table 1. Exchange Stabilization Fund Financing Agreements, 1980-99 . . . . . . . 5

The Exchange Stabilization Fund of the U.S.
Treasury Department:
Purpose, History, and Legislative Activity
As part of an international support package, the United States agreed, in
November 1998, to provide contingent financing of $5 billion to Brazil. Fund
1
s
would come from the Department of the Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund
(ESF). As of late September 1999, no funds have been drawn from the ESF under
this agreement.
Some congressional concern has been expressed about the ESF’s ability to make
foreign loans without congressional approval. Appropriation legislation in the 104th
Congress imposed limitations on the use of the ESF (P.L. 104-52 and P.L. 104-208),
but the limitations expired at the end of fiscal year 1997. Several bills were
introduced in the 105 Congress to reimpose restrictions, but none received floo
th
r
action. An amendment to H.R. 4104 to reimpose restrictions was defeated in a House
vote on July 16, 1998. In the 106 Congress, H.R. 1540, which would impos
th
e
restrictions, was introduced April 22, 1999, but no floor action has occurred.
The ESF engages in monetary transactions in which one asset is exchanged for
another, such as foreign currencies for dollars. It is under the control of the Secretary
of the Treasury, subject to approval of the President. The Fund provides flexibility
to respond quickly to unexpected stresses in international financial markets. The
Treasury Department cites 31 U.S.C. Section 5302 (see box on p. 3) as its statutory
authority for providing financing to other countries through the Exchange
Stabilization Fund.
The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of the past and current roles
of the Exchange Stabilization Fund, the loans provided by the ESF to foreign
countries since 1980, and bills introduced in recent years to limit the ESF.
Brief History

The ESF was established by Section 20 of the Gold Reserve Act of January 30,
1934 (48 Stat. 337, 341) to stabilize the exchange value of the dollar. At that time,
similar funds of European countries were having a significant effect on exchange
markets. The purpose of the ESF was to give the United States adequate financial
A
1
discussion of the global financial crisis is beyond the scope of this report. See CRS Report
RL30012, Global Financial Turmoil: Contagion, Effects, and Policy Responses, by (na m
e redacted).

CRS-2
resources to counteract the activities of the European funds.2 It was established with
$2 billion appropriated from profits realized from the revaluation of U.S. gold
holdings. The Gold Reserve Act provided temporary authority for the ESF, which
was renewed periodically until it was made permanent in 1945.
The ESF was used actively in the 1930s to manage the dollar’s exchange rate.
After World War II, when the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was established,
the ESF was the source of funds for the U.S. contribution. As provided in the
Bretton Woods Agreement Act of 1945 (59 Stat. 514), $1.8 billion of the ESF’s
capital of $2 billion was used to make a partial payment on the U.S. subscription to
the IMF. The Bretton Woods Agreement Act of 1945 also included permanen
3
t
authority for the ESF.
During the 1960s, the likelihood that the United States would have to withdraw
foreign currencies from the IMF to support the dollar increased. The ESF was
authorized to receive foreign currencies which the United States withdrew from the
IMF. In 1968, when the IMF first issued special drawing rights (SDRs), the ESF was
authorized to receive the SDRs allocated to the United States.
The statutory language reflecting the purpose of the ESF was changed somewhat
in 1976 and 1977. After fixed exchange rates were replaced by a floating exchange
rate system in 1973, the IMF Articles of Agreement w
4
ere amended to conform to the
current international monetary system. In the Second Amendment to the Articles of
Agreement of the IMF, which became effective in 1978, countries were no longer
required to maintain fixed par values for their currencies. To conform to the Second
Amendment, the language alluding to “stabilizing the exchange value of the dollar”
was deleted and language referring to “being consistent with U.S. obligations in the
IMF regarding orderly exchange arrangements and a stable system of exchange rates”
was inserted.
One use of the ESF has been to provide resources for intervention in the foreign
exchange market. Since 1962, the Federal Reserve System has also taken an active
role in foreign exchange intervention, and has swap (reciprocal currency)
arrangements with Canada and Mexico totaling $5 billion as of March 31, 1999.5
Generally, U.S. Treasury loans to foreign countries are made under special swap
arrangements negotiated when necessary, while the Federal Reserve has continuing
U.S.
2
Congress. House. Committee on the Budget. Exchange Stabilization Fund. Hearing
before the Task Force on Tax Expenditures and Off-Budget Agencies, 94th Cong., 2 sess.,
nd
February 18, 1976, p. 3.
Under
3
current law, U.S. participation in an IMF quota increase must be approved by the U.S.
Congress (22 U.S.C. 286c).
In
4
a fixed exchange rate system, a government agrees to maintain its currency at a specified
rate, while in a floating exchange rate system, supply and demand in the market determine the
exchange rate.
5Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations. Federal Reserve Bulletin.
June 1999, p. 400.

CRS-3
swap arrangements.6 As of March 31, 1999, the U.S. Treasury had ESF swap
arrangements in effect of $3 billion with the Bank of Mexico.
31 U.S.C. 5302 Stabilizing exchange rates and arrangements
(a)(1) The Department of the Treasury has a stabilization fund. The fund is available
to carry out this section, section 18 of the Bretton Woods Agreement Act (22 U.S.C. 286e-
3), and section 3 of the Special Drawing Rights Act (22 U.S.C. 286o), and for investing
in obligations of the United States Government those amounts in the fund the Secretary of
the Treasury, with the approval of the President, decides are not required at the time to
carry out this section. Proceeds of sales and investments, earnings, and interest shall be
paid into the fund and are available to carry out this section. However, the fund is not
available to pay administrative expenses.
(2) Subject to approval by the President, the fund is under the exclusive control of
the Secretary, and may not be used in a way that direct control and custody pass from the
President and the Secretary. Decisions of the Secretary are final and may not be reviewed
by another officer or employee of the Government.
(b) Consistent with the obligations of the Government in the International Monetary
Fund on orderly exchange arrangements and a stable system of exchange rates, the
Secretary or an agency designated by the Secretary, with the approval of the President,
may deal in gold, foreign exchange, and other instruments of credit and securities the
Secretary considers necessary. However, a loan or credit to a foreign entity or government
of a foreign country may be made for more than 6 months in any 12-month period only if
the President gives Congress a written statement that unique or emergency circumstances
require the loan or credit be for more than 6 months.
(c)(1) By the 30th day after the end of each month, the Secretary shall give the
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate a detailed financial
statement on the stabilization fund showing all agreements made or renewed, all
transactions occurring during the month, and all projected liabilities.
(2) The Secretary shall report each year to the President and the Congress on the
operation of the fund.
(d) A repayment of any part of the first subscription payment of the Government to
the International Monetary Fund, previously paid from the stabilization fund, shall be
deposited in the Treasury as a miscellaneous receipt.
The ESF has also been used to finance short-term loans with both developed and
developing countries. The short-term nature of the financing has been emphasized by
an amendment to the ESF statute requiring the President to notify the Congress if a
Swap
6
arrangements are short-term reciprocal currency agreements between major foreign
central banks and the U.S. Federal Reserve and the U.S. Department of the Treasury. In
effect, they are lines of credit, up to an agreed upon amount, that either country can draw on
it if needs foreign currencies to intervene in the foreign exchange market, or to make short-
term loans to foreign governments that are experiencing balance of payments problems. See
also CRS Report 95-169 E, The Mexican Peso Devaluation and Swap Arrangements, by
Arlene Wilson.

CRS-4
loan or a credit to a foreign country is made for more than 6 months in any 12-month
period. Most of the ESF swap arrangements were part of a multilateral financing
package, usually in anticipation of, or in support of, an IMF stabilization program, or
together with loans by foreign central banks through the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS).
Income and Resources of the ESF
No funds have been appropriated to the ESF since the initial $2 billion
appropriation in 1934. One source of the ESF’s income is interest on its investments
or loans. The Exchange Stabilization Fund invests part of its funds in U.S. and
foreign securities which pay market interest rates and have a high degree of liquidity
and credit quality. It also receives interest and some fees from loans to foreign
countries. Second, the ESF has both gains and losses from its operations in foreign
exchange markets (except in swap agreements which have no exchange risk). On
balance, over the years, gains have exceeded losses, providing a substantial amount
of income. As of late September 1999, resources available for lending are
approximately $30 billion.
ESF Financing from 1980 through March 1999
Table 1 on pages 5 and 6 provides information on the drawings and repayments
under Exchange Stabilization Fund swap agreements between 1980 and 1999. It is
important to note that the table reflects only ESF financing agreements; financing was
also provided through Federal Reserve swap arrangements over this period.
As shown in Table 1, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina were by far the largest
borrowers from 1980 to 1994. In this period, drawings from the ESF totaled $3.0
billion for Mexico, $2.1 billion for Brazil, and $1.7 billion for Argentina. Importantly,
all drawings were repaid. Except for a $600-million swap agreement with Mexico in
1982, all drawings were repaid within 6 months. In fact, some were of much shorter
duration. Two drawings (Costa Rica and Peru) were repaid the same day. Eleven
other drawings were paid back within one month. Sixteen more were repaid within
3 months.
Table 1. Exchange Stabilization Fund Financing Agreements, 1980-99

CRS-5
Amount
Drew
Country
Year
Agreed
Amount
Date(s)
Repaid in
($mil.)
($mil.)
Full by
Mexico
1982
1,000.0
825.0
8/14/82
8/24/82
Mexico
1982
600.0
600.0
9/82-2/83
8/23/83
Mexico
1986
273.0
273.0
8/86-12/86
2/13/87
Mexico
1988
300.0
300.0
8/1/88
9/15/88
Mexico
1989
425.0
384.1
9/25/89
2/15/90
Mexico
1990
600.0
600.0
3/28/90
7/90
Mexico
1995
20,000.0
250.0
11/11/95
3/14/95
Mexico
250.0
1/13/95
3/14/95
Mexico
1,000.0*
2/2/95
1/29/96
Mexico
3,000.0#
3/14/95
1/16/97
Mexico
3,000.0#
4/19/95
8/5/96
Mexico
2,000.0#
5/19/95
8/5/96
Mexico
2,500.0#
7/5/95
1/16/97
Brazil
1982
500.0
500.0
10/82-11/82
12/28/82
Brazil
1982
280.0
280.0
11/82
2/1/83
Brazil
1982
450.0
450.0
11/82
3/3/83
Brazil
1982
250.0
250.0
12/82
1/83
Brazil
1983
200.0
200.0
2/28/83
3/11/83
Brazil
1983
200.0
200.0
3/3/83
3/11/83
Brazil
1988
250.0
232.5
7/29/88
8/26/88
Argentina
1984
300.0
0.0
Argentina
1984
500.0
500.0
12/28/84
1/15/85
Argentina
1985
150.0
143.0
6/85
9/30/85
Argentina
1987
225.0
225.0
3/9/87
7/15/87
Argentina
1987
200.0
190.0
11/12/87
12/30/87
Argentina
1988
550.0
550.0
2/88-3/88
5/31/88
Argentina
1988
265.0
79.5
11/22/88
2/28/89
Table 1. Exchange Stabilization Fund Financing Agreements, 1980-
99 (Continued)

CRS-6
Amount
Drew
Country
Year
Agreed
Amount
Date(s)
Repaid in
($mil.)
($mil.)
Full by
Jamaica
1984
50.0
10.0
12/29/84
3/2/85
Philippines
1984
45.0
45.0
11/7/84
12/28/84
Ecuador
1986
150.0
75.0
5/16/86
8/14/86
Ecuador
1987
31.0
31.0
12/4/87
1/26/88
Nigeria
1986
37.0
22.2
10/31/86
12/10/86
Yugoslavia
1988
50.0
50.0
6/15/88
9/30/88
Venezuela
1989
450.0
450.0
3/15/89
4/3/89
Venezuela
1990
104.0
25.0
3/30/90
4/30/89
Bolivia
1986
100.0
0.0
Bolivia
1989
100.0
100.0
7/89
9/15/89
Bolivia
1989
100.0
75.0
9/22/89
12/29/89
Bolivia
1989
75.0
75.0
12/29/89
1/2/90
Poland
1989
200.0
86.0
12/28/89
2/9/90
Guyana
1990
31.8
31.8
6/20/90
9/90
Honduras
1990
82.3
82.3
6/28/90
11/20/90
Hungary
1990
20.0
20.0
6/90-7/90
9/5/90
Costa Rica
1990
27.5
27.5
5/21/90
5/21/90
Romania
1991
40.0
40.0
3/7/91
3/21/91
Panama
1992
143.0
143.0
1/31/92
3/92
Peru
1993
470.0
470.0
3/18/93
3/18/93
Source: Abstracted by CRS from quarterly articles entitled “Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign
Exchange Operations” in the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
Note: In the drawings and repayments columns, monthly data were used in some cases in the absence
of specific dates or because more than one drawing was made under one swap agreement. In the case
of Mexico, each of the seven drawings under the 1995 $20,000 million swap agreement is listed
separately because of their large size.
* A 90-day loan which was rolled over three times.
# A medium-term (2 to 5 year) loan.
Since 1995, Mexico has been the only recipient of ESF loans. The 1994
Mexican peso crisis resulted in a $38 billion international support package, of which
the United States agreed to contribute $20 billion, mostly through the ESF. The $20
billion, large in relation to previous ESF swap agreements, also included medium-term

CRS-7
loans and loan guarantees. Although loan guarantees are relatively rare, there are
several precedents. The ESF guaranteed a BIS loan of $500 million to Brazil in 1982
and a BIS loan to Yugoslavia for $75 million in 1983, and provided a guarantee for
an unspecified amount for Macedonia in early 1994.7
As it turned out, ESF loans to Mexico totaled $12 billion, all of which were
made in 1995. Of the $12 billion, $10.5 billion were in medium-term (2 to 5 year)
loans. One of the short-term (90 day) loans was renewed three times. All of the
loans were repaid in a timely way; the medium-term loans were repaid ahead of
schedule. All loans were repaid by January 16, 1997. Loan guarantees were not
used.
Legislative Activity

104 Congress
th
In the fiscal years ending September 30, 1996 and 1997, appropriation legislation
included some limitations on the size and duration of ESF loans that could be made
without congressional approval. The provisions of P.L. 104-52, Section 632, which
applied to fiscal year 1996, were the same as those of P.L. 104-208, Section 628 for
fiscal year 1997.
The main provisions of both laws were as follows:
! An ESF loan of more than 60 days to a foreign country required the President
to certify to the appropriate congressional committees that there was no
projected cost to the United States and that the U.S. expenditure was
adequately backed by an assured source of repayment.
! An ESF loan to a foreign government greater than $1 billion for more than 180
days required an Act of Congress, with a waiver if the President certified in
writing to the Congress that a financial crisis in a foreign country was a threat
to U.S. interests or to the international financial system. If the Congress,
within 30 days, enacted a joint resolution of disapproval, the certification
would not take effect. To become effective, such a joint resolution requires
the signature of the President or a veto override. Expedited procedures for
such a joint resolution were detailed in both laws.
! ESF loans to Mexico under the assistance package announced by the President
on January 31, 1995 were specifically exempted from the provisions of both
laws.
105 Congress
th
7Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations. Federal Reserve Bulletin,
March 1983, p. 144, and June 1983, p. 407, and Statement by the U.S. Department of the
Treasury, February 1, 1995.

CRS-8
Since the expiration of P.L. 104-208 on September 30, 1997, there have been
no congressionally-mandated restrictions in effect on ESF loans. Seven bills were
introduced in the 105 Congress that would impose restrict
th
ions on the amount of ESF
loans under certain conditions, require money to be transferred from the ESF to
another fund, or require reports by the Administration on the ESF.8 None of these
bills received floor action.
On July 16, 1998, House Amendment No. 16 to H.R. 4104 (The Treasury-Postal
Operations Appropriations Bill) was introduced. The text of the Amendment was:
At the end of the bill, insert after the last section (preceding the short
title) the following new section:
SEC. 648. None of the funds made available in this Act may be used
to make any loan or credit in excess of $250,000,000 to a foreign entity or
government of a foreign country through the exchange stabilization fund
under section 5302 of title 31, United States Code.
After a floor discussion House A
9
mendment No. 16 failed by a recorded vote of
195-226.
106 Congress
th
On April 22, 1999, H.R. 1540 (ESF Transparency and Accountability Act) was
introduced. It requires the Secretary of the Treasury to provide specified
congressional committees with a detailed financial statement on the Exchange
Stabilization Fund and to make the Fund’s Annual Report to the President and the
Congress available to the public. H.R. 1540 also prohibits the Secretary of the
Treasury from making any expenditure or loan or more than $1 billion from the Fund
without Congressional approval unless the President certifies that it is necessary to
address a financial crisis. As of September 20, 1999, H.R. 1540 has not received
floor action.

Pros and Cons of Limiting the ESF
The argument in favor of restricting the use of the ESF is that the Congress, and
ultimately the taxpayer, should have a voice in whether and how billions of dollars
are spent. Since appropriations are not required for the ESF, the Congress does not,
under current law, have an opportunity to debate or vote on potential loans to foreign
governments. It is argued that since the Congress openly debates authorizations and
appropriations of far smaller amounts, Congress should have the chance to do so
when ESF funds to foreign governments are committed.
The argument against imposing restrictions is that the ESF provides the U.S.
Treasury Department with a rapid and flexible tool to respond to international
financial crises. In recent years, technological change and large increases in
H.R. 3106, H.R. 3138, H.R. 3573, H.R. 3114, H.R. 3580, S. 1458, and S. 1962.
8
9See Congressional Record, July 16, 1998, p. H5698-5719.

CRS-9
international capital flows mean that crises can spread more rapidly. The Treasury
contends that the availability of the ESF could play a crucial role in stemming
potential crises. There is no evidence to suggest that the ESF has abused its
authority. Previous ESF loans to foreign governments were all repaid in a timely way.
A recent study, which examined the history, legal bases, and financial operations
of the ESF, focused on the basic question: “How can the United States maintain
democratic accountability for executive branch officials engaged in international
financial rescues and at the same time preserve a capacity to respond to financial
crises with speed, flexibility, and effectiveness? The study concluded that, sinc
10
e
financial markets are imperfect, the United States should maintain the Exchange
Stabilization Fund under the sole authority of the Department of the Treasury.
However, the study also concluded that the Secretary of the Treasury should continue
to manage the ESF conservatively and should increase the transparency of the ESF,
while the Congress should maintain oversight over the Secretary’s administration of
the ESF.
10C. Randall Henning. The Exchange Stabilization Fund: Slush Money or War Chest?
Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C. May 1999, p. 2-3.

EveryCRSReport.com
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is a federal legislative branch agency, housed inside the
Library of Congress, charged with providing the United States Congress non-partisan advice on
issues that may come before Congress.
EveryCRSReport.com republishes CRS reports that are available to al Congressional staff. The
reports are not classified, and Members of Congress routinely make individual reports available to
the public.
Prior to our republication, we redacted names, phone numbers and email addresses of analysts
who produced the reports. We also added this page to the report. We have not intentional y made
any other changes to any report published on EveryCRSReport.com.
CRS reports, as a work of the United States government, are not subject to copyright protection in
the United States. Any CRS report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without
permission from CRS. However, as a CRS report may include copyrighted images or material from a
third party, you may need to obtain permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or
otherwise use copyrighted material.
Information in a CRS report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public
understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to members of Congress in
connection with CRS' institutional role.
EveryCRSReport.com is not a government website and is not affiliated with CRS. We do not claim
copyright on any CRS report we have republished.