Foreign and Defense Policy: Key Issues in the 106th Congress

Foreign and Defense Policy: Key Issues in the 106th Congress

Order Code RL30010
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Foreign and Defense Policy:
Key Issues in the 106th Congress
January 4, 1999
(name redacted) (coordinator)
Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

ABSTRACT
This report lays out foreign and defense policy issues likely to receive attention in the 106th
Congress, either in oversight or in enacting legislation. The report discusses the U.S. role in
the world, and addresses tools available to Members to affect foreign and defense policy,
including: the use of military force, foreign assistance, foreign policy sanctions, export
controls, participation in the United Nations, and oversight of the State Department. The
report also identifies issues in foreign and defense policy that remain unresolved from previous
Congresses, figure prominently in current news reports, and may be the subject of
congressional oversight or legislative effort. These foreign and defense policy issues are
organized into categories of: global issues (i.e., financial crisis, terrorism, narcotics control);
defense policy (i.e., spending, ballistic missile defense, readiness, acquisition reform, base
closures); nonproliferation; treaties; and regional concerns. This report will not be updated.
Other CRS products related to the topics discussed in this report are cited in box notes
throughout the report. Appendix 2 provides bibliographic information for relevant CRS
Checklists of Products.

Foreign and Defense Policy:
Key Issues in the 106 Congress
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Summary
When the 106 Congress comes to work in January, its first order
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of business
will be to deal with the impeachment of the President of the United States.
The 1998 congressional campaigns and elections suggested that the agenda of
the 106 Congress also will be largely domestic
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in its focus: Social Security, health
care, and education were the order of the day in campaigns across America and on
post-election news programs. Indeed, of the issues discussed in this report, only
increased defense spending to address military readiness and retention of trained
military personnel has been reported on recently, as the President announced over
New Year's weekend his proposal to ask for a substantial increase in the FY2000
budget for military pay and hardware development.
Most immediately, the 106 Congress is expected to consider a supplementa
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appropriations bill to support the Wye River Memorandum, including increased
assistance to Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians. Congress likely will quickly consider
new assistance and trade benefits to Central American countries hit hardest by
Hurricane Mitch. Development aid to countries severely affected by the global
financial crisis, and more humanitarian assistance to Kosovo are another two issues
that might find their way into a supplemental appropriations bill in the first few
months of the new Congress. The United States also stands in arrears with the United
Nations and the World Bank, but neither matter is expected to receive appropriators'
attention in the supplemental.
There are a few routine foreign affairs and defense issues to be addressed by the
106 Congress, albeit with
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less urgency than the supplemental appropriations. The
President will issue international narcotics control certifications before March 1 , as
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required by law. For any country found to be trafficking or producing narcotics,
certification could jeopardize its receipt of U.S. foreign assistance; Congress might
respond with legislation supporting or negating specific countries' certification status.
New authorizations and appropriations bills will be considered for departments and
agencies. Authorization for some foreign assistance programs expires before the end
of the first session, and reauthorizations are likely to be taken up. The President's
authority to waive proliferation sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan last May
must be renewed this year or be allowed to expire, which would require the
reimposition of sanctions that many Members of Congress find counterproductive.
Several laws remain in the United States Code that were shaped during the Cold
War. The 106 Congress could turn its attention to these. Previous severa
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Congresses have made some effort to amend, repeal, or replace the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 and Export Administration Act of 1979; consensus on new
provisions, however, has not been reached. Congress has not enacted a foreign aid
authorization bill since 1985, each year waiving the requirement to do so and relying
on the annual appropriations measure to express its foreign policy interests and
opinions. Export controls in the Export Administration Act expired in 1994 and since
then have been left entirely to the executive branch to administer.

Contents
The U.S. Role in the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
(name redacted), Senior Specialist in International Security Policy
Congressional Tools for Managing
Foreign and Defense Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Larry Q. Nowels, Specialist in Foreign Affairs
Use of Military Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
(name redacted), Specialist in National Defense
(name redacted), Specialist in International Security Affairs
Foreign Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Larry Q. Nowels, Specialist in Foreign Affairs
The Imposition of Sanctions to Achieve Foreign Policy Goals . . . . . . . . . . 5
(name redacted), Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation
Export Controls of Sensitive Goods and Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Robert G. Shuey, Specialist in Foreign Policy and National Defense
Participation in the United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
(name redacted), Specialist in International Relations
Administration of the State Department, Diplomacy and Embassy Issues . . 9
(name redacted), Specialist in Foreign Policy and Trade
Global Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The Global Financial Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
(name redacted), Specialist in International Trade and Finance
International Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
(name redacted), Specialist in International Relations
Terrorism: Domestic Preparedness and Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Steven R. Bowman, Specialist in National Defense
International Narcotics Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
(name redacted), Specialist in International Relations
International Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
(name redacted), Specialist in International Relations
Global Y2K (Year 2000) Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Stephen A. Hildreth, Specialist in National Defense
Defense Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Defense Spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
(name redacted), Specialist in National Defense
Ballistic Missile Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
(name redacted), Specialist in National Defense
(name redacted), Specialist in National Defense
(name redacted), Specialist in U.S. Foreign Policy and National Defense
(name redacted), Specialist in National Defense
Military Readiness: Recruitment, Retention, and Retirement . . . . . . . . . . 17
(name redacted), Specialist in National Defense
(name redacted), Specialist in National Defense
Acquisition Reform, Outsourcing, and Infrastructure Reductions . . . . . . . 18
(name redacted), Analyst in National Defense

New Military Base Closure Rounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
(na me redacted), Specialist in U.S. Foreign Policy and Nationa
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Defense
Nonproliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Controlling the Spread of WMD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Deterring and Defending Against the Use of WMD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
(name redacted), Specialist in International Nuclear Policy
(name redacted), Specialist in U.S. Foreign Policy and National Defense
Treaties and International Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Arms Control Treaties Under Revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Steven R. Bowman, Specialist in National Defense
Human Rights Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
(name redacted), Specialist in International Relations
Kyoto Protocol: Global Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
(name redacted), Senior Analyst in International Environmental Policy
Controlling the Use of Anti-Personnel Landmines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Ed F. Bruner, Specialist in National Defense
Regional Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Trade, Investment, and Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
African Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
(name redacted), Specialist in International Relations
Theodros S. Dagne, Specialist in International Relations
Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Kerry B. Dumbaugh, Specialist in Asian Affairs
Korean Peninsula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
(name redacted), Specialist in Asian Affairs
India and Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
(name redacted), Analyst in Asian Affairs
Southeast Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
(name redacted), Senior Specialist in International Politics
Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
(name redacted), Specialist in Asian Affairs
Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
(name redacted), Specialist in Russian Affairs
Bosnia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
(name redacted), Specialist in International Relations
Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Steven J. Woehrel, Specialist in European Affairs
Northern Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
(name redacted), Specialist in European Affairs
NATO Enlargement and NATO’s Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Paul E. Gallis, Specialist in European Affairs
Latin America and the Caribbean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Trade Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
(name redacted), Specialist in Trade Relations

Central American Reconstruction after Hurricane Mitch . . . . . . . . . . 34
(name redacted), Foreign Affairs Analyst
Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
(name redacted), Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
(name redacted), Specialist in International Security
Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
(name redacted), Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Haiti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
(name redacted), Analyst in Latin American Affairs
Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
(name redacted), Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Panama. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
(name redacted), Specialist in Latin American Affairs
The Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Implementation of the Wye River Memorandum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
(name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
(name redacted), Specialist in Middle East Affairs
Iran. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
(name redacted), Specialist in Middle East Affairs
Appendix 1. Major Legislation and Committees of Jurisdiction. . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Appendix 2. Checklists of CRS Products. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Foreign and Defense Policy:
Key Issues in the 106th Congress
The U.S. Role in the World
Since the end of the Cold War almost ten years ago, two Presidents and
Members of four Congresses have sought to adapt U.S. foreign and defense policies
to a dramatically new international environment. Without the unifying imperative of
a clear and imminent threat to U.S. national security, both branches of government
have found it more difficult to produce consistent consensual approaches to a plethora
of international challenges.

In the U.S. system of constitutionally-shared responsibility for foreign and
defense policy, the President plays a key leadership role. The Congress, however, has
precise and important responsibilities, including authorization and appropriation of
funds for the United States' international role, the requirement for Senate advice and
consent to U.S. participation in international treaties, the responsibility of both houses
to oversee the administration’s conduct of policy, and declaration of war, should that
be necessary.
During the 106 Congress, as in the previous two Congresses, thes
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responsibilities will be assumed in a circumstance of divided government, with the
Democratic Party holding the Presidency and the Republican Party controlling both
houses of Congress. In such a political setting, the goal of developing consensual
approaches to foreign policy will be pursued in the context of philosophical,
institutional and partisan differences between the two branches.
Some of the broad questions that the Congress and the President will be called
on to address include: How should the United States play its role as the only true
global power? What roles should U.S. military forces play in defending U.S.
interests? How can an effective balance be struck between unilateral U.S. actions and
those taken in concert with allies or the international community? In an increasingly
interdependent world, is the United States effectively combining the political,
economic and military aspects of its international involvement to maximize benefits
for U.S. interests?
These issues were raised prominently when, in December 1998, the United States
and the United Kingdom once again used force against Iraq to try to bring Saddam
Hussein’s regime into compliance with international prohibitions against the
possession and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction. Other members of the
U.N. Security Council questioned the desirability and effectiveness of the military
strikes, and some countries accused the United States of acting like a hegemonic
power and undermining the United Nations. The episode has revived fundamental
questions about under what circumstances the United States should use force,

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particularly in the absence of an international consensus or congressional mandate for
the action.
In recent years, such questions have come down to more specific issues in the
Congress. With regard to the use of force, the United States has played a key role ,
with other NATO countries, in restoring an uneasy peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina
and in the recent Kosovo crisis. The Congress never explicitly supported the
President’s decision to send U.S. forces to Bosnia but has also continued to fund their
presence. The question of supporting continued U.S. involvement the Balkans will
come before the 106 Congress as well.
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With regard to U.S. diplomacy, the Congress and the Clinton Administration
have jointly reorganized the U.S. foreign policy establishment, eliminating three
foreign policy agencies and merging their functions within the Department of State.
Implementation of the reorganization will likely receive oversight from the 106th
Congress. Other foreign policy matters raised by preceding sessions of Congress
remain unresolved. There are continuing differences about how to deal with the issue
of back dues the United States owes to the United Nations, for example. And U.S.
foreign assistance authorizing legislation has for several years now been blocked by
differences over highly charged political issues. The Administration and Congress
have also differed over the imposition and management of export controls and the use
of sanctions in U.S. foreign policy.
U.S. foreign policy increasingly is influenced by economic conditions around the
world. The well-being of the U.S. economy is affected by weaknesses in other parts
of the world, as recently demonstrated by the Asian and Russian financial crises. In
an increasingly “globalized” world, for example, issues like how much the United
States should contribute to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), become issues
of political and security as well as financial importance.
CRS Reports
The U.S. Role in the World: Indispensable Leader or Hegemon?, by (name redacted), CRS
Report 97-1046F
The Clinton Presidency in Crisis: Foreign Reactions and Policy Implications, by (name reda
cted), CRS Report 98-828
Congressional Tools for Managing
Foreign and Defense Policy
Although the President, through his powers as Commander in Chief, maintains
formidable authority to manage and direct U.S. foreign and defense policy, Congress
possesses a broad range of tools to oversee, influence, and in some cases, reverse
executive policies. The most direct means for lawmakers is through the enactment
of defense, State Department, and foreign aid authorization and appropriations bills,
usually considered annually. Control over funding key White House defense and
foreign policy initiatives, such as the costs of deploying American forces to Bosnia,
paying U.S. obligations at the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund,
procuring military weapons systems, and supporting Middle East peace efforts, offers
Congress perhaps its most powerful instrument.

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Legislative-executive controversies have blocked passage of State Department
authorization bills for four years and foreign aid authorizing measures for over a
decade. As a result, appropriations bills have grown increasingly important as a
means of influencing foreign policy. Placing conditions on how or when defense and
foreign affairs funds can be used — such as the current conditions and restrictions
on paying for heavy fuel oil for North Korea — offers lawmakers the means to
maintain close oversight of executive policy or block initiatives that require financial
commitments out of favor with Congress. The Senate also can exert influence through
its powers to approve or reject treaties, ambassador and high-level Administration
personnel appointments. Congress also enacts non-binding resolutions that do not
require presidential signature, holds open hearings where executive officials can be
vigorously questioned, or issues statements on personal views to express
congressional sentiment and educate the public in ways that may influence the
conduct of American foreign and defense policy.
Whether by conducting oversight or by enacting legislation, the 106 Congress
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can have a significant role in determining the direction of U.S. foreign policy, and
might be particularly active in areas pertaining to the use of military force; the
allocation of foreign assistance; the imposition, strengthening, or easing of foreign
policy sanctions; controlling exportation of sensitive goods and technology; U.S.
participation in the United Nations; and the administration of the newly reorganized
Department of State, its agencies, and embassies. Each of these issues is discussed
in some detail below.
Use of Military Force
In the years since the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, policymakers have struggled
to redefine the role of military power in an environment of numerous and diffuse
threats. As the United States deployed troops to Bosnia, Southwest Asia, Haiti, and
elsewhere, some far-reaching issues have been raised, including:
(1) Determining the circumstances in which force should be used. U.S. defense
strategy calls for military forces to help shape the international security environment,
respond to challenges across the entire spectrum of conflict, and prepare for future
threats. To shape the environment and respond to crises requires, among other
things, extensive U.S. military engagement abroad and a willingness to employ force
in response to a wide range of challenges to security. Former Defense Secretary
William Perry argued that the use of force may be appropriate not only when vital
interests are threatened, but also when important interests are at stake and even, under
strictly limited conditions, for humanitarian reasons. The issue, he said, is whether
costs and risks are properly calibrated to U.S. interests. Many legislators remain
skeptical about U.S. involvement where less than vital U.S. interests are at stake.
(2) Peacekeeping. As the Cold War was ending, some policymakers hoped that
the use of multilateral forces operating under U.N. auspices in situations short of war
— peacekeeping — would help contain and resolve local conflicts, enhancing world
stability with a minimal commitment of U.S. forces. Former Presidents Reagan and
Bush both endorsed this concept. Deployments during the Bush and Clinton
Administrations, however, generated a great deal of debate about U.N.-sponsored
peacekeeping operations, particularly where high levels of force were, and are, used.
In May 1994 the Clinton Administration announced Presidential Decision Directive

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(PDD) 25, a set of guidelines to help determine when and how the United States
would support U.N. peacekeeping and, by implication, when it might act either in an
ad hoc coalition or unilaterally. Skeptics of this approach maintain that many
peacekeeping operations, whether under the United Nations or other auspices, cost
too much and burden U.S. Armed Forces while doing little to promote U.S. interests.
(3) Congress’s Role. The Constitution gives Congress the responsibility to
declare war, to raise and regulate the armed forces, and to provide funds for activities
of the U.S. government, including military action. How Congress should exercise
these responsibilities — and how vigorously it should assert its role — is a matter of
perennial debate. Since the votes on the Persian Gulf War in 1991, Congress has not
asserted a direct role in deciding between war and peace. Efforts to use the power
of the purse to limit military operations, either before or after the fact, have also had
limited success. Though Congress has vigorously debated the use of force in Somalia,
Haiti, Bosnia, and elsewhere, it has, in the end, imposed few direct constraints on
presidential action. The main issue in Congress has been, and continues to be, how
to pay for military operations — in particular, whether funds should be provided as
emergency supplemental appropriations, over-and-above the regular defense budget,
or should they be offset by cuts in other defense programs.
CRS Reports
The Use of Force: Key Statements by Weinberger, Shultz, Aspin, Bush, Powell, Albright, and
Perry, by (name redacted) and (name redacted), CRS Report 94-805 F
Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief
94040
Foreign Aid
Following sharp cuts in foreign aid spending during the 104 Congress
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,
lawmakers increased funds for economic and military assistance in 1997 and 1998,
with substantial growth for Russia and other former Soviet states, counter-narcotics
programs, development assistance concentrated on child survival activities, and
appropriations to clear U.S. arrears at the World Bank and regional international
financial institutions. It is likely that the Administration will send to Congress a
foreign aid budget request for FY2000 at or above the $13.8 billion enacted for
FY1999.
Congress will face foreign aid legislation almost immediately in the new session
in the form of a $2 billion-plus emergency supplemental appropriation to support the
Wye River Israeli-Palestinian peace accord and to begin reconstruction for countries
severely damaged by Hurricane Mitch. About $1.8 billion is anticipated for support
of the Middle East peace process: $400 million in economic aid for the Palestinians
for education, water development and support of the rule of law; $1.2 billion for Israel
to cover the costs of relocating Israeli military forces from West Bank territory, and
$200 million for Jordan in security assistance. The Administration is also expected
to seek $120 million or more for hurricane-related reconstruction in Central America.
The United States has already committed $300 million for emergency assistance to
the region, mostly for the most seriously damaged nations of Nicaragua and
Honduras. Congress is likely to suggest other options. Senator Graham, for example,
advocates adding to a Hurricane Mitch supplemental provisions similar to Caribbean

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Basin Initiative (CBI) parity legislation that stalled in the 105 Congress. Such
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measure would extend NAFTA trade benefits to CBI nations. Also under
consideration, although less certain, is an additional request for development aid for
countries affected by the Asian financial crisis, and more humanitarian aid for Kosovo.
While the Administration is likely to designate the entire supplemental as an
“emergency,” requiring no equivalent reductions in existing spending, some Members
may recommend offsets to make the supplemental appropriations budget neutral.
Funding for the Wye River accord could prove contentious because it would exceed
a congressionally- imposed FY1999 cap of $5.4 billion total U.S. assistance to the
Middle East.
While Congress will consider many foreign aid issues in supplemental and foreign
operations appropriations measures, the balance of the foreign aid legislative agenda
is less certain. Without enactment since 1985 of foreign assistance authorization bills,
the main statute — Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 — is seriously out of date and
reflects few of the post-Cold War changes in foreign aid policy priorities. Congress
could attempt to revise the 1961 Act, or address individual, and perhaps less
controversial, issues in more narrowly focused authorization bills. Authority for
continuance of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a program
authorized in the 1961 Act, for example, expires on September 30, 1999, and will
require some legislative action for OPIC to continue.
Foreign aid bills, whether authorizations or appropriations, frequently attract
debate on broader foreign policy issues, some of which are matters of significant
controversy between the President and Congress. Conditioning aid to Russia on that
country's termination of nuclear cooperation with Iran is likely to be raised again in
the new session. The submission of Presidential certifications by March and June
1999 regarding North Korea’s suspected resumption of a nuclear weapons program,
as required by law, will be closely scrutinized, and lawmakers may consider attaching
further restrictions to the Administration's FY2000 funding requests to supply heavy
fuel oil to North Korea. A persistent controversy in annual foreign aid debates that
past two Congresses have considered but reached no long-term consensus concerns
abortion restrictions and U.S. international family planning programs, and will almost
certainly be revisited in 1999.
CRS Reports
Appropriations for FY1999: Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs,
by Larry Q. Nowels, CRS Report 98-211
Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S.. Programs and Policy, by (name redacted) and
Larry Q. Nowels, CRS Report 98-916F
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 91141
U.S. International Population Assistance: Issues for Congress, by Kerry B. Dumbaugh and
Larry Q. Nowels, CRS Issue Brief 96026
The Imposition of Sanctions to Achieve Foreign Policy Goals
The 106 Congress inherits from its predecessors a continuing debate abou
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how and when to use coercive economic measures to achieve U.S. foreign policy
goals. Both Congress and the President selectively support sanctions as a foreign

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policy tool to combat proliferation, terrorism, aggression, drug trafficking, or human
rights abuses. Some U.S. business representatives, and others, depict foreign policy
sanctions as often ineffective and damaging to the U.S. economy. Congress often
incorporates sanctions in foreign aid authorization and appropriation bills, and in bills
targeting specific countries, most recently Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, China, Burma
(Myanmar), Serbia, Russia , or North Korea.
While the congressional debate over the use of sanctions has its recent roots in
Cold War legislation of the 1960s, anti-apartheid legislation of the 1980s, and U.S.
reaction to Iraq's aggression toward Kuwait in 1990, the debate changed dramatically
in the aftermath of India's and Pakistan's testing of nuclear detonation devices in the
spring of 1998. The President was required by law to impose sanctions against the
two nations, sanctions that, in part, prohibited American wheat growers from selling
their harvest to Pakistan — a primary market. At about the same time news reports
were circulating stating that sanctions against Iraq were having a serious impact on
the civilian population in Iraq. Congress looked anew at the practice of restricting
another country's access to American food and medical exports for foreign policy
reasons. The sanctions against India and Pakistan were eventually modified by
Congress to allow for agricultural commodity sales, and the President was authorized
to ease or adjust those sanctions over the course of one year. Multilateral sanctions
against Iraq, imposed by the U.N. Security Council, were offset with renewal and
enlargement of the U.N.'s oil-for-food program.
The 105 Congress considered the Enhancemen
th
t of Trade, Security, and Human
Rights Through Sanctions Reform Act, legislation that sought to constrain the use of
sanctions by the executive branch and to make the cost and impact of sanctions more
transparent. It gained momentum throughout the second session but was not enacted;
a version of the measure is likely to be introduced early in the 106 Congress. During
th
the adjournment between the 105 and 106
th
th Congresses, Senator Dorgan (ND-Dem.)
and Representative Nethercutt (WA-Rep.) both announced they would introduce
legislation to repeal or prohibit the imposition of agricultural commodity and medical
export sanctions. In December 1998, more than 30 Members of Congress sent a
letter to the President asking him to authorize a one-time agricultural commodities
sale to Iran — a country otherwise prohibited from such transactions by U.S.
unilateral sanctions — and to generally reconsider the use of food as a foreign policy
weapon. The 105 Congress, on the other hand, enac
th
ted the Freedom from Religious
Persecution Act, which authorizes the President to impose new sanctions; the 106th
Congress will probably provide some oversight to the Act's implementation.
Difficulties in U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis hot spots such as Cuba, China, Iran, Iraq,
or Serbia might result in the 106 Congress enacting new sanctions legislation
th
.
Congressional efforts to make humanitarian exemptions to the use of sanctions, recent
complaints before the World Trade Organization by the United States' European
trading partners about the imposition of unilateral sanctions, human rights
organizations' reporting on the impact of sanctions, all might result in serious
deliberation in the 106 Congress on the utility and effectiveness of sanctions.
th

CRS-7
CRS Reports
Economic Sanctions to Achieve U.S. Foreign Policy Goals: Discussion and Guide to Current
Law,, by (name redacted) and (name redacted), CRS Report 97-949 F
Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation Sanctions: Selected Current Law, by
(name redacted), CRS Report 98-116 F
Export Controls of Sensitive Goods and Technology
Congress and the Administration have tried to rewrite the Export Administration
Act of 1979 (EAA-1979) since it initially lapsed in 1990. Different views on the value
of export controls in foreign policy and national security, the role and procedures of
government agencies in exerting such controls, and participation in international
nonproliferation regimes have kept Congress from approving a new Act or
reauthorizing the EAA-1979. Most provisions of the EAA-1979, authorizing the
Department of Commerce to regulate exports of civil and dual-use goods and
technology, were extended by executive order after its initial lapse and since its final
expiration in 1994. (Exports of defense goods and services are regulated by the
Department of State under the Arms Export Control Act.) One attempt by the 101st
Congress to extend and amend the EAA-1979 was pocket vetoed by President Bush;
subsequent Congresses were unable to resolve numerous disputes. The EAA-1979,
which had a primary purpose of blocking exports that could help the military buildup
of Communist bloc countries, was Cold War law that some contend is no longer
relevant to U.S. interests. Threats to U.S. national security and foreign policy goals
now stem from less powerful countries and sub-national groups that seek to expand
their influence or intimidate their neighbors, many by acquiring weapons of mass
destruction and related delivery systems, and many by employing or supporting
international terrorists. Although export controls might still restrict the military
capabilities of these potential belligerents, U.S. and other Western business interests
are less willing to link export regulations to national security and foreign policy goals
since the end of the Cold War and rapid technological developments. A multilateral
regime, CoCom, once controlled the exports of participating countries to communist
countries. CoCom dissolved in 1994, however, and was eventually replaced by the
Wassenaar Arrangement, under which export control efforts are largely voluntary.
A few countries, such as North Korea, China, and Russia, continue to defy
international norms by exporting dangerous goods and technology to unstable regions
and aggressive nations.
Many Members of Congress have expressed concern that the Administration has
liberalized export controls to such an extent that U.S. national security interests are
not sufficiently protected. Others are concerned that some export controls are
arbitrary and harmful to the U.S. economy. Exports of nuclear technology, satellites,
high-performance computers, jet engines, and machine tools to China have been
particularly controversial and have helped prompt a closer look at U.S. export
administration. Congress has also critiqued U.S. policies regarding transfers of
encryption, stealth (low radar cross-section), and telecommunication technology.
U.S. businesspersons and some Members of Congress have also criticized unilateral
controls on exports to Iran, India, Pakistan, and Cuba, particularly when other
industrial countries do not restrict exports to these countries. Some key issues for
Congress are: implications of U.S. export administration for nonproliferation policy,

CRS-8
for national security and foreign policy, and for U.S. business; foreign availability of
goods and technology; end-use controls; criminal and civil penalties; and judicial
review. Revising export administration legislation to reflect the changed international
environment could benefit U.S. national security, foreign policy, and commerce but
would require compromise or agreement on some difficult questions between the
Administration and Congress and among Members of Congress and committees of
diverse perspectives and conflicting interests.
Participation in the United Nations
Congressional use of legislative tools to influence U.S. policy on the United
Nations has both negative and positive effect on the United Nations, its agencies, and
activities, as well as on the ability of the United States to promote its interests more
broadly.
Withholding full funding of U.S. contributions to international organizations,
including the United Nations, and to U. N. peacekeeping accounts has produced a
number of consequences, both negative and positive.
C
Arrears in U.S. assessed contributions to the U.N. regular budget have
threatened a loss of its vote in the U.N. General Assembly in 1999.
However, congressional appropriation for FY1999 of nearly the full
amount of Presidential requests in current funding ensures probably that the
United States will retain its vote. U.N. officials and member states have
launched positive changes, in part, in response to U.S. congressional and
Administration demands for reform prior to the release of U.S. arrears
money. In 1997 and 1998, however, in actions directly attributed to
continued U.S. arrears, the U.N. General Assembly refused to elect the
United States to membership in the Advisory Committee on Administrative
and Budgetary Questions. In the past, a U.S. national has always been on
this body.
C
Substantial arrears to U.N. peacekeeping operations accounts, in the
view of some experts, have damaged the ability of the United Nations to set
up and carry out peacekeeping operations. The United Nations would use
most of these arrearages to reimburse states, including the United States,
that contribute troops and lease equipment for U.N. peacekeeping
operations. According to a June 1998, General Accounting Office report,
at the end of 1997, the United Nations owed $1.2 billion to 71 nations,
including $109.2 million to the United States.
C
Arrears in U.S. payments to U.N. specialized agencies and to non-U.N.
regional organizations may have caused some programmatic changes but
they have also led to reviews by these organizations of budgetary goals and
spurred structural and other reforms.
Secondly, Congress’ linkage of the release of appropriated funds for current
U.N. contributions to achievement of specified U.N. actions has apparently prompted
positive changes, such as the establishment and effective operation of the U.N. Office
of Internal Oversight Services and adherence to a specific regular budget limit. U.N.
implementation of these congressionally initiated reforms has been viewed widely as

CRS-9
beneficial because they have helped identify and eliminate cases of “waste, fraud, and
abuse” and controlled “run away” spending.
Thirdly, Congress has required the executive branch to report to it before
supporting in the U.N. Security Council any new U.N. peacekeeping operation or
increases in size or mandate of current operations. This report is to include a
reprogramming request showing how additional U.S. contributions are to be financed.
In at least three instances, congressional committee chairpersons have rejected the
reprogramming request. Critics have charged that this reporting process has
hampered U.N. Security Council responses to peace and security threats, thus
diminishing the United Nations' capacity to react to breaking crises. Others maintain
that these restraints on the U.S. executive branch have ensured congressional access
to information about and participation in decisions requiring a commitment of U.S.
taxpayer funds for U.N. operations.
As the 105 Congress ended, a bill authorizing substantial payment of $81
th
9
million in U.S. arrears to the United Nations was sent to the President for signature.
The legislation also included abortion related provisions, however, leading to a veto
of the entire bill, despite Presidential agreement with its United Nations-related
portions. Thus when the 106 Congress convenes, it will fa
th
ce issues of financing U.S.
arrears payments for assessed budgets of these organizations and the status of the
congressionally proposed conditions for payment of these arrears. The
Administration maintains that some of these conditions are now outdated and require
revision. Some in the Congress maintain that revision or reopening of negotiations
on these conditions is unnecessary and unacceptable.
Congress will continue to consider authorizations and appropriations for current
U.S. contributions to international organizations, including U.N. and U.N.
Peacekeeping assessed accounts, in the annual State Department appropriations bill,
under Contributions to International Organizations and Contributions to International
Peacekeeping Activities.
CRS Reports
U.N. Funding, Payment of Arrears and Linkage to Reform: Legislation in the 105th Congress,
by (name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted), CRS Report 97-711F
U.N. System Funding: Congressional Issues, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 86116
United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief
90103
Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief
94040
Administration of the State Department, Diplomacy and Embassy
Issues
U.S. diplomacy, America’s first line of defense overseas, and the foreign policy
agencies that contribute to those goals are in a transition phase as the United States
grapples with how best to address global and regional issues in the post-Cold War
era. To streamline the U.S. foreign policy apparatus, the 105 Congress passe
th
d

CRS-10
legislation to consolidate the foreign policy agencies under the aegis of the
Department of State. In addition, examination of security procedures in U.S. facilities
overseas was emphasized as a top priority, particularly after terrorist attacks in
August 1998 razed two U.S. embassies in Africa. It is likely that the 106 Congress
th
will hold oversight hearings on the role of U.S. diplomacy in the 21 century
st
,
including concerns about continually changing technologies, implementation of the
foreign policy agencies reorganization, and the security of those carrying out U.S.
foreign policy abroad. Among other sources, this oversight may draw on the recent
recommendations of two prominent policy institutes’ reports concerning the need for
substantive changes in the management of U.S. foreign policy.
After being debated by both the 104 and 105
th
Congress, a plan reorganizin
th
g
the foreign policy agencies — Department of State, U.S. Information Agency (USIA),
Agency for International Development (USAID), the International Development
Cooperation Agency (IDCA), and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA) — finally signed into law on October 21, 1998, as the Foreign Affairs
Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (division G of P.L. 105-277) requires that:
ACDA and its functions merge into State by April 1, 1999; USIA merge into State
by October 1, 1999; IDCA terminate by April 1, 1999; and USAID reorganize by
April 1, 1999, operating under the authority of the Secretary of State. The 106th
Congress is likely to oversee the consolidation early in the first session with hearings
perhaps coinciding with the appropriations process, and continue monitoring the
evolution of the new State Department to ensure that the objectives of the
reorganization — budgetary savings, streamlining and better coordination U.S.
foreign policy — are attained.
In order to help advance American interests abroad, the United States maintains
249 posts in over 180 countries around the world. Security of these facilities and the
people that work in them became a top priority in August 1998 after terrorist attacks
on U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. As part of P.L. 105-277 (division B),
Congress approved an FY1998 emergency supplemental appropriations of $1.8 billion
to defray antiterrorism and overseas security expenses. The appropriations provided
for rebuilding the bombed embassies, medical needs of injured personnel,
reestablishing embassy functions, improvements in security procedures for U.S.
facilities worldwide, and establishing a new security review panel (see further
discussion under International Terrorism).
CRS Reports
Foreign Policy Agency Reorganization in the 105th Congress, by (name redacted), Larry Q.
Nowels, and (name redacted), CRS Report 97-538 F
Embassy Security: Background, Funding, and FY1998 Supplemental Request, by (name re
dacted), CRS Report 98-771 F
Terrorism: U.S. Response to Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania: A New Policy Direction?, by
(name redacted), CRS Report 98-733 F
Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Embassies in Africa: Aftermath and U.S. Retaliation, by (name re
dacted) and Theodros S. Dagne, CRS Issue Brief 98042

CRS-11
Global Issues
The Global Financial Crisis
In early 1997, it seemed unlikely that difficulties in Thailand would develop into
a global financial crisis that has now taken, perhaps, one-third of the world’s
economies into deep recessions. The crisis has generated serious discussion of the
ability of the current institutional structures, most notably the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), to deal with the present crisis, prevent future crises, and fulfill the needs
of the global economy in the 21 century. In
th
approving funding for the IMF (division
A, sec. 101(d), title VI, of P. L 105-277), the 105 Congress laid the basis for a
th
n
active congressional role in these discussions and for an unprecedented degree of
oversight. Some of the ways in which this was achieved include:
! establishing, with appointment by House and Senate leadership, for a duration
of six months, an International Financial Institution Advisory Commission to
advise and report to Congress and the Secretary of the Treasury;
! requiring an annual report (by Oct. 1) to various congressional committees,
and testimony by the Secretary of the Treasury on international financial issues;
! providing for annual audits of the IMF by the General Accounting Office
(GAO) to congressional committees; and
! requiring two reports to congressional committees, in July 1999 and 2000, on
the “architecture” of the international monetary system.
The 106 Congress is scheduled to appoint Commissioners to the Advisor
th
y
Commission early in the first session, and will oversee implementation of IMF reforms
enacted in the 105 Congress. It is likely, also, that the Administration will sen
th
d
requests to Congress for approval of bilateral assistance for countries most deeply
afflicted by the debt crisis.
CRS Reports
The International Monetary Fund’s Proposed Quota Increase and “New Arrangements to
Borrow” (NAB), by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 97038
Asian Financial Crisis: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy, by (name redacted), CRS
Report 98-74 F
The Asian (Global) Financial Crisis, the IMF, and Japan: Economic Issues, by (name r
edacted), CRS Report 98-434 E
International Terrorism
The August 7, 1998 terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
have given renewed focus to Administration and congressional concern about the
threat of international terrorism. The Administration announced a new more
aggressive approach to combating terrorist groups, exemplified by the U.S. missile
strikes against alleged terrorist bases in Afghanistan and Sudan. The new policy is

CRS-12
said to involve: (1) a more global and proactive rather than reactive stance; (2) an
increasingly national security focus rather than law-enforcement orientation; (3) a
greater willingness to use military force; (4) less constraint over national boundaries
when countries provide sanctuary to terrorists; and (5) a willingness to take unilateral
action when other measures cannot be agreed. Critics have questioned the usefulness
and the sustainability of such a new policy. Some have also questioned whether there
has been a real change in policy to which the Administrations has a long-term
commitment.
Substantial counterterrorism legislation was incorporated into the FY 1999
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (division G,
title XXIII of P.L. 105-277). Significant new funding was provided for anti-terrorism
and anti-proliferation efforts, as well as embassy security. The Act established within
the Department of State the position of Coordinator for Counterterrorism to supervise
international counterterrorism activities. The Act also established a 10-member
National Commission on Terrorism, to be appointed by House and Senate leadership,
tasked with issuing a final report to the President and to Congress within six-months
of its first meeting. The Administration and Congress are likely to take up further
measures to deter and punish terrorist acts and to reduce U.S. vulnerabilities,
particularly to potential attacks with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, that
could cause mass-casualties. A review of U.S. policy, organizational mechanisms, and
the adequacy of consultation with Congress is also possible. Any significant new
terrorist act against U.S. interests during the 106 Congress would add urgency.
th
CRS Reports
Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 95112
Terrorism: U.S. Response to Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania-A New Policy?, by (name reda
cted), CRS Report 98-733 F
Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, by Kenneth B. Katzman, CRS Report
98-722 F
Embassy Security: Background, Funding, and FY 1998 Supplemental Request, by (name re
dacted), CRS Report 98-771 F
Terrorism: Domestic Preparedness and Response
Concern over the threat of a large-scale terrorist attack in the United States,
especially one using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons — weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) — has recently increased. Terrorist use of nerve agents in the
Tokyo subway, the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings, and reports
concerning the availability and proliferation of chemical and biological weapons have
led to closer scrutiny of the ability to deter or mitigate WMD domestic terrorism.
Popular literature and films have also served to heighten public concern. Government
agencies have identified shortcomings in protection, detection, and medical
capabilities, and efforts are underway to remedy them. Domestic WMD terrorism
would present unique challenges and require the resources of governmental agencies
from the local to the Federal level. Congress has demonstrated its concern by holding
extensive hearings, mandating reports from the Defense Department and intelligence
agencies, and by enacting increasingly large appropriations for research, defensive

CRS-13
equipment, and training. Major FY1999 appropriations included $529 million for the
Defense Department, $135 million for the Department of Justice, and $216 for the
Department of Health and Human Services.
Though WMD have historically been considered the province of the armed
forces, civilian agencies must grapple with their potential effects. Emergency
response personnel, public health care facilities, police departments, along with local
and state governments are all beginning to focus on this issue. Using the reservoir of
professional military expertise in this area, the Department of Defense has played a
leading role in assisting civilian authorities; notably, its Domestic Preparedness
Program is training emergency personnel in 120 cities around the nation.
Recently, the Federal Bureau of Investigation assumed the role of lead agency
in domestic efforts, and the National Security Council established a National
Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism.
Nevertheless, questions have arisen over efficient inter- and intra-government
coordination and cost effectiveness. Given the broad range of agencies involved, (e.g.
the Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice, Health and Human Services, and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency), numerous congressional committees and
subcommittees will be involved in legislative oversight and address their concerns
through authorizing and appropriations legislation.
International Narcotics Control
International political and economic instabilities, especially political turmoil and
ethnic strife in third world and former communist states where police powers and
capabilities have been drastically reduced, provide fertile ground for expansion of a
wide range of criminal activities. One such criminal activity, illicit production and
smuggling of narcotics, remains an important area of concern for Congress.
Increasingly, drug trafficking organizations, terrorist organizations, and other
international criminal groups cooperate with each other to facilitate illicit cross-border
and transnational activities. Intergovernmental cooperative efforts to combat such
criminal enterprises are often slow and cumbersome.
Issues likely to be the focus of attention in the upcoming Congress include: (1)
whether Congress should seek to override any of the President’s March 1
determinations of certification for major drug producing or transiting countries (an
annual certification as to a country's cooperation in international drug control efforts
is required of the President under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; a negative
certification may result in loss or reduction of foreign assistance); (2) the effectiveness
of current drug interdiction policies; (3) the rising importance of drug cartels in
Mexico and their potential destabilizing effect on the country; (4) the growing
relationships between drug traffickers and other organized criminal groups; and (5)
North Korean drug production and trafficking activity. Moreover, U.S. relations with
Burma, the world’s largest source of illicit opium and heroin, are strained over lack
of narcotics control cooperation and human rights violations. Prospects for
immediate improvement do not appear promising.

CRS-14
CRS Reports
Drug Control: International Policy and Options, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 88093
The International Drug Trade and its Impact on the United States, by (name redacted), et al.,
CRS Report 96-671 F
International Crime
International crime has become a major problem for the United States and other
countries around the world. A growing share of organized crime in the United States
has foreign roots. International criminal activities, furthermore, have begun to
threaten broader U.S. foreign policy interests, such as a stable and healthy work
economy, the spread of democracy, establishment and strengthening of market
economies, regional stability, and nonproliferation. There is a growing connection
among international organized crime groups, drug cartels, and terrorist organizations.
As a result, international crime is seen as a national security threat, in additional to a
law enforcement challenge.
Governments and international bodies are struggling to keep pace with what
many see as a global security threat. The State Department and Federal Bureau of
Investigation have been given the lead U.S. role abroad in the fight against
international crime. The United States now has a permanent crime fighting presence
in some 34 countries, including Russia, for purposes of investigation, training, and
other cooperation. The United States has worked closely with foreign governments
and international organizations to curb international criminal activities.
The Administration and Congress have expressed growing concern about
international crime. In May 1998, the Clinton Administration announced a new
International Crime Control Strategy to combat global crime. As a key part of its
announced strategy, the Administration transmitted to Congress proposed legislation,
the International Crime Control Act of 1998. The bill was introduced as S. 2303 in
the Senate in June 1998. It was not acted on by the 105 Congress. It is likely to be
th
reintroduced in the 106 Congress.
th
CRS Report
International Crime: Russian Organized Crime's Role and U.S. Interests, by (name redacted),
CRS Report 98-907 F
Global Y2K (Year 2000) Technology
The Year 2000 (Y2K) technology issue refers to the inability of many computers
and information systems to process calendar dates after midnight on January 1, 2000.
Hence, serious concerns are raised over potential adverse effects to a wide range of
critical U.S. sectors, such as telecommunications, transportation, energy systems,
defense and government services. Fixing these problems may cost the U.S. public and
private sectors tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars; there is no assurance all
Y2K problems will be fixed in time.

CRS-15
By comparison, addressing Y2K problems in foreign computer and information
systems lags considerably behind the United States. This relative unpreparedness
overseas may adversely affect U.S. national security interests. United States national
security, for instance, is affected by economic prosperity at home and abroad.
Attempts to resolve the current global economic crisis through financial reform,
however, likely will be slowed or exacerbated because of the Y2K problem. Under
the current national security strategy multilateral solutions to national security threats
and challenges are preferred over unilateral action. Fixing Y2K software and
hardware problems on U.S. weapon systems does not necessarily ensure that such
systems will continue to operate effectively with foreign allied and friendly systems
that may not be Y2K compliant. The potential, albeit temporary, collapse of key
sectors in some countries, such as food distribution and energy systems, might
precipitate very serious problems for struggling or failing states, or create new, global
humanitarian demands that could, in turn, further stress the international system and
place additional burdens on the United States. Given the wide reach of the potential
problem, and its unanticipatible impact, any number of committees might hold
oversight hearings, particularly the Senate Committees on Armed Services, and
Commerce, Science and Transportation, and House Committees on National Security,
and Science.
CRS Reports
The Year 2000 Computer Problem: Activity in the 105th Congress, by (name redacted), CRS
Issue Brief 97036
Year 2000 Computer Problem: Info Pack, CRS IP 528Y
Year 2000 Problem: Potential Impacts on National Infrastructures, by (name redacted),
CRS Report 98-967 STM
Defense Policy
Defense Spending
The White House-congressional budget agreement of 1997 projected an
essentially flat defense budget over the five years through FY2002. In the months
since the budget agreement was reached, however, defense officials have warned that
planned spending is not adequate both to maintain military readiness in the short term
and to acquire new weapons for the future. Problems have grown particularly severe,
they have said, in recruiting and retaining a high quality force. At the end of 1998,
Congress approved an additional $8.3 billion in emergency funding for the Pentagon.
The level of defense spending promises to be a major issue when the 106 Congress
th
considers, first, the annual budget resolution for FY2000 and, then, defense
authorization and appropriations bills.
Military readiness is likely to be a particular focus of debate. Senior military
officers now warn that shortages of personnel in key specialties, gaps in weapons
maintenance, and a high pace of operations are affecting even forward-based military
forces and units tagged for early deployment in a conflict. These concerns are
mounting even though budgets have repeatedly been adjusted to protect readiness-
related activities at the expense of weapons modernization.

CRS-16
A number of factors appear to be at work. Shortfalls in personnel recruitment
and retention have aggravated problems in ensuring full manning of deployed units.
Underfunding of real property maintenance and facility operations has often led
commanders to reallocate money meant for training to meet urgent repair needs.
Weapons maintenance costs have regularly been underestimated. A constant presence
in the Persian Gulf and occasional surges to the region have stretched the Air Force,
which has recently reorganized to be more expeditionary in character. Even a
relatively small presence in Bosnia has strained the Army because units are not fully
manned in peacetime, certain units are in particularly heavy demand, and the pace of
regular training activities is intense.
The 106 Congress will consider changes in military pay,
th
retirement benefits, and
recruitment. The military services have also proposed large increases in funding both
for short-term readiness and long-term weapons modernization programs, and
Congress may confront difficult trade-offs among competing priorities. Missile
defense, its development, and the spending it would require, also remains a key issue.
Both development and funding for shorter-range theater missile defense and longer-
range national missile defense are challenging, high-risk development programs. At
issue is whether imminent threats warrant an effort to accelerate development despite
technical uncertainties.
CRS Report
Appropriations for FY1999: Defense, by (name redacted), CRS Report No. 98-205F
Ballistic Missile Defense
The debate over National Missile Defense (NMD) has focused on how best and
how quickly to develop and deploy a system to protect the United States against a
limited, long-range missile attack. Such an attack might be accidental from a country
friendly to the United States, or deliberate from a nation hostile to the United States.
The Clinton Administration is pursuing a 3 plus 3 strategy — the goal of which is to
develop an NMD system over a three-year period ending in 2000 to permit
deployment of that system three years later in 2003, if a decision to do so were made.
If a deployment decision were deferred, development of an increasingly effective
system would continue. Missile defense advocates in Congress, however, want to set
a firm date for deployment. Faced with the prospect of a presidential veto, Congress
has not set a deployment date in annual defense bills. Instead, Congress has
considered, but not enacted, freestanding bills to establish NMD policy, such as the
American Missile Protection Act of 1998 (S. 1873). Similar legislative efforts are
likely in the 106 Congress. NMD programs receive about $1 billion in annua
th
l
appropriations. Some key issues include how quickly rogue nations might acquire
long-range missiles, weighing program risk, technical advances, and near-term
deployment, and implications for the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
U.S. troops deployed abroad and U.S. allies are increasingly threatened by
enemy short and medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, some potentially armed
with biological, chemical, or even nuclear warheads. During the Gulf War, 23 U.S.
troops were killed by an Iraqi Scud missile with a conventional warhead. More than
30 countries have ballistic missiles and scores of countries have various types of cruise
missiles — mostly anti-ship missiles. There is considerable support in Congress to

CRS-17
develop and deploy theater missile defense systems with U.S. forces overseas and to
help allied countries achieve effective theater missile defense. The Department of
Defense (DOD) has six basic theater missile defense weapons programs: Patriot
(PAC-3), Navy Area (NA) defense, Medium-Extended Air Defense System
(MEADS), Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD), Navy Theater Wide
(NTW), and Airborne Laser (ABL). These programs and related research,
international cooperation, and support programs receive over $2 billion in annual
appropriations. Congress has criticized the pace of development and schedules of
deployment, redundancy of the various systems, restrictions that adherence to the
ABM Treaty may impose, and systems management of missile defense. Congress has
been particularly critical of THAAD, which has failed its five attempted interception
flight tests, and MEADS, which is a joint program with Germany and Italy, but has
not been given high priority by DOD. NTW has received strong congressional
support and is considered a possible supplement to NMD.
As the 106 Congress reviews DOD’s TMD and NMD programs, it may als
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o
explore the relationship between these programs and the ABM Treaty. This
agreement limits the United States to a single site for NMD, with no more than 100
interceptor missiles at that site. It does not limit TMD programs, and several
agreements that the United States and Russia signed in September 1997 confirm that
U.S. TMD programs would be considered outside the constraints of the ABM Treaty.
The President has stated that he will submit these agreements to the Senate, for its
advice and consent to ratification, after the Russian parliament approves the START
II Treaty. Because the ABM Treaty is controversial, the Senate may reconsider U.S.
adherence when it debates these agreements. Some in Congress contend that the U.S.
could develop more effective TMD systems and a more robust NMD system if it were
not limited by the ABM Treaty. Others, however, argue that this agreement is central
to the U.S. strategic relationship with Russia and that, without it, Russia would not
continue to reduce offensive nuclear weapons under the START Treaties.
CRS Reports
National Missile Defense: Status of the Debate, by (name redacted) and (name redacted),
CRS Report 97-862 F
Theater Air and Missile Defense: Issues for Congress by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief
98028
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Demarcation and Succession Agreements: Background and
Issues, by (name redacted), CRS Report 98-496 F
Military Readiness: Recruitment, Retention, and Retirement
For the first time since the early 1980s, Congress will be concerned about the
ability of the armed forces to recruit and retain sufficient quantities of qualified active
duty military personnel. Plentiful jobs in the civilian economy, an alleged reduction
in the competitiveness of military pay and benefits, and, for some military personnel,
an exhausting frequency of overseas deployments and rapid-response contingencies,
have all combined to dissuade prospective recruits from joining and prospective career
members from staying on active duty. In FY1998, for the first time in over 20 years,
the Army and Navy did not meet their recruiting goals. The consequences have

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included understrength or zero strength combat infantry units and naval vessels having
to sail with understrength crews.
Particularly important is debate over whether the Military Retirement Reform
Act of 1986, which reduced the retired pay (for those who retire with less than 30
years of service) of those personnel who first entered the military after August 1,
1986, should be repealed. Secretary of Defense Cohen, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman General H. Hugh Shelton, and the other five JCS members (the four service
chiefs and the Vice Chairman) have all called for repeal (partial or total) of the 1986
Act, known as Redux. They, and others, assert that as military people whose
retirement pay will be computed according to Redux get close to making the key
decision to leave the service or stay for a full 20 years or more, they are “voting with
their feet” due to the inadequacy of Redux-computed retired pay. Those opposed to
repealing Redux usually acknowledge the need to improve pay and benefits, but think
repealing Redux is less effective than: (1) increasing active duty pay, particularly for
senior noncommissioned officers and some field-grade officers; (2) increasing
bonuses and their effectiveness by relating them more to manpower requirements; and
(3) improving other quality-of-life benefits such as housing, health care, and moving
costs.
Leaders of both parties, including President Clinton, have stated their general
support for a package of military benefit increases in the 106 Congress. The issues
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will be exactly what kind of benefits are to be increased, and by how much. In
addition to debate over whether Redux should be repealed, compensation increases
will have to compete with the desire of the uniformed leadership of the services for
increased weapon system modernization and training funds, and both will have to
compete with a broader range of uses for the projected budget surplus. The issue cuts
across party lines; some Republicans who are “deficit hawks” may view large pay
increases skeptically; some Democrats who are generally opposed to defense budget
increases may be supportive of “people programs” which do not involve expenditures
on large, high-tech weapon systems. These issues will be debated, and voted on, in
the legislative vehicle of the FY2000 National Defense Authorization and Department
of Defense Appropriation Acts.
CRS Reports
Military Retirement: Major Legislative Issues, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 85159
The Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986: Issues and Implications, by (name redacted),
CRS Report 87-702 F
Military Medical Care Services: Questions and Answers, by Richard A. Best, CRS Issue Brief
IB93103
Military and Civilian Pay: Is There a Gap?, by (name redacted), CRS Report 95-492 F
Acquisition Reform, Outsourcing, and Infrastructure Reductions
The Department of Defense (DOD) leadership is implementing a number of
defense reform initiatives in order to streamline its operational capabilities and
produce budgetary savings that can fund critical needs in readiness and modernization.
These initiatives, which some describe as a revolution in business affairs, are aimed

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at reforming acquisition procedures, outsourcing support functions, reducing
headquarter staffs and other overhead activities, and reducing inventories of spare
parts and munitions. The Congress has supported many DOD measures to improve
the efficiency of DOD business practices, but has sometimes differed with DOD on
some issues.
The 104
th Congress enacted a major reform of DOD acquisition regulations as
part of the FY1996 DOD Authorization Act (P.L. 104-106). Key reform provisions
included: simplifying procedures to procure commercial products and services to
preserve the concept of full and open competition; and eliminating the requirement for
certified cost and pricing data for commercial products to reduce procurement
barriers for more commercial company participation. Congress also required DOD
to reduce its acquisition workforce by 25 percent over a five-year period, a rate that
is viewed in DOD as controversial and difficult to achieve.
The 105 Congress wen
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t further to prompt DOD and other Federal agencies to
streamline their operations. The FY1998 DOD Authorization Act (P.L. 105-85)
required DOD to: review opportunities for cross-service, cross-functional
arrangements within the military services and defense agencies; and identify
overlapping and duplicating functions with an eye toward further streamlining
acquisition processes. In addition, Congress enacted the Federal Activities Reform
Act (P.L. 105-270) requiring Federal executive agencies to categorize agency
activities as either inherently governmental or commercial. Activities in the latter
category would be subject to managed competition, possibly resulting in outsourcing
or transferring some activities to the private sector.
The 106 Congress will have an important oversight role on defense reform
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,
especially monitoring DOD reports to Congress on many of its acquisition reform
initiatives such as progress in reducing the size of the acquisition workforce, or in
defining governmental activities subject to competition and outsourcing.
CRS Reports
Defense Acquisition Reform: Status and Current Issues, (name redacted), CRS Issue
Brief 96022
Defense Acquisition Workforce: Issues for Congress, (name redacted), CRS Report 98-
938 F
Privatizing DOD Functions through Outsourcing: A Framework for Discussion, (name r
edacted), CRS Report 96-700 F
New Military Base Closure Rounds
Over the last decade, as part of its post-Cold War transition, the Department of
Defense has reduced its overall base structure by about 21 percent. This figure
compares to a 33 percent reduction in DOD’s force structure (personnel and units)
during the same period. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, as well as other high
ranking officials, has pointed to this structural imbalance as one reason for Congress
to authorize two more rounds of base closures in 2001 and 2005. He has also
declared that significant savings would be achieved.

CRS-20
In an April 1998 report to Congress, the Defense Secretary estimated that
savings from the first four base closure rounds (initiated in 1988, 1991, 1993, and
1995) would produce net total savings of about $14 billion through 2001. Annual
savings, thereafter, were estimated at $5.6 billion. As for the two new rounds sought
by DOD, he projected additional savings, after implementation, of about $3 billion a
year.
In the 105 Congress, the Secretary of Defense was unable to persuad
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Congress to pass legislation authorizing him to close more bases. Many Members
were opposed for reasons that included: (1) the need to assess fully the outcome and
consequences, especially in terms of costs/savings, of the first four rounds of base
closings; (2) the concern of many local communities about the potentially disruptive
economic and social impact of any new rounds; and (3) the continuing anger of
lawmakers over President Clinton’s 1995 actions in the closing of McClellan and
Kelly air force bases.
In the 106 Congress,
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Secretary of Defense Cohen will almost certainly resume
his campaign to close down more bases — beginning with his submission of DOD’s
FY2000 budget to Congress in January 1999. He will emphasize, as he has in the
past, the importance of bringing DOD’s base structure into alignment with the force
structure, as well as achieving much needed savings. In the absence of such savings,
he has warned, funding will not be available to maintain an adequate level of military
readiness and investment in new weapons.
CRS Report
Military Base Closures: Time for Another Round?, by (name redacted), CRS Report 97-
674 F
Nonproliferation
U.S. policy regarding foreign weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was
severely tested in the 1990s and particularly in 1998 when India and Pakistan
detonated nuclear devices, North Korea showed signs of resuming its nuclear
program, Iraq again defied the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)
assigned to eliminate Iraq’s WMD programs, and Iran continued its nuclear program
with Russian help. Also in 1998, North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran cooperated in
missile development, received help from China and/or Russia, and each tested medium
or longer-range missiles. Congress will confront the policy as a flurry of legislative
issues, including authorizations and appropriations, and as topics of oversight. While
considering legislation on numerous and complex issues, Congress has also indicated
concern for the overall policy regarding foreign WMD and the U.S. ability to combat
this key threat. Two aspects Congress has focused on are how the Federal
government is organized to establish and carry out U.S. nonproliferation policies, and
the proper control of exports of sensitive dual-use goods and technology that can
contribute to WMD programs.
Controlling the Spread of WMD
Multilateral nonproliferation regimes augment U.S. policies with treaties,
agreements, verification mechanisms, and shared export policies. Key elements of the

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nuclear nonproliferation regime include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, its
verification arm (the International Atomic Energy Agency), the Zangger Committee,
and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The Chemical Weapons Convention has a
verification agency (the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons). The
Australia Group monitors chemical exports of primary supplier countries as well. The
Biological Weapons Convention has no inspection or verification arms but the
Australia Group also monitors biological exports. The Missile Technology Control
Regime sets export guidelines to which Congress added unilateral enforcement
mechanisms. The Export Administration Act, which expired in 1994, but the
authority contained therein is continued pursuant to the President invoking national
emergency authority, and congressionally mandated sanctions are primary tools in
restricting proliferation. Several government departments are involved in these
decisions and they are frequently in disagreement. Good intelligence on foreign WMD
programs is also critical to U.S. nonproliferation efforts.
Arms control treaties can support nonproliferation by capping weapons
development through a nuclear weapon test ban, halting the production of fissile
material, and by establishing nuclear weapons free zones. Such agreements will face
significant opposition in Congress, requiring the Administration to expend political
and economic resources to gain their approval. In several cases, the United States
and other countries have resorted to stopgap measures: the Agreed Framework effort
to freeze nuclear weapon development in North Korea; the UNSCOM mission to
block Iraqi WMD programs; negotiations to reduce the nuclear threat in South Asia;
controls on sensitive exports to Iran; and Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
programs help prevent nuclear capabilities from leaking out of Russia and other
former-Soviet Republics. Success in these efforts depends on vigorous advocacy for
coherent policies by the Administration and support by Congress.
An ultimate goal of U.S. nonproliferation policy is to reduce the number of
countries that possess WMD. A number of countries have abandoned their nuclear
capabilities in recent years. Most recently, however, India and Pakistan joined the
ranks of those with demonstrated nuclear capability. Currently, only U.S. and Russian
nuclear inventories are being reduced in accordance with treaties and international
agreements. The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons
Convention call for a total ban on production, stockpiling , or use of these weapons.
The United States, Russia, and other republics of the former Soviet Union are
eliminating certain classes of missiles, and most states that join the MTCR agree not
to produce missiles with ranges greater than 300 km (186 miles).
Deterring and Defending Against the Use of WMD
U.S. conventional and nuclear military forces are the primary means of deterring
WMD attacks against the United States, U.S. interests overseas, and our allies.
Although nuclear war has been avoided since 1945, some question the credibility of
U.S. deterrence policy, especially as it is extended to allies and friends, and
particularly as it may be applied to the use of chemical or biological weapons by rogue
regimes or sub-national groups. Among some countries and subnational groups there
is little stigma attached to the use of chemical or biological weapons, ballistic or cruise
missiles against military targets or even civilian population centers. Recent statements
by Administration officials have tried to emphasize the United States' intolerance of
the use of WMD and all forms of terrorism, and the President has reiterated U.S.

CRS-22
commitment to help defend Israel against missile attacks and to help defend South
Korea against North Korean aggression. In regions such as South Asia, where U.S.
security interests are not directly threatened, the United States has used diplomacy,
confidence building measures, sanctions, and incentives rather than deterrence to
prevent the use of WMD.
U.S. national missile defense and theater missile defense objectives have been the
subject of great congressional interest, and have received large annual authorizations
and appropriations. Congressional debate will surely continue as to whether the
programs are sufficient and appropriate (see Ballistic Missile Defense, above). Other
programs to defend against WMD attacks include measures to detect chemical and
biological agents and protect troops and civilian populations against them. The U.S.
military is also developing special counterproliferation weapons to destroy WMD,
even when protected in bunkers, without dispersing deadly materials. Faced with
WMD in the hands of many potential adversaries, the U.S. military is devising new
methods for projecting force while minimizing the WMD threat to U.S. troops.
Congress has also called on the Administration to improve the coordination of military
and civilian agencies with state and local governments to protect against the use of
WMD by foreign or domestic terrorists.
CRS Reports
Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Issues, by (name redacted),
CRS Issue Brief 92056;
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: the State of Proliferation, by
(name redacted), CRS Report 98-103 F;
Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 98039
Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation Sanctions: Selected Current Law, by
(name redacted), CRS Report 98-116 F
Treaties and International Agreements
Arms Control Treaties Under Revision
Negotiations are currently underway either to revise or expand the provisions of
two arms control treaties: the Biological Weapons convention (BWC), and the Treaty
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). Neither is expected to require
consideration in the 106 Congress' first session, but new provisions for either could
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be submitted during the second session. The BWC currently has no verification
provisions, and efforts have been underway for several years to devise a verification
protocol acceptable to all State Parties. Progress has been slow, but negotiators hope
that a protocol will be submitted for approval by the next BWC Review Conference
in 2000. The CFE, which establishes overall and regional limits on certain types of
military equipment in Europe, was negotiated prior to the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact. All State Parties agree that it must be adapted to reflect
the new political and military realities in Europe. Talks to this end are underway,
though it is not clear if they will be completed during the 106 Congress. Russia
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concerns stemming from the enlargement of NATO eastward and restrictions on

CRS-23
deployments in its volatile Caucasus border region have proven to be major stumbling
blocks.
Another arms control treaty issue that could come under consideration is revision
of the Chemical Weapons Convention's (CWC) ratification resolution and/or its
implementing legislation. Some CWC supporters believe that certain provisions of
these measures, as passed by the 105 Congress, are not consonant with CW
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C
requirements, open loopholes in the verification regime, or could serve to erode the
effectiveness of the Convention. There has been some discussion of introducing
legislation to address these concerns in the 106 Congress.
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Human Rights Treaties
In Executive Order 13107, issued on December 10, 1998, on the occasion of the
50th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
President Clinton defined current U.S. Government policy and practice on
implementation of human rights treaties. He stated that policy, "being committed to
the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, fully to
respect and implement its [U.S.] obligations under the international human rights
treaties to which it [U.S.] is a party...." The executive order set up an Interagency
Working Group on Human Rights Treaties, to provide "guidance, oversight, and
coordination...concerning the adherence to and implementation of human rights
obligations and related matters." Of particular import for Congress are the following
functions delineated for the Working Group: (1) to conduct an annual review of U.S.
reservations, declarations, and understandings to human rights treaties "in order to
determine...consideration of any modification" thereof; and (2) to review legislation
proposed by the Administration or under consideration by Congress for "conformity
with international human rights obligations."
CRS Report
Human Rights Treaties: A Summary of Provisions and Status in the U.S. Ratification Process,
by (name redacted), CRS Report 95-191 F.
Kyoto Protocol: Global Climate Change
Congress has taken an active and continuing interest over the past several years,
reflected in legislation and hearings, in implications for the United States of possible
global climate change resulting from increased levels in the atmosphere of several
greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide emitted from burning of fossil fuels and
wood. In particular, recent attention has focused on the international negotiations
that respond to these concerns that as human activities increase the concentrations of
greenhouse gases — carbon dioxide, methane, and others — in the atmosphere, the
Earth may experience significant warming of the climate with a corresponding rise in
sea levels, changes in agricultural production, possible effects on health, and other
consequences.
In 1992, the nations of the world agreed upon the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which the United States was among the
first to sign and ratify. In 1997, the parties to this convention further agreed to the
Kyoto Protocol to establish binding reductions in greenhouse gases for the developed

CRS-24
countries. The terms of reference under which these negotiations were carried out
limited new commitments to developed countries and excluded developing countries
until the wealthier industrialized nations had taken the first steps. The United States
made a commitment under this Protocol to reduce its emissions of the six major
greenhouse gases by 7% below 1990 levels, including carbon dioxide (1995 levels for
three man-made gases) during a commitment period between 2008-2012. In 1998 the
parties met again in Buenos Aires, Argentina, to flesh out the specifics of this
Protocol, and decided on work plans for each of the major issues, such as how
emissions trading would be structured, funding for developing countries under the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), compliance, and enforcement. These work
plans are to be completed by 2000. In November, 1998, the United States signed the
Kyoto Protocol, but President Clinton continues to hold that the Administration will
not submit it to the Senate for advice and consent, which is required for U.S.
ratification, until developing countries are also brought under binding requirements
to limit their emissions. The U.S. Senate passed a resolution, S.Res. 98, in 1997,
stating that the United States should not agree to a protocol that does not include
requirements for developing countries. Congressional interest has focused on issues
related to the extent and nature of global warming threats, if any, and related research
needs, whether and under what conditions the United States should ratify and become
a party to the Kyoto Protocol, and implications for the U.S. economy of various
means of complying with the emissions reductions in the Protocol.
CRS Reports
Global Climate Change, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 89005
Global Climate Change Treaty: The Kyoto Protocol, by (name redacted), CRS Report 98-2
ENR
CRS Electronic Briefing Book: Global Climate Change; available at:
http://www.crs.loc.gov or http://thomas.loc.gov/brbk/html/ebgcctop.html.
Controlling the Use of Anti-Personnel Landmines
Anti-personnel landmines (APL) are small, inexpensive weapons that kill or
maim people upon contact. Indiscriminate use in many countries has resulted in
numerous civilian casualties. Worldwide awareness of this problem has resulted in
recent efforts to control or ban use of APL. The United States is a party to the
Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), in which Protocol II seeks to regulate
the use and removal of landmines. The United States also supports more far-reaching
efforts to restrain the use of anti-personnel landmines, but did not sign a recent
international convention , the Ottawa Treaty, banning APL. President Clinton would
not sign because he felt certain exceptions were needed: the ability to use smart APL
to protect anti-tank minefields, and continued use of APL to protect U.S. and South
Korean forces in Korea. He did suggest that the United States would sign the Ottawa
Treaty in 2006 if effective alternatives to APL were then available. In May, 1996, a
CCW review conference amended Protocol II to improve protection of non-
combatants; the President referred it to the Senate for ratification in January 1997.
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has recommended that the Senate give
advice and consent, with reservation, to the Amended Protocol. The resolution
would make clear that the Administration should not effectively implement the Ottawa
Treaty before the Senate advises on its ratification.

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CRS Report
Landmines: Basic Facts and Congressional Concerns, by (name redacted), CRS Report 96-
362
Regional Concerns
Africa
In the 106 Congress, legislation to promote U.S./Africa trade, as well as U.S.
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investment in Africa, will likely be re-introduced, and Congress is also expected to act
on legislation funding U.S. assistance for the sub-Saharan region. Hearings are
anticipated on U.S. policy toward a number of conflicts distressing sub-Saharan
Africa, and on the political, humanitarian, and economic consequences of those
conflicts. Legislation could be introduced on one or more of these conflicts.
Congress may use hearings to monitor elections scheduled in Nigeria and South
Africa. Resolutions supporting Nigeria’s democratic transition may be proposed.

Trade, Investment, and Aid. At the end of the 105 Congress, the Hous
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passed H.R. 1432, the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, which sought to
accelerate African economic development by strengthening trade relations and
boosting U.S. investment in the region. The Senate did not vote on the bill; sponsors
are expected to re-introduce it and the Clinton Administration has said it will again
support passage. In addition, Congress is expected to act on the annual
Administration request for funding for U.S. economic and security assistance
programs in Africa. Issues may include the balance between development programs
and support for child survival; the appropriateness of aid for broad development
programs as against specific development projects; and aid proposals for countries
that are controversial for a range of reasons.
CRS Reports
The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, by Theodros S. Dagne and (name redacted), CRS Issue
Brief 98015
Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 95052
African Conflicts. Africa’s Great Lakes region, dominated by events in the vast
Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), is engulfed in a number of
complex ethnic and inter-related conflicts. Several African countries have troops in
Congo, where a new civil war broke out in August 1998, and there is continuing
armed conflict or violent unrest in the Congo Republic (Brazzaville Congo), Burundi,
Uganda, Angola, and Rwanda. In northeast Africa, the 15-year war in southern
Sudan continues to rage, with serious consequences for Christian civilians in the area;
and border tensions are high between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which fought a brief war
in 1998. In West Africa, Sierra Leone and Senegal face lingering rebellions, while
several other countries, including Liberia, are potentially unstable.

CRS-26
CRS Reports
Angola Update, by (name redacted), CRS Report 98-816 F
Burundi Update, by Theodros S. Dagne, CRS Report 98-877 F
Congo (formerly Zaire), by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 96037
Liberia: Issues for the United States, by Carl W. Ek, CRS Issue Brief 96025
Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism, and U.S. Policy, by Theodros S. Dagne,
CRS Issue Brief 98043
Elections. Nigeria, a leading U.S. oil-supplier, is moving forward with elections
in preparation for a May 1999 democratic transition. Nigeria has been under military
rule for most of its history as an independent nation, and congressional observers will
closely monitor this attempt to restore democracy in a country that is home to more
than 110 million people. Many in Congress will also follow the parliamentary
elections in South Africa, which will take place in late April or May. The new
parliament will choose President Nelson Mandela’s successor.
CRS Reports
Nigeria in Political Transition, by Theodros S. Dagne, CRS Issue Brief 98046
South Africa: Background, Current Issues, and Political Outlook, by (name redacted),
CRS Report 98-650 F
Asia
China. The Clinton Administration continues to favor engagement with China
and to put a high priority on improving U.S.-China relations. These efforts have
included the resumption of presidential summitry (in October 1997 and June 1998);
decisions to move forward on bilateral nuclear energy cooperation and a range of
other languishing bilateral issues; and a 1998 statement by President Clinton that
many believe appeared to distance U.S. policy from Taiwan and move it in a direction
preferred by Beijing. The 105 Congress was active in targeting these and othe
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Administration policies on China, seeking to pressure the White House to take a
firmer, more sanction-oriented approach. These efforts are likely to continue in the
106
th Congress. Although Congress in 1999 may well be unwilling to disapprove the
annual extension of China’s most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status (or normal trade
relations), the MFN renewal process will most likely trigger consideration of other
trade-related issues. These include conditioning China’s entry into the World Trade
Organization (WTO); possibly linking WTO access with permanent MFN status; and
determining how to handle the increasing U.S.-China trade deficit, which is expected
to widen if the Asian financial crisis worsens or continues.
The 106 Congress will also likely visit a range of other,
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perennial issues in U.S.-
China relations, including religious persecution in China; allegations about China’s
prison system and treatment of prisoners; allegations about coercive abortion; and
allegations that China continually violates its weapons nonproliferation commitments.
The 105 Congress requested two reports from DOD by e
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arly 1999 on theater missile
defense in Asia and security in the Taiwan Strait, which might stress U.S.-China

CRS-27
relations. Finally, one of the first issues likely to demand congressional attention in
the new year will be the report of the House Select Committee on U.S. National
Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China,
released in classified form on December 30, 1999. According to the Select
Committee, two American aerospace companies, Hughes Electronic Corporation, and
Loral Space and Communications Systems, Ltd., transferred sensitive missile-related
information to China that improved the accuracy of China’s ballistic missiles, and thus
harmed U.S. national security.
CRS Reports
China-U.S. Relations, by Kerry B. Dumbaugh, CRS Issue Brief 98018
China’s MFN Status: Congressional Consideration, 1989-1998, by Kerry B. Dumbaugh, CRS
Report 98-603 F
Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues, by (name reda
cted) and (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 92056
China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers From U.S. Satellite Export Policy —
Background and Chronology, by (name redacted), CRS Report 98-485 F
Korean Peninsula. The 106 Congress will be concerned primarily wit
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h
overseeing and making future legislative decisions regarding the provisions related to
North Korea in the Omnibus Appropriations measure for FY 1999 (Public Law 105-
277). That measure appropriates $35 million for funding of the Korean Peninsula
Development Organization (KEDO), the multinational organization created to
implement the obligations assumed by the United States under the October 1994
U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework obligates the United
States to facilitate the provision to North Korea of two light water nuclear reactors
and 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually, the oil shipments to cease when the reactors
are constructed. North Korea is obligated to suspend the operations of its nuclear
facilities, which the United States believed were for production of nuclear weapons.
The Omnibus Appropriations bill for FY 1999 conditions the allocation of the
$35 million to two sets of presidential certifications. The first is due on March 1,
1999, for the allocation of $15 million. The second for the balance is due on June 1,
1999. These restrictions were the result of two developments in the summer of 1998:
(1) the disclosure that U.S. intelligence agencies had uncovered a secret underground
facility in North Korea that had the appearance of a nuclear installation; and (2) a
North Korean test of a three-stage rocket on August 31, 1998, which U.S.
intelligence agencies reportedly believe indicates that North Korea soon will have an
intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking Alaska or Hawaii. Another factor
was growing congressional discontent over the Clinton Administration's offers of
enlarged amounts of food aid (500,000 tons promised in 1998) to North Korea to
secure its agreement to hold negotiations and meetings.
The certifications call for the President to show that progress is being made on
a number of issues between the United States and North Korea. These include
securing access to the secret underground facility; reducing and eliminating North
Korea’s missile threat, including the export of missiles; certification that North Korea
is complying with all provisions of the Agreed Framework; and implementation of the
North Korea-South Korea Denuclearization Agreement of 1992.

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In 1999, Congress will review the President’s response to these certification
requirements and will evaluate them in deciding on funding for KEDO in FY 2000.
Congressional criticism of the Administration’s use of food aid also makes likely
increased congressional scrutiny of the food aid program in 1999.
CRS Reports
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 91141
Korea: U.S. South Korean Relations: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted), CRS Issue
Brief 98045
India and Pakistan. Following their May 1998 nuclear tests, President Clinton
imposed economic and military sanctions on India and Pakistan as required by section
102 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA.). In November 1998 — under one-
year waiver enacted in 1998 — the President eased some economic sanctions against
India and Pakistan in response to positive steps taken by both countries to address
U.S. nuclear nonproliferation concerns. A major South Asia issue for the 106th
Congress will be to decide whether to extend the one-year waiver authority, in return
for specific actions of restraint by India and Pakistan, or to maintain or broaden the
AECA sanctions.
U.S. policy analysts have long considered the continuing arms race between
India and Pakistan as posing perhaps the most likely prospect for the future use of
nuclear weapons. The two nations have fought three wars and have a continuing
standoff over the disputed territory of Kashmir. Both India and Pakistan have aircraft
and missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The United States has urged both
countries to take the following steps in order to avoid a destabilizing nuclear and
missile competition and to end sanctions: halt further nuclear testing and sign and
ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; not deploy or test missiles or nuclear
weapons; halt fissile material production and cooperate in Fissile Material Control
Treaty negotiations; maintain and formalize restraints on sharing sensitive goods and
technologies with other countries; and reduce bilateral tensions.
CRS Reports
India-Pakistan Nuclear Tests and U.S. Response, coordinated by (name redacted), CRS
Report 98-570F
India-US Relations, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 93097
Pakistan-US Relations, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 94041
India-Pakistan: Arms Race in South Asia, CRS InfoPak IP525I
Southeast Asia. Congress shares serious Clinton administration concerns over
the implications of Indonesia’s severe economic decline and related political
instability. Indonesia’s economy is not seen as critically important to the U.S.
economy, but its large size and location mean that economic and political turmoil
there have important repercussions throughout Southeast Asia. Congress continues
to debate the efficacy of the Clinton Administration-backed IMF rescue efforts, and
it provided $70 million in additional humanitarian assistance to Indonesia at the end
of the 105 Congress. Some in Congress favor using the currently fluid politica
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situation to push for tangible progress toward greater democracy and for autonomy
(some seek independence) for Indonesian-controlled former Portuguese colony of
East Timor; others argue for caution in the politically delicate Indonesian situation.
Free market and human rights issues also drive congressional concerns regarding
Malaysia, where a late 1998 reassertion of state guidance in economic development
coincided with the arrest, beating, and prosecution of the leading pro-free market
political leader. His arrest and treatment in detention was condemned by many in the
Congress and the Clinton Administration. Many in Congress also support a firm U.S.
policy in the face of human rights violations of the authoritarian regime in Burma; and
some criticize forward movement in U.S. normalization with Cambodia and Vietnam
on human rights grounds, and in the latter case, on the basis that Hanoi has not
provided a full accounting of U.S. prisoners of war and missing in action
(POW/MIAs).
CRS Reports
Indonesia: Political and Economic Situation and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted), CRS
Report 98-686
East Asia and the Pacific: Issues at the End of the 105th Congress, by (name redacted), CRS
Report 98-931
Cambodia in Crisis; Elections and Their Aftermath—Concerns for Congress, by (name reda
cted), CRS Issue Brief 98036
Vietnam-U.S. Relations: Background, Recent Developments, and Issues for Congress, by
(name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 98033
Japan. A budding regional power shift since the end of the Cold War and the
tarnishing of Japan's postwar economic miracle in recent years have combined to
undermine Japan's self-confidence and raise some questions about the future of
U.S.-Japan relations. Particularly troubling to the Japanese have been the
demoralizing effects of a steadily worsening economy, which has experienced little or
no economic growth since 1991, and fears about the United States by-passing Japan
in favor of closer ties to an increasingly powerful and influential China. Japan remains
strongly attached to its alliance relationship with the United States, but it is also
uneasily aware that American perceptions of Japan are in flux.
Although Congress has paid comparatively little attention to U.S.-Japan relations
in recent years, several developments during the past year could reverse this pattern.
The inability thus far of the government headed by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi to
deal effectively with the deepening financial and economic crisis might attract
Congress' attention. Congress might also move forward on legislation necessary to
activate a September 1997 U.S.-Japan agreement that would expand Japan’s role in
providing non-combat logistical support to U.S. forces in the event of a regional
military contingency, such as a crisis on the Korean peninsula. Among the
consequences of Japan’s economic policy failures, the U.S. market has been flooded
with low-cost Japanese steel, generating strong complaints about dumping that have
been echoed in Congress. Because of domestic political pressure from agricultural
and wood products interest groups, Japan also obstructed a U.S.-promoted plan for
early liberalization of a number of trade sectors at the November 1998 annual
meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) countries. On the

CRS-30
more positive side, however, there are some encouraging political developments in
Japan. In a November 1998 gubernatorial election in Okinawa Prefecture, host to the
largest contingent of U.S. military forces in Japan, the Socialist-backed, anti-bases
incumbent was unseated by a conservative candidate who has called for a pragmatic
accommodation with the Japanese government and the U.S. military. In addition, a
late 1998 political realignment is seen as strengthening the hand of the Obuchi in
gaining Diet approval of the currently stalled defense cooperation legislation. All of
these issues can be expected to be the subject of oversight hearings by Congress
during 1999.
CRS Reports
Japan-U.S. Security Relations and the Revised Defense Cooperation Guidelines: Status
Report and Policy Options, by (name redacted), CRS Report 98-857 F
Japan-U.S. Relations, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 97004
Europe
Russia. U.S. interest in and concern about Russia is fueled by that country’s
sharply increasing political, economic, and social instability. During the 106th
Congress, Russia is scheduled to elect a new parliament (December 1999) and
president (June-July 2000), although it is unclear whether President Yeltsin’s physical,
mental, and political health will sustain him through mid-2000. The Russian economy
stumbled into its most serious crisis yet in mid-1998, with the likelihood of sharper
contraction and social misery in 1998-1999, and the possibility of a catastrophic
economic collapse — with grave social and political consequences.
Some believe that in response to Russia’s present instability and apparent drift
away from western-oriented reforms by the government of Premier Primakov, U.S.
policy should be to disengage somewhat from the waning Yeltsin regime, reducing
both assistance and advice in favor of a wait-and-see posture. Others argue that
disengagement and failure to help Russia avoid economic collapse (Moscow is
urgently seeking international debt rescheduling) could increase the likelihood of an
authoritarian anti-western regime coming to power. These issues could affect
congressional consideration of direct U.S. assistance to Russia in the annual foreign
aid bill and indirect assistance through institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). The 105 Congress conditioned aid to Russia on how it implements a
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controversial 1997 law restricting religious activities, and on Russia halting ballistic
missile and nuclear reactor technology transfers to Iran. Congress is highly concerned
about the missile and nuclear technology transfer issue. The 105 Congress passed
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the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act (H.R. 2709), which would have required
the president to impose sanctions on Russian, and other, entities assisting Iran’s
ballistic missile program. The President, however, vetoed the measure. Similar
legislation may be introduced in the 106 Congress.
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The continuing instability in Russia has deepened concerns about the safety
and security of Russia’s nuclear weapons and materials. The United States has
provided around $2 billion to help Russia and other former Soviet republics safely
store, transport, and dismantle these weapons and to enhance the security of nuclear
materials. But questions about discipline, morale, and funding in the armed services

CRS-31
have led some to conclude that Russian scientists or materials might end up in nations
seeking to develop their own nuclear weapons. Some, including Senators Lugar and
Domenici, have suggested that the United States provide additional funding and
assistance to avert this problem. Others fear that financial and personnel problems in
Russia’s nuclear command and control system could lead to a loosening of control
over those weapons. They suggest that the United States and Russia alter the alert
postures of their nuclear weapons to reduce this risk. Finally, many remain hopeful
that the Russian parliament will soon approve the START II Treaty, which would
reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear forces each to 3,500 deployed warheads and allow
for the negotiation of further reductions in a START III Treaty.
CRS Reports
Russia, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 92089
The Former Soviet Union and U.S. Foreign Assistance, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief
95077
Nuclear Weapons in Russia: Safety, Security, and Control Issues, by (name redacted), CRS
Issue Brief 98038
Russian Missile Technology and Nuclear Reactor Transfers to Iran, by (name redacted),
Kenneth B. Katzman, (name redacted), and Carl Behrens, CRS Report 98-299
Bosnia. President Clinton’s decision in late 1995 to send up to 20,000 U.S.
troops to Bosnia, initially for a year, to implement the Dayton peace agreement
touched off a heated debate in Congress. Since then, many Members of Congress
have raised concerns about the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission in
Bosnia, its lapsed deadlines and repeated extensions, its costs to the United States,
and its impact on U.S. military readiness. In June 1998, NATO extended SFOR’s
mandate without assigning a specific withdrawal date. Instead, NATO has outlined
a number of benchmarks to indicate progress toward sustainable peace in Bosnia.
Currently, about 7,000 U.S. troops, of a total of about 32,000 from all participants,
continue to serve with SFOR in Bosnia. Incremental Department of Defense costs
for Bosnia/former Yugoslavia operations have totaled over $8 billion from Fiscal Year
1996 through Fiscal Year 1999.
Congress did not give formal authorization to the initial deployment of U.S.
troops to Bosnia, but has since provided funding for U.S. participation in SFOR in
emergency supplemental and regular Defense Department appropriations bills. In
these bills, Congress has considered numerous amendments relating to the deployment
of U.S. troops in Bosnia; some that would have barred funding for the operation or
mandated troop level reductions were eventually defeated in floor votes or dropped
in conference. Congress has also provided funding for civilian reconstruction
programs in Bosnia in annual foreign operations appropriations bills, and has passed
legislation regarding Yugoslav war criminals. The 106 Congress will be asked t
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o
authorize and appropriate funding for the NATO operation and for economic
assistance to Bosnia for Fiscal Year 2000. As in the past, foreign affairs and defense
authorization and appropriations committees may hold oversight hearings on U.S. and
international policy in Bosnia.
Kosovo. Years of simmering tensions in Serbia’s Kosovo region exploded
into large-scale violence between ethnic Albanian guerrillas and Serbian security

CRS-32
forces in February 1998. About 1500 people have been killed and nearly 300,000
driven from their homes by the fighting. A NATO threat of air strikes in October
1998 induced Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to agree to a series of
conditions, including a cease-fire, a partial pullback of his forces, and verification by
the OSCE and NATO. This may have averted a humanitarian disaster this winter and
has given a breathing space for ongoing talks on a political settlement brokered by
U.S. envoy Christopher Hill. However, it is uncertain whether the agreement marks
merely a pause before fighting resumes in the spring or whether it is the first step to
a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem. It does appear that whatever the
outcome of the current situation, the United States and the international community
may see a need to remain engaged in Kosovo for some time to come. If the current
cease-fire breaks down, the United States and its NATO allies may conduct air strikes
against Serb positions to halt the fighting. If a peace agreement is achieved, the
United States may be involved in implementation of the settlement for some time.
Congressional concerns about such issues as U.S. national interests in former
Yugoslavia, war powers, and the costs of deeper U.S. involvement in the Balkans may
be reflected in foreign aid and defense authorization and appropriations bills, as well
as other legislation, and in oversight hearings.
CRS Reports
Kosovo and U.S. Policy, by Steven J. Woehrel and (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 98041
Bosnia-Former Yugoslavia and U.S. Policy, by Steven J. Woehrel and (name redacted), CRS Issue
Brief 91089
Bosnia and Kosovo: U.S. Military Operations, by Steven R. Bowman, CRS Issue Brief 93056
Northern Ireland. Since 1969, over 3,200 people have died as a result of
political violence in Northern Ireland. The Protestant majority (56%) defines itself
as British and largely supports continued incorporation in the United Kingdom; the
Catholic minority considers itself Irish and many Catholics desire a united Ireland. On
April 10, 1998, the British and Irish governments and the eight parties participating
in the peace talks announced agreement on a political settlement. It includes the
establishment of a Northern Ireland Assembly, a North/South Ministerial Council, and
a British-Irish Council. The Assembly is in place, but implementation of other key
elements of the agreement has stalled. The Clinton Administration and many
Members of Congress have played an active role in the peace process. For FY1999,
Congress approved $19.6 million for the International Fund for Ireland to aid the
region (division A, sec, 101(d) of P.L. 105-277). President Clinton signed the Irish
Peace Process Cultural and Training Program Bill into law (P.L. 105-319) on October
30, 1998, to establish a cultural and training program for disadvantaged individuals
from Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
CRS Report
Northern Ireland: The Peace Agreement, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 98029
NATO Enlargement and NATO’s Missions. During the 105 Congress,
th
the Senate gave its advice and consent to amending the North Atlantic Treaty to
admit Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO. The three countries will
join the alliance in early 1999. Congress also passed the European Security Act

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(division G, title XXVII, of P.L. 105-277), which endorsed further enlargement of the
alliance, and named the Baltic states, Bulgaria, and Romania as potentially viable
candidates. Some Members of Congress have also strongly supported Slovenia’s
candidacy. At the April 1999 Washington summit, the NATO allies plan to agree to
a new strategic concept to outline the alliance’s future missions and the means to
achieve them. During the debate over enlargement, the Senate urged the
Administration to seek further evolution of the alliance to embrace responsibility for
countering threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, outside
the treaty area. The Senate also called for the development of lighter, more flexible
combat forces in all member states in order to meet such threats. Some allies are
developing such forces, while others are not. The 106 Congress will likely address
th
appropriations measures for funding further development of U.S. forces for greater
power projection, and assistance to the three new member states and to candidate
states that meet the criteria for admission.
CRS Reports
NATO: Congress Addresses Expansion of the Alliance, by Paul E. Gallis, CRS Issue Brief
95076
NATO’s Evolving Role and Missions, by (name redacted), CRS Report 97-708
Latin America and the Caribbean
Trade Issues. The 106 Congress is expected to consider two main trad
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e
issues that will affect Latin America directly: (1) Caribbean Basin parity legislation,
and (2) reauthorization of fast-track trade negotiating authority.
As in the 104 and 105
th
Congresses, legislation to provide Caribbean Basin
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countries the same treatment Mexico receives under the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) is expected to be introduced in the 106 Congress. Thes
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e
countries maintain that they have been losing trade and investment opportunities to
Mexico as a result of the preferential access Mexico has to the U.S. market under
NAFTA. Differences between a bill reported out of the Senate Committee on
Finance, which was supported by the American Textile Manufacturers Institute
(ATMI), and a bill reported out by the House Committee on Ways and Means, which
was supported by the American Apparel Manufacturers Association (AAMA),
impeded passage of a CBI bill in the 105 Congress. In the wake of the devastation
th
caused by Hurricane Mitch, efforts are now being made to forge an intra-industry
consensus on a CBI bill that could be incorporated into a Central American hurricane-
relief package, and introduced in the beginning of the 106 Congress.
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The Clinton Administration is expected to seek reauthorization of fast-track
trade negotiating authority again in the 106 Congress. Renewal of fast-track, which
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provides that a trade agreement negotiated by the President will be voted on by both
houses of Congress under a fixed timetable with no amendments allowed, could
provide the Administration with greater leverage to negotiate Chile's joining NAFTA
and advance negotiations to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) that
began September 1998 in Miami. Efforts in the 104 and 105
th
Congresses t
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reauthorize fast-track were impeded by disagreements about whether and how labor
and environmental issues should be addressed in future trade agreements.

CRS-34
CRS Reports
Trade and the Americas, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 95017
Caribbean Basin Interim Trade Program, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 95050
Central American Reconstruction after Hurricane Mitch. As of
December 11, 1998, according to President Clinton, the United States had committed
$283 million in disaster assistance to the countries of Central America and will add
another $17 million shortly. The life threatening emergency is now over and the focus
of U.S. assistance has shifted to reconstruction. While the Administration and the
Congress are in agreement that a major reconstruction effort should be undertaken,
the shape and extent of that effort remains to be decided. The President has said he
will ask Congress for a supplemental appropriation early in 1999. He is calling for
debt forgiveness, new loans with easy terms, improved trade terms, private and public
investment initiatives and changes in policy on immigration from the area as well as
funds for rebuilding. The governments of Central America have also called for a
favorable resolution of the status of the illegal immigrants currently in the United
States and trade terms like those for Mexico (NAFTA parity). Although the 106th
Congress may reconsider these suggestions, several have been opposed in the past.
The Administration has granted temporary protected status to some immigrants in
the United States from Nicaragua and Honduras. It is likely that some Members on
both sides of the aisle will object to the new immigration status. Improved trade
status, such as NAFTA parity has been introduced in the past and is opposed by those
members who oppose expanding NAFTA for labor and environmental reasons.
Forgiveness of loans from the multilateral development banks has been opposed, both
in this country and in other developed countries, and would imply precedents for
forgiving the debt of other developing countries. Beyond all these issues, some
development experts and environmental groups are concerned that the long standing
problem of land ownership and the misuse of farm land in Central America must be
addressed in order to protect fragile areas, allow sustainable development, and
mitigate future disasters. These concerns have not yet been addressed.
CRS Reports
Central American Reconstruction after Hurricane Mitch, coordinated by (name redacted),
CRS Report 98-1030 F
Immigration: Temporary Protected Status Background and Issues, by (name redacted),
CRS Report 98-759
Trade and the Americas, by Ray J. Ahearn, CRS Issue Brief 95017
Brazil. During 1999, the U.S. Congress will be monitoring Brazil to see how
recently reelected President Cardoso fares in efforts to sustain economic reforms.
The reforms are assisted by a $41.5 billion international support package provided in
late 1998 by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Inter-American
Development Bank, the World Bank, and major developed countries, including the
United States. President Cardoso’s Real Plan, which essentially pegs the Brazilian
currency (the real) to the dollar, was remarkably successful in his first term at
controlling the runaway inflation that plagued the country before 1994. The country
has experienced trade and budget deficits and speculative attacks on its currency,

CRS-35
however, which were compounded with the Asian and Russian crises. Reelected in
the first round in October 1998, President Cardoso has proposed a three-year
austerity plan with tax increases and budget cuts of over $80 billion. While some
observers argue that the magnitude of the crisis will galvanize Brazil's Congress to
approve major reforms, others argue that the tax increases and high interest rates will
send the country into prolonged recession and postpone needed social programs. So
far, the Brazilian Congress has acted on some of the reforms, but failed to act on
others. The international package was provided as a preventive measure to restore
the confidence of investors, with the reasoning that a collapse of the important
Brazilian economy would have serious consequences for Latin America and the
world.
CRS Report
Brazil’s Economic Reform and the Global Financial Crisis, by (name redacted), CRS Report 98-
987 E
Colombia. The 106 Congress may wish to reconsider increasing aid t
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Colombia to support the peace negotiations with two leftist guerrilla organizations
initiated by President Andres Pastrana in mid-1998. In response to this initiative,
some U.S. policymakers called for changes in U.S. policy, long focused on
counternarcotics efforts, in hopes of promoting a settlement acceptable to the United
States. Some advocated a broader policy that would include development and other
assistance as an incentive for the guerrillas to settle; others urged counterinsurgency
assistance to strengthen the Colombian military. Many Members were reluctant to
provide additional support to an army with a poor human rights record and reported
ties to rightist paramilitary groups. Others were loathe to offer development aid and
related support for the peace process in advance of a settlement because of
widespread doubts that the guerrillas would be willing to forego income from the
drug trade, and fears that the Pastrana government might accept a settlement leaving
the guerrillas in control of areas where illicit narcotics cultivation and production take
place. In 1998, Congress rejected new approaches. Instead, it greatly increased
FY1999 counternarcotics funding for the Colombian National Police over FY1998
levels on the grounds that cutting drug trafficking would deprive the guerrillas of drug
income and provide an incentive to settle. It also tightened the human rights
conditions that restrict aid to the Colombian army. In 1999, if the peace process
falters, or if the Colombian government appears ready to settle for terms that would
impede counternarcotics efforts, Members may wish to reconsider the other options.
CRS Report
Colombia: The Problem of Illegal Narcotics and U.S.-Colombian Relations, by (name r
edacted), CRS Report 98-152 F
Cuba. As in past years, the main issue for U.S. policy toward Cuba in the
106th Congress will be how best to support economic and political change. In the
debate over U.S. policy, there have been different schools of thought about how to
achieve that objective. Some advocate a policy of keeping maximum pressure on the
Communist government until reforms are enacted, while continuing efforts to support
the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach that is sometimes referred to as

CRS-36
constructive engagement, a policy aimed at easing sanctions (which some argue are
hurting the Cuban people) and engaging Cuba in dialogue.
In 1999, Congress will likely continue its high level of interest in Cuba, with
a variety of legislative initiatives regarding sanctions (some to tighten and some to
loosen), human rights, and U.S. Government-sponsored radio and television
broadcasting to Cuba. In the 105 Congress, initiatives were introduced that would
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have eased restrictions on the commercial export of food and medicines while another
was introduced that focused on U.S.-government funding for humanitarian aid to the
Cuban people; it is likely that these initiatives will be reintroduced in the 106th
Congress. In early January 1999, the Administration decided against establishing a
National Bipartisan Commission on Cuba, as called for by a bipartisan group of 15
Senators led by Senator John Warner in mid-October 1998. The Senators had called
for the commission to conduct an analysis of current U.S. policy that would help
shape and strengthen future U.S.-Cuban relations. Some Members opposed the
formation of such a commission, maintaining that it was intended to soften current
U.S. policy toward Cuba. Instead of forming the commission, the Administration
announced a series of measures to support the Cuban people, ranging from expanding
people-to-people contact to authorizing the sale of food and certain agriculture-
related goods to independent entities in Cuba.
CRS Report
Cuba: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 94005
Haiti. Congressional concern over political stability and the development of
democracy in Haiti has increased as a political stalemate has dragged on there for
more than a year and a half. An election dispute over April 1997 elections, which
many opposition parties and international observers believed to be fraudulent, remains
unresolved. The country has been without a prime minister since June 1997, leaving
the government unable to function effectively. Haiti’s failure to resolve its stalemate
has led many Members of Congress to question the Administration’s request to
double U.S. assistance to Haiti. Congress has been concerned that U.S. assistance to
Haiti be effective, and has placed conditions on the release of aid to Haiti since
FY1996. In the FY1999 foreign operations bill (passed as part of the omnibus
appropriations bill which became P.L. 105-277 on October 21, 1998), Congress
imposed restrictions on most aid to Haiti, including requiring the completion of
privatization of three public enterprises, the investigation of political killings, and, for
electoral assistance, resolution of the 1997 dispute. The 106 Congress is likely to
th
exercise its oversight responsibilities through activities such as hearings on U.S. policy
toward Haiti, and monitoring U.S. assistance to Haiti.
CRS Report
Haiti Under President Preval: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted), CRS Issue
Brief 96019
Mexico. During the 106 Congress, interest in Mexico is likely to focus on
th
drug trafficking, trade, and democracy issues in the context of the annual drug
certification debates in March, continuing partnership under the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and Mexico’s approaching presidential and

CRS-37
congressional elections in July 2000. Mexico has avoided aid and trade sanctions by
being certified as fully cooperative in counter-narcotics efforts over the years, despite
congressional criticisms and calls for greater action against major drug traffickers.
The United States and Mexico have been cooperating extensively through the High
Level Contact Group (HLCG) on Narcotics Control since 1996. Congressional
efforts to overturn the President’s certifications of Mexico advanced the furthest in
1997, when both houses passed modified resolutions of disapproval, while a Senate
resolution of disapproval was defeated in 1998. Mexico objected to certain aspects
of the U.S. undercover Operation Casablanca, announced in May 1998, that
implicated officials from 12 of Mexico’s 19 largest banking institutions in money
laundering activities, but cooperation has continued. In October 1998, the U.S.
Congress substantially increased anti-drug funding on the Southwest border through
the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act (division C, title VIII, of P.L. 105-
277). While opposition parties have controlled the Chamber of Deputies, the
mayorship of the Mexico City Federal District, and a number of governorships
following mid-1997 elections, the July 2000 elections are viewed as a major test of
Mexico’s evolving democratic practices. President Zedillo is seeking to deal with
continuing economic difficulties, assassination/corruption probes, and still unresolved
guerrilla complaints.
CRS Reports
Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 97028
Mexican Drug Certification Issues: U.S. Congressional Action, 1986-1998, by (name re
dacted), CRS Report 98-174F
Panama. Panama will be a focus of congressional interest, and potential
legislative initiatives, as the Canal is transferred to Panamanian control on December
31, 1999, and as U.S. military bases are turned over to Panama by year’s end. Under
the terms of the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty, U.S. forces are to withdraw by the end
of 1999, unless an agreement is reached to continue their presence. In 1996, U.S.-
Panamanian talks began regarding a U.S. military contribution to a Multinational
Counternarcotics Center in Panama, but those talks ultimately ended in September
1998 with no agreement. Another issue that has arisen is the extent to which the
United States will clean up U.S. military ranges that have been used for testing
explosives.
CRS Report
Panama-U.S. Relations, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 92088
The Middle East
Implementation of the Wye River Memorandum. The Israeli-Palestinian
peace process was stalemated from March 1997 until Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasir Arafat signed the Wye River
Memorandum on October 23, 1998. The Memorandum delineated concrete, parallel
steps that each side would take over a 12-week period to complete implementation
of earlier Israeli-Palestinian agreements. It called for Israel to redeploy in three stages
from territory on the West Bank after the Palestinians met specific security and

CRS-38
political commitments. Israel completed the first stage of redeployment on November
20 following a brief delay. After Palestinians violently expressed their dissatisfaction
with Israel’s release of Palestinian criminals as well as political prisoners, Netanyahu
conditioned further redeployments on Palestinian compliance with requirements not
included in the Memorandum, placing its implementation in doubt. President Clinton’s
December 12-15 trip to the region was intended, in part, to get the process back on
track. Netanyahu, however, held his ground. The prospect of early national elections
in Israel has further complicated or diminished the outlook for Wye.
In an effort to overcome the parties’ deep distrust for one another at Wye, the
Memorandum created an active, unprecedented role for the Central Intelligence
Agency in ensuring implementation. Congress is expected to scrutinize this
development as well as the Administration’s pledge of $400 million in aid over an
unspecified period for the Palestinians, over and above the FY1999 appropriation.
Israel reportedly has requested $1.2 billion from the United States over its current aid
levels to help cover the cost of redeployment. In addition, Congress will continue to
monitor the Palestinians’ compliance with commitments to Israel and what some
Members sometimes consider undue Administration pressure on Israel to make
concessions. Oversight may intensify if final status talks are seriously undertaken on
even more contentious issues such as Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, water, borders,
and the nature of a future Palestinian political entity.
CRS Reports
Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: The Wye River Memorandum, by (name redacted), CRS
Report 98-911F
The Middle East Peace Talks, by (name redacted), CRS Issue Brief 91137
Palestinians and Middle East Peace: Issues for the United States, by (name redacted), CRS
Issue Brief 92052
A Palestinian State and U.S. Recognition: Pro and Con Arguments, by (name redacted), CRS
Report 98-791F
Iraq. Iraq continues to challenge containment and sanctions measures
imposed by the U.N. Security Council and by the United States and its allies after Iraq
invaded Kuwait in 1990. Since the mid-1990s, the United States has maintained an
average of 20,000 military personnel, 20 ships, and 200 aircraft in the Persian Gulf
region to enforce no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq, protect U.S. allies in
the Gulf, and help maintain trade sanctions against Iraq. On two occasions during
1998, Iraqi obstruction of U.N. inspections designed to identify and dismantle its mass
destruction weapons programs led the United States to augment its forces in the Gulf.
In both cases, U.S. military retaliation against Iraq was averted at the last moment
when Iraq agreed to resume cooperation with U.N. weapons inspectors. Many in the
U.S. Administration and Congress doubt that Iraq will ever provide a full accounting
of its weapons programs or comply with other U.N. demands as long as the regime
of President Saddam Hussein remains in power. Iraqi opposition groups are internally
divided and have few assets within Iraq, although they have made some recent efforts
to improve cooperation.
Congress provided $1.31 billion in FY1998 supplemental appropriations (P.L.
105-174) to cover unanticipated costs of U.S. force build-ups, and also appropriated

CRS-39
$10 million in FY1998 and $8 million in FY1999 to support activities of the Iraqi
opposition. A separate bill, the Iraq Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338), signed on
October 31, 1998, gives the President authority to provide up to $97 million in
defense articles and services to support an insurgency against Saddam Hussein, and
directs the President to designate one or more Iraqi opposition groups as eligible to
receive such assistance. Likely issues facing the 106 Congress include overseeing
th
the implementation of the Iraq Liberation Act, appropriations to defray costs of any
further U.S. force build-ups in the Gulf, and legislation to support or restrict U.S.
military operations against Iraq if it continues to violate terms of pertinent U.N.
resolutions.
CRS Reports
Iraqi Compliance with Cease-Fire Agreements, by Kenneth B. Katzman, CRS Issue Brief
92117
Iraq-U.S. Confrontation: 1997-1998, by Kenneth B. Katzman, CRS Issue Brief 94049
Iraq’s Opposition Movements, by Kenneth B. Katzman and (name redacted), CRS Report 98-
179 F
Iran. Iran continues to oppose key U.S. policies in the Middle East, although
signs of a thaw in U.S.-Iranian relations have recently appeared. Principal areas of
contention between the two countries include Iran’s support for terrorist groups,
Iranian efforts to undermine the U.S.-sponsored Arab-Israeli peace process, and
Iran’s programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. During the Clinton
Administration, as part of a dual containment policy directed toward Iran and Iraq,
both the President and Congress have tried to tighten containment of Iran in an effort
to change its behavior. In 1995, President Clinton imposed a ban on U.S. trade with
Iran, and the following year Congress passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (P.L.
104-172), which among other things prescribes sanctions against foreign firms that
invest more than $20 million per year in Iran’s oil or gas sectors. European nations
and Japan oppose this measure as an extra-territorial application of U.S. law. Iran’s
President Muhammad Khatami, elected in May 1997, has called for increased cultural
contacts between Iran and the United States, but has ruled out a dialogue with the
U.S. Government at this time. Moreover, Khatami’s more moderate policies remain
circumscribed to a considerable extent by Iran’s conservative supreme religious
leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and other conservatives in the political and clerical
establishments.
The foreign operations appropriations act for FY1999 (division A, sec.
101(d), of P.L. 105-277) states the sense of Congress that the United States should
make no concessions toward Iran until Iran modifies its policies on key issues of U.S.
concern. Congress provided $4 million in FY1998 and again in FY1999 for a Radio
Free Iran, to be run by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and based in the Czech
Republic. On June 23, 1998, the President vetoed the Iran Missile Proliferation
Sanctions Act (H.R. 2709), which would have penalized entities that contribute to
Iran’s missile programs, on grounds that this measure would harm Russia’s post-
Soviet transition. Issues involving economic sanctions, weapons proliferation, and
relations with Iranian opposition groups are likely to be topics of oversight and
possibly of further legislation in the 106 Congress.
th

CRS-40
CRS Reports
Iran: Current Developments and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth B. Katzman, CRS Issue Brief 93033
Iran: U.S. Policy and Options, by Kenneth B. Katzman, CRS Report 97-231F

CRS-41
Appendix 1. Major Legislation and the Committees of
Jurisdiction
Foreign Assistance Authorization Act. This Act is considered annually;
Congress, however, has not passed such legislation since 1985 for a variety of reasons
(although smaller, issue-specific authorizations have been enacted in the last 13
years). Instead, the requirement for authorization has been waived each year by the
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
which has increasingly become a vehicle for authorization language. A Foreign
Assistance Authorization Act authorizes and states congressional guidance for foreign
assistance programs. Such a measure would be reported out of the House Committee
on International Relations or the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
Foreign Relations Authorization Act. This Act is usually considered on a
biennial basis. The second session of the 105 Congress enacted the Foreign Affairs
th
Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (division G of P.L. 105-277), which
reauthorized State Department programs, so the 106 Congress will likely take up a
th
new authorization bill in its second session. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act
authorizes the State Department, its agencies, offices, and programs, and states
congressional guidance on diplomatic matters. Such a measure would be reported out
of the House Committee on International Relations or the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations.
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2000. Appropriations are generally required
annually, although several programs are provided multi-year funding. This measure
provides for programs in foreign assistance, including: Agency for International
Development, Economic Support Fund, Military Assistance, Peace Corps, Migration
and Refugee Assistance, U.S. Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private Investment
Corporation, to name a few. Such a measure would be reported out of the
Committees on Appropriations.
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2000. This annual bill funds
the State Department and its related agencies, such as broadcasting, arms control, and
diplomatic security; Commerce Department, including its administration of export
controls; Justice Department, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation oversight
of domestic terrorism efforts. Such a measure would be reported out of the
Committees on Appropriations.
Intelligence Authorization Act. Reported out annually by the Select
Committees on Intelligence.
National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2000. Usually an annual
bill (although in past years some Acts have covered two-year authorizations);
reported out of the House Committee on National Security and Senate Committee on
Armed Services.
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 2000. Also an
annual measure; reported out of the Committees on Appropriations.

CRS-42
Appendix 2. Checklist of CRS Products*
Arms Control Issues: A Checklist of CRS Products, by Sherry B. Shapiro, December
23, 1998, CRS Report 98-1013 L
Defense Policy and Budgets: A Checklist of CRS Products, by Emily Newman,
December 31, 1998, CRS Report CL 40003
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Checklist of CRS Products, by
Sherry B. Shapiro, December 29, 1998, CRS Report 98-1022 L
Regional Hot Spots: A Checklist of CRS Products, by Sherry B. Shapiro, December
31, 1998, CRS Report CL 40001
Resources, Institutions, and Global Issues: A Checklist of CRS Products, by Emily
Newman, December 29, 1998, CRS Report CL 40002
* To order copies of these checklists, or other CRS products cited in this report, call the
CRS Product Line at 707-7132.

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