Congressional Rules Pertaining to Changes in Mandatory Program Spending in Appropriations Bills (CHIMPs)

Congressional Rules Pertaining to Changes in Mandatory Program Spending in Appropriations Bills (CHIMPs)

Congressional Rules Pertaining to Changes in
September 21, 2023
Mandatory Program Spending in
Drew C. Aherne
Appropriations Bills (CHIMPs)
Analyst on Congress and
the Legislative Process
When Congress considers legislation, it takes into account the proposal’s potential budgetary

effects. This helps Members to weigh the legislation’s merits and to consider whether it complies
Megan S. Lynch
with the budgetary rules that Congress has created for itself. One of these rules concerns the way
Specialist on Congress and
in which the budgetary effects of certain changes in spending associated with mandatory
the Legislative Process
spending programs—programs for which spending is typically controlled through laws other than

appropriations acts—will be treated for budget control purposes. In particular, when changes to
James V. Saturno
mandatory spending are included in appropriations measures, they are colloquially referred to as
Specialist on Congress and
CHIMPs, or Changes in Mandatory Programs, and their budgetary effects are attributed to the
the Legislative Process
Appropriations Committee rather than the legislative committee that would otherwise have

jurisdiction over that program. In many cases, this allows them to be used as an offset for
discretionary spending. As such they are important for understanding how scorekeeping works in

the context of congressional budget process rules.
To understand what CHIMPs are and why they exist, it is first necessary to discuss how Congress assesses the budgetary
effect of legislation. While information on the potential budgetary effects of legislation may come from numerous sources,
the authority to determine whether legislation complies with congressional budgetary rules is given to the House and Senate
Budget Committees. In this capacity, the Budget Committees generally rely on estimates (or “scores”) that are statutorily
required to be provided by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT).
When producing cost estimates, CBO and JCT are directed to adhere to scorekeeping guidelines—specific rules for
determining or attributing certain budgetary effects of legislation—that were first agreed to in conjunction with the Budget
Enforcement Act of 1990. These general guidelines are meant to ensure consistent enforcement of various procedural and
statutory budgetary requirements. One of these guidelines requires that, when increases or decreases in mandatory spending
are included in an appropriations measure, they are attributed to the Appropriations Committee. As a consequence, the net
budgetary impact of such changes (CHIMPs) will be added to or subtracted from discretionary spending in the bill to
determine compliance with any procedural and statutory limits imposed on discretionary spending.
In many cases, the projected budgetary effect of a CHIMP is a net savings, but CHIMPs may be projected to have a net cost
or no impact on the budget. If the budgetary effect of a CHIMP is to reduce or otherwise restrict the projected level of
spending for a mandatory program, thus producing net savings, it could be used to offset an increase in the amount of
discretionary spending that could be provided elsewhere in the appropriations bill.
While congressional scorekeeping rules explicitly allow for CHIMPS, and the practice is not uncommon, Members of
Congress have sometimes criticized their use for various reasons. In response to such concerns, in recent years Congress has
periodically adopted rules that would restrict the inclusion of CHIMPs in appropriations legislation. The only formal
restriction on CHIMPS currently, however, is a Senate prohibition against certain CHIMPS with net costs.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background Information on Cost Estimates ............................................................................. 1
CHIMPs and the Congressional Budget Process ............................................................................. 3
Scorekeeping Guidelines ........................................................................................................... 4
Scorekeeping Guideline #3 and CHIMPs ................................................................................. 4
Types of CHIMPs and Their Scoring Effects .................................................................................. 5
Congressional Efforts to Restrict the Use of CHIMPs .................................................................... 6
Senate Limit on the Net Budgetary Effect of Individual CHIMP Provisions ........................... 6
House and Senate Limits on the Absolute Value of All CHIMPs Enacted for a Given
Fiscal Year .............................................................................................................................. 7
House and Senate Limits on CHIMPs Provisions Affecting Specific Budget Accounts .......... 8

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 10

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Changes in Mandatory Program Spending in Appropriations Bills (CHIMPs)

Introduction
In exercising its power of the purse, Congress
CHIMPs Definition
has developed a budget process consisting of
Changes In Mandatory Programs (CHIMPs) are
various types of budgetary legislation, rules,
provisions in appropriations bil s that have an impact on
and practices. As the federal budget process
mandatory spending. Normally, appropriations acts
has evolved, and as Congress has sought to
control discretionary spending, while mandatory
spending is control ed in other laws. When changes in
address federal budget deficits, it has
mandatory spending are included in an appropriations
embedded into this process a complex set of
act, however, they are treated as discretionary
restrictions governing the content of budgetary
spending for purposes of budget enforcement. In many
legislation. Congress relies on cost estimates
cases, this allows them to be used as an offset for
to assess whether legislation complies with
discretionary spending. Any change in mandatory
spending can be considered a CHIMP if it is included in
these budgetary restrictions.
an appropriations act.
These budgetary restrictions divide spending
into two general categories: discretionary and mandatory (also known as direct) spending.
Discretionary spending is defined as budget authority provided and controlled by appropriations
acts. Mandatory spending is defined as budget authority provided and controlled by other laws.1
As enforcement categories, these are intended to be exclusive, meaning that any spending should
be in one category but not the other, and changes in spending in one category may generally not
be used to offset changes in spending in the other.
As described below, however, when a provision that has an impact on mandatory spending is
included in an appropriations bill, the budgetary effect of the provision is required to be attributed
to the Appropriations Committee. As a consequence, such provisions are effectively treated as
discretionary spending and counted against any procedural and statutory limits imposed on
discretionary spending, such as the spending allocation to the Appropriations Committee under
Section 302 of the Congressional Budget Act.2 These provisions are colloquially referred to as
CHIMPs, for Changes in Mandatory Programs.
Background Information on Cost Estimates
To understand how CHIMPs fit into the context of the budget process, it is first necessary to
discuss how Congress assesses the budgetary effect of legislation. An assessment of a measure’s
budgetary impact, known as a cost estimate or “score,” helps Members to weigh the legislation’s
merits and to consider whether it complies with the budgetary rules that Congress has created for
itself.
While information on the potential budgetary effects of legislation may come from numerous
sources, the formal authority to determine whether legislation complies with congressional
budgetary rules is assigned to the House and Senate Budget Committees. H.Res. 5 3 In this

1 These classifications are defined in statute (2 U.S.C. §900(c)(7)-(8)) for purposes of procedural and statutory budget
enforcement rules.
2 For more on spending allocations in the budget process, see CRS Report R47388, Enforceable Spending Allocations
in the Congressional Budget Process: 302(a)s and 302(b)s, by Drew C. Aherne.
3 Specifically, Section 312 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (CBA; P.L. 93-344, as amended), Determinations
and Points of Order, states that for the purposes of enforcing budgetary rules, levels of spending and revenues “shall be
determined on the basis of estimates made by the Committee on the Budget of the House of Representatives or the
Senate, as applicable.” House Rule XXIX, clause 4, clarifies that such determinations may be provided by the chair of
the House Budget Committee. This provision was added to House rules by (112th Congress).
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capacity, the Budget Committees generally rely on estimates provided by the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT).4
Cost estimates provided by CBO and JCT are guided, in part, by certain requirements that have
been articulated by Congress in different forms in laws, precedents, and rules.5 For example,
CBO is required to prepare cost estimates for all bills reported from committee “to the extent
practicable.”6 CBO is also required to rely on estimates provided by JCT for revenue legislation7
and to include in its estimates “the costs which would be incurred” in carrying out the legislation
in the fiscal year in which the legislation is to become effective, as well as the four following
years, together with “the basis for such estimate.”8
When producing cost estimates, CBO and JCT measure the budgetary effect of a legislative
proposal in relation to projections of revenue and spending levels that are assumed to occur under
current law, typically referred to as baseline levels. This means that the way a policy is reflected
in the baseline will affect how CBO and JCT estimate changes from the baseline for proposed
legislation related to that policy.
In calculating the baseline, CBO makes its own technical and economic assumptions, but the law
generally requires that CBO assume that spending and revenue policies continue or expire based
on what is currently slated to occur in statute.9
Congress can direct the creation or content of cost estimates through chamber rules or provisions
in budget resolutions. In addition, the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, as amended (CBA)
specifies that CBO’s “primary duty and function” is to assist the Budget Committees,10 and the
Budget Committees have jurisdiction over CBO. Through their oversight of CBO, the Budget
Committees provide guidance related to scorekeeping matters.11 For the JCT, the creation and
content of its estimates may be shaped by the committee itself or by guidance or assumptions

4 Such estimates include information on the legislative proposal’s projected budgetary effects, such as spending,
revenue, and the deficit/surplus. CBO was established in 1974 under Title II of the CBA. JCT was established under the
United States Revenue Act of 1926 and is governed by provisions in Title 26, Subtitle G, of the U.S. Code. Additional
information on CBO can be found at https://www.cbo.gov/about/overview. Additional information about JCT can be
found at https://www.jct.gov/about-us/overview.html.
5 These requirements are not completely prescriptive, however, and as a result both CBO and JCT adopt practices and
conventions that guide the creation of cost estimates. For example, former CBO Director Douglas Elmendorf, in a
paper written shortly after his tenure at CBO, stated that the exclusion of macroeconomic effects within the cost
estimates provided by CBO and JCT is “long-standing convention.” Douglas W. Elmendorf, “‘Dynamic Scoring’: Why
and How to Include Macroeconomic Effects in Budget Estimates for Legislative Proposals,” Brookings Institution, Fall
2015, p. 1.
6 CBA, §402. The requirement excludes bills reported from the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations.
7 CBA, Section 201(f), states, “Revenue Estimates: For the purposes of revenue legislation which is income, estate and
gift, excise, and payroll taxes (i.e., Social Security), considered or enacted in any session of Congress, the
Congressional Budget Office shall use exclusively during that session of Congress revenue estimates provided to it by
the Joint Committee on Taxation.”
8 CBA, Section 402, also requires “a comparison of the estimates of costs described in the estimate with any available
estimates of costs made by such committee or by any Federal agency, and a description of each method.”
9 Statutory requirements related to the calculation of the baseline can be found in the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, in Section 257 (2 U.S.C. §907). CBO’s baseline is called the Budget and
Economic Outlook.
10 CBA, §202(a).
11 Scorekeeping has been described as “the process of developing and recording consistent measures of the budgetary
effects—changes in federal spending, revenues, and deficits—of proposed and enacted legislation.” Congressional
Budget Office, CBO Explains Budgetary Scorekeeping Guidelines, January 2021, p. 2, https://www.cbo.gov/system/
files/2021-01/56507-Scorekeeping.pdf.
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provided by the tax committees—the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate
Committee on Finance.
CHIMPs and the Congressional Budget Process
Although federal budgeting had previously distinguished between spending provided through
appropriations legislation and spending provided outside of appropriations legislation,12 this
distinction was primarily conceptual prior to the enactment of the Budget Enforcement Act of
1990 (BEA).13 The BEA supplanted the budget control mechanism of the earlier Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act, which had focused on prescribing a maximum deficit
amount.14 Instead, the BEA established separate budgetary control mechanisms for discretionary
and mandatory spending and, as a consequence, required that all spending be classified in one
category or the other. The term discretionary appropriations was defined as “budgetary resources
(except to fund direct-spending programs) provided in appropriation Acts,” while mandatory
spending was referred to as “direct” spending and defined as “budget authority provided by law
other than appropriation Acts” as well as entitlement authority and the food stamp program.15
The control mechanisms established under the BEA limited consideration of changes to
mandatory spending and revenues through its Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) provisions and limited
discretionary spending through statutory spending limits. Both mechanisms were enforced by
sequestration, which is a procedure implemented by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) to automatically reduce spending in the relevant category if a breach of the new
restrictions were to occur.16
Although the PAYGO mechanism allowed trade-offs between changes in revenues and mandatory
spending, discretionary spending was largely kept separate. This framework, which continues in
place today,17 generally does not allow a change in mandatory spending or revenues to be used as
an offset for a change in discretionary spending (and vice versa). The scorekeeping guidelines
described below, however, do permit some types of exceptions to this general framework.

12 See, for example, Report of the President’s Commission on Budget Concepts (Washington: GPO, 1967). Mandatory
spending was initially referred to as “backdoor spending,” although subsequently discretionary and mandatory
spending were often discussed in terms of being generally “controllable” or “uncontrollable.” The Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA; P.L. 99-177), referred to as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act,
divided committee 302(a) allocations between “current level” amounts and “discretionary action” amounts. Current
level was used to indicate amounts provided or required by law as a result of permanent appropriations, advance
appropriations, existing entitlement authority, and outlays from prior year discretionary appropriations, while
discretionary action was used to indicate amounts assumed in the budget resolution but not yet enacted into law,
meaning any assumed legislative increase or decrease to existing direct spending laws and all new discretionary
appropriations.
13 P.L. 101-508, Title XIII.
14 For background on budgetary control legislation, see CRS Report R41901, Statutory Budget Controls in Effect
Between 1985 and 2002, by Megan S. Lynch.
15 BEA, §13101. The food stamp program was renamed the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program in P.L. 110-
246, the 2008 farm bill.
16 For a discussion of sequestrations, see CRS Report R42972, Sequestration as a Budget Enforcement Process:
Frequently Asked Questions, by Megan S. Lynch.
17 For information on the current use of these mechanisms, see CRS Insight IN12168, Discretionary Spending Caps in
the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023, by Grant A. Driessen and Megan S. Lynch; and CRS Report R41157, The
Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010: Summary and Legislative History, by Bill Heniff Jr.
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Scorekeeping Guidelines
The BEA included in the Joint Explanatory Statement of the conference report18 a list of
“scorekeeping guidelines” (described as “general budget scorekeeping conventions”) to
consistently measure compliance with the new budgetary control mechanisms as well as other
budgetary rules. Enforcement of the two new budget control mechanisms through sequestration
vested substantial power in OMB to estimate the costs of legislation in order to determine
compliance with the budget enforcement restrictions. The Joint Explanatory Statement, therefore,
noted that OMB “must make its estimates in conformance with scorekeeping guidelines
determined for consultation among the Senate and House Committees on the Budget, the
Congressional Budget Office, and the Office of Management and Budget” and, further, that these
guidelines should be revisited annually.19
Scorekeeping guidelines continue to be used today and have occasionally been revised and
expanded after being approved by all of the scorekeepers.20
Scorekeeping Guideline #3 and CHIMPs
One such guideline, Scorekeeping Guideline #3, “specifies when to record the budgetary effects
of provisions in appropriation legislation that affect direct [mandatory] spending and revenues.”21
Specifically, it states in part, “Substantive changes to or restrictions on entitlement law or other
mandatory spending law in appropriations laws will be scored against the Appropriations
Committee’s section 302(b) allocations in the House and the Senate.”22 This scorekeeping
guideline has been referred to as the “fingerprint” rule, as it attributes the budgetary effect of the
provision to the Appropriations Committee—because it reported the legislation—rather than the
committee that would otherwise have jurisdiction over the substance of the provision.
This means that estimates of appropriations legislation will count the effects of any provisions
making substantive changes to mandatory spending—such as modifying eligibility requirements
or limiting obligations—as discretionary spending. Such provisions have been colloquially
referred to as CHIMPs, for Changes in Mandatory Programs.

18 U.S. House of Representatives, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, conference report, 101st Cong., 2nd sess.,
October 27, 1990, H.Rept. 101-964, pp. 1151-1218.
19 H.Rept. 101-964, p. 1172.
20 This according to U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Budget, A Compendium of Laws and Rules of
the Congressional Budget Process, 114th Cong., 1st sess., August 2015, pp. 2, 603. See also OMB, Circular No. A-11:
Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget, Appendix A, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2018/06/a11.pdf.
21 CBO, CBO Explains Budgetary Scorekeeping Guidelines, January 2021, p. 2, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/
2021-01/56507-Scorekeeping.pdf.
22 In its entirety, Scorekeeping Guideline #3 states, “Revenues, entitlements and other mandatory programs (including
offsetting receipts) will be scored at current law levels, as defined in section 257 of GRH [Gramm-Rudman-Hollings,
also known as BBEDCA], unless congressional action modifies the authorizing legislation. Substantive changes to or
restrictions on entitlement law or other mandatory spending law in appropriations laws will be scored against the
Appropriations Committee’s section 302(b) allocations in the House and the Senate. For the purpose of CBA scoring,
direct spending savings that are included in both an appropriations bill and a reconciliation bill will be scored to the
reconciliation bill and not to the appropriations bill. For scoring under sections 251 or 252 of GRH, such provisions
will be scored to the first bill enacted.” See OMB, Circular No. A-11, Appendix A, p. A-1.
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Types of CHIMPs and Their Scoring Effects
Substantively, CHIMPs can vary in terms of their budgetary or policy effects. Previously used
CHIMPs have affected a variety of programs,23 including those related to transportation,
agriculture, health, education, and housing.
In many cases, the projected budgetary effect of a CHIMP is a net savings, but CHIMPs may be
projected to have a net cost or even no impact on the budget. If the budgetary effect of a CHIMP
is to reduce or otherwise restrict the projected level of spending for a program, thus producing net
savings, it could be used to offset an increase in the amount of discretionary spending that could
be provided elsewhere in the appropriations bill. When CHIMPs produce multiyear or permanent
changes, only the current year effects are scored as discretionary. Any future budgetary effects of
the change would be reflected in new baseline projections of mandatory spending rather than
being scored against future discretionary allocations or limits.
The budgetary effect of a CHIMP may be projected to affect budget authority, outlays, or both.
For example, a CHIMP could shift the timing of expected outlays. By doing so, the overall level
of resources available to a program (its budget authority) would remain the same, but the delay in
outlays may result in projected outlay savings in the upcoming year. Similarly, a change that
would reduce or rescind budget authority that was not projected to be fully spent would produce
net savings in terms of budget authority but have no impact on outlays. As a consequence, the
policy effects of CHIMPs can vary, because they may affect only the timing or use of resources
within a mandatory program’s account without significantly affecting the way the program
actually functions.
Some federal programs draw upon trust or special funds to support their activities, and in some
cases these funds are available for obligation without further legislative action. One common
form for a CHIMP is a provision that would limit the obligation of budget authority for one year
at a time. This type of CHIMP would have the effect of reducing the projected budget authority
available for that year, although those funds would remain available for future fiscal years.
Because budget authority in excess of the obligation limit could not be spent, however, the
provision would be scored as producing a reduction (a savings) in budget authority for the budget
year. These savings could then be used to offset the appropriation of additional budget authority
for other programs or activities, even though there would be no reduction in the overall budget
authority or resulting outlays for the program.
Some CHIMPs would amend or reauthorize mandatory spending programs that might otherwise
expire. In general, the baseline for mandatory spending is required to assume that all laws
providing mandatory spending will operate in the manner specified and include all payments
required by those laws. In addition, mandatory spending programs that are scheduled to expire are
instead assumed to continue to operate.24 Because the level of mandatory spending under current
law is already included in the baseline, only the increase or decrease in spending attributable to
the new authorization would be scored for purposes of budget enforcement. If the reauthorization
is a CHIMP included in an appropriations bill, the increase or decrease would be scored as
discretionary spending and counted as part of the spending in that appropriations bill. Any future

23 See, for example, U.S. General Accounting Office, Budget Process: Use of PAYGO and Discretionary Offsets, B-
280341, July 14, 1998, https://www.gao.gov/assets/aimd-98-213r.pdf. (GAO is now known as the Government
Accountability Office.)
24 BBEDCA, §257. This applies to any program with estimated current year outlays in excess of $50 million.
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budgetary effects of the reauthorization would be reflected in new baseline projections of
mandatory spending but would not be scored against future discretionary allocations or limits.
Congressional Efforts to Restrict the Use of CHIMPs
While CHIMPS have commonly been included in appropriations legislation, and the
scorekeeping guidelines since the BEA explicitly account for this practice, Members of Congress
have sometimes criticized their use for various reasons. Some have argued that CHIMPS reduce
the available budgetary resources of the affected mandatory accounts.25 Others have labeled
CHIMPs as budgetary gimmicks and argued that they do not produce true net savings.26 In
response to such concerns, in recent years Congress has occasionally adopted rules restricting the
budgetary effect of CHIMPs in appropriations legislation.27
Beginning in 2007, such restrictions have been in effect in both the House and the Senate at
various points and have taken several different approaches to limiting the use of CHIMPs. Each
of the rules involving CHIMPs established over this period have fallen under one of the following
three general categories:
1. Rules establishing certain limitations on the net budgetary effect of individual
CHIMP provisions,
2. Rules establishing certain limitations on the absolute value of all CHIMPs
enacted across appropriations legislation for a given fiscal year, and
3. Rules establishing certain limitations on CHIMP provisions affecting specific
budget accounts.
Of the types of CHIMP restrictions described below, one is currently in effect: the Senate point of
order prohibiting certain CHIMPs with net costs.
Senate Limit on the Net Budgetary Effect of Individual CHIMP
Provisions
The Senate first adopted a rule establishing limitations on the net budgetary effect of individual
CHIMP provisions in the budget resolution for FY2008.28 This limitation was in the form of a
point of order prohibiting the consideration of any appropriations legislation that included a
CHIMP that would produce net costs.29 This point of order was readopted in the budget resolution
for FY2009 and was in effect in the Senate until it was repealed in the budget resolution for

25 For example, see Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 159 (October 2, 2013), pp. S7137-S7139. For a
counterargument to this criticism, see Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 167 (June 23, 2021), pp. S4713-S4714.
26 For example, see Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 157 (October 31, 2011), pp. S6899-S6901; Congressional
Record, daily edition, vol. 157 (November 17, 2011), p. H7778; and Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 161
(December 1, 2015), p. S8229. Also see Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, “CRFB Explainer: Gimmicks in
the FY 17 Omnibus Bill,” May 3, 2017, https://www.crfb.org/blogs/crfb-explainer-gimmicks-fy-17-omnibus-bill.
27 This report does not address points of order under House or Senate rules that might have an impact on the
consideration of CHIMPs based on committee jurisdiction or legislative language in an appropriations bill.
28 S.Con.Res. 21, §209 (110th Congress).
29 The point of order also applied against amendments, motions, conference reports, and amendments between the
chambers in relation to appropriations legislation.
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FY2016.30 The point of order was subsequently readopted, however, in the budget resolution for
FY2018 and remains in effect.31
Under this rule, a provision or provisions is subject to a point of order if:
• it would increase budget authority in at least one of the nine fiscal years that
follow the budget year and over the period of the total of the budget year and the
nine subsequent fiscal years,
• it would increase net outlays over the period of the total of the nine fiscal years
following the budget year, and
• the sum total of all CHIMPs in the legislation would increase net outlays as
measured over the period of the total of the nine fiscal years following the budget
year.32
Pursuant to this rule, a Senator can raise a point of order against a provision (or multiple
provisions) contained in an appropriations bill or amendment that violates the rule. If sustained by
the presiding officer, the point of order would strike the violating provision, and the measure as a
whole would continue to be considered without such provision.33 The point of order can be
waived by an affirmative vote of three-fifths of Senators (60 votes if there is no more than one
vacancy). The point of order does not apply, however, to CHIMPs that have been enacted in
appropriations legislation in each of the previous three fiscal years prior to the budget year of the
legislation being considered.34
House and Senate Limits on the Absolute Value of All CHIMPs
Enacted for a Given Fiscal Year
Another approach that Congress has previously taken to limit the use of CHIMPs is establishing
nominal caps on the absolute value of all CHIMPs enacted across all appropriations legislation
for a given fiscal year. Such rules have generally prohibited the consideration of appropriations
measures containing CHIMPs that, if enacted, would cause the absolute value of the total budget
authority of all CHIMPs enacted for that fiscal year to exceed a certain level.
This rule was first adopted for the House and Senate in the budget resolution for FY2016, which
established caps on the absolute value of CHIMPs enacted across all appropriations legislation for
FY2016-FY2019.35 For the purpose of this rule, a CHIMP was defined as a provision that:

30 S.Con.Res. 70, §314 (110th Congress). Section 3103(e) of S.Con.Res. 11 (114th Congress) repealed this point of
order.
31 H.Con.Res. 71, §4102(e) (115th Congress). In addition, Section 4102(b) established a point of order against CHIMPs
that would cause the absolute value of all CHIMPs to exceed specified levels for FY2018, FY2019, and FY2020.
32 Section 4102(c) of H.Con.Res. 71 (115th Congress) provided that the determination of whether a provision is subject
to this point of order shall be made on the basis of estimates provided by the chair of the Senate Budget Committee.
33 If the point of order is sustained, the budgetary effect of the stricken provision would no longer be a part of the bill.
As a consequence, if the stricken CHIMP had been scored as savings, the remaining bill might become vulnerable to
other budgetary enforcement procedures.
34 In addition, Section 209(g)(1) of S.Con.Res. 21 (110th Congress) provided that the point of order would not apply to
legislation making supplemental appropriations for FY2007.
35 S.Con.Res. 11, §3103(b) (114th Congress). The amount specified in Section 3103(b)(3) for the cap was:
(A) for FY2016, $19.1 billion;
(B) for FY2017, $19.1 billion;
(continued...)
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• would have been estimated as affecting direct spending or revenues if it were
included in legislation other than appropriations acts; and
• would have resulted in a net decrease in budget authority in the budget year but
would not have resulted in a net decrease in outlays over the period of the total of
the current year, the budget year, and all fiscal years covered under the most
recently adopted budget resolution.36
This rule established points of order in the House and Senate prohibiting the consideration of
appropriations bills or amendments to such bills containing CHIMPs that, if enacted, would cause
the limits on the absolute value of all CHIMPs enacted for that fiscal year to be breached.37 A
point of order pursuant to this rule could be waived in the Senate by an affirmative vote of three-
fifths of Senators (60 votes if there was no more than one vacancy).
This rule was readopted for both the House and Senate in the budget resolution for FY201838 and
subsequently readopted for the Senate for FY2021 in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019.39
House and Senate Limits on CHIMPs Provisions Affecting Specific
Budget Accounts
In one case, Congress has also established a rule limiting the consideration of CHIMPs affecting a
specific budget account. In particular, Congress has adopted rules limiting CHIMPs affecting the
Crime Victims Fund (CVF).

(C) for FY2018, $17 billion; and
(D) for FY2019, $15 billion.
36 S.Con.Res. 11, §3103(a) (114th Congress).
37 The point of order in the House and Senate also applied to motions, conference reports, and amendments between the
chambers in relation to appropriations bills. Section 3103(c) of S.Con.Res. 11 (114th Congress) established that the
determination of whether a provision was subject to this point of order be made on the basis of estimates provided by
the chair of the House or Senate Budget Committee.
38 H.Con.Res. 71, §4102(b) (Senate) and §5103(b) (House) (115th Congress). The amount specified in Section
4102(b)(2) for the cap in the Senate was:
(A) for FY2018, $17 billion;
(B) for FY2019, $15 billion; and
(C) for FY2020, $15 billion.
The amount specified in Section 5103(b)(3) for the cap in the House was:
(A) for FY2018, $19.1 billion;
(B) for FY2019, $17 billion; and
(C) for FY2020, $15 billion.
39 P.L. 116-37, § 207(b). The amount specified in Section 207(b)(2) for the cap in the Senate for FY2021 was $15
billion.
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Changes in Mandatory Program Spending in Appropriations Bills (CHIMPs)

In 1984, the Victims of Crime Act40 established the CVF to provide funding for state victim
compensation and assistance programs.41 Funds are deposited in the CVF from a number of
sources including criminal fines and other penalties. Funding for a current year’s grants is
provided by the previous year’s deposits to the CVF. If the level of deposits exceeds the level of
grants, the act requires that the excess must remain in the CVF for obligation in future fiscal
years. In response to an unprecedented level of antitrust criminal fines collected in the previous
year, Congress enacted an obligation limit on the CVF in 1999 for FY2000 in order to reduce the
impact of the increased deposits and to ensure the long-term stability of funding for programs
supported by the CVF.42 Because the obligation limit was lower than the level of resources
available in the CVF, the provision was scored as producing a savings, although resources above
the obligation limit remained available for future obligations.
Similar obligation limits were enacted in subsequent years. In addition to the rule restricting the
absolute value of all CHIMPs adopted in the budget resolution for FY2016, a separate rule
limiting CHIMPs affecting the CVF was adopted for the House and Senate in the same budget
resolution. This rule established a total limit of $10.8 billion on the absolute value of all CHIMPs
affecting the CVF in appropriations legislation for FY2016. To enforce these limits, the rule
established points of order in both the House and Senate prohibiting the consideration of
appropriations legislation or amendments to such legislation containing CHIMPs affecting the
CVF that would cause the $10.8 billion limit for FY2016 to be exceeded.43 Points of order
pursuant to this rule could be waived in the Senate by an affirmative vote of three-fifths of
Senators (60 votes if there was no more than one vacancy).
This rule was readopted for the Senate in the budget resolution for FY2018, establishing a total
limit of $11.224 billion on the absolute value of all CHIMPs affecting the CVF enacted in
appropriations legislation for FY2018.44

40 P.L. 98-473.
41 34 U.S.C. §20101. For more on the CVF, see CRS Report R42672, The Crime Victims Fund: Federal Support for
Victims of Crime, by Lisa N. Sacco.
42 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, Fiscal Year 2000, report to accompany H.R. 2670, 106th
Cong., 1st sess., August 2, 1999, H.Rept. 106-283, p. 138.
43 S.Con.Res. 11, §3104(b) (Senate) and §3104(c) (House) (114th Congress). This rule used the same definition of a
CHIMP as the rule established in Section 3103(a) of S.Con.Res. 11. Points of order pursuant to this rule also applied to
motions, conference reports, and amendments between the chambers in relation to appropriations bills.
44 H.Con.Res. 71, §4103(b) (115th Congress).
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Changes in Mandatory Program Spending in Appropriations Bills (CHIMPs)

Author Information

Drew C. Aherne
James V. Saturno
Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process
Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process

Megan S. Lynch

Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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