India-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress

India-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress

India-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
June 16, 2023
India, home to nearly one-fifth of global population, became the world’s most populous country
in 2023. Many factors combine to infuse India’s government and people with “great power”
K. Alan Kronstadt
aspirations: the country’s rich civilization and history; expanding strategic horizons; increased
Specialist in South Asian
engagement with international partners; and critical geography (with more than 9,000 miles of
Affairs
land borders, many of them disputed) astride vital sea and energy lanes. Its status as one of the

fastest growing major economies is giving rise to an expanding middle class; greater defense and
Shayerah I. Akhtar
defense and power projection capabilities (replete with a nuclear weapons arsenal and triad of
Specialist in International
delivery systems); and vigorous space, science, and technology sectors, among others.
Trade and Finance

In recognition of India’s increasingly central role and ability to influence world affairs—and with
a widely held assessment that a stronger and more prosperous democratic India is good for the

United States—the U.S. Congress and four successive U.S. Administrations have acted to both
broaden and deepen U.S. engagement with India. The U.S. and Indian governments launched a “strategic partnership” in
2005, along with a framework for long-term defense cooperation that now includes large-scale joint military exercises and
significant defense trade. In concert with Japan and Australia, the United States and India in 2020 reinvigorated a
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”) as a flagship initiative in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. The mechanism is widely
viewed, at least in part, as a counter to China’s growing influence. Bilateral trade and investment have increased, while a
relatively wealthy Indian-American community is exercising newfound domestic political influence, and Indian nationals
account for a large proportion of foreign students on American college campuses and foreign workers in the information
technology sector.
At the same time, more engagement has meant more areas of friction in the partnership, including some that attract
congressional attention. India’s economy, while slowly reforming, continues to be a relatively closed one, with barriers to
trade and investment deterring foreign business interests. The U.S. government also has issues with India’s cooperative
engagements with Russia, a country where India has long-standing ties. Differences over U.S. immigration law, especially in
the area of nonimmigrant work visas, remain unresolved. India’s intellectual property protection regime comes under regular
criticism from U.S. officials and firms. Other stumbling blocks—on localization barriers and civil nuclear commerce, among
others—sometimes cause tensions. Meanwhile, cooperation in the fields of defense trade, intelligence, and counterterrorism,
although progressing rapidly and improved relative to that of only a decade ago, runs up against institutional and political
obstacles. Moreover, the U.S. Administration and some Members of Congress take notice of human rights issues in India,
including those related to democratic backsliding and infringements on religious freedom.
Despite these many areas of sometimes serious discord, the U.S. Congress has remained broadly positive in its posture
toward the U.S.-India strategic and commercial partnership. The Biden Administration indicates that it will continue the
expansion and deepening of U.S.-India ties. Congressional legislation and oversight have and may continue to affect the
course of U.S.-India relations, including in areas such as resourcing for a U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, trade and investment
(including bilateral defense trade) relations, immigration policy, nuclear proliferation, human rights, and cooperative efforts
to address health security and climate change, among others.
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Contents
Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1
Considerations for Congress............................................................................................................ 3
U.S.-India Strategic and Security Relations .................................................................................... 4
India’s Economy and U.S.-India Trade Relations ........................................................................... 6
Economic Conditions ................................................................................................................ 6
Trade and Investment Trends .................................................................................................... 7
Select Trade Issues .................................................................................................................... 7
Energy and Climate ....................................................................................................................... 10
Space Issues and Cooperation ........................................................................................................ 11
Health Cooperation and the COVID-19 Pandemic ....................................................................... 12
Immigration ................................................................................................................................... 12
Human Rights ................................................................................................................................ 13
India-Russia Relations and the War in Ukraine ............................................................................. 14
India-China Relations .................................................................................................................... 16
India-Pakistan Relations and Kashmir .......................................................................................... 17

Figures
Figure 1. U.S. International Trade and Investment with India ........................................................ 8
Figure 2. Map of Indian States ...................................................................................................... 18

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 18

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India-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress

Overview
India is characterized by U.S. officials as an emerging great power, strategic partner of the United
States, and key potential counterweight to the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China)’s
growing international clout.1 The country is South Asia’s dominant actor with 1.4 billion citizens
and the world’s fifth-largest economy, recently surpassing that of the United Kingdom. New
Delhi has long pursued “strategic autonomy” in foreign affairs; it welcomes a multipolar world
and aspires to be “a leading power, rather than just a balancing power.”2 Since 2005, the United
States and India have pursued a strategic partnership, and bilateral security cooperation has
expanded, including through defense trade and combined military exercises. Bilateral trade and
investment also have generally grown in that timeframe, although India accounts for a relatively
small share of U.S. total trade.3 The Administrations of George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and
Donald Trump sought to strengthen the U.S.-India partnership, and the Trump Administration
identified India as a leading player in the U.S. efforts to secure the vision of a “free and open
Indo-Pacific.”4 The Indian-American community—more than four million strong and relatively
wealthy and well-educated—is increasingly influential in American politics.5
The Administration of President Joe Biden has continued to expand and deepen U.S.-India ties,
working with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in office since 2014.6 In 2022, much U.S.
foreign policy attention focused on the U.S.-China rivalry and on the Indian government’s neutral
posture toward Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Despite divergences on the latter issue, U.S. and
Indian leaders continue to issue strongly positive remarks on the state of the partnership. This was
demonstrated most recently following the January 2023 launch of a sweeping bilateral initiative
on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET), as well as with a May 2023 Leaders’ Summit of
the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or “Quad”—which also includes Japan and Australia.7
The U.S. Congress remains broadly positive in its posture toward the U.S.-India strategic
partnership, despite some areas of friction that attract congressional attention.8 U.S.-India
cooperation on defense, intelligence, and counterterrorism, although progressing rapidly on
several fronts and improved relative to that of only a decade ago, still faces institutional and

1 For example, just before leaving office, the Trump Administration declassified its “Strategic Framework for the Indo-
Pacific,” and the document gives a prominent role to India therein, stating that, “A strong India, in cooperation with
like-minded countries, would act as a counterbalance to China” (see the January 15, 2021, document at
https://tinyurl.com/2j5c5nxf).
2 See the July 20, 2015, remarks by India’s then-foreign secretary and current foreign minister S. Jaishankar at
https://tinyurl.com/5ywbk77v.
3 Based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). For instance, total U.S. goods and services trade
with India grew from about $37 billion in 2005 to $191 billion in 2022 (not adjusting for inflation). The 2022 amount
accounted for less than 3% of total U.S. trade with the world.
4 See the Pentagon’s June 1, 2019, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report at https://go.usa.gov/xuxXH.
5 According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey 2021, Indian-Americans are more than twice as
likely to have a college degree (and more than three times as likely to have a graduate or professional degree) than the
U.S. average, and have fully double the median household income (see https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs;
“Indian Americans Rapidly Climbing Political Ranks,” New York Times, February 23, 2023).
6 See also CRS In Focus IF10298, India’s Domestic Political Setting, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
7 “United States and India Elevate Strategic Partnership with the initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology
(iCET),” White House fact sheet, January 31, 2023; “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement,” White House release, May 20,
2023.
8 For example, early in 2023, Senate Majority Leader Sen. Chuck Schumer led a bipartisan delegation of nine Senators
to New Delhi for meetings with Prime Minister Modi and other senior Indian officials. Upon his return, Sen. Schumer
said his leading takeaway from the travel was that “the United States should deepen our relationship with India if we
want to outcompete the Chinese Communist Party in this century” (Congressional Record 169, 38, February 28, 2023).
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political obstacles. U.S. officials have taken issue with India’s cooperative relations with Russia,
where Indian officials see vital interests. U.S. Administrations and some Members of Congress
also raise concerns about human rights in India, including 2019 changes to the status of India’s
Jammu and Kashmir region, proposed changes to India’s citizenship laws, religious persecution,
and signs of democratic backsliding, among others.9
India’s economy, while slowly changing, continues to be a relatively closed one, with barriers to
trade and investment deterring foreign business engagement. According to the State Department’s
2022 Investment Climate Statements, “India remains a challenging place to do business.”10 U.S.
officials and firms regularly criticize India’s intellectual property (IP) protection regime. The
Trump Administration took some significant trade actions, including terminating India’s
eligibility for the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) over market access concerns.11
Differences over U.S. immigration law, especially in the area of nonimmigrant work visas, remain
unresolved. During the Biden Administration, the United States and India have revived
ministerial-level meetings of their bilateral Trade Policy Forum (TPF) to engage on trade and
investment issues.
India’s government calls the United States “a crucial strategic partner of India in the Indo-Pacific
and in the Quad framework.”12 In 2022, India arguably emerged as “the world’s ultimate swing
state.”13 While enthusiasm for the U.S.-India partnership is palpable in both capitals, historical
complications presenting sometimes mismatched objectives persist. As articulated by one
longtime U.S. observer, the United States and India have “divergent ambitions for their security
partnership”: “New Delhi will never involve itself in any U.S. confrontation with Beijing that
does not directly threaten its own security.”14 Another U.S.-based analyst argues that, because
“India is willing and potentially able to assist it in constraining Beijing’s expansive regional
ambitions,” the United States should continue to support India’s efforts to expand its military
capabilities and diplomatic influence.15
Prime Minister Modi is set to be in Washington, DC, in late June for the third state visit of the
Biden Administration (after the presidents of France and South Korea). The White House
announcement states the visit “will affirm the deep and close partnership between the United
States and India and the warm bonds of family and friendship that link Americans and Indians
together.”16 U.S. congressional leadership, noting the two countries’ “shared values and
commitment to global peace and prosperity,” invited Modi to address a Joint Meeting of Congress
during his visit.17 U.S. business interests view the visit as an opportunity to increase bilateral

9 See CRS In Focus IF12198, India: Human Rights Assessments, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
10 The assessment continues: “New protectionist measures, including strict enforcement and potential expansion of data
localization measures, increased tariffs, sanitary and phytosanitary measures not based on science, and Indian-specific
standards not aligned with international standards effectively closed off producers from global supply chains and
restricted the expansion in bilateral trade and investment” (see https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-investment-climate-
statements/india).
11 See CRS In Focus IF11232, Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), by Liana Wong.
12 Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 2022.
13 Michael Schuman, “What Limits Any U.S. Alliance with India over China,” Atlantic, March 1, 2023.
14 Ashley Tellis, “America’s Bad Bet on India,” Foreign Affairs, May 1, 2023. Similarly, India does not seek (and may
not receive) direct U.S. involvement in its border disputes with China (see Lisa Curtis and Derek Grossman, “India-
China Border Tensions and U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Pacific,” Center for a New American Security, March 30, 2023.)
15 Arzan Tarapore, “America’s Best Bet in Asia,” Foreign Affairs, May 29, 2023.
16 See the White House’s May 10, 2023, release at https://tinyurl.com/4p2c9t9v.
17 See the June 1, 2023, invitation at https://tinyurl.com/4kmvywem.
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trade, perhaps especially in the private and defense sectors.18 The Indian leader has planned
several events with a largely welcoming Indian-American diaspora community, although some
among them are more critical.19 Indian political opposition figures also offer criticisms.20 Among
potential “deliverables” during the state visit is an unprecedented deal that would allow General
Electric to manufacture its advanced F414 jet engines in India (subject to congressional
approval). India may also be close to purchasing up to two dozen armed MQ-9 Reaper drones
from the United States.21
Considerations for Congress
As India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi is welcomed for a state visit to the U.S. capital,
Members may consider what legislative and oversight roles Congress can play in key issue areas
likely to arise during his visit, including:
• The Administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy, including how the strategy conceives
and approaches India’s role; the resourcing required to meet stated U.S. goals; the
ways in which India’s rivalry and border conflict with the PRC affects New
Delhi’s policy preferences in its engagements with both the United States and the
Quad; and how to facilitate India’s navigation of its newly articulated pursuit of
“multi-alignment” while keeping India as an effective U.S. partner.
• The optimal balancing of U.S. democratic values and respect for human rights
with the pursuit of other U.S. interests in relations with India; the potential
implications for the United States of further democratic backsliding in India; and
how Congress may wish to conduct oversight of the Administration’s handling of
democracy and human rights concerns with respect to India.
• What issues, if any, to direct the Administration to prioritize in U.S. trade policy
on India; the adequacy of current mechanisms to engage on bilateral trade issues
as well as on regional and global economic issues of shared concern; any
opportunities, if desired, for expanded cooperation on trade issues.
• If and how Congress may wish to adjust existing U.S. laws and regulations that
may hinder the kind of defense trade and defense industrial cooperation with
India that is sought by the Administration, as well as the means by which the
aspirations of the U.S.-India initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies
(iCET) can be best and most efficiently realized, should some Members support
that initiative.

18 “Private Sector Collaboration Is the Next Great Phase of Indo-U.S. Defense Ties,” Hindu (Chennai), June 12, 2023.
19 “Indians-Americans Organize Lavish Welcome for PM Modi in US,” Economic Times (Delhi), June 12, 2023.
Among more critical observers is the U.S.-based Hindus for Human Rights, which offered, “This visit, rather than
celebrating a partnership, provides a platform for a leader whose tenure has been marred by numerous infringements on
democracy” (email communication, June 7, 2023).
20 For example, weeks before Modi’s U.S. travel, leading Indian opposition figure and dynastic Congress Party scion
Rahul Gandhi—who was in March 2023 convicted in a politically fraught defamation case and expelled from
Parliament—made a three-city U.S. tour during which he warned audiences that the Modi/BJP government was
dividing India and damaging its democratic and constitutional values (“Indian Court Sentences Opposition Leader
Gandhi to 2 Years in Prison,” Washington Post, March 23, 2023; “Indian Opposition Leader Gandhi Calls on U.S.
Audience to Stand Up for ‘Modern India,’” Associated Press, June 4, 2023).
21 “US Set to Allow GE to Make Engines in India for New Delhi’s Military Jets,” Reuters, May 31, 2023. If
consummated, the drone deal would make India the first country that is not a U.S. treaty ally to buy the armed version
of the platform (“US Pushing India to Seal Big Armed Drone Buy for Modi Visit—Sources,” Reuters, June 13, 2023).
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• The potential implications of a prolonged war in Ukraine if India continues its
large-scale purchases of Russian energy supplies and other commodities, thus
indirectly aiding Moscow’s ability to continue prosecuting that war, as well as the
pace at which India reduces its dependence on Russian defense equipment.
Congress may consider whether to conduct oversight of the Administration’s
handling of CAATSA sanctions provisions with respect to India.
U.S.-India Strategic and Security Relations
The Biden Administration calls U.S. relations with India among the most consequential of the 21st
century. Its February 2022 Indo-Pacific strategy presents 10 “core lines of action” to pursue,
among them support for “India’s continued rise and regional leadership,” with India called “a
like-minded partner” in the region.22 The Administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS,
issued in October 2022)—which prioritizes “maintaining an enduring competitive edge” over
China—counts the Quad among “a latticework of strong, resilient, and mutually reinforcing
relationships that prove democracies can deliver for their people and the world.” The NSS also
includes the “I2U2”—a new minilateral grouping of the United States, India, Israel, and the
United Arab Emirates—in this latticework.23
Reflecting the priority placed on expanding cooperation with key regional partners, President
Biden initiated the Quad’s first-ever summit-level meeting (held virtually) less than two months
after taking office. The March 2021 meeting produced the forum’s first Joint Statement, noting a
collective striving for an Indo-Pacific region “that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by
democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion.”24 The March 2023 Quad Ministerial
statement notably included language opposing “any unilateral actions that seek to change the
status quo or increase tensions” in the South and East China Seas (India had previously resisted
signing on to implicit criticisms of PRC actions so as not to antagonize Beijing).25 All four Quad
leaders met again in Japan in May 2023 and identified 10 key areas for Quad cooperation.26 They
also issued a “Vision Statement” outlining four Quad principals focused on prosperity and
stability in the Indo-Pacific in accordance with international law, respect for the centrality of
regional institutions, and a practical Quad agenda to deliver economic and social value.27 New
Delhi is concurrently deepening and expanding its security and other ties with Japan and
Australia.
India is the only Quad member to share a land border with China and the only one to operate
outside of the U.S.-led alliance system. Its leaders typically emphasize “inclusiveness” in the
Indo-Pacific. Until 2020, India had taken a cautious approach to Quad engagement, possibly due
to uncertainty about U.S. strategic intent and to avoid antagonizing China. Since India’s border

22 See the February 2022 “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States” at https://go.usa.gov/xzs5W.
23 See the October 2022 National Security Strategy at https://tinyurl.com/3atxmuzm; and the July 14, 2022, I2U2 Joint
Statement at https://tinyurl.com/mr3dpz44.
24 See the March 12, 2021, “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: ‘The Spirit of the Quad,’” at https://go.usa.gov/xH6Rb.
25 The statement also included a collective commitment to strengthening cooperation with the 34-nation Indian Ocean
Rim Association (IORA)—the United States has been an IORA Dialogue Partner since 2012 (see the March 3, 2023,
document at https://tinyurl.com/3ayddckk; “Blinken, Counterparts Say Quad Grouping Not a Military Alliance,”
Bloomberg, March 3, 2023).
26 These are: (1) infrastructure; (2) investment; (3) critical and emerging technology; (4) maritime; (5) education; (6)
climate and clean energy; (7) health; (8) technology standards; (9) cyber; and (10) space (see the White House’s May
20, 2023, fact sheet at https://tinyurl.com/22h58adh).
27 See the White House’s May 20, 2023, Vision Statement at https://tinyurl.com/mwkzvw49.
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disputes with China led to violent and lethal clashes in mid-2020, New Delhi has engaged the
Quad mechanism more enthusiastically. While Quad leaders emphasize the group is not and does
not seek to become a formal military alliance, some analysts see potential for fruitful security
cooperation that could advance the Biden Administration’s objective of building “integrated
deterrence” in the Indo-Pacific region.28 India’s myriad internal challenges may also constrain the
country’s ability to influence global affairs.29
In January 2023, the United States and India formally launched a wide-ranging new bilateral
initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) to foster increased bilateral cooperation on
defense production, quantum computing, semiconductor supply chains, space, and other high-tech
fields. iCET is distinctive in being overseen by the two countries’ respective National Security
Councils. Mutually-held concerns about China’s growing clout and aggressive actions are widely
seen to provide the context, and the two parties say the initiative is rooted in “shared democratic
values and respect for universal human rights.”30 Enhanced collaboration on semiconductor
production and supply chains could facilitate efforts in both capitals to shift away from any
reliance on China for such critical technologies—the Biden Administration has said it will work
to remove existing obstacles to trade with India on these and other high-technology items.31
The U.S. Congress formally named India as a “Major Defense Partner” (MDP) in 2016, a
bespoke designation. Military exercises across all services are now routine and defense trade has
emerged as a leading facet of the security partnership.32 The James M. Inhofe National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2023 (P.L. 117-263, Sec. 1260) includes provisions to further enhance
defense ties. In 2020, India signed the final of four “foundational” defense cooperation accords
that facilitate and, in many cases, provide the legal framework for intensified U.S.-India defense
engagement.33 President Biden has “reaffirmed the strength of the defense relationship” and the
“unwavering commitment to India” as an MDP.34 Bilateral cooperation also continues on
counterterrorism and intelligence sharing, in particular through a longstanding Counterterrorism
Joint Working Group and a Homeland Security Dialogue that was reinvigorated in 2022.35 Other
bilateral security fora include a Maritime Security Dialogue, a Defense Space Dialogue, a Cyber

28 Dhruva Jaishankar and Tanvi Madan, “The Quad Needs a Harder Edge,” Foreign Affairs, May 19, 2022; Lisa Curtis
et al., “Operationalizing the Quad,” Center for New American Security, June 2022.
29 According to the U.S. National Intelligence Council, “India faces serious governance, societal, environmental, and
defense challenges that constrain how much it can invest in the military and diplomatic capabilities needed for a more
assertive global foreign policy.” The Global Peace Index, a composite index measuring the peacefulness of countries
made up of 23 quantitative and qualitative indicators, ranks India 135th of 163 countries, due largely to internal conflict
and terrorism, and conflictual relations with neighbors (U.S. National Intelligence Council, “Global Trends 2040: A
More Contested World,” March 2021; https://www.visionofhumanity.org).
30 “U.S. Courts India as Technology Partner to Counter China,” New York Times, January 31, 2023. See the White
House’s iCET fact sheet at https://tinyurl.com/yjhv5bde.
31 “U.S. Pursues India as a Supply-Chain Alternative to China,” Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2023; “US to Remove
Obstacles to Defense, High-Tech Trade with India, NSA Adviser Sullivan Says,” Reuters, June 13, 2023.
32 India is now a major purchaser in the global arms market, and the two nations have signed defense contracts worth at
least $20 billion since 2008 (see the White House’s September 24, 2022, fact sheet at https://tinyurl.com/3p6k56cd).
33 U.S.-based boosters of closer U.S.-India defense ties contend that “effective collaborative deterrence requires more
complex military exercises, more frequent use of logistics arrangements, more presence in different theaters, and
greater access and overflight” (Sameer Lalwani and Vikram Singh, “A Big Step Forward in U.S.-India Defense Ties”
(op-ed), Hindustan Times (Delhi), June 4, 2023).
34 See the September 24, 2021, White House release at https://go.usa.gov/xtg2C.
35 “Joint Press Statement of the 19th Meeting of the India-USA Counter Terrorism Joint Working Group,” U.S.
Embassy release, December 22, 2022; Indian Ministry of Home Affairs January 12, 2022, release at https://tinyurl.com/
458ehxep.
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Dialogue, a Counternarcotics Working Group, and, most recently, an Advanced Domains Defense
Dialogue and the Defense Acceleration Ecosystem, or “INDUS-X.”36
iCET’s Defense Innovation and Technology Cooperation mechanism is aimed at fostering long-
term research and development cooperation, and includes a Defense Industrial Cooperation
Roadmap component that is expected to lead to joint production of advanced weaponry—
including the potential GE jet engine deal noted above—and may accelerate progress in
Washington’s efforts to wean New Delhi away from its reliance on Russian-supplied defense
wares. The two countries have also launched a new “Innovation Bridge” that will connect U.S.
and Indian defense startups. The GE engine deal and other potential co-production projects will
require adjustments to U.S. technology transfer policies, as well as reforms of Indian laws.37
India’s Economy and U.S.-India Trade Relations38
Trade and investment ties are a key aspect of U.S.-India relations. The 118th Congress may
oversee U.S.-India trade relations and seek to shape U.S. trade policy on India. Congress may
monitor whether Prime Minister’s Modi upcoming state visit yields any outcomes on efforts to
resolve current bilateral trade frictions such as over tariffs; or new or enhanced engagement on
specific trade matters (e.g., supply chains and new technologies).
Economic Conditions
In 2022, India overtook the United Kingdom (UK) to become the world’s fifth-largest economy.39
India also is among the fastest-growing major economies—it grew by 6.8% in 2022 and is
projected to grow by 5.9% in 2023.40 Services, especially information technology and
communications (ITC) and the digital economy, are a key part of the economy. Agriculture
remains India’s top jobs provider in India, but its share of India’s GDP has declined, as the
country’s economy has diversified. India’s government seeks to boost its manufacturing sector to
create jobs and support self-reliance. India’s 2023/2024 budget has a major focus on investing in
physical and digital infrastructure.
India was projected to overtake China as the world’s most populous country at the end of April
2023, with a population of more than 1.4 billion.41 India’s economy features a large middle class
that has driven its domestic consumption-led economic growth, but also was hard-hit by COVID-
19.42 The country also faces challenges related to unemployment and poverty.43 Other issues

36 See the Pentagon’s June 5, 2023, release at https://tinyurl.com/4jtwy8sv.
37 See the White House’s January 31, 2023, iCET fact sheet at https://tinyurl.com/yjhv5bde; “U.S. and India Launch
High-Level Defense and Tech Initiative,” Washington Post, January 31, 2023.
38 This section written by Shayerah I. Akhtar, Specialist in International Trade and Finance.
39 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook, April 2023. Data for nominal gross domestic product
(GDP).
40 IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2023. Annual percentage change for real GDP.
41 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “India Overtakes China as the World’s Most Populous
Country,” Policy Brief No. 153, April 2023.
42 Rakesh Kochhar, “In the Pandemic, India’s Middle Class Shrinks and Poverty Spreads While China Sees Smaller
Changes,” Pew Research Center, March 18, 2021.
43 India’s unemployment rate was an estimated 7.7% in May 2023 (Natasha Somayya K, “Unemployment Rate Slides
Down in May,” Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy, June 7, 2023). In 2019, 10% of India’s population was
living on less than $2.15 a day at 2017 purchasing power adjusted prices (World Bank).
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include inflationary pressures and weak infrastructure. India’s currency, the rupee, depreciated to
record lows against the U.S. dollar in 2022.
Prime Minister Modi’s government has enacted some market-opening reforms and sought to
attract foreign direct investment (FDI). In particular, India’s government aims to position the
country as a viable alternative destination for companies seeking to diversify their supply chains
beyond China.44 Yet under Modi, India has raised tariffs and adopted other trade-restrictive
measures—some in a declared bid to promote “self-reliance” and boost manufacturing. Some
Members of Congress and other observers have responded to these restrictive measures by
questioning the pace and direction of reform.45
Trade and Investment Trends
U.S.-India bilateral trade and investment ties have generally grown over the past decade (see
Figure 1). Their trade still accounts for a small share of global U.S. trade and it is more
consequential for India. For example, in 2022, India was the United States’ 10th-largest goods
export market by country (2.3% share of total U.S. goods exports). In comparison, the United
States was India’s largest market (a share of nearly one-fifth).46 In 2022, top U.S. goods exports
to India were in oil and gas, miscellaneous manufactured commodities, coal and petroleum gases,
basic chemicals, waste and scrap, and aerospace products and parts. Top U.S. goods imports from
India in 2022 were in miscellaneous manufactured commodities, pharmaceuticals and medicines,
apparel, basic chemicals, textiles and furnishing, and petroleum and coal products.47 In 2021, top
U.S. services exports to India were travel and charges for intellectual property; the top U.S.
services imports from India were various business services and telecommunications, computer,
and information services.48 Defense sales also are significant. A range of U.S. firms operate in
India, across sectors. FDI from India in the United States is concentrated in information
technology (IT) services, software, business services, pharmaceuticals, and industrial equipment
sectors.
Select Trade Issues
India’s economy presents opportunities for U.S. commercial interests.49 At the same time, U.S.-
India trade ties are characterized by a history of bilateral trade frictions over tariffs, other trade
restrictions, and differences in approaches in the World Trade Organization (WTO) (discussed
further below). Both sides “recogniz[e] that for economies of their size, significant potential
remains unfulfilled,” and aim to continue to “increase and diversify” bilateral trade.50

44 Chloe Cornish, “India Chases Dividends from China Trade Tensions,” Financial Times, December 19, 2022.
45 See, e.g., discussion in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.-India Relations: Balancing
Progress and Managing Expectations, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., May 24, 2016, S. Hrg. 114-764 (Washington: GPO,
2018); and Richard M. Rossow, “Crawling to the Finish Line on Big Reforms,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), May 18, 2023.
46 Calculated based on official country data compiled by Trade Data Monitor.
47 U.S. trade data categorized at the four-digit-level in the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS),
from the U.S. International Trade Commission Dataweb.
48 Based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and the U.S. International Trade Commission.
49 International Trade Administration, India Country Commercial Guide.
50 U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), “Joint Statement on the United States-India Trade Policy Forum,” January 11,
2023.
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Figure 1. U.S. International Trade and Investment with India

Source: CRS, based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
During the Trump Administration, bilateral tensions grew over tariffs and other policies. A trade
deal to address some market access issues reportedly neared conclusion in 2020, but did not
materialize. During the Biden Administration, the two nations have agreed to resolve certain
bilateral trade issues and explore ways to expand trade ties.51 Persistent U.S. government
concerns include India’s high tariffs, unpredictable tariff regime, agricultural trade barriers, weak
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, and restrictive data policies.52 The concerns India’s
leaders have raised include U.S. temporary visa and Social Security tax policies that affect Indian
nationals working in the United States. Further, U.S. Section 232 tariffs on certain U.S. imports of
steel and aluminum from India, and India’s retaliatory tariffs, remain unresolved.53 The partners
have made progress on some issues, including certain agricultural market-openings.54 New issues
of U.S. concern include India’s energy trade with Russia and potential U.S. sanctions evasion (see
below).55
Notably, the partners revived their bilateral Trade Policy Forum (TPF)—the 2021 TPF ministerial
was the first held in four years, and since then, the partners have continued to convene the TPF.
At the January 2023 TPF ministerial, the partners discussed issues such as tariff reductions,
agricultural market access, and IPR. India’s representatives also expressed their government’s
desire for reinstatement of the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP); the U.S. side said
that this “could be considered, as warranted, in relation to the eligibility criteria determined by”
Congress.56 Among other things, the partners agreed to establish a TPF working group on

51 USTR, “Readout of Ambassador Katherine Tai’s Virtual Meeting with Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry
Piyush Goyal,” press release, March 25, 2021.
52 See USTR, 2022 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, March 2022 p. 245.
53 Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. §1862, as amended).
54 See, e.g., Senator Jon Ossoff, “Breaking: Following Sen. Ossoff’s Months-Long Push, India Cuts Tariffs on U.S.
Pecan Exports by 70% in Major Win for Georgia Farmers,” press release, February 1, 2023; and Senator Reverend
Raphael Warnock, “Following Months of Leadership, Senator Reverend Warnock Secures Victory for Georgia Farmers
as India Agrees to Lower Pecan Tariffs,” press release, February 2, 2023.
55 Jack Dutton, “U.S. Tells India There Will Be ‘Consequences for Dodging Russia Sanctions,’” Newsweek, April 1,
2022.
56 USTR, “Joint Statement on the United States-India Trade Policy Forum,” January 11, 2023. The United States
terminated India’s GSP designation for concerns over market access issues in 2019. GSP expired on December 31,
2020. CRS In Focus IF11232, Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), by Liana Wong.
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“resilient trade,” focusing initially on issues such as trade facilitation, worker rights, regulatory
cooperation, and environmental protection.57
The United States and India are pursuing other economic cooperation in areas such as artificial
intelligence, semiconductor supply chains, and telecommunications (see iCET discussion
above).58 Some commentators view these moves as part of the Biden Administration’s efforts to
shift critical supply chains away from China.59 India also is a focus of a Partnership for Global
Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), launched by the Group of Seven (G7) to make “strategic
investments” to support infrastructure needs of low- and middle-income countries. Some
commentators describe PGII as an effort to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative.60
India is among 14 countries involved in the U.S.-led, four-pillar Indo-Pacific Economic
Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), the Biden Administration’s first major trade and economic
initiative in the Indo-Pacific.61 India was the only country to opt out of IPEF’s trade pillar,
questioning the pillar’s commitments on environment, labor, and other areas, while joining
IPEF’s three other pillars (supply chains, infrastructure and decarbonization, and tax and anti-
corruption).62 The trade pillar’s scope and effectiveness is a point of debate among some
stakeholders in the United States and abroad, given its current exclusion of tariffs.63 India is
negotiating trade deals with other countries, including with the European Union (EU) and the UK,
and, in 2022, reached deals with Australia and the United Arab Emirates.
U.S. and Indian views diverge at times in the WTO, with some WTO members seeing India as
blocking multilateral progress in negotiations on some issues over its developing country-oriented
concerns.64 At the January 2023 TPF ministerial, both sides expressed their shared intent “to work
constructively at the WTO,” but differences remain over some seemingly intractable issues (e.g.,
agricultural subsidies and market access) and other newer issues (e.g., e-commerce).
India, which holds the Group of Twenty (G-20) presidency for 2023, has indicated that it seeks to
prioritize climate and the environment, “accelerated, inclusive, and resilient growth,” sustainable
development goals, technology and digital public infrastructure, multilateral institutions, and

57 USTR, “Joint Statement on the United States-India Trade Policy Forum,” January 11, 2023.
58 The White House, “FACT SHEET: United States and India Elevated Strategic Partnership with the Initiative on the
Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET),” January 31, 2023.
59 See, e.g., Vivian Salama, “U.S. Pursues India as a Supply-Chain Alternative to China,” Wall Street Journal, January
31, 2023.
60 See, for example, Elizabeth C. Losos and T. Robert Fetter, “Building Bridges? PGII Versus BRI,” Brookings
Institution, September 29, 2022.
61 CRS In Focus IF12373, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), by Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs,
Kyla H. Kitamura, and Mark E. Manyin.
62 Government of India, Press Information Bureau, “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) for Prosperity
Ministerial Meet Was Inclusive and Fruitful: Shri Piyush Goyal,” press release, September 10, 2022.
63 Ana Swanson, “Biden Administration Outlines Scope of Asian Economic Pact,” New York Times, September 9,
2022.
64 CRS Report R45417, World Trade Organization: Overview and Future Direction, by Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs and
Rachel F. Fefer. For example, India previously blocked progress on a WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement until WTO
members addressed its concerns over treatment of public stockholding for food security.
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women-led development.65 India is touting its G-20 presidency as an opportunity to strengthen its
role in the global economic order and to shape global economic priorities.66
Energy and Climate
India is the world’s third-largest energy consumer after China and the United States. Due to its
large population and use of high-emitting fuels for electricity, India is the third-largest emitter of
greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide (CO2), despite low per capita CO2 emissions.
Reliance on coal is persistent, and the carbon intensity of India’s power sector is well above the
global average. Indian leaders vow to reduce carbon emissions even as energy demand grows,
and they view Washington as a key partner in this effort.67 The United States and India
established a Strategic Energy Partnership in 2018 (later redubbed as the Strategic Clean Energy
Partnership by the Biden Administration) and in 2021 launched a new high-level “U.S.-India
Climate and Clean Energy Agenda 2030 Partnership,” envisaging cooperation to meet the goals
of the Paris Agreement with a focus on collaboration in cleaner energy sectors. A 2022 Ministerial
Joint Statement reviewed an array of “enhanced bilateral efforts.”68 Of the Administration’s
requested $82.5 million in FY2024 Development Assistance for India, more than three-quarters is
to go toward climate adaptation, clean energy, and sustainable landscape programs.69
Scientific assessments find India acutely vulnerable to and poorly prepared for the effects of
climate change. For example, Yale University’s 2022 Environmental Performance Index, which
ranks countries on climate change performance, environmental health, and ecosystem vitality,
placed India 180th of 180 countries, finding especially poor performance in the categories of
biodiversity and air quality. Also, as of late 2022, the independent Climate Action Tracker gives
India an overall rating of “highly insufficient” (the United States is rated “insufficient”),
“indicating that India’s climate policies and commitments are not consistent with the Paris
Agreement’s 1.5°C temperature limit.”70
India has taken some steps toward meeting its vows to reduce carbon emissions, including
Parliament’s December 2022 passage of an Energy Conservation (Amendment) Bill and the more
recent launch of a $2.3 billion plan to incentivize development of a green hydrogen industry.71 At
the November 2022 Climate Change Conference in Egypt (COP27), India released its national
report on plans to decarbonize and reach its goal of net-zero by 2070. A senior Indian official

65 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “G-20 and India’s Presidency,” press release, December 9, 2022.
The G-20 is a forum for international economic and foreign policy coordination. It is comprised of developed and
emerging market economies. See CRS Report R40977, International Economic Policy Coordination at the G-7 and the
G-20, by Rebecca M. Nelson.
66 Government of India, Press Information Bureau, “Today India Commences Its G20 Presidency—Shri Narendra
Modi, Prime Minister,” December 1, 2022. See also, Mohit Anand, “India’s G20 Presidency Will Be a Win for
Narendra Modi,” The Economist, February 28, 2023.
67 See Indian Ambassador to the United States Taranjit Sindhu, “India’s Commitment to Climate Action and Potential
for US-India Partnership” (op-ed), Newsweek, March 7, 2022. See also CRS In Focus IF12178, India: Climate Change
Issues, by K. Alan Kronstadt, Kezee Procita, and Bruce Vaughn.
68 See the Energy Department’s October 7, 2022, release at https://tinyurl.com/2ya6s585.
69 FY2024 Congressional Budget Justification Foreign Operations, Appendix 2.
70 See the Yale index at https://epi.yale.edu/epi-results/2022/country/ind. The Climate Action Tracker is an independent
scientific project that tracks government climate action and measures it against globally agreed Paris Agreement aims
(https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/india).
71 See the PRS Legislative Service (Delhi) bill summary at https://tinyurl.com/2nc63nzc; “India OKs $2 bln Incentive
Plan for Green Hydrogen Industry,” Reuters, January 4, 2023. See also CRS In Focus IF12178, India: Climate Change
Issues, by K. Alan Kronstadt, Kezee Procita, and Bruce Vaughn.
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reportedly has said India will need up to $100 billion in annual investment to reach this goal.72 A
year earlier Prime Minister Modi had announced ambitious new national targets to address
climate change, even as his government faces criticism for its refusal to “phase out” coal.73 Many
observers agree that Indian energy and climate policies will be crucial to global efforts to slow
climate change, yet as the New Delhi government seeks to balance its decarbonization goals with
efforts to forward economic development, it often favors the latter. India’s projected reliance on
coal beyond 2040, its continued large-scale subsidization of fossil fuel industries, and its
significant perceived shortfall in “green transition” investment may combine to limit progress.74
Space Issues and Cooperation
A U.S.-India Space Security Dialogue first met in 2015 after nearly 15 years of less formalized
bilateral civil space cooperation. At the April 2022 bilateral 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, U.S. and
Indian officials pledged to expand bilateral space cooperation, concluded a Memorandum of
Understanding on Space Situational Awareness, and lauded ongoing collaboration between the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and Indian Space Research Organization
(ISRO), including on the NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR) satellite now
scheduled for launch in 2024.75 The iCET forum includes efforts to further foster NASA-ISRO
collaboration, including expanding the agenda of the U.S.-India Civil Space Joint Working Group
to include planetary defense.76 New Delhi established a new Indian Space Association in 2021 to
provide an apex body for developing India’s private space and satellite industries, and ISRO
reports having successfully deployed 385 foreign satellites since 1999, with 5 launch missions in
2022 alone. As India further develops its commercial space launch sector, reports suggest that
U.S. companies have found India’s space launch services effective and affordable.77 India is also
increasing space-related cooperation with its two other Quad partners, Japan and Australia.78
India successfully tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in 2019, becoming the fourth country to
demonstrate this capability. In 2022, the U.N. General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted a U.S.-
sponsored resolution for a nonbinding moratorium on ASAT tests, despite India’s abstention.79

72 See the Indian Ministry of Environment’s November 14, 2022, release at https://tinyurl.com/ym7rnwrs; “COP27:
India lays out plan for long-term decarbonization,” Reuters, November 14, 2022; “India Needs to Invest up to $100
bln/yr More to Achieve 2070 Net Zero Goal—Lawmaker,” Reuters, January 9, 2023.
73 Modi vowed that, by 2030, India would (1) raise its non-fossil energy capacity to 500 GW; (2) meet 50% of its
energy needs from renewable energy; (3) reduce the total projected carbon emissions by one billion metric tons; and (4)
reduce the carbon intensity of its economy to less than 45% (see Modi’s November 2, 2021, speech transcript at
https://tinyurl.com/2j2yyzde).
74 “The World Needs India to Avert Climate Catastrophe. Can Modi Deliver?,” CNN, November 8, 2022; “India
Chases Clean Energy, but Economic Goals Put Coal First,” New York Times, December 7, 2022; “India Needs to Invest
up to $100 bln/yr More to Achieve 2070 Net Zero Goal—Lawmaker,” Reuters, January 9, 2023.
75 See the April 11, 2022, “2+2 Ministerial Joint Statement” at https://go.usa.gov/xutM3, and the NISAR page at
https://nisar.jpl.nasa.gov/mission/isro-partnership.
76 See the January 31, 2023, White House iCET fact sheet at https://tinyurl.com/yjhv5bde.
77 See the ISRO page at https://www.isro.gov.in/Mission.html; Kartik Bommakanti, “US-India Space Cooperation:
Moving Away from the Burden of the Past,” Observer Research Foundation (Delhi), December 16, 2019.
78 Rajeswari Rajagopalan, “Indian Space Cooperation with the US and the Quad Intensifies,” Diplomat (Tokyo), March
29, 2021.
79 The vote was 155 in favor and 9 against (including ASAT-capable Russia and China), with India among the 9
abstentions (“UN General Assembly Adopts Draft Resolution Against ASAT Tests,” Via Satellite, December 9, 2022).
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Health Cooperation and the COVID-19 Pandemic
The U.S. government has long supported India’s health sector with assistance on infectious
diseases, maternal and child health care, and HIV/AIDS, among others areas. The Biden
Administration has requested $48.5 million for such aid for both FY2023 and FY2024 to support
the goals of preventing child and maternal death and combating infectious disease threats. The
United States and India expanded cooperation to address the COVID-19 pandemic in India, and
the Quad countries collaborated to accelerate vaccine production.80 The United States allocated
more than $226 million in COVID-19 relief to India, including $55 million in emergency
supplies.81 India’s official COVID-19 death toll (about 531,000) may grossly underreport the
actual toll—the World Health Organization estimates more than 4.7 million “excess deaths” in
India for 2020-2021, which would give India the world’s highest mortality rate.82
Immigration83
India closely watches U.S. immigration policy, especially as related to the H-1B nonimmigrant
visa (for temporary workers in specialty occupations). Indians account for at least two-thirds of
annual H-1B visa issuances. Reforming the H-1B program has been of interest to Congress,
where there is debate between Members concerned that hiring through the program displaces U.S.
workers, and others who argue that U.S. employer demand for H-1B nonimmigrant workers
reflects a lack of qualified U.S. workers to fill open positions, and is thus a problem for U.S.
competitiveness.84 Some U.S. officials have also raised concerns over delays in processing work
authorization and status renewals for H-1B spouses living in the United States, as well as long
wait times for Indians applying for visas abroad. The United States has taken steps to address
processing delays related to renewals85 and, in January 2023, the U.S. Mission in India announced
a multi-pronged approach to address visa backlogs.86 In February 2023, the State Department
announced that it would pilot a program to allow temporary workers in H-1B (and L-1 status) to
renew their visas without having to leave the United States.87
Leaders in New Delhi express particular concern about Indian nationals who have been approved
for employment-based Legal Permanent Resident status, but who face long wait times for a

80 To date, India has distributed more than 298 million vaccine doses to 101 countries (see https://www.mea.gov.in/
vaccine-supply.htm).
81 See https://www.usaid.gov/india/coronavirus.
82 See Indian government mortality data at https://www.mohfw.gov.in; WHO, “Global Excess Deaths Associated with
COVID-19,” updated May 21, 2022.
83 This section written by William Kandel, Specialist in Immigration Policy, and Jill Wilson, Analyst in Immigration
Policy.
84 CRS Report R47159, Temporary Professional Foreign Workers: Background, Trends, and Policy Issues, by Jill H.
Wilson.
85 See for example, Letter from Senator Jeanne Shaheen, to Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, June 27, 2022, at https://tinyurl.com/39etrna5; and USCIS, Fiscal Year 2022 Progress Report,
December 2022.
86 U.S. Embassy and Consulates in India, “U.S. Mission to India Launches Staffing Surge as Part of Expanded Efforts
to Reduce Visitor Visa Wait Times,” press release, January 22, 2023, at https://tinyurl.com/bdebamah.
87 “U.S. to Allow H-1B Workers to Renew Visas Without Leaving Country,” Wall Street Journal, February 10, 2023.
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numerically limited employment-based visa to become available. U.S. immigration law prevents
any one country from receiving more than 7% of such visas in a given year.88
Human Rights89
The U.S. government and many independent assessments identify India as the site of widespread
human rights abuses, some of them perpetrated by agents of the state. By many accounts, the
scale of such abuses has increased significantly under Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP). The State Department’s 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights reviews
evidence of “significant human rights issues in India.” Its 2022 Report on International Religious
Freedom lists extensive ongoing problems, and its 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report finds that
India’s “Overall anti-trafficking efforts, especially against bonded labor, remained inadequate.”90
Press freedoms, and restrictions on nongovernmental organization operations and social media
companies, are further areas of concern.91 India reportedly has led the world in internet
shutdowns for five consecutive years and accounts for more than half of all shutdowns worldwide
since 2016.92 Some Members of Congress have publicly expressed concerns about religious
freedom and the plight of Muslims and other religious minorities in India.93 Numerous
independent assessments warn that, under the Modi/BJP government, India’s democratic
institutions are eroding, its syncretic traditions are under threat, and its citizens’ freedoms of
expression and religion increasingly are being constrained by government actions.94
In April 2022, while standing next to his Indian counterpart following a “2+2 Ministerial
Meeting,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken issued a rare public—and apparently scripted—
rebuke, saying, “[We]’re monitoring some recent concerning developments in India, including a
rise in human rights abuses by some government, police, and prison officials.”95 His remarks
were in response to violent, large-scale clashes between Hindus and Muslims that took place in
several Indian states in 2022, as well as Hindu leaders issuing hate speech and even calls for
genocide of Muslims. In June 2022, two BJP officials sparked controversy by making remarks

88 For more information, see CRS Report R45447, Permanent Employment-Based Immigration and the Per-country
Ceiling, by William A. Kandel.
89 See also CRS In Focus IF12198, India: Human Rights Assessments, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
90 The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom continues to recommend that the United States designate
India as a “country of particular concern” for “engaging in and tolerating systematic, ongoing, and egregious religious
freedom violations” (see a November 2022 update at https://tinyurl.com/mkkhbank). See State’s 2022 human rights
report India narrative at https://tinyurl.com/yckfse6t; State’s 2022 IRF report India narrative at https://tinyurl.com/
mr3baju8; and State’s 2022 TIP report at https://tinyurl.com/28kc3cpu.
91 The France-based Reporters Without Borders ranked India 150th of 180 world countries on its 2022 Press Freedoms
Index, down from 142nd the previous year (see https://rsf.org/en/index). See also “After Silencing Critics at Home,
Narendra Modi Goes After Foreign Media,” Economist (London), February 16, 2023.
92 “Five Years in a Row: India Is 2022’s Biggest Internet Shutdowns Offender,” Access Now, February 28, 2023.
93 For example, in the 116th Congress, H.R. 745 on the situation in Kashmir included a call to “preserve religious
freedom for all residents” and garnered 68 cosponsors. In 2020, 14 Senators signed a letter asking the Secretary of State
to designate India (among other countries) as a “Country of Particular Concern” as recommended by USCIRF (see the
September 9, 2020, letter at https://go.usa.gov/xHDQW).
94 Among the most prominent of many examples, U.S.-based non-profit Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World”
assessment for 2021 re-designated India as only “Partly Free,” and its “Democracy Under Siege” narrative concluded
that “Modi and his party are tragically driving India itself toward authoritarianism” (see the Freedom House narrative at
https://tinyurl.com/w639946z). See also Thomas Carothers and Benjamin Press, “Understanding and Responding to
Global Democratic Backsliding,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 20, 2022; Ramachandra Guha,
“The Cult of Modi,” Foreign Policy, November 4, 2022; and Kaushik Raj, “The Year Hate Got Away Scot-Free in
India,” Article 14 (Bangalore), December 28, 2022.
95 See the State Department’s April 11, 2022, briefing transcript at https://go.usa.gov/xuwgV.
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about the Prophet Mohammed that were seen as offensive to Muslims (several Muslim countries
formally condemned the remarks). More recently, the New Delhi government responded angrily
to a BBC News documentary on mass-scale anti-Muslim pogroms in the state of Gujarat in 2002,
during Modi’s tenure as the state’s chief minister. Tax officials subsequently raided BBC offices
in two Indian cities.96
Biden Administration officials insist that they raise human rights concerns with India consistently,
but in private. In New Delhi in March 2023, Secretary Blinken told reporters “[We] regularly
engage with our Indian counterparts to encourage the Indian government to uphold its own
commitments to protect human rights, just as we look to ourselves to do the same thing.” Yet
some reporting suggests that inside the State Department there is frustration with “the kid-glove
treatment” India receives, even in internal U.S. government documents.97
India-Russia Relations and the War in Ukraine
Indian officials describe their “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership with Russia” as
“exceptionally steady and time-tested.”98 India’s five decades of close and friendly relations with
the former Soviet Union and Russia may complicate the Biden Administration’s pursuit of stated
goals in the Indo-Pacific region, including in the context of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of
Ukraine. Moscow’s recent diplomatic outreach to key Indian rivals China and Pakistan reportedly
has led to disquiet in New Delhi, with the Indian government seeking in turn to forestall any
deepened Russia-China alignment by reaffirming its ties with Moscow.99 Meanwhile, Russia
remains India’s top arms supplier and, although Indian officials have blamed the war in Ukraine
for Russia’s inability to deliver vital defense equipment, the two countries are moving forward to
strengthen their defense cooperation.100 U.S. officials regularly encourage India leaders to reduce
their reliance on imported Russian arms.101 India’s ongoing purchases of Russian-made weapons
systems have the potential to trigger U.S. sanctions on India under Section 231 of the Countering
America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44).102
In early 2022, New Delhi’s neutrality on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine—and India’s
abstention on all U.N. votes condemning or criticizing that invasion—met with dismay among
some Members of Congress, as well as many Western analysts, who had hoped for a stronger

96 “Religious Clashes Across India Spark Fears of Further Violence,” Washington Post, April 20, 2022; “Prophet
Muhammad Remarks Deepen India’s Diplomatic Crisis,” BBC News, June 7, 2022; “India Says BBC Documentary on
India PM Modi Is ‘Propaganda,’” Reuters, January 19, 2023; “India Escalates Fight Against BBC with New Financial
Case,” Washington Post, April 13, 2023.
97 Secretary Blinken’s March 2, 2023, remarks at https://tinyurl.com/ypu5najz; Nahal Toosi et al., “On India, Say
Nothing,” Politico, March 2, 2023.
98 See the External Affairs Ministry’s November 8, 2022, transcript at https://tinyurl.com/2p8wfeyv.
99 “Putin’s War Is Complicating India’s Middle Path Among Powers,” New York Times, March 30, 2022.
100 “India, Russia Agree to Boost Longstanding Defense Ties,” Reuters, April 28, 2023; “Russia Cannot Meet Arms
Delivery Commitments Because of War, Indian Air Force Says,” Reuters, March 23, 2023.
101 In April 2022, U.S, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin told a House panel, “[We] believe that it’s not in [India’s] best
interest to continue to invest in Russian equipment.” Since 2010, Russia has been the source of about 62% of all Indian
arms imports, and India has accounted for more than one-third (34%) of all Russian arms exports by the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI’s) trend-indicator value (see the April 5, 2022, House Armed Services
Committee transcript at https://tinyurl.com/2kx5yhzv; arms trade data from SIPRI Arms Transfers Database).
102 CAATSA targets “significant transactions” with Russia’s defense or intelligence sectors. In 2021, India began
taking delivery of S-400 Triumf air defense systems purchased from Russia in a multi-billion-dollar deal, but the Biden
Administration has not made a determination on Section 231 sanctions in this case. The House-passed National
Defense Authorization Act for FY2023 (H.R. 7900) included a call for the waiver of potential CAATSA sanctions on
India, but the bill was not taken up by the Senate.
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stance from the world’s most populous democracy.103 Russia’s war on Ukraine has elevated
India’s influence and importance on the world stage, but also has disrupted India’s current
presidencies of both the G-20 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.104 For some observers,
India’s unwillingness to openly criticize Russia belies its purported commitment to “shared
values” with the United States, and may squander a portion of the good will India has built in
recent decades, both globally and in Washington, DC.105 According to its foreign minister, India
“strongly advocates a return to dialogue and diplomacy” on Russia and Ukraine, and is “clearly
on the side of peace, respect for international law and support for the U.N. Charter.”106
Energy trade is another central feature of the India-Russia relationship and, in late 2022, Russia
emerged as India’s leading source of imported oil.107 U.S. officials stated earlier in the year that
Washington would not set “red lines” for Indian purchases of Russian oil, but did not want to see
“rapid acceleration” of such imports.108 Nonetheless, Indian purchases of Russian oil reportedly
have increased 16-fold following the invasion to some 1.6 million barrels per day in December
2022, providing revenue that, by some accounts, contributes to sustaining Moscow’s war effort.109
In a decision welcomed by Russian leaders, India does not honor price caps on Russian petroleum
products imposed by G7, European Union, and other nations as a further means of reducing
revenue flows to Moscow, and India has (along with China), made purchases above the cap.110
The overall value of Indian imports from Russia has more than quadrupled since the February
2022 invasion as compared to earlier years.111
To date, Biden Administration officials acknowledge the strategic and economic motivations for
India’s neutrality policy and appear willing to abide ongoing India-Russia ties in the pursuit of
what the Administration deems to be broader U.S. interests.112 Yet one former U.S. official noted

103 See, for example, remarks by several Senators at a March 2, 2022, Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee hearing
on U.S.-India relations at https://tinyurl.com/2p8tr2dr; Stephen Biegun and Anja Manuel, “India’s Abstention on
Ukraine Resolution Risks Its Democratic Stature Before the World” (op-ed), Print (Delhi), February 28, 2022.
104 “Russia’s War Could Make It India’s World,” New York Times, December 31, 2022; Emily Tamkin, “India Is Stuck
in a New World Disorder,” Foreign Policy, June 1, 2023.
105 Anish Goel, “Inside India’s Abstention,” The American (Rome), March 12, 2022; “India, as Largest Democracy,
Must Condemn Russia for Ukraine War” (interview), Nikkei Asia (Tokyo), May 29, 2023.
106 See S. Jaishankar’s November 8, 2022, remarks in Moscow at https://tinyurl.com/3xreut62.
107 “Russia Becomes India’s Top Oil Supplier as Sanctions Deflate Price,” Financial Times (London), October 10,
2022.
108 “US Does Not Want ‘Rapid Acceleration’ in India Energy Imports from Russia,” Reuters, March 31, 2022.
109 “How Russia Is Surviving the Tightening Grip on Its Oil Revenue,” New York Times, February 7, 2023.
110 “India and China Snap up Russian Oil in April Above ‘Price Cap,’” Reuters, April 18, 2023. During a November
2022 visit to New Delhi, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen stated that, so long as Western services are not used, Indian
importers can purchase as much Russian oil as they want, regardless of price caps. In January 2023 hearing testimony,
Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman told a Senate panel that Indians are now major beneficiaries of the price cap
“because the oil that they’re buying from Russia is so much cheaper” (“India Can Buy as Much Russian Oil as It
Wants, Outside Price Cap, Yellen Says,” Reuters, November 13, 2022; “Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds
Hearing on Countering Russian Aggression,” CQ Transcripts, January 26, 2023).
111 In May 2023, months of negotiations on re-establishing a Cold War-era ruble-rupee trade mechanism to allow
Indian exporters to trade with Russia despite sanctions restricting international payment mechanisms were halted when
Moscow could not be persuaded to hold rupees (“Exclusive: India, Russia Suspend Negotiations to Settle Trade in
Rupees,” Reuters, May 4, 2023; trade data from Indian Ministry of Commerce).
112 For example, during an April 2022 press briefing, Secretary of State Blinken stated, “[We] call on all nations to
condemn Moscow’s increasingly brutal actions,” while adding, “India has to make its own decisions about how it
approaches this challenge” (see the State Department’s April 11, 2022, transcript at https://go.usa.gov/xuwgV).
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the Administration’s “tremendous forbearance toward India’s very disappointing response” and
warned that Washington’s frustration may increase over time, potentially hampering relations.113
India-China Relations
India’s relations with China have been fraught for decades, with significantly increased enmity in
recent years. In 2020, relations saw the worst bilateral border conflict since the Sino-Indian War
of 1962, significantly reducing trust and confidence in both capitals. Impasses persist over
disputed frontiers, as well as China’s support for Pakistan, India’s key rival, and China’s growing
influence in India’s periphery, including in the Indian Ocean. Indian officials likely are rankled by
Beijing’s repeated moves to obstruct imposition of U.N. sanctions on Pakistan-based terrorists.
Leaders in Beijing, meanwhile, take issue with the presence of the Dalai Lama and a self-
described “Central Tibetan Administration” and “Tibetan Parliament in Exile” on Indian soil.
Indian and U.S. officials—including the U.S. Congress—blamed spring 2020 border clashes on
PRC aggression, and that development renewed fears that India could face a two-front war, given
China’s potential collusion with Pakistan.114 According to one Indian pundit, “From New Delhi’s
perspective, the PRC military aggression on the disputed border is the price India is paying for
joining hands with the Western alliance.”115 India has since adjusted its economic relations with
China in response to the conflict, banning more than 250 PRC mobile apps and seeking to
diversify supply chains.116 Still, trade ties remain crucial: China was a close second to the United
States among India’s top trade partners during India’s FY2021/22, and the value of Indian imports
from China reached a record high last year, as did the trade deficit, given the modest levels of
Indian exports to China.117
Despite ongoing negotiations, including 18 rounds of military-to-military talks, tensions at the
India-China Line of Actual Control (LAC) remain high, and China newly holds a reported 580
square miles of territory previously patrolled by India. Non-lethal December 2022 clashes
involving hundreds of soldiers from each side renewed fears of a wider conflict. Both parties
maintain about 50,000 troops and heavy weaponry at the LAC, and both continue to improve
their infrastructure and military capabilities in the region; the U.S. intelligence community
assesses that “persistent low-level friction on the LAC has the potential to escalate swiftly.”118
U.S.-supplied defense equipment has bolstered India’s capabilities at the LAC, and Washington
reportedly provided India with intelligence that allowed Indian forces to repel the latest PRC
incursion.119 The United States is “strongly opposed to any unilateral attempts to advance
territorial claims by incursions, military or civilian, across the border,” and it encourages India

113 Lisa Curtis quoted in “India-US Ties Entering Uncharted Territory over Ukraine: Ex-Trump Advisor” (interview),
Press Trust of India, April 7, 2022.
114 The William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for FY2021 (P.L. 116-283) includes a sense
of Congress that China’s “continued military aggression ... along the border with India is a significant concern.”
115 Ajai Shukla, “Why India and China Are Fighting in the Himalayas” (op-ed), New York Times, January 1, 2023.
116 “Full List of Chinese Apps Banned in India So Far,” India Today (Delhi), August 21, 2022.
117 Major Indian imports from China include electrical and nuclear power equipment, and organic chemicals, including
fertilizers, among other commodities (India Ministry of Commerce and Industry data; “India’s Imports from China
Reach Record High in 2022, Trade Deficit Surges Beyond $100 Billion,” Hindustan Times (Delhi), January 13, 2023).
118 Sameer Lalwani, Daniel Markey, and Vikram Singh, “Another Clash on the India-China Border Underscores Risks
of Militarization,” U.S. Institute for Peace, December 20, 2022. See the March 8, 2023, Annual Threat Assessment of
the U.S. Intelligence Community at https://tinyurl.com/4hjartj7.
119 “India Deploys U.S. Weapons to Fortify Disputed Border with China,” Bloomberg, October 28, 2021; “U.S. Intel
Helped India Rout China in 2022 Border Clash: Sources,” U.S. News and World Report, March 20, 2023.
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and China “to utilize existing bilateral channels to discuss disputed boundaries.”120 India remains
firm in its position that PRC “transgressions” at the LAC preclude restoration of “normalized
relations.” New Delhi boosted the country’s latest defense budget by more 10% with an emphasis
on improving border security.121
India-Pakistan Relations and Kashmir
India and Pakistan have fought four wars since 1948, three of them over the disputed former
princely region of Kashmir, the most recent in 1999. India largely cut off bilateral engagement
following an early 2019 terrorist attack in Pulwama, in Indian-held Kashmir, and a subsequent
Indian airstrike on a suspected militant camp inside Pakistan. India’s government continues to
hold Pakistan responsible for supporting cross-border anti-India militancy, while Islamabad
highlights India’s alleged repression of the Kashmir Valley’s overwhelmingly Muslim populace.
Later in 2019, the Indian government took a series of controversial actions that significantly
eroded the (largely nominal) constitutional autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir—until then the
country’s only Muslim-majority state—and cracked down on protesters, suspended internet and
cell service, and took thousands of people, including prominent local politicians, into “preventive
detention.” Pakistan, which also claims the region, strongly objected. Some Members of Congress
criticized India’s actions, mainly on human rights grounds.122 Although New Delhi lifted
remaining internet lockdowns in 2021—and tourist visits have since reached record levels beyond
pre-pandemic levels—reports indicate that tensions and disaffection remain in the Kashmir
Valley, with the central government’s credibility harmed by ineffective governance, a depressed
economy, and continued militant recruitment.123
Developments in Afghanistan since mid-2021 further complicated India-Pakistan relations, and
the potential for further conflict remains high, according to U.S. intelligence assessments.124 In
March 2022, what New Delhi called a “technical malfunction” led to the “accidental firing” of a
missile that landed (without detonation) on Pakistani territory. Islamabad decried “technical
lapses of serious nature in Indian handling of strategic weapons.”125 India’s government also
continues to look warily upon U.S.-Pakistani security ties; New Delhi formally protested the
Biden Administration’s recent plans to provide sustainment for Pakistan’s F-16 combat aircraft
fleet at a potential cost of up to $450 million.126 Hopes for restored India-Pakistan diplomatic ties
persist, but recent animus over water sharing issues appears to have added to ongoing mutual
circumspection.127

120 State Department press briefing, December 13, 2022.
121 “S Jaishankar: India Beefs Up Military at Tense China Border,” BBC News, December 20, 2022; “India Raises
Defense Budget to $72.6 bln amid Tensions with China,” Reuters, February 1, 2023.
122 See CRS Report R45877, Kashmir: Background, Recent Developments, and U.S. Policy, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
123 See, for example, “The Mirage of Peace and Prosperity in Kashmir,” Economist (London), January 10, 2023.
124 See the Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, February 2022, at https://tinyurl.com/
5n8kt6d3.
125 Indian Ministry of Defense release, March 11, 2022, at https://tinyurl.com/2p929w9s; Pakistan Ministry of Foreign
Affairs release, March 12, 2022, at https://tinyurl.com/2mysewnt.
126 “India Registers Strong Protest with U.S. Over Pakistan F-16 Package,” Times of India (Delhi), September 11, 2022.
127 “After 62 Years, India Moves to Amend Its Water Treaty with Pak,” Indian Express (Delhi), January 28, 2023;
Brahma Chellaney, “South Asia’s Looming Water War,” Project Syndicate, February 16, 2023.
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Figure 2. Map of Indian States

Source: Graphic created by CRS. Map information generated by using data from http://www.mapsofindia.com,
Department of State international boundary files (2015); Esri (2014); and DeLorme (2014).

Author Information

K. Alan Kronstadt
Shayerah I. Akhtar
Specialist in South Asian Affairs
Specialist in International Trade and Finance

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Disclaimer
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Congressional Research Service
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