Central Asia: Implications of Russia’s War in Ukraine

Central Asia: Implications of Russia’s War in Ukraine

Central Asia: Implications of Russia’s War in
June 9, 2023
Ukraine
Maria A. Blackwood,
The five countries of Central Asia—Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Coordinator
and Uzbekistan—share historical, economic, and military ties with Russia, but since they became
Analyst in Asian Policy
independent with the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union they have generally sought to balance

relations between Russia, China, and other powers, including the United States. Russia’s renewed
Ricardo Barrios
invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 arguably has placed Central Asian countries in a difficult
Analyst in Asian Affairs
position economically and diplomatically. Although they maintain relations with Russia, the five

Central Asian states have avoided endorsing Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan have explicitly stated their support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and dispatched
Rebecca M. Nelson
humanitarian aid. Some analysts posit that the war is undermining Russia’s position in the region
Specialist in International
and leading Central Asian countries to distance themselves from Moscow. Although Russia has
Trade and Finance
long served as Central Asia’s primary security guarantor, some observers see that role as

diminishing as a result of the war. Central Asian countries appear to be increasingly engaging
Michael D. Sutherland
with other partners in the security sphere. In addition, some experts question the long-term
Analyst in International
viability of Russia-led multilateral organizations including the Eurasian Economic Union and the
Trade and Finance
Collective Security Treaty Organization. While the economic impacts in Central Asia of the war

have not been as dire as some experts initially predicted, regional countries are facing high
inflation and disruptions to supply chains. In response, Central Asian countries are seeking to

diversify their trade relationships and establish transit routes that bypass Russia.
Central Asia’s strategic geography—bordering Russia, China, Afghanistan, and Iran—and its wealth of critical resources
have driven U.S. interest in the region. Given recent developments, some Members of Congress have expressed interest in
expanding U.S. engagement with Central Asia.
Potential areas of opportunity for expanding U.S. relations with Central Asia and congressional action include the following:
• Trade. Trade between the United States and Central Asia remains limited. Trade with four of the five
Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) is governed by Section
402 of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618), the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment, which denies
permanent normal trade relations to certain former non-market economies. Exempting a given country from
Jackson-Vanik requires Congress to pass relevant legislation. The Biden Administration supports repealing
Jackson-Vanik for Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
• Energy and minerals. Central Asia is a region rich in hydrocarbons. Because Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan are natural gas producers, many in the United States and the European Union have argued
that these countries represent a potential alternative to Russian natural gas for the European market,
although Central Asia and Europe have not traded natural gas directly to date. At the same time, Central
Asia’s export potential is hampered by domestic energy crises in the region’s gas-producing countries,
resulting from high demand coupled with infrastructural deficiencies. Additionally, given the diversity of
the region’s mineral base, some experts see Central Asia as a potential alternative to China as a source of
rare earth elements and rare metals.
• Regional connectivity. Promoting regional connectivity has long been a U.S. policy priority in Central
Asia, in part to strengthen regional countries’ economic and political sovereignty. Some analysts suggest
that regional connectivity in Central Asia has taken on added significance in light of the war in Ukraine as
Central Asian governments seek to diversify their economic and security relationships.
• Security cooperation. Some analysts and U.S. officials see new opportunities for expanding security
cooperation between the United States and Central Asia in light of the war in Ukraine.
• Media freedom and disinformation. Central Asia is a challenging environment for press freedom. At the
same time, Russian media maintain a significant presence in the region, raising concerns among some
analysts about Central Asia’s susceptibility to Russian propaganda and disinformation.
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Contents
Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1
Background: Central Asian Countries’ International Relations ....................................................... 2
Relations with Russia ................................................................................................................ 2
Relations with the United States ............................................................................................... 3
Responses to Russia’s February 2022 Invasion of Ukraine ............................................................ 4
Economic Implications .................................................................................................................... 5
Trade ......................................................................................................................................... 7
Exchange Rates ......................................................................................................................... 8
Financial Institutions ................................................................................................................. 9
Foreign Remittances ................................................................................................................ 10
Implications for Relations with Russia ........................................................................................... 11
Russia-Led Multilateral Organizations ................................................................................... 13
Potential Sanctions Evasion .................................................................................................... 15
Central Asian Migrants in Russia ............................................................................................ 17
Russians Fleeing to Central Asia ............................................................................................. 18
Seeking Alternative Partners ................................................................................................... 19
Implications for China’s Presence in Central Asia ........................................................................ 20
Diplomatic Relations ............................................................................................................... 21
Regional Security Cooperation ............................................................................................... 22
China–Central Asia Trade and the Belt and Road Initiative ................................................... 23
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 25
Trade ....................................................................................................................................... 25
Energy ..................................................................................................................................... 26
Minerals .................................................................................................................................. 27
Regional Connectivity ............................................................................................................. 28
Security Cooperation ............................................................................................................... 28
Media Freedom and Combatting Disinformation ................................................................... 30

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Central Asia ......................................................................................................... 1
Figure 2. Economic Growth in Central Asia ................................................................................... 7
Figure 3. Central Asia’s Trade with Russia ..................................................................................... 8
Figure 4. Exchange Rates in Central Asia & Russia ....................................................................... 9

Tables
Table 1. Snapshot of China’s Trade with Central Asia .................................................................. 24

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 31
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Central Asia: Implications of Russia’s War in Ukraine

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Central Asia: Implications of Russia’s War in Ukraine

Overview
Central Asia is a landlocked, five-country region rich in mineral resources bordering Afghanistan,
the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China), Iran, and Russia. Russia maintains strong
political and military ties with the region, and China’s significant economic presence is
accompanied by an expanding security footprint. Since 2001, U.S. engagement with Central Asia
has largely focused on security cooperation, particularly in relation to the conflict in Afghanistan.
Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 arguably has placed the Central Asian
countries in a difficult position both economically and diplomatically, even as Central Asian
governments face a range of domestic and regional challenges. Shifting geopolitics in the wake of
Russia’s invasion may present new opportunities for U.S. engagement with Central Asia, which
some Members of Congress have expressed interest in developing.1 Since the beginning of
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Central Asian countries have moved to diversify their diplomatic
and economic relations, increasing engagement with the European Union and with countries such
as Turkey, Iran, and Azerbaijan. Some analysts speculate, however, that China will be the primary
beneficiary of any distancing between Russia and Central Asia.2
Figure 1. Map of Central Asia

Source: Graphic created by CRS.

1 See, for example, “Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and
Counterterrorism Holds Hearing on Central Asia,” Congressional Quarterly, March 8, 2023; House Foreign Affairs
Subcommitee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia and Nonproliferation Holds Hearing on US Engagement in Central
Asia, Congressional Quarterly, September 14, 2022.
2 Jeffrey Mankoff, “As Russia Reels, Eurasia Roils,” War on the Rocks, October 11, 2022.
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Background: Central Asian Countries’ International
Relations
Central Asian governments have varying
outlooks on international relations and postures
Central Asia at a Glance
toward Russia, although scholars generally
Kazakhstan
agree that, as neighbors of Russia and China,
Capital: Astana
these countries “can’t afford to choose sides.”3
Head of state: President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev
Land area: 2,699,700 sq. km.; about four times the
Kazakhstan, the largest Central Asian country
size of Texas
by land area and gross domestic product (GDP),
Population: 19.4 mil ion (2022 est.)
pursues a “multi-vector” foreign policy, seeking
GDP/GNI per capita (2021): $197.1
to balance its relations with major powers while
bil ion/$8,880
actively participating in international
Kyrgyz Republic
organizations. Uzbekistan, the largest by
Capital: Bishkek
population, has since 2016 been pursuing a
Head of state: President Sadyr Japarov
similarly balanced policy, actively developing
Land area: 191,801 sq. km.; slightly smaller than
South Dakota
its relations with a broad range of partners after
Population: 6.1 mil ion (2022 est.)
years of relative isolationism. Analysts generally
GDP/GNI per capita (2021): $8.5 bil ion/$1,180
describe the Kyrgyz Republic (commonly
Tajikistan
known as Kyrgyzstan) and Tajikistan as more
Capital: Dushanbe
dependent on and aligned with Russia, although
Head of state: President Emomali Rahmon
both countries have partnered with the United
Land area: 141,510 sq. km.; slightly smaller than
States on security issues and both countries have
Wisconsin
Population: 9.8 mil ion (2021 est.)
also been increasing economic and security
GDP/GNI per capita (2021): $8.7 bil ion/$1,150
engagement with China in the past decade.
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan’s constitutionally mandated
Capital: Ashgabat
policy of “permanent neutrality” translates in
Head of state: President Serdar Berdimuhamedov
practice to foreign policy isolationism, and the
Land area: 469,930 sq. km.; slightly larger than
government of Turkmenistan rarely comments
California
on international events. Turkmenistan is highly
Population: 5.6 mil ion (2022 est., disputed)
GDP/GNI per capita (2019): $45.2 bil ion/$6,970
economically dependent on China, however, and
has been expanding economic cooperation with
Uzbekistan
Russia in recent months.
Capital: Tashkent

Head of state: President Shavkat Mirziyoyev
Land area: 425,400 sq. km., slightly larger than
Relations with Russia
California
Population: Approximately 35 mil ion (2021)
As former Soviet republics, the five Central
GDP/GNI per capita (2021): $69.2 bil ion/$1,960
Asian states share a common institutional legacy

with Russia that underpins military, political,
Data from the World Bank, the CIA World Factbook, and
economic, and cultural ties. Historically, public
the U.S. Department of State
opinion surveys of Central Asians have shown
Russia enjoying much higher approval than either China or the United States.4 Russian media
maintain a strong presence in the region, although Russia’s economic role in Central Asia is being
surpassed by that of China. Russia remains the primary destination for labor migrants from

3 See, for example, Gavin Helf, “Blinken Debuts New U.S. Approach in Central Asia,” United States Institute of Peace,
March 2, 2023.
4 See, for example, Eric McGlinchey and Marlene Laruelle, “Explaining Great Power Status in Central Asia:
Unfamiliarity and Discontent,” Minerva Research Initiative, October 29, 2019.
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Central Asia: Implications of Russia’s War in Ukraine

Central Asia, however. According to Russian government figures, about 9.5 million Central
Asians registered with Russian migration authorities in 2019; the total number of Central Asian
migrants in the country is likely higher.5
In the 30 years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia served as Central Asia’s
primary security partner. Russia is estimated to have accounted for approximately 60% of arms
transfers to the region by value between 2015 and 2021.6 Most Central Asian military leaders
studied at one of Russia’s military academies, and Russian professional military education
maintained significant prestige among Central Asian military officers.7 Russia continues to
maintain military installations in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The Russia-led
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), established in 1992, is a security alliance that
includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, as well as Armenia and Belarus.8 The CSTO’s
first-ever deployment took place in January 2022, with some 2,500 primarily Russian
peacekeeping troops sent to Kazakhstan to bolster the government response to unprecedented
unrest in that country.9
Relations with the United States
The United States was among the first countries to recognize the independence of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan following the 1991 dissolution of the
Soviet Union. Since that time, Congress and U.S. presidential administrations have repeatedly
expressed support for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the five Central
Asian states, and the United States has implemented programs to support democracy, good
governance, and economic reforms in the region. In the past three decades, the United States has
provided more than $9 billion in direct assistance to the countries of Central Asia to support
security, democratic reform, and economic growth, and to meet humanitarian needs.10 Some
observers contend that Central Asia’s importance to the United States has historically been
“derivative of interests that were not indigenous to Central Asia itself, but rather were functions
of U.S. policies, priorities, and relationships with countries around the region.”11 Some analysts
describe Central Asia as a challenging environment for democracy promotion efforts, and have
voiced concerns that democratic progress in the region has been uneven or nonexistent.12 Since
2001, U.S. engagement with Central Asia has largely focused on security cooperation,
particularly in relation to U.S.-led efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. The United States engages in
security cooperation with all five Central Asian countries, implementing programs to provide
training, improve peacekeeping and disaster response capabilities, and bolster border security.

5 Sher Khashimov et al., Introducing the Central Asia Migration Tracker, Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs,
December 15, 2020.
6 Data from SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. Available date indicates that Russia did not transfer any arms to Central
Asian countries in 2022 with the exception of Tajikistan.
7 Erica Marat, “China’s Expanding Military Education Diplomacy in Central Asia,” PONARS Eurasia, April 19, 2021.
8 See CRS Report R46761, Russia: Foreign Policy and U.S. Relations, by Andrew S. Bowen and Cory Welt.
9 See CRS Insight IN12030, Political Reforms in Kazakhstan, by Maria A. Blackwood.
10 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, “United States Strategy for Central Asia 2019-
2025: Advancing Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity (Overview),” February 5, 2020.
11 Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, and Paul Stronski, U.S. Policy Toward Central Asia 3.0, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, January 2016, pp. 3-4.
12 See, for example, Rumer et al, U.S. Policy Toward Central Asia 3.0; Sean Roberts, Saving Democracy Promotion
From Short-Term U.S. Policy Interests in Central Asia, The Century Foundation, 2009; Martha Brill Olcott,
“Democracy Promotion in Central Asia: From High Expectations to Disillusionment,” CORE Workshop on
Democratization in Central Asia, February 10, 2007.
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Central Asia: Implications of Russia’s War in Ukraine

U.S. policy priorities for the region are outlined in the United States Strategy for Central Asia, the
most recent version of which was issued in February 2020.13 The strategy defines the primary
U.S. strategic interest in Central Asia as building “a more stable and prosperous Central Asia that
is free to pursue political, economic, and security interests with a variety of partners on its own
terms; is connected to global markets and open to international investment; and has strong,
democratic institutions, rule of law, and respect for human rights.”14 The strategy reiterates U.S.
commitment to supporting the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Central
Asian states. Other U.S. priorities in Central Asia outlined in the Strategy include reducing the
threat of terrorism, promoting the rule of law and human rights, and promoting U.S. investment in
the region.
Since 2015, U.S. bilateral relationships in the region have been complemented by the C5+1
diplomatic platform, which provides a forum for the United States and the five Central Asian
countries to address the common challenges they face in areas such as security, economic
connectivity, and environmental vulnerabilities. The U.S. State Department notes the format’s
success in “enhancing regional dialogue, cooperation, and partnership among the participating
countries” and contributions to “increasing economic and energy connectivity and trade,
mitigating environmental and health challenges, jointly addressing security threats, and
advocating for the full participation of women in all aspects of the political, economic, and social
life of member countries.”15 The most recent C5+1 Ministerial took place in February 2023, when
Secretary of State Antony Blinken traveled to Astana, Kazakhstan, and met with his Central Asian
counterparts.16 Blinken also met separately with senior officials from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan in Astana to discuss bilateral and regional issues before traveling to
Uzbekistan to conduct similar meetings with Uzbek officials in Tashkent.
Responses to Russia’s February 2022 Invasion of
Ukraine
Despite their close security ties with Russia, the Central Asian states have avoided endorsing
Russian aggression in Ukraine. At the United Nations, the Central Asian countries either did not
cast a vote or voted to abstain on the March 2, 2022, resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine; the March 24, 2022, resolution criticizing Russia for creating a humanitarian crisis in
Ukraine; the October 12, 2022, resolution condemning the “illegal so-called referendums” held
by Russia in eastern Ukraine; the November 14, 2022, resolution calling for reparations for
Ukraine; and the February 23, 2023, resolution calling for a “comprehensive, just, and lasting
peace in Ukraine” based on the principles of the United Nations Charter.17 Analysts and some

13 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, “United States Strategy for Central Asia 2019-
2025: Advancing Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity (Overview),” February 5, 2020.
14 Ibid.
15 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement on the C5+1 Virtual Ministerial,” May 4, 2021.
16 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement on the C5+1 Ministerial in Astana,” March 9, 2023.
17 On A/RES/ES-11/1, “Aggression Against Ukraine,” Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan abstained;
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan did not vote. On A/RES/ES-11/2, “Humanitarian Consequences of the Aggression
Against Ukraine,” A/RES/ES-11/4, “Territorial Integrity of Ukraine: Defending the Principles of the Charter of the
United Nations,” A/RES/ES-11/5, “Furtherance of Remedy and Reparation for Aggression Against Ukraine,” and
A/RES/ES-11/6, “Principles of the Charter of the United Nations Underlying a Comprehensive, Just and Lasting peace
in Ukraine,” Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan abstained; Turkmenistan did not vote. On A/RES/ES-
11/3, an April 7, 2022, resolution suspending the membership of Russia in the United Nations Human Rights Council
in light of the situation in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan voted against, and
(continued...)
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Central Asia: Implications of Russia’s War in Ukraine

U.S. officials observed as significant that the Central Asian countries did not side with Russia,
even if they did not vote in favor of these resolutions.18 The governments of Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan have expressed support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, stating that they would not
recognize the Russia-backed self-proclaimed Luhansk and Donetsk republics.19 Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan have also sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine.20 Kazakh officials describe their
government’s position on the conflict as one of “strategic neutrality.”21 Kyrgyzstan expressed its
support for “compliance with the universally recognized norms and principles of international law
laid down in the U.N. Charter and other documents, including the territorial integrity of states and
the peaceful settlement of conflicts,” and the country’s president stated before parliament that
Kyrgyzstan should maintain neutrality.22 The governments of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have
been largely silent about the conflict.
Available polling indicates that public opinion on the war is divided in Central Asia; many in the
region continue to perceive Russia favorably. In one poll conducted in May and June 2022, 86%
of Kyrgyz, 76% of Uzbeks, and 55% of Kazakhs surveyed said they had a favorable opinion of
Russia.23 When asked who was mainly responsible for the situation in Ukraine, 28% of
respondents in Kazakhstan blamed Russia, whereas 19% blamed Ukraine and 10% blamed the
United States. In Kyrgyzstan, 14% indicated the conflict was Russia’s fault, 36% blamed
Ukraine, and 13% blamed the United States.24 In a November 2022 poll conducted in Kazakhstan,
22% of respondents expressed support for Ukraine, 13% said they supported Russia, and 59%
said they preferred to remain neutral; younger people were more likely to support Ukraine. When
asked about the role their country should play, 42% of respondents said Kazakhstan should act as
a peacemaker and call on Russia and Ukraine to negotiate, whereas 37% said that Kazakhstan
should remain neutral.25
Economic Implications
The five landlocked economies of Central Asia are a small part of the global economy. Together,
they account for less than 0.5% of global economic output and have a population smaller than
Germany (77 million, compared to Germany’s 83 million).26 Economically, the region’s

Turkmenistan did not cast a vote. On A/RES/77/284, an April 26, 2023, resolution on cooperation between the United
Nations and the Council of Europe that explicitly mentions “aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine,”
Kazakhstan voted in favor, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan abstained, and Turkmenistan did not vote.
18 Paul Stronski, “The Common Theme in Central Asia’s Response to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, March 30, 2022; “Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South
Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism Holds Hearing on Central Asia,” Congressional Quarterly, March 8, 2023.
19 “In Break with Moscow, Uzbeks Won’t Recognize Separatist ‘Republics’ In Ukraine,” RFE/RL, March 17, 2022.
20 Catherine Putz, “Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan Dispatch Humanitarian Aid to Ukraine,” The Diplomat, April 11, 2022.
21 CRS communication with Kazakhstan’s Special Representative for International Cooperation.
22 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, “Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Ruslan Kazakbaev Met with
Ukrainian Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic Valery Zhovtenko,” March 17, 2022; Islam Roziev, “Sadyr Zhaparov:
My dolzhny zanimat’ neitral’nuiu pozitsiiu v voine Rossii s Ukrainoi” [Sadyr Japarov: We must maintain a neutral
position in the war between Russia and Ukraine], Kloop, March 9, 2022.
23 Ali Koseoglu, “Does the Eurasian Economic Union Have a Place in Central Asia’s Future?” The Diplomat,
December 2, 2022.
24 Central Asia Barometer, “Russia-Ukraine War: Public Opinion in Central Asia,” available at https://ca-
barometer.org/assets/files/froala/f67ac6f34d17e7e3b51e3be30aedb9ffe60d9ae9.pdf.
25 Demoscope, “What People in Kazakhstan Think About the War in Ukraine,” November 30, 2022, available at
https://demos.kz/what-people-in-kazakhstan-think-about-the-war-in-ukraine-2/?lang=en.
26 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database, October 2022. GDP data are estimates for
2022 and measured in U.S. dollars at current prices.
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importance is tied to its geographic location—adjacent to Russia, China, South Asia, and the
Middle East—and its natural resources (particularly oil and natural gas). In addition to the
extraction of natural resources, agricultural production is a major sector of economic activity. The
World Bank classifies the countries of Central Asia as upper-middle and lower-middle income
countries.27
Like other developing economies, the countries of Central Asia have struggled with a series of
economic shocks: the global economic crisis of 2008-2009, the oil price shock of 2014-2015, and
the economic disruptions resulting from the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic
starting in 2020. Their economies also face persistent challenges, including prevalent corruption,
frequent natural disasters, and climate change.28 The rate of economic growth in Central Asian
economies has fluctuated over the past two decades, and largely mirrored the average growth rate
of emerging-market and developing economies (see Figure 2).
Average growth rates in Central Asia have fallen from 5.9% in 2021 to an estimated 5.1% in 2022
and 4.1% in 2023.29 Although a number of factors in the global economy continue to affect the
region, including the ongoing pandemic and related economic disruptions, Central Asian
economies are also affected by Russia’s war on Ukraine and the subsequent multilateral sanctions
imposed on Russia. The World Bank assesses that the war is constraining economic growth in the
region, although to a lesser extent than initially forecasted.30

27 World Bank Country and Lending Groups, at https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-
world-bank-country-and-lending-groups, accessed January 12, 2023.
28 Krista Lee-Jones, “Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Central Asia,” Transparency International,
January 28, 2021; Anna Bjerde, “Envisioning Central Asia’s Green Recovery,” Diplomat, July 1, 2021.
29 IMF, World Economic Outlook Databases, April 2023.
30 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, January 2023, pp. 62-63; World Bank, Social Protection for Recovery,
ECA Economic Update, Fall 2022, pp. 26-27.
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Central Asia: Implications of Russia’s War in Ukraine

Figure 2. Economic Growth in Central Asia
% Change in Real GDP

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2022.
Trade
Russia is a major trading partner for Central Asian countries, although they also have strong trade
relationships with China, Turkey, and the European Union (EU). Two Central Asian countries—
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan—belong to the Eurasian Economic Union, a Russia-led initiative
established in 2015 to integrate several post-Soviet states into an economic union (see “Russia-
Led Multilateral Organizations” below).31
Russia is a major source of imports to Central Asian countries, accounting for approximately one-
fifth to one-third of imports for each country (Figure 3). These imports vary across countries but
generally include oil, iron and steel, refrigerators, washing machines, margarine, and wood. To a
lesser extent, Russia is a main export market for Central Asian countries, particularly for ores,
iron, chemicals, vegetables, cotton, and apparel. Russia is also a major transit hub for Central
Asia, whereby goods imported into Russia are often re-exported to post-Soviet states.
The war in Ukraine and related sanctions are disrupting trade in Central Asia. Russia’s trade
contracted sharply at the start of the war (some estimates suggest 60% in March 2022), resulting
in major supply chain disruptions for goods that would normally be re-exported from Russia to
Central Asia.32 Supply chain disruptions create concerns about product shortages and inflation.33
The effects may be ameliorated as Central Asian countries attempt to develop alternative sources

31 For more on the Eurasian Economic Union, see, for example, “What Is the Eurasian Economic Union?,” Chatham
House, July 15, 2022. See also “Russia-Led Multilateral Organizations” below.
32 Zsolt Darvas, Catarina Martins, and Conor McCaffrey, “Russian Foreign Trade Tracker,” Bruegel, April 25, 2023.
33 Nizom Khodjayev, “Kazakh Businesses Reliant on Russia for Re-exports Wary of Knock-on Effects of War
Sanctions,” BNE IntelliNews, April 27, 2022.
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Central Asia: Implications of Russia’s War in Ukraine

for these products, particularly via Turkey and Poland. Some speculate that Central Asian
countries may become a market whereby goods will be re-exported to Russia, for example after
they are brought into Kazakhstan through the Chinese-Kazakh Khorgos free trade zone (see
“Potential Sanctions Evasion” below).
The war’s disruption to global agricultural
markets is also creating concerns about food
Figure 3. Central Asia’s Trade with Russia
security.34 Russia and Ukraine are major
agricultural exporters, particularly for wheat
and sunflower oil. The war has prevented
farmers in Ukraine from tending to their
crops, and both Ukraine and Russia have
restricted their agricultural exports. In March
2022, Russia briefly banned the export of
grain to countries in the Eurasian Economic
Union (including Kazakhstan). Kazakhstan,
itself also a major wheat exporter, in turn
banned the export of wheat between April and
September 2022. Normally, the other
countries in Central Asia import about 90% of
their wheat from Kazakhstan.35

Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF),
Direction of Trade Statistics.
Exchange Rates
Notes: 2021 data.
The values of Central Asian currencies
generally move in tandem with Russia’s currency, the ruble. In the initial weeks following the
renewed invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and subsequent sanctions by the United States,
the European Union, and other countries, the ruble depreciated rapidly against the U.S. dollar.36
Central Asian currencies likewise depreciated, although to a lesser extent. Russia’s central bank
quickly enacted a number of policies that stabilized the ruble, including raising interest rates and
imposing strict capital controls, and by early June the ruble had appreciated above its pre-war
value. Likewise, some central banks in Central Asia increased interest rates and used foreign
exchange reserves to stabilize their currencies.37 By early June 2022, the values of Central Asian
currencies also appreciated, but not to the same extent as the ruble (see Figure 4).
The ruble’s value remains precarious to date; it would almost certainly depreciate if the central
bank removed capital controls and lowered interest rates. The ruble depreciated in late 2022 in
light of the economic challenges resulting from the ongoing war and sanctions. Significant
movements in the value of the ruble create risks for Central Asian economies. Rapid depreciation
of their currencies increases the value (in local currency) of debts denominated in dollars, and
Central Asia’s loans from China are usually denominated in dollars. Additionally, foreign
remittances are an important source of capital for several countries in Central Asia, and changes
in the exchange rates impact the value of these remittances. More broadly, fluctuations in
exchange rates introduce uncertainty and risks in international transactions.

34 For more on the impact of the war on global food security, see CRS Insight IN11919, Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine:
Implications for Global Food Prices and Food Security, by Rhoda Margesson et al.
35 Economist, “Russia’s War Is Causing Hunger in Asia,” May 7, 2022.
36 Exchange rate data in this section from S&P Capital IQ.
37 Eurasianet, “Central Asian Currencies Feeling Heavy Pressure from Ruble’s Tumble,” February 28, 2022.
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Figure 4. Exchange Rates in Central Asia & Russia

Source: S&P Capital IQ.
Financial Institutions
Central Asia’s financial sectors are closely intertwined with Russia’s financial sector. Kazakhstan
arguably has the most developed banking sector in the region, and as of February 2022 three of its
major banks were subsidiaries of Russian banks (Sberbank, VTB, and Alfa Bank, all of which are
now sanctioned). Additionally, many Central Asian banks partner with Russian banks to facilitate
cross-border transactions in the form of credit and debit cards, as well as electronic funds and
transfers.38 Banks in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic are also connected to Russia’s
financial messaging system (the System for Transfer of Financial Messages, or SPFS), a system
to facilitate cross-border payments. Russia developed SPFS after sanctions were imposed
following its initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014.39
Sanctions on Russia’s financial sector are having broad effects on the financial sector in Central
Asia. The three Russian financial institutions with subsidiaries in Kazakhstan are all now
sanctioned, and two of the three subsidiaries have scaled back or exited Kazakhstan’s market (see
textbox). International companies are finding it difficult to transfer money to Tajikistan, because
Tajikistan’s banks are so closely intertwined with Russian banks.40 In Kyrgyzstan, ATM

38 Gregory Gleason, “Saving Central Asia from Putin’s Embrace,” War on the Rocks, April 8, 2022.
39 For more about financial messaging providers, including SWIFT, see CRS Report R46843, International Financial
Messaging Systems, by Liana Wong and Rebecca M. Nelson.
40 Kamila Ibragimova, “Tajikistan: Ruble Collapses Taking Tolls on Living Standards,” Eurasianet, March 9, 2022.
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withdrawals on Russian bank cards no longer work in many cases.41 A major bank in Uzbekistan,
Hamkorbank, suspended the transfer of funds to its bank cards through a mobile app owned by
Sberbank.42
Kazakhstani Subsidiaries of Sanctioned Russian Financial Institutions
Sanctions on Russian financial institutions fol owing the expanded invasion of Ukraine in 2022 created pressures on
subsidiaries in Kazakhstan:
•
Sanctions on Alfa Bank, the fourth largest financial institution in Russia, triggered a run on the Kazakhstani
subsidiary, which was forced to limit cash withdrawals and was subsequently purchased by a local bank (Bank
CenterCredit).43
•
Fol owing sanctions on Sberbank, the largest financial institution in Russia, Sberbank’s Kazakhstan subsidiary
sold part of its business loan and retail portfolio to a local bank (Halyk Bank), and Kazakhstan’s government
revoked the decision to use Sberbank platforms for its e-government services. In March 2023 the U.S.
Department of the Treasury removed sanctions on the former Kazakhstan subsidiary of Sberbank after 99%
of the entity’s shares were purchased by a Kazakhstani state-owned holding company.44
•
The Kazakhstani subsidiary of VTB (Russia’s second largest financial institution) is continuing to operate in
Kazakhstan despite the sanctions, seeing opportunities as other Russian banks exit or scale back.45
Banks in Central Asia may find ways around sanctions to engage in cross-border payments with
Russia. SFPS provides one such mechanism, although it is not nearly as developed as the main
global financial messaging system (the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication, or SWIFT) and sanctions make it difficult for SFPS to facilitate dollar-
denominated transactions.
Additionally, sanctions on Russia are, in limited cases, creating economic opportunities for
financial institutions in Central Asia. Approximately 500,000 Russian citizens opened bank
accounts in Kazakhstan in 2022, allowing them to circumvent financial sanctions imposed
because of the war, and Russian travel agencies are offering special packages to open bank
accounts in Uzbekistan (including assistance in preparing paperwork in advance and a visit to a
bank to sign documents and collect a debit card).46
Foreign Remittances
Russia has long been the primary destination for migrant workers from Central Asia, with more
than 7.8 million migrants from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan reportedly registered with
the Russian government in 2021.47 Most migrant workers in Russia have low-paying and

41 Ian Pryde, “Russia’s Economic Doldrums Causing Hardship in Kyrgystan,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, May
7, 2022.
42 Tashkent Times, “Hamkorbank Suspends Transfers with Russian Sberbank,” June 7, 2022.
43 A bank run is when a large number of depositors withdraw their money from banks simultaneously based on fears
that the institution will become insolvent. Paolo Sorbello, “Kazakhstani Banks Eye the Spoils of Sanctioned Russian
Subsidiaries,” The Diplomat, April 26, 2022.
44 U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Iran-Related Designations; Russia-Related
Designation Removal; Ukraine-Related Designation Removal,” March 8, 2023. See also Mengqi Sun, “U.S. to Remove
Sanctions on Former Kazakhstan Subsidiary of Russia’s Sberbank,” Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2023.
45 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Kazakh Banks Unevenly Affected by Sanctions on Russia,” June 7, 2022; Maximilian
Hess, “Does a Russian Bank Merit a Sanctions Waiver for Central Asia?,” BNE IntelliNews, May 5, 2022.
46 Joanna Lillis, “Russians Flock to Central Asia to Open Sanctions-Busting Bank Accounts,” Eurasianet, April 8,
2022; “Kazakhstan: Banks Flummoxed by Russian Money Whack-a-Mole,” Eurasianet, June 2, 2023.
47 Farangis Najibullah, “Central Asian Migrants Losing Work as Russian Businesses Downsize or Close,” Radio Free
Europe Radio Liberty, March 26, 2022.
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physically demanding jobs in the service sector, construction, and agriculture. The money migrant
workers send back to family at home (remittances) has been a main source of external financing
for some Central Asian countries.48 Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are among the most remittance-
dependent countries in the world, with remittances—predominantly from Russia—exceeding
30% of the gross domestic product (GDP) in both countries in 2022.49 Uzbekistan, Central Asia’s
most populous country, also sends large numbers of labor migrants to Russia and remittances to
Uzbekistan equaled roughly 17% of GDP in 2022.50 The World Bank initially projected that
remittances to Central Asia would decline sharply in 2022 as a result of the war; it now estimates
that remittances from Russia reached record highs in that year, due in part to increased demand
for labor and to the Russian ruble’s appreciation against the U.S. dollar.51 At the same time, the
cost of sending remittances from Russia has increased significantly due to international
sanctions.52 The World Bank assesses that remittances to Central Asia may grow more slowly in
2023 than initially projected.53
Implications for Relations with Russia
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine arguably places Central Asia in a difficult position diplomatically.
Some observers posit that the conflict has led Central Asian governments to rethink Russia’s role
in the region, and that these governments may seek to distance themselves from Russia, in what
one scholar terms a “tectonic shift away from Moscow.”54 Nevertheless, high-level contacts
between Russia and Central Asian governments are continuing. Between February and December
2022, President Vladimir Putin visited every Central Asian country, an unusually high number of
trips to the region by the Russian leader, and held more than 50 meetings with his Central Asian
counterparts.55 Some observers see this activity as a reflection of Central Asia’s increased
importance to Russia in light of shifting geopolitics. All five Central Asian presidents attended
Russia’s May 9, 2023, parade in Moscow commemorating the defeat of Nazi Germany in World
War II, reflecting what some observers see as Russia’s continued leverage over Central Asian
governments.56 One analyst posits that—with the exception of Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr
Japarov, whose attendance was announced in advance—Central Asian leaders likely made last-
minute decisions to attend in response to pressure from Putin, and that the Central Asian
presidents’ presence at the parade is part of their “survival strategy.”57 One scholar argues that

48 For more on remittances, see CRS Report R43217, Remittances: Background and Issues for the 118th Congress, by
Martin A. Weiss and Andrew P. Scott.
49 Dilip Ratha et al., “Remittances Brave Global Headwinds,” World Bank Migration and Development Brief 37,
November 2022, p. 33.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., pp. 7, 32; Dilip Ratha and Eung Ju Kim, “Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Implications for Remittance flows to
Ukraine and Central Asia,” KNOMAD Policy Brief 17, March 4, 2022, p. 3.
52 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, June 2023, p. 63.
53 Ibid.
54 Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, “Ukraine War: Is Central Asia Loosening Ties with Russia?,” Al Jazeera, March
25, 2022; Marlene Laruelle, “The End of the Post-Soviet Order: How Putin’s War Has Hurt Russia in Central Asia and
the Caucasus,” Foreign Affairs, October 13, 2022.
55 Temur Umarov, “Russia and Central Asia: Never Closer, or Drifting Apart?,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, December 23, 2022.
56 Chris Rickleton, “Central Asian Leaders Shun ‘Reputational Costs’ to Join Putin’s Victory Day Parade,” RFE/RL,
May 9, 2023. No Central Asian leaders attended the May 2022 parade.
57 Temur Umarov, “Why Did Central Asia’s Leaders Agree to Attend Moscow’s Military Parade?” The Kyiv
Independent, May 12, 2023.
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Central Asian countries are seeking to maintain the “right” distance from Russia, “balancing the
intensity of their relations with Russia in a context of the competing pressures exerted by the
Kremlin and the international community on the one hand, and those arising from domestic
political developments on the other.”58 Their “ultimately ambiguous” stance on Ukraine can be
explained by the “primacy of their domestic authoritarian stability,” which motivates them to
avoid “alienating an important source of authoritarian support or, alternatively, encountering the
potentially destabilizing criticism of Western states.”59
Since Russia’s 2014 occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea region, analysts have noted “nervousness”
in Central Asia about Russian rhetoric concerning Ukraine and the potential application of similar
sentiments toward Central Asian countries.60 This is particularly true in Kazakhstan, which is
home to a sizeable ethnic Russian minority and shares a lengthy land border with Russia. In
recent years, Russian officials, including Putin, have publicly questioned Kazakhstan’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity.61 Since Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russian
politicians and political commentators have repeatedly insinuated that a similar fate may await
Kazakhstan.62 An August 2022 social media post on the account of Russia’s former President
Dmitry Medvedev referred to Kazakhstan as an “artificial state” whose territory should be
returned to Russia; the post was quickly deleted, and a Medvedev aide claimed the account had
been hacked.63
The war has led some scholars and intellectuals to reevaluate the imperial and colonial
dimensions of Russia’s presence in Central Asia, and some observers see a rethinking of national
identities in the region.64 For instance, in Kazakhstan—a multi-ethnic country where the Russian
language has official status and remains widely spoken—reporting indicates that the war has
resulted in “unprecedented” interest in learning the Kazakh language, among both ethnic Kazakhs
and ethnic Russians.65 In the assessment of one Kazakh language activist, “the war has had a
wake-up effect on Kazakh national self-consciousness.”66

58 Luca Anceschi, “The Right Distance: Russia–Central Asia Relations in the Aftermath of the Invasion of Ukraine,”
Russian Analytical Digest No. 289, November 30, 2022.
59 Ibid.
60 Eric McGlinchey and Shairbek Dzhuraev, “Russia’s Erosion in Central Asia,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No.
808, November 2022.
61 Almaz Kumenov, “Kazakhstan bolsters defenses amid Russian invasion of Ukraine,” Eurasianet, April 14, 2022.
62 Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan-Russia frictions over Ukraine war go public,” Eurasianet, June 20, 2022.
63 “Medvedev Questions Neighbors’ Sovereignty in ‘Hacked’ Post,” The Moscow Times, August 2, 2022.
64 Botakoz Kassymbekova and Erica Marat, “Time to Question Russia’s Imperial Innocence,” PONARS Eurasia Policy
Memo No. 771, April 2022; Madina Kuanova and Aleksandr Grigoriants, “Batyl bol. Voina v Ukraine podtolknula
kazakhstantsev k otkazu ot russkogo iazyka i poisku natsional’noi identichnosti” [Batyl bol: The war in Ukraine has
pushed Kazakhstanis to reject the Russian language and search for national identity], Mediazona, May 10, 2022;
Bermet Talant, “Is The Russian Language Losing Its Dominance In Central Asia?” RFE/RL, May 27, 2022; Catherine
Putz, “Botakoz Kassymbekova and Erica Marat on Russia’s ‘Imperial Myth,’” The Diplomat, July 1, 2022; Azamat
Junisbai, “Speaking Kazakh: How Putin’s attack woke me to my own identity,” OnlySky, November 7, 2022; Levi
Bridges, “Conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan raises legacy of Russian colonialism,” The World, December 14,
2022.
65 Farangis Najibullah and Yelnur Alimova, “Kazakh-Language Club A Hit With Russian Speakers In Kazakhstan,
Amid Ukraine War,” RFE/RL, October 28, 2022.
66 Daniyar Moldabekov, “Kazakhstan: Ukraine War Motivates Russian-Speakers to Learn Kazakh,” Eurasianet,
October 31, 2022.
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Russia-Led Multilateral Organizations
Some analysts believe that the war in Ukraine may undermine the viability of Russia-led
multilateral organizations as regional countries reassess the nature of their relationships with
Russia. One such organization is the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU, also abbreviated EAEU), a
single market established in 2015 that unites Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Russia. The EEU facilitates labor migration within the bloc, but trade continues to face
administrative barriers.67 Some analysts contend that the body serves primarily as a vehicle for
Russia to exert geopolitical influence rather than a rules-based economic integration project.68
While Russia dominates the EEU and accounts for most of the bloc’s collective GDP, Kazakhstan
in particular has resisted Russian efforts to develop the EEU into more of a political union.69 The
EEU has been a source of frustration for some member states due to enduring trade barriers as
well as unilateral actions by Russia that negatively impact other member states. For example,
after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region, sanctions imposed on Russia by the
United States and the European Union and countersanctions introduced by Russia affected other
EEU members’ economies.70 Some analysts assess that the war further reduces the benefits of
EEU membership while imposing higher costs on member countries.71 Although Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan had been considering membership in recent years (Uzbekistan became an observer in
2020), some analysts see it as “unlikely” that they will seek to join the EEU in the context of the
war.72
Some countries also appear to be questioning the value of their membership in the Russia-led
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a security alliance established in 1992 that
includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, as well as Armenia and Belarus.73 Under the
auspices of the CSTO, member states conduct joint military exercises and training; member states
are also able to purchase Russian military equipment at reduced prices. Uzbekistan left the CSTO
in 2012, but the country increased security cooperation with Russia under President Shavkat
Mirziyoyev, who assumed office in 2016. As part of its constitutionally mandated neutrality
policy, Turkmenistan avoids membership in multilateral security organizations. One longtime
observer of Central Asia has posited that, in light of the war in Ukraine, the CSTO “seems to be
dying” given that “the reasons for not being a CSTO member are increasing.”74

67 Almaz Kumenov, “Kazakhstan Grumbles at Russia Breaking Trade Bloc Rules,” Eurasianet, April 28, 2021; Oybek
Madiyev, “The Eurasian Economic Union: Repaving Central Asia’s Road to Russia?” Migration Policy Institute,
February 3, 2021; Nurjamal Djanibekova, “Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan Border Crises Complicated by Mutual Distrust,”
Eurasianet, February 6, 2020.
68 Kataryna Wolczuk, “Myth 10: ‘The Eurasian Economic Union is a Genuine and Meaningful Counterpart to the
EU,’” in Duncan Allan et al., Myths and Misconceptions in the Debate on Russia, Chatham House, May 2021, pp. 63-
69.
69 See, for example, “Kazakhstan Rejects Proposal to Join Russian Sanctions-Busting Plans,” Eurasianet, June 7, 2021
and “Kazakh President Warns Against Further Integration of Russia-Led Economic Bloc,” The Moscow Times, May
25, 2023.
70 Evgeny Troitskiy, “The Eurasian Economic Union at Five: Great Expectations and Hard Times,” Wilson Center,
January 14, 2020.
71 Kataryna Wolczuk and Rilka Dragneva, “Putin’s Eurasian dream may soon become a nightmare,” Chatham House,
May 3, 2022.
72 Catherine Putz, “Can the Eurasian Economic Union Survive Putin?” The Diplomat, May 26, 2022.
73 On the CSTO, see CRS Report R46761, Russia: Foreign Policy and U.S. Relations, by Andrew S. Bowen and Cory
Welt.
74 Bruce Pannier, “Central Asia in Focus: October 11, 2022,” RFE/RL, October 11, 2022.
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This turn of events comes shortly after the CSTO’s first-ever deployment in support of a member
state, when the government of Kazakhstan requested CSTO assistance to respond to a wave of
unprecedented unrest in January 2022. At the time, some analysts posited that the CSTO
intervention would bolster the organization and potentially undermine Kazakhstan’s “multi-
vector” foreign policy, increasing the country’s dependence on Russia.75 Nevertheless, in the
wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Kazakhstan has maintained its “diplomatic balancing act,”
and Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has not shifted in favor of Russia.76 Kazakhstan’s President
Kassym-Jomart Tokayev directly rejected speculation that the CSTO intervention rendered him
beholden to Moscow.77 Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Kazakhstani
officials have repeatedly stated that CSTO forces would not be sent to Ukraine, and that
Kazakhstan would only deploy troops to Ukraine as part of a U.N. peacekeeping mission.78 Two
political scientists who conducted a public opinion survey in Kazakhstan in September
characterize popular support for CSTO membership in that country as “weak” and posit that it
will decline further.79
Some analysts see the CSTO’s credibility as undermined by the organization’s repeated failure to
mitigate armed conflicts between its member states. In September 2022, more than 100 people
were killed and more than 100,000 were displaced due to fighting between Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan that originated along the two countries’ largely undelimited border, concurrently with a
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit at which both the Tajik and Kyrgyz presidents were
present, as were Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin.80 Each side
named the other as the instigator of the conflict, and Kyrgyzstan asserted that its territory was
invaded by Tajik troops.81 A similar outbreak of violence along the border occurred during an
April 2021 CSTO summit in Tajikistan’s capital. Scholars attribute the conflict to domestic
factors in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan rather than any weakening of Russia’s position in the region,
but some analysts argue that the war in Ukraine has undermined Russia’s ability to serve as a
mediator in Central Asia.82 The most recent outbreak of violence came after more than 2,000
Russian troops stationed in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were reportedly redeployed to Ukraine.83

75 Bruce Pannier, How Intervention in Kazakhstan Revitalized the CSTO, Foreign Policy Research Institute, March
2022; Luca Anceschi, “The Week That Changed Kazakhstan Forever,” Open Democracy, January 6, 2022.
76 Christoph P. Mohr, “Kazakhstan’s Balancing Act,” International Politics and Society, March 22, 2022; Aliya Askar,
“Kazakh-Russian Relations in the Context of the War in Ukraine,” The Diplomat, March 7, 2022.
77 Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan-Russia Frictions over Ukraine War Go Public,” Eurasianet, June 20, 2022.
78 “‘Vopros dazhe ne rassmatrivaetsia’: Minoborony Kazakhstana ob otpravke mirotvortsev v Donbass” [“The issue is
not even being considered”: The Ministry of Defense of Kazakhstan on sending peacekeepers to Donbass], Nur.kz,
May 3, 2022; Tamara Vaal’, “Voiska ODKB ne budut zadeistvovany v vooruzhennom konflikte mezhdu Rossiei i
Ukrainoi—Ashimbaev” [CSTO troops will not be involved in the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine—
Ashimbaev], Vlast.kz, February 24, 2022.
79 Pauline Jones and Regina Smyth, “The Future of Kazakhstani-Russian Relations: Public Opinion and the CSTO,”
PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 806, October 2022.
80 Danil Usmanov, “Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan: The Terror and Death of a Fruitless Border Conflict,” Eurasianet,
September 18, 2022; Catherine Putz, “Kyrgyz-Tajik Conflict Escalates Even Though Presidents Met at SCO,” The
Diplomat, September 18, 2022.
81 “Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan Border Clash Resumes and Spreads,” Eurasianet, September 16, 2022; Ayzirek
Imanaliyeva, Peter Leonard, and Kamila Ibragimova, “Tens of Thousands Displaced as Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan Conflict
Rages On,” Eurasianet, September 16, 2022; Aijan Sharshenova, “More Than a ‘Border Skirmish’ Between
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,” The Diplomat, September 19, 2022; “Video Footage Appears to Implicate Tajikistan,”
Eurasianet, September 17, 2022.
82 Asel Doolotkeldieva and Erica Marat, “Why Russia and China Aren’t Intervening in Central Asia,” Foreign Policy,
October 4, 2022; Jeffrey Mankoff, “As Russia Reels, Eurasia Roils,” War on the Rocks, October 11, 2022.
83 Aibek Biybosunov and Kubat Kasymbekov, “Investigation Shows Contractors at Russian Base in Kyrgyzstan
(continued...)
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Other observers posit that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has increased the social and economic
vulnerability of communities most affected by economic downturns in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,
contributing to the escalation of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border conflict.84 Some analysts see the lack of
CSTO intervention in the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border conflict as a sign of the organization’s
dysfunction.85 Kyrgyzstan withdrew from CSTO military exercises held in Kazakhstan in October
and cancelled the portion of the exercises that were set to take place on its territory, in what one
observer saw as “a clear demonstration of Moscow’s dwindling influence in Central Asia.”86
Potential Sanctions Evasion
Some observers have raised concerns about the potential for the United States to impose
secondary sanctions on Central Asian entities if they are used to circumvent sanctions on Russia,
and the resulting economic fallout.87 In June 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau
of Industry and Security included Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan on a list of
countries that serve as “common transshipment points through which restricted or controlled
exports have been known to pass before reaching destinations in Russia or Belarus.”88 The State
Department concurrently designated an Uzbekistan-based company for “actively support[ing]”
efforts by a Russian entity specializing in procuring foreign items for Russia’s defense industry to
evade U.S. sanctions.89 Alisher Usmanov, an Uzbekistan-born Russian billionaire, was designated
by the U.S. Department of the Treasury in March 2022 for his involvement in the technology
sector of the Russian economy.90 Usmanov reportedly maintains close ties with Uzbekistan’s
government.91 In April 2023, Treasury revoked the general license that had authorized
transactions involving entities in which Usmanov holds at least a 50% stake and that are not
included on Treasury’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List.92 The State
Department concurrently designated a number of companies tied to Usmanov, including an
Uzbekistan-based cement producer.93

‘Dispatched To Ukraine,’” RFE/RL, September 13, 2022; “‘Up To 1,500’ Russian Troops Redeployed To Ukraine
From Tajik Base, Investigation Reveals,” RFE/RL, September 14, 2022.
84 Catherine Putz, “Parviz Mullojonov on the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan Border Dispute: What Explains the Dramatic
Escalation of Violence Along the Kyrgyz-Tajik Border?” The Diplomat, November 1, 2022.
85 Hélène Thibault, “L’impact de la guerre en Ukraine en Asie centrale: instabilité, méfiance et perte d’influence russe”
[The impact of the war in Ukraine on Central Asia: Instability, mistrust, and loss of Russian influence], Le Rubicon,
December 14, 2022.
86 Ali Koseoglu, “Does the Eurasian Economic Union Have a Place in Central Asia’s Future?” The Diplomat,
December 2, 2022.
87 Nizom Khodjayev, “Russia’s Sanctions Woes Could Be a Shot in the Arm for Kazakhstan ... or the Kiss of a Dead
Man,” bne IntelliNews, March 29, 2022.
88 U.S. Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, “FinCEN and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau
of Industry and Security Urge Increased Vigilance for Potential Russian and Belarusian Export Control Evasion
Attempts,” June 28, 2022.
89 U.S. Department of State, “Targeting Russia’s War Machine, Sanctions Evaders, Military Units Credibly Implicated
in Human Rights Abuses, and Russian Federation Officials Involved in Suppression of Dissent,” June 28, 2022.
90 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Russians Bankrolling Putin and Russia-Backed Influence
Actors,” March 3, 2022.
91 Catherine Putz, “New Ukraine Sanctions Target Business Interests of Russian-Uzbek Billionaire Usmanov,” The
Diplomat, April 14, 2023.
92 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Russian Financial Facilitators and Sanctions Evaders Around the
World,” April 12, 2023.
93 U.S. Department of State, “Further Curbing Russia’s Efforts to Evade Sanctions and Perpetuate its War against
Ukraine,” April 12, 2023.
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Some analysts view sanctions compliance as a question of economic self-preservation for Central
Asia, rather than a means of signaling disapproval of Russia’s invasion or support for the West.94
Kazakhstan, the world’s largest uranium producer, has rerouted exports to avoid Russia in light of
sanctions.95 Some banks throughout the region have ceased accepting Russian-issued Mir
payment cards, and Uzbekistan has suspended the use of Mir cards entirely.96 In September 2022,
the then-U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan stated in press remarks that the government of
Uzbekistan “stated very clearly” its intention to comply with sanctions on Russia.97 In November
2022 remarks to the press, Kazakhstan’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs stated, “our territory
has not been used and will not be used for sanctions evasion in any form,” adding that, “the
principled position of Kazakhstan is that Kazakhstan does not allow its territory to be used to
circumvent sanctions.”98
Reporting indicates that Central Asian countries—particularly Kazakhstan, which shares a
lengthy border with Russia—are functioning as a transit route for parallel imports to Russia.99
Analysis by Bloomberg determined that there was a significant increase in consumer electronics
imports to Kazakhstan from the European Union in the first half of 2022, coinciding with an
increase in shipments of such products from Kazakhstan to Russia. European officials have
reportedly expressed concern that components and microchips from such appliances transiting
through Kazakhstan may be being used by Russia for military purposes as a means of
circumventing sanctions, although analysts assess that at least some of this spike may represent
an “opportunistic” means of meeting Russian consumer demand.100 The Organized Crime and
Corruption Reporting Project additionally found that Russian citizens have established companies
in Kazakhstan in order to import sensitive electronics such as drones and microchips.101
Kazakhstan introduced a new system to more closely monitor re-exports in April 2023.102 The
Financial Times found that, since February 2022, at least $1 billion in dual use items—goods
with both civil and military application—subject to European Union (EU) export controls likely
ended up in Russia under the pretense of shipment from the EU to Armenia, Kazakhstan, and
Kyrgyzstan, indicating that Russia is potentially sidestepping sanctions via falsified EU customs
declarations.103

94 Temur Umarov, “Russia and Central Asia: Never Closer, or Drifting Apart?” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, December 23, 2022.
95 Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan Moves Uranium Exports through Middle Corridor,” Eurasianet, January 3, 2023.
96 Joanna Lillis, “Kyrgyz Banks Shun Russia’s Mir Cards to Avoid Sanctions Contagion,” Eurasianet, October 18,
2022; “US Sanctions Threat Zaps Russia’s Homegrown Mir Cards in Setback,” Bloomberg, November 22, 2022;
Siddharth Venkataramakrishnan and Nastassia Astrasheuskaya, “Russians Search for Bootleg Solutions to Overcome
Payments Sanctions,” Financial Times, April 9, 2023.
97 “Uzbekistan Is Set to Comply with Sanctions Against Russia, Says U.S. ambassador,” The Tashkent Times,
September 5, 2022.
98 “Kazakhstan ne pozvoliaet ispol’zovat’ svoiu territoriu dlia obkhoda sanktsii—MID” [Kazakhstan does not allow its
territory to be used to circumvent sanctions—MFA], KazTAG, November 30, 2022.
99 “Russia’s Parallel Imports Hindered by Central Asia Bottleneck,” Eurasianet, April 10, 2023.
100 Alberto Nardelli, Bryce Baschuk, and Marc Champion, “Putin Stirs European Worry on Home Appliance Imports
Stripped for Arms,” Bloomberg, October 29, 2022.
101 Maria Zholobova, Benjamin Bidder, Vyacheslav Abramov, and Ilya Lozovsky, “Kazakhstan Has Become a
Pathway for the Supply of Russia’s War Machine. Here’s How It Works,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting
Network, May 19, 2023.
102 Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan Poised to Intensify Vetting of Re-exports to Russia,” Eurasianet, March 22, 2023;
Catherine Putz, “Kazakhstan Moves to Curtail Parallel Trade to Russia,” The Diplomat, May 10, 2023.
103 Chris Cook, Federica Cocco, and Max Seddon, “EU Goods Worth at Least $1bn Vanish in Russia ‘Ghost Trade,’”
Financial Times, May 10, 2023.
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Central Asian Migrants in Russia
Russian authorities have introduced incentives to encourage Central Asian migrants to join the
Russian armed forces, including fast-track citizenship and high salaries, and are reportedly
attempting to recruit Central Asia’s military veterans.104 Since Russia’s February 2022 invasion,
the governments of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan—the three Central Asian countries that
send the most labor migrants to Russia—have issued reminders to their citizens that fighting in a
foreign war is a criminal offense.105 Similar legislation exists in Kazakhstan. In addition, religious
authorities from the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan issued a statement asserting that Muslims
should not participate in armed conflicts except to defend their homeland.106 Some Central Asian
nationals have reportedly been coerced or misled into joining the Russian military.107 Reported
casualties of the conflict include Central Asian nationals, some of whom had become naturalized
citizens of Russia, fighting for the Russian military, as well as Central Asian nationals recruited to
fight for the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company.108 Some Central Asians have
also reportedly volunteered to fight for Ukraine.109 The overall number of Central Asians
participating in the armed conflict is difficult to determine, although analysts assess that it is
likely small, citing dozens of confirmed cases. More Central Asian nationals are estimated to be
fighting on the Russian side, likely due to labor migration patterns.110

104 Christ Rickleton, “Russian Military Eyes Central Asian Recruits Amid Mobilization Drive,” RFE/RL, September 23,
2022; “Central Asians Targeted in Russia’s Desperate Mobilization Drive,” Eurasianet, October 3, 2022.
105 Embassy of the Republic of Tajikistan in the Russian Federation, “Vnimanie, uvazhaemye grazhdane Respubliki
Tadzhikistan!” [Attention, dear citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan!], September 22, 2022; Embassy of the Kyrgyz
Republic in the Russian Federation, “Informatsionnoe soobshchenie Posol’stva ot 21 sentiabria 2022 goda” [Embassy
announcement dated September 21, 2022], September 21, 2022; “Naemnichestvo i postuplenie na sluzhbu v
inostrannye struktury podlezhat ugolovnoi otvetstvennosti – Miniust” [Being a mercenary and entering service in
foreign structures are subject to criminal liability – Ministry of Justice], kun.uz, March 2, 2022. In May 2023, a Bishkek
court sentenced a Kyrgyz citizen to 10 years in prison for fighting for Russian forces in Ukraine. See “Kyrgyz
Mercenary Who Fought for Russia in Ukraine Jailed,” Agence France Presse, May 17, 2023. Kyrgyz authorities have
also launched a criminal case against a Kyrgyz citizen who is reportedly leading a Turkic battalion within the Ukrainian
armed forces. See Munduzbek Kalykov, “GKNB nachal sledtstvie po faktu uchastiia kyrgyzstantsa v voine v Ukraine”
[GKNB has begun an investigation into the participation of a Kyrgyzstani in the war in Ukraine], Kloop, November 22,
2022.
106 “Muslim Board of Uzbekistan Calls on Citizens Not to Join the Russian-Ukrainian War,” kun.uz, September 23,
2022.
107 Chris Rickleton, “Tricks, Threats, Tragedy: Central Asian Migrants Targeted In Russian Military Mobilization,”
RFE/RL, October 18, 2022; “Central Asians Targeted in Russia’s Desperate Mobilization Drive,” Eurasianet, October
3, 2022; Coleen Wood and Sher Khashimov, “Central Asians in Russia Pressured to Join Moscow’s Fight in Ukraine,”
The Moscow Times, March 17, 2022.
108 Catherine Putz, “Ethnic Central Asians Among Those Killed With the Russian Army in Ukraine,” The Diplomat,
March 25, 2022; Eliza Kenenbaeva, “For Money or a Passport: Many Kyrgyz Fighting Alongside Russians in
Ukraine,”RFE/RL, April 10, 2022; Khadisha Akaeva and Aiia Reno, “‘Veroiatnost’, chto eti liudi vernutsia, nevelika,’
Kak ChVK ‘Vagner’ verbuet v Kazakhstane i pochemu s etim ne boriutsia?” [“‘The likelihood that these people will
return is low.’ How does PMC Wagner recruit in Kazakhstan, and why is that not being fought?”], Radio Azattyq, April
10, 2023. On the Wagner Group, see CRS In Focus IF12344, Russia’s Wagner Private Military Company (PMC), by
Andrew S. Bowen.
109 “Central Asians Fight in Ukraine Eyeing Russian Citizenship,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, April 19,
2022.
110 Nurbek Bekmurazev, “Central Asians Fighting in Ukraine Are Both Defending and Attacking It,” Global Voices,
March 23, 2023; Farangis Najibullah, “Central Asians Pressed to Fight in Ukraine with Russian Troops Returning
Home in Coffins,” RFE/RL, February 25, 2023.
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In addition to being targeted for military recruitment, Central Asian laborers in Russia are
reportedly being hired to work in Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine.111 Some analysts posit that
the war may increasingly push Central Asian labor migrants toward alternative destinations such
as Kazakhstan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.112 To date, however, migration from
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to Russia has remained strong.113
Russians Fleeing to Central Asia
The war has brought an unprecedented influx of Russian citizens into Central Asia. With the
exception of Turkmenistan, Central Asian countries allow Russian nationals visa-free entry and
impose few barriers for extended stays, making the region an attractive option for some of those
seeking to leave Russia.114 An initial wave of Russian migration to Central Asia shortly after
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began comprised largely tech workers and others who could work
remotely.115 Some governments, including Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, introduced programs
intended to entice Russian tech workers to relocate to their countries.116 A second, larger wave of
migrants followed Russia’s announcement of “partial mobilization” on September 21, 2022, and
included many with fewer financial resources. Between September 21 and October 5, more than
200,000 Russian citizens entered Kazakhstan, which shares a 4,750-mile land border with Russia;
an estimated 50,000 entered Uzbekistan in the same period.117 Large-scale travel by Russian
citizens to Central Asia continued in the following weeks. While many Russians used Central
Asia as a transit point before traveling elsewhere, hundreds of thousands remain in the region.118
Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev stated that his government would “ensure their safety.”119
Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov welcomed the influx of Russians, saying they need not fear
extradition.120 Similarly, the government of Uzbekistan has indicated that it will not deport
Russians fleeing mobilization.121 Reporting indicates a significant increase in interest from
Russians in obtaining citizenship from Central Asian countries such as Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan.122 Kazakhstan deported an officer from Russia’s Federal Guard Service for illegally

111 Sher Khashimov, “By Sending Migrants to Ukraine, the Kremlin Is Damaging Ties with Central Asia,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, March 31, 2023.
112 Joanna Lillis, “As Russian Economy Sputters, UK Lures Central Asian Labor Migrants,” Eurasianet, June 15, 2022.
113 Catherine Putz, “War and Migration: Central Asian Migrant Worker Flows amid the Ukraine Conflict,” The
Diplomat, May 31, 2023.
114 See Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan: New Migration Rules to Hit Russians Fleeing the Draft,” Eurasianet, January 17,
2023.
115 Ayzirek Imanaliyeva, “Kyrgyzstan Joins the List of Countries Favored by Russia’s Emigres,” Eurasianet, March 18,
2022; “Uzbekistan Lays out the Red Carpet for Fleeing Russian IT Specialists,” Eurasianet, March 16, 2022.
116 Djoomart Otorbaev, “Central Asia’s Bidding War for Russian Emigrants,” Project Syndicate, October 12, 2022;
Kenneth Rapoza, “Techies from Russia, Belarus, Find Solace in Uzbekistan. Can They Attract Western Outsourcers?”
Forbes, July 3, 2022; Ayzirek Imanaliyeva, “Kyrgyzstan Joins the List of Countries Favored by Russia’s Emigres,”
Eurasianet, March 18, 2022.
117 “Why the Exodus of Russians to Central Asia Matters,” The Economist, October 12, 2022.
118 CRS communication with Kazakh officials, May 2022.
119 “Kazakhstan to Ensure Safety of Russians Fleeing Draft—President,” AFP, September 27, 2022.
120 Andrew Higgins, “Russians Fleeing the Draft Find an Unlikely Haven,” New York Times, October 5, 2022.
121 “Uzbekistan Says It Won’t Deport Russians Fleeing Conscription,” Reuters, September 30, 2022; “MID vystupil s
raz”iasneniem po otdel’nym voprosam o situatsii vokrug Ukrainy i uvelichenii chisla pribivaiushchikh v Uzbekistan
rossiiskikh grazhdan” [The MFA issued an explanation on certain issues related to the situation concerning Ukraine and
the increase in the number of Russian citizens arriving in Uzbekistan], Dunyo, September 30, 2022.
122 Farangis Najibullah, “Russians Getting Kyrgyz Passports as a Way out amid Ongoing Ukraine War,” April 4, 2023;
Farangis Najibullah, “Private Firms Obtain Kyrgyz Citizenship for Russians Desperate to Escape Homeland,” RFE/RL,
May 30, 2023.
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crossing the border in December 2022, and has since denied asylum to at least one Russian
military deserter on similar grounds.123 The government of Kyrgyzstan has reportedly pressured
Russian activists in order to discourage them from public anti-war activity.124
Some analysts argue that Russians relocating to Central Asia boost the region’s economies, and
that startup hubs in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are “growing at breakneck speed”
thanks to the exodus of IT professionals from Russia.125 Other observers see the influx of Russian
citizens relocating in response to the war as a “humanitarian crisis in the making” for Central
Asia, however, as it places pressure on already strained housing markets.126 Both waves of
migration brought spikes in rental prices in many Central Asian cities, and some local residents
have reportedly been evicted by landlords seeking to extract higher rents from new Russian
arrivals.127 Some observers also suggest that the influx of thousands of Russians could lead to
strains on Central Asia’s job markets.128 Analysts assess that public opinion among Central Asians
is mixed when it comes to Russians fleeing mobilization.129 In a November poll conducted in
Kazakhstan, 38% of respondents stated they did not support mass migration by Russian citizens
to their country, 27% expressed support, and 22% said they were indifferent.130
Seeking Alternative Partners
International sanctions on Russia have hampered Central Asian trade, spurring some Central
Asian leaders to explore alternative transit routes.131 Similarly, Central Asian governments have
been moving to diversify their security relationships, accelerating a trend that began in the past
decade.132 Both Turkey and Iran have been actively engaging Central Asian governments on trade
and security issues.133 India, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates have also been ramping up
outreach to Central Asia.134 During an October 2022 trip to Kazakhstan for the first-ever

123 “Russian’s Kazakh Asylum Request Denied, Gets Suspended Sentence for Crossing Border Illegally,” RFE/RL,
May 3, 2023; “FSB Officer Who Sought Asylum In Kazakhstan Jailed In Siberia,” RFE/RL, March 24, 2023.
124 Kamila Eshalieva, “Kyrgyzstan was a safe haven for anti-war Russians. Then things got hostile,” Open Democracy,
April 12, 2023; Nurbek Bekmurazev, “Kyrgyzstan: Exiled Russians facing pressure for anti-war stance,” Eurasianet,
March 13, 2023.
125 Aaron Eglitis, “Putin’s War Boosts Central Asian Economies as Russians Relocate,” Bloomberg, May 16, 2023;
Katie Marie Davies, “Startup Revolution: Can Central Asia reap the rewards of Russia’s IT exodus?” Meduza, March
16, 2023.
126 Yan Matusevich, “Central Asia Faces a Russian Migrant Crisis,” Foreign Policy, October 4, 2022.
127 Fatima Yerbolek, “Evicted by Putin: Central Asia Renters Forced Out for Russians,” Eurasianet, November 18,
2022; Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan: Rents Rocket as Russian Draft Dodgers Push Up Demand,” Eurasianet, September
27, 2022.
128 “Why the Exodus of Russians to Central Asia Matters,” The Economist, October 12, 2022.
129 Asel Doolotkeldieva, “Russian Draft Dodgers Find Mixed Reception in Central Asia,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, October 19, 2022; Kirill Krivosheev, “Russia’s Mass Exodus Is Forcing Its Neighbors to Get Off
the Fence,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 5, 2022; Yan Matusevich, “Central Asia Faces a
Russian Migrant Crisis,” Foreign Policy, October 4, 2022.
130 Demoscope, “What People in Kazakhstan Think About the War in Ukraine,” November 30, 2022, available at
https://demos.kz/what-people-in-kazakhstan-think-about-the-war-in-ukraine-2/?lang=en.
131 Sophia Nina Burna-Asefi, “Uzbekistan Looks South for New Trade Routes,” The Diplomat, April 1, 2022.
132 See, for example, Bruce Pannier, “Russia’s Two Centuries of Central Asia Dominance Are Over,” bne IntelliNews,
October 11, 2022 and Bruce Pannier, “Filling the Geopolitical Void in Central Asia,” Foreign Policy Research Institute,
November 14, 2022.
133 Francisco Olmos, “Busy Times in Iran-Central Asia Relations,” June 24, 2022; Bruce Pannier, “Filling the
Geopolitical Void in Central Asia,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, November 14, 2022.
134 Bruce Pannier, “Filling the Geopolitical Void in Central Asia,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, November 14,
2022; Dante Schulz, “How India Can Broaden its Relationships with Central Asia,” The Diplomat, December 10, 2022.
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European Union-Central Asia leaders’ summit, European Council President Charles Michel called
for increased cooperation between the EU and Central Asia.135 Kazakhstan has been pursuing
expanding trade across the Caspian Sea via Azerbaijan to Turkey and by rail via Turkmenistan
and Iran to Turkey.136 The bulk of Kazakhstan’s oil is exported by pipeline via Russia, and that
route has been interrupted four times since March 2022, in what some analysts see as retaliation
for Kazakhstan’s refusal to support Russian aggression in Ukraine.137 Kazakhstan has begun
shipments of oil across the Caspian by barge to Azerbaijan, and plans to continue expanding this
export route, although capacity is currently limited by existing infrastructure.138 Uzbekistan is
seeking to establish transit routes across Afghanistan to Pakistan and Iran, although some
observers question the viability of these efforts in light of the security situation.139 The war in
Ukraine has brought increased interest in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also
known as the Middle Corridor, which aims to connect rail freight transport networks in China and
the European Union via Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Turkey, bypassing Russia.140 Some
analysts speculate that China will be the primary beneficiary of any distancing between Central
Asia and Russia.141
Implications for China’s Presence in Central Asia
Geographic proximity binds the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) and Central Asia
together, particularly in terms of security and economic development. Since Russia’s 2022
invasion of Ukraine, PRC leaders’ numerous high-level exchanges (including in-person visits)
with Central Asian counterparts suggest Beijing is interested in bolstering ties. PRC leaders attach
great importance to regional stability, fearing potential spillover effects of unrest in Afghanistan
on the PRC’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), where the PRC has reportedly
adopted repressive policies and committed human rights abuses against religious and ethnic
minorities, including Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz. Although PRC state media entities are
active in promoting the Chinese government’s official narrative in Central Asia, Central Asian
communities have increasingly unfavorable perceptions of China, as measured by the biannual
Central Asia Barometer Survey.142 Some analysts attribute the negative turn in opinion to a range
of factors, including China’s treatment of ethnic and religious minorities; numerous corruption
scandals concerning China-based companies involved in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
projects; and rising nationalist sentiment in Central Asian countries.143

135 European Council, “Remarks by President Charles Michel After His Meeting with President of Kazakhstan Kassym-
Jomart Tokayev in Astana,” October 27, 2022.
136 Paul Bartlett, “Central Asia Looks Beyond Russia’s Orbit to Secure Its Future,” Nikkei Asia, November 15, 2022;
Joanna Lillis, “In Turkey, Kazakhstan’s President Talks Trade and China Transport,” Eurasianet, May 11, 2022.
137 Almaz Kumenov, “Kazakh Oil Exports Across Russia Interrupted for Fourth Time This Year,” Eurasianet, August
23, 2022.
138 Haley Nelson, “Kazakhstan Sends Second Oil Shipment Across the Caspian Sea to Baku,” Caspian Policy Center,
March 29, 2023; “Astana zaiavliaet o planakh narastit’ ob”em postavok nefti cherez Azerbaidzhan” [“Astana
announces plans to increase oil supplies via Azerbaijan”], Radio Azattyq, April 10, 2023.
139 Sofia Nina Burna-Asefi, “Uzbekistan Looks South for New Trade Routes,” The Diplomat, April 1, 2022.
140 Kanat Shaku, “Is the Middle Corridor All It’s Cracked Up to Be?” bne IntelliNews, October 15, 2022.
141 Keith Bradsher, “In the ‘Great Game’ of Central Asia, China’s Leader Seeks the Advantage,” New York Times,
September 16, 2022.
142 Elizabeth Woods and Thomas Baker, “Public Opinion on China Waning in Central Asia,” The Diplomat, May 5,
2022.
143 Ibid.
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Central Asia also is a geographic focus of China’s BRI, an effort to boost infrastructure
development and economic connectivity—and expand China’s influence—around the world.
Leaders of all five Central Asian countries joined the BRI, and they have signed cooperation
agreements covering economic integration efforts, including in infrastructure and connectivity
projects, standards and technical cooperation, and joint development of special economic and
trade zones.144 Some experts see China’s economic engagement with Central Asia as being in
direct competition with similar Russian initiatives, including the Eurasian Economic Union.145
Over the longer term, China’s efforts to establish stronger trade links with Central Asia and
increased regional connectivity could significantly affect regional food and energy trade
networks.
Diplomatic Relations
In 2022, China held several high-level exchanges with Central Asian countries that suggest a
particular interest in strengthening relations with the region in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion.
The most important of these exchanges were PRC leader Xi Jinping’s state visits to Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan in September 2022, coinciding with the 2022 Summit of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO)—a Eurasia-based group with members including Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, but also China and Russia (see “Regional Security Cooperation,”
below). The two-country tour was Xi’s first foreign trip since January 2020. During the trip, Xi
met with the five Central Asian presidents,146 and he indicated China’s willingness to strengthen
cooperation within the “China+Central Asia” (“C+C5”) mechanism, as well as to work with
Central Asia to implement two of Beijing’s new policies: the Global Development Initiative
(GDI) and the Global Security Initiative (GSI).147 Announced in September 2021 and April 2022
respectively, the initiatives (while still vague) propose new architectures for global development
and security, for which the PRC has sought to rally the support of developing countries.
A number of high-level exchanges with Central Asian leaders preceded President Xi’s September
2022 visit. In January 2022, Xi participated in a virtual summit to commemorate the 30th
anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and the five Central Asian countries.148 Then-
State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visits to the region in June and August 2022
shortly followed. During his June visit, Wang participated in the third C+C5 Foreign Ministers’
Meeting in Kazakhstan, where the six parties agreed to establish a heads of state meeting
mechanism for the C+C5 platform and adopted four outcome documents.149 One of these
documents expressed support for a regional version of China’s Data Security Cooperation
Initiative, which seeks to strengthen coordination on cross-border data flows.150 China’s readout

144 Fabio Indeo, “China and Russia: Cooperation or Rivalry Along the Belt and Road Initiative?” in China’s Belt and
Road Initiative in Central Asia: Ambitions, Risks, and Realities, OSCE Academy in Bishkek (2020), at https://osce-
academy.net/upload/file/BRI_08_07.pdf, p. 8.
145 Ibid.
146 During the Summit, Xi also met with a number of other leaders, including Vladimir Putin.
147 The one exception is Tajikistan, the readout for which did not mention either the Global Development Initiative or
the Global Security Initiative. See Foreign Ministry of the PRC, “President Xi Jinping Meets with Tajik President
Emomali Rahmon,” September 15, 2022.
148 Foreign Ministry of the PRC, “Xi Jinping Chairs the Virtual Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of
Diplomatic Relations Between China and Central Asian Countries,” January 25, 2022.
149 Foreign Ministry of the PRC, “Wang Yi Talks about the Outcomes and Consensus of the Third China+Central Asia
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” June 8, 2022.
150 Foreign Ministry of the PRC, “‘中国＋中亚五国’数据安全合作倡议”(“C+C5 Data Security Cooperation
Initiative”), June 8, 2022, at https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202206/t20220609_10700811.shtml.
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of the meeting states that all sides agreed to “coordinate positions on the situation in Afghanistan
in a timely manner,” but it does not mention Ukraine.151 In May 2023, China held the first in-
person C+C5 Summit in Xi’an, bringing together Xi and the five Central Asian presidents.152
Some observers see the summit as evidence that China is increasingly challenging Russia’s
influence in Central Asia in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine.153
Regional Security Cooperation
Over the last decade, China’s security presence in Central Asia has increased, as have arms
transfers and military-to-military ties, including joint exercises. Security has also been a key
theme of some of China’s recent high-level visits to the region. In April 2022, then-PRC Minister
of Defense Wei Fenghe visited Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The tour included meetings with
Kazakh President Tokayev and Turkmen President Berdimuhamedov and their respective defense
ministers. During the meetings, the parties
discussed strengthening military exchanges and
The Global Security Initiative
cooperation in “equipment technology” and
•
exchanged views on the situations in Ukraine and

Unveiled during Xi’s April 2022 speech at the
Boao Forum for Asia, the PRC’s Global
Afghanistan.156
Security Initiative (GSI) aims to “promote
China’s influence on the region’s security
security for all in the world.”154 Though the
exact nature of the Initiative remains largely
architecture may increase if Central Asian
undefined, Xi’s speech highlighted the
countries become increasingly reluctant to engage
importance of “staying committed” to “the
with Moscow as a security partner. Beijing does
vision of common, comprehensive,
not seem to be actively trying to reduce Russia’s
cooperative and sustainable security”;
“respecting the sovereignty and territorial
role in Central Asia at present. The March 22,
integrity of all countries”; and “taking the
2023 joint statement following Xi’s visit to Russia
legitimate security concerns of all countries
explicitly noted that China and Russia “are willing
seriously” as some of the GSI’s founding
to strengthen cooperation, support Central Asian
principles.
countries in safeguarding their national
•
Notably, Xi’s speech also mentioned
sovereignty, guaranteeing national development,
upholding the principle of indivisible
and opposing external forces’ promotion of ‘color
security—frequently cited by Russia as part of
its justifications for invading Ukraine—as one
revolutions’ and interference in regional
of the main ideas at the heart of the GSI.155
affairs.”157

151 Foreign Ministry of the PRC, “Wang Yi Talks about the Outcomes and Consensus of the Third China+Central Asia
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” June 8, 2022.
152 Foreign Ministry of the PRC,“外交部长秦刚就中国外交政策和对外关系回答中外记者提问” (“Foreign Minister
Qin Gang Answers Questions from Chinese and Foreign Journalists on China’s Foreign Policy and External
Relations”), March 7, 2023. Xi and his Central Asian counterparts attended a virtual summit in 2022 marking the 30th
anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and the five Central Asian countries.
153 “Xi Invites C. Asian Leaders to First Summit in China,” Agence France Presse, March 21, 2023.
154 The State Council, “Full Text: President Xi Jinping’s Keynote Speech at the Opening Ceremony of BFA Annual
Conference 2022,” April 21, 2022.
155 For more on the concept on “indivisible security,” see Alexander Graef and Ulrich Kühn, “A Letter From Moscow:
(In)divisible Security and Helsinki 2.0,” War on the Rocks, February 14, 2022.
156 Ministry of National Defense of the PRC, “Turkmen president meets with Chinese defense minister,” April 26,
2022; Ministry of National Defense of the PRC, “Kazakh president, Chinese defense minister agree to strengthen
military cooperation,” April 26, 2022.
157 Foreign Ministry of the PRC,
“中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦关于深化新时代全面战略协作伙伴关系的联合声明” (“Joint Statement between
(continued...)
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Recent interactions between PRC and Central Asian officials suggest Beijing is focused on
shoring up security fundamentals (e.g., military exchanges and counterterrorism cooperation), at
least in the short term. This approach allows China to participate in regional security without
taking on any new commitments or alienating Russia. At the SCO Summit in 2022, for example,
Xi pledged that China “is ready to train 2,000 law enforcement personnel for SCO member states
in the next five years, and establish a China-SCO base for training counter-terrorism personnel, so
as to enhance capacity-building for law enforcement of SCO member states.”158
Over the longer term, the PRC has sought to broaden the SCO as a platform for cooperation
beyond security. Xi seems to have reaffirmed this intent at the 2022 Summit, when he stated that,
“as an important constructive force in international and regional affairs,” the SCO “should keep
itself well-positioned in the face of changing international dynamics, [ ... ] strengthen solidarity
and cooperation and build a closer SCO community with a shared future.”159 Over time, PRC
leaders may hope to shift security cooperation with Central Asia to China’s nascent GSI, which
Beijing pitched to Central Asian governments in June 2022, but which does not include Russia.160
China–Central Asia Trade and the Belt and Road Initiative
Following the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union, China began steadily building trade and
economic relationships with each of the Central Asian countries.161 In recent years, analysts have
noted that China is eclipsing Russia in terms of its economic presence in the region. According to
customs data from China and the five Central Asian countries, China ranked among the top six
trading partners of each country and was the largest trading partner of both Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan prior to the onset of COVID-19. According to data from China’s General
Administration of Customs, in 2021, China exported goods to Central Asia totaling
approximately $29.5 billion in value and imported approximately $17.4 billion in goods from the
region, primarily in the oil and gas, metals, and agricultural sectors. In January 2022, PRC
Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao claimed that China’s trade with the region had “grown by
more than 100 times in the past 30 years.” Wang also said China would continue to invest in
infrastructure and connectivity projects to further deepen ties.162 During a summit hosted by
Chinese leader Xi Jinping in January 2022, Xi announced that China would further open its
market to imports from Central Asia with the goal of increasing total trade turnover to $70 billion
between China and the region by 2030.163

the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of
Coordination in the New Era”), March 22, 2023.
158 The State Council Information Office of the PRC, “Full Text of Xi’s Speech at the SCO Samarkand Summit,”
September 17, 2022.
159 Ibid.
160 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Wang Yi Attends the Third ‘China + Central Asia’
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” June 9, 2022.
161 China Briefing, “China and Central Asia: Bilateral Trade Relationships and Future Outlook,” May 20, 2021, at
https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-and-central-asia-bilateral-trade-relationships-and-future-outlook.
162 State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “China-Central Asia Trade Grew by 100 Times over 30 Years,”
press release, January 18, 2022, at http://english.www.gov.cn/statecouncil/ministries/202201/18/
content_WS61e60de2c6d09c94e48a3cf9.html.
163 “Full Text: Remarks by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Virtual Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary
of Diplomatic Relations Between China and Central Asian Countries,” Xinhua, January 25, 2022; Almaz Kumenov,
“China promises more investment at Central Asia summit,” Eurasianet, January 26, 2022.
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Table 1. Snapshot of China’s Trade with Central Asia
Total Imports from C5
Total Exports to C5
Top PRC Import
Country
2020
2021
2020
2021
Categories
Kazakhstan
$9,273,669,859
$9,805,100,650
$11,703,134,130
$13,971,277,470 Oil, copper, zinc,
base metals
Kyrgyzstan
$66,041,403
$34,801,089
$2,865,365,575
$7,477,464,298
Precious metals,
cotton, aluminum
Tajikistan
$84,619,584
$45,293,459
$1,016,842,189
$1,685,742,986
Precious metals,
cotton, base metals
Turkmenistan $8,686,022,768
$6,071,881,112
$443,488,588
$514,491,192
Oil, vegetables, salt,
chemicals
Cotton, oil,
Uzbekistan
$2,180,781,409
$1,483,308,489
$5,138,716,239
$5,896,823,304
chemicals,
vegetables
C5 Total
$20,291,135,023
$17,440,384,799
$21,167,546,721
$29,545,799,250
Source: Congressional Research Service with China Customs data from Trade Data Monitor.
Infrastructure projects have long been a focus of China’s investment and financing activities in
Central Asia, particularly since the announcement of the BRI. PRC entities have focused heavily
on projects that increase connectivity and facilitate trade both within the region and between the
region and the PRC. Between 2008 and 2017, China Development Bank and China Ex-Im Bank
(China’s two major state banks involved in overseas project finance) provided an estimated $30.5
billion in financing for infrastructure construction and industrial upgrading projects in the C5
countries.164 Oil and gas pipelines have been a particular focus of China’s long-term investment
and financial involvement in the region, with several major projects predating the BRI.
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan all ranked among China’s top five suppliers of natural
gas delivered via pipeline in January-April 2022 according to PRC customs data, though both
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have announced plans to halt exports within the next five years to
meet domestic demand.165 In the midst of international sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine, Kazakhstan’s Atasu-Alashankou pipeline continues to be a major artery in oil trade
between China and Russia—in February 2022, Russian oil firm Rosneft extended by 10 years a
prior agreement to supply China with 200,000 barrels of crude oil per day via the pipeline.166
China is also mobilizing significant finance and investment in developing new transit corridors
and digital infrastructure that could entrench its role in Central Asia’s medium-to-long-term
economic development. In 2017 and 2020 respectively, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan formally
requested to join the Quadrilateral Traffic in Transit agreement (QTTA) between China, Pakistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, originally signed in 1995 to harmonize customs procedures between
the four countries.167 China and other Central Asian countries have continued to reference the
QTTA and its potential touchpoints with other planned economic corridors within the BRI, such
as CPEC, as a foundation for further connectivity projects, such as the China-Kyrgyzstan-
Uzbekistan (CKU) railway, which is set to begin construction in 2023 pending feasibility

164 Rebecca Ray et al., “Geolocated Dataset of Chinese Overseas Development Finance,” Scientific Data 8, 241 (2021),
at https://doi.org/10.1038/s41597-021-01021-7/.
165 Joanna Lillis, “Uzbekistan Resumes Gas Exports to China,” Eurasianet, May 23, 2022.
166 “Russia’s Rosneft Agrees 100 mln T Oil Supply Deal with CNPC,” Reuters, February 4, 2022.
167 Mubarak Zeb Khan, “Uzbekistan Looks to Pakistani Ports,” Dawn, May 8, 2020.
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studies.168 Chinese firms are also involved in building out various components of digital
infrastructure grids in Central Asian countries, with projects including local surveillance
networks, cloud storage and computing facilities, and “smart city” projects, including a planned
$1 billion investment in Uzbekistan’s digital infrastructure and a major smart city platform in
Tashkent.169
Although China’s involvement in the region is significant and appears to be accomplishing stated
PRC objectives of deepening China’s trade with and economic development role in the region,
some experts have noted signs of deepening suspicion of and potential hostility toward certain
forms of PRC economic involvement in the region, which some local interest groups view as
predatory. Data collected by the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs on protests and labor
disruptions in the region recorded a total of 158 demonstrations related to PRC projects in the
region between September 2019 and May 2021 and some of these protests were attributed to fears
that the projects would result in land seizures or job losses among local workers.170 Other experts
have highlighted recent efforts by PRC firms to increase the degree of localization in their Central
Asian operations in response to backlash against PRC-funded projects. Such backlash may
indicate a strategic opportunity for U.S. engagement in the region to offer an alternative to PRC-
funded development projects.171
Issues for Congress
Some analysts assess that Eurasia’s shifting geopolitics in the wake of the war present new
opportunities for U.S. engagement with Central Asia. Congress might consider various avenues—
including trade, energy, minerals, regional connectivity, security cooperation, and media
freedom—for developing bilateral and multilateral relations with regional countries.
Trade
U.S. trade with Central Asia remains limited. With the exception of Kyrgyzstan, Central Asian
countries are governed by Section 402 of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618), the so-called
Jackson-Vanik amendment. This section denies normal trade relations (NTR) status to some
current and former nonmarket economy countries unless they adhere to certain freedom-of-
emigration requirements. Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan receive
temporary NTR status under a provision of the amendment that allows the President to extend
NTR status to a country affected by the amendment by either waiving the freedom-of-emigration
requirements or determining that the country is not in violation of the amendment’s provisions,
subject to annual review. A complete lifting of the Jackson-Vanik requirements would require
Congress to pass relevant legislation. Legislation that would have exempted Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan was introduced in previous Congresses but did not make it out of

168 Global Times, “China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway to Start Construction in 2023: Kyrgyz President Tells Local
Media,” June 2, 2022.
169 Australian Strategic Policy Institute, “Mapping China’s Tech Giants,” last updated June 2021, at
https://chinatechmap.aspi.org.au/#/map/f1-Kyrgyzstan,f1-Kazakhstan,f1-Tajikistan,f1-Turkmenistan,f1-Uzbekistan.
170 Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, “Central Asia Protest Tracker,” accessed June 7, 2022, at
https://oxussociety.org/viz/protest-tracker/.
171 Dirk Van Der Kley and Niva Yau, “How Central Asians Pushed Chinese Firms to Localize,” Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, October 15, 2021, at https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/10/15/how-central-asians-pushed-
chinese-firms-to-localize-pub-85561.
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committee.172 The Biden Administration supports lifting Jackson-Vanik for those three
countries.173 H.R. 1755 and H.R. 3611, introduced in the 118th Congress, would authorize the
President to determine that Jackson-Vanik should no longer apply to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan,
respectively, and to extend permanent normal trade relations to those countries.
The Biden Administration seeks to address the war’s economic reverberations in Central Asia
through the Economic Resilience in Central Asia Initiative (ERICEN), launched in September
2022. Using $50 million in FY2022 and FY2023 funding, ERICEN aims to diversify trade routes,
increase shipping capacity, and enhance Trans-Caspian infrastructure, in addition to bolstering the
private sector (including by facilitating the movement of Western multinational companies to
Central Asia) and providing training and education opportunities.174 In the assessment of one
analyst, despite its small scale, “ERICEN lays the groundwork for prosperous trade relations and
business partnerships” and “can emphasize U.S. comparative advantages in terms of international
standards that bring greater long-term benefits” as compared to Chinese investment.175 Others
have criticized ERICEN as too modest in size, with one scholar terming it “not a very serious
gesture” due to the fact that “$50 million is insignificant compared to what other powers are
bringing in.”176 Congress could consider whether to appropriate additional funding for the
initiative.
Energy
Because Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan produce significant volumes of natural gas,
some analysts in the United States and the European Union have argued that these countries
represent a potential alternative to Russian natural gas for the European market.177 To date,
Central Asian and European countries have not traded gas directly. The proposed Trans-Caspian
Gas Pipeline would enable Turkmenistan to supply gas to European markets, but this project has
been hampered by opposition from Russia and Iran, as well as by unresolved questions
concerning the delimitation of Caspian seabed rights.178 Azerbaijan has begun exports of Caspian
natural gas to Europe, and in January 2021 the governments of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan
signed an agreement to jointly develop a previously disputed gas field on their maritime border,
potentially facilitating future gas exports from Turkmenistan to Europe.179 In July 2022, Turkey
announced that it is exploring avenues for supplying gas to its Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas
Pipeline (TANAP), which runs from northeastern Turkey to the border with Greece, from

172 These bills include: 117th Congress: H.R. 1913 (Uzbekistan), H.R. 5544 (Kazakhstan), H.R. 9322 (Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan); 115th Congress: H.R. 4067 (Kazakhstan); 114th Congress: H.R. 3400 (Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), H.R. 4219 (Kazakhstan), S. 3413 (Kazakhstan); 112th Congress: H.R. 1102 (Kazakhstan);
111th Congress: H.R. 876 (Kazakhstan), H.R. 2631 (Kazakhstan), S. 282 (Kazakhstan); 110th Congress: H.R. 2415
(Kazakhstan), S. 2562 (Kazakhstan); 109th Congress: H.R. 4004 (Kazakhstan); 108th Congress: H.R. 3708
(Kazakhstan); 107th Congress: H.R. 1318 (Kazakhstan), H.R. 3979 (Uzbekistan), S. 168 (Kazakhstan).
173 “Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism Holds
Hearing on Central Asia,” Congressional Quarterly, March 8, 2023.
174 U.S. Department of State, “Economic Resilience in Central Asia Initiative,” February 28, 2023.
175 Haley Nelson, “The U.S. Confronts China’s Long Game in Central Asia: How the U.S. is Addressing the
Implications of China’s BRI,” Caspian Policy Center, March 6, 2023.
176 Navbahor Imamova, “Blinken’s Central Asia Visit Raises Questions on US Role, Assistance,” VOA News, March 2,
2023.
177 See CRS Report R42405, European Energy Security: Options for EU Natural Gas Diversification, coordinated by
Michael Ratner.
178 Ibid.
179 David O’Byrne, “Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan Agreement Advances Caspian Gas Cooperation,” Eurasianet,
January 22, 2021.
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Turkmenistan via Azerbaijan.180 Congress could consider how the United States might promote
the development of gas supplies from Central Asia to Europe. Although they are gas producers,
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have each experienced domestic energy crises in
recent winters due to increased domestic demand combined with infrastructural deficiencies.
Promoting energy security within Central Asia, including by supporting a transition to renewable
energy sources, is a stated goal of U.S. policy in the region.181 Congress could consider whether
existing programs are effective, and whether and how they should potentially be expanded.
Central Asian countries have significant potential to develop wind, solar, and hydropower energy
sources. In recent years, some Central Asian governments have committed to diversifying toward
renewable energy. Both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have initiated solar energy projects with
Chinese and European investors.182 Central Asia’s water resources give some countries in the
region “immense” hydropower potential, but they also serve as a potential source of conflict
given downstream countries’ dependence on the region’s rivers for irrigation.183 Although Central
Asian countries have made some progress in resolving recurrent disagreements over the
management of water resources, access to water continues to be a focal point of intermittent
cross-border disputes.184 Some analysts argue that climate change will lead to additional stress on
Central Asia’s water resources, heightening the potential for conflict.185
Minerals
Central Asia is rich in mineral deposits, including rare earth elements and rare metals. The U.S.
Geological Survey assesses that, in additional to substantial known deposits, Central Asia may
have “considerable undiscovered resources.”186 Scholars assess that Central Asian countries have
mineable resources of most of the critical materials necessary for clean energy technologies and
that, thanks to the diversity of the region’s mineral base, Central Asia is “likely to become a new
hotspot for mineral extraction.”187 Some analysts argue that Central Asia could serve as a
significant source of rare earths, particularly for countries seeking to diversify their imports away
from China, but cite legislation and investment climates unfavorable to foreign mining companies
and a lack of up-to-date geological maps as factors hampering development.188 Some Members of
Congress have expressed interest in Central Asia as a source of rare earth elements and rare
metals for the United States, suggesting that the United States assist Central Asian countries in

180 David O’Byrne, “Turkey looking to transit Turkmen gas via Azerbaijan,” Eurasianet, July 5, 2022.
181 See, for example, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, “United States Strategy for
Central Asia 2019-2025: Advancing Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity (Overview),” February 5, 2020, and U.S.
Agency for International Development, “USAID Power Central Asia,” at https://www.usaid.gov/central-asia-regional/
fact-sheets/usaid-power-central-asia.
182 Niva Yau, “Chinese Solar Investments in Central Asia: A Snapshot,” Eurasianet, October 15, 2020.
183 International Hydropower Association, “Region Profile: South and Central Asia,” at https://www.hydropower.org/
region-profiles/south-and-central-asia and Bruce Pannier, “Hydropower a Hot Topic in Central Asia, and Not Just from
the Usual Suspects,” RFE/RL, June 19, 2017. On the hydropower potential of individual Central Asian countries, see
Bahtiyor Eschchanov et al., “Hydropower Potential of the Central Asian Countries,” Central Asian Regional Data
Review 19 (2019): 1-7.
184 Alima Dalbaeva, “End the Weaponisation of Water in Central Asia,” International Crisis Group, March 15, 2018.
185 Khamza Sharifzoda, “Climate Change: An Omitted Security Threat in Central Asia,” The Diplomat, July 22, 2019;
and World Economic Forum, “Climate Change Is Threatening Security in Central Asia,” January 25, 2019.
186 U.S. Geological Survey, “Rare Earth Element and Rare Metal Inventory of Central Asia,” March 2018.
187 Roman Vakulchuk and Indra Overland, “Central Asia is a missing link in analyses of critical materials for the global
clean energy transition,” One Earth vol. 4, issue 12, December 2021: 1678-1692.
188 Robert Cekuta et al., Sourcing Rare Earth Minerals in Central Asia, Caspian Policy Center, June 2022.
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conducting surveys and encourage investment by U.S. private sector companies.189 In March
2023, the U.S. Geological Survey signed a memorandum of understanding with Kazakhstan’s
Ministry of Industry and Infrastructural Development on scientific and technical cooperation,
including developing new mineral maps.190
Regional Connectivity
Promoting regional connectivity has long been a U.S. policy priority in Central Asia, and the
United States has funded projects promoting regional cooperation in a range of areas. Since 2015,
U.S. bilateral relationships in the region have been complemented by the C5+1 diplomatic
platform, which provides a forum for the United States and the five Central Asian countries to
address common challenges they face in areas such as security, economic connectivity, and
environmental vulnerabilities. Some analysts suggest that regional connectivity in Central Asia
has taken on added significance in light of the war in Ukraine. In his March 2023 testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Near East, South Asia, Central Asia,
and Counterterrorism, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Donald Lu stated
that furthering regional connectivity would grant Central Asian countries “options that enable
them to stand firm in the face of malign influence.”191 For instance, greater regional connectivity
could bolster Central Asia’s energy security and decrease its dependence on Russian natural gas,
as well as facilitate trade via routes that bypass Russia. Congress could consider how Central
Asian regional connectivity aligns with broader U.S. interests in light of the war, and how U.S.
programs could support connectivity within Central Asia in a new geopolitical context. Congress
could consider, for instance, whether to appropriate additional funding for the Biden
Administration’s ERICEN initiative in order to bolster connectivity within Central Asia.
Security Cooperation
In his March 2023 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Near
East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism, Assistant Secretary of State for South and
Central Asia Donald Lu stated that the war in Ukraine has created new opportunities for security
cooperation between the United States and Central Asia, noting Central Asian countries’ desires
to diversify the sourcing of their defense equipment away from Russia as well as the success of
the National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP) in the region.192 Through the SPP, four of
the five Central Asian countries are paired with U.S. states (Kazakhstan-Arizona, Kyrgyzstan-
Montana, Tajikistan-Virginia, and Uzbekistan-Mississippi), developing military-to-military
contacts and receiving training in areas such as counterterrorism and disaster preparedness.
Turkmenistan previously partnered with Nevada from 1996 to 2011.193 In September 2022,
Turkmenistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs met with the Commander of the Montana National
Guard to discuss the resumption of Turkmenistan’s participation in the SPP, and the two sides

189 “Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism Holds
Hearing on Central Asia,” Congressional Quarterly, March 8, 2023.
190 “Kazakhstan and US Discuss Cooperation in Field of Geology,” El.kz, March 1, 2023; Kazakh Embassy DC, March
2, 2023, tweet, available at https://twitter.com/KazakhEmbassy/status/1631269272121929728; “Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism Holds Hearing on Central
Asia,” Congressional Quarterly, March 8, 2023.
191 “Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism Holds
Hearing on Central Asia,” Congressional Quarterly, March 8, 2023.
192 Ibid.
193 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Central Asia,” May
19, 2021.
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“expressed their readiness to further develop and strengthen military cooperation with the United
States in accordance with the norms of the Constitution of Turkmenistan,” which mandates
neutrality as the basis of the country’s foreign policy.194 Some scholars and U.S. officials have
identified training and professional military education as areas of opportunity for expanding
security cooperation between the United States and Central Asian countries.195 Congress might
consider how to take advantage of new opportunities for engagement with Central Asian
countries in the security sphere, whether by funding new programs or examining the effectiveness
of existing programs.
Nonproliferation has historically been a major area of U.S. engagement with Central Asia,
particularly with Kazakhstan.196 Following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, one Kazakh
official cited Senate ratification of the negative security assurance protocol of the Central Asian
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ) treaty as an example of “low-hanging fruit” that would
demonstrate U.S. commitment to developing relations with Central Asia, noting that the
institutionalization of the CANWFZ has gained new strategic meaning.197 The CANWFZ treaty,
which entered into force in 2009, prohibits the production, acquisition, stationing, storage, or use
of nuclear weapons on the territory of the five Central Asian states. Like other nuclear-weapon-
free zone treaties, CANWFZ includes a protocol to be signed and ratified by the five nuclear
weapon states (the United States, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom), pledging that
they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the countries in the zone, also called
negative security assurances.198 The United States signed the CANWFZ protocol in 2014.
President Barack Obama sent it to the Senate for its advice and consent for ratification in 2015,
stating, “ratification of the Protocol is in the best interest of the United States, as it will enhance
U.S. security by furthering our objective of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons [and]
strengthen our relations with the states and the people of Central Asia.”199 China, France, Russia,
and the United Kingdom have ratified the CANWFZ protocol.200 One expert argues that negative
security assurances, similar to those in the NWFZ protocols, have become increasingly significant

194 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan, “A Meeting with the Adjutant General of the State of Montana on
Military Issues Was Held at the MFA of Turkmenistan,” available at https://www.mfa.gov.tm/en/news/3357.
Turkmenistan previously partnered with Nevada from 1996 to 2011.
195 Erica Marat, “China’s Expanding Military Education Diplomacy in Central Asia,” PONARS Eurasia, April 19,
2021; Karoun Demirjian, “U.S. Works to Scale up Intelligence Networks in Central Asia,” Washington Post, June 21,
2022.
196 See, for example, Togzhan Kassenova, “Project Sapphire: How to Keep 600 Kilograms of Kazakh Highly Enriched
Uranium Safe,” War on the Rocks, April 1, 2022, National Nuclear Security Administration, “Top NNSA Leaders Visit
Kazakhstan, Discuss Continued Security, Nuclear Nonproliferation Cooperation,” October 14, 2022.
197 Remarks by Kazakh Ambassador Yerzhan Ashikbayev at the Kennan Institute, May 2, 2023, available at
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/future-central-asias-development-between-russia-and-china.
198 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in Central Asia
(CANWFZ), available at https://treaties.unoda.org/t/canwfz. See also CRS Report RL33865, Arms Control and
Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
199 U.S. Senate, “Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, Signed at New York on May 6, 2014,” 114th Congress, 1st Session, Treaty Doc.
114-2, 2015.
200 See United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in
Central Asia,” at https://treaties.unoda.org/t/canwfz_protocol. The United States has similarly signed but not ratified
Protocols to the African and South Pacific NWFZ treaties. All three remain on the Senate calendar. The United States
ratified the protocols to the Latin American NWFZ. See United Nations Platform for Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones,
“Protocols to the Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaties,” at https://www.un.org/nwfz/content/protocols-nuclear-
weapon-free-zone-treaties and CRS Report RL33865, Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and
Agreements, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
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in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.201 The Biden Administration supports the ratification of
the CANWFZ protocol.202
Media Freedom and Combatting Disinformation
Central Asia is a challenging environment for press freedom. Although Kyrgyzstan has long had
the freest media in the region, analysts note increasing government pressure on independent
outlets, including a 2021 law on “false information” that enables authorities to block access to
websites publishing information deemed to be “inaccurate.”203 Some Members of Congress have
expressed concern about “recent regressions in press freedom in the Kyrgyz Republic,” citing the
government’s crackdown on independent media, particularly Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s
Kyrgyz Service, and reports of threats of violence against journalists.204 In Kazakhstan, several
incidents of violence against journalists in January 2023 drew expressions of concern from the
United States and other governments.205 Independent journalists have criticized proposed changes
to legislation regulating Kazakhstan’s media, unveiled in January 2023 and officially geared
toward bolstering the country’s information security in light of the global geopolitical situation, as
introducing new means of censorship.206 Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has stated
his support for press freedom, but journalists in the country note “hidden but strict” censorship.207
Reporters Without Borders describes increasing government repression of independent media in
Tajikistan, which ranks 152nd out of 180 countries in the organization’s 2022 World Press
Freedom Index. Turkmenistan, considered one of the world’s most repressive countries, ranks
177th. 208 At the same time, Russian media outlets remain a major source of international news
throughout Central Asia.209 Some scholars express concern that this renders Central Asian
populations vulnerable to Russian propaganda and disinformation.210 Congress might consider
options for supporting media freedom and combatting disinformation in Central Asia, whether by
drawing attention to instances of pressure on independent media or expanding programming in
this area.

201 Francesca Giovannini, “Negative Security Assurances After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” Arms Control Today,
July/August 2022, at https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-07/features/negative-security-assurances-after-russias-
invasion-ukraine/.
202 U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, “Ambassador Bruce Turner’s Remarks to the Conference on
Disarmament on Nuclear Weapon Free Zones,” January 31, 2023.
203 Catherine Putz, “Kyrgyzstan’s Media Under Pressure,” The Diplomat, February 7, 2023; Catherine Putz, “Will
Kyrgyzstan’s ‘False Information’ Law Threaten Free Speech?” The Diplomat, August 26, 2021.
204 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Menendez, Risch Condemn Kyrgyz Republic’s Crackdown on RFE/RL,
Other Independent Media,” January 20, 2023.
205 U.S. Embassy to Kazakhstan, January 20, 2023, tweet, available at https://twitter.com/USembassyKAZ/status/
1616394959665483778; and Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Kazakhstan, “Local EU Statement
on Recent Attacks on Independent Journalists in Kazakhstan,” January 20, 2023; British Embassy Astana, January 20,
2023, tweet, available at https://twitter.com/UKinKZ/status/1616391114491133953. See also Dmitriy Mazorenko and
Paolo Sorbello, “Against Journalists, Violence Without Borders in Kazakhstan,” Global Voices, March 9, 2023.
206 Almaz Kumenov, “Kazakhstan: Wary Media See Peril in Government Attempt to Combat Fake News,” Eurasianet,
March 3, 2023.
207 “Uzbekistan: Plea for Greater Press Freedoms Greeted with Rebukes and Silence,” Eurasianet, March 9, 2023.
208 Reporters Without Borders, “Tajikistan,” available at https://rsf.org/en/country/tajikistan; Reporters Without
Borders, “Turkmenistan,” available at https://rsf.org/en/country/turkmenistan.
209 Central Asia Barometer, “Russia-Ukraine War: Public Opinion in Central Asia,” available at https://ca-
barometer.org/assets/files/froala/f67ac6f34d17e7e3b51e3be30aedb9ffe60d9ae9.pdf.
210 “Central Asia’s Vulnerability to Russian Propaganda,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, December 13, 2022.
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Author Information

Maria A. Blackwood, Coordinator
Rebecca M. Nelson
Analyst in Asian Policy
Specialist in International Trade and Finance

Ricardo Barrios
Michael D. Sutherland
Analyst in Asian Affairs
Analyst in International Trade and Finance

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
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