Cybersecurity: Bureau of Cyber Statistics

Cybersecurity: Bureau of Cyber Statistics

Cybersecurity: Bureau of Cyber Statistics
January 19, 2023
The scope and scale of cyberattacks against the United States have been difficult to catalog and
quantify. Most observers recognize the frequency, severity, and diversity of such attacks as
Chris Jaikaran
increasing. A lack of uniform data on the attacks stymies public policy debate and action.
Specialist in Cybersecurity
Policy
Some government agencies and private companies already collect cyber incident information.

Federal and state regulators may require certain entities to report when they experience certain
types of attacks; and private cybersecurity companies collect data on incidents from their

customers. However, the data are not centralized, standardized, or filtered for duplication. The
variation of data and the number of different houses for those data limit the data’s use to understand the scope and scale of
cyberattacks.
In an effort to create a central repository of cyber incident data, Congress enacted the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical
Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA). The act requires the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to (1)
engage in rulemaking to require private sector entities to report when they experience a cyberattack or pay a ransom; (2)
enforce compliance with required reporting; and (3) disseminate analysis based on the information collected. CISA is
currently working with stakeholders on developing a notice of proposed rulemaking.
A proposal that extends this concept is the Cyberspace Solarium Commission’s (Commission) recommendation to create a
Bureau of Cyber Statistics (BCS). The Commission’s proposed BCS would be a federal statistical agency, and would collect,
process, analyze, and distribute data on cybersecurity incidents, as well as the effects of those incidents. The proposal meets
much of what CIRCIA intends. However, there is a key difference; the audience for BCS outputs would be policymakers and
industry decisionmakers, as opposed to just the cybersecurity community. As a federal statistical agency, a BCS would
produce objective analysis on cyber incidents to inform policymakers and industry, rather than collecting and analyzing data
to serve a purpose or program for the agency itself. Additionally, as a federal statistical agency, a BCS would follow strict
and rigorous methodologies for collecting and processing data, adding to its credibility.
Other federal statistical agencies include the U.S. Census Bureau, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, and the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
The Commission identified five distinct attributes for a BCS: (1) definition of cybersecurity metrics; (2) collection and
aggregation of cyberattack data; (3) reporting mandates for incidents; (4) data and privacy protection; and (5) information
exchange between academia and the private sector. While not specifically discussed by the Commission, an analytic
capability would also be necessary for a BCS to develop useful products for policymakers and industry.
Recent proposals have advocated for establishing a BCS within CISA so that resources developed to implement CIRCIA can
be leveraged. Despite the capabilities outlined by CIRCIA, CISA would still need to add others in order to achieve the full
BCS capability.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
The Case for Improved Cybersecurity Statistics ............................................................................. 1
Data for Risk Management ....................................................................................................... 2
Review of the Bureau of Cyber Statistics Proposal ......................................................................... 3
BCS as a Federal Statistical Agency ......................................................................................... 4
Cyber Incident Reporting Data Sources .......................................................................................... 5
CISA Data Sources and Limitations.......................................................................................... 7
Considerations for CISA Undertaking BCS Responsibilities .......................................................... 9
Defining Cybersecurity Metrics ................................................................................................ 9
Collecting and Aggregating Data ............................................................................................ 10
Reporting Mandates for Incidents ........................................................................................... 10
Protecting Data and Privacy .................................................................................................... 10
Exchanging Information Between Academia and the Private Sector ....................................... 11
Analyzing Data......................................................................................................................... 11

Tables
Table 1. Selected Cyber Incident Reporting Requirements ............................................................. 5

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 12

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Introduction
This report provides information and analysis regarding the Cyberspace Solarium Commission’s
(Commission) 2020 recommendation to create a Bureau of Cyber Statistics (BCS).1
The Case for Improved Cybersecurity Statistics
Industry groups,2 private companies,3 and think tanks4 have all attempted to catalogue and qualify
the scope and scale of cyberattacks against the United States. It is widely accepted that with each
passing year, such attacks become more diverse, more frequent, and more impactful.5 Despite
acceptance of these subjective statements as objective information, stakeholders have also
recognized that the available data are insufficient to quantify and evaluate the totality of attacks
and their effect on the nation.
Existing data on cyberattacks are held among many different public and private sources across
federal and nonfederal entities. The data held by these entities are inconsistently reported, uneven
in data object values (i.e., the information collected), and potentially redundant or duplicative.
Furthermore, most of the available data only measure cyber risk input (e.g., the type of attack,
indicators of compromise, and attribution). Data on attack responses and outcomes—measures
that successfully defended the attack, the quantified loss from a successful attack (e.g., profit loss
or down time), and changes to business operations from the attack—are rarely collected and
analyzed. These challenges manifest for both government and industry in similar ways—the lack
of data leads to weak analysis and poorly informed decisionmaking.
Some scholars argue that the lack of consistent and complete data inhibits policymakers from
understanding the true scope and scale of cybersecurity risk and adopting appropriate policies to
address those risks.6 An analogy may be drawn to crime statistics: scholars argue that the
standardized collection and analysis of national crime statistics have contributed to more
evidence-based policymaking and positive policy shifts.7
Congress may experience challenges with insufficient data when evaluating annual agency
budget requests or considering new authorizations for agencies. Members are asked to make
choices on which programs to resource and determine how much investment will lead to a
sufficient reduction in cybersecurity risk. Without independent information on risk management,
Members must rely on agency claims and stakeholder input to determine which programs are
funded and at what levels.

1 Cyberspace Solarium Commission, “Final Report,” Recommendation 4.3, March 2020, at https://cybersolarium.org/
wp-content/uploads/2022/05/CSC-Final-Report.pdf.
2 FS-ISAC, “Navigating Cyber: 2021,” report, 2021, at https://www.fsisac.com/hubfs/GIOReport2021/
NavigatingCyber2021.pdf.
3 Verizon, “DBIR: Data Breach Investigations Report,” report, 2022, at https://www.verizon.com/business/resources/
reports/2022/dbir/2022-data-breach-investigations-report-dbir.pdf.
4 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Significant Cyber Incidents,” website, May 2022, at
https://www.csis.org/programs/strategic-technologies-program/significant-cyber-incidents.
5 CRS Video WVB00451, 2022 Issues & Policy - The Evolution of Cybersecurity Issues in the 117th Congress, by
Chris Jaikaran.
6 Eileen Decker and Mieke Eoyang, “We Need Better Cybercrime Data,” Lawfare, April 15, 2020, at
https://www.lawfareblog.com/we-need-better-cybercrime-data.
7 Ibid.
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Industry also faces challenges from the lack of useful data. For instance, cybersecurity insurance
has been touted as a market-driven tool to reduce cyber risk by pricing policies based on data
related to risk exposure and mitigating measures.8 However, the scarcity of historical information
related to cyberattacks has complicated efforts to create accurate actuarial data.9 Traditionally,
insurers use data from previous claims as well as new data on emerging risks to develop price
models for new policies, but in the absence of that information, these models have yet to be fully
developed.10
Data for Risk Management
Risk is a function of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. Data on risk (e.g., the
vulnerabilities that threat actors compromise and where an entity is vulnerable) are necessary to
adequately assess management strategies’ effectiveness. The Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) has recognized the lack of comprehensive data on cybersecurity risk and has funded
projects through its Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) related to improved information
sharing (IMPACT)11 and the economics of risk mitigation (CYRIE).12 However, the limited scale
of the pilot projects, low visibility into the work, and lack of mandates stymied project success
and led to the end of government sponsorship.
Risk can be managed by avoiding it, transferring it, controlling it, and finally accepting it. One
may also ignore risk, but that is not a management strategy. Cybersecurity insurance represents
one way to mitigate risk—by transferring it. Companies may choose to control risk by buying
goods and services to reduce their vulnerabilities or the consequences of an attack. However,
without knowledge of the scope of risk and emerging trends, individual firms face similar
challenges as Congress does when resourcing federal agencies—firms are uncertain which
solutions are best to invest in and what investment levels may achieve desired effects.13
Additionally, insurers and firms are resigned to measure past risk and assume measures to control
that risk will be sufficient in the future. However, cybersecurity risk is constantly evolving.
Threat actors and cybersecurity companies continually learn from each other’s tactics and strive
to outpace the other’s efforts. This active and dynamic environment means that past performance
rarely provides a stable assumption upon which to base future investments.

8 Department of Homeland Security/National Protection and Programs Directorate, Cybersecurity Insurance Workshop
Readout Report, November 2012, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
November%202012%20Cybersecurity%20Insurance%20Workshop.pdf.
9 National Research Council of the National Academies, At the Nexus of Cybersecurity and Public Policy: Some Basic
Concepts of Issues, 2014, at https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/18749/at-the-nexus-of-cybersecurity-and-public-
policy-some-basic.
10 Andrew Granato and Andy Polacek, “The Growth and Challenges of Cyber Insurance,” Chicago Fed Letter, 2019, at
https://www.chicagofed.org/-/media/publications/chicago-fed-letter/2019/cfl426-pdf.pdf?sc_lang=en.
11 Department of Homeland Security, “Information Marketplace for Policy and Analysis of Cyber-Risk & Trust,”
website, October 25, 2021, at https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/cybersecurity-impact.
12 Department of Homeland Security, “Cyber Risk Economics,” website, January 27, 2022, at https://www.dhs.gov/
science-and-technology/cyrie.
13 This assumes a firm is willing to invest in cybersecurity risk management. Many businesses may lack the knowledge,
resources, or desire for major cybersecurity investments.
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Review of the Bureau of Cyber Statistics Proposal
To provide better data to public policymakers and private decisionmakers, the Commission
recommended in 2020 establishing a statistical agency to collect, process, analyze, and distribute
data on cybersecurity incidents and their effects. This recommendation to create a Bureau of
Cyber Statistics would inform efforts to create and amend cybersecurity policy and programs as
well as complement other Commission recommendations, such as those related to informing
national risk management and helping insurers create more accurate risk models.
The Commission based its BCS recommendation on the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
Created in 1884, the BLS strives to provide objective and unadulterated data on the labor market
for policymakers. To do this, BLS identified measures and metrics to track key matters (e.g.,
labor market activity, price changes, and unemployment), confidentially collects this data from
respondents, and applies a transparent methodology to the data to create data products.14 In turn,
policymakers use BLS data (e.g., on employment, wage growth, and inflation)15 and products like
the Employment Cost Index16 to understand the state of the national economy and inform policy
decisions.
Similarly, a BCS could identify key measures of cyber incidents (e.g., common vulnerabilities
exploited and costs associated with downtime and response) and develop data products (e.g.,
quantified attacks by critical infrastructure sector or region) to better understand national cyber
risk.
To aid Congress in establishing a BCS, the Commission drafted model legislative text, which
further elaborates on their recommendation.17 The proposed BCS would be established within a
federal agency.18 The proposed BCS would be charged with:
 collecting and analyzing cybersecurity information (e.g., cyberattacks and crime)
on a continual basis;
 compiling and publishing statistics from that cybersecurity information;
 coordinating with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) on
standards and metrics for ensuring the reliability and validity of cybersecurity
statistics;
 researching and innovating on methods to collect and analyze anonymized
cybersecurity statistics;
 entering into agreements with other agencies, academia, and private companies to
support the bureau’s duties;
 providing the President, Congress, other federal agencies, the private sector, and
the general public with cybersecurity statistics;

14 Bureau of Labor Statistics, “About the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,” website, June 1, 2020, at
https://www.bls.gov/bls/infohome.htm.
15 Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Economic News Releases,” website, April 4, 2022, at https://www.bls.gov/bls/
newsrels.htm#major.
16 Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Employment Cost Index News Release,” USDL-22-0712, April 29, 2022, at
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/eci.htm.
17 Cyberspace Solarium Commission, “4.3 Establish a Bureau of Cyber Statistics,” draft legislation, May 2022, at
https://cybersolarium.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Recommendation_4.3.pdf.
18 The original proposal called for establishing a BCS within the Department of Commerce, but the recent draft text
changed to place it within the CISA.
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 liaising with state and local governments; and
 participating with other federal statistical agencies and conforming to such laws
and regulations related to disclosure of federal statistical data.
In addition to these duties, the BCS would be authorized to develop specific statistics related to
federal network operations, provide grants to state governments to help them submit data to the
bureau, promulgate a rule requiring entities to report to the BCS after experiencing a
cybersecurity incident, and issue fines to entities that violate the rule.
BCS as a Federal Statistical Agency
The legislative proposal highlights the importance of the proposed BCS as a federal statistical
agency. A federal statistical agency is an executive branch organizational unit “whose principal
function is to collect, compile, analyze, and disseminate information for such statistical uses as
monitoring key economic and societal indicators ... evaluating programs, and conducting
scientific research.”19
Federal statistical agencies and recognized statistical units are subject to Office and Management
and Budget (OMB) regulations pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950
(P.L. 84-784),20 the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (P.L. 104-13),21 and the Information
Quality Act (P.L. 106-554)22 such as Statistical Policy Directive 1.23 Information collected and
used by federal statistical agencies are also subject to confidentiality and use restrictions per the
Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act of 2018 (CIPSEA, P.L. 115-
435).24
Federal Statistical Agency

A federal statistical agency (or entity) engages with statistical activities for a statistical purpose.
Statistical activities are defined as “the col ection, compilation, processing, analysis, or dissemination of data for the
purpose of describing or making estimates concerning the whole, or relevant groups or components within, the
economy, society, or the natural environment, including the development of methods or resources that support
those activities, such as measurement methods, models, statistical classifications, or sampling frames. Statistical
activities implicitly but necessarily involve the design, editing, and storage of statistical data as instrumental to
col ection, compilation, processing, analysis, release, and dissemination of statistical information. Therefore, for
clarity, this Directive explicitly refers to each of these as statistical activities.”
Statistical purpose is defined as “the description, estimation, or analysis of the characteristics of groups, without
identifying the individuals or organizations that comprise such groups; and includes the development,
implementation, or maintenance of methods, technical or administrative procedures, or information resources
that support such purposes.”
(Office of Management and Budget, “Statistical Policy Directive No. 1: Fundamental Responsibilities of Federal
Statistical Agencies and Recognized Statistical Units,” 79 Federal Register 71614, December 2, 2014.)

19 “Summary,” in Principles and Practices for a Federal Statistical Agency, ed. Brian A. Harris-Kojetin and Constance
F. Citro, 7th ed. (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2021), p. 1.
20 31 U.S.C. §1104(d).
21 44 U.S.C. §3504(e).
22 44 U.S.C. §3502.
23 Office of Management and Budget, “Statistical Policy Directive No. 1: Fundamental Responsibilities of Federal
Statistical Agencies and Recognized Statistical Units,” 79 Federal Register 71610-71616, December 2, 2014.
24 44 U.S.C. §§3561-3583.
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The collection and use of data by federal statistical agencies contrasts with that of other federal
agencies. For instance, an industry regulator may require data from their regulated entity in order
to inform future requirements on the industry. A federal statistical agency’s work is not intended
to impose a burden on industry or directly influence a program of that agency. Instead, a federal
statistical agency’s work is meant to inform policymakers and private sector entities. This is also
different from the data collection that an agency engages in through normal business. For
example, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) collects data and produces
products that are predominately used by the cybersecurity community. If, as recent proposals
have advocated, a BCS is placed within CISA, then a portion of BCS work products would
expand beyond the cybersecurity community to include non-cybersecurity policymakers and
industries.
The conduct of federal statistical agencies in executing their activities is described in the
principles of those agencies, and highlights how they are different from other executive branch
agencies. According to the Committee on National Statistics, a federal statistical agency’s work
strives to be:
 relevant to policy issues and society;
 credible among data users and stakeholders;
 trusted among public and private providers of data;
 independent from political and external influence; and
 continually improving and innovating.25
Any federal agency may strive to meet these principles. However, specific programs or agency
activities may face broad disagreement concerning relevancy, credibility and trust, or face
significant political and external influence. This is where the rigorous methodological, data
collection and processing methods that federal statistical agencies are beholden to serve to
minimize criticism of products and increase public acceptance of them.
Cyber Incident Reporting Data Sources
The federal government receives reports of cybersecurity incidents and information related to
cyber risk mitigation from a variety of sources—both voluntary and mandatory.
Table 1 provides a selected list of federal regulations requiring private sector entities to report
cybersecurity specific incidents to federal entities, by sector.
Table 1. Selected Cyber Incident Reporting Requirements
Reporting
Receiving
Sector
Entity
Entity
Requirement
Authority
Federal
Federal Agencies
OMB, CISA,
Report significant cyber
44 U.S.C. §3554
Government
Congressional
incidents within OMB-
M-21-02
Committees
prescribed time frames.
Communications Undersea Cable
FCC
Report outages related to
47 C.F.R. Part 4
Operators
submarine cables.

25 Principles and Practices for a Federal Statistical Agency, ed. Brian A. Harris-Kojetin and Constance F. Citro, 7th ed.
(Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2021), p. 23.
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Reporting
Receiving
Sector
Entity
Entity
Requirement
Authority
Defense
Defense
DOD
Analyze and report cyber
48 C.F.R. §§204,
Industrial Base
Contractors
incidents affecting covered
212, 217, 252
defense information.
Energy
Electricity
FERC
Report cyber incidents if they
7 C.F.R. §1730
Providers
have compromised or
CIP-008-05
disrupted one or more tasks
related to the reliability of
energy distribution.
Financial Services Financial
Financial
Report to regulators instances
12 C.F.R. Part 30
Institutions
Regulators
of unauthorized access to
12 C.F.R. Parts
nonpublic customer
208 and 225
information.
12 C.F.R. Part
364
12 C.F.R. Parts
568 and 570
Health Care
Covered Health
HHS
Report losses of protected
45 C.F.R. Part
Care Institutions
health information.
160 and Subparts
A and E of Part
164
Nuclear
Nuclear Licensees NRC
Report cyber incidents that
10 C.F.R. §73.77
affect safety, security,
emergency preparedness, or
support systems of a nuclear
site within one hour of
discovery.
Transportation
Pipeline
TSA and CISA
Report actual or suspected
49 C.F.R. §114
Operators
cyberattacks that could impact
industrial control systems,
measurement or telemetry
systems, or enterprise IT.
Source: CRS analysis of the Code of Federal Regulations.
Notes: Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Memorandum on the Fiscal Year 2020-2021 Guidance on
Federal Information Security and Privacy Management Requirements (M-21-02). The fol owing abbreviations
appear in the table: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA); Federal Communications
Commission (FCC); Department of Defense (DOD); Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC); Critical
Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standard (CIP); Department of Health and Human Services (HHS); Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC); Transportation Security Agency (TSA); Information Technology (IT);
Department of Education (ED); U.S. Code (U.S.C.); and Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.).
Depending on the financial institution, the financial regulator for cyber incident reporting may include the Federal
Reserve System Board of Governors, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union
Administration, the Office of the Comptrol er of the Currency, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and
state regulatory agencies.
Despite the existence of these reporting requirements, there is no comprehensive picture of
national cybersecurity risk. First, not every critical infrastructure sector has a regulator that
requires reporting from covered entities within the sector. The chemical, commercial facilities,
critical manufacturing, dams, emergency services, food and agriculture, information technology,
and water and wastewater system sectors do not have sector-specific cybersecurity incident
reporting mandates.
Further, some sectors have incomplete mandates. For example, the communications sector’s
mandate only covers undersea cable disruptions; the transportation sector mandate only applies to
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pipelines. These narrow remits arguably ignore some of the largest concerns in those sectors (i.e.,
internet service providers for the communications sector; aviation companies for transportation).
Second, while industry is required to make reports to a specific agency, there is rarely an
obligation for one agency to further report that incident to another agency—let alone to a central
agency for consolidated analysis.
A mechanism exists whereby information about cybersecurity risk can be shared: private sector
entities may share cyber threat information amongst themselves through information sharing and
analysis centers (ISAOs), the private sector may share information with CISA, and government
agencies may share information amongst themselves at the Director of National Intelligence’s
Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC). However, participation in these types of
information sharing programs has seen limited success.26 Furthermore, there are still barriers to
regular information sharing that inhibit government management of cybersecurity risk. For
example, information classification standards and uncertainty about liability protections continue
to impede information sharing.27
The disparate collection of data held across the federal government has led some in Congress to
advocate for the implementation of another Commission recommendation—the proposed Joint
Collaborative Environment (JCE).28 A JCE is a separate proposal from the BCS and would create
a common environment for federal agencies to quickly share and analyze data from across the
federal government (regardless of classification) and from the private sector. If both the proposed
JCE and BCS are implemented, then it is likely that the BCS would collect data directly from
sources and provide information products that the JCE would use in conjunction with other
information sources to inform government operations related to cybersecurity.
CISA Data Sources and Limitations
Arguably, CISA is the agency that has the most comprehensive access to data on cybersecurity
incidents in the federal government. Because of this, CISA is frequently discussed as the home of
a potential BCS. Despite the agency’s current information, it likely does not have access under its
existing authorities to all the information necessary for a federal statistical agency.
CISA gathers information from three sources: (1) direct collection; (2) information sharing; and
(3) acquisitions. The data in CISA’s possession suffer from the same drawbacks as discussed
above: the data are (i) not uniform, (ii) incomplete, and (iii) housed in datasets, which are not
scrubbed, ready, or prepared for combined use.
CISA operates a variety of programs to collect cyber risk information directly. The agency
collects information from sensors deployed on federal agency networks, such as the National
Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS),29 an integrated system for intrusion detection and

26 Department of Homeland Security/Office of the Inspector General, DHS Made Limited Progress to Improve
Information Sharing Under the Cybersecurity Act in Calendar Years 2017 and 2018, OIG-20-74, September 25, 2020,
at https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-74-Sep20.pdf.
27 U.S. Government Accountability Office, High-Risk Series: Federal Government Needs to Urgently Pursue Critical
Actions to Address Major Cybersecurity Challenges, GAO-21-288, March 2021, pp. 61-63, at https://www.gao.gov/
assets/gao-21-288.pdf.
28 Sara Friedman, “Rep. Langevin Plans to Push for Joint Collaborative Environment Legislation to Accelerate JCDC
Efforts,” Inside Cybersecurity, March 31, 2022, at https://insidecybersecurity.com/daily-news/rep-langevin-plans-push-
joint-collaborative-environment-legislation-accelerate-jcdc.
29 Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, “National Cybersecurity Protection System,” website, at
https://www.cisa.gov/national-cybersecurity-protection-system-ncps.
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prevention, and the asset and vulnerability inventorying Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation
program (CDM).30 Per law31 and OMB direction,32 agencies are required to report to CISA when
they experience cybersecurity incidents. Additionally, CISA accepts voluntary cyber incident
reports from the public and private sectors.33
CISA receives information from both public and private entities related to cyber incidents. Sector
risk management agencies have agreements with CISA to share cybersecurity risk information.
For example, the Food and Drug Administration signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the
precursor agency to CISA (i.e., the National Protection and Programs Directorate) related to
medical device cybersecurity.34 Private entities also share information with CISA. For example,
prior to making their public release on the SolarWinds vulnerability and its exploitation by
Russia, the cybersecurity firm FireEye notified CISA of the ongoing investigation, which gave
the agency a head start on developing response guidance.35 CISA may collect freely available data
sets, such as those published by researchers.36
CISA may also acquire threat intelligence from a cybersecurity firm, just the same as any private
sector entity may purchase or subscribe to such services. For example, CISA has a subscription to
Mandiant Threat Intelligence.37 However, as with other sources of information, data from these
feeds may not be easily combined with other data sources to be analyzed by automated means,
may not contain information relevant to the government’s analytic purposes, or may carry
restrictions on how the data may be used.
Additionally, data not directly collected by the agency are aggregated by the original collector to
protect privacy. This forces secondary analysis as opposed to primary review of data. Such
analysis may still prove valuable, but does not provide the same level of granularity and
precision, as it relies on data collected (including the collection methodology) and analyzed by
another party, rather than tailoring the data collection, analysis, and publication to the agency’s
statutory purpose.

30 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, “Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM),” website, at
https://www.cisa.gov/cdm.
31 44 U.S.C. §3554.
32 Office of Management and Budget, Fiscal Year 2021-2022 Guidance on Federal Information Security and Privacy
Management Requirements, M-22-05, December 6, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/
M-22-05-FY22-FISMA-Guidance.pdf.
33 “Cyber Incident Reporting: A Unified Message for Reporting to the Federal Government,” fact sheet, at
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Cyber%20Incident%20Reporting%20United%20Message.pdf.
34 “Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Homeland Security, National Protection and Programs
Directorate and the Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, Relating to Medical
Device Cybersecurity Collaboration,” MOU 225-19-002, April 9, 2019, at https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/domestic-
mous/mou-225-19-002.
35 See CRS Insight IN11559, SolarWinds Attack—No Easy Fix, by Chris Jaikaran.
36 For an example, see Verizon, “Data Breach Investigations Report,” report, 2022, at https://www.verizon.com/
business/resources/reports/2022/dbir/2022-data-breach-investigations-report-dbir.pdf.
37 Mandiant, “DHS Shared Cybersecurity Services,” data sheet, 2021, at https://www.fireeye.de/content/dam/fireeye-
www/products/pdfs/pf/gov/dhs-intelligence-subscription.pdf.
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Considerations for CISA Undertaking BCS
Responsibilities
The Commission identified five distinct attributes for a BCS: (1) definition of cybersecurity
metrics; (2) collection and aggregation of cyberattack data; (3) reporting mandates for incidents;
(4) data and privacy protection; and (5) information exchange between academia and the private
sector. Each attribute is discussed further below with implications for CISA. An additional
attribute of analytic capabilities is also discussed.
Defining Cybersecurity Metrics
This attribute relates to the authorization in the model legislative text for the proposed BCS to
collaborate with NIST on measures and metrics. As discussed above, much cybersecurity risk
data exists among federal and nonfederal entities today. However, the data object values that are
pertinent to national policymaking and private sector decisionmaking have not been articulated.
Industry has expressed reservations about government collection of information related to
cybersecurity matters as the very information technology (IT) systems that experience the
incidents may also hold sensitive data that victims may not want exposed to third parties,
including the government.38 This concern may be raised again as a BCS capability seeks to define
the metrics necessary to perform statistical analyses. Additionally, statistical models for analyzing
cybersecurity datasets have not been developed. If the government were going to require entities
to report cybersecurity data to a new federal statistical agency, then national stakeholders would
likely expect such an agency to adhere to the principles of federal statistical agencies—
particularly developing credibility among data users and trust among the data providers.
Transparent metrics and analytical methodologies are generally accepted practices for achieving
those goals.
As an agency, CISA has not yet had to delve into statistical agency activities, so establishing a
BCS would require new lines of effort. Explicit congressional authorization for CISA to perform
these duties (particularly data collection) would help the agency build relationships with the
organizations that would be required to share information. NIST and CISA have a history of
working together and may be likely partners in developing such a capability. During the Obama
Administration, the agencies partnered in developing and disseminating the Framework for
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity39 and recently the agencies released a joint
statement on performance goals developed for critical infrastructure industrial control systems
pursuant to a National Security Memorandum.40 While NIST could assist CISA in developing
CISA’s statistical capability, other federal entities may also be able to provide support. The
National Science Foundation-funded Committee on National Statistics, as well as other statistical
agencies (e.g., BLS), may be able to provide expertise, experience, and education in support of
building out a statistical capability for the proposed BCS.

38 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection,
and Innovation, Stakeholder Perspectives on the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2021, 117th
Cong., 1st sess., September 1, 2021, Serial No. 117-28 (Washington: GPO, 2021).
39 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, “Cybersecurity Framework,” website, at https://www.cisa.gov/
uscert/resources/cybersecurity-framework.
40 Department of Homeland Security, “Joint Statement by Secretaries Mayorkas and Raimondo on President Biden’s
National Security Memorandum to Strengthen Nation’s Cybersecurity Infrastructure,” press release, September 22,
2021, at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2021/09/22/joint-statement-secretaries-mayorkas-and-raimondo-president-biden-s-
national.
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Collecting and Aggregating Data
This capability refers to the BCS’s ability to acquire necessary data and conduct pertinent
analysis. The model legislative text discusses options for the BCS administrator to enter into
agreements with other federal agencies to share existing data. The proposed BCS may also create
mandates for industry and agencies to directly report on data object values. The proposed BCS
may need to purchase data from private sources, and the Commission advocates for a BCS to be
resourced sufficiently to make those purchases regularly.
As discussed above, CISA currently has some experience in entering into agreements with other
federal agencies for cybersecurity information sharing and has subscribed to services providing
threat intelligence. CISA’s fiscal year 2023 congressional budget request asks for increases to
current programs related to purchasing privately held data for federal analysis—particularly to
support information and communications technology supply chain risk assessment and to provide
cyber threat intelligence feeds to other agencies as part of a shared service.41 It is likely that CISA
would require an increase in resources in order to acquire (through either agreement or purchase)
and manage the data necessary to carry out BCS responsibilities.
Reporting Mandates for Incidents
This attribute relates to the requirement for entities (private and public) to report information to
BCS in order to inform statistical analysis.
Congress has already legislated a requirement to report incidents. Division Y of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103)—named the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical
Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA)42—requires CISA to (1) engage in rulemaking to mandate
private sector reporting of cybersecurity incidents to the agency; (2) enforce noncompliance with
required reporting; and (3) disseminate analysis based on the information collected. CISA is
currently working with stakeholders on developing the notice of proposed rulemaking.
Protecting Data and Privacy
This attribute relates to the potential confidentiality of data provided and the requisite protections
those data may require. As a federal agency, CISA is already subject to the data protection
provisions pursuant to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (P.L. 113-283)43 and
the privacy protections of individuals under the Privacy Act (P.L. 93-579).44 As a statistical
agency, CISA would be subject to further requirements under CIPSEA and OMB’s regulations
and directives for the federal statistical system.45
CIRCIA extends data protections found in the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-113, Division
N) to data collected for the cyber incident reporting and creates explicit limitations for the
purposes of data collected, the sharing of that data, and requirements to protect that data. Here

41 Department of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Budget Overview, Fiscal Year
2023 Congressional Justification, March 2022, pp. O&S 30-31, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/
Cybersecurity%20and%20Infrastructure%20Security%20Agency%20%28CISA%29_Remediated.pdf.
42 6 U.S.C. §§681a-g.
43 44 U.S.C. §§3551-3559.
44 5 U.S.C. §552a. For more information see, CRS Report R47058, Access to Government Information: An Overview,
by Meghan M. Stuessy.
45 44 U.S.C. §§3561-3564.
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again, CIRCIA’s requirements for CISA may be extended to the BCS capability should Congress
choose to assign such activities to CISA.
Exchanging Information Between Academia and the Private Sector
This attribute relates to the recognition that federal statistical agencies engage in academic
research and should strive to share methods, techniques, and analysis with the research
community, contribute to innovations, and provide forums by which public and private sector
entities can engage. CISA has a history of engaging the cybersecurity research community in the
discovery and disclosure of novel technological vulnerabilities and has been host to many public-
private fora on critical infrastructure security and resilience and cyber risk management.
However, those activities were generally in support of CISA’s programs and not in furtherance of
national data on cybersecurity, which may require different engagement strategies.
A BCS would be expected to expand the body of knowledge and advance research opportunities
for cybersecurity risk data. These would be new outcomes for CISA, but the programmatic
considerations of such activities are already familiar to the agency. Should Congress choose to
assign BCS activities to CISA, the agency may benefit from explicit authorization related to such
engagements—both to require the agency to regularly conduct them and to encourage researcher
participation in the exchange.
Analyzing Data
The Commission did not explicitly discuss the analytic capability necessary for a BCS to develop
analytic products, although it was considered as part of the first two attributes. Following the
principles of federal statistical agencies, developing transparent methodologies so that
stakeholders may have confidence in the published products would be critical to the proposed
BCS’s success. Here again, CISA would likely need assistance from NIST and existing statistical
agencies in developing these models. However, CISA may be able to leverage existing
partnerships in order to acquire and use technical capabilities to perform and interpret analyses.
CISA’s National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC, an element of the
National Risk Management Center)46 works with the National Laboratories47 and Federally
Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)48 to acquire data and perform analyses to
inform models related to projecting the cascading effects of information technology failures
among critical infrastructure industries. These capabilities may be useful to a BCS capability, but
would likely be supplemental.

46 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, “National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center,”
website, at https://www.cisa.gov/NISAC.
47 Department of Energy, “National Laboratories,” website, at https://www.energy.gov/national-laboratories.
48 National Science Foundation, “Master Government List of Federally Funded R&D Centers,” website, February 2022,
at https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/ffrdclist/.
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Author Information

Chris Jaikaran

Specialist in Cybersecurity Policy

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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