Budget Process Reform: In Brief

Budget Process Reform: In Brief

Budget Process Reform: In Brief
December 15, 2022
Many Members of Congress have expressed frustration with the budget process or with
budgetary outcomes. No consensus has emerged, however, regarding specific problems to be
James V. Saturno
addressed by possible reforms. Nevertheless, in recent years, a wide array of budget process
Specialist on Congress and
reform proposals have been put forth seeking to refine or modify the existing constitutional
the Legislative Process
requirements, laws, and rules that make up the federal budget process. These proposals may be

procedural, such as those designed to alter some aspect of congressional budgetary
Megan S. Lynch
decisionmaking, the availability of budgetary information, or the requirements imposed on
Specialist on Congress and
agency budget execution. Proposals may also be focused on outcomes, such as those that would
the Legislative Process
impose specific requirements with respect to spending, revenue, deficit, or debt.

This report provides a discussion of possible methods for making changes in the budget process

and identifies the House and Senate committees that have jurisdiction over various types of
budget process legislation. It also provides a brief summary of major task forces and committees that Congress has formed in
recent decades to study budget process reform.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Methods of Modifying the Budget Process ..................................................................................... 2
Congressional Committee Jurisdiction over Budget Process Reform Issues .................................. 2
Congressional Studies and Budget Process Reform ........................................................................ 4
House Committee on Rules Task Force on the Budget Process (97th-99th Congresses) ............ 4
Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress (103rd Congress) ........................................ 4
House Budget Committee Task Force on the Budget Process (105th and 106th
Congresses) ............................................................................................................................ 5
The Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform (115th
Congress) ............................................................................................................................... 5

Contacts
Author Information .......................................................................................................................... 5

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Budget Process Reform: In Brief

Introduction
The Constitution grants Congress enormous power and flexibility with respect to budgetary
decisionmaking and budget execution. First, the Constitution grants Congress the power of the
purse by requiring that all spending by the federal government result from enacting laws, but it
does not prescribe or require any specific budgetary legislation or budgetary outcomes.1 Further,
the Constitution allows the House and Senate to determine the rules of their internal proceedings
and similarly does not prescribe or establish specific budgetary rules or restrictions.2 Over time,
Congress has developed laws, rules, and practices that govern the content and consideration of
budgetary legislation that are referred to as the congressional budget process. In addition, the
Constitution’s charge that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”
applies to laws enacted pursuant to Congress’ spending power.3 As a consequence, executive
branch authority and flexibility with respect to budget execution are defined in statutes such as
the antideficiency acts.4
Although many Members of Congress have expressed frustration with the budget process or with
budgetary outcomes, no consensus has emerged regarding specific problems to be addressed by
possible reforms. Nevertheless, in recent years, a wide array of budget process reform proposals
have been put forth seeking to refine or modify the existing constitutional requirements, laws, and
rules that make up the federal budget process. These proposals may be procedural, such as those
designed to alter some aspect of congressional budgetary decisionmaking, the availability of
budgetary information, or the requirements imposed on agency budget execution. Proposals may
also be focused on outcomes, such as those that would impose specific requirements with respect
to spending, revenue, deficit, or debt.
Some proposals have focused on institutional or structural questions, such as presidential or
executive branch responsibilities, requirements imposed on agency budget execution,
congressional committee jurisdictions, the availability of budgetary information, or the form or
type of questions that need to be addressed. In recent years, these questions have included
proposals for biennial budgeting, automatic continuing resolutions, and statutory budget
resolutions.
Other proposals have focused on ways to promote more efficient operation of the congressional
budget process in order to promote or regulate congressional consideration of budgetary questions
in a more timely manner. In any given year, Congress may consider myriad budgetary measures,
including concurrent resolutions on the budget; authorizations and direct spending measures;
regular, supplemental, and continuing appropriations; public debt legislation; revenue measures;
and reconciliation bills. Their consideration is often linked, so delays in consideration of one can
have an impact on several others. Reforms to address the timing or form for enacting budgetary
legislation, however, especially regular appropriations bills, is not just a budget process question.

1 U.S. Const. art. I, §9. For more on the spending power, see CRS Report R46417, Congress’s Power Over
Appropriations: Constitutional and Statutory Provisions, by Sean M. Stiff.
2 Art. I, §5.
3 Art. II, §3.
4 The antideficiency acts consist of a series of provisions and revisions enacted into law over the years relating to
budget execution—such as prohibited activities, the apportionment system, and budgetary reserves—that are codified
in Title 31 of the United States Code, including in Sections 1341-1342. For more on executive branch budget
processes, see CRS Report R47019, The Executive Budget Process: An Overview, by Dominick A. Fiorentino and
Taylor N. Riccard.
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Budget Process Reform: In Brief

The timing of consideration of budgetary legislation, like other legislation, often reflects a
complex set of political considerations and agenda-setting choices by committees and chamber
leadership.
Another focus of reform proposals has been budgetary control mechanisms intended to promote,
require, or enforce specific budgetary outcomes such as a maximum deficit amount, statutory
spending caps (including the Budget Control Act), or offset requirements (including the Statutory
PAYGO Act).5 These proposals have often involved sequestration as an enforcement mechanism.
Methods of Modifying the Budget Process
Because the existing budget process comprises so many separate elements, it can be modified
through a variety of methods. On one end of the spectrum, the budget process can be altered
informally though changes in practice. For example, the majority party leadership may establish
specific protocols concerning the scheduling of legislation for plenary consideration. Although
these cannot be enforced formally through action on the floor, they may govern the practices or
customs the majority party leadership uses when establishing the agenda of the chamber. In
addition, party conference or caucus rules within a chamber might similarly affect the actions of
its members in the budget process as well.
The House or Senate may adopt or amend rules that apply to the content or consideration of
budgetary legislation in that chamber. This can be done by agreeing to a freestanding simple
resolution. The House does this routinely when it adopts its standing rules at the beginning of a
new Congress. The House and Senate may also agree to a concurrent resolution that that would
establish a rule applicable to the proceedings in one or both chambers. For example, a concurrent
resolution on the budget adopted pursuant to the Congressional Budget Act often includes rule-
making provisions altering the congressional budget process. However, rules included in a
concurrent resolution may be applied only if the concurrent resolution has been adopted in both
chambers, even if the rule would apply in only one chamber.
The budget process may also be amended in statute either in the form of freestanding legislation
or as a provision in another measure, such as an appropriations bill or a measure to increase the
debt limit. Statutory changes that affect chamber proceedings and are made pursuant to
congressional rulemaking authority, such as those in the Congressional Budget Act, may be
modified by further statutory changes, or their application may be modified for one or both
chambers by action on a simple resolution or concurrent resolution. Finally, the budget process
could be altered through an amendment to the U.S. Constitution, such as through a balanced
budget requirement or imposing a limit on federal spending, revenue, or debt or the consideration
of spending, revenue, or debt legislation.
Congressional Committee Jurisdiction over Budget
Process Reform Issues
House and Senate rules grant jurisdiction over budget process reform to standing committees. In
addition, select committees have sometimes been established to consider budget process reform.

5 For more, see CRS Report R41901, Statutory Budget Controls in Effect Between 1985 and 2002, by Megan S. Lynch;
CRS Report R41965, The Budget Control Act of 2011, by Bill Heniff Jr., Elizabeth Rybicki, and Shannon M. Mahan;
and CRS Report R41157, The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010: Summary and Legislative History, by Bill Heniff
Jr.
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House Rule X, clause 1(d), grants the House Budget Committee jurisdiction over the “budget
process generally,” and House Rule X, clause 4(b)(5), instructs the House Budget Committee to
“study on a continuing basis proposals designed to improve and facilitate the congressional
budget process, and report to the House from time to time the results of such studies, together
with recommendations.” House Rule X, clause 1(o), grants the House Rules Committee
jurisdiction over “Rules and joint rules … and the order of business of the House.” By granting
the committee jurisdiction over propositions that would make or change the rules of the House,
this rule includes any changes to the budget process that would have an impact on the content or
consideration of budgetary legislation by the House. The House Committee on Oversight and
Reform does not have jurisdiction over the budget process directly. House Rule X, clause 1(n),
however, does grant it jurisdiction over government management, including jurisdiction over
government accounting measures, as well as the economy and efficiency of government
operations, which can have an impact on legislation concerning executive branch agencies and
issues related to budget execution. If a reform proposal takes the form of a proposal of an
amendment to the Constitution, Rule X, clause 1(l), grants jurisdiction to the House Judiciary
Committee regardless of whether it concerns budgetary issues.
In the Senate, a standing order6 supersedes the language in Senate Rule XXV concerning
committee jurisdiction over budget process issues. Under this standing order, the Senate Budget
Committee exercises exclusive jurisdiction over measures affecting the congressional budget
process that are:
(1) the functions, duties, and powers of the Budget Committee;
(2) the functions, duties, and powers of the Congressional Budget Office;
(3) the process by which Congress annually establishes the appropriate levels of budget
authority, outlays, revenues, deficits or surpluses, and public debt—including subdivisions
thereof—and including the establishment of mandatory ceilings on spending and
appropriations, a floor on revenues, timetables for congressional action on concurrent
resolutions, on the reporting of authorization bills, and on the enactment of appropriation
bills, and enforcement mechanisms for budgetary limits and timetables;
(4) the limiting of backdoor spending devices;
(5) the timetables for Presidential submission of appropriations and authorization requests;
(6) the definitions of what constitutes impoundment—such as “rescissions” and
“deferrals”;
(7) the process and determination by which impoundments must be reported to and
considered by Congress;
(8) the mechanisms to insure Executive compliance with the provisions of the
Impoundment Control Act, title X—such as U.S. Government Accountability Office
review and lawsuits; and
(9) the provisions which affect the content or determination of amounts included in or
excluded from the congressional budget or the calculation of such amounts, including the
definition of terms provided by the Budget Act.
In addition, the standing order grants the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs jurisdiction over “Budget and accounting measures, other than
appropriations, except as provided in the Congressional Budget Act of 1974” as well as studying
the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of all agencies and departments of the federal

6 S.Res. 445 (108th Congress), effective at the beginning of the 109th Congress.
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government. Senate Rule XXV, paragraph (1)(n), grants the Committee on Rules and
Administration jurisdiction over congressional organization relative to rules and procedures. As in
the House, if a reform proposal takes the form of a proposal of an amendment to the Constitution,
Rule XXV, paragraph 1(m), grants jurisdiction to the Senate Judiciary Committee regardless of
whether it concerns budgetary issues.
Congressional Studies and Budget Process Reform
In addition to these standing committees, Congress has from time to time established select or
special committees or task forces to examine the existing budget process and make
recommendations for reform. In such cases, any recommendations made by the committee are
referred to the House and Senate standing committees with jurisdiction.
House Committee on Rules Task Force on the Budget Process (97th-
99th Congresses)
After the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 was enacted, its
implementation required a number of ad hoc modifications over the first several years of its use.
Congressional dissatisfaction with this piecemeal approach resulted in several committees in the
House and Senate devoting attention to a number of proposals to take a more systematic look at
the budget process. One of the most prominent efforts was undertaken by the Task Force on the
Budget Process of the House Rules Committee (97th-98th Congresses), which studied budget
reform from early 1982 until issuing its report in May 1984. The task force’s recommendations
were introduced as H.R. 5247 (98th Congress) and subsequently reported by the Rules Committee
(H.Rept. 98-1152, Part 1), but the House took no further action on it.
Interest in the recommendations continued into the 99th Congress. They were incorporated into
several budget process reform proposals and subsequently enacted as part of the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177).
Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress (103rd Congress)
In 1992, the House and Senate voted to create a Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress
to review a diverse spectrum of administrative and procedural issues related to the organization
and operation of the legislative branch. Among the most prominent issues was budget process
reform. The committee ultimately made separate recommendations to the House and Senate that
included several budget process changes. Legislation embodying these recommendations was
subsequently referred to the House Committees on Rules, Government Operations, and House
Administration (H.R. 3801, 103rd Congress) and the Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration (S. 1824, 103rd Congress).
In the House, the committees of jurisdiction held additional hearings in 1994, but the measure
was not reported and not considered further by the House. In the Senate, the Committee on Rules
and Administration held additional hearings (S.Hrg. 103-488), and the bill was subsequently
ordered reported with an amendment (S.Rept. 103-297) but was not considered further by the
Senate.
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House Budget Committee Task Force on the Budget Process (105th
and 106th Congresses)
The House Budget Committee established a bipartisan task force in the 105th Congress to address
continuing questions about whether the budget process met the needs of Congress. The task force
held several hearings and issued its recommendations asH.R. 4837, but the measure was not
considered further. The provisions of this measure were subsequently reintroduced in the 106th
Congress (H.R. 853) and referred to the Budget Committee, the Rules Committee, and the
Appropriations Committee. The Rules Committee and the Budget Committee held additional
hearings, and the three committees subsequently reported the bill.7 H.R. 853was considered by
the House but failed to pass by a vote of 166-250.
The Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process
Reform (115th Congress)
Most recently, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123) created a joint select committee
made up of 16 Members from the House and Senate to recommend legislation that would
“significantly reform the budget and appropriations process.”8 While the committee’s co-chairs
released draft legislation, the committee did not adopt the vote on reporting the legislation, and
the draft was not considered further by the House or Senate.9

Author Information

James V. Saturno
Megan S. Lynch
Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process
Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process

7 The Appropriations Committee reported the bill adversely, amended (H.Rept. 106-198, part 1); the Budget Committee
reported the bill, amended (H.Rept. 106-198, part 2); and the Rules Committee reported the bill, amended (H.Rept.
106-198, part 3).
8 For more information on the Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform, see CRS Report
R45111, The Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform, by Megan S. Lynch and James V.
Saturno.
9 Ibid. See also U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Budget, Legislative History of the Joint Select Committee on
Budget and Appropriations Process Reform, committee print, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Prt. 115-15 (Washington, DC:
GPO, 2018).
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Disclaimer
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