DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE): Overview and Selected Issues for Congress

DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE): Overview and Selected Issues for Congress

DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and
July 11, 2022
Execution (PPBE): Overview and Selected
Brendan W. McGarry
Issues for Congress
Acting Section Research
Manager
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution

(PPBE) system is a strategic planning process for allocating resources among the military
departments, defense agencies, and other components. The process serves as a framework for

DOD civilian and military leaders to decide which programs to fund based on strategic objectives
and produces the department’s portion of the President’s annual budget request. In FY2022, Congress created a commission
to study the effectiveness of the process in view of concerns over the pace at which the U.S. military is fielding commercially
driven advances in software and other emerging technologies—such as hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, and 5G
mobile technologies—relative to China and other strategic competitors.
The PPBE process dates to the Kennedy Administration. In 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara introduced the
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, or PPBS, in part to exert more control over DOD’s budget formulation
process. Prior to the adoption of this system, the military departments had greater autonomy in formulating budgets. In
subsequent decades, the process evolved within DOD, though its logic and major elements have remained generally intact.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense manages the overall process. During the planning phase, the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy prepares force development priorities in Defense Planning Guidance. During the programming phase, the Director
of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation reviews each component’s five-year projections for forces, personnel, and
funding known as Program Objective Memorandums, which are incorporated into a database called the Future Years Defense
Program. During the budgeting phase, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) reviews components’ Budget Estimate
Submissions and prepares the information for the annual budget request submitted to Congress. During the execution phase,
officials implement funded programs and adjust resources, if necessary, typically through transfer and reprogramming actions
that require congressional notification or prior approval.
Some observers have criticized DOD’s PPBE process—particularly its assumptions about program timelines and
development—as reflecting an “industrial-era” approach and oriented toward large capital expenditures, such as aircraft
carriers and strategic bombers. Such systems typically cost billions of dollars, take years to complete, and follow a traditional
model of research and development before procurement and fielding. In 2019, the Defense Innovation Board, a DOD
advisory board, stated in part that the PPBE process “requires two years or more in lead time” and “increases the barriers for
integrating advancements in digital technology in a timely and effective manner.” Others have defended the PPBE process by
noting that DOD can alter the process or elements of the process without intervention by Congress; increase flexibility within
its annual budget request by amending certain line items or by submitting amendments or supplemental requests to Congress;
and respond to emerging priorities by reprogramming and transferring funds through existing (or amended) authorities
provided by Congress.
As part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (NDAA; P.L. 117-81, §1004; 135 Stat. 1884),
Congress established the Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform to study DOD’s PPBE
process and to submit recommendations for improving the process in 2023.
Potential issues for Congress relating to DOD’s PPBE process include: perceived advantages and disadvantages; Congress’s
role; oversight considerations; comparisons with alternative models; and congressional control versus department flexibility.
Congress may consider reviewing how recommended changes to the process may affect the balance of the perceived pros and
cons—and the incentives of stakeholders involved; how much or how little control or influence Congress should exert (e.g.,
in law or report language); how certain oversight considerations may produce additional information about DOD
decisionmaking; how alternative or complementary models may affect DOD decisionmaking; and how the adoption of new
defense appropriations or authorities may affect the balance of congressional control and department flexibility.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Overview of the PPBE Process ....................................................................................................... 2
Selected Definitions and Laws .................................................................................................. 3
PPBE’s Role in DOD Decision-Support Systems ..................................................................... 5
PPBE Phases, Actors, and Outputs............................................................................................ 6
Planning .............................................................................................................................. 8
Programming ...................................................................................................................... 9
Budgeting .......................................................................................................................... 10
Execution .......................................................................................................................... 10
Timelines ................................................................................................................................. 10
Calendar-Driven Events .................................................................................................... 10
Cyclical Planning Process .................................................................................................. 11
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) ............................................................................ 12
Policy Context and Considerations ............................................................................................... 13
Historical Context ................................................................................................................... 14
Contemporary Context ............................................................................................................ 17
Selected Legislative Activity ......................................................................................................... 22
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2022 .................................................................. 22
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 ...................................................... 23
Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform.................. 24
Potential Issues for Congress......................................................................................................... 26
Perceived Advantages and Disadvantages .............................................................................. 26
Congress’s Role ...................................................................................................................... 28
Oversight Considerations ........................................................................................................ 30
People vs. Process ............................................................................................................. 30
Centers of Power ............................................................................................................... 31
Influences .......................................................................................................................... 31
Integration with Other Systems ........................................................................................ 34
Comparisons with Alternative Models .................................................................................... 35
Congressional Control vs. Department Flexibility .................................................................. 36

Figures
Figure 1. DOD Decision-Support Systems ..................................................................................... 6
Figure 2. Calendar-Driven Events in the Annual PPBE Process .................................................... 11
Figure 3. Fiscal Year Cycles in the PPBE Process (notional) ........................................................ 12
Figure 4. Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) Structure ......................................................... 13

Tables
Table 1. Phases, Actors, and Outputs of the DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting,
and Execution (PPBE) Process..................................................................................................... 7
Table 2. Appointments to the PPBE Commission ......................................................................... 45
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Appendixes
Appendix A. Selected Terms and Definitions ................................................................................ 38
Appendix B. Selected Laws .......................................................................................................... 41
Appendix C. Selected Policies and Regulations ............................................................................ 44
Appendix D. Appointments to the Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting,
and Execution Reform ................................................................................................................ 45

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 49

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Introduction
With a discretionary budget of nearly $800 billion and a workforce of nearly three million
employees (servicemembers and civilians), DOD is the largest federal agency.1 It uses a system
called Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) to allocate resources among
military departments, defense agencies, and other components (hereafter, DOD components or
simply components).2 The process, which dates to the Kennedy Administration, serves as an
annual framework for DOD civilian and military leaders to decide which programs to fund based
on strategic objectives.3 While the process is intended as a deliberative way to decide who gets
what and how much, it’s also a venue for institutional politics. A key output of the process is the
department’s portion of the annual President’s budget request that is submitted to Congress.4
Following the inception of the precursor to PPBE in 1961, Congress expressed interest in the
process.5 Some of the questions Congress raised about the process historically remain relevant
today, such as to what degree the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) uses the process to
centralize decisionmaking and exert control over the budgets of the armed services and to gauge
the performance of individual programs, projects, and activities against strategic objectives.6
Members of the 117th Congress have raised questions about the process, citing concerns over the
pace at which the U.S. military is fielding commercially driven advances in software and other
emerging technologies—such as hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, and 5G mobile
technologies—relative to China and other strategic competitors.7 In 2021, for example, Senator
Jack Reed, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, said, “I am concerned that the
Defense Department is not postured correctly to invest in the correct emerging technologies or to
play the appropriate role of co-developer and early adopter of the advanced capabilities they will
enable.”8
Some observers have pointed to China’s increasing military threats toward Taiwan in recent years
and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 as evidence of an erosion of the U.S. military’s ability

1 Department of Defense (DOD), “About” website, accessed June 18, 2022, at https://www.defense.gov/about/.
2 DOD, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 7045.14, The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
(PPBE) Process, August 29, 2017, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/704514p.pdf.
DOD components include military departments, such as the Department of the Navy, which includes two armed
services: the Navy and Marine Corps; defense agencies, such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA); DOD field activities, such as the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC); and combatant commands,
such as U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDO-PACOM).
3 For a brief overview of the PPBE process, see CRS In Focus IF10429, Defense Primer: Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process, by Brendan W. McGarry.
4 Ibid.
5 For more information, see the “Historical Context” section.
6 Ibid.
7 For more information, see CRS Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke; CRS Report R46458, Emerging Military Technologies: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler; CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler; CRS Report R45178, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, by Kelley M.
Sayler; and CRS In Focus IF11251, National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies, by
John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler.
8 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Emerging Technologies and Their Impact on National
Security, 117th Cong., 1st sess., February 23, 2021, transcript at https://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/21-05_02-23-2021.pdf.
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to deter aggressors, and as a reason to consider changes to the PPBE process.9 A former DOD
official has said that the United States “is in a race against time to reestablish credible deterrence
and contain further aggression before it turns into military conflicts. Timely adoption of new
technology and fielding advanced equipment have become national security imperatives.”10
Between FY2016 and FY2018, Congress was particularly active in legislating acquisition
reform.11 The legislation was intended in part to produce faster and more efficient defense
acquisitions, including weapons systems.12 During the 117th Congress, first session, Congress
expressed interest in PPBE reform during congressional hearings and in legislation.13 As part of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (NDAA; P.L. 117-81, §1004),
Congress established the Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
Reform to study the PPBE process and make recommendations for improving the process in
2023.14
This report describes a notional PPBE process, summarizes the historical basis for the PPBE
system, and discusses potential issues for Congress. A detailed description of how each of the
DOD components implements the PPBE process internally is beyond the scope of this report.15
For other CRS products on this topic and related issues, see CRS In Focus IF10429, Defense
Primer: Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process, by Brendan W.
McGarry; CRS In Focus IF10428, Intelligence Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and
Evaluation (IPPBE) Process, by Michael E. DeVine; and CRS In Focus IF10831, Defense
Primer: Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), by Brendan W. McGarry and Heidi M. Peters.
Overview of the PPBE Process
In practice, aspects of the PPBE process may differ based on current events or leadership
preferences. While the Deputy Secretary of Defense manages the overall PPBE process,
numerous actors and decisionmaking bodies within OSD, the military departments, and defense
agencies are involved.
In addition to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, other OSD civilian leaders involved in the
process are the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (hereafter USD Policy), Director of the
Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (hereafter CAPE), and Under Secretary of Defense

9 John Whitley, Three Reforms to Improve Defense Resource Management, IBM Center for the Business of
Government, June 9, 2022, p. 8, at
https://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/Three%20Reforms%20to%20Improve%20Defense%20Reso
urce%20Management.pdf.
10 Ibid.
11 For more information, see CRS Report R45068, Acquisition Reform in the FY2016-FY2018 National Defense
Authorization Acts (NDAAs), by Heidi M. Peters.
12 Ibid.
13 On March 18, 2021, for example, the Senate Committee on Armed Services held a closed hearing, “Planning,
Programming, Budget, and Execution Process of the Department of Defense,” at which CRS analysts, including the
author, provided a briefing. See https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/21-03-18-planning-programming-
budget-and-execution-process-of-the-department-of-defense.
14 135 Stat. 1884.
15 For a reference on department-specific PPBE implementation, see Bob Bradford, “Army Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution Process,” Chapter 8 in How the Army Runs: 2019-2020: A Senior Leader Reference
Handbook, ed. Louis G. Yuengert (Carlisle, PA: The Army War College), pp. 8-1 to 8-24, at
https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3736.pdf.
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(Comptroller) (hereafter DOD Comptroller). Military leaders involved in the process include the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (hereafter CJCS),16 service chiefs, commanders of the
combatant commands, and the chief of the National Guard Bureau. The CJCS plays a role in the
PPBE process in accordance with broader responsibilities as the principal military advisor to the
Secretary of Defense established by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433).17 The CJCS’s role is, in part, to advocate for solutions
to department-wide requirements.
Congress plays a role in the department’s internal PPBE process.18 Congress has required that
DOD civilian and military personnel carry out certain activities directly and indirectly related to
the process. Congress also authorizes and appropriates funding for DOD, the amount and timing
of which can affect activities conducted in various phases of the process. Congress also provides
limited authority for DOD to transfer and reprogram funds, which can affect the activities
typically conducted in the final phase of the process.
Selected Definitions and Laws19
The DOD Financial Management Regulation (FMR) defines PPBE as:
A cyclic process containing four distinct, but interrelated phases: planning, programing,
budgeting, and execution. In addition to establishing the framework and process for
decision making on future programs, the process permits prior decisions to be examined
and analyzed from the viewpoint of the current environment (threat, political, economic,
technological, and resources) and for the time period being addressed. The ultimate
objective of PPBE is to provide operational commanders the best mix of forces, equipment,
and support attainable within fiscal constraints.20
DOD policy describes PPBE in part as “the annual resource allocation process for DoD within a
quadrennial planning cycle.”21
The CJCS, the highest-ranking military officer of the Armed Forces, describes the PPBE process
as the Secretary of Defense’s “institutional strategic planning system and the primary decision
making process for translating strategic guidance into resource allocation decisions.”22
DOD policy does not reference a statutory basis for the establishment of the PPBE process.23
Rather, the PPBE process has emerged largely as a product of administrative decisions and

16 The Joint Staff assists the CJCS in accomplishing his responsibilities. For more information, see DOD, Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Leadership, Director, Joint Staff, accessed June 28, 2022, at https://www.jcs.mil/Leadership/Director-Joint-
Staff/.
17 For more information, see 10 U.S.C. §§113, 151, 153, 161, 163, 164, 181, and 482.
18 For a broader discussion of this topic, see the “Congress’s Role” section.
19 For a list of terms and definitions used in the PPBE process, see Appendix A. For a list of other Title 10 sections of
the U.S. Code that reference the PPBE process, system, or its elements, see Appendix B. For a list of DOD policies and
regulations on the PPBE process, see Appendix C.
20 DOD, Financial Management Regulation, DoD 7000.14-R, Glossary, p. G-28, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/fmr/current/glossary.pdf. The reference to quadrennial aligns
with a previous document called the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a DOD study conducted every four years
that was replaced by the National Defense Strategy (NDS).
21 DOD, DODD 7045.14, The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process, August 29, 2017, at
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/704514p.pdf.
22 DOD, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.0lE, Joint Strategic Planning System, May 21,
2021, p. E-3, at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%203100.01E.pdf.
23 DOD, DODD 7045.14, The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process, August 29, 2017, at
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practices. Over time, Congress has included references to the PPBE process, system, or its
elements in multiple provisions of Title 10 of the United States Code (U.S. Code or U.S.C.),
mostly in the context of responsibilities of senior department officials. See, for example, the
following:24
 10 U.S.C. §113: Secretary of Defense. This law states in part that the Secretary of
Defense, with the advice of the CJCS, is to provide Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) to
the secretaries of the military departments, chiefs of staff of the Armed Forces,
commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands, and the heads of defense
agencies and field activities;25
 10 U.S.C. §134: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. This law states in part that the
USD Policy shall be responsible and have overall direction and supervision for, among
other matters, “the development of the Defense Planning Guidance that guides the
formulation of program and budget requests by the military departments and other
elements of the Department”;26
 10 U.S.C. §135: Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). This law states in part that
the DOD Comptroller shall advise and assist the Secretary of Defense in, among other
matters, “supervising and directing the preparation of budget estimates of the Department
of Defense”;27
 10 U.S.C. §139a: Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation. This law
states that the Director of CAPE is the principal official within the senior management of
DOD for, among other matters, “analysis and advice on matters relating to the planning
and programming phases of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution
system, and the preparation of materials and guidance for such system, as directed by the
Secretary of Defense, working in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller);”28 and
 10 U.S.C. §153: Chairman: functions. This law states that the CJCS shall determine
whether to prepare in certain years a National Military Strategy, which describes how the
military will support national security objectives and which typically informs the DPG.29

https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/704514p.pdf?ver=2019-06-06-145814-060.
24 For a list of other Title 10 sections of the U.S. Code that reference the PPBE process, system, or its elements, see
Appendix B.
25 10 U.S.C. §113(g)(2)(A), which describes the DPG in part as written guidance that establishes “goals, priorities,
including priorities relating to the current or projected risks to military installation resilience, and objectives, including
fiscal constraints, to direct the preparation and review of the program and budget recommendations of all elements of
the Department.” For a more detailed description of the DPG, as well as a list of other terms and definitions used in the
PPBE process, see Appendix A.
26 10 U.S.C. §134(b)(2)(E).
27 10 U.S.C. §135(c)(2).
28 10 U.S.C. §139a(d)(2).
29 10 U.S.C. §153(b). For certain other authorities related to military roles in the PPBE process, see 10 U.S.C. §§113,
151, 161, 163, 164, 181, and 482.
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PPBE’s Role in DOD Decision-Support Systems30
PPBE is one of three main decision-support systems used by DOD civilian and military leaders to
allocate resources and manage defense acquisitions. Taken together, these systems are sometimes
referred to as “Big A” acquisition:31
 Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). The
process by which DOD identifies capabilities, or items, required by the military
to fulfill its missions, resulting in programmatic requirements;32
 Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) System. The
process by which DOD translates strategic guidance into resource allocation
decisions, resulting in funding;33 and
 Defense Acquisition System (DAS). The process by which DOD manages the
development and purchase of products and services, resulting in acquisition
(sometimes referred to as “Little A” acquisition).34
See Figure 1.

30 This section draws in part from research previously coordinated by Heidi M. Peters, Analyst in U.S. Defense
Acquisition Policy.
31 For more information, see CRS Report RL34026, Defense Acquisitions: How DOD Acquires Weapon Systems and
Recent Efforts to Reform the Process.
32 DOD defines a requirement in part as “a capability which is needed to meet an organization’s roles, functions, and
missions in current or future operations to the greatest extent possible.” For more information, see DOD, CJCSI
5123.01I, Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Implementation of the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System, October 30, 2021, p. GL-11, at
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%205123.01I.pdf; and JCIDS Manual, August
31, 2018, at https://www.acq.osd.mil/asda/jrac/docs/2018-JCIDS.pdf. DOD defines capability as “the ability to
complete a task or execute a course of action under specified conditions and level of performance.” See DOD, DOD
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, updated November 2021, p. 2, archived at
https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/dictionary.pdf.
33 DOD, DODD 7045.14, The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process, August 29, 2017, at
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/704514p.pdf.
34 DOD, DODD 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition System, September 9, 2020, at
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/500001p.pdf; DODD 5000.02, Operation of the
Adaptive Acquisition Framework, January 23, 2020, at
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/500002p.pdf; and DOD, Defense Acquisition
University (DAU), Defense Acquisition Guidebook, at https://www.dau.edu/tools/dag.
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Figure 1. DOD Decision-Support Systems

Source: Figure created by CRS based on DOD, Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Report, February
2006, p. 4, archived at https://www.airforcemag.com/PDF/DocumentFile/Documents/2006/DAPA-Rpt-
012706.pdf.
Notes: JCIDS is Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System; PPBE is Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution; and DAS is Defense Acquisition System.
PPBE Phases, Actors, and Outputs35
PPBE comprises four separate, but interrelated phases: planning, programming, budgeting, and
execution (see Table 1). Each phase typically involves certain actions, officials, and outputs:
 Planning. During the planning phase, the USD Policy assesses strategic guidance
(e.g., the President’s National Security Strategy; the Secretary of Defense’s
National Defense Strategy; and the CJCS’s National Military Strategy)36 and
coordinates the DPG detailing force development priorities that inform the
programming phase;
 Programming. During the programming phase, the Director of CAPE reviews
the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) developed by each DOD
component.37 The POM is a funding plan that describes proposed resource
requirements (forces, personnel, and funding) over five years and adjusts
programs in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) database.38 At certain

35 This section draws from CRS In Focus IF10429, Defense Primer: Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and
Execution (PPBE) Process, by Brendan W. McGarry.
36 For more information on these types of documents, see CRS Insight IN10842, The 2017 National Security Strategy:
Issues for Congress and CRS Insight IN10855, The 2018 National Defense Strategy.
37 DOD defines the POM as the final product of the PPBE programming phase displaying each DOD component’s
recommendations to OSD for resource allocation decisions. For more information, see DOD, DODD 7045.14, The
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process, August 29, 2017, p. 12, at
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/704514p.pdf.
38 DOD defines the FYDP as the “program and financial plan for the DoD as approved by the Secretary of Defense.
The FYDP arrays cost data, personnel, and force structure over a 5-year period (force structure for an additional 3
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points throughout the year, OSD works with DOD components to make changes
to programs through Resource Management Decisions (RMDs);39
 Budgeting. During the budgeting phase, the DOD Comptroller reviews the
Budget Estimate Submission (BES) developed by each DOD component.40 The
BES covers the first year of the POM and adjusts amounts in the FYDP. The
output is the DOD portion of the President’s budget request to Congress. At
certain points throughout the year, particularly in the fall, OSD works with the
White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to make changes to
budgets through RMDs; and
 Execution. During the execution phase, officials in OSD and the DOD
components adjust resources, typically through transfer and reprogramming
actions that require congressional notification and/or prior approval.
Table 1. Phases, Actors, and Outputs of the DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting,
and Execution (PPBE) Process
Phase
Description
Lead Actor
Output(s)
Planning
Review strategic guidance Under Secretary of
Chairman’s Program
Assess threats
Defense for Policy
Recommendations (CPR)
Evaluate takeaways from
Defense Planning Guidance
war games
(DPG)
Identify capability gaps and
Fiscal Guidance (FG)
risks
Programming
Translate planning
Director, Cost
Program Objective
decisions into program
Assessment and Program
Memorandum (POM)
and resource
Evaluation (CAPE)
Resource Management
requirements
Decisions (RMDs;
Consider program
programmatic)a
alternatives
Future Years Defense
Develop five-year
Program (FYDP) updates
projections for forces,
personnel, funding

years), portraying this data by major force program for DoD internal review for the program and budget review
submission. It is also provided to the Congress annually in conjunction with the President’s budget.” For more
information, see DOD, DODD 7045.14, The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process,
August 29, 2017, p. 12, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/704514p.pdf; and CRS
In Focus IF10831, Defense Primer: Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), by Brendan W. McGarry and Heidi M.
Peters.
39 According to DAU, OSD publishes decisions related to program and budget issues in Resource Management
Decisions (RMDs). The term RMD replaced Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) for program-related decisions
and Program Budget Decisions (PBD) for budget-related decisions. There are two sets of RMDs: programmatic RMDs
issued in early November reflecting decisions made during the programming phase; and budgetary RMDs issued in late
November or early December reflecting decisions made during the budgeting phase.
40 DOD, DODD 7045.14, The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process, August 29, 2017,
p. 5, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/704514p.pdf.
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Phase
Description
Lead Actor
Output(s)
Budgeting
Review budget
Under Secretary of
Budget Estimate Submission
justifications
Defense (Comptrol er)
(BES)
Consider funding
RMDs (programmatic)a
alternatives
FYDP updates
Prepare budget
(incorporating RMDs)
submission
DOD portion of President’s
budget request
Execution
Assess output to planned
Multiple: Under Secretary
Assessments (internal
performance
of Defense (Comptrol er)
reviews by OSD and DOD
Adjust resources, as
and DOD component
components)
necessary
financial managers
Reprogramming actions and
transfers (including external
interactions with Congress)
Source: Table created by CRS based on CRS In Focus IF10429, Defense Primer: Planning, Programming, Budgeting,
and Execution (PPBE) Process; and DOD, Defense Acquisition University (DAU) references.
Notes: For a list of terms and definitions used in the PPBE process, see Appendix A.
a. According to DAU, OSD publishes decisions related to program and budget issues in Resource
Management Decisions (RMDs). The term RMD replaced Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) for
program-related decisions and Program Budget Decisions (PBD) for budget-related decisions. There are
two sets of RMDs: programmatic RMDs issued in early November reflecting decisions made during the
programming phase; and budgetary RMDs issued in late November or early December reflecting decisions
made during the budgeting phase.
A more detailed description and discussion of each phase follows.
Planning
The USD Policy conducts and coordinates the planning phase.41 The phase involves reviewing
the President’s National Security Strategy,42 the Secretary of Defense’s National Defense
Strategy,43 and the CJCS’s National Military Strategy44 to develop the DPG aligned with the
Administration’s policy goals and potential threats, force structure, readiness posture, and other
factors.45 Also during this phase, OSD provides fiscal guidance detailing projected funding for
DOD components.46 In addition to issuing the National Military Strategy, the CJCS provides the
chairman’s program recommendation to the Secretary of Defense. The recommendation is the
CJCS’s “direct input” to the DPG and incorporates the CJCS’s military advice on programming

41 DOD, DODD 7045.14, The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process, August 29, 2017,
p. 5, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/704514p.pdf.
42 50 U.S.C. §3043.
43 10 U.S.C. §113.
44 10 U.S.C. §153.
45 10 U.S.C. §113 details elements of the DPG; 10 U.S.C. §134 states in part that the USD Policy shall be responsible
and have overall direction and supervision for, among other matters, development of the DPG. For more information,
see Appendix B.
46 Sean C. Sullivan, Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution Workbook, Naval War College Faculty Paper,
updated 2015. According to DOD, fiscal guidance is the Secretary of Defense’s “topline fiscal control” provided to
each DOD component for the purpose of preparing a program objective memorandum. For more information, see
DOD, CJCSI 8501.01B, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, Chief, National Guard
Bureau, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process, December 15,
2021, p. GL-4, at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%208501.01B.pdf.
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priorities.47 The recommendation is based in part on a capability gap assessment performed by the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council,48 including priorities identified by combatant commanders
(known as integrated priority lists, or IPLs)49 and by the chief of the National Guard Bureau. With
this input from the CJCS, the DPG is drafted by the USD Policy and typically contains guidance
on investments and divestments for the DOD components and is intended to inform a
component’s POM.50
Programming
The programming phase is meant to analyze anticipated effects of present-day decisions on the
future force. The Director of CAPE leads this phase.51 Traditionally, CAPE provided the analytic
baseline—an integrated set of data related to combatant commander’s plans and force
management decisions—to analyze POMs developed by the DOD components.52 A POM
describes proposed resource requirements (forces, personnel, and funding) for programs over five
years.53 Each POM prioritizes and adjusts programs in the FYDP and describes risks associated
with unfunded, underfunded, or overfunded programs. After each component submits a POM, the
CJCS submits to the Secretary of Defense a chairman’s program assessment, an independent
assessment intended to inform program reviews.54 The CJCS typically reviews the extent to
which the military departments satisfied combatant command requirements.55 The Director of
CAPE leads program reviews, forecasts resource requirements for the next five years, and
updates the FYDP. To adjudicate disagreements during program and budget reviews, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense may convene a meeting of the Deputy’s Management Action Group.56 As a
result of program reviews, the Secretary of Defense may direct the components to make RMDs.

47 DOD, CJCSI 3100.0lE, Joint Strategic Planning System, May 21, 2021, pp. G-4 to G-5, at
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%203100.01E.pdf.
48 10 U.S.C. §181. JROC is the decision authority for the JCIDS process.
49 10 U.S.C. §153.
50 DOD, CJCSI 8501.01B, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, Chief, National Guard
Bureau, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process, December 15,
2021, p. B-2, at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%208501.01B.pdf.
51 10 U.S.C. §139a; and DOD, DODD 7045.14, The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE)
Process, August 29, 2017, p. 6, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/704514p.pdf.
52 DOD, DODD 8260.05, Support for Strategic Analysis (SSA), July 7, 2011, p. 2, at
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/826005p.pdf.
53 Forces may include items of equipment or combat units, such as elements of Army brigade combat teams or combat
aviation brigades, Navy ships or carrier strike groups, Marine Corps marine expeditionary forces or infantry battalions,
and Air Force squadrons or aircraft. For more information, see DOD, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP) Structure Handbook, February 2020.
54 DOD, CJCSI 8501.01B, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, Chief, National Guard
Bureau, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process, December 15,
2021, p. B-3, at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%208501.01B.pdf.
55 DOD, DAU, Teaching Note: Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process, March 2018, p.
114.
56 DOD, CJCSI 8501.01B, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, Chief, National Guard
Bureau, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process, December 15,
2021, p. B-3, at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%208501.01B.pdf. DAU
describes the DMAG as, “One of the principal integrated civilian-military governance bodies of DoD. Meets at the
discretion of the Deputy Secretary of Defense ... to provide advice and assistance to the deputy on matters pertaining to
DoD enterprise management, business transformation, and operations, and strategic-level coordination and integration
of planning, programming, budgeting, execution, and assessment activities within the department.” For more
information, see DOD, DAU Glossary, “Deputy Secretary’s Management Action Group,” accessed June 5, 2022, at
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Budgeting
The DOD Comptroller leads the budgeting phase,57 in which the components complete a BES for
the first year of the FYDP. Using guidance from OMB, the DOD Comptroller reviews the budget
submissions for funding and fiscal controls, phasing of the efforts over the funding period, and
feasibility of execution within the budget year. During this phase, Comptroller analysts
collaborate with component analysts to align component budget requests with the overall defense
budget. As a result of budget reviews, the Secretary of Defense may direct the components to
make changes in RMDs. The final product is typically submitted to OMB in December for
inclusion in the President’s annual budget request to Congress, which is usually submitted in
February.58
Execution
During the execution phase, OSD and the DOD components evaluate the obligation and
expenditure of funds, as well as program results.59 The purpose of execution review is to assess
program objectives against outcomes. The components assess compliance with priorities and
guidance of the Secretary of Defense, performance metrics, and program results. OSD staff
review the assessments and recommend changes, in coordination with the CJCS and the Joint
Staff.
Timelines
The PPBE process is a calendar-driven process intended to produce the DOD portion of the
annual President’s budget request. This section describes and illustrates notional timelines of
certain events and phases in the PPBE process.
Calendar-Driven Events
Figure 2 shows some of the key calendar-driven events, processes, and outputs of the PPBE
process during a typical calendar year for a given fiscal year cycle.

https://www.dau.edu/glossary/Pages/GlossaryContent.aspx?itemid=27324.
57 10 U.S.C. §135; and DOD, DODD 7045.14, The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE)
Process, August 29, 2017, p. 5, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/704514p.pdf.
58 31 U.S.C. §1105(a).
59 DOD, DODD 7045.14, The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process, August 29, 2017,
p. 11, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/704514p.pdf.
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Figure 2. Calendar-Driven Events in the Annual PPBE Process
(notional timeline)

Source: Figure created by CRS based on Sean C. Sul ivan, Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution
Workbook, Naval War Col ege Faculty Paper, updated 2015; and DOD, CJCSI 8501.01B, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, Chief, National Guard Bureau, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process, December 15, 2021, p. B-5, at
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%208501.01B.pdf.
Notes: Timeline is notional.
Cyclical Planning Process
The PPBE process is characterized by long-term planning, with a planning phase that can begin
more than two years before the expected year of budget execution. Figure 3 shows a notional
representation of this timeline. Initial planning for the fiscal year (FY) 2022 budget request began
in early 2019. The figure shows Congress’s role in the process with the portion labeled
“enactment,” referring to the period from the issuance of the request to passage of annual defense
authorization and appropriations legislation. The figure also shows how, in any given month,
multiple phases of the PPBE process are occurring simultaneously for various fiscal year cycles.
For example, in June 2022, defense officials were executing or spending FY2022 funding (and
prior-year funding, as some appropriations are available for obligation for longer than a year);
monitoring the enactment of FY2023 funding; programming and budgeting FY2024 funding; and
planning FY2025 funding.
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Figure 3. Fiscal Year Cycles in the PPBE Process (notional)
(fiscal year cycle by calendar year and month)

Source: Figure created by CRS based on DAU references.
Notes: Timeline is notional. CY is calendar year; FY is fiscal year. Execution as shown is based on appropriations
available for one year.
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)60
The PPBE process is intended to be a way for DOD components to identify funding for programs,
projects, and activities over a multi-year period as part of the FYDP. On any given day, the Navy,
for example, is operating ships, maintaining ships, building ships, decommissioning ships,
training sailors to operate ships, and equipping ships with weapons systems and, in some cases,
aircraft.61 In doing these activities, the service uses the PPBE framework to associate inputs (i.e.,
funding) with outputs (i.e., programs) and assess tradeoffs between allocation options.62 These
decisions are entered into the FYDP, a classified database containing five-year projections of
forces, personnel, funding, and programs intended to support DOD operations. In this context,
fiscal years beyond the forthcoming budget year are sometimes referred to as “out-years.”63 The
FYDP is compiled every year during the programming phase of the PPBE process. The projection
is updated during the budgeting phase of the PPBE process to reflect DOD’s final funding

60 This section is drawn in part from CRS In Focus IF10831, Defense Primer: Future Years Defense Program (FYDP),
by Brendan W. McGarry and Heidi M. Peters.
61 Philip J. Candreva, “PPBE,” YouTube video, 28:39, March 16, 2020, at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lCH4BUYuQZM.
62 According to DOD, a program element (PE) is the primary data element in the FYDP and the “building blocks” of
the programming and budget system. For more information, see DOD, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP) Structure Handbook, February 2020, p. 8.
63 DOD, DAU, Teaching Note: Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process, March 2018, p.
107.
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decisions presented in the President’s annual budget request. According to DOD, the FYDP is
intended in part to link DOD’s internal review structure based on program elements with
Congress’s review structure based on appropriation accounts.64 The FYDP structure allows a user
to examine DOD plans and programs in three dimensions: component (e.g., Air Force); major
force program (e.g., strategic forces);65 and appropriation title (e.g., procurement). See Figure 4.
Figure 4. Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) Structure

Source: Figure created by CRS based on DOD, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP) Structure Handbook, February 2020.
Policy Context and Considerations66
Proposals to change or improve the PPBE process occur in the context of various historical laws,
regulations, institutions, and practices. The current-day PPBE process is a product of these
influences.

64 DOD, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) Structure Handbook, February
2020, p. 5.
65 A Major Force Program (MFP) is an aggregation of the resources (total obligational authority, personnel, and forces)
intended to achieve objectives. Currently, six of the MFPs are considered combat force programs (strategic forces;
general purpose forces; command, control, communications, intelligence, and space; mobility forces; Guard and
reserve forces; and special operations forces) and six are considered support programs (research and development;
central supply and maintenance; training, medical, and other personnel activities; administration and associated
activities; support of other nations; and national security space). For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10831,
Defense Primer: Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), by Brendan W. McGarry and Heidi M. Peters.
66 This section draws in part from research previously conducted in coordination with Heidi M. Peters, Analyst in U.S.
Defense Acquisition Policy; and John R. Hoehn, Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs.
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Historical Context
Congressional efforts to reconsider or change the PPBE process may benefit from insights into its
history, including its underlying assumptions and original problems it was intended to address.
Some academics have described PPBE as a type of organizational budgeting process known as
program budgeting,67 which is “a framework through which organizations allocate different
resources to different departments or teams for a program.”68 A historical example from DOD was
using the process to allocate resources based on an assessment of “the marginal contributions of
strategic bombers, land based missiles, and submarine based missiles to nuclear deterrence—
notwithstanding their locations in different components of the department.”69 The concept of
program extends to the smallest element of the DOD budget, which is called a “program
element.”70
As a type of program budgeting, PPBE has precedents in both the private sector and
government.71 In the private sector, some observers trace the origins of program budgeting to
efforts during the 1920s to improve organizational efficiency at major U.S. manufacturing
companies, such as DuPont Corporation, Bell Laboratories, Ford Motor Company, and General
Motors Corporation.72 In the government context, program budgeting is associated with efforts by
Congress to better understand the performance of government programs through agency budgets.
In 1956, acting in part on recommendations from the Hoover Commission—a panel appointed to
study and propose Executive Branch organizational changes—Congress passed legislation (P.L.
84-863) that amended the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 (P.L. 81-784) to require
agency heads to support budget justifications with “information on performance and program
costs by organizational units.”73
At DOD, the process currently known as PPBE dates to 1961, when Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara and Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Charles Hitch implemented the
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), in part to centralize budget
decisionmaking processes in DOD.74 Prior to this system, the military departments had greater
independence in formulating their budgets, and McNamara described this decentralized approach
as problematic for department-wide decisionmaking. Some participants have described the
defense budget prior to the advent of PPBS as “essentially a bookkeeping device for dividing

67 See, for example, William F. West, Program Budgeting and the Performance Movement: The Elusive Quest for
Efficiency in Government (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011); and Philip J. Candreva, National
Defense Budgeting and Financial Management: Policy and Practice (Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing,
2017). Candreva notes that DOD program budgeting is complex and incorporates other systems.
68 CFA Institute, “What Is Program Budget? And How Does It Work?” accessed May 28, 2022, at
https://www.cfajournal.org/program-budget/. According to this article, other types of budgeting processes include
incremental budgets, zero-based budgets, rolling budgets, activity-based budgets, top-down budgets, and bottom-up
budgets.
69 William F. West, Program Budgeting and the Performance Movement: The Elusive Quest for Efficiency in
Government (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), p. 10.
70 For more information on program elements, see the “Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)” section below.
71 Philip J. Candreva, National Defense Budgeting and Financial Management: Policy and Practice (Charlotte, NC:
Information Age Publishing, 2017), pp. 200-201.
72 Jonathan Kraft, “The Evolution of Program Budgeting in the United States Government,” Armed Forces
Comptroller, Winter 2009, pp. 40-41.
73 P.L. 84-863, §2; 70 Stat. 782.
74 William F. West, Program Budgeting and the Performance Movement: The Elusive Quest for Efficiency in
Government (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), p. 9.
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funds between Services and accounts and a blunt instrument for keeping a lid on defense
spending.”75 Some observers have described another perceived problem of the previous practice
as a disconnect between policy and funding processes.76 Appointed at a time when the position of
Defense Secretary and the department itself were slightly more than a decade old,77 McNamara
had the necessary authorities but lacked the necessary management tools to make effective
decisions, according to some participants.78 Earlier in his private-sector career, McNamara had
used a similar budgeting process in efforts to improve organizational efficiency at Ford.79 Hitch,
who previously headed the economics division at the RAND Corporation,80 has been described as
the “father” of PPBS and the “architect of the system.”81 The PPBS proponents were interested in
identifying a process that would allow officials to allocate funding efficiently based on national
security objectives.82 According to participants in PPBS’s early implementation, the system was
premised on six main ideas:
1. Decision-making on the basis of the national interest;
2. Considering needs and costs simultaneously;
3. Explicit consideration of alternatives;
4. Active use of an analytical staff;
5. A multiyear force and financial plan; and
6. Open and explicit analysis.83
To implement PPBS, its founders created the following management tools:
 Five-year defense plan;84

75 For more information, see Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense
Program, 1961-1969 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005, first published 1971 by Harper & Row), p. 11, at
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commercial_books/CB403.html.
76 John Whitley, Three Reforms to Improve Defense Resource Management, IBM Center for the Business of
Government, June 9, 2022, p. 11, at
https://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/Three%20Reforms%20to%20Improve%20Defense%20Reso
urce%20Management.pdf.
77 The National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253, §201; 61 Stat. 499), established a National Military Establishment
headed by a Secretary of Defense and consisting of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The National
Security Act Amendments of 1949 (P.L. 81-216, §4; 63 Stat. 579) amended the law to establish the Department of
Defense.
78 Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005, first published 1971 by Harper & Row), pp. 32-33. Enthoven served as
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis from 1965 to 1969, and Smith served as Special Assistant to the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis.
79 Jerry L. McCaffery and L.R. Jones, Budgeting and Financial Management for National Defense (Greenwich, CT:
Information Age Publishing, 2004), p. 89.
80 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization based in Santa Monica, CA, with contracts to operate
certain federally funded research and development centers. For more information, see https://www.rand.org/; and CRS
Report R44629, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs): Background and Issues for
Congress, by Marcy E. Gallo.
81 Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005, first published 1971 by Harper & Row), p. xix.
82 William N. Dunn, Public Policy Analysis: An Integrated Approach (New York, NY: Routledge, 2018), p. 39.
83 Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005, first published 1971 by Harper & Row), pp. 32-47, 365-366.
84 This concept is currently known as the Future Years Defense Program. For more information, see the “Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP)” section; and CRS In Focus IF10831, Defense Primer: Future Years Defense Program
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 Draft presidential memorandums;85
 Development concept paper;
 Readiness, information, and control tables; and
 Systems analysis.86
In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered other federal agencies to adopt similar budget
processes.87 However, the process proved difficult to implement across the federal government, in
part because of its complexity, questions about its relevance, and lack of staff with the necessary
technical expertise.88 Beginning in 1967, Congress conducted its first major congressional inquiry
into PPBS.89 Around this time, some academics questioned the ability of program budgeting to
perform as intended, with one outspoken critic arguing that budgets, like the political process,
change only incrementally each year.90 In 1969, during the Nixon Administration, Defense
Secretary Melvin Laird modified the system to a more decentralized approach, directing the
military departments to identify resourcing needs within guidance provided by OSD.91 In 1971,
also during the Nixon Administration, OMB effectively retracted President Johnson’s
government-wide order as part of an effort to simplify budget submission requirements.92
In subsequent decades, the manner in which DOD leaders implemented the process evolved
within DOD; however, in general, the logic of the process and its major elements remained intact.
Illustrative milestones include the following:

(FYDP), by Brendan W. McGarry and Heidi M. Peters.
85 These documents included analysis of 16 categories of major defense programs. For more information, see Alain C.
Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2005, first published 1971 by Harper & Row), p. 54. These categories are currently known as
Major Force Programs (MFPs), of which there are 12: Strategic Forces; General Purpose Forces; C3 [Command,
Control, and Communications], Intel, and Space; Mobility Forces; Guard and Reserve Forces; Research and
Development; Central Supply and Maintenance; Training, Medical, and Other; Administrative and Associated; Support
of Other Nations; Special Operations Forces; and Space. For a definition of MFP, see Appendix A.
86 The Systems Analysis office was the predecessor organization to the Office of Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation (CAPE) within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
87 Allen Schick, “A Death in the Bureaucracy: The Demise of Federal PPB,” Public Administration Review, vol. 33, no.
2 (Mar.-Apr., 1973), pp. 146-156, at https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/974211.pdf.
88 Ibid.; and William N. Dunn, Public Policy Analysis: An Integrated Approach (New York, NY: Routledge, 2018), p.
39.
89 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security and International
Operations, Planning Programming Budgeting, 90th and 91st Congress (1st sess.), March 1970, 42-649 O, p. III.
90 Robert D. Lee, Jr., Ronald W. Johnson, and Philip G. Joyce, Public Budgeting Systems, 10th ed. (Burlington, MA:
Jones and Bartlett Learning, 2021), pp. 172-173. For examples of such criticism, see Aaron Wildavsky, “Rescuing
Policy Analysis from PPBS,” Public Administration Review, vol. 29, no. 2 (March-April, 1969), pp. 189-202, at
https://www.jstor.org/stable/973700?seq=1; and, more recently, William F. West, Program Budgeting and the
Performance Movement: The Elusive Quest for Efficiency in Government (Washington, DC: Georgetown University
Press, 2011).
91 Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005, first published 1971 by Harper & Row), p. xii, at
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commercial_books/CB403.html.
92 Allen Schick, “A Death in the Bureaucracy: The Demise of Federal PPB,” Public Administration Review, vol. 33, no.
2 (Mar.-Apr., 1973), pp. 146-156, at https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/974211.pdf.
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 The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L.
99-433) resulted in an expanded role for the CJCS and combatant commanders in
the resource allocation process;93
 The Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986 (P.L. 99-145) required a
two-year budget proposal for DOD, resulting in certain temporary changes to the
PPBE process, until the provision was repealed in FY2008;94 and
 In 2003, during the George W. Bush Administration, DOD renamed the process
PPBE to emphasize the need to better manage the “execution” of budget
authority provided by Congress.95
The process has also generated interest from the Comptroller General of the United States. In
1984, the General Accounting Office—the predecessor organization to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO)—and DOD conducted a joint study of PPBS. The report described
the process as “an extensively developed and flexible resource allocation system” and identified
several areas of potential improvement.96
Other agencies with significant capital expenditures—including the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and elements of the intelligence
community—have adopted similar budgeting processes, in part to meet performance
requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and subsequent
amendments (GPRA; P.L. 103-62 and P.L. 111-352).97
Contemporary Context
Congress has expressed interest in the PPBE in view of multiple developments, mostly in the
context of questions about the pace at which the U.S. military is modernizing its forces relative to
China and other strategic competitors. Some observers have cautioned that DOD’s budget process
may not be sufficient to maintain U.S. competitiveness with China. DOD has pointed to China’s
military-civil fusion strategy, which seeks to “develop and acquire advanced dual-use technology
for military purposes and deepen reform of the national defense science and technology

93 P.L. 99-433, §§201, 211; 100 Stat. 1004, 1016. In addition, §109(d)(2); 100 Stat. 1000 required the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to study the functions and organization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including
“whether the planning, programming, and budgeting system of the Department of Defense (including the role of the
Office in such system) needs to be revised.”
94 P.L. 99-145, §1405; 99 Stat. 744. This provision of law was repealed in P.L. 110-181, §1006; 122 Stat. 303.
95 Philip J. Candreva, National Defense Budgeting and Financial Management: Policy and Practice (Charlotte, NC:
Information Age Publishing, 2017), p. 202.
96 The study identified the following areas of potential improvement: Planning, Its Linkage with Programming, and
Cross-Service Analysis; Time Horizon and Out-Year Uncertainties; Structures of Information in PPBS; Budget
Presentation and Justification; Managerial Flexibility and Legislative Control; Timing and Work Intensity;
Programmatic Analysis of Operating Accounts; Compatibility Among Management Information Systems; and
Management Review, Evaluation; and Feedback. The study also included discussion of “Some Management
Implications of a Change in Appropriation Accounts.” For more information, see General Accounting Office, The DOD
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, OACG-84-5, September 1, 1983, at
https://www.gao.gov/products/oacg-84-5.
97 NOAA adopted a version of program budgeting in 2002, and NASA and DHS in 2005. For more information, see
William F. West, Program Budgeting and the Performance Movement: The Elusive Quest for Efficiency in Government
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), pp. 78, 184, 191. For more information about GPRA, see CRS
Report R42379, Changes to the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA): Overview of the New Framework
of Products and Processes, by Clinton T. Brass.
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industries, and serves a broader purpose to strengthen all of the [People’s Republic of China’s]
instruments of national power.”98 The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence
stated, “While the United States should by no means adopt China’s centrally planned and state-
directed economic model, it must start by developing better strategic planning, forecasting, and
prioritization of emerging technologies to ensure long-term competitiveness.”99 A RAND
Corporation report concluded that “neither Russia nor China has better acquisition processes”
than the United States, but noted that China is growing organic capabilities through joint ventures
and acquisition of foreign technology.100
In this context, some observers have criticized DOD’s PPBE process—particularly its
assumptions about program timelines and development—as reflecting an “industrial-era”
approach and oriented toward large capital expenditures, such as aircraft carriers and strategic
bombers. Such systems typically cost billions of dollars, take years to complete, and follow a
traditional model of research and development before procurement and fielding. In 2019, the
Defense Innovation Board, a DOD advisory board, argued in part that the PPBE process,
including its requirement for two years or more in planning time, “limits the ability to quickly
adapt systems against rapidly changing threats and increases the barriers for integrating
advancements in digital technology in a timely and effective manner.”101 It also argued, “the latest
industry best practices for developing, fielding, and sustaining software applications and
information technology (IT) systems are substantially outpacing the US government’s industrial-
era planning, programming, budgeting, and execution system ... methods.”102 In a 2021 report, the
Hudson Institute argued that DOD’s decision time—that is, the time necessary from the early
identification of opportunity or need through the first contract—can take even longer, up to six
years, and that “to gain an advantage in a military competition with China, the [United States]
will likely need to revise its resource allocation processes to permit faster decisions and more
adaptability in selecting how to best pursue its operational objectives”103 Eric Schmidt, former

98 DOD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2021, p. IV, at
https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF. For more background and
analysis on China’s military-civil fusion, see CRS Report R46808, China’s Military: The People’s Liberation Army
(PLA), by Caitlin Campbell.
99 National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence Final Report, March 2021, p. 257, at
https://www.nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf. The commission was established by P.L.
115-232, §1051; 132 Stat. 1962.
100 Mark Ashby et al., Defense Acquisition in Russia and China, RAND Corporation, 2021, p. 31, at
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA100/RRA113-1/RAND_RRA113-1.pdf.
101 DOD, Defense Innovation Board, Final Report of the Defense Innovation Board (DIB) Software Acquisition and
Practices (SWAP) Study, Software Is Never Done: Refactoring the Acquisition Code for Competitive Advantage, May
3, 2019, p. S134, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/30/2002124828/-1/-
1/0/SOFTWAREISNEVERDONE_REFACTORINGTHEACQUISITIONCODEFORCOMPETITIVEADVANTAGE_
FINAL.SWAP.REPORT.PDF. P.L. 115-91, §872; 131 Stat. 1497, required the Defense Secretary to direct the Defense
Innovation Board, an independent advisory board to DOD, to study how to streamline the department’s software
development and acquisition regulations.
102 Ibid., p. S77. The report recommended for DOD to shift from a traditional linear development approach (i.e.,
“waterfall”) to an iterative software development methodology that combines development, security, and operations
(i.e., “DevSecOps”). See p. xi.
103 William Greenwalt and Dan Patt, Competing in Time: Ensuring Capability Advantage and Mission Success through
Adaptable Resource Allocation, Hudson Institute, February 2021, pp. 6, 10-11, at
https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/Patt%20Greenwalt_Competing%20in%20Time.pdf. For additional
discussion of perceived shortcomings of the PPBE process, see also Eric M. Lofgren, The DoD Budget Process: The
Next Frontier of Acquisition Reform, George Mason University, School of Business, Center for Government
Contracting, July 29, 2020, at https://business.gmu.edu/news/2021-10/no-5-dod-budget-process-next-frontier-
acquisition-reform; Thomas Spoehr and Frederico Bartels, Reforming the Defense Department’s Planning,
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chief executive officer of Google who served as a co-chair of the National Security Commission
on Artificial Intelligence, testified before Congress that the problem facing DOD is not
“innovation, but innovation adoption.”104 He said the department’s outdated budgeting process
“creates a valley of death for new technology, allowing basic research funding and also
procurement of weapons systems, but preventing the flexible investment needed in prototypes,
concepts, and experimentation of new concepts and technologies like AI.”105
Other observers, including former participants in the process, have provided different
characterizations of the PPBE process. Some of them have noted that because the PPBE process
adheres to provisions of permanent law but does not have an explicit statutory basis for
establishment, DOD can:
 alter internal the process or elements of the process without intervention by
Congress;106
 adopt a different approach to funding defense programs, organizations, and
missions in its annual budget request, for example, by consolidating or
reorganizing program elements;107
 seek budgetary changes through amendments or supplemental requests to
Congress; and
 respond to emerging priorities by reprogramming and transferring funds through
existing (or amended) authorities provided by Congress.108
A former DOD official has argued that the PPBE process is not a cause of the “valley of death”—
that is, the period when experimental programs fail to transition from either the science and
technology phase or development phase to production—but rather part of the solution, by
providing an opportunity for decisionmakers to allocate funding for such transitions during the
multi-year funding plan.109 While noting that the DOD budgeting process “is not responsive
enough to pivot away from losing efforts or to quickly double down on emerging winners,” a
RAND Corporation analyst has argued that an overemphasis on speed can produce unintended

Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process, The Heritage Foundation, January 14, 2022, at
https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/reforming-the-defense-departments-planning-programming-budgeting-
and-execution; and Jon Etherton et al., Stepping Back from Acquisition Reform: How Our Resourcing Processes Drive
Defense Outcomes, January 2022, at https://www.ndia.org/-/media/sites/policy-issues/acquisition-
reform/ndia_acquisition_reform-final3.pdf.
104 Testimony of Eric E. Schmidt, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Emerging Technologies
and Their Impact on National Security, hearings, 117th Congress, 1st sess., February 23, 2021, pp. 11-12, at
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Schmidt_02-23-21.pdf.
105 Ibid.
106 CRS communications with former DOD officials. For a list of laws related to PPBE, see Appendix A.
107 See, for example, Jamie Morin, “Podcast: PPBE Reform Panel 2 — From Ideas to Implementation,” in Acquisition
Talk, produced by Eric Lofgren, April 6, 2021, at https://acquisitiontalk.com/2021/04/podcast-ppbe-reform-panel-2-
from-ideas-to-implementation/.
108 See, for example, Dov S. Zakheim, “Reform the Pentagon’s budget process, or lose our military and tech
advantages,” The Hill, April 2, 2021, at https://thehill.com/opinion/546097-reform-the-pentagons-budget-process-or-
lose-our-military-and-tech-advantages? For more information on DOD transfer and reprogramming authorities, see
CRS Report R46421, DOD Transfer and Reprogramming Authorities: Background, Status, and Issues for Congress, by
Brendan W. McGarry.
109 John Whitley, Three Reforms to Improve Defense Resource Management, IBM Center for the Business of
Government, June 9, 2022, p. 26, at
https://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/Three%20Reforms%20to%20Improve%20Defense%20Reso
urce%20Management.pdf.
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consequences, such as systems that become “evolutionary dead ends” or “outsized operations and
maintenance burdens.”110
Certain reviews in 2021 have recommended changes to defense appropriations and authorities as
part of efforts to modernize the DOD budget process. The 2021 National Security Commission on
Artificial Intelligence Final Report included several recommendations for Congress and DOD to
modernize the budget and oversight processes for digital technologies, for example, by creating a
single appropriation and budget structure for software and digital technologies.111 A former
chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services said another commission
recommendation—for a pilot program to test a portfolio management approach for requirements
and budgeting—should produce lessons learned for broader reforms to the PPBE process.112
In the DOD context, some observers have described the concept of portfolio-based budgeting as
managing funding for an entire category of systems, such as all Army helicopters, rather than a
single program, such as the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter.113 For many programs, Congress
currently authorizes and appropriates funding for one or more appropriation accounts, each
containing one or more line items. For example, of the $790 million provided for the AH-64
helicopter in FY2022, $780 million was for line items within the Aircraft Procurement, Army
account and $10 million was provided for a line item in the Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation, Army account.114
The aforementioned DIB report made certain recommendations that it characterized as priority,
including the establishment of a new appropriation category to fund software “as a single budget
item, with no separation between RDT&E, production, and sustainment.”115 In FY2021, Congress
established a new RDT&E budget activity (6.8), “Software and Digital Technology Pilot

110 Jonathan P. Wong, “Bad Idea: Overly Focusing on Speed in Development and Acquisition,” The Center for
Strategic and International Studies, December 15, 2020, at https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-overly-focusing-on-
speed-in-development-and-acquisition/. For examples of questions posed about the long-term utility of mine-resistant
ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles built for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, see Alex Rogers, “The MRAP: Brilliant
Buy, or Billions Wasted?” Time, October 2, 2012, at https://nation.time.com/2012/10/02/the-mrap-brilliant-buy-or-
billions-wasted/.
111 The report included the following defense budget-related recommendations: make supplemental funding available to
drive operational prototyping, scale, and transition of AI technologies; accelerate efforts to implement a portfolio
management approach for requirements and budget; direct the Secretary of Defense to establish a dedicated AI fund;
support the continuation of the Budget Activity 8 pilot program in FY2022 and direct the Department to add an S&T
[science and technology] project to the pilot programs; establish a single appropriation and budget structure for
software and digital technologies by FY2023; and identify and implement successful portfolio- and mission-based
budgeting constructs at scale across DOD. For more information, see National Security Commission on Artificial
Intelligence Final Report, March 2021, pp. 308-311, at https://www.nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-
Report-Digital-1.pdf.
112 William “Mac” Thornberry, “How Congress must reform its budget process to compete against China in AI,” The
Hill, June 25, 2021, at https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/560345-how-congress-must-reform-its-
budget-process-to-compete/.
113 Thomas Spoehr and Frederico Bartels, Reforming the Defense Department’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting,
and Execution Process, The Heritage Foundation, January 14, 2022, at
https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/reforming-the-defense-departments-planning-programming-budgeting-
and-execution.
114 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, April 2022, Program
Acquisition Cost by Weapon System, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, p. 1-9, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Weapons.pdf.
115 DOD, Defense Innovation Board, Final Report of the Defense Innovation Board (DIB) Software Acquisition and
Practices (SWAP) Study, Software Is Never Done: Refactoring the Acquisition Code for Competitive Advantage, May
3, 2019, pp. 37-38.
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Programs.”116 In general, a budget activity is a grouping of similar line items within an
appropriation account.117 The funding can be used for activities typically associated with other
types of defense appropriations during the period of availability, including “agile research,
development, test and evaluation, procurement, production, modification, and operation and
maintenance.”118
Defense appropriations generally have differing periods of availability in which DOD financial
managers can obligate the authority for new obligations, obligation adjustments, expenditures,
and outlays.119 For example, military personnel (MILPERS) and operations and maintenance
(O&M) appropriations are generally available for such actions for up to one year; RDT&E
appropriations for two years, procurement appropriations for three years (shipbuilding for five
years), and military construction (MILCON) appropriations for five years.120 The DIB report also
made other recommendations that it characterized as secondary,121 including replacing PPBE and
other processes with a portfolio management approach that would empower a program executive
officer in each of the armed services to allocate funding for software capabilities based on
warfighter needs.122
In 2022, a RAND Corporation report summarized recent proposals for PPBE reform as follows:
 More efficient execution of the existing PPBE process (e.g., reduce the number
of approval authorities, modernize budget justification documents, release timely
strategic guidance);
 Broader or different units of analysis (e.g., create new budget categories for
networked communications and other modernization priorities, consolidate
various RDT&E program elements into larger groupings, establish a contingency
fund to be used for multiple purposes);

116 P.L. 116-260, Division C, §8131; 134 Stat. 1335.
117 According to DAU, budget activities are “categories within each appropriation and fund account that identify the
purposes, projects, or types of activities financed by the appropriation or fund.” See DOD, DAU Glossary, “budget
activity,” accessed June 28, 2022, at https://www.dau.edu/glossary/Pages/GlossaryContent.aspx?itemid=26941. For
more information on RDT&E budget activities, see CRS Report R44711, Department of Defense Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E): Appropriations Structure, by John F. Sargent Jr.
118 Ibid.
119 The major categories of DOD appropriations are military personnel (MILPERS); operation and maintenance
(O&M); procurement; research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E); and military construction and family
housing (MILCON). For more information on the DOD budget, see CRS Report R46965, The Department of Defense
(DOD) Budget: An Orientation, by Pat Towell.
120 This concept is often referred to as “colors of money.” See, for example, Department of the Army, “Understanding
Acquisition: The Colors of Money,” Army ALT [Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology] Magazine, March 25, 2021, at
https://asc.army.mil/web/news-understanding-acquisition-the-colors-of-money/.
121 DOD, Defense Innovation Board, Final Report of the Defense Innovation Board (DIB) Software Acquisition and
Practices (SWAP) Study, Software Is Never Done: Refactoring the Acquisition Code for Competitive Advantage, May
3, 2019, p. S16.
122 According to the Project Management Institute, portfolio management “refers to the centralized management of one
or more project portfolios to achieve strategic objectives.” See Project Management Institute, Portfolio Management,
accessed June 11, 2022, at https://www.pmi.org/learning/featured-topics/portfolio. According to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), some companies and organizations use a portfolio management approach to “assess
product investments collectively from an enterprise level, rather than as independent and unrelated initiatives.” See
GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon System Investments Could Improve
DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-07-388, March 2007, summary, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-07-388.pdf.
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 Integrated portfolios (e.g., consolidate portions of the defense budget into
missions, capability areas, or regions—similar to previous efforts that funded the
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, or JIEDDO, and the
Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, or JAIC);123
 Removal of RDT&E from the FYDP (i.e., exclude RDT&E funding from long-
term budget projections);
 More powerful reprogramming (e.g., increase the amount of funding that DOD
can transfer or reprogram, delegate authority for such actions to lower
organizational levels).124
Selected Legislative Activity
This section of the report discusses recent legislation relevant to the discussion of PPBE reform.
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2022
In response to calls to establish new appropriations accounts or structures to provide DOD with
greater acquisition and budgetary flexibility for software-related development, as discussed
above, Congress in FY2021 established a new RDT&E budget activity for software and digital
technology pilot programs, and increased funding for such efforts from $588 million in FY2021
to $741.8 million in FY2022.125
At the same time, in the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2021 defense appropriations
act, Congress argued that “objective quantitative and qualitative evidence is needed to evaluate
potential expansion of the approved pilot programs” and that “seeking additional flexibility in the
execution of appropriations should not be a solution to internal accounting and guidance issues
that challenge the Department’s ability to execute these programs.”126
In legislative documents accompanying FY2022 defense appropriations bills, Congress made
similar points. The Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense
acknowledged DOD’s “rationale regarding the incremental technical challenges posed by modern
software development practices, including implementing technical fixes to existing code,
addressing cyber vulnerabilities, and integrating incrementally developed new capabilities.”127
However, the panel stated, “reporting requirements ... have not been submitted to the

123 Congress has directed the creation or expansion of certain defense capabilities. Congress regularly provides funding
for the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account (NGREA) to procure items for the reserve components (see,
for example, P.L. 117-103, Division C, Title III; 136 Stat. 169). Congress has also directed DOD to establish a
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) rapid response team (see P.L. 104-201, §1414; 110 Stat.
2720).
124 Jonathan P. Wong, Resourcing Defense Innovation: The Role of Organizational Values, Acquisition Research
Program at the Naval Postgraduate School, May 2, 2022, at https://dair.nps.edu/bitstream/123456789/4565/1/SYM-
AM-22-052.pdf.
125 DOD requested $1.78 billion for such pilot programs in FY2023. For more information, see DOD, Research
Development, Test & Evaluation Programs (R-1) FY2023 budget document, accessed June 10, 2022, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/r1.xlsx.
126 Explanatory statement accompanying the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2021 (Division C of P.L. 116-
260), in the House, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 166 (December 21, 2020), Book III, p. H8167.
127 Senate Appropriations Committee, Explanatory Statement for the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2022
(draft statement released by the committee’s majority [Democratic] caucus), October 18, 2021, p. 154, at
https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DEFRept_FINAL.PDF.
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congressional defense committees on a timely basis, and have not yet provided a baseline for
analyzing the effectiveness of the pilot programs compared to traditional appropriation
practices.”128 In the explanatory statement accompanying the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2022 (Division C of P.L. 117-103), Congress encouraged the Secretary of
Defense to perform “detailed analysis of the Department’s accounting and financial management
process for such pilot programs compared to traditional software and digital technology
programs,” and to submit quarterly reports to the congressional defense committees that detail the
quantitative and qualitative metrics and other information as part of assessments of each pilot.129
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022
Congressional consideration of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022
(NDAA; P.L. 117-81) involved debate about the speed and effectiveness of the PPBE process.130
The House-passed NDAA included a provision (§1079) to establish Defense Resource Budgeting
and Allocation Commission.131 The purpose of the provision would have been to “develop a
consensus on an effective and strategic approach to Department of Defense resource budgeting
and allocation, including by conducting an examination of the planning, programming, budgeting,
and execution methodology of the Department; and by considering potential alternatives to such
methodology to maximize the ability of the Department to equip itself in a timely manner to
respond to current and emerging threats.”132 The SASC-reported NDAA included a similar
provision (§1002) that would have established a Commission on Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution Reform to provide an independent review and assessment of DOD’s
PPBE process.133
The enacted FY2022 NDAA included an amended version (§1004) of the SASC provision.134 The
legislation stated the purpose of the commission was to examine the effectiveness of the PPBE
process (and related processes), consider alternatives, and make legislative and policy
recommendations for improvement “to field the operational capabilities necessary to outpace
near-peer competitors, provide data and analytical insight, and support an integrated budget that
is aligned with strategic defense objectives.”135 The legislation stated the duties of the
commission were to compare the process with similar processes of private industry, other federal
agencies, and other countries; assess the efficacy and efficiency of all phases and aspects of the
process; and propose recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the process.136
The enacted legislation included other provisions related to the PPBE process. These included
requirements for the Secretary of Defense to establish a pilot program to identify ways to more

128 Ibid.
129 Explanatory statement accompanying the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2022 (Division C of P.L. 116-
260), in the House, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 166 (March 9, 2022), Book III, p. H2064.
130 See, for example, SASC, Hearings, “Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution Process of the Department of
Defense,” March 18, 2021, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/21-03-18-planning-programming-
budget-and-execution-process-of-the-department-of-defense.
131 H.R. 4350, §1079.
132 H.Rept. 117-118, p. 234.
133 S. 2792, §1002; and S.Rept. 117-39, p. 227.
134 135 Stat. 1884; and explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House
section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, Book II, p. H7314.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
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quickly meet the operational needs of combatant commands (§871);137 for the Secretary of
Defense to establish pilot programs within the Strategic Capabilities Office to close “significant”
capability gaps in theater (§872);138 and for the DOD Comptroller to submit a plan to the
congressional defense committees to consolidate the information technology systems used to
manage data and support the process (§1003).139
Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform
As discussed above, Section 1004 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) established the
Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform. The section
discusses the purpose, duties, and other selected elements of the commission.
Purpose
The legislation stated the purpose of the commission was to:
1. examine the effectiveness of the planning, programming, budgeting, and
execution process and adjacent practices of the Department of Defense,
particularly with respect to facilitating defense modernization;
2. consider potential alternatives to such process and practices to maximize the
ability of the Department of Defense to respond in a timely manner to current and
future threats; and
3. make legislative and policy recommendations to improve such process and
practices in order to field the operational capabilities necessary to outpace near-
peer competitors, provide data and analytical insight, and support an integrated
budget that is aligned with strategic defense objectives.140
Duties
The legislation stated the duties of the commission were to compare the process with similar
processes of private industry, other federal agencies, and other countries; assess the efficacy and
efficiency of all phases and aspects of the process; and propose recommendations to improve the
effectiveness of the process. In particular, the commission was to assess the following:
(A) the roles of Department officials and the timelines to complete each such phase or aspect;
(B) the structure of the budget of Department of Defense, including the effectiveness of
categorizing the budget by program, appropriations account, major force program, budget
activity, and line item, and whether this structure supports modern warfighting requirements
for speed, agility, iterative development, testing, and fielding;
(C) a review of how the process supports joint efforts, capability and platform lifecycles, and
transitioning technologies to production;

137 135 Stat. 1855; and explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House
section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, Book II, p. H7308.
138 135 Stat. 1859; and explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House
section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, Book II, p. H7308.
139 135 Stat. 1884; and explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House
section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7314.
140 135 Stat. 1885.
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(D) the timelines, mechanisms, and systems for presenting and justifying the budget of
Department of Defense, monitoring program execution and Department of Defense budget
execution, and developing requirements and performance metrics;
(E) a review of the financial management systems of the Department of Defense, including
policies, procedures, past and planned investments, and recommendations related to
replacing, modifying, and improving such systems to ensure that such systems and related
processes of the Department result in: (i) effective internal controls; (ii) the ability to achieve
auditable financial statements; and (iii) the ability to meet other financial management and
operational needs; and
(F) a review of budgeting methodologies and strategies of near-peer competitors to
understand if and how such competitors can address current and future threats more or less
successfully than the United States.141
Reports and Briefings
The legislation requires the commission to issue an interim report by February 6, 2023, and a
final report by September 1, 2023.142 It also requires the commission to provide three briefings to
the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations (the first within six
months after its establishment, the next within one month after submitting the interim report, and
the last within one month after submitting the final report).143
Appointments
The legislation established a 14-member commission to be composed of nongovernment civilian
experts appointed by leaders of the DOD, Congress, Armed Services, and Appropriations
committees.144 The commission subsequently elected as chair Robert Hale, a senior advisor at the
consulting company Booz Allen Hamilton who served as DOD Comptroller during the Obama
Administration; and as vice chair Ellen Lord, a director on the Board of Directors for the sensor-
manufacturer GEOST who served as the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment (A&S) during the Trump Administration.145
Some observers have criticized the composition of the commission. For example, one article
reported that 11 of the 14 commissioners had ties to the defense industry and, while affirming
potential benefits of PPBE reform, argued in part that “it would also present irresistible money-
grabbing opportunities to the defense industry’s revolving door regulars: folks who bounce
between high-profile jobs on Capitol Hill, in the Pentagon, and within top military contractors’
executive ranks and boards.”146 Others have highlighted the importance of appointing
commissioners with “the right mix” of professional backgrounds to assess the implications of

141 Ibid.
142 135 Stat. 1886.
143 Ibid. As of July 8, 2022, the commission had informal consultations with the committees for information-gathering
purposes but had not provided a formal briefing on the status of the review and assessment.
144 For a complete list of appointments to the commission, see Appendix D.
145 Tony Bertuca, “New PPBE reform commission names Hale as chair, Lord as vice chair,” Inside Defense, June 2,
2022, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/new-ppbe-reform-commission-names-hale-chair-lord-vice-chair.
146 Julia Gledhill, “Reform—or Repeat? Congress Fills New Pentagon Reform Panel with Revolving Door Regulars,”
Project on Government Oversight (POGO), March 8, 2022, at https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2022/03/reform-or-
repeat-congress-fills-new-pentagon-reform-panel-with-revolving-door-regulars.
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potential changes on the various stakeholders involved in the process: “Add too many people
invested in the current system, and it becomes a recipe for perpetuating the status quo. Pour in an
overabundance of people with innovative private-sector experience, and the solutions will turn
out to be wholly unworkable in the Pentagon.”147
More generally, some long-standing criticisms of commissions are that they reflect an abdication
of lawmaker responsibility, engage in an undemocratic practice because commissioners are
unelected, and produce findings that are frequently ignored.148 A former DOD official encouraged
the commission to avoid: trying to eliminate the reality of resource scarcity or fix poor leadership
with changes to the PPBE process; ignoring the incentives of stakeholders in the process,
including Congress; and legislating a policy process.149
Potential Issues for Congress
Potential issues for Congress relating to DOD’s PPBE process include, among others: perceived
advantages and disadvantages; Congress’s role; oversight of DOD design and implementation;
comparisons with alternative models; and balancing congressional control and department
flexibility.
Perceived Advantages and Disadvantages
Congress may consider reviewing how changes to the PPBE process could affect the balance of
perceived advantages and disadvantages of the process and the incentives of stakeholders
involved.
In terms of advantages, proponents have praised the PPBE process as deliberate, disciplined,
logical, consistent, and forward-looking. At multiple levels of DOD, the calendar-driven process
provides regular forums for civilian and military leaders to review and make decisions on defense
programs, projects, and activities. The process is structured to include participation from multiple
stakeholders with differing incentives to encourage negotiation and consensus-building on
contentious issues. The precursor to CAPE was established in part to provide independent
analysis to enable the Secretary of Defense to make informed budget and strategy decisions as
part of the process.150 Some observers argue that DOD civilian leaders need independent sources
of information to counterbalance and overcome the incentives of service leaders and others to
“‘sell’ their programs with overly optimistic cost estimates and promises of revolutionary
performance and to preserve those programs by withholding bad news.”151

147 Thomas Spoehr and Frederico Bartels, Reforming the Defense Department’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting,
and Execution Process, The Heritage Foundation, January 14, 2022, at
https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/reforming-the-defense-departments-planning-programming-budgeting-
and-execution.
148 For more information, see CRS Report R40076, Congressional Commissions: Overview and Considerations for
Congress, by Jacob R. Straus.
149 John Whitley, Three Reforms to Improve Defense Resource Management, IBM Center for the Business of
Government, June 9, 2022, pp. 32-33, at
https://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/Three%20Reforms%20to%20Improve%20Defense%20Reso
urce%20Management.pdf.
150 Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005, first published 1971 by Harper & Row), p. 11, at
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commercial_books/CB403.html.
151 Peter Levine, Defense Management Reform: How to Make the Pentagon Work Better and Cost Less (Stanford,
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In general, the process is oriented toward the base defense budget—that is, the planned or
regularly occurring costs to staff, train, and equip the military force—and reflective of anticipated
strategies and needs. The process is intended to provide an opportunity for oversight and
consideration of tradeoffs, both internally by DOD and externally by Congress. A former DOD
Comptroller has said that alternative assessments during the process help ensure that “program
effects are correctly identified” and “costs are correctly estimated.”152 Some observers have said
of the PPBE process, in concert with other decision-support systems: “Having multiple entities
working on solutions to the same or similar sets of joint operational problems can result in
creative solutions.”153
In terms of disadvantages, critics have called the PPBE process slow, rigid, complex, outdated,
and insular. While the process may be conducive for defense programs characterized by
significant capital expenditures, such as aircraft carriers and strategic bombers, it may be less
agile for certain other defense programs, such as those characterized by software or rapidly
evolving information-technology requirements, or for emergencies and contingencies. For
example, during the past decade, funding designated for Overseas Contingency Operations was
incorporated into the FYDP as placeholder projections that frequently underestimated actual
amounts.154 Some observers have argued that the PPBE process does not effectively integrate
with other DOD decision-support systems;155 does not result in changes to a significant
percentage of defense programs, particularly during periods of downsizing or major funding
changes;156 and assumes a linear development model for funding weapon systems.157 One
academic has argued that PPBE and another type of government budgeting system “fell short of
their goals. In particular, the substantial effort that went into these systems failed to change the
way federal resources were allocated.”158 Some have described PPBE as an example of
“centralized planning” and called for the adoption of a budgeting process that supports
“modularity, iteration and speed.”159 Other budget allocation processes may better address rapidly
emerging concerns and situations where strategies and needs emerge from events or new insights.
Apart from the PPBE discussion, one author has argued that the strengths of a bureaucracy—for
example, well-defined rules, structures, and procedures—are weaknesses “when the agency needs

California: Stanford University Press, 2020), p. 139.
152 Robert F. Hale, “Should PPBES Be Reformed?” Armed Forces Comptroller, Fall 2021.
153 Susanna V. Blume and Molly Parrish, Make Good Choices, DoD, Center for a New American Security, November
20, 2019, at https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/make-good-choices-dod.
154 For more information, see CRS Report R44519, Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and
Status, by Brendan W. McGarry and Emily M. Morgenstern.
155 GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon System Investments Could
Improve DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-07-388, March 2007, summary, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-07-
388.pdf.
156 Gordon Adams and Cindy Williams, Buying National Security: How America Plans and Pays for Its Global Role
and Safety at Home (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), p. 118.
157 William Greenwalt and Dan Patt, Competing in Time: Ensuring Capability Advantage and Mission Success through
Adaptable Resource Allocation, Hudson Institute, February 2021, pp. 6, 10-11, at
https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/Patt%20Greenwalt_Competing%20in%20Time.pdf.
158 Philip G. Joyce, “Using Performance Measures for Federal Budgeting: Proposals and Prospects,” Public Budgeting
and Finance, vol. 13, no. 4 (December 1993), at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1540-5850.00987.
159 Jerry McGinn and Eric Lofgren, “Three steps to help defense innovation break free from its shackles,” Defense
News, January 20, 2022, at https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/01/20/three-steps-to-help-
defense-innovation-break-free-from-its-shackles/.
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to respond quickly. In some cases, a problem comes and goes before the responsible agency can
act. Other times the environment is so dynamic that the stable processes cannot keep up.”160
Any given resource allocation process may not serve all purposes. That is, simultaneous operation
of PPBE and other, more nimble processes might be viewed as complements, given the needs for
both deliberate, long-range strategic planning and quickly responding to emerging lessons
learned, needs, and strategies.161 From such a perspective, questions for Congress might include
how to accommodate PPBE with other potential processes and, accordingly, how to structure
planned flexibility while preserving coordination with DOD and accountability and transparency
to Congress. Questions might also include identifying instances in which DOD entities more
strictly or loosely adhered to the PPBE process to determine whether one approach or the other
resulted in a timelier adoption and fielding of certain commercially driven technology.
Congress’s Role
In weighing recommendations to reform the PPBE process, Congress may consider how much or
how little control or influence to exert over the PPBE process in statute. DOD policy does not
reference a statutory basis for the establishment of the current PPBE process.162 Rather, the PPBE
process is largely the product of administrative decisions and practices; Congress has referred to
the process in multiple provisions of Title 10 of the U.S. Code.163 If Congress chooses to exert
more control over the process, it may consider providing a statutory basis for the establishment of
the PPBE process, or an alternative process or processes, perhaps as a part of a broader
reorganization of statutory references to the PPBE process, system, or its elements. Alternatively,
Congress might also consider the role of existing statutory references in advancing congressional
influence and their potential impact on the flexibility of the PPBE process. A former DOD official
has cautioned against legislating on what he considers an internal policy process: “Attempts to
codify specific resource allocation processes internal to the department will make the process
more antiquated (over time), slower, and less able to meet national security needs.”164 Some
academics have also argued that legislative or regulatory reforms to the defense budgeting
process will never resolve political differences of opinion over funding priorities: “No amount of
budget process or [PPBE] reform will reconcile the different value systems and funding priorities
for national defense and security represented by opposing political parties, nor will it eliminate
the budgetary influence of special interest politics.... threat perception and politics drive the
defense budget, not the budget process itself.”165

160 Philip J. Candreva, National Defense Budgeting and Financial Management: Policy and Practice (Charlotte, NC:
Information Age Publishing, 2017), p. 20.
161 For discussion of the deliberate/emergent dichotomy, see Henry Mintzberg and James A. Waters, “Of Strategies,
Deliberate and Emergent,” Strategic Management Journal, vol. 6, no. 3 (July-September 1985), pp. 257-272, at
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2486186.
162 DOD, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 7045.14, The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
(PPBE) Process, August 29, 2017, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/704514p.pdf.
163 For a list of Title 10 sections of the U.S. Code that reference the PPBE process, system, or elements, see Appendix
B.
164 John Whitley, Three Reforms to Improve Defense Resource Management, IBM Center for the Business of
Government, June 9, 2022, p. 33, at
https://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/Three%20Reforms%20to%20Improve%20Defense%20Reso
urce%20Management.pdf.
165 Jerry L. McCaffery and L.R. Jones, Budgeting and Financial Management for National Defense (Greenwich, CT:
Information Age Publishing, 2004), p. 134.
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Congress may also consider how it influences the PPBE process in routine legislative activity,
such as by passing or not passing appropriations acts (e.g., regular defense appropriations acts,
continuing resolutions, and supplemental funding); providing limited authority for the DOD to
transfer and reprogram funds; and requiring military officials to submit lists of “unfunded
priorities” that were not included in the President’s budget request.
Relying on continuing resolutions rather than regular appropriations acts to fund the government
may affect multiple phases of the PPBE process, for example, by limiting DOD funding at the
previous fiscal year’s level and by preventing the department from starting new programs or
increasing production rates.166 Some observers have argued that Congress could improve the
effectiveness of the PPBE process by enacting on-time regular defense appropriations acts. A
former DOD Comptroller has argued that the PPBE “trains generally run on time unless
congressional delays interfere with schedules” and recommended changing the start and end dates
of the government’s fiscal year to better align with legislative activity at the end of a calendar
year.167 Congress also sometimes enacts supplemental funding in response to emergencies,
contingencies, and disaster relief that may affect the PPBE process by changing baseline
assumptions for certain DOD programs, projects, and activities. For example, Congress has
provided $26.6 billion in FY2022 supplemental funding for DOD in response to the war in
Ukraine,168 with assistance for thousands of Javelin anti-tank missiles, Stinger anti-aircraft
missiles, and other weapon systems.169 This assistance has generated congressional interest in
U.S. stockpiles and manufacturing capacity related to such systems.170
Congress also provides limited authority for DOD to transfer and reprogram funds, which can
affect activities typically conducted in the final phase of the PPBE process (i.e., execution) by
allowing DOD financial managers to obligate funds for purposes other than those originally
approved.171 Some observers have argued that Congress could improve the flexibility of the PPBE
process by increasing DOD transfer authority in law and DOD reprogramming thresholds in
report language.172 Others have recommended that any proposals to increase DOD funding
flexibility should complement the ability of Congress to provide oversight of taxpayer funds.173

166 For more information, see CRS Report R45870, Defense Spending Under an Interim Continuing Resolution: In
Brief, coordinated by Pat Towell.
167 Robert F. Hale, “Should PPBES Be Reformed?”, Armed Forces Comptroller, Fall 2021.
168 As of June 28, 2022, Congress provided $26.632 billion for DOD in FY2022 supplemental funding in response to
the situation in Ukraine, including $6.528 billion in the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (Division N of
H.R. 2471; P.L. 117-103) and $20.104 billion in the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R.
7691; P.L. 117-128), according to Congressional Budget Office (CBO) scores of the legislation. For more information,
see CBO, Estimate for H.R. 2471 [Table 2. Discretionary Spending Under Division N], p. 3, at
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2022-03/HR2471_As_Cleared_by_the_Congress.pdf; and CBO, Estimate for H.R.
7691, at https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2022-05/hr7691_passed.pdf.
169 DOD, “Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine,” press release, June 17, 2022, at
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3066864/fact-sheet-on-us-security-assistance-to-ukraine/.
170 Letter from Representatives Adam Smith and Mike Rogers to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, March 18, 2022, at
https://armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/8/a/8a41d8b1-43fc-4999-b13a-
c6baa81d1d73/8460402C4BE18C5B6B3BCC8C058AD302.smith-rogers-stinger-letter-march-2022.pdf.
171 For more information, see CRS Report R46421, DOD Transfer and Reprogramming Authorities: Background,
Status, and Issues for Congress, by Brendan W. McGarry.
172 See, for example, Dov S. Zakheim, “Reform the Pentagon’s budget process, or lose our military and tech
advantages,” The Hill, April 2, 2021, at https://thehill.com/opinion/546097-reform-the-pentagons-budget-process-or-
lose-our-military-and-tech-advantages?
173 John Whitley, Three Reforms to Improve Defense Resource Management, IBM Center for the Business of
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Congress also requires that certain DOD military and civilian leaders submit annual “unfunded
priorities” lists that can affect the PPBE process.174 Some observers have argued that such lists
constitute a circumvention of the process because they reflect items that DOD and OMB leaders
opted to not include in the budget request.175 Others argue that they provide Congress with greater
transparency into the process by detailing examples of internal tradeoffs.176
If Congress determines that the PPBE process is not agile enough, it may consider various options
intended to provide DOD with more budgetary flexibility. Such options may include establishing
new appropriations or increasing funding for certain existing appropriations, such as software and
digital technology pilot programs; expanding the period of availability for new or existing
defense appropriations; establishing new funds or increasing funding for organizations or entities
tasked with carrying out specific missions; or increasing DOD transfer and reprogramming
thresholds. If Congress determines that the PPBE process is not transparent enough, it may
consider various options to provide more visibility into the process. Such options may include
encouraging or requiring DOD to publish additional information and data related to the process in
its annual budget request, reprogramming actions, and unfunded priorities lists; or one-time or
recurring reports on certain topics of interest, such as how certain budget activities are intended to
support strategic objectives or tradeoffs made during certain phases of the process.
Oversight Considerations
In conducting oversight of DOD’s design and implementation of the PPBE process, Congress
may consider several broad categories of questions, including the effectiveness of people carrying
out the process; centers of power in the process; the integration of PPBE with other DOD
decision-support systems; and potential Executive Branch influences on the process.
People vs. Process
Congress may consider to what degree the effectiveness of any given decisionmaking process,
including PPBE, can be attributable to the civilian and military leaders carrying out the process
rather than the framework of the process itself. In 1968, an economist described the precursor to
PPBE as “a method or procedure whose worth depends on the skill and wisdom of the people
who use it. Identifying coherent objectives, relating activities to objectives, identifying costs with
activities, comparing alternatives, and weighing achievements against costs, are bound to be
unimpeachable activities if properly done.”177 In 2021, RAND Corporation concluded that the

Government, June 9, 2022, pp. 23-24, at
https://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/Three%20Reforms%20to%20Improve%20Defense%20Reso
urce%20Management.pdf.
174 DOD unfunded priorities generally refer to reports submitted to Congress pursuant to United States Code provisions
(e.g., 10 U.S.C. §222a and 10 U.S.C. §222b) listing military programs, activities, or mission requirements that were not
included in the President’s annual budget request but that the department would fund with additional appropriations.
For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11964, Defense Primer: Department of Defense Unfunded Priorities, by
Maureen Trujillo and Brendan W. McGarry.
175 See, for example, Taxpayers for Common Sense, “Unfunded Priorities Lists: The Latest Iteration of Backdoor
Earmarking,” May 4, 2022, at https://www.taxpayer.net/national-security/unfunded-priorities-lists/.
176 See, for example, Elaine McCusker and John G. Ferrari, The Defense Unfunded Priority Lists Expose a Strategy and
Resourcing Mismatch, American Enterprise Institute, June 2022, at https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/the-
defense-unfunded-priority-lists-expose-a-strategy-and-resourcing-mismatch/.
177 Thomas C. Schelling memorandum, “PPBS and Foreign Affairs,” in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on
Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Planning Programming
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research, development, and acquisition (RDA) processes of Russia and China were comparable to
those in the United States and noted the importance of people involved in the process: “In
practice, the outcomes of these broad RDA frameworks hinge on the people and institutions that
are tasked with implementing the frameworks.”178 From these perspectives, questions for
Congress related to PPBE reform might include how to separate people-related issues from
process-related issues; what people-related issues are frequently associated with perceived
dysfunction in the PPBE process; how might talent management principles ameliorate people-
related issues in the process, such as by selecting better-suited individuals for various roles; and
whether mechanisms exist to incentivize individuals involved in the process to make more
effective, agile, and timely decisions.179
Centers of Power
Congress may consider to what degree the OSD can or should exert control over the process
relative to the DOD components. While many observers associate the PPBE process with former
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, some have argued that the process today more closely
resembles that of his successor Melvin Laird, in that the armed services have a greater role in
identifying resourcing needs.180 According to one account, “This approach has remained the
practice since, with recurrent debates over how much guidance the Secretary of Defense should
provide and how much review the Secretary’s staff should undertake.”181 The idea of guidance
and delegation rather than control may be similar to the military concept of mission command,
which is defined as “the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based
upon mission-type orders.”182 Some observers have argued that “the services are consistently the
power centers in this process, even when particularly robust civilian leadership is in place.”183
From this perspective, questions before Congress might include what are the relative centers of
power in the PPBE process, what would be a proper balance of power in the process, and how
could actors be incentivized to provide such a balance.
Influences
Congress may consider the degree to which actors and events within the Executive Branch may
influence each phase of the PPBE process.

Budgeting, 90th Congress and 91st Congress (1st sess.), March 1970, 42-649 O, p. 111.
178 Mark Ashby et al., Defense Acquisition in Russia and China, RAND Corporation, 2021, p. 31, at
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA100/RRA113-1/RAND_RRA113-1.pdf.
179 DOD, Defense Business Board (DBB), Strengthening Defense Department Civilian Talent Management, May 12,
2022 (released May 18, 2022), at
https://dbb.defense.gov/Portals/35/Documents/Reports/2022/DBB%20Talent%20Management%20Study%20Report%2
023%20May%202022%20(reduced%20size).pdf.
180 Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005, first published 1971 by Harper & Row), p. xii, at
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commercial_books/CB403.html.
181 Ibid.
182 For more information, see DOD, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication, Joint Publication 1-02,
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, p. 155, archived at
https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf; and DOD, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-31, Joint
Land Operations, pp. V-14—V-15, at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_31ch1.pdf.
183 Susanna V. Blume and Molly Parrish, Make Good Choices, DoD, Center for a New American Security, November
20, 2019, at https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/make-good-choices-dod.
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The planning phase of the PPBE process may be affected or influenced by the delayed release of
strategic guidance, the President’s budget request, or projections that sometimes accompany the
request, particularly during a presidential transition year. In theory, the President’s National
Security Strategy (NSS) informs the Secretary of Defense’s National Defense Strategy (NDS),
which informs the CJCS’s National Military Strategy.184 In March 2022, the Biden
Administration transmitted a classified version of the 2022 NDS the same day it released the
FY2023 President’s budget request.185 The documents were based on the Administration’s Interim
National Security Strategic Guidance and predated the release of the anticipated NSS.186 Some
observers have criticized as “backwards” the release of an NDS before an NSS, as well as the
release of a detailed defense budget request prior to the release of an NDS.187 According to news
reports, the Administration delayed releasing the NDS in part to revise the document following
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.188 Potentially illustrating how the absence of strategic
guidance can affect long-term defense budget planning, in May 2021, the Biden Administration
released an FY2022 President’s budget request that included “mechanical extrapolations” for
projected funding levels for national defense discretionary funding “because these strategy
documents are currently under development.”189
Historically, U.S. military leaders have embraced the idea of planning as a problem-solving
technique. As President Dwight D. Eisenhower once said, “Plans are worthless, but planning is
everything.”190 While long-term planning is a major element of the strategic-planning process in
PPBE, some observers have focused on the fact that, for any fiscal year cycle, the planning phase
of PPBE can begin more than two years before the budget execution phase.191 One observer has
argued that the planning phase “should not take two years for an idea to go from inception to
getting funding that you’re actually able to spend,” and that the annual DPG is often issued too

184 Mara Karlin and Christopher Skaluba, “Strategic Guidance for Countering the Proliferation of Strategic Guidance,”
War on the Rocks, July 20, 2017, at https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/strategic-guidance-for-countering-the-
proliferation-of-strategic-guidance/.
185 DOD, “DoD Transmits 2022 National Defense Strategy,” press release, March 28, 2022, at
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2980584/dod-transmits-2022-national-defense-strategy/. As
of June 9, 2022, the White House had not released the 2022 National Security Strategy.
186 White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
187 See, for example, Zack Cooper, Melanie Marlowe, and Christopher Preble, “Podcast: A Strategy-Budget
Mismatch?” in Net Assessment, April 29, 2022, at https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/a-strategy-budget-mismatch/.
188 Connor O’Brien, Paul McLeary, and Lee Hudson, “Russia crisis forces Pentagon to rework defense strategy on the
fly,” Politico, March 3, 2022, at https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/03/russia-ukraine-defense-strategy-
pengtagon-00013449; and Peter Martin and Jennifer Jacobs, “Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine Forces Biden to Rewrite US
Security Plan,” Bloomberg News, June 3, 2022, at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-03/putin-s-war-
forces-biden-to-rewrite-security-plan-nod-to-europe.
189 OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2022, Footnote 2 in Table S.7, “Funding Levels for
Appropriated (“Discretionary”) Programs by Category,” p. 56, archived at
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2022-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2022-BUD.pdf.
190 Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, p. 235, accessed at
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/PPP. Eisenhower continued, “There is a very great distinction because when
you are planning for an emergency you must start with this one thing: the very definition of “emergency” is that it is
unexpected, therefore it is not going to happen the way you are planning. So, the first thing you do is to take all the
plans off the top shelf and throw them out the window and start once more. But if you haven’t been planning you can’t
start to work, intelligently at least. That is the reason it is so important to plan, to keep yourselves steeped in the
character of the problem that you may one day be called upon to solve—or to help to solve.”
191 DOD, DAU, Teaching Note: Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process, March 2018, p.
112. For more information on a notional PPBE schedule, see the “Timelines” section in this report.
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late in the calendar year to inform the armed services’ programmatic decisions.192 A former DOD
official has recommended that DOD rebuild strategic analysis to support the planning phase of
PPBE, in part by designating a lead among the USD Policy, the Director of CAPE, and Joint Staff
to produce a consolidated DPG and to support civilian leadership in implementing the NDS and
coordinating strategic-level processes across the department.193
The programming phase of the PPBE process may be affected or influenced by the extent to
which the military departments develop programs independent of the DPG and any OSD changes
to such programs. Some observers have argued that “in the programming process the services are
very much in the driver’s seat, using the bulk of the year to build their inputs into the process.”194
She also stated OSD-level program and budget reviews only adjust approximately 5% of
programs.195 Congress has sought information about DOD’s ability to perform strategic analysis
in support of planning and programming phases of the PPBE process following the department’s
decision in 2011 to disestablish CAPE’s campaign modeling and simulation—the methods used
to develop the analytic baseline.196 In 2016, RAND Corporation recommended in part that DOD
create a new planning construct and revamp the analytical methods to review programmatic
decisions.197 The 2018 National Defense Strategy Commission, established by Congress to
provide an independent assessment of the Trump Administration’s National Defense Strategy,
concluded in part that “DOD struggled to link objectives to operational concepts to capabilities to
programs and resources. This deficit in analytical capability, expertise, and processes is
intolerable ... and it must be remedied.”198
In 2019, GAO recommended that DOD determine the analytic products needed to support senior
leader decisionmaking, provide guidance for the services to explore alternative approaches and
force structures to respond to key threats, and establish an approach for comparing analyses of
force structure requirements.199 According to GAO, DOD has accepted these recommendations
and the Deputy Secretary of Defense in February 2022 issued standards for analysis supporting
strategic decisions.200 Given this issuance, questions for Congress may include what are the
standards for analysis supporting strategic decisions, to what degree are DOD components

192 See, for example, Todd Harrison, “Experts Preview the FY 2023 Defense Budget Request,” posted April 29, 2022,
Center for International and Strategic Studies, 74:05, at https://www.csis.org/events/experts-preview-fy-2023-defense-
budget-request.
193 John Whitley, Three Reforms to Improve Defense Resource Management, IBM Center for the Business of
Government, June 9, 2022, p. 23, at
https://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/Three%20Reforms%20to%20Improve%20Defense%20Reso
urce%20Management.pdf.
194 Susanna V. Blume and Molly Parrish, Make Good Choices, DoD, Center for a New American Security, November
20, 2019, at https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/make-good-choices-dod.
195 Ibid.
196 P.L. 113-291, §1053; 128 Stat. 3498.
197 Paul Davis, Capabilities for Joint Analysis in the Department of Defense: Rethinking Support for Strategic Analysis,
RAND Corporation, p. 57, at
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1469/RAND_RR1469.pdf.
198 Eric Edelman and Gary Roughead (co-chairs), Providing for the Common Defense: The Report of the National
Defense Strategy Commission, United States Institute of Peace, November 2018, p. x, at
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf.
199 GAO, Defense Strategy: Revised Analytic Approach Needed to Support Force Structure Decision-Making, GAO-
19-385, March 2019, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-385.pdf.
200 Ibid.
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complying with the standards, and how are the standards affecting decisionmaking in the PPBE
process.
The budgeting phase of the PPBE process may be affected or influenced by the extent to which
the services seek to identify DOD-wide solutions to operational problems, create broader
categories (i.e., portfolios) of capabilities, and acquire technology services rather than end-
products. Some observers have questioned the ability or incentives of the armed services to
independently propose DOD-wide programmatic and budgetary changes intended to meet
operational challenges. One report noted that, “Service Chiefs want to hold on to their percentage
of the budget and there is a Gentlemen’s Agreement between them preventing the Service Chiefs
from trying to grow their TOA [total obligational authority] by recommending reductions in
another Service’s TOA.”201 Others have recommended that DOD and Congress improve the
department’s agility in allocating resources, in part by consolidating certain DOD line items to
create broader portfolios of capabilities that can be used for multiple types of activities and longer
periods of availability, expanding the use of software and digital technology pilot programs, and
purchasing technology as a service rather than a product.202
The execution phase of the PPBE process may be affected or influenced by the extent to which
DOD components conduct program reviews, transfer or reprogram funds, and utilize information
technology systems for financial management. Some observers have recommended that DOD
conduct more regular reviews to improve the execution of funds during the PPBE process by
transferring or reprogramming funds from under-performing programs to more promising
efforts.203 Others have recommended that DOD expand the use of data analytics platforms, such
as ADVANA (“advanced analytics”), to better measure actual cost and performance of programs
during the PPBE process as a way to improve decisionmaking.204
Integration with Other Systems
Congress may consider to what degree the PPBE process integrates with DOD’s other decision-
support systems, including JCIDS and DAS.205 Independent reviews of DOD decision-support
systems have raised questions about their effectiveness. In 2007, GAO concluded in part that the
armed services “identify needs and allocate resources separately, using fragmented
decisionmaking processes that do not allow for an integrated, portfolio management approach

201 Jon Etherton et al., Stepping Back from Acquisition Reform: How Our Resourcing Processes Drive Defense
Outcomes, National Defense Industrial Association, January 2022, p. 20, at https://www.ndia.org/-/media/sites/policy-
issues/acquisition-reform/ndia_acquisition_reform-final3.pdf.
202 See, for example, Eric M. Lofgren, The DoD Budget Process: The Next Frontier of Acquisition Reform, George
Mason University, School of Business, Center for Government Contracting, July 29, 2020, at
https://business.gmu.edu/news/2021-10/no-5-dod-budget-process-next-frontier-acquisition-reform; and John Whitley,
Three Reforms to Improve Defense Resource Management, IBM Center for the Business of Government, June 9, 2022,
pp. 23-24, at
https://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/Three%20Reforms%20to%20Improve%20Defense%20Reso
urce%20Management.pdf.
203 See, for example, Dov S. Zakheim, “Reform the Pentagon’s budget process, or lose our military and tech
advantages,” The Hill, April 2, 2021, at https://thehill.com/opinion/546097-reform-the-pentagons-budget-process-or-
lose-our-military-and-tech-advantages? For more information on DOD transfer and reprogramming authorities, see
CRS Report R46421, DOD Transfer and Reprogramming Authorities: Background, Status, and Issues for Congress, by
Brendan W. McGarry.
204 Robert F. Hale, “Should PPBES Be Reformed?” Armed Forces Comptroller, Fall 2021, p. 17.
205 For a brief description of these systems, see the “PPBE’s Role in DOD Decision-Support Systems” section.
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like that used by successful commercial companies.”206 GAO made several recommendations for
DOD to implement a portfolio management approach to weapon system investments, including
establishing “a single point of accountability at the department level with the authority,
responsibility, and tools to ensure that portfolio management for weapon system investments is
effectively implemented.”207
In 2019, a DOD advisory panel, known as the Section 809 Panel and appointed to recommend
defense acquisition reforms,208 described DOD decision-support systems as “disjointed” and “one
of the major inhibitors to achieving timeliness, flexibility, agility, and innovation.”209 The panel
noted the different descriptive categories used in DOD decision-support systems (i.e., joint
capability areas in JCIDS, major force programs in PPBE, and affordability portfolios in DAS),210
and recommended for DOD to implement a portfolio management framework, including by
transitioning “from a program-centric execution model to a portfolio execution model.”211 DOD
guidance states that joint capability areas (JCAs) serve as the department’s framework for
capability portfolios.212 In 2021, a DOD official reported an ongoing process to “rebalance from a
program-centric approach to a portfolio-based perspective.”213 Questions for Congress may
include to what degree does the PPBE process integrate with the other DOD decision support
systems, how does a dissimilar taxonomy for such systems complicate or inhibit decisionmaking,
and how would shifting from a program-centric approach to a portfolio-based approach affect all
activities in PPBE process, in addition to those related to weapons procurement.
Comparisons with Alternative Models
Some Members of Congress and observers have questioned the relevance and responsiveness of
DOD’s PPBE process in the modern era, noting the shift since the process’s inception in the
1960s from a manufacturing-dominated economy to a services-oriented economy. Among the
duties of Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform is to
compare the DOD process “with similar processes of private industry, other federal agencies, and

206 GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon System Investments Could
Improve DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-07-388, March 2007, summary, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-07-
388.pdf.
207 Ibid., p. 32.
208 P.L. 114-92, §809; 129 Stat. 889.
209 Section 809 Panel, Report of the Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Regulations: Volume 3
of 3, January 2019, pp. 53-135 (recommendations 36-42), at https://discover.dtic.mil/wp-content/uploads/809-Panel-
2019/Volume3/Sec809Panel_Vol3-Report_Jan2019_part-1_0509.pdf.
210 Section 809 Panel, Report of the Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Regulations: Volume 2
of 3, June 2018, pp. 38-39, at https://discover.dtic.mil/wp-content/uploads/809-Panel-
2019/Volume2/Sec809Panel_Vol2-Report_Jun2018.pdf.
211 Section 809 Panel, Report of the Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Regulations: Volume 3
of 3 Summary of Recommendations, p. 4, at https://discover.dtic.mil/wp-content/uploads/809-Panel-
2019/Volume3/Vol3_Summary_Letter-size.pdf.
212 DOD, DODD 7045.20, Capability Portfolio Management, June 21, 2019, at
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/704520p.pdf. The current JCAs are force
integration; battlespace awareness; force application; logistics; command and control; communications and computers;
protection; and corporate management and support. For more information, see DOD, CJCSI 5123.01I, Charter of the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Implementation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System, October 30, 2021, p. B-7, at
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%205123.01I.pdf.
213 Tony Bertuca, “DOD embarks on new acquisition portfolio reviews,” Inside Defense, September 28, 2021, at
https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/dod-embarks-new-acquisition-portfolio-reviews.
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other countries.” Such comparisons may yield insights for potential improvements to the DOD
process, particularly from leading companies in information technology, manufacturing, and
space industries.
The relevancy of such comparisons to the DOD process may be limited by the size of the
department’s budget; number of employees; and qualitatively different issues of scale,
complexity, and operational tempo.214 As such, the applicability of specific lessons learned in the
private sector to DOD may depend heavily on context. Unlike private-sector companies, which
largely rely on profit to measure performance, DOD and other departments generally lack a
comparable variable to gauge outcomes—other than outright success or victory in a war or armed
conflict.215
Strategic planning and budgeting processes in the private sector may vary by company (or even
by division or unit within a company), market segment, or industry. In addition, strategic
processes in the private sector are not always effective. For example, one Ernst and Young survey
found that 66% of corporate strategy is never executed—an outcome some observers attributed to
challenges related to competing cultures and traditions, conflicting interests, and poor
communications.216 In this context, much of the business management literature in recent decades
has focused on matters of strategy formation and execution, in contrast with planning and
budgeting.217 Accordingly, there may be opportunities for further study of how DOD and other
public and private organizations infuse discussion of strategy into planning and budgeting
processes.
In 2022, GAO made several recommendations for DOD to adopt certain product development
principles viewed by the authors as effective in the private sector for encouraging innovation.
Specifically, GAO recommended for the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment update DOD acquisition policies to: attain a sound
business case; apply iterative design approaches; off-ramp capabilities when needed to maintain
schedule; and incorporate feedback from users of initial capabilities.218
Congressional Control vs. Department Flexibility
The concept of balancing congressional control and department flexibility in providing and
overseeing funding for DOD (or any federal agency) is a fundamental issue for Congress in
discharging its constitutional responsibilities. Congress may consider how potential changes to

214 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, April 2022, Defense Budget
Overview, United States Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, p. 1-3, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.
pdf. For more information on the FY2023 defense budget request, see CRS Video WVB00468, FY2023 Defense
Budget, by Lawrence Kapp et al.
215 John Whitley, Three Reforms to Improve Defense Resource Management, IBM Center for the Business of
Government, June 9, 2022, p. 32, at
https://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/Three%20Reforms%20to%20Improve%20Defense%20Reso
urce%20Management.pdf.
216 Harvard Management Update, “Execute Your Strategy—Without Killing it,” Harvard Business Review, February
27, 2008, at https://hbr.org/2008/02/execute-your-strategy-without-1.html.
217 For example, see Henry Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles for Planning,
Plans, Planners (New York, NY: Free Press, 1994); and Shona L. Brown and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Competing on
the Edge: Strategy as Structured Chaos (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1998).
218 GAO, Leading Practices: Agency Acquisition Policies Could Better Implement Key Product Development
Principles, GAO-22-104513, March 10, 2022, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104513.pdf.
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defense appropriations and authorities to reform the PPBE process may affect the balance of
congressional control and department flexibility.
In 1984, a General Accounting Office-DOD joint study of the PPBS (the precursor to PPBE)
stated that the system “could accommodate practically any appropriations account structure the
Congress wished to use.”219 The study stated that congressional committees frequently conducted
defense policy reviews from a broader perspective than appropriation accounts.220 The study
stated that the architect of the system concluded that advantages of the congressional
appropriations structure “far outweigh the disadvantages, which are principally mechanical,
namely, the need to translate program categories into budget categories and vice versa. This is the
sort of disadvantage that modern high-speed computers are well designed to overcome.”221 The
report discussed potential consequences of a change to a “mission-oriented” appropriations
structure, including compliance with controls required under the Anti-Deficiency Act (31 U.S.C.
§1342).222 The report presented the following scenarios as extremes:
1. The Congress would insist on maintaining, within a mission- or output-oriented
structure, the current level of control over projects, procurements, and other commodities
at the expense of efficiency deriving from flexibility or economies of scale in DOD
activities.
2. The Congress, while appropriating in broad mission categories, would accept a lessening
of its control over items to foster efficiency in DOD’s activities.223
This concept of balancing congressional control and department flexibility extends to any
discussion of potential PPBE reforms related to changing defense appropriations and authorities,
including establishing new appropriations or increasing funding for certain existing
appropriations, such as those created for software and digital technology pilot programs;
expanding the period of availability for new or existing defense appropriations; establishing new
funds or organizations for specific missions or activities; and increasing DOD transfer and
reprogramming thresholds.

219 General Accounting Office, The DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, OACG-84-5, September 1,
1983, pp. 115-119, at https://www.gao.gov/products/oacg-84-5.
220 Ibid.
221 Ibid.
222 Ibid.
223 Ibid.
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Appendix A. Selected Terms and Definitions
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
(PPBE) process employs numerous technical terms specific to defense planning and budgeting.
The following list includes a selection and definition of such terms. All of the definitions come
from DOD sources unless otherwise noted.
 Budget Estimate Submission (BES). Budget estimates submitted by a DOD
component to the DOD Comptroller during the budgeting phase of PPBE in
preparation of compiling the department’s portion of the annual President’s
budget request to Congress.224 DOD policy states that budget submissions
“include budget estimates, justification, and materials submitted in support of
budget estimates submissions.”225
 Capability. “The ability to complete a task or execute a course of action under
specified conditions and level of performance.”226
 Capability Gap Assessment. An assessment led by the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) that may include military needs “prioritized across
Service and functional lines, risk area, and determining long-term strategic
planning issues.”227
 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). According to statute, the DPG is written
guidance provided each year by the Secretary of Defense to DOD components
establishing “goals, priorities, including priorities relating to the current or
projected risks to military installation resilience, and objectives, including fiscal
constraints, to direct the preparation and review of the program and budget
recommendations of all elements of the Department, including: (i) the priority
military missions of the Department, including the assumed force planning
scenarios and constructs; (ii) the force size and shape, force posture, defense
capabilities, force readiness, infrastructure, organization, personnel, technological
innovation, and other elements of the defense program necessary to support the
[National Defense Strategy]; (iii) the resource levels projected to be available for
the period of time for which such recommendations and proposals are to be
effective; and (iv) a discussion of any changes in the strategy and assumptions
underpinning the strategy.”228 The DPG is produced during the PPBE planning
phase, which is coordinated by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.229

224 DOD, DAU, Teaching Note: Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process, March 2018, p.
115.
225 DOD, DODD 7045.14, The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process, August 29, 2017,
p. 5, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/704514p.pdf.
226 DOD, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, updated November 2021, p. 2, archived at
https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/dictionary.pdf.
227 DOD, CJCSI 8501.01B, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, Chief, National Guard
Bureau, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process, December 15,
2021, at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%208501.01B.pdf.
228 10 U.S.C. §113(g)(2)(A).
229 DOD, DODD 7045.14, The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process, August 29, 2017,
p. 5, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/704514p.pdf.
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 Fiscal Guidance (FG). The Secretary of Defense’s “topline fiscal control”
provided to DOD components in preparation of the programming phase of
PPBE.230
 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). “Program and financial plan for the
DoD as approved by the Secretary of Defense. The FYDP arrays cost data,
manpower, and force structure over a 5-year period (force structure for an
additional 3 years), portraying this data by major force program for DoD internal
review for the program and budget review submission. It is also provided to the
Congress annually in conjunction with the President’s budget.”231
 Integrated Priority List (IPL). “A list of combatant commanders’ highest
priority requirements, prioritized across Service and functional lines. They define
shortfalls in key programs that may adversely affect the combatant commander’s
mission. Each [combatant command] submits an IPL annually.”232
 Major Force Program (MFP). “An aggregation of [program elements] that
contain the resources needed to achieve an objective or plan.”233 Of the 12 MFPs,
six are considered combat force programs (strategic forces; general purpose
forces; command, control, communications, intelligence, and space; mobility
forces; Guard and reserve forces; and special operations forces) and six are
considered support programs (research and development; central supply and
maintenance; training, medical and other personnel activities; administration and
associated activities; support of other nations; and national security space).234
 Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE). “A cyclic process
containing four distinct, but interrelated phases: planning, programing,
budgeting, and execution. In addition to establishing the framework and process
for decision making on future programs, the process permits prior decisions to be
examined and analyzed from the viewpoint of the current environment (threat,
political, economic, technological, and resources) and for the time period being
addressed. The ultimate objective of PPBE is to provide operational commanders
the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable within fiscal
constraints.”235
 Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The final product of the PPBE
programming phase displaying a DOD component’s recommendations for

230 DOD, CJCSI 8501.01B, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, Chief, National Guard
Bureau, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process, December 15,
2021, p. GL-4, at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%208501.01B.pdf.
231 DOD, DODD 7045.14, The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process, August 29, 2017,
p. 12, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/704514p.pdf. For more information, see
CRS In Focus IF10831, Defense Primer: Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), by Brendan W. McGarry and Heidi
M. Peters.
232 DOD, CJCSI 8501.01B, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, Chief, National Guard
Bureau, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process, December 15,
2021, p. GL-4, at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%208501.01B.pdf.
233 DOD, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) Structure Handbook, February
2020, p. 6.
234 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10831, Defense Primer: Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), by
Brendan W. McGarry and Heidi M. Peters.
235 DOD, Financial Management Regulation, DoD 7000.14-R, Glossary, p. G-28, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/fmr/current/glossary.pdf.
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resource allocation decisions.236 POMs are submitted during the programming
phase, which is coordinated by the Director of CAPE.237
 Requirement. “A capability which is needed to meet an organization’s roles,
functions, and missions in current or future operations to the greatest extent
possible.”238
 Resource Management Decision (RMD). The name of a decision document
issued after a program review or a budget review during the PPBE process.239 In
general, program-related RMDs are issued in early November for the upcoming
fiscal year and reflect final decisions made during the PPBE programming phase,
while budget-related RMDs are issued in late November or early December for
the upcoming fiscal year and reflected decisions made during the PPBE
budgeting phase.240

236 DOD, DODD 7045.14, The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process, August 29, 2017,
p. 12, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/704514p.pdf.
237 DOD, DAU, Teaching Note: Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process, March 2018, p.
114; and 10 U.S.C. 139a(d)(2).
238 DOD, CJCSI 5123.01I, Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and Implementation of the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System, October 30, 2021, p. GL-11, at
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%205123.01I.pdf.
239 DOD, DAU, Teaching Note: Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process, March 2018, p.
107.
240 Ibid.
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Appendix B. Selected Laws
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
(PPBE) process, system, or its elements, are referenced in the following sections of Title 10 of the
U.S. Code:
 10 U.S.C. §113: Secretary of Defense. This law states in part that the Secretary of
Defense, with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is to provide the
Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), which is typically produced during the planning
phase of PPBE, to the secretaries of the military departments, chiefs of staff of the armed
forces, commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands, and the heads of
all defense agencies and field activities.241
 10 U.S.C. §129a: General policy for total force management. This law states in part
that “the Secretaries of the military departments and the heads of the Defense Agencies
shall have overall responsibility for the requirements determination, planning,
programming, and budgeting for such policies and procedures.”242
 10 U.S.C. §134: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. This law states in part that,
among other responsibilities, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall be
responsible and have overall direction and supervision for “the development of the
Defense Planning Guidance that guides the formulation of program and budget requests
by the military departments and other elements of the Department.”243
 10 U.S.C. §135: Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). This law states in part
that, among other responsibilities, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) shall
advise and assist the Secretary of Defense “in supervising and directing the preparation of
budget estimates of the Department of Defense.”244
 10 U.S.C. §139a: Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation. This law
states that the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense is the principal official within the senior management of DOD for,
among other matters, “analysis and advice on matters relating to the planning and
programming phases of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution system,
and the preparation of materials and guidance for such system, as directed by the
Secretary of Defense, working in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller).”245
 10 U.S.C. §153: Chairman: functions. This law states that the CJCS shall determine
whether to prepare in certain years a National Military Strategy, which describes how the
military will support national security objectives and which typically informs the DPG.246
 10 U.S.C. §167b note: Assignment of Certain Budget Control Responsibilities to
Commander of United States Cyber Command. This law, included as a statutory note

241 10 U.S.C. §113(g)(2)(A).
242 10 U.S.C. §129a(c)(2).
243 10 U.S.C. §134(b)(2)(E).
244 10 U.S.C. §135(c)(2).
245 10 U.S.C. §139a(d)(2).
246 10 U.S.C. §153(b). For certain other authorities related to military roles in the PPBE process, see 10 U.S.C. §§113,
151, 161, 163, 164, 181, and 482.
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in Title 10, requires the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command to “be responsible for
directly controlling and managing the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution
of resources to train, equip, operate, and sustain the Cyber Mission Forces.”247
 10 U.S.C. §229 note: Prioritization of funds for equipment readiness and strategic
capability. This law, included as a statutory note in Title 10, requires the Secretary of
Defense to “take such steps as may be necessary through the planning, programming,
budgeting, and execution systems of the Department of Defense” to prioritize funds for
equipment readiness and strategic capability.248
 10 U.S.C. §1071 note: Health care management demonstration program. This law,
included as a statutory note in Title 10, directs the Secretary of Defense to carry out a
demonstration program on health care management to “explore opportunities for
improving the planning, programming, budgeting systems, and management of the
Department of Defense health care system.”249
 10 U.S.C. §2222 note: Standardized business process rules for Military Intelligence
Program. This law, included as a statutory note in Title 10, requires the Chief
Management Officer to coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
and Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence [now the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and Security] to “develop and implement standardized business process rules
for the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process for the Military
Intelligence Program.”250
 10 U.S.C. Chap. 223 note: Trusted defense systems. This law, included as a statutory
note in Title 10, requires the Secretary of Defense to “identify the appropriate lead
person, and supporting elements, within the Department of Defense for the development
of an integrated strategy for managing risk in the supply chain for covered acquisition
programs,” and for that lead person to develop a risk-management strategy that, among
other matters, provides guidance “for the planning, programming, budgeting, and
execution process in order to ensure that covered acquisition programs have the necessary
resources to implement all appropriate elements of the strategy.”251
 10 U.S.C. §4403: Requirements relating to availability of major system interfaces
and support for modular open system approach. This law states in part that the
secretary of each military department shall, among other matters, “ensure that necessary
planning, programming, and budgeting resources are provided to specify, identify,
develop, and sustain the modular open system approach, associated major system

247 P.L. 117-81, Div. A, Title XV, §1507; 135 Stat. 2030.
248 P.L. 109-364, Div. A, Title III, §323; 120 Stat. 2146.
249 P.L. 106-398, §1 [[Div. A], Title VII, §733]; 114 Stat. 1654A-191.
250 P.L. 115-232, Div. A, Title XVI, §1624(a); 132 Stat. 2119. On January 2, 2021, DOD disestablished the position of
CMO. For more information, see memorandum from Kathleen Hicks, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to Senior Pentagon
Leadership, Commanders of the Combatant Commands, and Defense Agency and DOD Field Activity Directors,
“Disestablishment of the Chief Management Officer, Realignment of Functions and Responsibilities, and Related
Issues,” September 1, 2021, at https://media.defense.gov/2021/Sep/03/2002847421/-1/-1/0/DISESTABLISHMENT-
OF-THE-CMO-REALIGNMENT-OF-FUNCTIONS-AND-RESPONSIBILITIES-AND-RELATED-ISSUES.PDF. For
more information on the PPBE process for intelligence, see CRS In Focus IF10428, Intelligence Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation (IPPBE) Process, by Michael E. DeVine.
251 P.L. 110-417, [Div. A], Title II, §254; 122 Stat. 4402.
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interfaces, systems integration, and any additional program activities necessary to sustain
innovation and interoperability.”252
 10 U.S.C. §4506: Procurement of services: data analysis and requirements
validation. This law requires that the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Director of Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation, ensure that “appropriate and sufficiently detailed data are collected and
analyzed to support the validation of requirements for services contracts and inform the
planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process of the Department of
Defense.”253
 10 U.S.C. §4811 note: National security innovation partnerships. This law, included
as a statutory note in Title 10, requires the Secretary of Defense to report to the
congressional defense committees an implementation plan for an activity to establish
national security innovation partnerships with academic institutions, private-sector firms
in defense and commercial sectors, and other entities, including plans for “integration of
the activity into the programming, planning, budgeting, and execution process of the
Department of Defense.”254
 10 U.S.C. §7724: Executive Director. This law states in part that the executive director
of the Army National Military Cemeteries is responsible in part for “overseeing the
programming, planning, budgeting, and execution of funds authorized and appropriated
for the Cemeteries.”255

252 10 U.S.C. §4403(4).
253 10 U.S.C. §4506(a).
254 P.L. 116-283, Div. A, Title II, §219; 134 Stat. 3463.
255 10 U.S.C. §7724(8).
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Appendix C. Selected Policies and Regulations
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
(PPBE) process is referenced in various department policies and regulations, including the
following:
Department of Defense Directive (DODD)
 DOD, DODD 7045.14, The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE)
Process, August 29, 2017, at
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/704514p.pdf.
 DOD, DODD 8260.05, Support for Strategic Analysis (SSA), July 7, 2011, at
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/826005p.pdf.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)
 DOD, CJCSI 5123.01I, Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC) and the Implementation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System, Oct. 30, 2021, at
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%205123.
01I.pdf.
 DOD, CJCSI 3100.0lE, Joint Strategic Planning System, May 21, 2021, at
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%203100.
01E.pdf.
 DOD, CJCSI 8501.01B, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant
Commanders, Chief, National Guard Bureau, and Joint Staff Participation in the
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process, Dec. 15, 2021, at
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%208501.
01B.pdf.
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Appendix D. Appointments to the Commission on
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
Reform
Table 2 lists the names and titles of individuals appointed to the Commission on Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform, as well as those of their appointing officials.
Table 2. Appointments to the PPBE Commission
Commissioner
Current Position
Past Positions
Appointing
Appointing
Official
Official Title
Peter Levinea
Senior Fellow,
Former Deputy
Lloyd J. Austin III
Secretary of
Institute for
Chief Management
Defense
Defense Analyses
Officer and Acting
Under Secretary of
Defense for
Personnel and
Readiness; Minority
Counsel, General
Counsel, and Staff
Director of the
Senate Armed
Services Committee
Lisa Disbrowa
Director on the
Former Under

Board of Directors,
Secretary of the Air
Mercury Systems
Force; Assistant
Secretary of the Air
Force (Financial
Management and
Comptrol er)
Arun A. Seraphinb
Deputy Director of
Former Professional Senator Chuck
Majority Leader of
the Emerging
Staff Member on the Schumer
the Senate
Technologies
Senate Armed
Institute at the
Services Committee
National Defense
Industrial
Association
Diem Salmonc
Senior Director,
Former Budget
Senator Mitch
Minority Leader of
Mission Autonomy
Deputy Policy
McConnell
the Senate
at Anduril
Director on the
Industries; Adjunct
Senate Armed
Senior Fellow at the
Services Committee
Center for a New
American Security
Susan Davisd
Co-Chair of the
Former
Representative
Speaker of the
Board of Directors
Representative who
Nancy Pelosi
House
for the Information
served on the
Technology and
House Armed
Innovation
Services Committee
Foundation
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Commissioner
Current Position
Past Positions
Appointing
Appointing
Official
Official Title
Jonathan Burkse
Vice President for
Former Chief of
Representative
Minority Leader of
Global Public Policy
Staff and National
Kevin McCarthy
the House
at Walmart
Security Advisor to
former House
Speaker Paul Ryan;
Policy Advisor for
Budget and
Appropriations to
Senator McConnell;
Policy Director and
Budget Analyst for
House Budget
Committee
Robert F. Halef
Senior Advisor at
Former Under
Senator Jack Reed
Chair of the Senate
Booz Al en
Secretary of
Armed Services
Hamilton; and
Defense
Committee
Center for Strategic
(Comptrol er)/
and International
Chief Financial
Studies
Officer; head of Air
Force financial
management; head
of defense group at
Congressional
Budget Office
El en M. Lordg
Senior adviser at
Former Under
Senator Jim Inhofe
Ranking Member of
The Chertoff
Secretary of
the Senate Armed
Group; Director on
Defense for
Services Committee
Board of Directors
Acquisition and
at GEOST
Sustainment (A&S);
President and Chief
Executive Officer of
Textron Systems
Eric Fanningh
President and Chief
Former Secretary of Representative
Chair of the House
Executive Officer of
the Army; Chief of
Adam Smith
Armed Services
the Aerospace
Staff to the
Committee
Industries
Secretary of
Association
Defense; Acting
Secretary of the Air
Force and Under
Secretary of the Air
Force; Deputy
Under Secretary of
the Navy/Deputy
Chief Management
Officer; and
Professional Staff
Member of the
House Armed
Services Committee
Raj Shahi
Managing Partner of
Former head of
Representative Mike Ranking Member of
Shield Capital; and
DOD’s Defense
Rogers
the House Armed
Chair of Resilience
Innovation Unit
Services Committee
Insurance
Experimental
(DIUx)
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Commissioner
Current Position
Past Positions
Appointing
Appointing
Official
Official Title
Jennifer Santosj
Principal Director
Former Naval R&D
Senator Patrick
Chair of the Senate
for Strategic
Investment
Leahy
Appropriations
Initiatives, National
Executive at the
Committee
Security and Space
Department of the
at Charles Stark
Navy; Deputy
Draper Laboratory
Assistant Secretary
of Defense for
Industrial Policy;
Professional Staff
Member on Senate
Appropriations
Committee
Steven J. Cortesek
Retired
Former Executive
Senator Richard
Ranking Member of
Vice President at
Shelby
the Senate
DRS Technologies;
Appropriations
Senior Vice
Committee
President at ATK;
Vice President of
Programs and
Budget at Lockheed
Martin; Staff
Director of the
Senate
Appropriations
Committee
Jamie M. Morinl
Vice President of
Former Director of
Representative Rosa Chair of the House
Defense Systems
Cost Assessment
L. DeLauro
Appropriations
Operations at The
and Program
Committee
Aerospace
Evaluation in the
Corporation
Office of the
Secretary of
Defense; Assistant
Secretary of the Air
Force for Financial
Management and
Comptrol er; Acting
Under Secretary of
the Air Force;
Professional Staff
Member of the
Senate Budget
Committee
David Norquistm
President and Chief
Former Deputy
Representative Kay
Ranking Member of
Executive Officer of
Secretary of
Granger
the House
the National
Defense; Under
Appropriations
Defense Industrial
Secretary of
Committee
Association
Defense
(Comptrol er)/Chief
Financial Officer,
and Professional
Staff Member of the
House
Appropriations
Committee
Source: DOD and Congressional releases (see links to individual source documents in the Notes below).
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Notes:
a. DOD, “DoD Announces Appointments to the Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting and
Execution Reform,” press release, February 28, 2022, at
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2948756/dod-announces-appointments-to-the-
commission-on-planning-programming-budgeting/;
b. National Defense Industrial Association, “ETI’s Seraphin chosen for commission to examine defense PPBE,”
press release, February 10, 2022, at https://www.ndia.org/about/media/press-
releases/2022/2/10/ppbecommission; and “Appointments,” in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition,
vol. 168 (February 1, 2022), p. S449;
c. “Appointment,” in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 168 (March 16, 2022), p. S1227; and
Diem Salmon’s LinkedIn page, accessed June 10, 2022, at https://www.linkedin.com/in/diem-salmon-
2a438b25;
d. “Appointment of Individual to Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform,” in
the House, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 168 (February 11, 2022), p. H305; and Information
Technology and Innovation Foundation, accessed June 10, 2022, at https://itif.org/person/susan-davis/;
e. “Communication from the Republican Leader,” in the House, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 168
(February 11, 2022), p. H1118; and Jonathan Burks’s LinkedIn page, accessed June 10, 2022, at
https://www.linkedin.com/in/jonathan-burks-28a8234;
f.
“Appointments,” in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 168 (February 1, 2022), p. S449; and
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), accessed June 10, 2022, at
https://www.csis.org/people/robert-f-hale;
g. “Appointments,” in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 168 (February 1, 2022), p. S449; and
“GEOST Inc. Announces Appointment of El en Lord to Board of Directors,” press release, BusinessWire,
January 12, 2022, at https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20220112005359/en/GEOST-Inc.-
Announces-Appointment-of-El en-Lord-to-Board-of-Directors; and DOD, El en M. Lord biography, accessed
June 10, 2022, at https://www.defense.gov/About/Biographies/Biography/Article/1281505/ellen-m-lord/;
h. Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Armed Services Committees Leadership Announces Selections for
Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform,” press release, February 1, 2022,
at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press-releases/armed-services-committees-leadership-announces-
selections-for-commission-on-planning-programming-budgeting-and-execution-reform;
i.
Ibid.;
j.
“Message from the Senate,” in the House, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 168 (February 7, 2022), p.
H993; and Jennifer Santos’ LinkedIn page, accessed June 10, 2022, at https://www.linkedin.com/in/jennifer-
santos-00922441;
k. “Appointment,” in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 168 (February 10, 2022), p. S650; and
Steven J. Cortese’s LinkedIn page, accessed June 10, 2022, at https://www.linkedin.com/in/steve-cortese-
86782682;
l.
Jamie Morin Twitter post, February 14, 2022, 4:02 p.m., at
https://twitter.com/jamiemmorin/status/1493329894197051401?; and The Aerospace Corporation, accessed
June 10, 2022, at https://aerospace.org/person/dr-jamie-m-morin;
m. House Committee on Appropriations, minority website, “Granger Nominates Former DOD Deputy
Secretary Norquist to PPBE,” press release, February 15, 2022, at https://republicans-
appropriations.house.gov/news/press-releases/granger-nominates-former-dod-deputy-secretary-norquist-
ppbe; and National Defense Industrial Association, “David Norquist named NDIA's new president and
CEO,” press release, March 31, 2022, at https://www.ndia.org/about/media/press-
releases/2022/3/31/newceo.

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Author Information

Brendan W. McGarry

Acting Section Research Manager

Acknowledgments
This report draws in part from research previously conducted in coordination with Heidi M. Peters, Analyst
in U.S. Defense Acquisition Policy; and John R. Hoehn, Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs.
The author wishes to acknowledge their work on this topic and peer reviews of this report. The author
wishes to acknowledge Clinton T. Brass, Specialist in Government Organization and Management; Kristy
N. Kamarck, Specialist in Military Manpower; Lawrence Kapp, Specialist in Military Personnel Policy;
Liana W. Rosen, Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics; Kelley M. Sayler, Analyst in Advanced
Technology and Global Security; Edward C. Liu, Legislative Attorney; and F. Matthew Woodward,
Principle Analyst in the National Security Division at the Congressional Budget Office, for their reviews of
this report. The author wishes to acknowledge Mari Y. Lee, Visual Information Specialist, for her
compilation of the figures in this report. This report draws in part from research previously conducted by
Lynn M. Williams, former CRS Specialist in Defense Readiness and Infrastructure.

Disclaimer
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