U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID- May 31, 2022
19: Successes and Challenges
Marc Labonte
The economic recession triggered by COVID-19 caused a historically rapid and deep decline in
Specialist in
economic activity and employment. This decline was caused by reductions in supply (production
Macroeconomic Policy
of goods and services) and demand (spending).

Lida R. Weinstock
Policymakers responded by rapidly implementing historically large fiscal and monetary stimulus
Analyst in Macroeconomic
beginning in spring 2020 and continuing into 2021. This stimulus, and the gradual reopening of
Policy
the economy, led to a historically rapid economic recovery. However, the recovery was

incomplete and uneven—the demand for goods and services recovered more quickly than supply
did, and the demand for labor rebounded faster than labor supply did. Continued supply chain

disruptions have caused shortages in the availability of products, such as automobiles. Firms have
periodically suffered temporary disruptions due to COVID outbreaks among employees or foreign suppliers. More recently,
the war in Ukraine has disrupted food, energy, and other commodity markets, causing a spike in their prices. The labor force
participation rate has fallen from 63.4% before the pandemic to 62.2% in April 2022. Economic growth slowed in the second
half of 2021 and was negative in the first quarter of 2022. Although demand may have roughly returned to its pre-pandemic
trend in 2021, potential supply remains reduced until supply chain disruptions can be resolved and workers return to the labor
force. Furthermore, the nature of the pandemic has changed the mix of demand, at least for the time being, in favor of goods
instead of services, some of which cannot be consumed while socially distanced. A market imbalance where demand is
higher than supply can be resolved only by prices rising. As a result, inflation has risen in 2022 to a level last seen in the
early 1980s.
Policymakers have grappled with how to address these issues without undermining the economic recovery. To do so,
monetary and fiscal policy needs to be normalized quickly enough to avoid high inflation from becoming endemic but not so
quickly that it would cause a recession. Fiscal and monetary policy generally aim to maximize employment and keep prices
stable. Since unemployment is already low by historical standards, maintaining stimulus absent other changes currently has
greater potential to further increase inflation than to further reduce unemployment. When inflation is persistently high, it can
become more costly to reduce. In 2021, policymakers took a wait-and-see approach to withdrawing the extraordinary
pandemic-era fiscal and monetary policy, guarding against the possibility that private demand would be inadequate without
stimulus and hoping that high inflation would prove transient because supply problems would resolve themselves quickly. In
2022, policymakers largely changed their view, believing that high inflation would not be resolved until policy was tightened,
reducing demand. The Fed started raising interest rates and stopped purchasing assets in March 2022. The budget deficit has
fallen by more than half as the economy has recovered and much of the COVID-19 relief has expired or been exhausted. But
because of the wait-and-see approach in 2021 and gradual tightening in 2022, the amount of stimulus still in place is large.
Policymakers always face a tradeoff between inflation and employment when setting fiscal and monetary policy. The
pandemic has introduced one unique consideration. To the extent that supply constraints are temporary, inflationary pressures
may somewhat diminish once they are resolved. However, economists are uncertain on how quickly supply constraints can
be resolved—if they even can be. For example, it is uncertain how many of the individuals who have left the labor force are
willing to return during or after the pandemic. Policies aimed at demand can be adjusted quickly, but arguably, current supply
constraints cannot be fully resolved through domestic policy, at least in the short run. For example, it is uncertain how the
pandemic will evolve going forward, and many supply chain problems are originating overseas, disrupting the imports
desired by U.S. consumers and as intermediate inputs by U.S. producers. If expectations of high inflation become entrenched,
high inflation could become difficult to reverse. Inflation was high from the late 1960s until the early 1980s and was reduced
only after interest rates reached 19% and the economy entered a deep and long recession.

Congressional Research Service

link to page 5 link to page 5 link to page 6 link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 12 link to page 13 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 19 link to page 20 link to page 20 link to page 22 link to page 24 link to page 25 link to page 26 link to page 28 link to page 29 link to page 31 link to page 32 link to page 7 link to page 9 link to page 10 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 17 link to page 18 link to page 22 link to page 24 link to page 28 link to page 31 link to page 35 link to page 35 link to page 36 link to page 36 U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
The COVID-19 Recession and Recovery ........................................................................................ 1
The Decline and Recovery in Output ........................................................................................ 2
Changing Patterns of Consumer Demand ................................................................................. 4
The Spike in Personal Income and Saving ................................................................................ 5
Supply Disruptions .................................................................................................................... 8
Labor Market ............................................................................................................................. 9
Low Unemployment but Remaining Employment Gap ..................................................... 9
Low Labor Force Participation ......................................................................................... 10
A Tight Labor Market ....................................................................................................... 12
High and Rising Inflation ........................................................................................................ 13
Booming Financial Conditions During the Pandemic ............................................................. 15
Fiscal and Monetary Policy Stimulus ............................................................................................ 16
Fiscal Policy ............................................................................................................................ 16
Monetary Policy ...................................................................................................................... 18
Policy Issues Moving Forward ...................................................................................................... 20
Removing Fiscal and Monetary Stimulus ............................................................................... 21
The Federal Reserve and Interest Rates ............................................................................ 22
Supply Disruptions .................................................................................................................. 24
Low Labor Force Participation ............................................................................................... 25
Federal Debt Sustainability ..................................................................................................... 27
What If Asset Prices Continue to Fall? ................................................................................... 28

Figures
Figure 1. Real GDP ......................................................................................................................... 3
Figure 2. Cumulative Change in Spending from Q4 2019 .............................................................. 5
Figure 3. Total Personal Income, Saving, and Consumption........................................................... 6
Figure 4. Employment Situation .................................................................................................... 10
Figure 5. Labor Force Participation Rate ....................................................................................... 11
Figure 6. Job Openings vs. Workers .............................................................................................. 13
Figure 7. Inflation for Selected Components of GDP ................................................................... 14
Figure 8. Deficit-to-GDP Ratio ..................................................................................................... 18
Figure 9. Federal Funds Rate ......................................................................................................... 20
Figure 10. Inflation and Unemployment When the Fed Began Raising Rates .............................. 24
Figure 11. Debt-to-GDP Ratio ....................................................................................................... 27

Figure A-1. Initial COVID-19 Economic Shock Represented in a Simple Aggregate-
Supply-Aggregate-Demand Framework .................................................................................... 31
Figure A-2. Current Supply-Constrained Economy Represented in a Simple Aggregate-
Supply-Aggregate-Demand Framework .................................................................................... 32

Congressional Research Service

link to page 34 link to page 34 link to page 37 link to page 38 U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

Appendixes
Appendix A. Understanding the Economy Under COVID-19 in a Supply and Demand
Framework ................................................................................................................................. 30
Appendix B. Defining Economic Concepts .................................................................................. 33

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 34

Congressional Research Service

link to page 34 U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic caused an unprecedented disruption to the basic functioning of the
economy in spring 2020. According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), an
independent, nonprofit research group, the U.S. economy experienced a two-month recession in
March and April of 2020.1 The recession was the deepest since the Great Depression, with gross
domestic product (GDP) falling by the largest percentage in one quarter in the history of the data
series and unemployment rising to its highest monthly rate in the history of that series. Just as
economic activity had declined at a historically fast pace, it also started to recover at a historically
fast pace. In May 2020, a new economic expansion began, spurred in large part by the historic
nature of both fiscal and monetary stimulus throughout the initial months of the pandemic. The
recovery continued throughout 2020 and 2021, bolstered by additional stimulus, the gradual
loosening of travel restrictions and stay-at-home orders, and the eventual rollout of COVID-19
vaccines and treatments.2
Fiscal and monetary support continued through 2021, as did the economic recovery. Despite the
brevity of the recession and the rapid recovery, most economic indicators—such as output and
unemployment—had not fully recovered until the latter part of 2021. To date, in the aggregate,
the recovery has been fairly robust, but there are nonetheless frictions in the economy that
indicate it has not fully returned to normal yet. As the U.S. economy has rebounded from the
disruptions caused by the initial stages of the pandemic, it is now characterized by relatively tight
labor markets and inflation higher than the United States has experienced since the 1980s. In
addition to high inflation, the key economic policy challenges going forward relate to supply
disruptions, a low labor force participation rate, and maintaining financial stability in light of
rapid asset price appreciation in 2020 and 2021.
This report details the initial economic impact of the pandemic and the ways in which the
economy has recovered and continues to recover. This report further explores the ways in which
this shock and recovery have been unusual and what this all might mean for the economy in the
coming months and years. The state of the recovery has implications for how much and how
quickly fiscal and monetary stimulus should be removed, which is also discussed. To understand
what those implications are, the report first discusses what has happened in a simplified supply-
demand framework. The report ends with two appendices. The first provides a theoretical
framework for understanding the issues raised in this report. The second provides explanations of
economic concepts used in this that might be unfamiliar to a lay reader.
The COVID-19 Recession and Recovery
The pandemic initially caused reductions in both aggregate supply (production) and aggregate
demand (spending), as is discussed at greater length in Appendix A. In the initial months of the
pandemic, social distancing measures and concerns about the spread of the virus caused a
significant decrease in consumer spending, particularly in services.3 As many businesses closed
temporarily or permanently, millions of workers were laid off (including temporary furloughs),4

1 National Bureau of Economic Research, U.S. Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, https://www.nber.org/
research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions.
2 For more information, see CRS Report R46606, COVID-19 and the U.S. Economy, by Lida R. Weinstock.
3 Real personal consumption expenditures fell by 33.4% in the second quarter of 2020, largely driven by a 42.4% drop
in services expenditures.
4 In April 2020, employment fell by 22,279,000 workers.
Congressional Research Service

1

link to page 7 link to page 37 U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

further exacerbating the decrease in spending. These dynamics together lowered aggregate
demand in the economy.
As aggregate demand fell in the economy, so too did aggregate supply. In the beginning of the
pandemic (and also during subsequent waves of the pandemic) the production process was
slowed for businesses owing largely to health constraints on operations and workers, capacity
limits on customers, and prohibitions on attendance at certain activities, such as mass sporting or
musical events.5 Businesses either laid off part of their workforces as aggregate demand fell or
were otherwise forced to slow production as employees contracted COVID-19 at high rates.6 In
other words, the pandemic caused the productive capacity of the economy to shrink temporarily.
Additionally, demand for certain goods and services such as gasoline and dining away from home
fell as workers began to telework at unprecedented rates and people stayed home. At the same
time, demand for other products rose quickly and supply chains could not keep up. Grocery stores
experienced shortages in food, toilet paper, and cleaning supplies, and personal protective
equipment became scarce.7 Many of these specific supply issues cleared over time, although
several other specific bottlenecks have cropped up and continue to cause supply problems in the
economy.8
As the public health situation continued to evolve, supply and demand continued to be affected to
varying degrees. For the past several months, the economy has been in a state where demand has
significantly recovered from the COVID-19 shock thanks in no small part to fiscal and monetary
stimulus, but supply has remained constrained by COVID-19-related problems. Since 2021, these
supply-side problems have included supply chain disruptions, man hours lost to sickness (peaking
during the COVID-19 Omicron-variant surge), and a slow and incomplete return of workers to
the labor force.
The Decline and Recovery in Output
Output, as measured by GDP,9 declined at an annual rate of 31.2% in the second quarter of 2020,
which was larger than any single quarterly change in GDP recorded (dating back to 1947). As
shown in Figure 1, after falling in the first and second quarters of 2020, the growth rate of GDP
since the third quarter of 2020 has generally been elevated compared to pre-pandemic rates
because of “catch up” growth, as idled production was brought back on line. In 2021, GDP grew
by 5.7%, compared to 2.3% in 2019. GDP surpassed its pre-pandemic (fourth quarter 2019) level
in the second quarter of 2021. However, since potential GDP (see Appendix B) grows every
quarter, output did not return to near its trend until the fourth quarter of 2021.

5 See, for example, Brent Meyer, Mark E. Schweitzer, The Impact of the Pandemic on US Businesses: New Results
from the Annual Business Survey, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, March 2022, https://www.atlantafed.org/research/
publications/policy-hub/2022/03/22/03—impact-of-pandemic-on-us-businesses—new-results-from-annual-business-
survey.aspx.
6 For example, see Josh Funk, “At Least 59,000 U.S. Meat Workers Caught COVID-19 in 2020, 269 Died,” PBS News
Hour, October 27, 2021, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/at-least-59000-u-s-meat-workers-caught-covid-19-in-
2020-269-died.
7 Ana Swanson, “Global Trade Sputters, Leaving Too Much Here, Too Little There,” New York Times, April 10, 2020,
at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/business/economy/global-trade-shortages-coronavirus.html.
8 For example, see Stephanie Yang and Jiyoung Sohn, “Global Chip Shortage ‘Is Far from Over’ as Wait Times Get
Longer,” Wall Street Journal, October 29, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/global-chip-shortage-is-far-from-over-
as-wait-times-get-longer-11635413402.
9 Unless otherwise noted, all references to GDP in this report refer to inflation-adjusted, or real, GDP.
Congressional Research Service

2

U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

Figure 1. Real GDP
Q1 2007-Q1 2022

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), “National Data: National Income and Product Accounts.”
Notes: Trend growth is calculated as average growth rate during 2009-2019 expansion.
After rapid catch up growth, economic output showed signs of slowing in the second half of
2021. (The labor market has not experienced a comparable slowdown.) GDP growth was 2.3% in
the third quarter of 2021. It grew by almost 7% in the fourth quarter, but that was mostly
attributable to firms restocking their inventories after their unusual depletion during the
pandemic. Removing private inventory adjustments, the economy grew by 2% in the fourth
quarter. Inventory restocking, once it is completed, will be a one-off contributor to growth.10
In the first quarter of 2022, the economy shrank by 1.4%. Although consistent with a slowdown, a
closer look at the data suggest that this may not be a sign that the economy is reentering a
recession. Both consumption and private investment grew at relatively healthy rates—the
contraction was caused entirely by trade, which was influenced by the war in Ukraine,
government spending (which is not indicative of the overall business cycle), and a modest
inventory drawdown (which may be a reaction to the large inventory buildup in the previous
quarter). The effect of higher inflation on the economy can be seen in the first quarter data—
nominal GDP grew by 6.5%, while real GDP shrank by 1.4%.
All of the major private components of GDP—personal consumption, fixed investment, and
international trade—showed the same pattern of an unprecedented contraction in the second
quarter of 2020 and an unprecedented rebound in the following quarters. In contrast, the growth
pattern of government spending (especially federal nondefense spending) has been driven largely
by the timing of COVID-19-relief legislation, not the broader business cycle. However, a few
subcomponents of GDP—particularly investment in structures and exports—have grown slowly
since the economy began to rebound and have still not reached their pre-pandemic peak after

10 Jason Furman and Wilson Powell III, The US Economy Grew Faster Than Expected In 2021, but the Pandemic
Transformed Its Composition, Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 27, 2022, https://www.piie.com/
blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/us-economy-grew-faster-expected-2021-pandemic-transformed-its.
Congressional Research Service

3

link to page 9 U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

adjusting for inflation. Other subcomponents have grown more quickly than overall GDP.
Consumption and government spending are discussed in more detail below.
Changing Patterns of Consumer Demand
As discussed above, early in the pandemic, consumers held back on purchases due to economic
uncertainty, COVID-19 fears, restrictions on services, and unavailability of products. Uncertainty
about job prospects amid a wave of unemployment also held back consumer demand in 2020. As
unemployment fell and job openings became plentiful in 2021, that constraint on demand was
loosened. As these headwinds receded, consumers released some pent-up spending. Consumer
spending exceeded its pre-pandemic peak in the first quarter of 2021 and increased by 7.9% in
2021, after adjusting for inflation. Consumption has grown more slowly since November 2021.
Consumer demand continues to be affected by the pandemic, but since 2021 this has mainly
resulted in compositional changes in demand rather than a reduction in overall demand. Namely,
there has been a shift from consumer spending on services to goods, especially durable goods, as
shown in Figure 2. Spending on durable goods has been high because the supply and demand for
services has been limited11 and because fiscal and monetary stimulus have boosted demand for
consumer durables relative to other spending. Adjusted for inflation, spending on services did not
surpass its pre-pandemic peak until the first quarter of 2022, whereas spending on durable goods
is now 22% higher than before the pandemic and nondurable spending is 12% higher. Spending
on goods increased in the second half of 2020 and the first half of 2021 before falling back to
trend in the second half of that year. Services spending, by contrast, was unusually strong in the
second and third quarters of 2021. Both goods and services spending slowed in the fourth quarter,
perhaps because of the COVID-19 Omicron-variant surge.

11 Demand for services may be limited for a variety of reasons, including any social distancing measures and fears of
the spread of COVID-19. For example, see Brett Nelson, “Fear, Not Government Shutdowns, Chilled the Economy,”
Chicago Booth Review, August 4, 2020, https://www.chicagobooth.edu/review/fear-not-government-shutdowns-
chilled-economy.
Congressional Research Service

4

link to page 17
U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

Figure 2. Cumulative Change in Spending from Q4 2019
Q1 2020-Q1 2022

Source: CRS calculations based on BEA, “National Income and Product Accounts.”
Notes: Data are annualized and inflation-adjusted.
GDP data show the intersection of supply and demand—in other words, what consumers have
been able to purchase given the availability of products. Because of supply constraints (discussed
below), supply has not been able to meet existing demand. Consumers would have purchased
additional new houses, automobiles, and other consumer durables had they been available, which
are not reflected in these statistics. Instead, prices of these goods rose in response to demand
outpacing supply, as is discussed in the section below entitled “High and Rising Inflation.”
Consumer spending has also been supported by fiscal and monetary policy. Monetary stimulus
has led to historically low interest rates that have made the financing of consumer durables more
affordable. Part of the fiscal stimulus came in the form of transfer payments to individuals
through a variety of COVID-19-relief income transfer programs. Those transfers, by boosting
household income (as discussed in the next section), have also boosted consumer spending.
The Spike in Personal Income and Saving
Frequently, in a recession, when demand falls and unemployment rises, overall levels of personal
income decrease, as occurred during the 2001 and 2007-2009 recessions. Depending on the
relative magnitude of spending and income decreases, levels of personal saving may also
decrease. However, owing in large part to the fiscal policy response to COVID-19, overall
personal income and saving increased during the first several months of the pandemic. The policy
response, which is discussed in detail in a subsequent section, included direct government
transfers to households (such as economic impact payments),12 enhanced unemployment

12 Economic impact payments provided direct payments to individuals with qualifying income and household size
characteristics. For more information, see CRS Report R46415, COVID-19 and Direct Payments: Resources and
Experts, coordinated by Margot L. Crandall-Hollick.
Congressional Research Service

5

link to page 10
U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

benefits,13 and direct support to farmers and ranchers14 impacted by pandemic-related supply
chain issues, among others. These transfers directly increased personal income by an
unprecedented amount, particularly in the two quarters with high levels of transfers—the second
quarter of 2020 and the first quarter of 2021—as seen in Figure 3. Of the various transfer
programs enacted, the economic impact payments contributed the most to personal income,
although the three rounds of payment were all one-time transfers and therefore the effects
dropped off quickly. Nonetheless, these payments contributed 12.3%, 7.7%, and 16.7% to
personal income in April 2020, January 2021, and March 2021, respectively, contributing
significantly to the second quarter 2020 and first quarter 2021 increases noted earlier. Personal
income in March 2021 remained higher than pre-pandemic levels and was roughly $21.5 trillion
in April 2022 as compared to roughly $19 trillion in February 2020 before the pandemic began.15
COVID-19-relief income transfer programs have now expired or been exhausted, so research
from Goldman Sachs projects that after-tax income will fall below trend in the first quarter of
2022 for the first time since the CARES Act (P.L. 116-136) was enacted.16
Figure 3. Total Personal Income, Saving, and Consumption
Q1 2019-Q1 2022

Source: BEA, “National Income and Product Accounts.”
Notes: Not adjusted for inflation.

13 During the pandemic unemployment benefits were “enhanced” in several ways, including through extended
unemployment benefits, pandemic emergency unemployment compensation, pandemic unemployment assistance, and
pandemic unemployment compensation payments. For more information, see CRS Report R46687, Unemployment
Insurance (UI) Benefits: Permanent-Law Programs and the COVID-19 Pandemic Response, by Julie M. Whittaker and
Katelin P. Isaacs.
14 The Coronavirus Food Assistance Program provided direct payments to U.S. agricultural producers. For more
information, see CRS Report R46395, USDA’s Coronavirus Food Assistance Program: Round One (CFAP-1), by
Randy Schnepf; and CRS Report R46645, USDA’s Coronavirus Food Assistance Program: Round Two (CFAP-2), by
Randy Schnepf.
15 BEA, Personal Income, May 27, 2022, https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/pi0422.pdf.
16 Ronnie Walker, “One Step Back, Two Steps Forward: Q1 Growth and Omicron,” US Economics Analyst, January
31, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

6

link to page 10 U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

With large and sudden increases in personal income and decreases in consumer spending, the
personal saving rate also increased during the initial months of the pandemic, as seen in Figure 3.
Individuals receive a certain amount of after-tax income that they can spend or save. By
definition, what is not spent is saved. It follows that when personal consumption expenditures
decreased and income increased as the coronavirus spread, personal saving as a percentage of
disposable income would increase. The personal saving rate in the United States increased rapidly
from 8.3% in February 2020 to 33.7% by April 2020.
As with the increase in personal income, the rise in the personal saving rate was driven, in part,
by government transfers. For example, the three rounds of economic impact payments appear to
have contributed notably to rising savings. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York Survey of
Consumer Expectations found that respondents saved or expected to save 36.4% of the first round
of stimulus, 37.1% of the second round of stimulus, and 41.6% of the third round of stimulus.17
The inability to spend money due to business closures and social distancing was another reason
for the spike in the personal saving rate early in the pandemic. Notably, most of the increase in
saving in the initial months of the pandemic appears to be attributable to high-income households.
According to an economic tracker based on private-sector data created by economists to record
the effects of COVID-19 in real time, as of June 10, 2020, high-income households reduced
spending by 17%, while low-income households reduced spending by 4%.18
After traversing several more relative peaks and valleys, the household saving rate returned to a
rate similar to before the pandemic in the fourth quarter of 2021. The personal saving rate is 4.4%
as of April 2022.19 But since the saving rate measures current saving relative to current income,
despite the return to trend, households have now amassed a large stock of excess savings that they
could use to temporarily increase future consumption above trend. A TD Economics report
estimates this stock of excess saving at $2.7 trillion.20 A Goldman Sachs newsletter estimates that
this excess saving is predominantly being held in bank accounts—which can be easily spent at
any time—as opposed to less liquid investments or having been used to pay down household
debt.21 A Brookings study puts excess saving at $2.5 trillion and also finds it is predominantly
being held in bank accounts.22 Households may wish to temporarily consume (at above-trend
rates) certain goods or services, such as personal travel, that were forgone in the early stages of
the pandemic.

17 Olivier Armantier et al., “An Update of How Households Are Using Stimulus Checks,” Liberty Street Economics,
April 7, 2021, https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2021/04/an-update-on-how-households-are-using-
stimulus-checks.html.
18 Raj Chetty et al., How Did COVID-19 and Stabilization Policies Affect Spending and Employment? A New Real-
Time Economic Tracker Based on Private Sector Data, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper no.
27431, June 2020, p. 2.
19 BEA, Personal Income, February 25, 2022, https://www.bea.gov/data/income-saving/personal-income.
20 Maria Solovieva, Where the Road of Excess [Saving] Leads, TD Economics, September 16, 2021,
https://economics.td.com/us-excess-savings.
21 Joseph Briggs, “The Good and the Bad About the Consumer Spending Outlook,” Goldman Sachs, U.S. Economics
Analyst, March 20, 2022.
22 Mitchell Barnes et al., Bolstered Balance Sheets: Assessing Household Finances Since 2019, Brookings Institution,
March 22, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/research/bolstered-balance-sheets-assessing-household-finances-since-
2019.
Congressional Research Service

7

U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

Supply Disruptions
The pandemic has disrupted the production of many goods and services. Census survey evidence
shows a surge in labor shortages, supply shortages, and logistic/transport constraints causing U.S.
manufacturers to operate below capacity.23 Although those disruptions have greatly waned since
spring 2020, some continue to constrain production, exacerbating inflationary pressures
(discussed below).
Supply continues to be constrained by disruptions to global supply chains, labor shortages,
temporary business disruptions linked to COVID-19 outbreaks, and commodity shortages linked
to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.24 Pandemic-related shutdowns and production delays
worldwide have caused a chain reaction of delays in the availability of products across a wide
range of industries. Product availability has been disrupted for both final products sought by
consumers and inputs used by American producers. Earlier shutdowns created backlogs that have
taken months to unwind.
Periodic surges in COVID-19 cases have also caused labor shortages at times that have hobbled
production. For example, the Omicron-variant surge led to employee absences that caused new
supply disruptions last winter, including to flights and passenger rail.25 The U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics reported that 3.6 million employed individuals were unable to work at some point in
January 2022 (when Omicron peaked) because of illness—more than twice as high as the pre-
pandemic high.26 In the same month, 6 million individuals were unable to work because their
employers closed or lost business due to COVID-19. Absences and loss of business because of
illness have been consistently above average throughout the pandemic.27
Supply chains are global, and a product can pass through several countries before reaching the
United States.28 A delay or disruption in any one of those countries can therefore cause supply
problems for the United States. Different countries have experienced different kinds of production
disruptions and at different times compared to the United States, with some countries lifting or re-
imposing lockdowns and other work restrictions at different times than when such changes
occurred in the United States. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York publishes an index

23 Federal Reserve, Monetary Policy Report, February 2022, p. 20, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
files/20220225_mprfullreport.pdf.
24 See Gianluca Benigno et al., “Global Supply Chain Pressure Index: March 2022 Update,” Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, March 3, 2022, https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2022/03/global-supply-chain-pressure-index-
march-2022-update/.
25 Eli Rosenberg, “Workers Are Out Sick in Record Numbers, Exacerbating Labor Shortage Woes,” Washington Post,
January 20, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/01/20/workers-out-sick-omicron-census/; Luz Lazo,
“Amtrak to Reduce Train Service Amid Omicron Surge,” Washington Post, January 20, 2022,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2022/01/20/amtrak-cuts-service-virus-surge/.
26 BLS, Absences from Work, https://www.bls.gov/cps/absences.htm. Census also collects data on people who reported
that they were “caring for someone or sick myself with coronavirus symptoms” and workers who reported that they
were not working due COVID in its experimental Pulse survey. See U.S. Census Bureau, “Household Pulse Survey
Data Tables,” Employment Table 3, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/household-pulse-survey/data.html.
27 BLS, “2.5 Million Unable to Work in March 2022 Because Employer Closed or Lost Business Due to COVID-19,”
The Economics Daily, April 6, 2022, https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2022/2-5-million-unable-to-work-in-march-2022-
because-employer-closed-or-lost-business-due-to-covid-19.htm.
28 See CRS Report R46641, Global Value Chains: Overview and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Rachel F. Fefer;
and International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, ch. 4, “Global Trade and Value Chains During the
Pandemic,” April 2022.
Congressional Research Service

8

link to page 37 U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

measuring how much pressure there is in global supply chains. For much of the pandemic, supply
chains have faced significantly higher pressures than at any time in recent decades.
Shipping and U.S. port disruptions have also caused delays in imports arriving and being
processed in the United States.29 After falling early in the pandemic, import prices have risen
more quickly than overall inflation (13.9% compared to 8.0% in the first quarter of 2022).
The complexity of global supply chains has led to unexpected problems. For example, disruptions
in semiconductor (microprocessor) production led to a 2.3 million shortfall in new automobiles
produced in 2021 in North America, because each automobile contains an average of 298
semiconductors.30 As a result, demand for new automobiles outpaced supply, causing a spillover
into the used auto market, and inflation in the 12 months ending in April 2022 was 13.2% for new
automobiles and 22.7% for used automobiles.
The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has resulted in a new set of supply shocks, increasing the
world prices of energy and certain foodstuffs, metals, and other commodities and disrupting trade
patterns.31 It is still unclear the extent to which the invasion of Ukraine will disrupt global
economic growth, notably through disruptions to energy and commodity markets. The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) projects that if these supply
shocks last for one year, they will reduce U.S. growth by almost one percentage point and raise
U.S. inflation by almost 1.5 percentage points in the first full year.32
In addition, supply has been constrained by a decline in the labor supply—fewer workers means
less overall production—that dates to the beginning of the pandemic, which is discussed in more
detail in the next section.
Labor Market
Another contributing factor to lagging aggregate supply is an unusually tight labor market. The
labor market has seen a rapid but incomplete recovery from the spring of 2020. Employers have
been unable to hire as many workers as they would like in part due to workers leaving the labor
force. For labor market related definitions, see Appendix B.
Low Unemployment but Remaining Employment Gap
Similar to GDP, employment experienced a sharp and rapid contraction in spring 2020 and then
rapidly increased beginning in summer 2020. Employment fell by 22 million, and the
unemployment rate rose from 3.5% to 14.7% between February 2020 and April 2020.
Employment growth has been very strong since April 2020, adding an average of over 550,000
jobs per month in 2021. Many workers who were temporarily laid off returned to their old jobs,
while other workers found new jobs.
Unlike real GDP, several measures of the labor market have not fully recovered. As of April 2022,
employment remains over 760,000 jobs below its level in February 2020. Once accounting for the

29 See CRS Insight IN11800, Supply Chain Bottlenecks at U.S. Ports, by John Frittelli and Liana Wong.
30 See CRS In Focus IF12000, Semiconductor Shortage Constrains Vehicle Production, by Manpreet Singh.
31 Of note, the Consumer Price Index does not directly include the price of most raw materials such as metal or other
commodities, as these are not goods typically purchased by consumers. However, the prices of raw materials faced by
producers tend to be reflected in the prices of final goods and services purchased by consumers.
32 OECD, “Economic and Social Impacts and Policy Implications of the War in Ukraine,” Economic Outlook, Interim
Report, March 2022, https://www.oecd.org/economic-outlook/#gdp-inflation-impact.
Congressional Research Service

9

link to page 14 link to page 15
U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

growth in the population over that period, employment is relatively lower—the
employment/population ratio fell from 61.2% before the pandemic to 60.0% in April 2022 (as
shown in Figure 4), representing nearly 2.9 million workers.
The unemployment rate fell rapidly in 2021, from 6.4% in January to 3.9% in December and to
3.6% in April 2022. It is now almost the same as it was before the pandemic, and it is around the
lowest unemployment has reached in the past three long expansions (1991-2001, 2001-2007,
2009-2020).33 Unlike those expansions, which initially featured “jobless recoveries,”
unemployment fell below 4% in less than two years after the recession had ended. Because
unemployment is low, potential employment growth from further decreases in the ranks of the
unemployed is limited.
Figure 4. Employment Situation
January 2019-March 2022

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Current Population Survey (CPS).
Notes: Data are seasonally adjusted.
Low Labor Force Participation
The divergence between the unemployment rate and the employment/population ratio reflects the
decline in labor force participation. The pandemic caused an unusually large decline in the labor
force participation rate (LFPR—i.e., the employed and unemployed divided by the population).
The LFPR was 63.4% in February 2020 before the pandemic began and fell to 60.2% in April
2020. It has rebounded more slowly than the unemployment rate since and has only partially
recovered to 62.2% as of April 2022 (see Figure 5), which is still lower than at any point between
the 1970s and the start of the pandemic. This suggests that if workers could be brought back into
the labor force, there appears to be significant room for employment to grow (as suggested by job
opening statistics, discussed in the following section). However, the likelihood of this occurring is
highly uncertain.

33 Unemployment reached a low of 3.9% in the 1990s expansion and 3.5% in the 2010s expansion. It never fell below
5% in the 1980s expansion or 4% in the 2000s expansion.
Congressional Research Service

10

U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

Figure 5. Labor Force Participation Rate
January 2019-April 2022

Source: BLS, CPS.
Notes: Data are seasonally adjusted.
Notably, the decline was and incomplete recovery is concentrated among older workers, while
participation for those of prime age (25-54 years) has recovered to a larger extent. By February
2022, the LFPR for ages 55-64 had fully recovered to pre-pandemic levels, but the rate for ages
65-74 was still nearly two percentage points lower. The Federal Reserve (Fed) estimates the
different contributors to the LFPR decline since the beginning of the pandemic through December
2021.34 The Fed attributes about three-quarters of the decline to retirements. The share of retired
older Americans increased during the pandemic.35 About half of these retirements would have
occurred in the absence of the pandemic because of the aging of the baby boomers—the LFPR is
not calculated with an upper age limit—but the other half of retirements were in excess of what
was expected. Workers unexpectedly retired in response to layoffs and job scarcity early in the
pandemic and concerns about their health throughout the pandemic and did not return to the labor
force when the economy improved. Although some older workers might change their minds and
return to the labor force, the Fed indicated that most of the excess retirements were among
workers in their 70s.
Retirement is not the entire story, since the LFPR of prime age workers (ages 25-54) has also
declined. Prime age LFPR was 83% in February 2020 compared with 82.4% in April 2022. After
retirements, the largest factors to cause the LFPR to decline were caregiving responsibilities of
nonparents (for an elder or disabled household member, for example) and the “other” category,
which includes fears of COVID-19. Notably, caregiving responsibilities of parents were a
significant factor in December 2020 but were reducing the LFPR by 0.1 percentage points in

34 Federal Reserve, Monetary Policy Report, February 2022, p. 8, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/
20220225_mprfullreport.pdf. The LFPR rose by 0.3 percentage points between December 2021 and January 2022,
mainly because of the incorporation of new Census population estimates. Because of these new estimates, there is not a
straightforward way to update the Fed’s estimates.
35 Richard Fry, “Amid the Pandemic, a Rising Share of Older U.S. Adults Are Now Retired,” Pew Research Center,
November 4, 2021, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/11/04/amid-the-pandemic-a-rising-share-of-older-u-s-
adults-are-now-retired/.
Congressional Research Service

11

link to page 17 U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

December 2021 as children returned to school and other child care. However, the effect appears
to differ by gender. The female prime age LFPR was still 1.1 percentage points below its pre-
pandemic level, whereas the male prime age LFPR was 0.4 percentage points below in February
2022.
It does not appear that the LFPR is currently being held down by a large increase in discouraged
workers who have dropped out of the labor force—that rate was high in absolute terms and
compared to the unemployment rate in 2020 but fell to a normal level in 2021. There are also
some factors that increased the LFPR relative to the beginning of the pandemic, according to the
Fed: Fewer workers were out of the labor force because of disability, illness, and school
attendance. Some might decide to leave the labor force and return to school now that in-person
learning has resumed, which would reverse some of this particular trend.
Another factor holding back employment growth is the decline in immigration in recent years,
although this would not have a significant effect on the LFPR because it affects both the
numerator and denominator of the ratio.36 The foreign-born workforce declined in 2020 but
returned to its pre-pandemic share of the labor force in 2021.37
A Tight Labor Market
The relatively low supply of available workers (i.e., low unemployment rate and low LFPR)
combined with the relatively high demand for labor by businesses have resulted in a tight labor
market.38 The job openings rate and worker quits rate additionally both remain considerably
elevated compared to pre-pandemic rates and significantly higher than when unemployment was
low in 2000, 2007, and 2020.39 As of March 2022, the job openings rate was 7.1%, and the quits
rate was 3.0%, compared, respectively, to 4.4% and 2.3% in February 2020.40 Figure 6 shows the
level of job openings and unemployed workers over the past two decades. As the economy has
recovered from the initial shock of the pandemic, the number of unemployed workers has fallen
to levels lower than the number of job openings. In other words, since May 2021, there has been
more than one job opening per unemployed worker. This labor shortage may be more pronounced
in some industries compared with others. For example, the job openings rate in the
accommodation and food services industry in March 2022 was 9.9% compared to an average of
7.5% across private industries.41

36 The LFPR of the foreign-born population was three percentage points higher than the U.S.-born population, so a
decline in the foreign-born population would modestly reduce the LFPR, all else equal.
37 BLS, Foreign-Born Workers: Labor Force Characteristics—2021, May 18, 2022, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/
pdf/forbrn.pdf.
38 For a more in-depth analysis of current labor market trends and labor market tightness, see CRS Insight IN11770,
Labor Market Tightness and the Economic Recovery, Part 1, by Marc Labonte and Lida R. Weinstock; and CRS
Insight IN11771, Labor Market Tightness and the Economic Recovery, Part 2, by Marc Labonte and Lida R.
Weinstock.
39 These data series begin in December 2000, so today’s data can be compared only to the very end of the 1991-2001
expansion. For more information, see CRS Insight IN11770, Labor Market Tightness and the Economic Recovery, Part
1, by Marc Labonte and Lida R. Weinstock; and CRS Insight IN11771, Labor Market Tightness and the Economic
Recovery, Part 2, by Marc Labonte and Lida R. Weinstock.
40 For data on job openings and turnover, see BLS, Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey, https://www.bls.gov/jlt/.
41 BLS, Job Openings and Labor Turnover—March 2022, May 3, 2022, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/
jolts.nr0.htm.
Congressional Research Service

12

U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

Figure 6. Job Openings vs. Workers
January 2019 to March 2022

Source: BLS, CPS, and “Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey,” https://www.bls.gov/jlt/.
Notes: Data are seasonally adjusted.
Employment would be higher today if employers were able to fill job openings and retain
employees at a more historically normal rate. This fact, and the low LFPR, suggests that low
employment is being caused by lack of labor supply, not lack of labor demand. Labor market
tightness may be contributing to inflationary pressures, as will be discussed in the next section.
High and Rising Inflation
Unlike other indicators, inflation did not become problematic until the second year of the
pandemic.42 Prices fell in spring 2020 and then rose at fairly normal rates through January 2021.
Consumer price inflation has been unusually high each month since February 2021, however, and
was 6.3% in the 12 months ending in April 2022, as measured by the Personal Consumption
Expenditures (PCE) price index. (Another measure of inflation, the Consumer Price Index, has
shown larger rates of increase but a similar pattern over time.) At first, inflation was concentrated
in a few specific goods and services that were particularly affected by supply chain disruptions
(as discussed above), such as automobiles, or were in particular demand because of the demand
shift in consumption patterns caused by the pandemic. For example, durable goods prices rose at
an annualized rate of 7.6% in the third quarter of 2020. Unless other prices fall, a large increase in
a subset of prices will cause the overall inflation rate to rise. But many goods and services exhibit
price “stickiness,” which means that they do not tend to fall immediately. This offers a plausible
explanation of why inflation started to rise in early 2021, and inflation up to that point did not
necessarily imply that high inflation would be long-lasting, since supply disruptions were not
expected to be long-lasting.

42 For more information, see CRS Report R46890, Inflation in the Wake of COVID-19, by Marc Labonte and Lida R.
Weinstock.
Congressional Research Service

13

link to page 24 link to page 37 link to page 7
U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

Over the course of 2021, virtually all goods and services eventually began experiencing high
inflation rates.43 For the year as a whole, inflation exceeded 3% for every major category of GDP
except non-residential investment, led by an 11% increase in the price of residential investment.
This indicates that inflation is not being caused by relative price changes (although issues in
specific markets explain why some goods have experienced higher inflation than others have) but
that overall demand is too high relative to supply, meaning that inflation would be expected to
remain high until demand falls or supply rises. Explanations for the imbalance between supply
and demand include labor shortages, supply disruptions, and stimulative monetary and fiscal
policy. Each of these factors is discussed in detail in the “Policy Issues Moving Forward” section
below.
Figure 7. Inflation for Selected Components of GDP
1970-2021

Source: BEA, “National Income and Product Accounts.”
Notes: Gray bars denote recessions.
Typically, one would expect inflation to rise when the economy has been running hot—when the
level of GDP is above potential (see Appendix B for definitions). One seeming puzzle is why
inflation is so high given that GDP is not particularly high and employment is still lower than
before the pandemic, both of which would tend to indicate that current GDP is not above its
potential. GDP growth has been high since the recession has ended, but it has been mainly catch-
up growth that has restored the level of GDP from the 31% decline it experienced in the second
quarter of 2020 (which followed a 5% decline in the first quarter). If there had never been a
pandemic recession and the economy had continued to grow at its pre-pandemic average since the
beginning of 2020, CRS estimates that the economy would have been 0.2%-1.4% larger in the
fourth quarter of 2021 than it was in inflation-adjusted terms, depending on the starting point used
(see Figure 1 for reference).44

43 Although consumer price inflation receives the most attention, inflation rates are calculated for all categories of
spending.
44 The 0.2% estimate uses a starting point of the beginning of the 2007-2009 recession to calculate the average growth
Congressional Research Service

14

U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

The fact that inflation is high but GDP does not appear to be high relative to the pre-pandemic
trend raises the possibility that inflationary pressures are the result of actual GDP being high
relative to potential because the growth path of potential GDP has fallen (either temporarily or
permanently). In other words, the economy may not be capable of producing as much today as it
would be if the pandemic had not occurred, all else equal. A more sophisticated analysis takes
into account structural reasons why the potential growth rate might have changed from the recent
historical average. Economists Jason Furman and Wilson Powell estimate that potential GDP has
declined by 0.7 percentage points compared to before the pandemic due to a smaller capital stock
and population, which grew less because of higher mortality and lower immigration. Assuming
potential GDP has declined, they find that actual GDP was slightly above potential GDP at the
end of 2021.45 Notably, this estimate does not include current supply disruptions or the decline in
LFPR, so potential GDP may temporarily be lower than this estimate, although it may rebound as
temporary factors disappear in future years.
If the economy is, in fact, producing above its potential currently, there may be other demand-side
factors that could be of concern now or in the future. For example, in response to labor market
tightness, some commentators have warned of a “wage-price spiral,” where wages rise too
quickly in response to higher inflation, causing inflation to rise further as businesses pass higher
labor costs on to consumers in the form of higher prices of goods and services. Wage growth has
accelerated since 2021 but to date has been lower than overall inflation. For example, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta wage growth tracker reached its highest growth rate since data was first
collected in 1997 (6.0% for the three-month average for April 2022), but that is still lower than
the PCE for February (6.6%).46 In other words, although nominal wages are rising, inflation-
adjusted wages are falling. But if all employers continually raise wages beyond the productivity
gains of workers, it could eventually result in a wage-price spiral that could make it harder to
restore price stability. Thus, if the high productivity rates seen in the pandemic persist, a wage-
price spiral would be less likely.
Booming Financial Conditions During the Pandemic
After a large initial decline in asset prices during spring 2020, asset prices—such as equity (e.g.,
stock) prices—experienced an above-average rate of increase through November 2021, even after
taking into account higher inflation. This increase first reversed the early pandemic losses by
summer 2020 and then took asset prices to historic heights both in absolute terms and relative to
various valuation metrics, such as the price-earnings ratio. Asset prices have been volatile in
2022. They are down this year but remain above pre-pandemic levels thus far.
House prices have also risen rapidly, reaching historic highs in inflation-adjusted terms.
According to the Federal Housing Finance Agency, house prices rose 17.5% in nominal terms
between the fourth quarter of 2020 and the fourth quarter of 2021 and 11.1% in the four quarters
before that.47 To date, house prices have shown no sign of reversal.

rate (1.7%). The 1.4% estimate uses a starting point of the beginning of the 2009-2020 expansion, yielding an average
growth rate of 2.3%.
45 Furman and Powell, The US Economy Grew Faster Than Expected in 2021.
46 There are several different measurements of wage growth. The Atlanta Fed’s measure was chosen because it tracks
wage growth for the same individual over time. Available at https://www.atlantafed.org/chcs/wage-growth-tracker?
panel=1.
47 See Federal Housing Finance Agency, “House Price Index,” https://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/Pages/
House-Price-Index.aspx.
Congressional Research Service

15

link to page 37 U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

Together, this resulted in a large overall increase in financial and real estate wealth. A Brookings
study estimates an overall increase in inflation-adjusted household wealth of $24 trillion from the
fourth quarter of 2019 to the fourth quarter of 2021.48 Even “paper gains” in wealth can affect real
economic activity if households reduce their saving rate in response to feeling wealthier or
borrow against more valuable assets to finance higher consumption.
Since the beginning of the pandemic, financial conditions have been characterized by historically
low interest rates that have made borrowing more attractive to households and businesses.
(Interest rates have risen in 2022 but remain low by historical standards, especially if adjusted for
inflation.) Nonfinancial business borrowing is high relative to GDP by historical standards,
although it has fallen from its peak earlier in the pandemic and is lower than it was around the
2007-2009 financial crisis. Household debt relative to GDP is significantly lower than it was
around the financial crisis but higher than it was from the 1980s to 2001.49 Low interest rates are
partly the result of monetary policy (discussed in the next section) but also other worldwide
factors that have made private savings plentiful relative to investment demand. Interest rates have
been generally low for both riskless and risky corporate borrowers as investors have “reached for
yield.”50
In addition, broader financial conditions have been supported by the Fed’s response to COVID-19
(discussed in the next section). For example, when the Fed purchases assets, it creates more
liquidity in the financial system by design. As a result, after an initial liquidity freeze in March
2020, capital and liquidity have been plentiful, contributing to large financial flows into
traditional and non-traditional investment classes, such as private equity and crypto assets. At
some point after the Fed starts reducing its balance sheet in June, liquidity will likely stop being
overabundant in the financial system.
Fiscal and Monetary Policy Stimulus
In response to the pandemic and resultant economic downturn, unprecedentedly large monetary
and fiscal stimulus was put in place. This contributed to the rapid recovery in economic activity
after the initial contraction. Additionally, some of the unusual phenomena in this recovery can be
traced to this stimulus, such as the trends in personal income and saving, the sudden improvement
in financial conditions, and possibly inflation. Fiscal and monetary policy are expected to provide
less stimulus to the economy, but not return to a neutral or contractionary stance, in 2022. For
more detailed definitions of fiscal and monetary stimulus, see Appendix B.
Fiscal Policy
In March and April 2020, Congress passed four laws to provide economic stimulus and assistance
to the American people—the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-123); the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (P.L. 116-
127); the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act; and the Paycheck
Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act (P.L. 116-139). Additional relief and
stimulus was enacted in December 2020 and March 2021 in the Consolidated Appropriations Act,

48 Barnes et al., Bolstered Balance Sheets.
49 Federal Reserve, Financial Stability Report, November 2021, Figure 2-2, https://www.federalreserve.gov/
publications/2021-november-financial-stability-report-borrowing.htm.
50 Federal Reserve, Financial Stability Report, November 2021, Figure 1-5, https://www.federalreserve.gov/
publications/2021-november-financial-stability-report-borrowing.htm.
Congressional Research Service

16

U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

2021 (P.L. 116-260) and the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-2), respectively. The
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated at the time that the initial fiscal policy response in
March and April 2020 would increase real GDP by 4.7% in 2020 and 3.1% in 2021.51
While the pandemic has been a large legislative focus, Congress has enacted other stimulus as
well. Of note, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58) was enacted in November
202152 and increased discretionary spending by $415 billion over the FY2021-FY2031 period
(and added $256 billion to projected FY2021-FY2031 deficits),53 though the fact that these
outlays will come in the future means that this last spending package has likely had little direct
effect on current conditions.
The easiest way to gauge the size of the fiscal stimulus is the change in the budget deficit.54 CBO
projects that the stimulus enacted in FY2020 will increase FY2020-FY2030 deficits by $2.6
trillion55 and that the stimulus enacted in FY2021 will further increase FY2021-FY2031 deficits
by roughly $870 billion.56
As a result of this fiscal stimulus and the decline in economic activity,57 FY2020 and FY2021
budget deficits were unusually large by historical standards. In total, the FY2020 federal budget
deficit totaled $3.1 trillion, more than triple its FY2019 value, and the FY2021 budget deficit
totaled nearly $2.8 trillion. As a percentage of GDP, these deficits were equal to 15% in FY2020
and 12.4% in FY2021, compared to 4.7% in the year before the pandemic (FY2019).58 These
were the largest deficits as a share of GDP since World War II.

51 CBO, The Effects of Pandemic-Related Legislation on Output, September 2020, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/
2020-09/56537-pandemic-legislation.pdf.
52 November 2021 is part of FY2022 and therefore the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act is not included in the
FY2021 deficit.
53 CBO, Senate Amendment 2137 to H.R. 3684, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Cost Estimate, August 5,
2021, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57406. The effect of P.L. 117-58 on budget deficits is smaller than its increase
in spending because of offsetting provisions.
54 The COVID relief legislation included unusual temporary measures taken to prevent economic hardship, including
forgivable loans to small businesses and moratoria on foreclosures, evictions, and student loan payments. As a result,
the increase in the deficit does not fully capture the magnitude of fiscal stimulus provided.
55 CBO, An Update to the Budget Outlook: 2020 to 2030, September 2, 2020, p. 29, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/
2020-09/56517-Budget-Outlook.pdf.
56 CBO, The Budgetary Effects of Major Laws Enacted in Response to the 2020-2021 Coronavirus Pandemic,
December 2020 and March 2021, September 2021, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2021-09/57343-Pandemic.pdf.
57 Without policy changes, tax revenues automatically fall and means-tested spending automatically rises, causing the
deficit to automatically increase when economic activity declines. These are referred to as “automatic stabilizers.”
58 CBO, Monthly Budget Review: Summary for Fiscal Year 2021, November 8, 2021, https://www.cbo.gov/system/
files/2021-11/57539-MBR.pdf.
Congressional Research Service

17

U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

Figure 8. Deficit-to-GDP Ratio
FY1940-FY2032

Source: OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2023, and CBO, Budget and Economic Outlook, 2022-
2032.
Notes: Data for 2022-2032 are projections using current law. Gray bars denote recessions.
Reflecting its emergency nature, COVID relief was designed to be mostly temporary and
delivered quickly, so much of it has expired or been exhausted. As a result, CBO projects that the
budget deficit as a share of GDP will decline by more than half to 4.2% of GDP between FY2021
and FY2022.59 In other words, deficits are still large by historical standards but have been
shrinking, providing less support to overall demand. Goldman Sachs estimates that fiscal stimulus
since 2020 boosted GDP by 6% in (calendar year) 2021 and 2.25% in 2022 but will boost GDP
by less than 1% beginning in the second half of 2023.60 However, legislative changes, if enacted,
could make fiscal policy more expansionary. For example, the House passed the Build Back
Better Act (H.R. 5376) in November 2021, which CBO estimates would increase the deficit by
$155 billion in FY2022 and $365 billion over 10 years.61
Monetary Policy
The Fed provided monetary stimulus in spring 2020 by lowering the federal funds rate (FFR; the
overnight interbank lending rate and the Fed’s main monetary policy tool) to a range of 0%-
0.25%, purchasing assets (mainly Treasury securities and mortgage-backed securities), reviving
and creating new emergency credit facilities, and encouraging use of the discount window.62 As a

59 CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2022 to 2032, May 2022, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2022-05/
57950-Outlook.pdf.
60 Alec Phillips, “How Much Fiscal Drag?,” Goldman Sachs, US Economics Analyst, April 11, 2022. Goldman Sachs
reports that the contribution of legislation not already enacted to their estimates is modest.
61 CBO, Budgetary Effects of H.R. 5376 as Passed by the House of Representatives, letter to Honorable John
Yarmouth, December 8, 2021, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2021-12/hr5376_letter.pdf; CBO, Summary of Cost
Estimate for H.R. 5376, the Build Back Better Act, November 18, 2021, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57627.
62 For more information on the Federal Reserve’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, see CRS Report R46411, The
Congressional Research Service

18

link to page 24 U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

result of these actions, the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet expanded from $4.7 trillion on March
19, 2020, to $7 trillion on May 20, 2020, to almost $9 trillion on March 16, 2022, a level that the
Fed has announced it plans to start reducing in June 2022.63 Thus, the Fed continued to add
extraordinary stimulus and liquidity to the economy even as economic conditions significantly
improved.
As the economy has improved, the Fed has withdrawn historically large monetary stimulus
slowly. Emergency lending facilities were mostly closed at the end of December 2020 or March
2021. The Fed’s asset purchases (called “quantitative easing,” or “QE”) continued at a pace of
$120 billion per month until November 2021. Between November 2021 and March 2022, it
“tapered” (reduced the pace of) its asset purchases before ending those purchases in March 2022.
On March 16, 2022, the Fed raised the FFR by 0.25 percentage points—the first time that rates
were raised above the zero range since the onset of the pandemic. In May, the Fed announced that
it would begin to gradually reduce the size of its balance sheet in June 2022.
Projections from Fed officials indicate that they foresee further interest rate increases in 2022 but
believe it will be appropriate to leave interest rates below what they view as the long-run
equilibrium through the end of 2022. In other words, Fed officials believe monetary policy should
still be stimulative—but less so than it is today—through 2022. However, to date, interest rates
have not risen as quickly as inflation has, so in real (inflation-adjusted) terms interest rates are
negative and falling, as shown in Figure 9.64 Since real rates influence economic activity, even as
the Fed has raised nominal rates, policy has become more stimulative.

Federal Reserve’s Response to COVID-19: Policy Issues, by Marc Labonte.
63 Federal Reserve, Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet: Recent Balance Sheet Trends,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_recenttrends.htm.
64 Real interest rates are calculated in Error! Reference source not found. using the current inflation rate. This may o
verstate the decline in real interest rates if inflation falls in the next year. However, real interest rates would have still
fallen and would have been negative if projected inflation for 2022 had been used instead.
Congressional Research Service

19

U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

Figure 9. Federal Funds Rate
1960-2022

Source: CRS calculations based on data from Federal Reserve and BEA.
Notes: Adjusted for inflation using the PCE.
Policy Issues Moving Forward
As this report catalogues, the economy has made a rapid recovery in many aspects from the deep
contraction at the onset of the pandemic. Still, COVID-19 has left a lasting mark on the economy
that policymakers are still grappling with even as economic life gradually returns to normal. As
the recovery strengthens, four major challenges remain:
1. high inflation,
2. low LFPR,
3. supply disruptions related to COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine, and
4. falling asset prices.
Policymakers have also grappled with how to address these issues without undermining the
economic recovery. To do so, monetary and fiscal policy needs to be normalized quickly enough
to avoid high inflation from becoming endemic—but not so quickly that it would cause a
recession. Some of these challenges are still in flux. COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine continue
to pose unpredictable problems to the global economy. Asset prices remain volatile, but a
potential reversal in the large run-up in asset prices could depress investment and consumer
demand or, in a worst-case scenario, cause a sharp reduction in available credit, which would
make it harder to avoid a deep recession.
Congressional Research Service

20

link to page 34 U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

Returning to supply and demand (see Appendix A), these challenges are interrelated: Supply
disruptions and low LFPR exacerbate inflationary pressures, but conversely, tight labor markets,
high inflation, and supply shortages may also be symptoms of excessive demand. The low LFPR
and supply chain disruptions are constraining aggregate supply. They can be addressed through
microeconomic policy solutions but to some extent may be beyond the scope of domestic policy,
as they partly reflect personal choices that are not easily reversed in the former case and
international developments in the latter. These constraints may eventually resolve themselves but
could take a considerable amount of time to do so. They may also worsen in the short run if
COVID-19 or war disruptions worsen. However, both of these risks do not necessarily imply that
stimulus should be maintained, because they simultaneously weaken growth and add to
inflationary pressures.
Meanwhile, inflation that is high, widespread (i.e., across most goods and services), and
persistent (i.e., continually rising for an extended period of time) reflects excess demand at
current levels of supply. Various targeted microeconomic policy changes can lead to a one-time
decline in the price of one or several goods, but high, widespread, and persistent inflation can be
addressed only by government policies that change overall demand. Specifically, demand can be
reduced by tightening monetary policy (raising interest rates), fiscal policy (reducing the budget
deficit), or both. When supply constraints are resolved, that might alleviate inflationary pressures,
which might reduce how much policy tightening is needed, but at that point it may be too late to
avoid a prolonged episode of high inflation. Once expectations of high inflation become endemic,
inflation can remain at a new high equilibrium even when supply and demand are no longer
imbalanced.
The next section addresses the macroeconomic question of how much fiscal and monetary
tightening would be needed to restore low inflation. A later section addresses the separate but
related issue of restoring fiscal sustainability. The remaining sections address the microeconomic
questions of how to boost LFPR and remove supply chain constraints.
Removing Fiscal and Monetary Stimulus
The efficacy of stimulus depends on the state of the economy. Fiscal and monetary stimulus
helped expedite a return to full employment when unemployment was high in 2020 and 2021.
Yet, despite labor market tightness and low unemployment indicating the economy has been at—
or close to—full employment since late 2021, much of that stimulus remains in place.65
Stimulative policy is inconsistent with returning to price stability—regardless of why inflation is
high—at full employment. At full employment with low inflation, a neutral fiscal and monetary
policy (i.e., a policy that neither stimulates nor constrains demand) may be appropriate. At full
employment with high inflation, contractionary fiscal and monetary policy that curbs demand
may be required to reduce inflation, especially if expectations of high inflation have become
endemic.
In 2021, policymakers took a wait-and-see approach to withdrawing the extraordinary pandemic-
era fiscal and monetary policy, guarding against the possibility that maintaining adequate private
demand was still dependent on stimulus and hoping that supply problems would resolve
themselves quickly and high inflation would prove transient. In 2022, policymakers (notably, the
Fed) largely changed their view, believing that high inflation would not be resolved until policy
was tightened, reducing demand. But because of the wait-and-see approach in 2021, the amount

65 Although overall employment is still relatively low because of the low LFPR, in this context unemployment may be
a better gauge of full employment as it indicates excess demand for labor. The low LFPR, by contrast, appears to
reflect an inadequate supply of labor.
Congressional Research Service

21

link to page 37 U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

of stimulus that still needs to be withdrawn before policy is neutral is still large, as discussed
below.
Now the outstanding question is whether it is too late to restore price stability by withdrawing
stimulus in a way that allows the economy to maintain low unemployment (see Appendix B for
further discussion of the relationship between prices and unemployment, sometimes called the
“Phillips Curve”). Lags between policy implementation and its effect on the economy mean that
tightening today will take some time to translate to lower inflation. Policymakers aspire to
achieve a “soft landing,” where growth slows and unemployment rises only modestly, if at all,
before price stability is restored. But if expectations of high inflation have become entrenched
and inflation enters a wage-price spiral, so much tightening could be required to restore price
stability that a “hard landing,” where the economy enters a recession, would result. Alternatively,
policymakers could inadvertently trigger a hard landing by tightening too quickly, even if high
inflation expectations are not endemic. Gradual policy changes are more likely to result in a soft
landing but are also more likely to fail to put a dent in inflation, given the amount of tightening
still required at this point just to return policy to neutral. Thus, there is the risk that successfully
avoiding a mild recession could lead to worse outcomes down the road.
Policymakers still express hope (and forecast) that inflation will be relatively easy to reduce on
the grounds that, after 40 previous years of persistently low inflation, households will view the
last year as an anomaly and will therefore be easy to convince to keep their expectations of future
inflation low. This was not the case in the 1970s, however, when inflation remained high even
during economic slowdowns. Federal Reserve Bank of New York data show an increase in
inflationary expectations well above 2%—the level of inflation at which the Fed has defined price
stability—since 2021.66 Once expectations incorporate higher inflation as permanent, inflation
would be expected to stay high even if the economy were no longer growing rapidly and
unemployment were not unusually low. At that point, a recession might be needed to wring high
inflation out of expectations, as was the case in the early 1980s.
Although the removal of fiscal and monetary stimulus has already begun, in both cases, the
amount of stimulus still in place is large by historical standards. Monetary policy changes can be
made more quickly and precisely than fiscal policy changes and have a more direct relationship
with inflation, since the Fed directly influences the money supply, so the Fed is widely seen as
taking the leading role in addressing inflation.
The Federal Reserve and Interest Rates
Although the Fed began raising interest rates and stopped purchasing assets in March 2022,
monetary policy is still highly stimulative—though less stimulative than it was previously.
Liquidity will likely remain abundant for some time after the Fed starts its planned gradual
reduction in its $8.9 trillion balance sheet in June. Meanwhile, by historical standards, interest
rates remain unusually low. Despite rising in nominal terms, after adjusting for inflation, they are
lower than they have been at any time since 1960. The FFR is currently negative in real terms,
meaning investors’ compensation when repaid has less real purchasing power than did the amount
initially lent out.67 Since inflation varies by measure, the size of the difference between nominal

66 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Survey of Consumer Expectations, April 11, 2022, https://www.newyorkfed.org/
microeconomics/sce#/inflexp-1.
67 Using actual inflation could overstate how negative real rates currently are if inflation falls. Current interest rates
would still be negative, but less so, if adjusted by expected inflation for the coming year instead of actual inflation over
the past year.
Congressional Research Service

22

link to page 28 U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

interest rates and real interest rates today depends on the measure used. If inflation (as measured
by PCE) stays at 7%, with an effective FFR of 0.3% currently, the real rate would be -6.7%.
Alternatively, if inflation for the year meets the Fed’s projection of 4.3%, then the real rate would
currently be -4%.68 The other time real interest rates reached as low as -4% was in 1975, when
inflation exceeded 10% and nominal rates were between 5.5% and 7%.
Economists have theorized that there is a neutral rate of short-term interest rates where monetary
policy is neither stimulative nor contractionary. Prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the neutral
rate was thought to be about 2% after adjusting for inflation (i.e., 2% plus the prevailing inflation
rate.) Following the financial crisis, there was evidence that the neutral rate was variable over
time and had fallen in the past decade.69 One well-known estimate has it falling to around 0.5%
during the pandemic.70 Using the inflation assumptions above, the Fed would need to raise
interest rates to between 4.8% and 7.5% just to achieve a neutral monetary policy—assuming the
real neutral rate is still 0.5%—or 6.3%-9.0% if the neutral rate returned to 2% as pandemic-
related factors waned. If instead contractionary policy is needed to reduce inflation for reasons
discussed above, interest rates would need to be higher than the neutral rate to restore price
stability. By contrast, Fed leadership is now projecting that an appropriate FFR in real terms
would be negative in 2022 and about zero in 2023. The Fed prefers gradual interest rate increases
so that financial markets are not disrupted by large and sudden changes, which slows down how
quickly stimulus can be withdrawn. Although monetary policy would remain stimulative in this
projection, they project that this will cause inflation to fall to a range of 2.2% to 3.5% in 2023
with no increase in unemployment—the “soft landing” scenario.71
A historical comparison helps illustrate how unusually long the Fed waited to begin raising rates
and how unusually stimulative current monetary policy remains. The Fed has begun tightening
monetary policy at some point in each economic recovery since 1958. Figure 10 plots the
inflation rate and unemployment rate at the point when tightening began. Since each recovery is a
different speed, recoveries can instead be compared relative to the remaining progress to achieve
the Fed’s mandate. As can be seen, current unemployment is the lowest and inflation is the
second-highest of all of the episodes since 1958. In other words, the Fed has waited longer into
the recovery in terms of unemployment and inflation to start raising interest rates than in any
previous recovery. In each of these cases except for 2015 and 2022, interest rates were above zero
when the Fed started raising rates. As the figure shows, inflation was often above the Fed’s target
of 2%—which it formally introduced in 2012, at the onset of monetary tightening—but it was
above 4% only during the 1970s and early 1980s episodes, when the inflation rate was
persistently high. Between 1969 and 1983, inflation averaged 6.6%. This points to the risks of
waiting too long to raise rates.

68 Federal Open Market Committee, Summary of Economic Projections, March 16, 2022,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20220316.pdf.
69 For more information, see CRS Insight IN11056, Low Interest Rates, Part 2: Implications for the Federal Reserve,
by Marc Labonte.
70 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest, https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/
policy/rstar.
71 Federal Open Market Committee, Summary of Economic Projections, March 16, 2022,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20220316.pdf.
Congressional Research Service

23

U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

Figure 10. Inflation and Unemployment When the Fed Began Raising Rates
Following Recessions Since 1958

Source: CRS calculations based on data from BEA and BLS.
Notes: Inflation is measured as the 12-month change in the PCE.
If price stability is not restored quickly and expectations of high inflation become endemic, it
could ultimately become more costly to restore later, as the last period of high inflation
demonstrates. Low inflation was not restored during the periods of monetary tightening beginning
in 1972 or 1977, when the Fed was unwilling to tighten policy sufficiently—even after a
recession lasting from 1973 to 1975. Although the FFR exceeded 10% in nominal terms in both
episodes, rates peaked below 3% after adjusting for inflation. In the early 1980s, low inflation
was eventually restored—but only after the Fed raised the FFR to 19% and maintained double-
digit interest rates until 1982, contributing to an unusually long and deep recession. While
inflation fell steadily in response to high interest rates in the early 1980s, it did not reach low
levels until the mid-1980s.
Supply Disruptions
The Biden Administration has announced a series of initiatives to address supply chain
disruptions. Such actions have included executive orders to review sectors and products that rely
on imports72 and promote domestic manufacturing.73 The Administration has taken other actions,
such as holding a summit with several countries and the European Union on global supply chain
resilience focused on near- and longer-term supply-chain bottlenecks.74

72 Executive Office of the President, “America’s Supply Chains,” Federal Register 11849-11854, March 1, 2021,
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/03/01/2021-04280/americas-supply-chains.
73 Executive Office of the President, “Ensuring the Future Is Made in All of America by All of America’s Workers,”
Federal Register 7475-7479, January 28, 2021, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/28/2021-02038/
ensuring-the-future-is-made-in-all-of-america-by-all-of-americas-workers.
74 The White House, “FACT SHEET: Summit of Global Supply Chain Resilience to Address Near-Term Bottlenecks
and Tackle Long-Term Challenges,” October 31, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2021/10/31/fact-sheet-summit-on-global-supply-chain-resilience-to-address-near-term-bottlenecks-and-tackle-
long-term-challenges/.
Congressional Research Service

24

U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

If policymakers wish to curb inflation without reducing demand, supply disruptions must be
resolved. However, policy options to alleviate supply disruptions can be ineffective at reducing
inflation in the short run because they are time-consuming to implement and, depending on how
they are financed, could even potentially make inflation worse by adding to aggregate demand.
Capacity problems causing bottlenecks require new infrastructure investment that, by nature, are
long-term projects that cannot bring new capacity on line instantly. At the same time, increased
infrastructure investment could exacerbate labor and supply shortages in the short run, as the
infrastructure projects themselves require labor, commodities, and other inputs. In 2021, the
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58) was enacted to boost public infrastructure
investment, and the Administration has set goals to increase investment in port and waterway
infrastructure.75
Even if additional investments are made, firms with bottlenecks in production and distribution
caused by labor shortages face the same hiring and retention challenges as other firms, making
bottlenecks difficult to remove at the moment. (Options for expanding labor supply are discussed
in the next section.)
Supply chain problems are also difficult for U.S. policy to address due to their global nature.
Lockdowns in China and the Ukraine invasion demonstrate that foreign supply disruptions due to
the pandemic, foreign governments’ policies, or both are largely beyond U.S. influence. Policy
options to work around these disruptions are more long-term in nature, although the
Administration has announced a release of 1 million barrels of oil a day for six months from the
Strategic Petroleum Reserve,76 a U.S. government complex that stores crude oil, to provide short-
term relief.77 Disruptions caused by the invasion have the potential to reduce growth without
constraining price inflation.
Low Labor Force Participation
Tight labor markets make it more challenging to reduce inflation, as employers may pass higher
labor costs on to consumers through higher prices. By historical standards, job openings are
plentiful but have not lured enough workers back into the labor force to restore the LFPR to
historical norms. Current problems businesses face with labor shortages can be resolved through
an economic slowdown that reduces the demand for labor, by increasing immigration, or by more
American workers reentering the labor force. If businesses cannot hire enough workers, it would
directly constrain future economic (and income) growth. If permanent, a smaller workforce has
both social and economic implications. A permanently smaller workforce would permanently
reduce the level of GDP, all else equal. If the economy has fewer workers, it can produce fewer
goods and services. By definition, lower potential GDP means lower national income relative to
pre-pandemic trend.78

75 The White House, “FACT SHEET: The Biden-Harris Action Plan for America’s Ports and Waterways,” November
9, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/09/fact-sheet-the-biden-harris-action-
plan-for-americas-ports-and-waterways/.
76 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management, “Strategic Petroleum Reserve,”
https://www.energy.gov/fecm/strategic-petroleum-reserve-9.
77 The White House, “FACT SHEET: President Biden’s Plan to Respond to Putin’s Price Hike at the Pump,” March 31,
2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/31/fact-sheet-president-bidens-plan-to-
respond-to-putins-price-hike-at-the-pump/.
78 Technically, GDP is equal to gross domestic income by accounting identity. The difference between gross domestic
income and national income is the difference between income generated in the United States and income generated by
Congressional Research Service

25

U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

The LFPR is low for a number of reasons discussed above—not all of which are caused by the
pandemic—suggesting that a multifaceted approach by business and government may be needed
to increase it.79 Although not exhaustive, this section outlines some of the major drivers of labor
force participation that policy could address.
The growing share of older Americans is a demographic reality that cannot be easily reversed and
will place continued downward pressure on the LFPR in coming decades if retirement patterns
remain unchanged.80 A challenge facing policymakers is that relatively few workers typically
reverse their decisions to retire. Policy could also attempt to make it more attractive for older
workers who have not yet retired to stay in the labor force.
The pandemic has highlighted the challenge that working parents face in meeting child care
needs. Child care is currently both a cause and victim of labor shortages, as child care workers
have been in particular short supply.81 Similarly, there was an increase in workers who left the
labor force to care for adults, and institutional facilities for adults have faced staffing shortages
during the pandemic.82 Policymakers have debated the federal government’s optimal role in
supporting families’ care needs.
The pandemic may still be causing some workers in some industries—especially those where
social distancing is impossible—to find work to be too risky or undesirable from a health
perspective. If workers could move seamlessly among industries, this might have little effect on
the overall LFPR. But if workers find a skills mismatch or geographic mismatch, then it may be
hard to transition into other industries or occupations. In the longer term, these mismatches could
be addressed through policies that encourage training, education, and labor mobility.83
For prime age men, there has been a long-term downward trend in their LFPR, and in the past 10
years it has been lower than at any other point in the history of the series going back to 1948.84
This points to problems unrelated to the pandemic that could be addressed through policy, such as
barriers to finding work caused by discrimination or criminal records, in addition to skills and
geographic mismatches.85

Americans. In addition, national income is adjusted for capital depreciation, and GDP is not.
79 Economists have debated whether enhanced unemployment insurance benefits and other income support measures
provided by COVID-19 relief bills were constraining employment growth earlier in the pandemic. However, those
measures ended at various points in 2021, and unemployment insurance generally requires recipients to seek work,
which means the individual would, by definition, be in the labor force (although labor force statistics are not drawn
from beneficiary records).
80 According to the Social Security trustees, the elderly share of the population relative to the prime age share will
continue to rise until 2080. Board of Trustees, Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability
Insurance Trust Funds, The 2021 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds, Table V.A3, https://www.ssa.gov/oact/TR/2021/tr2021.pdf.
81 Sarah House et al, “Who Cares? How the Childcare Industry’s Problems Are Every Employer’s Problem,” Wells
Fargo, March 1, 2022.
82 Howard Gleckman, “How Nursing Home Staff Shortages Are Hurting Hospital Care,” Forbes, February 17, 2022,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardgleckman/2022/02/17/how-nursing-home-staff-shortages-are-hurting-hospital-
care/.
83 See CRS Report R47059, Skills Gaps: A Review of Underlying Concepts and Evidence, by Sarah A. Donovan et al.
84 The female prime age LFPR has leveled off since the late 1990s after a long increase in the decades before that. It
remains below the male prime age LFPR.
85 See, for example, Shawn Bushway et al., “Barred from Employment: More Than Half of Unemployed Men in Their
30s Had a Criminal History of Arrest,” Science Advances, vol. 8, no. 7 (February 2022), https://www.science.org/doi/
10.1126/sciadv.abj6992.
Congressional Research Service

26

link to page 31
U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

Alternatively, labor shortages could be alleviated by boosting immigration. Policymakers could
consider whether to offset the policies put in place in the years before and during the pandemic
that recently kept immigration inflows below average.
Federal Debt Sustainability
As discussed previously, the size of the fiscal stimulus enacted in response to the pandemic was
unprecedented, causing dramatic increases in both annual budget deficits and the federal debt (see
Figure 11). The FY2022 federal debt held by the public is projected to reach its highest share of
GDP since 1946. CBO projects that deficits would remain between 3.8% and 6.1% of GDP over
the next 10 years under current policy, causing the federal debt to continue to grow as a share of
GDP.86 Although smaller than in the past three years, these deficits are still projected to be higher
as a share of GDP than all but two periods since 1947—the periods from FY1982 to FY1986 and
FY2009 to FY2013.
Figure 11. Debt-to-GDP Ratio
FY1940-FY2021

Source: OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government.
Notes: Gray bars denote recessions.
Eventually, Congress would face a decision on reducing deficits through policy changes that
reduce spending, raise taxes, or both to stabilize the debt as a share of GDP. Otherwise, debt
service would eventually exceed revenues.87 Before that has happened in foreign countries,
sustainability concerns have triggered financial crises that have led to debt defaults. However,
with debt service still low due to low interest rates, financial market participants currently place
little risk on a sustainability crisis, and the dollar’s “reserve currency” status gives the United

86 CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2022 to 2032.
87 For more information, see CRS Report R46729, Federal Deficits, Growing Debt, and the Economy in the Wake of
COVID-19, by Lida R. Weinstock.
Congressional Research Service

27

U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

States a borrowing advantage relative to other countries.88 Thus, achieving debt sustainability is
not urgent in the short run from a financial stability perspective.89 Nevertheless, debt
sustainability and short-term macroeconomic stabilization considerations are complementary at
present. Deficit reduction would help curb inflation.
Because of the aftermath of the pandemic and future pressures on elderly entitlement spending
related to the aging population, the amount of deficit reduction that is eventually needed to
stabilize the debt under current policy is large. In simulations by the Government Accountability
Office (GAO), the debt would stay close to its current level until between FY2025 and FY2030
(depending on assumptions) and then increase exponentially for the rest of the long-term forecast
to levels that would exhaust financing capacity. GAO projects that to stabilize the publicly held
debt at 100% of GDP (its FY2020 level) in 30 years, federal non-interest spending would need to
be immediately and permanently reduced by 20% or revenue would need to be increased by 27%
from FY2020 levels.90 In this scenario, the government would still run reduced budget deficits
that would allow debt to rise in dollar terms at the same rate as nominal GDP. Gradual deficit
reduction initiated today minimizes the amount needed to achieve sustainability and is less likely
to destabilize the recovery than implementing it all at once.
What If Asset Prices Continue to Fall?
Low interest rates, ample liquidity, and high savings rates contributed to the rapid increase in
asset prices during the pandemic. Since the beginning of 2022, stock and bond prices have been
volatile and fallen on net, although stock prices remain significantly higher than they were before
the pandemic. Cryptocurrencies and other more exotic assets have fallen even more in value in
2022. Asset prices could lose more of their value in the future in response to higher interest rates
or because of turmoil in the world economy or because an asset bubble bursts. (A bubble is a
rapid run up in asset prices caused, in part, by “irrational exuberance” among investors, which is
then followed by a sharp decline in prices.) One concern is that falling asset prices could cause
financial instability or a credit crunch or lead to a larger-than-desired cutback in business and
household spending. If so, would that derail the economic recovery? Or would a more normal
economic environment be enough to offset higher interest rates and keep asset prices above pre-
pandemic levels?
Although a modest decrease in asset prices is unlikely to be problematic, there is precedent for
falling asset prices causing recessions. The bursting of asset bubbles were key contributors to the
two recessions prior to the pandemic. The 2001 recession featured the bursting of the dot-com
bubble, and the 2007-2009 recession featured the bursting of the housing bubble. Although the
former recession was mild by historical standards, the latter one was unusually long and deep
because the bursting of the bubble resulted in a broader financial crisis.
Policymakers have been reluctant to tighten policy specifically in response to rising asset prices
in the past and have shown little desire to do so in this case, either. In part, this is because they
cannot easily identify whether price changes are based on market fundamentals or represent price

88 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11707, The U.S. Dollar as the World’s Dominant Reserve Currency,
coordinated by Rebecca M. Nelson.
89 If interest rates rise more than OMB projects—OMB projects rates will rise over the course of the projection but will
be low by historical standards—deficits could be significantly larger. This could make deficit reduction more urgent.
90 The required fiscal tightening estimated by GAO is relative to FY2020 spending and deficit levels, which were near
peak pandemic highs. Thus, some of the tightening called for in these estimates is already occurring in FY2022. GAO,
The Nation’s Fiscal Health: After Pandemic Recovery, Focus Needed on Achieving Long-Term Fiscal Sustainability,
GAO-21-275SP, March 23, 2021, Table 3, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-275sp.pdf.
Congressional Research Service

28

U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

bubbles. They are also afraid that the cure could be worse than the disease. While policymakers
are concerned that a bursting bubble could cause a decline in employment and recession, they fear
that tightening policy to prevent a bubble could cause the same outcome.
If the price rise proves to have been a bubble, then the downside to not tightening policy in
response to rising asset prices is that a larger bubble would cause a larger crash when it bursts.
Furthermore, the pandemic response may have made bubbles more likely, as the Fed’s decision to
create emergency facilities and purchase securities to support financial markets may exacerbate
bubbles by creating an expectation among some that the Fed will intervene in some fashion every
time there are major losses in financial markets in ways that then make securities more valuable,
at least in the short run.91

91 For more information, see CRS Report R46411, The Federal Reserve’s Response to COVID-19: Policy Issues, by
Marc Labonte.
Congressional Research Service

29

link to page 35 U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

Appendix A. Understanding the Economy Under
COVID-19 in a Supply and Demand Framework
To understand the nature of the economic recovery, and some of the unusual phenomena
occurring, it is important to first understand the nature of the initial economic decline and how
events unfolded thereafter. Most recessions are caused either by an aggregate demand shock—a
sudden change in the amount of goods and services desired to be purchased at a specific price
point—or an aggregate supply shock—a sudden change in the amount of goods and services
available for sale at a specific price point. However, the pandemic caused initial problems to both
aggregate supply and aggregate demand, as discussed above.
Figure A-1 shows a simplified version of aggregate demand and aggregate supply upon the initial
pandemic shock. Within the theoretical framework of aggregate supply and aggregate demand in
the short run, the two metrics are plotted by output and price level. Here, aggregate demand is
shown as a downward sloping line (AD1), indicating that as the price level increases in the
economy, total spending will decrease. Aggregate supply is an upward sloping line (AS1),92
indicating that as the price level in the economy increases, the total amount of output produced
will increase in the short run. The two lines meet at an equilibrium price level (E1) in which total
spending equals output produced. This model can be used to analyze outside shocks to the
economy (e.g., the pandemic), as well as fiscal and monetary policy responses.
When the pandemic initially shocked the economy, both aggregate demand and aggregate supply
fell. This is represented by the shift from the blue curves (AD1, AS1) to the orange curves (AD2,
AS2) in the below graph. Such decreases unambiguously result in lowered output. However,
depending on the magnitude of the demand and supply shocks, such a scenario could result in
increased, decreased, or unchanged price levels. To the extent that anything definitive can be
determined about the magnitude of the supply and demand shocks in March and April, month-
over-month deflation (falling prices) in April suggest that aggregate demand fell by a larger
magnitude than did aggregate supply initially.

92 In the full version of the AD-AS model, aggregate supply is represented in the short run and long run. In the long
run, aggregate supply is fixed, meaning that it is represented by a vertical line, because in the long run prices are fully
flexible and output is at a level associated with full employment. In the short run, prices take time to adjust and
therefore the upward sloping supply curve represents how producers adjust to changing prices. Certain factors can
affect long-run aggregate supply, such as technology and resources, but long-run supply will always be a vertical line
owing to fully flexible prices and wages.
Congressional Research Service

30

link to page 36 link to page 17 link to page 17
U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

Figure A-1. Initial COVID-19 Economic Shock Represented in a Simple Aggregate-
Supply-Aggregate-Demand Framework

Source: CRS.
Over time, initial problems depressing supply and demand have been largely resolved, as
discussed above, but new problems have risen that are still constraining supply, preventing the
aggregate supply curve to shift all the way back to its pre-pandemic path. Meanwhile, fiscal and
monetary stimulus have caused the aggregate demand curve to shift to a higher combination of
output and prices. As shown in Figure A-2, even if supply has considerably recovered from the
initial shock, a situation where demand has fully recovered (AD3) and supply has only partially
recovered (AS3) has resulted in high and rising inflation, as discussed in the “High and Rising
Inflation” section above. In other words, Americans would like to buy more goods and services
than U.S. businesses can currently produce. At current levels of supply and demand, the only way
to resolve this imbalance is through higher prices (E3).
Congressional Research Service

31

U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

Figure A-2. Current Supply-Constrained Economy Represented in a Simple
Aggregate-Supply-Aggregate-Demand Framework

Source: CRS.
Congressional Research Service

32

U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

Appendix B. Defining Economic Concepts
This appendix provides a brief description of some of the major economic concepts found in this
report.
Short-term changes in overall economic activity can be thought of in a supply and demand
framework. A common way economists define aggregate demand is total spending, including
private and public, in the economy. Therefore, when individuals and businesses spend less, all
else equal, this causes a drop in aggregate demand. One way to think about aggregate supply is
as total production in the economy.
Potential output, sometimes referred to as potential GDP, is an estimate of total output in the
economy given optimal conditions (i.e., no business cycle fluctuations), including fully flexible
prices and fully utilized resources.93 Likewise, full employment is an estimate of employment in
an economy that is producing at its potential.94 Full employment does not necessarily mean an
economy with an unemployment rate of zero; rather it indicates that cyclical unemployment has
been minimized. A precise definition of full employment is not widely agreed upon, but BLS
defines it as a situation in which the unemployment rate is as low as possible without causing
inflation to rise, there is no cyclical unemployment, and GDP is at potential.95 Using this
definition, an economy at less than full employment cannot meet potential output in any given
short-run time frame. The difference between actual and potential output is known as the output
gap. A negative output gap indicates that the economy is not producing at its full capacity, while a
positive output gap indicates that the economy is producing above capacity and may be
overheating.96
Full employment and potential output are both theoretical constructs that cannot be directly
measured but can nonetheless be helpful in understanding the dynamics of the economy.
Numerical estimates of these concepts are produced by a number of agencies, including CBO and
the OECD.
The trend of potential output and full employment is important for long-term economic growth.
At any given time, employment and output may fluctuate from these potentials. However, short-
term fluctuations do not necessarily permanently change the trajectory of these potentials. That
being said, certain economic trends may cause permanent changes to potential output, full
employment, or both. For example, a concern currently is that the labor force may remain
permanently smaller than pre-pandemic levels, thereby lowering full employment and potential
output permanently as well.
The word unemployed can mean different things in common usage and technical economic
statistics. To be counted as unemployed in official government statistics, an individual without a
job must also be actively seeking work. If not actively seeking work, that individual is recorded
as not in the labor force. There are various reasons that individuals might decide not to be in the
labor force, including retirement, care for family members, or education or because they have

93 Charles I. Jones, Macroeconomics, ed. Jack Repcheck, 3rd ed. (W. W. Norton and Company, 2008), p. 12.
94 OECD, OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, 2008, p. 218, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264055087-
en.pdf.
95 BLS, Full Employment: An Assumption Within BLS Projections, November 2017, https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/
2017/article/full-employment-an-assumption-within-bls-projections.htm.
96 Sarwat Jahan and Ahmed Saber Mahmud, What Is the Output Gap?, International Monetary Fund, September 2013,
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/09/basics.htm.
Congressional Research Service

33

U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

become discouraged from seeking work. The labor force participation rate is measured as the
sum of the employed and unemployed divided by the total population.
The Phillips Curve is an economic model that suggests there is an inverse relationship between
unemployment and inflation (or wages in the original model). The theory suggests that as the
economy grows and unemployment decreases, prices will rise because demand will rise as more
workers become employed and have more disposable income, and wages will rise as the demand
for labor increases, leading firms to raise prices in order to account for the wage increases. The
curve of the slope represents the strength of the relationship between the two variables. For
example, a flatter Phillips Curve indicates that prices are not very sensitive to changes in the
unemployment rate, whereas a steeper curve indicates more price sensitivity.
Fiscal stimulus is an increase in government spending, a decrease in tax revenue, or a
combination of the two. All else equal, it increases the budget deficit. Monetary stimulus is,
conventionally, a decrease in interest rates and is expected to temporarily spur economic activity.
Both fiscal and monetary stimulus work to increase aggregate demand in the economy. (They do
not affect aggregate supply in the standard model.) In the case of fiscal stimulus, an increase in
public spending on goods and services directly increases total spending in the economy, while an
increase in government transfers or decrease in, for example, individual taxes increases the
disposable income of affected individuals, potentially resulting in increased private expenditures.
In the case of monetary stimulus, a decrease in interest rates tends to increase aggregate demand
by incentivizing interest-sensitive spending, such as consumer durables, business investment, and
residential investment.97

Author Information

Marc Labonte
Lida R. Weinstock
Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy
Analyst in Macroeconomic Policy

97 For more detailed information on fiscal and monetary policy and stimulus, see CRS In Focus IF11253, Introduction
to U.S. Economy: Fiscal Policy, by Lida R. Weinstock; and CRS In Focus IF11751, Introduction to U.S. Economy:
Monetary Policy, by Marc Labonte.
Congressional Research Service

34

U.S. Economic Recovery in the Wake of COVID-19: Successes and Challenges

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R47115 · VERSION 1 · NEW
35