The Beijing 2022 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games: Issues for Congress

The Beijing 2022 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games: Issues for Congress

The Beijing 2022 Olympic and Paralympic
January 24, 2022
Winter Games: Issues for Congress
Susan V. Lawrence,
The capital of the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China), Beijing, is scheduled to host the
Coordinator
XXIV Olympic Winter Games from February 4 to 20, 2022, and the XIII Paralympic Winter
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Games from March 4 to 13, 2022. The International Olympic Committee’s (IOC’s) selection of

Beijing as host city for the Games has been controversial in the United States and elsewhere,
primarily because of China’s poor human rights record.
L. Elaine Halchin

Specialist in American
National Government
The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has, moreover, posed major challenges for

the Games’ organizers. China has sought to maintain a “zero-COVID” approach to the pandemic,
seeking to contain and stamp out even the smallest outbreaks. To guard against Games
Ricardo Barrios
participants spreading the virus that causes COVID-19, the organizers say they will operate
Analyst in Asian Affairs
“closed-loop systems,” created “to ensure there is no contact with the general public or anyone

outside of the closed loop.” Games participants are to enter a loop on dedicated Games
Nicolas Cook
transportation carrying them either from the airport, or, if not fully vaccinated on arrival, from
Specialist in African Affairs
the dedicated facility where they will have spent their first 21 days in China in quarantine. The

discovery of a domestic case of the highly transmissible Omicron variant of the virus in Beijing
Thomas Lum
three weeks before the opening of the Games has further complicated the challenge of epidemic
Specialist in Asian Affairs
control and led organizers to halt spectator ticket sales.

Members of the 117th Congress have shown a strong interest in the Beijing 2022 Winter
Michael A. Weber
Olympics and Paralympics. Some Members have held and testified at hearings on the Games,
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
written Olympics-related letters, and made multiple public statements. Some have also

introduced related bills and resolutions, including H.Res. 837, which passed the House on
Cory Welt
December 8, 2021, by a unanimous vote of 428-0. The resolution states, among other things, that
Specialist in Russian and
it is the sense of the House that the IOC’s role in “legitimizing” PRC claims about the safety of
European Affairs
PRC tennis star Peng Shuai, who raised allegations of sexual coercion against a retired senior

PRC leader, “raise questions about the organization’s ability and willingness to protect the rights
of athletes participating in the 2022 Olympic and Paralympic games in Beijing.” Some Members

have called for the United States to implement a diplomatic boycott or full boycott (including
athletes) of the Games, and/or called for moving the Games out of China. Some Members have scrutinized Beijing 2022
corporate sponsors, and some Members have expressed concern for the security and freedom of expression of U.S. athletes at
the Games.
On December 6, 2021, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki told reporters that the Biden Administration “will not send any
diplomatic or official representation to the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics and Paralympic Games given the PRC’s ongoing
genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang and other human rights abuses.” Ten other countries have so far signaled
their intent to withhold official representation from the Games , for diverse reasons, while still sending athletes. One country,
North Korea, has stated that it will send neither officials nor athletes. It cited “the manoeuvers of hostile forces and the world
pandemic.” The IOC’s approach to human rights has been evolving. The host city contract for the Beijing 2022 Winter
Olympics includes no reference to human rights. In 2017, however, the IOC announced that starting with the 2024 Games,
host city contracts will include a provision relating to human rights.
The government of China appears to see Beijing’s hosting of the Games for a second time as serving multiple national
purposes. They include spurring progress on one of Communist Party of China (CPC) General Secretary Xi Jinping’s
signature initiatives, the development of a new megacity in north China. They also include boosting national pride,
demonstrating to the world the alleged superiority of China’s political system, boosting the global profile of Chinese brands,
and developing winter sports in China.
Appendices to this report list legislation related to the Beijing 2022 Games , provide information on the PRC bodies leading
planning for the Games and corporate sponsors of the Games , and discuss two case studies of historic approaches to human
rights and sport: the U.S.-led boycott of the Moscow 1980 Olympics and sporting bans against apartheid-era South Africa.
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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
Key Facts....................................................................................................................... 2
Beijing as Host City: Selection and Controversies ................................................................ 2
The IOC’s Selection of Beijing as Host City .................................................................. 4
Allegations of Genocide in China’s Xinjiang Region....................................................... 5
Concerns About the Welfare of Chinese Tennis Star Peng Shuai........................................ 7
The Human Rights Legacy of the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics.................................... 9
Challenges Related to the COVID-19 Pandemic ................................................................ 10
The U.S. Congress and the 2022 Games ........................................................................... 12
Congressional Calls for Diplomatic and Full Boycotts ................................................... 13
Congressional Calls to Move the Olympics Out of China ............................................... 14
Congressional Scrutiny of Beijing 2022 Corporate Sponsors .......................................... 14
Congressional Concerns Related to the Personal Security and Freedom of Expression
of U.S. Athletes at the Games.................................................................................. 16
U.S. and International Stances on Official Representation at the Games................................. 17
The Biden Administration’s Decision ......................................................................... 17
China’s Reaction to the Biden Administration Decision ................................................. 18
The IOC’s Stance .................................................................................................... 19
The U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee’s Stance................................................. 19
Select International Stances....................................................................................... 20
The International Olympic Committee and Human Rights ................................................... 25
The IOC’s Evolving Approach to Human Rights .......................................................... 25
Rule 50.2 of the Olympic Charter............................................................................... 27
The Government of China’s Goals for the Games............................................................... 29
Catalyzing a New Northern Megacity ......................................................................... 30
Boosting National Pride............................................................................................ 30
Showcasing the Alleged Superiority of China’s Political System ..................................... 31
Boosting Chinese Brands .......................................................................................... 31
Promoting Winter Sports, Including in Xinjiang ........................................................... 32
Issues for Congress ....................................................................................................... 33

Figures
Figure 1. Map of China .................................................................................................... 3

Tables
Table 1. Countries Withholding Official Representation from the Beijing 2022 Games ............ 21

Table A-1. Legislation in the 117th Congress Related to the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics
and Paralympics ......................................................................................................... 35
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Table B-1. Leadership of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Leading Group for the
Work of the 24th Olympic Winter Games ........................................................................ 38
Table B-2. Leadership of the Beijing Organising Committee for the 2022 Olympic and
Paralympic Winter Games (BOCOG) ............................................................................ 38
Table C-1. Participants in the IOC’s TOP Programme ......................................................... 41
Table C-2. Beijing 2022 Corporate Sponsors ..................................................................... 42

Appendixes
Appendix A. Legislation in the 117th Congress................................................................... 35
Appendix B. Official PRC Bodies Leading Planning for the Games ...................................... 38
Appendix C. Corporate Sponsors of the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics and Paralympics ......... 40
Appendix D. Historic Approaches to Sports and Human Rights: Two Case Studies ................. 43

Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 47

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Introduction
Beijing, the capital of the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China), is scheduled to host the
XXIV Olympic Winter Games and the XIII Paralympic Winter Games (collectively, the Games)
starting on February 4, 2022, five months after the closing of the Tokyo 2020 Summer Games,
which were postponed by a year due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.1
China’s state media have presented China’s leader, Communist Party General Secretary and State
President Xi Jinping, as personal y guiding China’s planning for the Games and they frequently
quote Xi’s instruction that the Games should be “Simple, Safe, and Splendid.”2
With the world stil in the grips of the pandemic, delivering on “simple” and “safe” has proved
chal enging both for the Beijing Organising Committee for the 2022 Olympic and Paralympic
Games (BOCOG, also known as “Beijing 2022”) and for the International Olympic Committee
(IOC) and the International Paralympic Committee (IPC), the independent, nonprofit,
international organizations that lead the Olympic Movement and the Paralympic Movement,
respectively. Together the three organizations have developed a complex set of protocols intended
to guard against the spread of the virus among athletes, officials, staff, media and others at the
Olympics.3 The emergence in late 2021 of the highly transmissible Omicron variant of the virus
has raised questions about whether even those extensive protocols wil be sufficient to prevent
widespread infections.4 (See “Chal enges Related to the COVID-19 Pandemic.”)
Complicating China’s efforts to portray the Games as “splendid” has been China’s human rights
record. Members of the 117th Congress have held hearings and introduced more than a dozen
pieces of legislation related to the Beijing Winter Games, many arguing against a “business as
usual” approach to an Olympics and a Paralympics hosted by a country accused of ongoing
genocide against predominantly Muslim groups in its northwest.5 Some Members have also
expressed concern about the welfare of a Chinese tennis star and three-time Olympian who
appeared to be silenced after posting on social media about a retired senior Chinese leader having
al egedly coerced her into sex.6 (See “Concerns About the Welfare of Chinese Tennis Star Peng
Shuai” and “The U.S. Congress and the 2022 Games.”)
On December 6, 2021, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki announced that the Biden
Administration “wil not send any diplomatic or official representation to the Beijing 2022 Winter
Olympics and Paralympic Games.” In explaining the decision, she cited, “the PRC’s ongoing
genocide and crimes against humanity” in China’s Xinjiang region “and other human rights
abuses.”7 Ten other countries have announced that they wil withhold official representation from

1 T he T okyo 2020 Olympic Summer Games (the Games of the XXXII Olympiad) were held from July 23 to August 8,
2021. T he T okyo Paralympic Summer Games were held from August 24 to September 5, 2021. T he XXIV Olympic
Winter Games are scheduled to open on February 4, 2022, although competition will begin on February 2, 2022.
2 “Xi Jinping Calls for Efforts to Ensure Success of Beijing Winter Olympics,” CGT N, January 5, 2022; “Vice-Premier
Calls for Efforts to Ensure “Simple, Safe, Splendid” Winter Games,” Xinhua, December 16, 2021.
3 International Olympic Committee, “Beijing 2022 Playbooks,” December 13, 2021, at https://olympics.com/ioc/
beijing-2022-playbooks.
4 World Health Organization, “Classification of Omicron (B.1.1.529): SARS-CoV-2 Variant of Concern,” November
26, 2021, at https://www.who.int/news/item/26-11-2021-classification-of-omicron-(b.1.1.529)-sars-cov-2-variant-of-
concern.
5 See, for example, S. 1169, S. 1260, and H.R. 3524.
6 See H.Res. 837, which passed the House on December 8, 2021, on a vote of 428-0.
7 T he White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki, December 6, 2021,” December 6, 2021.
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the Games, though fewer than half have cited human rights as the primary reason for doing so.
(See “Select International Stances” below.)
Key Facts
 The Beijing 2022 Winter Olympic Games are scheduled to take place from
February 4 to 20, 2022 (though competition is scheduled to begin February 2,
2022). The Beijing 2022 Winter Paralympic Games are scheduled for March 4-
13, 2022.8
 Beijing is the first city in Olympic history to be selected to host both Summer
(2008) and Winter Games. Beijing wil be reusing two 2008 Olympics and
Paralympics venues: the National Indoor Stadium (also known as the “Bird’s
Nest”) and the National Aquatic Center (formerly known as the “Water Cube”
and now known as the “Ice Cube.”)
 The Games are to be held in three zones: central Beijing (ice sports); Beijing’s
Yanqing District (alpine skiing, bobsled, luge, and skeleton); and the Chongli
district of Zhangjiakou in Hebei Province (skiing and snowboarding).
 Approximately 2,900 Olympic athletes are to compete in 109 events (51 for men,
46 for women, 11 mixed events, and 1 open event), divided into 15 disciplines
across 7 sports: biathlon, bobsleigh, curling, ice hockey, luge, skating, and
skiing.9
 Paralympic athletes are to compete in 78 events in two disciplines across six
sports: alpine skiing, cross-country skiing, biathlon, snowboarding, para ice
hockey, and wheelchair curling.10
 The United States and ten other countries have announced that they wil not send
officials to represent them at the Olympics, but wil send athletes. The other
countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Japan, Lithuania,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. (See “Select
International Stances.”)
 North Korea alone has stated that it wil send neither officials nor athletes to
Beijing, citing “the manoeuvers of hostile forces and the world pandemic.”11
Beijing as Host City: Selection and Controversies
Beijing’s selection to serve as the host city for the 2022 Winter Games has been controversial in
the United States and elsewhere, primarily due to China’s authoritarian political system and poor

8 International Olympic Committee, “Beijing 2022 Olympic Schedule,” at https://olympics.com/en/beijing-2022/
schedule/. T he opening ceremony is scheduled for February 4, 2022, but curling competition is to begin on February 2,
2022, and freestyle skiing and ice hockey on February 3, 2022.
9 International Olympic Committee, “All You Need to Know About the Winter Olympics,” at https://olympics.com/en/
news/winter-olympics-first-edition-sports-venue-faq; International Olympic Committee, “ Beijing 2022 Facts and
Figures,” https://olympics.com/ioc/beijing-2022-facts-and-figures.
10 International Paralympic Commit tee, “About the Games,” at https://olympics.com/en/beijing-2022/paralympics.
11 “DPRK Olympic Committee, Ministry of Physical Culture and Sports send letter to Chinese counterparts, Beijing
Winter Olympics organizing committee,” KCNA via Pyongyang Tim es, January 8, 20212, at
http://www.pyongyangtimes.com.kp/?bbs=40182.
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human rights record.12 Of particular concern to many critics of Beijing’s status as host city are
ongoing human rights abuses in the northwest China region of Xinjiang that both the Trump and
Biden Administrations have characterized as genocide. Some Members and others have also
pointed to Beijing’s record of curtailing freedom of expression, an impulse that many critics saw
at work in the apparent silencing of Chinese tennis star Peng Shuai after she accused a retired
senior Chinese leader of sexual coercion three months before the scheduled opening of the
Beijing Games. Pending legislation in the 117th Congress includes six resolutions that cite a
worsening of the human rights situation in China following the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics
in cal ing for either moving the Beijing 2022 Games to another country, or boycotting them.13
Figure 1. Map of China
The 2022 Winter Olympic Games are to be held in Beijing and Hebei.

Source: Graphic by CRS.
Note: The Games are to be held in three zones: central Beijing; Beijing’s Yanqing District; and the Chongli
district of Zhangjiakou in Hebei Province. China’s government is leveraging the Games as a way to promote the
development of a major new metropolitan area, known as “Jing-jin-ji,” consisting of Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei.

12 See, for example, Mitt Romney, “The Right Way to Boycott the Beijing Olympics,” New York Times, March 15,
2020; Kenneth Roth, “Olympic Snow Shouldn’t Cover China’s Repression,” Newsweek, February 25, 2021; Sally
Jenkins, “China Controls the IOC and Olympic Sponsors the Way it Governs Its Citizens: T hrough Fear,” The
Washington Post, April 14, 2021; Kurt Streeter, “ It’s T ime to Rethink the Olympics,” New York Tim es, April 12, 2021;
James Millward, “How to Protest the Beijing Olympics—A Response to Mitt Romney,” Medium, March 15, 2021; and
Michael Mazza, “Move the Games: What to Do About the 2022 Beijing Olympics,” American Enterprise Institute
(AEI), April 2021.
13 See H.Res. 160, H.Res. 162, H.Res. 466, H.Res. 812, and S.Res. 13.
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The IOC’s Selection of Beijing as Host City14
The IOC in July 2015 selected Beijing as the host city of 2022’s XXIV Olympic Winter Games.15
Beijing started as one of six cities vying to host the 2022 Games. The others were Almaty,
Kazakhstan; Krakow, Poland; Lviv, Ukraine; Oslo, Norway; and Stockholm, Sweden.16 Each city
won endorsement from its respective national Olympic committee (NOC), giving it the status of
an “applicant city.”17 Stockholm withdrew prior to submitting an application file to the IOC. After
the remaining five cities submitted their application files and prior to the IOC Executive Board
selecting candidate cities from among them, Krakow and Lviv dropped out.18 The board accepted
al three remaining cities as candidate cities. When Oslo withdrew prior to the deadline for
submitting a candidature file, Almaty and Beijing were left as the final two candidate cities. The
IOC’s 2022 Evaluation Commission analyzed Almaty’s and Beijing’s candidature files, visited
each city, and issued a report, which it “provided to the IOC Members to assist them in electing
the Host City.”19 The Evaluation Commission’s report included language on assurances China’s
government provided related to human rights:
Written assurances were provided regarding the following matters: human rights, the right
to demonstrate, media freedom to report on the Games with no restrictions on the Internet,
labour rights, displacement and environmental protection. 20 Taking these into
consideration, as well as the open nature of the discussions with Beijing 2022 and
government authorities and China’s experience from organising the 2008 Olympic Games
and the 2014 Youth Olympic Games, the Commission is confident that the Government of

14 Written by CRS Specialist in American National Government L. Elaine Halchin.
15 T he IOC is an independent, nonprofit, international organization that leads the Olympic Movement. The Olympic
Movement is “ the concerted, organised, universal and permanent action, carried out under the supreme authority of the
IOC, of all individuals and entities who are inspired by the values of Olympism …. In addition to its three main
constituents, the Olympic Movement also encompasses the Organising Committees of the Olympic Games
(“OCOGs”), the national associations, clubs and persons belonging to the IFs and NOCs, particularly the athletes,
whose interests constitute a fundamental element of the Olympic Movement’s action, as well as the judges, referees,
coaches and the other sports officials and technicians. It also includes other organisations and institutions as recognised
by the IOC.” International Olympic Movement, “Olympic Movement,” at https://olympics.com/ioc/olympic-
movement .
16 See International Olympic Committee, “Olympic Games Candidature Process,” at https://www.olympic.org/all-
about-the-candidature-process, for an overview of the current host city selection process. Note that the IOC has revised
the selection process over the years, so the process for selecting a host city for one Olympics may differ somewhat
from the process used for another.
17 T he host city selection process has two phases: application and candidature. In the first phase, NOCs endorse cities,
giving them the status of “applicant cities.” In the second phase, applicant cities accepted by the IOC executive become
“candidate cities.” T he U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee (USOPC) is the NOC for the United States.
International Olympic Committee, “Host City Election for the Olympic Winter Games 2022,” at
https://www.olympic.org/2022-host -city-election.
18 T he Executive Board, which consists of a president, 4 vice presidents, and 10 other members of the IOC, manages
the affairs of the IOC. International Olympic Committee, “ IOC Executive Board,” at https://olympics.com/ioc/
executive-board.
19 International Olympic Committee, “Factsheet, Host City Election 2022,” Update March 2018, p. 2, at
https://stillmedab.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Factsheets-Reference-Documents/Host -City-
Election/Facts-and-Figure/Factsheet -Host -City-Election-for-the-XXIV-Olimpic-Winter-Games-2022.pdf.
20 T he IOC website that contains the Beijing 2022 documents, at https://olympics.com/ioc/documents/olympic-games/
beijing-2022-olympic-winter-games, does not include the host city’s written assurances regarding human rights and the
other matters listed here.
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China would take all necessary measures to ensure the Olympic Charter and Host City
Contract would be respected.21
On July 31, 2015, IOC members voted by secret bal ot, selecting Beijing over Almaty by a vote
of 44 to 40.22 Any IOC member who was a national of either China or Kazakhstan was not
permitted to vote.23
Allegations of Genocide in China’s Xinjiang Region24
Between 2017 and 2020, authorities in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)
arbitrarily detained an estimated one mil ion-plus Turkic Muslims, mostly ethnic Uyghurs, in
“reeducation centers.”25 The government justified the detentions on the basis of detainees’ past
religious, cultural, scholarly, social, and online activities, which the government subsequently
deemed to be manifestations of religious extremism or potential y terrorist in nature, also referred
to as “pre-criminal offenses.” Detainees were compel ed to renounce many of their Islamic beliefs
and customs as a condition for their possible release.26 These detentions were an apparent part of
a PRC government effort to systematical y transform the thought and behavior of Uyghurs and
forcefully assimilate them into Chinese society, an effort which some observers claim is
destroying Uyghur culture and identity.27 Treatment and conditions in the centers reportedly
included compulsory factory labor, crowded and unsanitary conditions, food deprivation,
psychological pressure, sexual abuse, and medical neglect and torture, sometimes resulting in
deaths of detainees while in the camps or soon after their release.28 Since 2020, the XUAR
government appears to have closed or repurposed most reeducation centers; it has released some

21 Ibid., p. 73.
22 International Olympic Committee, “ The International Olympic Committee (IOC) T oday Named Beijing, People’s
Republic of China, as the Host City of the Olympic Winter Games 2022,” July 31, 2015, at https://www.olympic.org/
news/beijing-named-host-city-of-olympic-winter-games-2022. Presently, the IOC has 101 members from 75 countries.
International Olympic Committee, “Members,” at https://olympics.com/ioc/members.
23 International Olympic Committee, “Factsheet, Host City Election 2022.” T he three Chinese nationals who were IOC
members did not vote; the IOC did not have a member who was a national of Kazakhstan when the vote took place.
24 Written by CRS Specialist in Asian Affairs T homas Lum and CRS Analyst in Foreign Affairs Michael A. Weber.
For more information, see CRS Report R46750, Hum an Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 117th
Congress, by T homas Lum and Michael A. Weber.
25 According to some estimates, the number of Uyghurs detained in reeducation centers ranged from 1 million to 2
million out of a total population of roughly 1 2 million. Radio Free Asia, “ T rapped in the System: Experiences of
Uyghur Detention in Post 2015 Xinjiang,” February 2021; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2020
Annual Report, January 12, 2021; Department of State, “ 2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: China,” June
21, 2019; Adrian Zenz, “New Evidence for China’s Political Re-education Campaign in Xinjiang,” China Brief
(Jam estown Foundation), May 15, 2018. For further information on the Uyghurs, see CRS In Focus IF10281, China
Prim er: Uyghurs, by T homas Lum and Michael A. Weber.
26 Darren Byler, In the Camps: China’s High-Tech Penal Colony, New York: Columbia Global Reports, 2021; Radio
Free Asia, “ T rapped in the System: Experiences of Uyghur Detention in Post 2015 Xinjiang,” February 2021 ; Scilla
Alecci, “China Cables,” International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, November 24, 2019; “Inside the Camps
Where China T ries to Brainwash Muslims Until T hey Love the Party and Hate T heir Own Culture,” South China
Morning Post, May 17, 2018.
27 Sean R. Roberts, The War on the Uyghurs, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020.
28 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2020 Annual Report; Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on
Hum an Rights Practices—China, March 30, 2021; Department of State, “ Report to Congress on Human Rights Abuses
in Xinjiang,” November 20, 2020.
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detainees, sent others to factory labor, and kept many in pre-trial detention facilities or prosecuted
them as criminals and imprisoned them in higher security facilities.29
Many Uyghurs, including former detainees, reportedly have been assigned to factory employment
in Xinjiang and other parts of China under conditions that indicate forced labor.30 Uyghur
detentions, forced labor, and other state policies have led to family separations and contributed to
nearly half a mil ion Uyghur children attending state-run boarding schools.31 In 2017, the
government launched a campaign to reduce “il egal births” among Uyghurs and other Turkic
Muslims in Xinjiang, partly through forced contraception, sterilization, and abortion, affecting
many minority women with three or more children.32
On January 19, 2021, the day before the end of President Donald J. Trump’s term in office, the
State Department determined that China’s actions against Uyghurs and other Muslim groups in
Xinjiang constitute crimes against humanity and genocide.33 With regard to crimes against
humanity, the State Department referred to arbitrary imprisonment, forced sterilization, torture,
forced labor, and “draconian restrictions” on freedom of religion or belief, freedom of expression,
and freedom of movement. Regarding its genocide determination, the department stated that
Chinese authorities “are engaged in the forced assimilation and eventual erasure of a vulnerable
ethnic and religious minority group.”34 The Biden Administration has indicated concurrence with
this determination, and has described genocide in Xinjiang as “ongoing.”35 (For further
information about U.S. government actions in response to human rights violations in Xinjiang,
see CRS In Focus IF10281, China Primer: Uyghurs, by Thomas Lum and Michael A. Weber.)
Under international law, the crime of genocide,36 unlike crimes against humanity, requires
evidence of intent to destroy a particular group. Some legal experts view the intent standard as

29 Darren Byler, In the Camps: China’s High-T ech Penal Colony; Dake Kang, “Room for 10,000; Inside China’s
Largest Detention Center,” Los Angeles Times, August 3, 2021; “AP Looks Inside China’s Largest Detention Center in
Xinjiang,” Voice of America, July 22, 2021; Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, “Night Images Reveal Many New
Detention Centers in Xinjiang Region,” New York Times, September 24, 2020; Anna Fifield, “China Is Building Vast
New Detention Centers for Muslims in Xinjiang,” Washington Post, September 23, 2020; Nathan Ruser, “Documenting
Xinjiang’s Detention System,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 2020.
29 Adrian Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Mandatory Birth Control: T he CCP’s Campaign to Suppress Uyghur
Birthrates in Xinjiang,” Jamestown Foundation, June 2020; “China Cuts Uighur Births with IUDs, Abortion,
Sterilization,” Associated Press, June 29, 2020.
30 Adrian Zenz, “Coercive Labor and Forced Displacement in Xinjiang’s Cross-Regional Labor T ransfer Program,”
Victims of Communism, March 2, 2021; Amy Lehr and Mariefaye Bechrakis, “ Connecting the Dots in Xinjiang:
Forced Labor, Forced Assimilation, and Western Supply Chains,” Center for Strategic and Inter national Studies,
October 2019; Adrian Zenz, “ Beyond the Camps: Beijing’s Grand Scheme of Forced Labor, Poverty Alleviation and
Social Control in Xinjiang,” SocArXiv Papers, July 12, 2019.
31 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2020 Annual Report; Amy Qin, “In China’s Crackdown on
Muslims, Children Have Not Been Spared,” New York Times, July 1, 2020.
32 Adrian Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Mandatory Birth Control: T he CCP’s Campaign to Suppress Uyghur
Birthrates in Xinjiang,” Jamestown Foundation, June 2020; “China Cuts Uighur Births with IUDs, Abortion,
Sterilization,” Associated Press, June 29, 2020.
33 Department of State, “Determination of the Secretary of State on Atrocities in Xinjiang,” press statement, January
19, 2021. According to media reports, late in the T rump Administration, State Department lawyers and other
department employees disagreed over whether sufficient evidence existed to justify a finding of genocidal intent . See
Colum Lynch, “State Department Lawyers Concluded Insufficient Evidence to Provide Genocide in China,” Foreign
Policy, February 19, 2021.
34 Department of State, “Determination of the Secretary of State on Atrocities in Xinjiang,” January 19, 2021.
35 For example, U.S. Department of State, “ The Signing of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act,” December 23,
2021.
36 T he U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide as “any of the
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chal enging to prove. According to media reports, late in the Trump Administration, State
Department lawyers and other department employees disagreed over whether sufficient evidence
existed to justify a finding of genocidal intent.37 A March 2021 report produced by a group of
independent experts for a non-partisan think tank in Washington, DC, concluded that the
government of China committed genocide;38 conversely, an April 2021 Human Rights Watch
report al eged crimes against humanity, while stating, “Human Rights Watch has not documented
the existence of the necessary genocidal intent at this time.”39 In December 2021, a United
Kingdom-based nongovernmental tribunal found that the PRC government had, “beyond
reasonable doubt,” committed torture, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Xinjiang,
although the language of the tribunal’s summary judgement was measured with regard to the
genocide finding.40
Concerns About the Welfare of Chinese Tennis Star Peng Shuai41
Since November 2021, concerns about the welfare of Chinese tennis star Peng Shuai have
compounded many critics’ reservations about Beijing’s role as host city for the Olympics. In a
November 2, 2021, social media post, Peng, a former Wimbledon doubles champion and three-
time Olympian, al eged that she had been subject to sexual coercion from a former senior Chinese
leader, Zhang Gaoli.42 Zhang served as a member of China’s top decisionmaking body, the
Political Bureau Standing Committee from 2012 to 2017. Until 2018, Zhang also served as a vice
premier in China’s government and as head of the Central Leading Group for the Work of the
XXIV Olympic Winter Games.43

following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c)
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part; (d) imposing measures intended to preven t births within the group; and (e) forcibly transferring children of the
group to another group.” See United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect,” at
https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml.
37 Colum Lynch, “State Department Lawyers Concluded Insufficient Evidence to Provide Genocide in China,” Foreign
Policy, February 19, 2021.
38 T he report states that the intent standard does not require explicit statements and can be inferred from a collection of
facts, while also arguing that, “in some instances, the Government’s intent to destroy the Uyghurs as a group has been
explicit.” See Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China’s Breaches
of the 1948 Genocide Convention, March 8, 2021.
39 T he report further states “if such evidence were to emerge, the acts being committed against T urkic Muslims in
Xinjiang … could also support a finding of genocide.” Human Rights Watch, “‘Break T heir Lineage, Break T heir
Roots,’” April 19, 2021.
40 T he tribunal’s genocide finding rested on the U.N. Genocide Convention’s reference to preventing births within a
group. T he summary judgement states in part that “The T ribunal recognises that this may be the first public evidence -
based determination of a genocide under [such article] of th e Convention” and “ would, as a whole, prefer not to make
such a finding and to allow findings of genocide in law to match more closely the likely general public understanding
of the word.... T his Judgment, with no evidence of any mass killing, may be thought to diminish the perceived status of
genocide as a crime. In one way it may do that, and if so, in one way, not necessarily a bad thing. T he use of
superlatives—‘world’s gravest crime’ and hyperbole—‘crime of crimes’—when attached to tragedy brings public
attention, sometimes at a cost to other tragedies able to attract less attention despite being as serious.” See the summary
judgement of the Uyghur T ribunal at https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Uyghur-Tribunal-
Summary-Judgment-9th-Dec-21.pdf.
41 Written by CRS Specialist in Asian Affairs Susan V. Lawrence.
42 Manya Koetse, “Full T ranslation of Peng Shuai’s Weibo Post and T imeline of Events,” What’s On Weibo, December
20, 2021, at https://www.whatsonweibo.com/full-translation-of-peng-shuais-weibo-post -and-timeline-of-events/.
43 “张高丽强调：努力举办一届精彩非凡卓越的奥运盛会” (“Zhang Gaoli Emphasizes: Strive to Hold a Splendid,
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Peng’s statement disappeared minutes after she posted it, with most commentators attributing its
disappearance to China’s internet censors. Those searching for Peng’s name on the Chinese
internet found their searches blocked.44 Peng herself went silent. Twelve days after Peng’s post,
on November 14, 2021, the Chairman and CEO of the Women’s Tennis Association (WTA),
Steve Simon issued a statement declaring, “Peng Shuai, and al women, deserve to be heard, not
censored.”45 Three days later, a Chinese state media outlet claimed to have obtained the English
translation of an email from Peng to Simon, which it posted on Twitter.46 Simon demanded
“independent and verifiable proof that [Peng] is safe,” saying he had “repeatedly tried to reach
her via numerous forms of communication, to no avail.”47 Some of the biggest names in women’s
tennis followed up with expressions of concern for Peng’s wel being.48
State media journalists next posted photos and a video of Peng purporting to show her safe.49 The
propaganda campaign appeared to heighten concerns about Peng’s safety among her peers and
others outside China. On December 1, 2021, Simon announced that the WTA was suspending al
tournaments in China, including Hong Kong, citing “serious doubts that [Peng] is free, safe and
not subject to censorship, coercion and intimidation.” Simon added that he was “greatly
concerned about the risks that al of our players and staff could face if we were to hold events in
China in 2022.”50
The IOC took a different tack. It held video cal s with Peng on November 21 and December 1,
2021, reporting after the first cal that Peng “explained that she is safe and wel , living at her
home in Beijing, but would like to have her privacy respected at this time.”51 The IOC said it was
relying on “quiet diplomacy” and addressing concerns “directly with Chinese sports
organisations.”52 H.Res. 837, passed unanimously on December 8, 2021, by a vote of 428-0, was

Exceptional, and Extraordinary Olympics”), Xinhua, October 10, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2017-10/
10/c_1121782300.htm.
44 Manya Koetse, “Full T ranslation of Peng Shuai’s Weibo Post and T imeline of Events,” What’s On Weibo, December
20, 2021, at https://www.whatsonweibo.com/full-translation-of-peng-shuais-weibo-post -and-timeline-of-events/.
45 World T ennis Association, “WT A Seeks Full, Fair and T ransparent Investigation into Sexual Assault Allegations
Against Former Chinese Leader,” November 14, 2021, at https://www.wtatennis.com/news/2350641/wta-seeks-full-
fair-and-transparent-investigation-into-sexual-assault -allegations-against-former-chinese-leader.
46 For a screenshot of the since deleted tweet, see Manya Koetse, “Full T ranslation of Peng Shuai’s Weibo Post and
T imeline of Events,” What’s On Weibo, December 20, 2021, at https://www.whatsonweibo.com/full-translation-of-
peng-shuais-weibo-post -and-timeline-of-events/.
47 Women’s T ennis Association, “Statement by Steve Simon, WT A Chairman & CEO,” November 17, 2021, at
https://www.wtatennis.com/news/2356029/statement-by-steve-simon-wta-chairman-ceo.
48 See, for example, tweet by Naomi Osaka (@naomiosaka), November 16, 2021, https://twitter.com/naomiosaka/
status/1460723353174433793 and T weet by Serena Williams (@serenawilliams), November 18, 2021,
https://twitter.com/serenawilliams/status/1461408866697105413.
49 See tweet by Shen Shiwei (@shen_shiwei), November 19, 2021, https://mobile.twitter.com/shen_shiwei/status/
1461715435385020419 and T weet by Hu Xijin (@HuXijin_GT ), November 19, 2021, https://mobile.twitter.com/
huxijin_gt/status/1461728848651845632. See also, Matthew Futterman and Christopher Clarey, “ Videos Said to Be of
Peng Shuai Don’t Resolve Questions About Her Safety,” New York Times, November 22, 2021.
50 T weet by the Women’s T ennis Association, December 1, 2021, https://twitter.com/WTA/status/
1466123626701275140; Women’s T ennis Association, “ Steve Simon Announces WT A’s Decision to Suspend
T ournaments in China,” December 3, 2021. See also Leta Hong Fincher, “ Why Peng Shuai Has China’s Leaders
Spooked,” New York Times, December 2, 2021.
51 International Olympic Committee, “International Olympic Committee, IOC President and IOC Athletes’
Commission Chair Hold Video Call with Peng Shuai,” November 21, 2021, at https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-
president -and-ioc-athletes-commission-chair-hold-video-call-with-peng-shuai.
52 International Olympic Committee, “IOC Statement on the Situation of Peng Shuai,” December 2, 2021, at
https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-statement -on-the-situation-of-peng-shuai.
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strongly critical of the IOC’s role in the affair. Among other concerns, the resolution expressed
the sense of the House that, “by acquiescing to the Chinese Communist Party’s narrative, the IOC
failed to adhere to its own human rights commitments and protect the safety and free speech of
Olympic athletes.” The resolution also asserted that, “the IOC’s conduct has undermined the
efforts by the United States Government, human rights organizations, the Women’s Tennis
Association, and other international bodies and individuals to secure Peng’s safety.”
On December 19, 2021, in an apparently impromptu video interview with Singapore’s Lianhe
Zaobao on the sidelines of a skiing competition in Shanghai, Peng stated that she had always
been “very free.” Addressing her social media post, she said, “I have never said or written about
anyone sexual y assaulting me. That’s a very important point.” She said the social media post,
initial y shared with her nearly 600,000 followers on China’s Weibo Internet platform, was “my
private matter.”53
The Human Rights Legacy of the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics54
Ahead of the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympic Games, statements by PRC and IOC officials raised
the prospect that the Games might lead to improvements in human rights in China.55 By the time
the 2008 Games opened, however, nongovernmental human rights organizations outside China
general y contended that China’s hosting the Olympics had not led to overal improvements in
human rights conditions in China, and may have contributed to PRC government human rights
abuses in some areas.56 PRC authorities reportedly cracked down on China’s civil society sector
ahead of the Games and subjected human rights activists to detention, home confinement, and/or
surveil ance in order to stifle criticism of the country’s human rights record and prevent protests
during the Games.57 Rights advocates also criticized human rights problems associated with the
preparation for the Games in Beijing, including widespread evictions of and land seizures from
Beijing residents and the forced removal from the city of migrant workers and others.58 Amnesty
International reported:
Notwithstanding some important legislative and institutional reforms ... on balance the
Chinese authorities have so far failed to fulfil their own commitments to improve human
rights. In fact, the authorities have used the Olympic Games as pretext to continue, and in
some respects, intensify existing policies and practices which have led to s erious and
widespread violations of human rights.59
According to one academic study, the 2008 Games strengthened and accelerated technological
development in China’s security apparatus and surveil ance systems, including internet
surveil ance and censorship systems. Some of these efforts reportedly benefitted from

53 “接受《联合早报》独家采访 彭帅：从未说过写过遭任何人性侵” (“Peng Shuai, in an Exclusive Interview with
Lianhe Zaobao: Never Said or Wrote About Anyone Sexually Assaulting”), Lianhe Zaobao, December 20, 2021, at
https://www.zaobao.com.sg/news/china/story20211220-1224718.
54 Written by CRS Specialist in Asian Affairs T homas Lum and CRS Analyst in Foreign Affairs Michael A. Weber.
55 For example, see “Journalists to Write Whatever They Like If Beijing Holds 2008 Games,” China Daily, July 12,
2001; Jere Longman, “OLYMPICS; Mixed Messages,” New York Times, July 12, 2001; Nick Mulvenney, “Interview—
Games a Force for Good but No Panacea—Rogge,” Reuters, August 6, 2007.
56 For example, see Human Rights Watch, “ China: Olympics Harm Key Human Rights,” August 6, 2008.
57 CECC, “T he Human T oll of the Olympics,” August 4, 2008.
58 Human Rights Watch, “ China: Olympics Harm Key Human Rights,” August 6, 2008; Human Rights Watch, “ China:
Crackdown Violates Olympic Promises,” February 6, 2008.
59 Amnesty International, “China: T he Olympics Countdown —Broken Promises,” July 29, 2008.
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collaboration with U.S. companies. In addition, Olympic venues were marked by “overt
militarization”—including the deployment of soldiers—and the involvement of hundreds of
thousands of “voluntary informants.” The study concluded that “post-9/11 Olympic security and
surveil ance have authoritarian effects.”60
International concern over China’s hosting of the 2008 Games focused in particular on two
issues. The first was conditions in Tibet following March 2008 unrest in the Tibetan capital,
Lhasa, and other Tibetan areas. The second was China’s relations with Sudan amidst al egations
of genocide in Darfur. Some analysts have argued that international pressure on the latter issue
led to a PRC shift in posture toward Sudan’s government.61 Some human rights groups criticized
the IOC and world leaders for, in their view, not using the Games as an opportunity to
meaningfully press China’s government to improve human rights within China.62 Some
congressional hearings and proposed legislation raised concerns over China’s human rights
practices in the context of the Games and/or sought to restrict U.S. government attendance at the
Games.63 President George W. Bush opted to attend the opening ceremonies in Beijing and
utilized a policy speech prior to his arrival at the Games to express “deep concerns” over human
rights in China.64
With regard to foreign media access, in 2006, the PRC government announced that it would
temporarily relax restrictions beginning in January 2007, and al ow international journalists to
report freely from China during the 2008 Games. The Foreign Correspondents Club of China
reported that although the temporary regulations improved overal reporting conditions for
foreign journalists, intimidation, harassment, and detention of foreign journalists by state security
agents occurred during the lead up to the Games.65 Furthermore, despite having lifted some media
restrictions, PRC authorities reportedly implemented “creative mechanisms” to control the flow
of information, including blocking interviews of Chinese dissidents.66 During March 2008 unrest
in Lhasa, Tibet, the government blocked most news about Tibet for most Chinese and restricted
foreign access to the region.67
Challenges Related to the COVID-19 Pandemic68
SARS-CoV2, the virus that causes COVID-19, was first identified in the central Chinese city of
Wuhan in late 2019.69 Chinese authorities brought the subsequent COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan

60 Minas Samatas, “Surveillance in Athens 2004 and Beijing 2008: A Comparison of the Olympic Surveillance
Modalities and Legacies in T wo Different Olympic Host Regimes,” Urban Studies, vol. 48: no. 15 (November 2011).
61 Elizabeth Economy and Adam Segal, “ China’s Olympic Nightmare: What the Games Mean for Beijing’s Future,”
Foreign Affairs, vol. 87, no. 4 (July–August 2008), pp. 47-56; Adrian Gallagher, “ T o Name and Shame or Not, and If
So, How? A Pragmatic Analysis of Naming and Shaming the Chinese Government over Mass Atrocity Crimes Against
the Uyghurs and Other Muslim Minorities in Xinjiang,” Journal of Global Security Studies, April 2021.
62 Human Rights Watch, “ China: Hosting Olympics a Catalyst for Human Rights Abuses,” August 22, 2008.
63 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, The Impact of the 2008 Olympic Games on Human Rights and the
Rule of Law in China, hearings, 110th Congress, 2nd sess., February 27, 2008; H.R. 5668 (110th Congress).
64 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Bush to Attend Opening Ceremony in Beijing,” New York Times, July 4, 2008; CNN, “Bush
Chides China over Human Rights,” August 7, 2008.
65 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2007, March 11, 2008.
66 Briar Smith, “Journalism and the Beijing Olympics: Liminality with Characteristics,” in Monroe E. Price and Daniel
Dayan, eds. Owning the Olym pics: Narratives of the New China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008 ).
67 Mark Sweney, “China Blocks Media Due to T ibet Unrest,” The Guardian, March 17, 2008.
68 Written by CRS Specialist in Asian Affairs Susan V. Lawrence and CRS Analyst in Asian Affairs Ricardo Barrios.
69 See CRS Report R46354, COVID-19 and China: A Chronology of Events (December 2019 -January 2020), by Susan
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and other parts of China under control in the spring of 2020. Since then, China has maintained a
“zero-COVID” approach to the virus, seeking to contain and stamp out even the smal est
outbreaks. China appears committed to retaining that approach, even as it prepares to welcome
athletes, team officials, and media from across the globe for the Olympics.
To implement its “zero-COVID” policy, China has so far relied on some of the world’s strictest
pandemic measures, including keeping China’s borders largely closed since March 2020;
imposing domestic travel restrictions, mandatory quarantines, contact tracing, mass testing, and
lock-downs of neighborhoods and even whole cities as soon as cases appear; and promoting
widespread vaccination and mask-wearing. On November 26, 2021, a little over two months
before the 2022 Games were to open, the World Health Organization identified the highly
transmissible Omicron variant of the virus as a “variant of concern.”70 Its spread appears to be
responsible for several outbreaks in China that have led Chinese authorities to impose some of the
largest-scale lockdowns of the pandemic, including in Xi’an, a city of 13 mil ion, which has been
under lockdown since December 22, 2021.71 Beijing reported its first Omicron variant case of the
pandemic on January 15, 2022.72
For the Olympics, the IOC, the IPC, and BOCOG have together published two “Beijing 2022
Playbooks,” presented as guides “to a safe and successful games.” As of mid-January 2022, each
Playbook had gone through two editions. One Playbook addresses athletes and team officials.73
The other addresses “Broadcasters, International Federations, Marketing Partners, Olympic and
Paralympic Family, Press, Workforce.”74 Measures related to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic
dominate both Playbooks. From the Playbook for athletes and team officials, COVID-19-related
measures include:
 A mandatory vaccination policy, with a requirement that individuals be fully
vaccinated at least 14 days prior to departure for China in order to avoid
quarantine on arrival. (The Playbook states that exceptions wil be considered
“on a case-by-case basis, based on medical reasons.”)
 For al participants who are not fully vaccinated, a mandatory 21-day quarantine
upon arrival in Beijing in “a dedicated facility.”
 “Closed-loop systems,” created “to ensure there is no contact with the general
public or anyone outside of the closed loop.” Games participants enter a loop on
dedicated Games transportation carrying them either from the airport, or, if not
fully vaccinated on arrival, from the dedicated facility where they wil have spent
their first 21 days in China in quarantine. Within the loop are the Olympic
vil ages, contracted hotels, training venues, competition venues, and “other

V. Lawrence.
70 World Health Organization, “Update on Omicron,” November 28, 2021, at https://www.who.int/news/item/28-11-
2021-update-on-omicron; Natasha Khan, Liyan Qi, and Keith Zhai, “ Omicron Puts China’s Zero-Covid Strategy to Its
T oughest T est ,” Wall Street Journal, January 12, 2021.
71 “China’s Xi'an Imposes Lockdown Amid COVID-19 Resurgence, Xinhua, December 23, 2021. Alexandra
Stevenson, “ China’s Latest Lockdown Shows Stubborn Resolve on Zero-Covid,” New York Times, January 6, 2021.
72 “Beijing Reports One New Locally-T ransmitted COVID-19 Case,” Xinhua, January 15, 2022.
73 IOC, IPC, and Beijing 2022, “T he Playbook: Athletes and T eam Officials,” Version 2, December 13, 2021, at
https://stillmed.olympics.com/media/Documents/Olympic-Games/Beijing-2022/Playbooks/T he-Playbook-Athletes-
and-T eam-Officials-December-2021.pdf.
74 IOC, IPC, and Beijing 2022, “T he Playbook: Broadcasters, International Federations, Marketing Partners, Olympic
and Paralympic Family, Press, Workforce,” Version 2, December 13, 2021, at https://stillmed.olympics.com/media/
Documents/Olympic-Games/Beijing-2022/Playbooks/T he-Playbook-RHBs-IFs-T OP-OF-PF-Press-Workforce-
December-2021.pdf.
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permitted destinations,” with participants moving among those places using
dedicated Games transportation. Participants are warned that, “The closed loop
system wil apply during your entire stay in China.”
 Warnings to participants to, “Only carry out the activities relevant for your role at
the Games, at places on the list of permitted destinations” and “Avoid shouting,
cheering and singing—show support or celebrate by clapping instead.”
 A requirement that participants download a BOCOG-developed smartphone
application, “MY2022” and report body temperature and “any other COVID-19
symptoms” on the app’s “Health Monitoring System” daily. (In a report released
on January 18, 2022, the Citizen Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs &
Public Policy at the University of Toronto al eged security flaws in the app. The
report identifies “a simple but devastating flaw” in the encryption intended to
protect audio and file transfers. It also flags risks from “data transmissions that
MY2022 fails to protect with any encryption.” The report suggests that the
al eged flaws might enable an attacker “to read a victim’s sensitive demographic,
passport, travel, and medical information sent in a customs health declaration or
to send malicious instructions to a victim after completing a form.” Citizen Lab
says it reported the al eged flaws to BOCOG but as of January 18, 2022, BOCOG
had not addressed them.75)
The Playbook for journalists and others who are not athletes and team officials includes the
measures listed above. It also notes:
 “Spectator tickets wil only be available to residents of Chinese mainland who
meet the conditions of COVID-19 control.” (On January 17, 2022, after the
appearance of the Omnicron variant of the SARS-CoV-2 virus in Beijing,
BOCOG announced an update to the spectator policy. It halted ticket sales and
said the organizers would “invite groups of spectators to be present on site during
the Games,” with the expectation that, “these spectators wil strictly abide by the
COVID-19 countermeasures before, during and after each event.”)76
 “Photographers are not permitted to access areas outside the closed loop of a
venue, including public areas and spectator stands.”
 “When leaving a venue, accredited press can only take dedicated Games
transport and travel only to places on the list of permitted destinations.”
 “Reporters must keep two metres from the athletes at al times.”
The U.S. Congress and the 2022 Games77
Members of the 117th Congress have expressed a strong interest in the Beijing 2022 Winter
Games. Some Members have introduced bil s and resolutions related to the Beijing 2022 Winter
Olympics, held and testified at hearings on the Games, written Olympics-related letters, and made
multiple public statements. Citing China’s poor human rights record, some Members have

75 Jeffrey Knockel, “Cross-Country Exposure: Analysis of the MY2022 Olympics App,” T he Citizen Lab, Munk
School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of T oronto, January 18, 2022, https://citizenlab.ca/2022/01/cross-
country-exposure-analysis-my2022-olympics-app/.
76 Beijing 2022, “Beijing 2022 Spectator Policy Finalized,” January 17, 2022, https://www.beijing2022.cn/wog.htm?
cmsid=20220117006291.
77 Written by CRS Specialist in Asian Affairs Susan V. Lawrence.
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proposed diplomatic or full boycotts of the Beijing Games, and/or for the Games to be moved out
of China, and have scrutinized the roles of U.S. firms serving as corporate sponsors for the
Games. Some Members have also raised concerns about freedom of speech and the safety of U.S.
athletes at the Games, given China’s authoritarian political environment. Those stances are
discussed below. For a table of legislation in the 117th Congress related to the Beijing 2022
Winter Olympics, see Appendix A.
Congressional Calls for Diplomatic and Full Boycotts
On May 10, 2021, nearly seven months before the Biden Administration’s December 6, 2021,
announcement that it would not send diplomatic or official representation to the Beijing Winter
Olympics, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations reported comprehensive China-related
legislation that would include support for a “diplomatic boycott” of the Games. The Senate
subsequently incorporated the language of those Olympics-related provisions of the Strategic
Competition Act of 2021 (S. 1169) into a second comprehensive China-related bil , the United
States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021 (USICA) (S. 1260), which passed the Senate on
June 8, 2021, by a vote of 68-32. Section 3312 of USICA would:
 state that it shal be the policy of the United States “to implement a diplomatic
boycott” of the 2022 Winter Games and “to cal for an end to the Chinese
Communist Party’s ongoing human rights abuses, including the Uyghur
genocide”; and
 bar the Secretary of State from obligating or expending federal funds “to support
or facilitate” any U.S. government employee’s attendance at the Games, with
exceptions. The exceptions include expenditures “to provide consular services or
security to, or otherwise protect the health, safety, and welfare of, United States
persons, employees, contractors, and their families.”
As reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 15, 2021, a third comprehensive
China-related bil , Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement (EAGLE) Act (H.R.
3524), would state that it shal be the policy of the United States:
 “to implement a presidential and cabinet level diplomatic boycott” of the 2022
Winter Games;
 “to encourage other nations, especial y democratic partners and al ies, to do the
same”; and
 “to cal for an end to the Chinese Communist party’s ongoing human rights
abuses, including the Uyghur genocide.”
Other legislation related to representation includes:
 H.Con.Res. 16 (introduced on February 11, 2021) which would cal on the
United States Olympic and Paralympic Committee “to support human rights and
boycott the 2022 Winter Olympics if held in the People’s Republic of China”;
 H.Res. 129 (introduced on February 15, 2021) which would urge that “the United
States Olympic Committee and the Olympic Committees of other countries
should withdraw from the 2022 Winter Olympic Games” if held in China; and
 H.Res. 812 (introduced on November 18, 2021), which would support “a
diplomatic boycott of the 25th Olympic Winter Games and 25th Paralympic
Winter Games in Beijing,” and encourage “the International Olympic Committee
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to develop a framework for reprimanding or disqualifying host countries that are
committing mass atrocities.”
In testimony before a May 18, 2021, hearing of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission and
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) titled “China, Genocide and the
Olympics,” House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, too, backed “a diplomatic boycott.” The Speaker
described U.S. athletes as “sources of such pride” before stating, “Let’s honor them at home.
Let’s not honor the Chinese government by having heads of state go to China to show their
support for their athletes.” Having heads of state attend, Pelosi asserted, would “beg[] the
question: What moral authority do you have to speak again about human rights any place in the
world if you're wil ing to pay your respects to the Chinese government as they commit
genocide?”78
Congressional Calls to Move the Olympics Out of China
More than a year before the Beijing 2022 Games were scheduled to open, some Members of the
117th Congress began introducing legislation to urge that the Games be moved out of China.
Those items of legislation include:
 S.Res. 13 (introduced on January 22, 2021) and H.Con.Res. 16, H.Res. 160, and
H.Res. 162 (al introduced in February 2021), which would urge the IOC to rebid
the 2022 Games to “a country that recognizes and respects human rights;”
 H.Res. 129 (introduced on February 15, 2021), which would urge the U.S.
Olympic Committee to “propose the transfer of the 2022 Winter Olympic Games
to a site other than within the People’s Republic of China”;
 S.Res. 126 (introduced on March 18, 2021), which would urge the IOC “to
consider relocating the 2022 Winter Olympics from Beijing to another suitable
host city located outside of China, on account of the flagrant violations of human
rights committed by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the
Chinese Communist Party in mainland China, Hong Kong, the Tibet Autonomous
Region and other Tibetan areas, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and elsewhere”; and
 The EAGLE Act (as reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July
15, 2021) and H.Res. 466 (introduced on June 8, 2021) which would cal on the
IOC to “initiate an emergency search process for suitable replacement facilities
for the 2022 Winter Olympics if the Government of the PRC fails to release al
arbitrarily held Uyghurs from mass detention centers and prisons.”
Congressional Scrutiny of Beijing 2022 Corporate Sponsors
The Beijing Winter Olympics Sponsor Accountability Act (H.R. 3645), introduced on May 28,
2021, would bar executive agencies from contracting for the procurement of goods or services
with any person that has business operations with the Beijing Organising Committee for the 2022
Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games or the International Olympic Committee.

78 Statement of Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House, before the T om Lantos Human Rights Commission and
Congressional-Executive Commission on China hearing on China, Genocide and the Olympics, May 18, 2021, at
https://humanrightscommission.house.gov/sites/humanrightscommission.house.gov/files/documents/
Statement_ChinaOlympics_Pelosi.pdf.
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In July 2021, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) convened a hearing on
“Corporate Sponsorship of the 2022 Beijing Olympics,” cal ing as witnesses representatives of
U.S.-based companies that sponsor the Olympics through The Olympic Partner (TOP)
Programme of the IOC. (For a full list of TOP Programme sponsors, see Appendix C.)
Statements at the hearing included the following.
 Senator Jeff Merkley, CECC’s chair, suggested that the hearing was “not meant to attack
or embarrass individual U.S. companies but rather to explore how key Olympic
movement stakeholders, corporate stakeholders, can use their influence to ensure the
Olympics live up to its values.”79
 Addressing the corporate witnesses, Rep. James P. McGovern, CECC’s co-chair, stated,
“We hope you agree that your company’s reputational risk ... is not worth the association
with an Olympics held in the midst of a genocide.”80
 Representative Chris Smith, a CECC commissioner, referred to corporate sponsors of the
Games as “in effect those who underwrite, and help legitimize the ‘Genocide
Olympics.’”81
Senator Merkeley and Representatives McGovern and Smith followed up in January 2022 with a
letter to the IOC raising concerns about possible forced labor in the supply chains of two BOCOG
corporate sponsors that reportedly continue to source cotton from Xinjiang.82 (See “Boosting
Chinese Brands” below.)
On January 13, 2022, 25 members of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce wrote to
corporations participating in the IOC’s TOP Programme, asking each “how you wil use your
creative and financial investments in the games to shed light on what media coverage and
commercials wil likely not showcase—China’s history of human rights abuses and calculated
deception.” Among the questions committee Members posed in each letter were, “Are you
concerned that your investment and business in China has not resulted in China becoming a force
for good in the international community, but instead has given the [Chinese Communist Party]
legitimacy even as it engages in horrific human rights abuses and threatens democracies like
Taiwan and Hong Kong?”83

79 Statement of Senator Jeff Merkley at Congressional-Executive Commission on China hearing on Corporate
Sponsorship of the 2022 Beijing Olympics,” July 27, 2021, at https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/
files/documents/Chairman%20Merkley%20Opening%20Statement%20-
%20CECC%20Olympic%20Sponsors%20Hearing.pdf .
80 Statement of Rep. James P. McGovern at Congressional-Executive Commission on China hearing on Corporate
Sponsorship of the 2022 Beijing Olympics,” July 27, 2021 , at https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/
files/documents/JPM%20opening%20statement —Corporate%20Sponsorship%20Hearing.pdf.
81 “Corporate Sponsorship of the 2022 Beijing Olympics,” excerpts of remarks by Rep. Chris Smith (R-NJ), at
Congressional-Executive Commission on China hearing on Corporate Sponsorship of the 2022 Beijing Olympics,” July
27, 2021, at https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/Rep%20Smith%20remarks%20-
%20Coporate%20Sponsorship%20of%202022%20Beijing%20Olympics.pdf .
82 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “ Chairs Ask IOC President to Justify Contracts with Chinese
Companies Using Forced Labor,” January 12, 2022, https://www.cecc.gov/media-center/press-releases/chairs-ask-ioc-
president -to-justify-contracts-with-chinese-companies.
83 E&C Republicans, “ Leader Rodgers Calls on Companies Sponsoring the Beijing Olympics to Stand up Against
China’s Human Rights Abuses,” January 13, 2022, at https://republicans-energycommerce.house.gov/news/leader-
rodgers-calls-on-companies-sponsoring-the-beijing-olympics-to-stand-up-against -chinas-human-rights-abuses/.
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Congressional Concerns Related to the Personal Security and
Freedom of Expression of U.S. Athletes at the Games
Legislation related to freedom of expression in the context of the Games include:
 The EAGLE Act and H.Res. 466, which would cal on the IOC to “propose a set
of clear, executable actions to be taken by the International Olympic Committee
upon infringement of freedom of expression by a host country’s government
during any Olympics”;
 The EAGLE Act, which would cal on the IOC to “rescind Rule 50 of the
Olympic Charter, which restricts the freedom of expression by athletes when
competing during Olympics events, and affirm the rights of athletes to political
and other speech during athletic competitions, including speech that is critical of
their host countries” (see “Rule 50.2 of the Olympic Charter” below);
 The American Values and Security in International Athletics Act (H.R. 1211),
reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on February 25, 2021,
which would express the sense of Congress “that individuals representing the
United States at international athletic competitions in foreign countries should
have the opportunity to be informed about human rights and security concerns in
such countries and how best to safeguard their personal security and privacy,”
and would require the Secretary of State to devise and implement a strategy for
disseminating such information to U.S. athletes; and
 H.Res. 837, which passed the House on December 8, 2021, by a unanimous vote
of 428-0, and states, among other things, that it is the sense of the House that
IOC’s role in “legitimizing” PRC claims about the safety of PRC tennis star Peng
Shuai, “raise[s] questions about the organization’s ability and wil ingness to
protect the rights of athletes participating in the 2022 Olympic and Paralympic
games in Beijing.”
Some Members have raised concerns about China’s efforts to promote use of a new digital
currency, the Digital Currency Electronic Payment, or “digital yuan,” urging the U.S. Olympic
and Paralympic Committee to bar U.S. athletes from acquiring or using digital yuan during the
Beijing 2022 Games because of fears that it could be used for surveil ance purposes.84 In response
to an inquiry from the Wall Street Journal, a BOCOG representative stated in January 2022 that,
“Athletes and other stakeholders of the Games wil not be required to download or use China’s
digital currency (digital yuan) during Games time.”85
In a January 13, 2022, letter to the CEO of the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee, Senator
Rick Scott raised concern about BOCOG’s COVID-19 testing protocols and China’s “draconian

84 Office of Senator Marsha Blackburn, “ Blackburn, Wicker, Lummis Urge U.S. Olympic Committee to Prohibit
Athletes from Using the Digital Yuan,” July 19, 2021, at https://www.blackburn.senate.gov/2021/7/blackburn-wicker-
lummis-urge-us-olympic-committee-to-prohibit -athletes-from-using-the-digital-yuan; Office of Rep. Lance Gooden,
“Gooden Calls on U.S. Olympic Committee to Prohibit Athletes from Using Chinese Digital Currency,” December 16,
2021, at https://gooden.house.gov/press-releases?ID=836316B8-1BF4-41F8-A518-7244C73AC68D; Office of Senator
Marco Rubio, “ Rubio to President: Protect U.S. Olympic Athletes from Chinese Cybersecurity T hreats,” January 12,
2022, at https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?id=E4075190-0D23-42BB-86EF-
47A882151588.
85 Rachel Bachman and Louise Radnofsky, “ T eam USA Advises Athletes Heading to Beijing Olympics to Leave T heir
Phones at Home,” Wall Street Journal, January 14, 2022.
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technological surveil ance,” asserting that the Communist Party of China “has a track record of
stealing American citizens’ biological and personal information.”86 (For discussion of security
concerns related to BOCOG’s MY2022 smartphone app, see “Chal enges Related to the COVID-
19 Pandemic” below.)
U.S. and International Stances on Official
Representation at the Games87
The Biden Administration’s Decision
At a December 6, 2021, press briefing, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki told reporters that
the Biden Administration “wil not send any diplomatic or official representation to the Beijing
2022 Winter Olympics and Paralympic Games given the PRC’s ongoing genocide and crimes
against humanity in Xinjiang and other human rights abuses.”88 (See textbox for the full text of
Psaki’s announcement.) Psaki pushed back at a reporter’s characterization of the U.S. move as a
“diplomatic boycott,” however, saying that that term “brings people back to 1980,” when the
United States barred its athletes from competing at the Summer Olympic Games in Moscow. (For
discussion of the U.S. boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, see Appendix D.) For the 2022
Winter Games, Psaki said, the Administration decided that “U.S. athletes—people who have been
training, giving up a lot of blood, sweat, and tears preparing for these Olympics—should be able
to go and compete.” She added that the Administration would “look forward to cheering for them
from home.” Psaki said that the Biden Administration had informed al ies of the U.S. decision
and would “leave it to them to make their own decisions” about whether to follow suit.89
Text of White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki’s Announcement Related to U.S.
Participation in the Beijing 2022 Winter Games (December 6, 2021)90

“The Biden administration wil not send any diplomatic or official representation to the Beijing 2022 Winter
Olympics and Paralympic Games given the PRC’s ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang and
other human rights abuses.
“The athletes on Team USA have our ful support. We wil be behind them 100 percent as we cheer them on
from home. We wil not be contributing to the fanfare of the Games.

86 Office of Senator Rick Scott, “Sen. Rick Scott Demands Answers from T eam USA on Protecting American Athletes
at the 2022 Beijing Olympics,” January 13, 2022, at https://www.rickscott.senate.gov/2022/1/sen-rick-scott-demands-
answers-from-team-usa-on-protecting-american-athletes-at-the-2022-beijing-olympics.
87 Written by CRS Specialist in Asian Affairs Susan V. Lawrence and CRS Analyst in Asian Affairs Ricardo Barrios.
88 T he White House, “ Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki, December 6, 2021 ,” December 6, 2021, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/12/06/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-
december-6-2021/. Earlier in the Biden Administration, White House Press Secretary Psaki had appeared to reject the
idea. In April 2021, she stated, “ We have not discussed and are not discussing any joint boycott with allies and
partners.” See T he White House, “ Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and Secretary of Commerce Gina
Raimondo, April 7, 2021,” press briefing, April 7, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/
2021/04/07/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-and-secretary-of-commerce-gina-raimondo-april-7-2021/.
89 T he White House, “ Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki, December 6, 2021 ,” December 6, 2021, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/12/06/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-
december-6-2021/.
90 Ibid.
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“U.S. diplomatic or official representation would treat these Games as business as usual in the face of the PRC’s
egregious human rights abuses and atrocities in Xinjiang. And we simply can’t do that.
“As the President has told President Xi, standing up for human rights is in the DNA of Americans. We have a
fundamental commitment to promoting human rights. And we feel strongly in our position, and we wil continue
to take actions to advance human rights in China and beyond.”
The same day, State Department Spokesperson Ned Price clarified that the United States stil
intended “to provide consular and Diplomatic Security services to ensure that our athletes,
coaches, trainers, staff associated with the U.S. Olympic team, that they are secure, that they have
access to American citizen services.” He insisted that “this is a separate matter from official
diplomatic representation at the Games.”91 On January 19, 2022, the South China Morning Post
reported that China had approved visas for a U.S. delegation of 46, predominantly from the U.S.
Department of State. The paper quoted the U.S. Embassy in Beijing as stating that the visa
applications were for “consular and diplomatic security personnel” and that, “those personnel do
not constitute official or diplomatic representation at the Games.92
Days after the White House announcement that it would be withholding official representation
from the Games, Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo said the Biden Administration would
not be pressuring corporations over their Games sponsorships. “What individual companies do is
entirely up to them. We’re not going to pressure them one way or another,” Raimondo told
Bloomberg News. She added, “So if a company decides—as many companies have—that they
want to make a statement against human rights abuses, then that would be great. But we’re not
going to be pushing anyone to make that decision.”93
China’s Reaction to the Biden Administration Decision
Immediately following the U.S. announcement that it would forego diplomatic and official
representation at the Games, a spokesperson for China’s Foreign Ministry, Zhao Lijian,
characterized the decision as an attempt “to interfere with the Beijing Winter Olympics” and
predicted that it would cause the United States “greater loss of moral authority and credibility.”
He also accused the United States of “fabricating the biggest lie of the century about so-cal ed
‘genocide’ in Xinjiang.” Zhao said that China had “lodged stern representations” with the U.S.
government. He also said China would respond with unspecified “firm countermeasures” and
warned that the U.S. position could “affect bilateral dialogue and cooperation in important areas
and international and regional issues.”94
As some U.S. al ies indicated that they, too, would withhold official representation from the
Games, a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson responded by stating, “political manipulation with

91 U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing—December 6, 2021,” December 6, 2021, at
https://www.state.gov/briefings/department -press-briefing-december-6-2021/.
92 Catherine Wong, “Exclusive: China ‘Will Issue Visas’ for US Olympic Delegation Despite Diplomatic Boycott,”
South China Morning Post, January 19, 2022.
93 Jenny Leonard, “U.S. Won’t Push Companies to Pull Out of Olympics, Raimondo Says,” Bloomberg, December 9,
2021.
94 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “ Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press Conference on
December 7, 2021,” December 7, 2021, at https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/
2511_665403/202112/t20211207_10463627.html.
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the Olympic Games by the U.S., Australia, the U.K. and Canada wins no support and isolates the
countries themselves. They wil pay a price for their erroneous moves.”95
In a December 30, 2021, interview with Chinese state media, PRC State Councilor and Foreign
Minister Wang Yi criticized, “The politicization of the Olympics by certain countries,” saying it
“completely violates and discredits the Olympic spirit.” Wang also asserted, however, that the
stances of the United States and other countries “wil do no harm to a splendid Olympic
Games.”96
The IOC’s Stance
In a December 6, 2021, statement responding to the Biden Administration’s announcement, the
IOC stated, “The presence of government officials and diplomats is a purely political decision for
each government, which the IOC in its political neutrality fully respects.” The IOC indicated that
it interpreted the Administration’s announcement, which included support for the participation of
U.S. athletes in the Games, as “mak[ing] clear that the Olympic Games and the participation of
the athletes are beyond politics,” a stance the IOC said it welcomed.97
The U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee’s Stance
Following the Biden Administration’s announcement, Sarah Hirshland, CEO of the United States
Olympic and Paralympic Committee (USOPC) issued a statement saying, “We greatly appreciate
the unwavering support of the President and his administration and we know they wil be
cheering us on from home this winter. Competing on behalf of the United States is an honor and a
privilege, and Team USA is excited and ready to make the nation proud.”98
In congressional testimony in May 2021, Hirshland stated that Members of Congress who had
cal ed for an athletic boycott of the Beijing 2022 Games were “understandably concerned about
the conduct of the Chinese, including the oppression of the Uyghur population, which the United
States has designated a genocide.” Hirshland stated her opposition to an athletic boycott of the
Games, however, citing lessons from the U.S. boycott of the Moscow 1980 Olympics. She noted
that 461 U.S. athletes who qualified to compete in Moscow that year were barred from doing so.
“Many never had another chance to be part of Team USA and to compete at an Olympic Games,”
Hirshland lamented. She argued that “their sacrifice did not even achieve the government’s policy
goals” because “the Soviet Union stayed in Afghanistan for nearly another decade.”99 (For
discussion of the U.S. boycott of the Moscow 1980 Games, see Appendix D.)

95 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “ Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference
on December 9, 2021,” December 9, 2021, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/
2511_665403/202112/t20211209_10465086.html.
96 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “ State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi Gives Interview to Xinhua
News Agency and China Media Group on International Situation and China’s Diplomacy in 2021 ,” December 30,
2021, at https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202112/t20211230_10477324.html.
97 International Olympic Committee, “IOC Statement on T oday’s Announcement by the U.S. Government,” December
6, 2021, at https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-statement-on-today-s-announcement-by-the-us-government.
98 “Reactions to U.S. Govt Officials’ Boycott of Beijing Olympics,” Reuters, December 6, 2021.
99 Statement of Sarah Hirshland, Chief Executive Officer, United States Olympic and Paralympic Committee, before
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China and T om Lantos Human Rights Commission joint hearing, “ China,
Genocide and the Olympics,” May 18, 2021, https://chrissmith.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
usopc_statement_for_the_record_-_cecc_and_tlhrc_joint_hearing_5_18_21_.pdf.
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In an acknowledgement of risks to athletes’ personal information associated with participation in
the Beijing 2022 Games, the USOPC reportedly issued an advisory document in September 2021
and a technical bulletin in December 2021 related to use of electronic devices in China. The
bulletin warned, “every device, communication, transaction and online activity may be
monitored. Your device(s) may also be compromised with malicious software, which could
negatively impact future use.” USOPC advised athletes to use temporary (also known as
“burner”) phones while in China. Canada, the Netherlands, and the UK have reportedly issued
similar advice to their athletes.100
Select International Stances
The Biden Administration has not publicly cal ed on other countries to join the United States in
withholding official representation from the Beijing Winter Games. On December 6, 2021, State
Department Spokesperson Ned Price stated, “When it comes to representation at the Games, this
is a sovereign decision that each country needs to make.”101
Eleven countries other than the United States have so far indicated that they wil not send official
representatives to the Games:
 Several countries attributed their decisions primarily to reasons other than human
rights (Belgium, Estonia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and North Korea) or did
not offer a reason (Lithuania). While not attributing their decisions to human
rights, the Netherlands and New Zealand both mentioned human rights in their
statements.
 Canada is the sole country to refer to its action as a “diplomatic boycott.” British
Prime Minister Boris Johnson referred to the U.K.’s action as “effectively a
diplomatic boycott.”
 China’s al y North Korea is the sole country to state that it wil send neither
officials nor athletes to Beijing. North Korea said it took its action “due to the
manoeuvers of hostile forces and the world pandemic,” and offered praise for
China’s policies.102
 The decisions of New Zealand and Lithuania preceded the announcement of the
U.S. decision.
 Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom are members of the
“Five Eyes” (FVEY) intel igence sharing grouping that also includes the United
States.
 Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania, and the Netherlands are among the 30
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of which the United
States and Canada are also members. The five are also members of the 27-
member European Union.
 Japan is one of the United States’ five treaty al ies in Asia.

100 Rachel Bachman and Louise Radnofsky, “ T eam USA Advises Athletes Heading to Beijing Olympics to Leave T heir
Phones at Home,” Wall Street Journal, January 14, 2022.
101 U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing—December 6, 2021,” December 6, 2021, at
https://www.state.gov/briefings/department -press-briefing-december-6-2021/.
102 “DPRK Olympic Committee, Ministry of Physical Culture and Sports Send Letter to Chinese Counterparts, Beijing
Winter Olympics Organizing Committee,” KCNA via Pyongyang Times, January 8, 20212, at
http://www.pyongyangtimes.com.kp/?bbs=40182.
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Details of all eleven countries’ statements are provided in Table 1 below. Countries are listed in
the order in which they made their decisions public.
Table 1. Countries Withholding Official Representation from the Beijing 2022
Games
Listed in the order in which they publicly announced their positions
Announce-
Country
ment date
Details
Lithuania
12/2/2021
Fol owing cal s from Lithuanian Members of Parliament for Lithuania to boycott
the Games over human rights concerns, the Baltic News Service reported that
senior officials of the Lithuania’s Education, Science and Sport Ministry,
including the minister, would not travel to Beijing for the Winter Games,
although athletes would compete.103 The same day, Lithuanian Radio and
Television cited representatives of Lithuania’s President and Foreign Minister,
as saying that neither man would attend the Olympics.104 The news came as
Lithuania, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), was
in the midst of a diplomatic and economic standoff with China over Lithuania’s
decision to al ow Taiwan to open a “Taiwanese Representative Office” in its
capital, Vilnius.
New Zealand
12/6/2021
New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister Grant Robertson stated that even before
the U.S. announcement, his country had decided “that we won’t be
represented at a ministerial level” at the Beijing 2022 Winter Games and had
communicated that information to Beijing in October 2021. Robertson said the
decision was “mostly to do with COVID and the fact the logistics of travel
around Covid are not conducive to that kind of trip,” adding, “but we’ve made
clear to China on numerous occasions our concerns about human rights
issues.” A New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade spokesperson
elaborated, stating, “We often don't attend Winter Games at ministerial level,
and especial y in light of the global Covid situation, there are no plans to do so
on this occasion.” The spokesperson noted, “The New Zealand Olympic
Committee has sought accreditation for a smal number of Embassy staff,
including the Ambassador, to provide consular support to the team, should it
be needed, as is standard practice for this kind of event.”105
Australia
12/7/2021
Noting “human rights abuses in Xinjiang and the many other issues that
Australia has consistently raised” with China and the Chinese government’s
unwil ingness to discuss them, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison stated,
“It wil come as no surprise that the Australian government wil not be sending
any official representatives to the forthcoming Winter Games in China.”
Morrison said Australian athletes would compete, noting, “Australia’s a great
sporting nation and I very much separate the issues of sport and these other
political issues.”106

103 Baltic News Service, “ Lithuanian Athletes to Go to Beijing Olympics Despite Boycott Calls—Minister,” LRT ,
December 2, 2021, at https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1555433/lithuanian-athletes-to-go-to-beijing-olympics-
despite-boycott -calls-minister.
104 Rokas Suslavičius, “Iš Seimo atskriejęs boikoto siūlymas įaudrino žiemos sportininkus: tai yra tiesiog beprotystė,”
LRT , December 2, 2021, at https://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/sportas/10/1553732/is-seimo-atskriejes-boikoto-siulymas-
iaudrino-ziemos-sportininkus-tai-yra-tiesiog-beprotyste.
105 T homas Coughlan, “Louisa Wall and Simon O’Connor Call on Government to Boycott Games,” New Zealand
Herald, December 7, 2021; T homas Manch, “ Matthew Brockett, “ New Zealand Diplomats Won’t Attend Winter
Olympics in China,” Bloomberg, December 6, 2021.
106 Prime Minister of Australia, “Press Conference Penshurst, NSW,” December 8, 2021, at https://www.pm.gov.au/
media/press-conference-penshurst -nsw; “ Australia Will Not Send Officials to Beijing Winter Olympics,” 9 News
Australia, December 7, 2021, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nclD5CjcZRg.
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Announce-
Country
ment date
Details
United Kingdom
12/8/2021
Responding to questions from Members of Parliament concerned about
China’s human rights record, U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced,
“There wil be effectively a diplomatic boycott of the winter Olympics in
Beijing. No Ministers are expected to attend, and no officials.” With regard to
athletes’ participation, Johnson stated, “I do not think that sporting boycotts
are sensible, and that remains the policy of the Government.”107
Canada
12/8/2021
Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau cited “the repeated human rights
violations by the Chinese government” in announcing that Canada “wil not be
sending any diplomatic representation to the Beijing Olympic and Paralympic
Games this winter.” He said, “A diplomatic boycott doesn’t amount to a ful
boycott and Canadian athletes wil stil represent Canada at the 24th Olympic
Winter Games.”108 Trudeau added that athletes “wil continue to have al of
our ful est support.”109
Estonia
12/12/2021
On December 12, 2021, Estonian President Alar Karis announced that he
would not attend the Winter Olympics in Beijing, citing “political factors.”110 A
month later, on January 17, 2022, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Kristina Ots
told Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR), “[t]he Ministry of Foreign Affairs does
not know of any Estonian government members planning to participate in the
Beijing Olympics.” Government Spokesperson Sten Otsmaa confirmed to the
broadcaster that neither Prime Minister Kaja Kal as nor any government
members were planning to attend the Games. 111
Belgium
12/14/2021
In response to questions from a Member of Belgium’s Chamber of
Representatives, Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo stated, “the
federal government does not intend to send representation of any sort to the
Winter Olympic Games in Beijing.” A spokesperson subsequently clarified,
“Belgium regardless did not intend to send representation to China for two
simple reasons: firstly, no delegation has ever been dispatched to the Winter
Olympic Games, because typical y only a few athletes participate. Secondly, the
health situation does not permit it. No representation was sent to Tokyo this
past summer for the same reasons.” 112

107 U.K. Parliament, “Engagements Volume 705: Debated on Wednesday 8 December 2021,” Hansard, December 8,
2021, at https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2021-12-08/debates/45C3B261-14F7-4DDC-A7D8-EB8A76097CFB/
Engagements.
108 Stephen Maher, “Canada Won’t Send Diplomats to the Beijin g Olympics,” Maclean’s, December 9, 2021.
109 John Paul T asker, “T rudeau Announces Diplomatic Boycott of Beijing Olympics,” CBC News, December 8, 2021.
110 “President Alar Karis poliitilistel põhjustel P ekingi olümpiamängudele ei lähe” (“President Alar Karis Will Not Go
to the Beijing Olympics for Political Reasons”), Postimees, December 12, 2021.
111 “Estonian politicians to join Beijing Olympics boycott,” Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR), January 17, 2022.
112 “La Belgique va-t-elle boycotter diplomatiquement les JO d'hiver de Pékin?” (“Will Belgium Issue a Diplomatic
Boycott of the Winter Olympic Games in Beijing?”), La Libre, December 14, 2021.
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Announce-
Country
ment date
Details
Japan
12/24/2021
Japan announced that it would not send government representatives to the
Beijing Winter Olympics, but that several prominent Japanese citizens would
attend. Those expected to travel to Beijing for the Games include the head of
Japan’s Olympic Committee, the head of the country’s Paralympic Committee,
and a member of the upper house of the Diet, Japan’s parliament, who served
as the president of the organizing committee for the Tokyo 2020 Summer
Games. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s statement included a
reference to human rights: “Japan believes that it is important that the
universal values of freedom, respect for basic human rights and the rule of law
be guaranteed in China, and we have been working directly with the Chinese
side at various levels to promote this position held by Japan.”113
North Korea
1/8/2022
North Korea’s state media reported that North Korea’s Ambassador to China
delivered a letter to a senior Chinese sports official stating that North Korea
would not attend the Games “due to the manoeuvers of hostile forces and the
world pandemic.”114 The “hostile forces” language appears to refer to the
IOC’s September 2021, decision to suspend North Korea’s National Olympic
Committee (NOC) until the end of 2022, “as a result of the NOC’s unilateral
decision not to participate in the Olympic Games Tokyo 2020.” The IOC had
indicated that it would consider participation by individual North Korean
athletes.115 The North Korean letter lauded China’s preparations for the 2022
Winter Games “under the correct leadership of Xi Jinping, general secretary of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” and denounced
“the U.S. and its vassal forces” for “their anti-China smear campaign to block
the successful holding of the Olympic Games.”116
The
1/14/2022
A spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
Netherlands
confirmed to Dutch news agency ANP that the country would not send an
official government delegation to the Beijing 2022 Winter Games. According to
ANP, “The Cabinet decided not to send a delegation because no Dutch
spectators wil be al owed to be present.” The spokesperson also told ANP
that COVID-19 restrictions meant that it would be difficult for the
Netherlands to engage with the government of China on, “major concerns
about the human rights situation in a meaningful way.”117
Denmark
1/14/2022
Noting that, “It is no secret that we from the Danish side are very concerned
about the human rights situation in China,” Danish Foreign Minister Jeppe
Kofod said, “The government has decided that we wil not attend the Winter
Olympics in China.”118

113 Satoshi Sugiyama and Jesse Johnson, “ Japan Not Planning to Send Senior Officials to Beijing Olympics, Japan
Tim es, December 24, 2021.
114 “DPRK Olympic Committee, Ministry of Physical Culture and Sports Send Letter to Chinese Counterparts, Beijing
Winter Olympics Organizing Committee,” KCNA via Pyongyang Tim es, January 8, 20212, at
http://www.pyongyangtimes.com.kp/?bbs=40182.
115 International Olympic Committee, “IOC Executive Board Suspends NOC of Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea,” September 8, 2021, at https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-executive-board-suspends-noc-of-democratic-people-
s-republic-of-korea.
116 “DPRK Olympic Committee, Ministry of Physical Culture and Sports Send Letter to Chinese Counterparts, Beijing
Winter Olympics Organizing Committee,” KCNA via Pyongyang Tim es, January 8, 20212, at
http://www.pyongyangtimes.com.kp/?bbs=40182.
117 “Netherlands Will Not Send Government Delegation to Beijing Winter Olympics,” ANP, January 14, 2022.
118 “Denmark to Join Diplomatic Boycott of Beijing Olympics Over Human Rights,” Reuters, January 14, 2022.
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The European Parliament has supported broader participation in efforts to press China on human
rights by withholding official representation at the Games. On July 8, 2021, it passed a non-
binding resolution urging
[T]he European Commission, the Council of the European Union, and the Member States
to decline invitations for government representatives and diplomats to attend the Beijing
2022 Winter Olympics unless the Chinese Government demonstrates a verifiable
improvement in the human rights situation in Hong Kong, the Xinjiang Uyghur Region,
Tibet, Inner Mongolia and elsewhere in China.119
Nonetheless, most European Union governments have not announced plans to withhold official
representation from the Games. Explaining why France would not do so, French President
Emmanuel Macron stated, “You either have a complete boycott, and not send athletes, or you try
to change things with useful actions.” Macron stated that he supported “action that has a useful
outcome,” and said France would be working with the IOC on a charter to protect athletes.120
(Paris is scheduled to host the 2024 Summer Olympics.)
South Korean President Moon Jae-in said the United States had not requested that his country
withhold official representation from the Games and “the Korean government is not considering
it.”121 Asked about Moon’s statement, State Department Spokesperson Price said that the decision
“is theirs to make. It is not for the U.S. or any other government to make” for them.122 High-
profile figures who have committed to attend the opening ceremony for the Beijing Winter Games
include U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Polish
President Andrzej Duda, and Argentine President Alberto Fernandez.123 In remarks on January 13,
2022, Guterres stated that the Games are “an event that symbolizes the role of sports in bringing
people together and in promoting peace, and it is in this strict context and without any political
dimension that I intend to be present in the opening.”124

119 European Parliament, “ European Parliament Resolution of 8 July 2021 on Hong Kong, Notably the Case of Apple
Daily (2021/2786(RSP)),” at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/T A-9-2021-0356_EN.html, accessed
December 9, 2021.
120 “France Will Not Join ‘Insignificant’ Boycott of Beijing Olympics, Says Macron,” France 24, December 9, 2021.
121 Shin Ji-hye, “Seoul Not Considering Beijing Olympics Boycott: Moon,” The Korea Herald, December 13, 2021.
122 “U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing—January 6, 2022,” December 6, 2022, at
https://www.state.gov/?post_type=state_briefing&%3Bp=92333/.
123 Minlu Zhang, “United Nations Chief to Attend Beijing Winter Olympics,” China Daily, December 11, 2021;
“Russia’s Putin to Attend 2022 Beijing Olympics—Report,” Reuters, September 16, 2021; Deng Xiaoci, “Support from
US Allies, Latin America for Beijing Olympics a Slap at Washington’s Absurdity,” Global Tim es, December 13, 2021;
“Poland’s President to Attend Beijing Olympics Amidst U.S. Boycott,” Reuters, January 18, 2022; “Alberto Fernández
viajará a Rusia y a China el mes próximo,” (“ Alberto Fernández Will T ravel to Russia and China Next Month”), Página
12, January 14, 2022.
124 United Nations, “Secretary-General’s Press Encounter,” January 13, 2022, https://www.un.org/sg/en/node/261394.
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The International Olympic Committee and Human
Rights125
The IOC’s Evolving Approach to Human Rights
Cities accepted by the IOC as candidate cities must complete and submit a candidature
questionnaire, which occurs at least seven years prior to the scheduled Olympics. Neither the
questionnaire for the 2022 nor the 2024 Olympics included any reference to human rights.126 The
2026 questionnaire included two passages requiring host governments and cities to protect and
respect human rights.127 Consistent with the absence of human rights from the 2022 candidature
questionnaire, the host city contract (HCC) for the 2022 Olympics also does not mention human
rights.128 On February 28, 2017, the IOC announced that henceforth—beginning with the 2024
host city contract—it would include in the HCC, among other items, a provision regarding human
rights.129
One of the core requirements for the 2024 Olympics, which wil be held in Paris, includes
protecting and respecting human rights. According to the 2024 Host City Contract-Principles,
Paris, the host NOC, and the organizing committee of the Olympic Games (OCOG) (i.e., Paris
2024) shal
ensure any violation of human rights is remedied in a manner consistent with international
agreements, laws and regulations applicable in the Host Country and in a manner consistent
with all internationally-recognised human rights standards and principles, including the
United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, applicable in the Host
Country.130
On December 1, 2018, the IOC announced it had established an IOC Advisory Committee on
Human Rights and that HRH Prince Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, a former Jordanian diplomat and
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, had agreed to chair the committee.131 The
IOC acknowledged that its decision to create the committee was a “direct result of Olympic
Agenda 2020,” a set of 40 detailed recommendations “identified and collated through a
collaborative and consultative process involving Olympic Movement stakeholders and outside

125 Written by CRS Specialist in American National Government L. Elaine Halchin.
126 International Olympic Committee, 2022 Procedure and Candidature Questionnaire, at https://stillmed.olympic.org/
Documents/Host_city_elections/FINAL_2022_Candidature_Procedure_and_Questionnaire-FINAL.pdf; International
Olympic Committee, Candidature Questionnaire Olym pic Gam es 2024 , at https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/
Host_city_elections/Candidature_Questionnaire_Olympic_Games_2024.pdf.
127 Ibid., p. 88.
128 International Olympic Committee, Host City Contract, XXIV Olympic Winter Games in 2022, at
https://stillmedab.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/Host-City-Elections/XXIV-
OWG-2022/Host -City-Contract-for-the-XXIV-Olympic-Winter-Games-in-2022.pdf.
129 International Olympic Committee, “IOC Strengthens Its Stance in Favour of Human Rights and Against Corruption
in New Host City Contract,” February 28, 2017, at https://www.olympic.org/news/ioc-strengthens-its-stance-in-favour-
of-human-rights-and-against-corruption-in-new-host -city-contract.
130 International Olympic Commit tee, Host City Contract-Principles: Games of the XXXIII Olympiad in 2024, executed
on September 13, 2017, p. 16, at https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/
Host -City-Elections/XXXIII-Olympiad-2024/Host-City-Contract-2024-Principles.pdf.
131 International Olympic Committee, “IOC Sets Up Advisory Committee on Human Rights Chaired by HRH Prince
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein,” December 1, 2018, at https://www.olympic.org/news/ioc-sets-up-advisory-committee-on-
human-rights-chaired-by-hrh-prince-zeid-ra-ad-al-hussein.
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experts,” the overarching goal of which was to safeguard Olympic values and strengthen the role
of sport in society.132 The IOC added that the decision to create an advisory committee “follows
the inclusion of human rights standards into the ‘Operational Requirements’ of the Host City
Contract for the Olympic Games 2024 and beyond.”133
In addition to ensuring that it and the other relevant parties (e.g., Paris and the NOC) commit to
“their responsibility to respect human rights,” Paris 2024 is responsible for developing and
implementing a human rights strategy.134 Per the Host City Contract-Operational Requirements,
which is dated June 2018, this strategy shal :
Include detailed measures to be taken by the OCOG to identify potential human rights risks
and avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through its own
activities relating to the management and delivery of the Games;
Detail the processes and measures that will be implemented to address and remedy such
adverse human rights impacts, if and when they occur;
Seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts directly linked to the OCOG’s
operations, products or services through its business relationships with third parties;
Rely on effective consultation with potentially impacted groups, internal and external
communications and assessment; and
Ensure transparent and timely reporting on the OCOG’s, Host City’s, Host NOC’s, Host
NPC’s [National Paralympic Committee’s] and Host Country Authorities’ efforts to
respect human rights with regard to Games -related activities, as well as service providers
or other stakeholders assisting them in the Games delivery.135
In 2019, the IOC commissioned Prince Zeid and Rachel Davis, Vice President of Shift, a
nonprofit center that focuses on business and human rights, to develop a human rights strategy for
the IOC.136 Their report, which was published in March 2020, notes that “the human rights
impacts that could be connected to the [2022] Games are severe—as our consultations with expert
civil society stakeholders also confirmed—and addressing them remains chal enging.”137 One of
the recommendations included in the report mentions Beijing:
The IOC may want to consider that: 1. The Human Rights Strategy commit[s] the IOC to
an ongoing process of strengthening human rights due diligence across its operations,
including more routinely integrating the perspectives of affected s takeholders, while

132 Although the IOC referenced its Olympic Agenda 2020 in this statement, the agenda did not mention human rights.
International Olympic Committee, “Olympic Agenda 2020,” at https://www.olympic.org/olympic-agenda-2020. T he
agenda is undated, but it was presented at the 127 th IOC Session in December 2014.
133 International Olympic Committee, “IOC Sets up Advisory Committee on Human Rights Chaired by HRH Prince
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein”; International Olympic Committee, “Olympic Agenda 2020,” at https://www.olympic.org/
olympic-agenda-2020. T he Olym pic Agenda 2020 Closing Report is available at https://stillmedab.olympic.org/media/
Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/IOC/What -We-Do/Olympic-agenda/Olympic-Agenda-2020-Closing-
report.pdf#_ga=2.140062067.1141578428.1619439871-770950844.1612452820.
134 International Olympic Committee, Host City Contract—Operational Requirements, June 2018, p. 128, at
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/Host -City-Elections/XXXIII-
Olympiad-2024/Host -City-Contract-2024-Operational-Requirements.pdf.
135 Ibid.
136 International Olympic Committee, “IOC Moves Forward with Its Human Rights Approach, ” December 2, 2020, at
https://www.olympic.org/news/ioc-moves-forward-with-its-human-rights-approach.
137 Prince Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein and Rachel Davis, Recommendations for an IOC Human Rights Strategy, p. 8, at
https://stillmedab.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/News/2020/12/
Independent_Expert_Report_IOC_HumanRights.pdf .
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focusing on a series of priorities in the first phase. These should include: a. Advancing the
agreed strategic approach to engaging with Beijing 2022 on human rights, with support
from the top levels of the organization and informed by the IOC’s own consultations with
expert stakeholders.138
During a news conference in July 2020, Thomas Bach, President of the IOC, was asked whether
the IOC had discussed with Chinese authorities China’s treatment of its Uyghur minority.
Apparently referring to the IOC, he reportedly responded that its role is limited to “whatever is
related to the Olympic Games rather than society as a whole.”139 In March 2021, Reuters reported
that in response to a question “about claims of rights violations in China,” Bach said:140
We are taking this very seriously…. Human rights and labour rights and others are and wil
be part of the host city contract. We are working very closely with the organising
committee. We are monitoring supply chains, labour rights, freedom of press and many
other issues. This is our responsibility…. We are not a super world government where the
IOC could solve or even address issues for which not a United Nations security council,
no G7, no G20 has a solution…. This is in the remit of politics. We have to live up to our
responsibilities in our areas of responsibility.141
Neither of the two IOC statements issued in January 2021 and May 2021 about the Beijing
Games mentions human rights.142 Both statements concluded with the following sentence:
“Beyond this, the two leaders discussed al other matters which are important to the success of the
Olympic Games and the long-term mutual cooperation.”143
In an interview with the German press agency DPA on December 7, 2021, IOC President Bach
described the IOC’s “responsibilities related to the Games” as including “no discrimination,
freedom of the press, open internet, freedom of expression for the athletes.” He said the IOC was
“in close contact with the organizing committee,” but added, “The IOC does not have the power
and the means to change political systems. The political neutrality of the IOC and the Games
applies here.”144
Rule 50.2 of the Olympic Charter
Rule 50.2 of the Olympic Charter—formerly known and sometimes stil referred to as “Rule
50”—prohibits athletes and other accredited persons (e.g., coaches and trainers) from engaging in
protests or demonstrations in certain Olympic venues.145 The rule states: “No kind of

138 Ibid., p. 32.
139 “IOC President T homas Bach Warns of Possible 2022 Olympic Boycotts,” Associated Press via ESPN, July 17,
2020.
140 “IOC Is No ‘Super World Government’ to Solve China Issues, Says Bach,” Reuters, March 12, 2021.
141 Ibid.
142 International Olympic Committee, “IOC Statement on the Winter Olympic Games in Beijing 2022,” January 25,
2021, at https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-statement -on-the-olympic-winter-games-beijing-2022; International
Olympic Committee, “IOC Statement on the Winter Olympic Games in Beijing 2022,” May 7, 2021, at
https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-statement -on-the-olympic-winter-games-beijing-2022-2021-05-07.
143 Ibid.
144 Andreas Schirmer, Christian Hollmann and John Bagratuni, “Bach Says Peng Offered Help ‘In All Areas,’ Games
Cannot Change China,” DPA, December 7, 2021.
145 Although the Olympic Charter was amended earlier in 2021, creating Rule 50.1 and Rule 50.2 (this is the rule that
prohibits protests and demonstrations), some publications or documents may still refer to “ Rule 50.” International
Olympic Committee, “IOC Athletes’ Commission’s Recommendations on Rule 50 and Athlete Expression at the
Olympic Games Fully Endorsed by the IOC Executive Board,” press release, April 21, 2021, at https://olympics.com/
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demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda is permitted in any Olympic sites,
venues or other areas.”146
In 2019, the IOC’s Athletes’ Commission began drafting guidelines for Rule 50.147 The guidelines
distinguish between protests and demonstrations, which are not permitted, and expressing one’s
views, which is acceptable. The commission’s guidelines, which were released in January
2020,148 note that protests and demonstrations are prohibited during the Olympics, lists examples
of Olympic venues where such activities are not permitted (e.g., field of play, Olympic Vil age,
Olympic medal ceremonies, and al other official ceremonies), and provides examples of
activities that constitute a protest (e.g., displaying a political message, making a gesture that is
political in nature, and refusing to comply with Olympic ceremonies protocol). Noting that
athletes should respect local laws, the guidelines also state that athletes may express their views
in various settings, including press conferences, interviews, team meetings, and through digital or
traditional media.149 Final y, the guidelines advise that if an individual, such as an athlete or other
accredited participant, violates Rule 50, “each incident wil be evaluated by their National
Olympic Committee, International Federation and the IOC, and disciplinary action wil be taken
on a case-by-case basis as necessary.”150 (For its part, the USOPC has announced that “Team
USA athletes wil not be sanctioned by the USOPC for peacefully and respectfully demonstrating
in support of racial and social justice for al human beings.”151)
Groups of Olympic athletes, as wel as a few individual athletes who competed in the 2020 Tokyo
Summer Olympics, support the notion that Olympians may protest or demonstrate. On December
10, 2020, the Team USA Council on Racial and Social Justice released a statement regarding Rule
50 of the Olympic Charter. An excerpt reads as follows:
The Team USA Council on Racial and Social Justice, with support of the United States
Olympic & Paralympic Committee and the Athletes’ Advisory Council, today released
its recommendations related to Rule 50 and Section 2.2 to the International Olympic
Committee and International Paralympic Committee, respectively, that requests to end the
prohibition of peaceful demonstrations by team members at the Olympic an d Paralympic
Games. The Council’s recommendation is built on the foundation that athletes should have

ioc/news/ioc-athletes-commission-s-recommendations-on-rule-50-and-athlete-expression-at-the-olympic-games;
International Olympic Committee, “IOC Extends Opportunities for Athlete Expression During the Olympic Games
T okyo 2020,” press release, July 2, 2021, at https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-extends-opportunities-for-athlete-
expression-during-the-olympic-games-tokyo-2020.
146 International Olympic Committee, Olympic Charter, p. 90, at https://stillmed.olympics.com/media/
Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-Olympic-Charter.pdf.
147 International Olympic Committee, “IOC Athletes’ Commission’s Recommendations on Rule 50 and Athlete
Expression at the Olympic Games Fully Endorsed by the IOC Executive Board.” See International Olympic
Committee, “Rule 50.2 Guidelines—Olympic Games T okyo 2020,” n.d., at https://olympics.com/athlete365/app/
uploads/2021/07/Rule-50.2-Guidelines-Olympic-Games-T okyo-2020-Final.pdf.
148 Shannon Morgan, “Rule 50: Protecting the Integrity of the Olympics or Infringing Upon Freedom of Expression?”
Colum bia Journal of Law & the Arts, December 14, 2020, p. at https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/
lawandarts/announcement/view/369.
149 IOC Athletes’ Commission, “Rule 50 Guidelines,” p. 2, at https://stillmedab.olympic.org/media/
Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/News/2020/01/Rule-50-Guidelines-T okyo-2020.pdf.
150 Ibid., p. 3.
151 Sarah Hirshland, Chief Executive Officer, U.S. Olympic and Paralymp ic Committee, Letter to T eam USA Athletes,
n.d., at https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Eo411CVVQAEu2CL?format=png&name=medium.
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the right to peacefully protest and demonstrate against racial and social injustices and to
promote human dignity through global sport.152
Global Athlete, “an international athlete-led movement,” also objects to Rule 50. A Global Athlete
press release states, in part: “The International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) archaic approach to
limiting athletes’ rights to freedom of expression is another sign of an outdated sport system that
continues to suppress athletes’ fundamental rights.”153 In July 2020, the Los Angeles Times
reported that Casey Wasserman, chairperson of the Los Angeles 2028 Organizing Committee of
Olympic and Paralympic Games (LA28), had sent a letter to the president of the IOC the previous
month, asking that the IOC “al ow and encourage athletes to advocate against racism anywhere
they can, including on and off the field of play.”154
Using a gesture and a written symbol, two American athletes may have violated Rule 50.2 during
the 2020 Summer Olympics (which were held in 2021 due to the pandemic). Raven Saunders,
who won a silver medal in shot-put, crossed her arms over her head while standing on the medal
podium.155 A second Team USA member, American fencer Race Imboden, had a symbol written
on the back of his right hand when he appeared besides his teammates on the podium with their
bronze medals in men’s team foil.156
The Government of China’s Goals for the Games157
The government of China appears to see Beijing’s hosting of the Games for a second time as
serving multiple national purposes. They include spurring progress on one of Communist Party of
China (CPC) General Secretary Xi Jinping’s signature initiatives, the development of a new
megacity in north China; boosting national pride, to be harnessed in the drive for realization of
Xi’s “Chinese dream of national rejuvenation”;158 demonstrating to the world the al eged
superiority of China’s political system; boosting the global profile of Chinese brands; and
developing winter sports in China, including in Xinjiang. With the CPC due to convene its 20th
National Congress in the last quarter of 2022, Xi is believed to be seeking to ride national pride to
reelection at the Congress to an unusual third term as China’s top leader.159 China’s goals for the
Games are discussed below.

152 T eam USA Council on Racial and Social Justice, U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee, “Team USA Council
on Racial and Social Justice Releases First Set of Recommendations, Asks for Rule Change Allowing Athletes to
Peacefully Protest and Demonstrate Without Sanctions During Olympic and Paralympic Game s,” press release,
December 10, 2020, at https://www.teamusa.org/Media/News/USOPC/T eam-USA-Co uncil-on-Racial-and-Social-
Justice-releases-recommendations-on-demonstrations.
153 Global Athlete, “T he International Olympic Committee’s Rule Continues to Suppress Athletes’ Rights to Freedom
of Expression,” media release, April 21, 2021, at https://globalathlete.org/our-word/the-iocs-rule-50-continues-to-
suppress-athletes-rights-to-freedom-of-expression.
154 David Wharton, “L.A. Olympic Officials Ask IOC to Allow Athlete Protests,” Los Angeles Times, July 31, 2020, at
https://www.latimes.com/sports/olympics/story/2020-07-31/la-olympic-officials-ask-ioc-allow-athlete-protests.
155 Matthew Futterman, T alya Minsberg, and David W. Chen, “Shot -Putter’s Gesture Renews Controversy Over
Podium Protests,” New York Times, August 1, 2021, at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/01/sports/olympics/
olympics-protests-podium.html.
156 Gawon Bae, “Race Imboden: What US Olympic Fencer’s Black X Symbol on His Hand Means,” CNN, August 4,
2021.
157 Written by CRS Specialist in Asian Affairs Susan V. Lawrence.
158 “Full T ext of Xi Jinping’s Report at 19th CPC National Congress,” Xinhua, November 3, 2017.
159 For more information on the Communist Party of China’s 20 th National Congress, see CRS Report R46977, China’s
Political System in Charts: A Snapshot Before the 20th Party Congress, by Susan V. Lawrence and Mari Y. Lee.
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Catalyzing a New Northern Megacity
In “important instructions” that Xi issued in November 2015, ahead of the first meeting of the
CPC’s Central Leading Group for the Work of the 24th Olympic Winter Games, he presented
hosting the 2022 Games as “an important measure to implement the strategy for coordinated
development of Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei,” the latter being China’s capital, a nearby port city,
and the province that surrounds them.160 Xi envisions that “integrated development” yielding a
new metropolitan area of 130 mil ion people, to be known as “Jing-jin-ji,” that wil serve to ease
population pressure in the capital.161 In part to catalyze Xi’s vision, China’s Olympic planners
selected three locations for Olympic venues that are distant from each other: central Beijing;
Yanqing, an outlying district of Beijing adjacent to the border with Hebei Province; and Chongli
District of Hebei Province’s Zhangjiakou, a city 125 miles from Beijing.162 A new high-speed rail
line and a new expressway link them. China’s government presents its leveraging of the Games
for the development of Jing-jin-ji as consistent with the International Olympic Committee’s
(IOC’s) Olympic Agenda 2020, which supports Olympic projects “that are better aligned with
future hosts’ long-term development plans.”163
Boosting National Pride
Xi has frequently spoken of the national morale-boosting power of the Olympics. In 2016, he
predicted that having the world’s eyes on Beijing for the Games “is bound to greatly stimulate the
national spirit and wil be conducive to ral ying the sons and daughters of China at home and
abroad to strive hard in unity for the achievement of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese
nation.”164 The pursuit of “rejuvenation” is a Party rubric for fostering national effort to propel
China “closer to center stage” in the world by 2049, the hundredth anniversary of the 1949
founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).165 Xi has said that achieving rejuvenation wil
require sacrifices and hard work.166 The U.S. Department of Defense characterizes the Chinese
Communist Party’s quest for rejuvenation as “a determined pursuit of political and social
modernity that includes far-ranging efforts to expand China’s national power, perfect its
governance systems, and revise the international order.”167

160 “习近平对办好北京冬奥会作出重要指示” (“Xi Jinping Issues Important Instructions on Doing a Good Job
Holding the Beijing Winter Olympics”), Xinhua, November 24, 2015.
161 Ian Johnson, “As Beijing Becomes a Supercity, the Rapid Growth Brings Pains,” New York Times, July 19, 2015.
T he Jing-jin-ji name derives from the proposed megacity’s component parts: Beijing (“ Jing”), the port of T ianjin
(“ Jin”), and Hebei Province, whose traditional name is “ Ji.”
162 “Competition Zones,” Beijing Organising Committee for the 2022 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games,
accessed May 7, 2021.
163 “Xi Focus: President Xi Delivers on Olympic Promises,” Xinhua, January 31, 2021; International Olympic
Committee, “Olympic Agenda 2020 Closing Report,” December 2014.
164 “习近平听取北京冬奥会冬残奥会筹办工作情况汇报” (“Xi Jinping Listens to Report on Preparatory Work for
the Beijing Winter Olympics and Paralympics”), Xinhua, March 18, 2016.
165 “Xi Focus: Xi Stresses Racing Against T ime to Reach Chinese Dream,” Xinhua, January 23, 2020.
166 “Full T ext of Xi Jinping’s Report at 19th CPC National Congress,” Xinhua, November 3, 2017.
167 U.S. Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020,”
September 1, 2020.
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Showcasing the Alleged Superiority of China’s Political System
Xi has sought to present China’s Olympic preparations, in the midst of a global pandemic, as
demonstrating the superiority of China’s political system. Inspecting competition venues in
January 2021, Xi suggested that China’s speedy construction of Olympic-related infrastructure
and rapid training of winter sport athletes “fully reflects the Party’s leadership and the nation’s
system, and the institutional advantages of being able to focus efforts to do big things.”168 China’s
state news agency amplified Xi’s words in a dispatch that declared the “smooth progress” of
preparatory work for the Olympics to be “a profound manifestation of the advantages of our
country’s system.”169
Boosting Chinese Brands
The Beijing Organising Committee for the 2022 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games
(BOCOG) has presented corporate sponsorship of the Games as an opportunity to “showcase to
the world the strength and appeal of Chinese brands,” and share “extensive benefits from the
Olympic brand, and achieve both economic and social returns.”170 As of January 2022, BOCOG
had signed 44 corporate sponsors, almost al of which are based in China.171
BOCOG’s official partners include iFLYTEK Corporation, exclusive supplier of automated
translation software to the Games.172 The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry
and Security added iFLYTEK to its Entities List in 2019, saying the firm was “implicated in
human rights violations and abuses in the implementation of China’s campaign of repression,
mass arbitrary detention, and high-technology surveil ance against Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other
members of Muslim minority groups” in Xinjiang. 173
BOCOG corporate partners also include Anta Sports Products, official sportswear uniform
supplier to the Tokyo 2020 Olympics and Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics, and Hengyuanxiang
(HYX) Group, supplier of formal IOC uniforms at both Olympics.174 Both companies reportedly
continue to use cotton produced in Xinjiang, prompting some Members of Congress to warn of “a
worrisome possibility that IOC personnel or others attending the 2022 Olympic Games wil be

168 “习近平在北京河北考察并主持召开北京 2022 年冬奥会和冬残奥会筹办工作汇报会时强调 坚定信心奋发有
为精益求精战胜困难 全力做好北京冬奥会冬残奥会筹办工作 韩正出席汇报会” (“Xi Jinping Conducted an
Inspection T our in Beijing and Hebei and Presided over a Meeting to Hear About the Work of the Beijing 2022 Winter
Olympics and Paralympic Winter Games Preparations, Emphasizing Strengthening Confidence, Working Hard,
Striving for Perfection, Overcoming Difficulties, and Doing Good Preparatory Work for the Beijing Winter Olympics
and Paralympics; Han Zheng Attended the Meeting”), Xinhua, January 20, 2021.
169 “学习网评：制度优势是办好北京冬奥会的最大底气” (“Study Xi Online Commentary: Institutional Superiority
Provides the Greatest Confidence of Doing a Good Job of Holding the Beijing Winter Olympics”), Xinhua, January 21,
2021.
170 Beijing 2022, “China T hree Gorges Corporation Announced as Official Partner of Beijing 2022 Games,” December
17, 2020.
171 Beijing 2022, “Official Partners of Beijing 2022,” at https://www.beijing2022.cn/en/.
172 iFLYT EK, “ Beijing 2022 Signs iFLYT EK as the Official Automated T ranslation Software Exclusive Supplier ,”
press release, September 16, 2019, http://www.iflytek.com/en/news/37.html.
173 Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List,”
October 9, 2019.
174 International Olympic Committee, “The IOC Announces ANT A As its Official Sportswear Uniform Supplier,”
October 29, 2019, at https://olympics.com/ioc/news/the-ioc-announces-anta-as-its-official-sportswear-uniform-
supplier; International Olympic Committee, “ IOC Announces HYX as Formal Uniform Supplier,” September 16, 2019,
at https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-announces-hyx-as-formal-uniform-supplier.
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wearing clothing contaminated by forced labor.”175 (Anta is the owner of several popular Western
brands, including Arc’teryx.)176
Two Chinese companies, Alibaba Group Holdings Ltd. and China Mengniu Dairy Company Ltd.,
are among 16 businesses that are worldwide sponsors of the Games through participation in the
IOC’s TOP Programme. Mengniu’s participation is through a joint agreement it inked with the
Coca-Cola Company, whose headquarters is in the United States, in 2019.177 (For a full list of
corporate sponsors of the Games, see Appendix C.)
Promoting Winter Sports, Including in Xinjiang
Xi has stated that he sees the 2022 Olympics as an opportunity to promote mass participation in
winter sports and to develop competitive Chinese talent in snow sports, in which China sees itself
as relatively weak. In 2016, Xi presented popularizing winter sports as a way “to strengthen the
physique of the people.”178 In January 2021, Xi declared that building China into a “sporting
power” was an important part of “comprehensively building a modern socialist country.”179
Xinjiang has been a focus for the efforts to popularize winter sports because unlike most of
China, areas of Xinjiang are endowed with natural snow suited to winter sports. According to
Xinjiang Daily, Xinjiang’s government has been building winter sports facilities to support the
Olympics. In 2017, the General Administration of Sport of China designated an ice sports center
and two ski resorts in Xinjiang as “national sport training bases.” A ski resort in Xinjiang’s Altay
Prefecture later also received that designation.180 Altay, located in northern Xinjiang, borders
Russia, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia, and has a majority ethnic Kazakh population.181 In addition to
hosting national team athletes, the prefecture has reportedly been training locals to serve as
Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics volunteers and offering ski lessons to students.182

175 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “ Chairs Ask IOC President to Justify Cont racts with Chinese
Companies Using Forced Labor,” January 12, 2022, https://www.cecc.gov/media-center/press-releases/chairs-ask-ioc-
president -to-justify-contracts-with-chinese-companies.
176 Liao Shumin, “China’s Anta Sports Gets Green Light to Buy Finland’s Amer Sports,” Yicai Global, February 27,
2019.
177 T he Coca-Cola Company, “ T he IOC, T he Coca-Cola Company and China Mengniu Dairy Company Ltd Announce
Joint Worldwide Olympic Partnership to 2032,” press release, June 24, 2019, at https://www.coca-colacompany.com/
press-releases/coca-cola-announces-joint-worldwide-olympic-partnership-to-2032.
178 “习近平听取北京冬奥会冬残奥会筹办工作情况汇报” (“Xi Jinping Listens to Report on Preparatory Work for
the Beijing Winter Olympics and Paralympics”), Xinhua, March 18, 2016.
179 “习近平在北京河北考察并主持召开北京 2022 年冬奥会和冬残奥会筹办工作汇报会.... ” (“Xi Jinping
Conducted an Inspection T our in Beijing and Hebei and Presided Over a Meeting to Hear About the Work of the
Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics and Paralympic Winter Games Preparations,.... ”), Xinhua, Januar y 20, 2021.
180 Shi Liuyun, “ 助力北京冬奥会 新疆在行动” (“Boosting the Beijing Winter Olympics, Xinjiang in Action”),
Xinjiang Daily, January 27, 2021.
181 “阿勒泰概况” (“About Altay”), Xinjiang Altai (Altay) Prefecture Administration, accessed May 12, 2021.
182 Ren Jiang, “ 中国雪都”助力北京冬奥” (“‘China’s Snow Capital’ Boosts the Beijing Winter Olympics”), Xinjiang
Daily, December 29, 2020.
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Issues for Congress183
As the Beijing 2022 Olympic and Paralympic Games get underway, Congress may consider such
questions as:
 Should congressional leadership take a position on Member travel to attend the
XXIV Olympic Winter Games and the XIII Paralympic Winter Games in
Beijing?
 Has the USOPC done enough to prepare U.S. athletes for potential risks
associated with their participation in the Beijing 2022 Games? Such risks may
include:
(1) health risks related to the COVID-19 pandemic;
(2) reputational risks related to engagement with corporate sponsors under
U.S. sanctions (iFLYTEK) or dependent on supply chains that may include
forced labor;
(3) personal security risks related to PRC surveil ance and PRC authorities’
intolerance of expression on topics the PRC government deems sensitive,
such as human rights; and
(4) risks related to disclosure of personal information and health data, such as
those associated with COVID-19 testing and with mandatory use of the
BOCOG-developed MY2022 smartphone app.
 How can Congress judge whether the Biden Administration decision to withhold
official and diplomatic representation from the Beijing 2022 Games has been
effective in serving as a rebuke of China over its human rights record? To what
extent might any such rebuke be undercut by the presence at the Games opening
ceremony of the U.N. Secretary-General and official representatives from close
U.S. al ies, such as France and South Korea?
 Has scrutiny of the Games’ corporate sponsors by some Members of Congress
resulted in changes in the practices of those sponsors with regard to China and
human rights? Should Congress take other steps to encourage corporations to
prioritize human rights with regard to the Games? If so, what should those steps
be? To what degree might such efforts undermine the competitiveness of U.S.
brands in the PRC marketplace? How important a consideration should U.S.
corporate competitiveness be in congressional deliberations?
 In June 2019, the IOC adopted “a flexible new approach to future host elections,”
and it used this new approach in selecting Brisbane, Australia, to host the 2032
Summer Games and Paralympics.184 Despite the change in election procedures
for host cities, should Congress seek ways to ensure authoritarian countries are
not awarded the right to host future Olympics? Given that the IOC is an
independent international organization, would such an effort be feasible? Or

183 Karen M. Sutter, CRS Specialist in Asian T rade and Finance, and Michael D. Sutherland, Analyst in International
T rade and Finance, contributed to this section.
184 International Olympic Committee, Annual Report 2020: Credibility, Sustainability, Youth, p. 73,
https://stillmed.olympics.com/media/Documents/International-Olympic-Committee/Annual-report/IOC-Annual-
Report -2020.pdf; International Olympic Committee, “ IOC Elects Brisbane 2032 as Olympic and Paralympic Host,”
July 21, 2021, https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-elects-brisbane-2032-as-olympic-and-paralympic-host.
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might Congress consider supporting what some have proposed: establish
permanent hosts for the summer and winter Olympics? Such an arrangement
would, one commentator argues, “cut costs, environmental damage and
displacement” and “end the churn of a bidding process that invites corruption.”
Alternatively, given the interconnectedness of the world, the same commentator
suggests holding “individual events in already built sites across the globe.” 185
 The EAGLE Act (H.R. 3524), and H.Res. 466, would cal on the IOC to “propose
a set of clear, executable actions to be taken by the International Olympic
Committee upon infringement of freedom of expression by a host country’s
government during any Olympics.” What such actions might be most effective?
 The EAGLE Act would also cal on the IOC to “rescind Rule 50 of the Olympic
Charter, which restricts the freedom of expression by athletes when competing
during Olympics events, and affirm the rights of athletes to political and other
speech during athletic competitions, including speech that is critical of their host
countries.” Should Congress engage the IOC further or directly on the subject?
(See “Rule 50.2 of the Olympic Charter” above.)
 What actions, if any, might the United States consider taking in the event China
seeks to use its domestic laws to “punish” any member of Team USA who speaks
out on a sensitive issue? 186

185 Kurt Streeter, “It’s T ime to Rethink the Olympics,” New York Times, April 21, 2021.
186 Harvey Kong and Jess Ma, “Winter Olympics: Chinese Official Says T hose Who Speak Out on Sensitive Issues
May Be Punished as Rights Activists Advise Athletes to ‘Stay Silent ,’” South China Morning Post, January 19, 2022.
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Appendix A. Legislation in the 117th Congress
Table A-1. Legislation in the 117th Congress Related to the 2022 Beijing Winter
Olympics and Paralympics
Arranged by chamber and type of legislation, and chronological y by date introduced
Number and
Latest
Sponsor
Action
Title
H.R. 1211
Ordered
The American Values and Security in International Athletics Act. (Official title:
(McCaul)
to be
To direct the Department of State to ensure persons representing the United
reported
States in international athletic competitions in certain countries are
by the
appropriately informed, and for other purposes.)
House
Committee
on Foreign
Affairs
2/25/2021
H.R. 3524
Ordered
The Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement (EAGLE) Act (H.R.
(Meeks)
to be
3524)
reported
(Section 316(b) would include sense of Congress statements, including that the
by the
International Olympic Committee should “initiate an emergency search process
House
for suitable replacement facilities for the 2022 Winter Olympics if the
Committee
Government of the PRC fails to release al arbitrarily held Uyghurs from mass
on Foreign
detention centers and prisons”; “propose a set of clear, executable actions to
Affairs
be taken by the International Olympic Committee upon infringement of
7/15/2021
freedom of expression by a host country’s government during any Olympics”;
and “rescind Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter, which restricts the freedom of
expression by athletes when competing during Olympics events, and affirm the
rights of athletes to political and other speech during athletic competitions,
including speech that is critical of their host countries.”)
(Section 316(c) would state that it shal be the policy of the United States “to
implement a presidential and cabinet level diplomatic boycott” of the 2022
Winter Games; “to encourage other nations, especial y democratic partners and
al ies, to do the same”; and “to cal for an end to the Chinese Communist
party’s ongoing human rights abuses, including the Uyghur genocide.”)
H.R. 3645
Introduced
Beijing Winter Olympics Sponsor Accountability Act (Official title: To prohibit
(Waltz)
5/28/2021
the Federal Government from contracting with persons that have business
operations with the Beijing Organising Committee for the 2022 Olympic and
Paralympic Winter Games or the International Olympic Committee, and for
other purposes.)
H.R. 6417
Introduced
Free Peng Shuai Act (Official title: To require the imposition of sanctions
(Gal agher)
1/18/2022
pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act to combat
the perpetuation of human rights violations in the People’s Republic of China by
certain members of the International Olympic Committee, and for other
purposes.)
H.R. 6433
Introduced
Irresponsible Olympic Col aboration Act (IOC Act) (Official title: To amend the
(Waltz)
1/19/2022
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to eliminate the tax exemption of the
International Olympic Committee and similar organizations.)
H.Con.Res. 16
Introduced
Urging that the International Olympic Committee rebid the 2022 Olympic
(Reschenthaler)
2/11/2021
Winter Games, and expressing the sense of Congress that the United States
Olympic and Paralympic Committee should not participate if the Games are
held in the People’s Republic of China and that the United States Government
should lead an international boycott if the Games are held in the People's
Republic of China, and for other purposes.
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Number and
Latest
Sponsor
Action
Title
H.Res. 129
Introduced
Urging the United States Olympic Committee, the International Olympic
(Waltz)
2/15/2021
Committee, and the Olympic Committees of other countries to take certain
actions with respect to the 2022 Winter Olympic Games.
H.Res. 160
Introduced
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the International
(Perry)
2/24/2021;
Olympic Committee should rebid the 2022 Winter Olympic Games to be
Motion to
hosted by a country that recognizes and respects human rights.
discharge
committee
filed
5/11/2021
H.Res. 162
Introduced
Urging that the International Olympic Committee rebid the 2022 Olympic
(Waltz)
2/21/2021
Winter Games, and expressing the sense of Congress that the United States
Olympic and Paralympic Committee should not participate if the Games are
held in the People’s Republic of China and that the United States Government
should lead an international boycott if the Games are held in the People's
Republic of China, and for other purposes.
H.Res. 466
Introduced
Urging the International Olympic Committee to take into consideration the
(Malinowski)
6/8/2021
mass detention of Uyghurs and consider al options to uphold the fundamental
rights of persecuted minorities in China ahead of the 2022 Olympic Games.
H.Res. 812
Introduced
Supporting a diplomatic boycott of the XXIV Olympic Winter Games and XIII
(Langevin)
11/18/2021 Paralympic Winter Games in Beijing, and encouraging the International Olympic
Committee to develop a framework for reprimanding or disqualifying host
countries that are committing mass atrocities.
H.Res. 837
Passed/
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that Beijing should
(Wexton)
agreed to
immediately guarantee the safety and freedom of tennis star Peng Shuai.
in House
(Amended title)
12/8/2021
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the International
on vote of
Olympic Committee failed to adhere to its own human rights commitments.
428-0
(Title as introduced.)
S.1169
Reported
Strategic Competition Act of 2021. (Official title as introduced: A bil to address
(Menendez)
by Senate
issues involving the People's Republic of China.)
Committee
(Sec. 312(a) would state that it shal be the policy of the United States “to
on Foreign
implement a diplomatic boycott” of the 2022 Winter Games and “cal for an
Relations
end to the Chinese Communist Party’s ongoing human rights abuses, including
5/10/2021
the Uyghur genocide.” Section 312(b) would bar the Secretary of State from
obligating or expending federal funds “to support or facilitate” any U.S.
government employee’s attendance at the Games, with exceptions.)
S. 1260
Passed
United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021.
(Schumer)
Senate
(Section 3312(a) would state that it shal be the policy of the United States “to
6/8/2021
implement a diplomatic boycott” of the 2022 Winter Games and “cal for an
on vote of
end to the Chinese Communist Party’s ongoing human rights abuses, including
68-32
the Uyghur genocide.” Section 3312(b) would bar the Secretary of State from
obligating or expending federal funds “to support or facilitate” any U.S.
government employee’s attendance at the Games, with exceptions.)
S.Res. 13 (Rick
Introduced
A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the International Olympic
Scott)
1/22/2021
Committee should rebid the 2022 Winter Olympic Games to be hosted by a
country that recognizes and respects human rights.
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Number and
Latest
Sponsor
Action
Title
S.Res. 126
Introduced
A resolution condemning the crackdown by the Government of the People’s
(Rubio)
3/18/2021
Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong, including
the arrests of pro-democracy activists and repeated violations of the obligations
of that Government undertaken in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984
and the Hong Kong Basic Law.
(A “resolved” clause would cal on the U.S. Government “to urge the
International Olympic Committee to consider relocating the 2022 Winter
Olympics from Beijing to another suitable host city located outside of China, on
account of the flagrant violations of human rights committed by the
Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist
Party in mainland China, Hong Kong, the Tibet Autonomous Region and other
Tibetan areas, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region, and elsewhere.”)
S.Res. 474 (Rick
Introduced
A resolution demanding that the Communist Party of China prove that Peng
Scott)
12/8/2021
Shuai is free from censorship, coercion, and intimidation and ful y investigate the
sexual assault al egations against former Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli.
Source: Congress.gov
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Appendix B. Official PRC Bodies Leading Planning
for the Games187
A high-level Chinese Communist Party body, the Central Leading Group for the Work of the 24th
Olympic Winter Games, is overseeing preparations in China. The Central Leading Group is
headed by Han Zheng, China’s seventh-most-senior official and a member of the Party’s top
decisionmaking body, the seven-man Political Bureau (Politburo) Standing Committee. His
deputies are both members of the Party’s second-most senior decisionmaking body, the 25-
member Politburo.
Table B-1. Leadership of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Leading Group for
the Work of the 24th Olympic Winter Games
Leading Group
Name
Position
Other Positions
Han Zheng
Head
Party Politburo Standing Committee Member; Vice Premier of the State
Council
Sun Chunlan
Deputy Head
Party Politburo Member; Vice Premier of the State Council
Cai Qi
Deputy Head
Party Politburo Member; Beijing Party Secretary; President and Party
Secretary of the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games
(BOCOG)
Sources: Xinhua and the Beijing Government website, http://www.beijing.gov.cn/gongkai/sld/.
Note: Fol owing Chinese convention, family names precede given names.
The international-facing Chinese entity in charge of planning for the Olympics is the Beijing
Organising Committee for the 2022 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games (BOCOG), which
answers to the Central Leading Group. In addition to serving as a deputy head of the Party’s
Central Leading Group for the Games, Beijing Party chief Cai Qi also serves as President and
Party Secretary of BOCOG.188
Table B-2. Leadership of the Beijing Organising Committee for the 2022 Olympic
and Paralympic Winter Games (BOCOG)
Name
BOCOG Position
Other Positions
Cai Qi
President; Party
Party Politburo Member; Beijing Party Secretary; Deputy Head,
Secretary
Party Central Leading Group for the Work of the 24th Olympic
Winter Games
Gou
Executive President
Party Central Committee Member; Minister and Party Secretary,
Zhongwen
General Administration of Sport of China; President, Chinese
Olympic Committee
Chen Jining
Executive President;
Party Central Committee Member; Beijing Mayor and Deputy Party
Deputy Party Secretary
Secretary
Wang
Executive President;
Party Central Committee Member; Hebei Province Governor and
Zhengpu
Deputy Party Secretary
Deputy Party Secretary

187 Compiled by CRS Specialist in Asian Affairs Susan V. Lawrence.
188 “Leadership,” Beijing Organising Committee for the 2022 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games, accessed
January 24, 2022.
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Name
BOCOG Position
Other Positions
Zhang Haidi
Executive President
Chairperson of the China Disabled Persons’ Federation; Member of
the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)
Sources: Websites of BOCOG (https://www.beijing2022.cn/en/about_us/leadership.htm), the Beijing
Government, General Administration of Sport of China, Hebei Province Government, and the CPPCC.
Note: Fol owing Chinese convention, family names precede given names.
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Appendix C. Corporate Sponsors of the Beijing 2022
Winter Olympics and Paralympics
The Olympic Partners (TOP) Programme189
Established in 1985, the TOP Programme is the IOC’s “highest level of Olympic sponsorship,
granting category-exclusive marketing rights to the Summer, Winter and Youth Olympic Games
to a select group of global partners.”190 This program operates on a four-year term, which
coincides with the Olympiad.191 The duration of the TOP Programme agreements means that a
program participant has agreed to provide support for more than one Olympic Games.
TOP Programme partners provide funding, technical services, or products. For example, since
1932, OMEGA has served as the official timekeeper of the Olympic Games on 28 occasions; and
the Al ianz Group “collaborates with the IOC to provide insurance solutions and services to
support the Olympic Movement,192 including the Organising Committees of the Olympic Games
[OCOGs].”193 The IOC shares revenue generated by the TOP Programme with the OCOGs (e.g.,
Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games) and the Olympic Movement.194 TOP
Programme marketing rights accounted for 18% of the IOC’s revenue during the most recent
period (2013-2016) for which data are available; by comparison, broadcast rights accounted for
73% during the same period.195
With the exception of Dow Inc. and General Electric Co., al the TOP Programme participants are
also Worldwide Paralympic Partners. Ottobuck, a supplier of prosthetics and orthotics, is a
Worldwide Paralympic Partner but not a TOP partner.196

189 Written by CRS Specialist in American National Government L. Elaine Halchin.
190 International Olympic Committee, “The Olympic Partner Programme,” at https://olympics.com/ioc/partners. “The
T OP Programme provides each Worldwide Olympic Partner with exclusive global marketing rights and opportunities
within a designated product or service category. T he global marketing rights include partnerships with the IOC, all
active NOCs and their Olympic teams, and the two OCOGs and the Games of each Olympiad. T he T OP Partners may
exercise these rights worldwide and may activate marketing initiatives with all the members of the Olympic Movement
that participate in the T op Programme.” International Olympic Committee, Olympic Marketing Fact File: 2020
Edition, updated January 2020, p. 15, at https://stillmed.olympics.com/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/
Documents/IOC-Marketing-and-Broadcasting-General-Files/Olympic-Marketing-Fact -File.pdf?_ga=
2.101001987.324240359.1624621069-1177118858.1620232454.
191 International Olympic Committee, Olympic Marketing Fact File: 2021 Edition, updated March 2021, p. 12, at
https://stillmed.olympics.com/media/Documents/International-Olympic-Committee/IOC-Marketing-And-Broadcasting/
IOC-Marketing-Fact -File-2021.pdf. “ An Olympiad is a period of four consecutive calendar years, beginning on 1
January of the first year and ending on 31 December of the fourth year.” T he first year of the Olympiad is the year a
Summer Olympics is scheduled to be held. International Olympic Committee, Olym pic Charter, p. 21.
192 See footnote 15 for the description of “Olympic Movement.”
193 International Olympic Committee, “OMEGA,” at https://olympics.com/ioc/partners/omega; International Olympic
Committee, “Allianz,” at https://olympics.com/ioc/partners/allianz.
194 International Olympic Committee, “What Is the T OP Programme?” at https://olympics.com/ioc/faq/olympic-
marketing/what -is-the-top-programme.
195 International Olympic Committee, Olympic Marketing Fact File: 2020 Edition, p. 6.
196 International Paralympic Committee, “Worldwide Paralympic Partners,” at https://www.paralympic.org/beijing-
2022/media, accessed January 12, 2022.
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Table C-1. Participants in the IOC’s TOP Programme
As of the publication of this report
Company or Brand
Location of Headquarters
Notes
Airbnb, Inc.
United States of America

Alibaba Group Holdings Ltd.
China

The Al ianz Group
Germany

Atos Origin
France

The Bridgestone Group
Japan

The Coca-Cola Company
United States of America
Joint agreement with China
Mengniu Dairy Company Ltd.
Dow Inc.
United States of America

General Electric Co. (GE)
United States of America

Intel Corp.
United States of America

China Mengniu Dairy Company Ltd.
China
Joint agreement with The Coca-
Cola Company
OMEGA
Switzerland
OMEGA is a brand of the Swatch
Group.
Panasonic Corporation
Japan

The Procter & Gamble Company
United States of America

(P&G)
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
South Korea

Toyota Motor Corporation
Japan

Visa International
United States of America

Sources: International Olympic Committee, “The Olympic Partner Programme,” https://olympics.com/ioc/
partners; International Olympic Committee, “Coca-Cola and Mengniu,” https://olympics.com/ioc/partners/coca-
cola-mengniu; Swatch Group, “OMEGA,” https://www.swatchgroup.com/en/companies-brands/watches-jewelry/
omega.

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BOCOG Corporate Sponsors
Table C-2. Beijing 2022 Corporate Sponsors
As of January 12, 2022
Category of
Sponsorship
Sponsors
Official Partners (11)
Bank of China, Air China, Yili Group, ANTA Sports Products Ltd., China Unicom,
Shougang Group, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petroleum &
Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) Group, State Grid, People’s Insurance Company of
China (PICC) Group, and China Three Gorges (CTG) Corporation.
Official Sponsors (11)
Tsingtao Beer, Yanjing Beer, Yihai Kerry Jinlongyu (cooking oil), Shunxin Holding Group,
Cultural Investment Holdings, Beijing Beiao Group, Hengyuanxiang (HYX) Group, QI-
ANXIN Technology Group Inc., Yuanfudao Online Education, Yum China, and Panpan
Foods.
Official Exclusive
EF Education First, iFLYTEK Corporation, China Post, Hylink Group, Snickers, Hongyuan
Suppliers (9)
Group, 3TREES (Sankeshu) Paint, Dongdao Creative Branding Group, and BOSS Zhipin
(online recruitment platform).
Official Suppliers (13)
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) Zhong Tian LLP, Suirui Group, Kingsoft Office, 1rock
Technology, Beijing Gehua Cable TV Network (BGCTV), Hebei Radio and Television
Information Network Group (HBTN), Anhui BBCA Biochemical, KeesonTechnology
Corp., BBMG Tintan Furniture Co., Ltd., Shijiazhuang Banknote Printing Co., Ltd., Shua
(fitness equipment), Hangzhou Nabel Ceramics Co., Ltd., and Guangdong Dongpeng
Holdings Co., Ltd.
Source: BOCOG website, https://www.beijing2022.cn/en/, and company websites.
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Appendix D. Historic Approaches to Sports and
Human Rights: Two Case Studies
Russia: 1980 Summer Olympics197
In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to bolster a faltering communist regime
that had come to power the year before.198 In response to the invasion, President Jimmy Carter
took several measures, including cal ing on the U.S. NOC, then known as the United States
Olympic Committee (USOC), to boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics (official y known as the
Games of the XXII Olympiad) in Moscow.199 Although the USOC supported the President’s
request, President Carter reportedly was prepared to use emergency power authorities, if
necessary, to bar U.S. athletes’ travel to the Soviet Union.200
The U.S. boycott unfolded in the first months of 1980. On January 20, President Carter wrote the
USOC, urging it to propose to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) that the Summer
Olympics be cancel ed or moved to another country “if Soviet troops do not fully withdraw from
Afghanistan within the next month.”201 Shortly after, the House and Senate passed separate
versions of a concurrent resolution in support of the boycott by votes of 386-12 and 88-4,
respectively (H.Con.Res. 249). In February, the IOC resolved not to transfer, cancel, or postpone
the Summer Olympics and the Soviet Union ignored the deadline to withdraw from Afghanistan.
As a result, President Carter reiterated the United States’ intent to boycott the Moscow
Olympics.202 On April 12, the USOC voted by a 2-to-1 margin in favor of the boycott.203

197 Written by CRS Specialist in Russian and European Affairs Cory Welt.
198 Afghan opposition to the Soviet invasion turned into a military resistance movement that ultimately cost the USSR
an estimated 15,000 combat casualties and led to its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. Although actors from a
wide spectrum of Afghan politics opposed the Soviet invasion, Islamist elements (many based in Pakistan) dominated
the anti-Soviet opposition due to the support they attracted in terms of money, arms, and manpower from abroad,
including the United States. For overviews, see Gregory Feifer, The Great Gam ble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan
(New York: HarperCollins, 2009); and Rodric Braithwaite, Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979 -89 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013).
199 Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address, January 23, 1980, at https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets/
documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml. T he USOC changed its name to the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee
(USOPC) in June 2019. See at https://www.teamusa.org/News/2019/June/20/US-Olympic-Committ ee-Changes-Name-
T o-US-Olympic-Paralympic-Committee.
200 Barry Lorge and Nancy Scannell, “Carter T ells Athletes Decision on Olympics Is Final,” Washington Post, March
22, 1980, and Steven R. Weisman, “Sears Agrees to Withhold Olympic Gift,” New York Times, April 3, 1980.
201 “T elegram from the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts, the Embassy in Pakistan, and the Embassy in
Libya,” January 20, 1980, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1977-1980, Vol. 6, Soviet Union, at
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v06/d259. Also see Edward Walsh, “ U.S. Olympic Panel
Likely to Back a Boycott,” Washington Post, January 21, 1980; and Jerry Kirshenbaum, “T he Olympic Ultimatum,”
Sports Illustrated, January 28, 1980.
202 “White House Statement on the International Olympic Committee Decision to Hold the Games in Moscow,”
February 12, 1980, and “White House Statement on U.S. Withdrawal from the Games to Be Held in Moscow,”
February 20, 1980, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Jim m y Carter, 1980 -81, Book I—January 1
to May 23, 1980 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1981), pp. 305 -306, 356-357.
203 Steven R. Weisman, “U.S. Olympic Group Votes to Boycott the Moscow Games,” New York Times, April 13, 1980;
“Address by Vice President Mondale,” April 12, 1980, FRUS 1977-1980, at https://history.state.gov/
historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v01/d143; and Kenny Moore, “ T he Decision: No Go on Moscow,” Sports Illustrated,
April 21, 1980.
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The U.S.-led boycott had mixed support international y. According to the IOC, “67 nations did
not participate [in the Games], with 45 to 50 of these nations likely being absent because of the
U.S.-led boycott.”204 According to the State Department, the “closest U.S. al ies” to join the
boycott were Canada, West Germany, and Israel.205 China also boycotted. Although many
European states (and Australia and New Zealand) sent athletes to compete, several of them did
not participate in the Opening Ceremony or had their athletes participate under Olympic or NOC
flags rather than their national flags.
The boycott also was somewhat controversial domestical y. Although the media and public
opinion general y supported the boycott, several USOC members and many athletes expressed
disapproval or resentment, either at the time or subsequently.206 In May 1980, 25 athletes sued the
USOC for preventing them from competing in the Olympics; a U.S. district court dismissed the
case.207
In 1984, the Soviet Union reciprocated with its own boycott of the 1984 Summer Olympic Games
in Los Angeles. The Soviet leadership denied that their boycott was a direct response to the 1980
boycott and instead cited concerns about the “security” of Soviet participants and the possibility
of anti-Soviet protests. Around a dozen countries followed the Soviet Union’s lead.208
South Africa: Anti-Apartheid-Era Sports Boycott Movement209
From 1908 to 1960, South Africa sent only White athletes to participate in the Olympic Games.210
After 1948, when the South African government began to legal y establish apartheid—a system of
racial segregation and discrimination-based White minority rule—international support for
banning South Africa from international sports competitions grew. Contributing factors included
South African anti-apartheid advocacy groups’ efforts to oppose apartheid in sports; the growth of
African anti-colonial independence efforts and anti-apartheid sports boycott efforts led by
independent African governments; African National Congress and aligned global anti-apartheid
movement efforts to end apartheid; the rising influence of the African-American-centered U.S.
civil rights movement; and Cold War political rivalries. Starting in the mid-1950s, multiple
international sports federations expel ed South Africa or refused to al ow South Africa
membership in their associations or participation in these entities’ sports competitions.211

204 International Olympic Committee, “Moscow 1980,” at https://olympics.com/en/olympic-games/moscow-1980.
205 U.S. Department of State, “The Olympic Boycott, 1980,” at https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/qfp/
104481.htm. Also see Derick L. Hulme, Jr., The Political Olym pics: Moscow, Afghanistan, and the 1980 U.S. Boycott
(Praeger: New York, 1990), pp. 51-73.
206 On public opinion, see Hulme, Jr., The Political Olympics, pp. 36-40. On athletes’ responses, see, for example,
Barry Lorge and Nancy Scannell, “ Carter T ells Athletes Decision on Olympics Is Final,” Washington Post, March 22,
1980; Ronald Smothers, “Bitterness Lingering over Carter’s Boycott,” New York Times, July 19, 1996; Nicholas Evan
Sarantakes, “Jimmy Carter’s Disastrous Olympic Boycott,” Politico, February 9, 2014; and Rick Maese, “Invisible
Olympians,” Washington Post, July 16, 2020.
207 DeFrantz et al. v. United States Olympic Committee, 492 F. Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1980).
208 Dusko Doder, “Soviets Withdraw from Los Angeles Olympics,” Washington Post, May 9, 1984.
209 Written by CRS Specialist in African Affairs Nicolas Cook.
210 Floris J.G. van der Merwe, “Africa’s First Encounter with the Olympic Games in ... 1 904,” Journal of Olympic
History (JOH), September 1999.
211 After initial efforts by the international federations for football and table tennis in the late 1950s—later followed by
similar actions by nearly 30 international sports federations—the apartheid government denied passports to black and
colored athletes seeking to compete internationally and advocates supporting them. B. Kidd, “ T he Campaign Against
Sport in South Africa,” International Journal (43:4), 1988; and Muriel Finnigan, Chapter 7, “ Case Study—South
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After an unsuccessful effort by anti-apartheid sports advocates and some governments to press
the IOC to ban South Africa from the 1960 Olympics, pressure grew on the IOC to counter
apartheid. The IOC decided not to invite South Africa to participate in the 1964 and 1968
Olympics, and in 1970, it expel ed South Africa’s NOC from the Olympic Movement. These
decisions may not have been made absent substantial international pressure on the IOC.212
Several key IOC leaders, some historical analyses suggest, viewed apartheid as an internal
political South African matter outside the IOC’s jurisdiction, and acted to counter apartheid in
sports only when forced to do so by direct political pressure and when confronted with evidence
suggesting that the apartheid sports system violated the Olympic Charter.213 After the IOC
expel ed South Africa in 1970, efforts to expand boycotts of South African athletes and sports
bodies continued. The U.N. General Assembly, for instance, adopted resolutions opposing and/or
condemning apartheid in sports, and 31 countries boycotted the 1976 Summer Olympics in
Montreal, Canada.214
How direct a role the Olympic and broader anti-apartheid sports boycott movement played in
forcing an end to apartheid is difficult to determine, as its effects cannot be clearly differentiated
from those of diverse paral el economic boycotts and economic and political sanctions on South
Africa’s apartheid government. These sports boycott efforts, however, demonstrably kept that
government’s persistent and lengthy resistance to integration under intense and enduring
international public attention.
Eventual y, the boycott movement prompted the apartheid government to permit some multi-
racial international sports competitions, and in the late 1970s and 1980s, the government
rescinded or amended some of its apartheid sports laws. A range of legal caveats, however, often
rendered such reforms largely cosmetic. In the 1980s, anti-apartheid sports campaigners
continued to criticize an overal pattern of continued segregation in sports and large racial
disparities in access to sports facilities within South Africa.215 As a result, the IOC further acted to
counter apartheid in sports. It adopted a Declaration Against Apartheid in Sport in 1985 and
established an Apartheid and Olympism Commission in 1988.216 After the South African
government repealed key apartheid laws in 1991 and complied with several related IOC
conditions, South Africa was invited to rejoin the Olympics Movement. The country resumed its
participation with the 1992 Games.217

Africa: An Olympic Movement Success in International Peace and Security,” in Olym pic Singularity—The Rise of a
New Breed of Actor in International Peace and Security? , PhD T hesis, University of Glasgow, 2017 .
212 On the 1960, 1964, and 1968 decisions, see Philani Nongogo, The Effect of Sport Boycott and Social Change in
South Africa: A Historical Perspective [unpublished study], 1955-2005, 2011; Finnigan, Chapter 7, op cit.; Kidd, “ T he
Campaign Against …,” op cit.; T anya Kathleen Jones, The Struggle for Reconciliation: The United States, Anti-
Apartheid Politics, and the Olym pic Gam es, Master’s T hesis, California State University, Fullerton, 2016 ; and Robin
Kelley, “ T he Role of the International Sports Boycott in the Anti- Apartheid Movement,” Ufahamu (13:2-3), 1984.
213 See Finnigan, Chapter 7, op cit.; Nongogo, The Effect…, op cit.; and Jones, The Struggle…, op cit. Jones
documented personal correspondence between key IOC officials and South African NOC officials suggesting that the
former “worked behind the scenes to silence anti-apartheid opposition and preserve South Africa’s status within the
Olympic Movement” and privately were sympathetic to the views of pro -apartheid South African officials.
214 In addition to passing multiple resolutions addressing apartheid in sports, in 1977 UNGA adopted the International
Declaration against Apartheid in Sports (A/RES/32/105) and in 1986 enacted the International Convention against
Apartheid in Sports (A/CONF.137/Ref.4).
215 Kidd, “T he Campaign…,” op cit.
216 T he Commission’s charge was to monitor instances of apartheid in sport and develop a strategy to address the issue.
Finnigan, Chapter 7, op cit.
217 Other conditions included the racial integration of sports bodies, the establish ment of relations with other African
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Olympic bodies, and full compliance with the Olympic Charter. Rone T empest, “South Africa Readmitted to Olympics
Competition Apartheid: Nation Ends 21 Years as a Sports Pariah Because of Racism. It Is Eligible for the 1 992
Games,” Los Angeles Times, July 10, 1991, among others.
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Author Information

Susan V. Lawrence, Coordinator
Thomas Lum
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Specialist in Asian Affairs

L. Elaine Halchin
Michael A. Weber
Specialist in American National Government
Analyst in Foreign Affairs

Ricardo Barrios
Cory Welt
Analyst in Asian Affairs
Specialist in Russian and European Affairs

Nicolas Cook

Specialist in African Affairs

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