Critical Infrastructure Risk Management: Securing the Oil and Gas Supply Chain

Critical Infrastructure Risk Management: Securing the Oil and Gas Supply Chain

Critical Infrastructure Risk Management:
December 13, 2021
Securing the Oil and Gas Supply Chain
Brian E. Humphreys
Supply-chain disruptions caused by critical infrastructure failures, targeted attacks, or pandemic
Analyst in Science and
disease have sparked broad congressional interest in assuring availability of essential supplies at
Technology Policy
affordable prices. Congressional deliberations have highlighted risks that these and other hazards

may pose to critical supply functions, including supply of essential fuels and industrial feedstock.
Disruptions to the oil and gas subsector may propagate across the entire economy, beginning with

the petrochemical manufacturing and electricity generation—subsectors with key systems and
assets that are often physically linked to oil and gas processing and refining facilit ies via an extensive pipeline network—and
extend to agriculture, manufacturing, water, transportation systems, and other critical infrastructure sectors.
The Department of Energy (DOE), in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), leads public-private
partnerships for risk management and supply assurance in the energy sector, including the oil and gas subsector. The
Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Transportation Security Agency (TSA), a DHS agency, lead analogous
programs for pipeline safety and security. Although various components of the oil and gas subsector are subject to federal
regulation in differing degrees, the federal critical infrastructure security and resilience (CISR) policy framework affords
significant autonomy to private-sector stakeholders and generally favors voluntary collaboration. Federal agencies rely upon
private-sector partners in the subsector to develop and implement voluntary consensus standards and best practices, and to
engage in voluntary public-private partnerships for CISR-related policy coordination and information sharing.
Development of these partnerships to manage relevant categories of risk across the entire oil and gas supply chain has been
uneven within the subsector. The most developed partnerships are generally found in those segments with a history of federal
regulatory oversight or interest, such as offshore production facilities, long-distance pipeline transmission networks, and oil
refineries. Similarly, this general pattern is observed in specific risk categories, such as process safety—and, to a lesser
extent, cybersecurity. Physical security and supply-chain risk, also covered in this report, are both less regulated and less
developed as consensus-driven voluntary activities within the oil and gas subsector. Federal regulatory regimes, public-
private coordination programs and activities, and voluntary consensus standards within the subsector are often developed in
conjunction with each other, via both formal and informal processes. Therefore, both compulsory and voluntary elements of
the CISR enterprise coexist in the oil and gas subsector.
In some cases, this dynamic has spurred private-sector engagement in voluntary public-private CISR initiatives. For example,
private-sector entities in the offshore exploration and drilling segment have worked with relevant federal regulatory agencies
in the wake of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion and spill in the Gulf of Mexico to develop coordination and
information-sharing activities through industry and federal channels. In other cases—particularly in industry segments not
subject to federal regulatory oversight such as onshore exploration and production—there is less substantive engagement
between government and industry and shared risk information is generally less available. With few exceptions, federal
voluntary information-sharing initiatives do not appear to have consistently elicited widespread interest and engagement from
the oil and gas subsector, or the CISR enterprise as a whole.
The February 2021 cold weather event which disrupted power supplies across Texas, and the May 2021 ransomware attack
against the Colonial Pipeline Company which disrupted fuel supplies along the East Coast, galvanized concerns in Congress
regarding the CISR enterprise and its emphasis on voluntary public-private partnerships. Legislative proposals in the 117th
Congress would create new authorities and oversight functions for federal agencies, new incident reporting requirements for
industry, new federal capabilities for critical infrastructure risk modeling and data collection and analysis, and —in some
cases—provide direct grant funding to private-sector critical infrastructure owner-operators for cybersecurity investments.
Taken together, these measures presuppose a significant increase in the scope and extent of regulatory oversight within the
CISR enterprise, as well as more centralized federal role in management of critical infrastructure risks.
Regarding oil and gas sector risk management, Congress may consider several issues: the role of federal agencies in industry-
led standards development processes, and reliance on industry associations to provide standards used for regulatory purposes;
information sharing and incident-disclosure requirements, and the structure and governance of information-sharing bodies;
and optimization of regulatory, nonregulatory, or hybrid frameworks that combine voluntary guidance and public-private
coordination with risk-management mandates.
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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
Organization, Methods, and Scope of Report ................................................................. 1
Policy Background .......................................................................................................... 3
Risk Management Overview ....................................................................................... 3
Risk Management and the Standards Development Process.............................................. 4
Federal Nonregulatory Authorities................................................................................ 5
Federal Regulatory Authorities .................................................................................... 7
Balancing Coordination and Regulatory Authorities ........................................................ 8
Oil and Gas Subsector Overview ....................................................................................... 9
Exploration and Extraction of Fuels............................................................................ 10
Fuel Refining and Processing of Fuels ........................................................................ 10
Pipeline Transport.................................................................................................... 11
Fuel Storage and Reserves ........................................................................................ 12
Risk in the Oil and Gas Subsector .................................................................................... 12
Complex Interdependencies of Oil and Gas Infrastructure and Supply-Chain Risk ............. 13
Limited Redundancy or Spare Capacity ...................................................................... 13
Ownership and Responsibility Structures in the Oil and Gas Subsector ............................ 14
Geographic Concentration of Critical Systems and Assets .............................................. 16
Integration of Information and Communications Technology.......................................... 17
Risk Management in the Oil and Gas Subsector ................................................................. 18
Federal Regulatory Regimes...................................................................................... 19
Regulation of Exploration and Production of Oil and Gas ......................................... 19
Regulation of Fuel Refining and Processing of Fuels ............................................... 21
Regulation of Fuel Storage and Reserves ............................................................... 21
Regulation of Pipeline Transport........................................................................... 22
Voluntary Consensus Standards, Public-Private Partnerships, and Information Sharing....... 23
Voluntary Consensus Standards and Recommended Practices in the Oil and Gas
Subsector ....................................................................................................... 24
Organization of Public-Private Partnerships for Coordination and Information
Sharing in the Oil and Gas Subsector .................................................................. 28
Coordination and Information-Sharing Activities..................................................... 30
Discussion and Analysis ................................................................................................. 35
117th Congress Legislation ........................................................................................ 38
116th Congress Legislation ........................................................................................ 39
Issues for Congress .................................................................................................. 39
The Voluntary Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Framework ................... 40
Information Sharing, Data Gaps, and Incident Reporting Requirements ...................... 40
Regulatory Authorities and Oversight of Pipeline Security ........................................ 41

Figures
Figure 1. The Oil and Gas Subsector .................................................................................. 2
Figure 2. Hierarchy of Standards ....................................................................................... 5
Figure 3. BSEE Standards Development Process................................................................ 24
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Figure A-1. Hydrocarbon Liquids (Oil) Supply Chain ......................................................... 42
Figure A-2. The Natural Gas and Natural Gas Liquids Supply Chain ..................................... 43

Tables
Table 1. Selected Regulations with Risk-Management Requirements ...................................... 8
Table 2. Oil and Gas Subsector Regulation by Risk Type and Critical Function....................... 19
Table 3. API Standards Documents by Risk Type and Critical Function ................................. 26

Appendixes
Appendix A. Oil and Gas Subsector Supply-Chain Diagrams ............................................... 42
Appendix B. The National Standards System: Federal Roles, Authorities, and Policies ............ 44

Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 45

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Critical Infrastructure Risk Management: Securing the Oil and Gas Supply Chain

Introduction
Supply-chain disruptions caused by critical infrastructure failures, targeted attacks, or pandemic
disease have sparked broad congressional interest in assuring availability of essential supplies at
affordable prices. Subsequent congressional hearings and legislative proposals have highlighted
risks that these and other hazards may pose to critical supply functions, including supply of
essential fuels and industrial feedstock. These congressional activities have raised questions about
how the federal government and private-sector stakeholders manage risk in order to safeguard
critical infrastructure and prevent supply disruptions that may affect national security, economic
security, or public health and safety.
This report provides an overview of risk and risk management in the oil and gas subsector—part
of the energy critical infrastructure sector—considering interdependencies between its various
segments and a wide range of other critical supply functions.1 Effects from disruptions to the oil
and gas subsector may propagate across the entire economy, beginning with the petrochemical
manufacturing and electricity generation subsectors. These subsectors have key systems and
assets that are often physical y linked to oil and gas processing and refining facilities via an
extensive pipeline network. Disruption effects may subsequently extend to agriculture,
manufacturing, water, transportation systems, and other critical infrastructure sectors.
In addition, this report analyzes the complex interdependencies between development of
voluntary consensus standards, public-private partnerships, and regulatory regimes within the oil
and gas subsector, and how these influence government and industry risk-management activities.
This analysis may inform congressional assessments of both the overal security and resilience of
the oil and gas subsector specifical y, and critical supply functions more general y. Additional y,
the report may provide deeper understanding of the structure and function of the national critical
infrastructure security and resilience (CISR) enterprise as a whole.
Organization, Methods, and Scope of Report
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), a Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) agency, has established a set of 55 national critical functions as a means to
improve risk management across multiple critical infrastructure sectors. CISA defines national
critical functions as critical infrastructure enabled functions “so vital to the United States that
their disruption, corruption, or dysfunction would have a debilitating effect on security, national
economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof.”2 CISA organizes
these functions within four broad areas: connect, distribute, manage, and supply.

1 T he Department of Homeland Security recognizes 16 critical infrastructure sectors, and numerous associated
subsectors. T he Energy sector has two subsectors: oil and gas; and electricity. See Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency (CISA), “Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors.
2 In 2019, CISA promulgated the National Critical Function (NCF) set to improve methods for infrastructure risk
assessment and enable better collaboration across multiple CI sectors. See CISA, “ National Critical Functions Set,”
https://www.cisa.gov/national-critical-functions-set. The definition of national critical functions parallels the statutory
definition of critical infrastructure given in the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate T ools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct T errorism (USA PAT RIOT ACT ) Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-56). It defines critical
infrastructure as “ systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security,
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. ”

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This report focuses on management of risk to certain critical national functions in the “distribute,”
“manage,” and “supply” areas that form the foundations of the oil and gas subsector: exploration
and extraction of fuels; fuel refining and processing fuels; storage of fuel and maintenance of
reserves; and transport of materials by pipeline. Together, these four national critical functions
constitute a production, distribution, and supply system that provides necessary energy and
chemical inputs for other national critical functions of supply outside the oil and gas subsector.
These relationships are depicted below in Figure 1.3
Figure 1. The Oil and Gas Subsector
Providing Basic Inputs for National Critical Supply Functions

Source: CRS, adapted from CISA National Critical Functions Set.
Notes: See Appendix A for detailed graphic of connections between oil and gas supply chains and other
industries and critical infrastructure.
The report begins with a policy background section that provides an overview of risk
management, federal coordination and regulatory authorities for CISR-related programs and
activities relevant to the oil and gas subsector, and the standards development process. This is
followed by an overview of subsector risks incorporating both industry and government
perspectives. Next, the report describes risk-management programs and activities in the subsector
as these relate to regulatory and nonregulatory aspects of the national CISR risk-management
enterprise. These programs and activities address four risk categories of particular concern in the
oil and gas industry: process safety; physical security; cybersecurity; and third-party or supply-
chain risk.
In this context, process safety relates to the design and safe operation of heavy industrial
machinery. Physical security relates to protection of physical infrastructure systems and assets
against deliberate attack, theft of materials, sabotage, or malicious use. Cybersecurity relates to
protection from malicious exploitation of information and communications technology (ICT)
used in information management, automated sensing, and industrial control systems. Supply
chain risk management (SCRM) relates to an emerging area of risk management concerned with

3 T he Research and Development (R&D) supply function is omitted from the graphic.
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external or third-party risks affecting the production and supply process as a whole, from the
extraction of raw materials to manufacturing and distribution of finished products to end users.
In general, the nature, scope, and extent of coordinated risk-management programs and
activities—both regulatory and nonregulatory—vary across the several segments of the oil and
gas industry, from upstream production sites, to midstream storage and processing facilities, and
final y to downstream refineries and marketing. The analysis in this report provides insight about
this variation across oil and gas industry segments, focusing on the question of mutual influence
between regulatory and nonregulatory programs and activities.
The report concludes with a discussion of potential issues for Congress.
Certain related issues are outside the scope of this report: federal authorities to directly manage
and mobilize the productive resources (including energy production) of the United States for
defense purposes under the Defense Production Act of 1950 (P.L. 81-774, 50 U.S.C. §§4501 et
seq.); stockpiling programs such as the Strategic Petroleum Reserve; rate-setting and
environmental policies that may affect industry decisions on infrastructure investments; and trade
policies to encourage domestic production of strategic materials and commodities. Likewise, this
report does not cover environmental protection regulations focused on prevention of spil s and
other impacts external to a given production or processing facility, and not directly related to
national supply assurance issues. This report provides information on operational risks related to
spread of pandemic disease, such as il ness of key personnel or closure of facilities, but does not
cover second-order effects on essential supplies caused by pandemic-related supply and demand
imbalances or shocks.
Policy Background
The current federal critical infrastructure policy framework emphasizes the use of voluntary
public-private partnerships for risk management. This is particularly the case in the oil and gas
subsector given its unique ownership structure. In most countries, state ownership predominates
in the oil and gas industry, including ownership of mineral rights. The U.S. oil and gas industry is
distinctive in that both industrial enterprises and mineral rights are privately owned, and therefore
development of what may be considered national resources is in private hands. However,
mandatory and enforceable standards in subsector industries also play a role in the CISR risk-
management enterprise. Balancing voluntary public-private partnerships for risk management and
regulatory policy is an ongoing concern within the oil and gas subsector. The first section below
provides a brief description of risk-management definitions and principles widely recognized by
federal agencies and industry stakeholders. Sections on nonregulatory authorities, regulatory
authorities, and the standards development process fol ow.
Risk Management Overview
CISA and other federal agencies typical y assess risk as “a measure of potential harm from an
undesirable event that encompasses threat, vulnerability, and consequence.”4 In Congress and
federal agencies, broad-based risk assessments may be used to inform planning and resource
al ocation decisions related to congressional appropriations and agency budgets, as wel as
emergency preparedness, regulatory oversight of certain industries, grant funding, and voluntary
public-private partnerships. Private-sector stakeholders may use risk assessments to inform

4 CISA, Interagency Security Committee, The Risk-Management Process: An Interagency Security Committee
Standard, Washington, DC, 2021, p. 49, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
T he%20Risk%20Management%20Process%20 -%202021%20Edition_1.pdf.
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prioritization of capital investments, system design, and operational practices, in order to reduce
the likelihood of adverse events, such as costly accidents, physical and cybersecurity breaches,
and supply-chain disruptions.
Public and private-sector critical infrastructure risk managers general y seek to reduce risk to
vulnerable systems, assets, and networks, rather than eliminate risk entirely, given limited
resources of time, organizational capacity, and funding. Risk managers may also choose to accept
certain risks or transfer them to other organizations. From this perspective, effective risk
management is efficient—i.e., it achieves acceptable levels of risk at the lowest possible cost, and
al ows organizations to prioritize mitigation of the most serious risks to their most vital systems,
assets, and networks. In practice, it may be difficult for diverse stakeholders in government,
industry, and society to establish consensus on risk-management priorities when potential
consequences are not confined to a single stakeholder or category of stakeholders. Potential
chal enges include:
 defining acceptable risk in specific contexts,
 defining acceptable criteria for transferring risk to other stakeholders,
 setting specific performance standards and goals for risk reduction,
 barriers to information sharing between key stakeholders, and
 gaps in data for assessing effectiveness of risk-management programs.
Risk Management and the Standards Development Process
Stakeholders may engage in established standards development processes to resolve chal enges
described above and establish consensus on risk-management standards and practices. In the
United States, the standards development process encompasses both voluntary and regulatory
aspects of the CISR risk-management enterprise. In theory, owner-operators mitigate risks to
critical infrastructure by adopting and implementing risk-management standards that have
achieved wide recognition and acceptance among diverse stakeholders—oftentimes provided by
accredited standards developing organizations (SDOs). Owner-operators may adopt consensus
standards for purposes of regulatory compliance or on a voluntary basis. Voluntary reasons may
include:
 ensuring national and global systems compatibility and interoperability,
 improving security and resilience of critical systems, assets, and networks to
assure business continuity and improve overal sector security,
 providing conformity assurance to business partners and to U.S. and foreign
government entities for business and legal reasons,5
 mitigating or avoid litigation risk, and
 forestal ing or influencing increased government regulation.
Figure 2 provides a hierarchy of standards and the relationship between government regulations
and industry standards. Standards regimes may combine multiple elements from one or more
tiers.

5 For example, CACI, “ CACI Organization Achieves ISO® 28000 Certification for Supply Chain Security: First U.S.
Company to Obtain T his International Credential,” https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130403005272/en/
CACI-Organization-Achieves-ISO%C2%AE-28000-Certification-for-Supply-Chain-Security.
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Figure 2. Hierarchy of Standards
The Relationship Between Regulatory and Industry Standards

Source: CRS, adapted from International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, Regulators’ Use of Standards,
2010, p. 3.
Notes: Standards regimes may combine multiple elements from one or more tiers.
Oil and gas industries covered in this report develop and incorporate voluntary consensus
standards into their operations to varying degree depending upon specific business imperatives,
risk considerations, and the regulatory environment. In addition, regulatory agencies frequently
incorporate voluntary consensus standards into federal regulations by reference. Many industry
advocates argue that this al ows private-sector stakeholders with relevant technical expertise and
experience to develop detailed implementation guidance for regulations, relieving resource-
constrained federal agencies of the burden of developing such guidance on their own.6 Some
critics, on the other hand, believe incorporation of voluntary consensus standards into the Code of
Federal Regulations by reference may cede important technical aspects of federal oversight to
regulated entities and thus weaken affected regulatory regimes.7 Incorporation of voluntary
consensus standards by reference into the Code of Federal Regulations gives them the legal effect
of regulatory standards. For more detail on federal roles, authorities, and policies in the national
standards system, see Appendix B.
Federal Nonregulatory Authorities
Key federal nonregulatory authorities for voluntary CISR programs date to the late 1990s.8 After
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress enacted the Homeland Security Act (HSA) of

6 For example, Letter from Frank Macchiarola, Vice President, Downstream and Industry Operations, American
Petroleum Institute, Christina Sames, Vice President, Operations and Engineering, American Gas Association, Dave
Schryver, Executive Vice President, American Public Gas Association, et al., to Office of Electricity, U.S. Department
of Energy, August 23, 2019, https://www.ingaa.org/File.aspx?id=36893.
7 See the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), “Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations on the Outer
Continental Shelf—Oil and Gas Production Safety Systems,” 83 Federal Register 49222, September 28, 2018. BSEE
summarized public comments made during the rulemaking process that criticized the agency’s incorporation by
reference of API voluntary consensus standards.
8 For example, see Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63), “Critical Infrastructure Protection,” May 22, 1998,
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12762.
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2002 (P.L. 107-296), which expanded certain coordination authorities first established under the
Clinton Administration and added others. HSA created DHS as the lead agency for
implementation of the new CISR coordination authorities. HSA authorizes the Secretary of
Homeland Security to create and manage private-sector advisory councils, develop public-private
partnerships, provide security-related services, and assist the private-sector in the development
and promotion of best practices to secure critical infrastructure.
Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21), “Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,”
signed in 2013, directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to “provide strategic guidance,
promote a national unity of effort, and coordinate the overal Federal effort to promote the
security and resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure” in consultation with a wide range of
governmental and private-sector stakeholders.9 DHS created an organizational framework under
the 2013 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) to implement this guidance.10 The
various NIPP partnership councils may organize certain deliberations under the auspices of the
Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC), which was first established in
2006. The CIPAC Charter has been renewed several times since then, most recently in 2020.11
Under certain circumstances, CIPAC provides coordinating councils organized under the NIPP
framework and member organizations legal exemption from Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA; P.L. 92-463) provisions for open meetings, chartering, public involvement, and reporting
in order to facilitate discussion between critical infrastructure stakeholders on sensitive topics
relating to infrastructure security.12 The NIPP framework includes several different types of
coordination and advisory bodies—organized under the CIPAC charter—to serve each of the 16
critical infrastructure sectors and numerous other subsectors recognized under PPD-21:
 Government Coordinating Councils (GCC). These enable interagency,
intergovernmental, and cross-jurisdictional coordination on infrastructure issues
of common concern to sector stakeholders. GCCs are comprised of federal, state,
local, tribal, and territorial government agency representatives.
 Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC). These are organized and administered by
private-sector stakeholders, and maintain an advisory relationship with the
federal government, facilitating coordination and information sharing between
industry and government.
 Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC). These independently
organized organizations serve their members by providing information about
common threats (including cybersecurity) and sharing best practices for
mitigation.
 Multi-state and multi-sector coordination councils.

9 Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21), “Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” February 12, 2013, at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-
security-and-resil.
10 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,
Executive Summary, 2013, p. 1. NIPP 2013 supersedes previous plans published in 2009 and 2006, and remains current
policy as of this writing.
11 See CISA, “Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council,” https://www.cisa.gov/publication/cipac-charter.
12 Exemptions from FACA are made by the DHS Secretary under authority of section 87l(a) of the Homeland Security
Act, 6 U.S.C. §451(a). For more information on FACA regulations, see CRS Report R44253, Federal Advisory
Com m ittees: An Introduction and Overview, by Meghan M. Stuessy.
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In addition, the Secretary and certain other department or agency heads may organize federal
advisory councils—subject to FACA requirements—that provide expertise from relevant
stakeholders and specialists on a range of specific policy areas.
Overal government responsibility for sector coordination belongs to designated federal agencies
with sector-relevant responsibilities and expertise, known as Sector Risk-Management Agencies
(SRMAs). SRMAs provide sector coordination via leadership of the sector GCCs. The
Department of Energy (DOE) is the SRMA for the Energy Sector. DHS and the Department of
Transportation (DOT) are the SRMAs for the Transportation Systems Sector. The Transportation
Security Administration (TSA), a DHS agency, is the SRMA for the Oil, Gas, and Hazardous
Materials Pipeline subsector of the Transportation Systems Sector.
In 2013, following publication of the NIPP, SRMAs led development of sector-specific
implementation plans. CISA announced an initiative in late 2020 for SRMAs to refresh these
plans in response to a congressional mandate to refresh PPD-21 guidance and the NIPP in the
Wil iam M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-
283; FY2021 NDAA).13 The FY2021 NDAA also established statutory SRMA responsibilities.14
Federal Regulatory Authorities
Congress has established certain regulatory authorities for the oil and gas industry. Some federal
regulatory programs are based on prescriptive approaches, which mandate compliance with
technical standards for equipment, testing protocols, and operating procedures. These programs
may also include requirements for the reporting of known vulnerabilities and incidents. Other
regulatory programs mandate adoption of risk-management programs for covered critical
infrastructure owner-operators. In some cases, federal regulators mandate standards. In others,
voluntary consensus standards are incorporated by reference and become mandatory. Programs
may include some or al of the following: risk assessments, submission of risk-management
plans, mitigation of high-priority hazards, analysis of risk events, and reporting requirements.
Although specific authorities, policies, and programs vary, this latter category of regulation
general y relies more heavily on the expertise, judgment, and buy-in of private-sector
stakeholders in assessing and mitigating risk. As such, it frequently operates in conjunction with
public-private partnership structures described in the preceding section.
Table 1 below summarizes the latter category of regulatory authorities—i.e., those that include
risk-management requirements as a means of achieving CISR-related policy objectives in the oil
and gas subsector. Federal regulatory programs may also adopt hybrid approaches, which include
both prescriptive mandates and risk-based performance standards.15 For example, 30 C.F.R. §250,
which covers process safety of offshore oil and gas operations, includes both prescriptive and
risk-based performance standards. Subpart H, “Oil and Gas Production Safety Systems,” covers
design, instal ation, use, maintenance, and testing of safety equipment, while Subpart S, “Safety
and Environmental Management Systems,” covers requirements for offshore owner-operators’
risk-management programs.

13 See Sec. 9002, “Sector Risk-Management Agencies.”
14 Ibid.
15 T he Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has previously discussed benefits and drawbacks of
these various approaches with oil and gas industry stakeholders. See OSHA, “ Performance-based Regulatory Models in
the U.S. Oil and Gas Industry, Offshore and Onshore,” https://www.osha.gov/oil-and-gas-extraction/resources/
performance-based-models.
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Table 1. Selected Regulations with Risk-Management Requirements
CI Sector (subsector)
Selected Authorities
Implementation
Energy (Oil and Gas)
Maritime Transportation Security
Regulated maritime extraction and
Act (MTSA; P.L. 107-295); 33 C.F.R. handling facilities incorporate
§§105, 106
security assessments into a
comprehensive facility security plan.
Energy (Oil and Gas)
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Regulated offshore dril ing
(OCSLA; 43 U.S.C. §§1331 et seq);
instal ations must develop a Safety
30 C.F.R. §250
and Environmental Management
System program that includes
specified API recommended
practices incorporated by
reference.
Energy (Oil and Gas)
29 C.F.R. §1910
Regulated facilities must implement
process safety management
program using “applicable”
voluntary consensus standards.
Onshore oil and gas exploration
and production operations exempt.
Energy (Oil and Gas)
Protecting and Securing Chemical
Regulated facilities must meet risk-
Facilities from Terrorist Attacks
based performance standards for
Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-254).
physical security and cybersecurity.
Chemical Facility Antiterrorism
In oil and gas subsector applies
Standards (CFATS), 6 C.F.R.
primarily to certain storage
§27.230
facilities, gas processing, and
petroleum refineries in midstream
and downstream segments meeting
high risk criteria.
Transportation Systems (Pipelines)
TSA Security Directive Pipeline-
Regulated facilities must report
2021-01114 under 49 C.F.R. §114
cybersecurity incidents, designate a
Cybersecurity Coordinator to
coordinate with federal agencies,
and report results of risk
assessments to TSA and CISA.
Transportation Systems (Pipelines)
49 C.F.R. §192 Transportation of
Regulated pipeline operators must
natural and other gas by onshore
implement a process safety risk-
pipeline systems
management program under ASME
voluntary consensus standard
incorporated by reference.
Transportation Systems (Pipelines)
Protecting Our Infrastructure of
Regulated underground gas storage
Pipelines and Enhancing Safety
facilities must implement risk-
(PIPES) Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-183);
management program under API
49 C.F.R. §60141
recommended practices
incorporated by reference.
Source: CRS analysis of applicable statutes and regulations.
Notes: API=American Petroleum Institute; ASME=American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
Balancing Coordination and Regulatory Authorities
Policymakers have general y sought to limit the regulatory reach of government within the
broader CISR risk-management enterprise. For example, the Clinton-era directive that established
the foundations of the current PPD-21 policy framework stated, “we should, to the extent
feasible, seek to avoid outcomes that increase government regulation or expand unfunded
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government mandates to the private sector.”16 The Homeland Security Act subsequently created
an organization—DHS—with wide-ranging responsibilities, but relatively narrow regulatory
authorities.
DHS infrastructure security programs established under PPD-21 focus on enhancing voluntary
collaboration with infrastructure security partners at al levels of government and the private
sector through information sharing, analysis, training, and coordination, as wel as provision of
certain services upon request, such as voluntary on-site vulnerability assessments or cybersecurity
intrusion detection. DHS and other SRMAs with dual responsibilities for regulation and
coordination typical y separate the two roles. Nonetheless, federal regulatory and coordination
regimes often overlap and mutual y influence each other.17 For example:
 Federal regulatory agencies participate in industry-led initiatives to develop
voluntary standards for critical infrastructure security and resilience.
 Federal agencies incorporate voluntary consensus standards for risk management
into the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) by reference.18
 Federal agencies accept accredited third-party verification of private-sector firms’
compliance with consensus standards as evidence of compliance with federal
regulations in some cases.19
 Federal agencies may choose to delegate certain regulatory authorities to
industry-led reliability organizations, which develop, promulgate, and enforce
mandatory industry standards under federal oversight.
 Federal agencies may choose to defer or limit formal regulation of private-sector
risk management in favor of coordination with, or support of, industry-led
initiatives, which broadly align with national CISR policy goals.
Oil and Gas Subsector Overview
This section describes risk and risk-management issues affecting the physical and cyber systems
and assets that constitute the critical infrastructure of the oil and gas subsector. The subsections
below provide a summary overview of the oil and gas subsector characteristics most relevant to
critical infrastructure risk management. Readers interested in a broader overview of the energy
sector and relevant market and regulatory trends may reference CRS Report R46723, U.S. Energy
in the 21st Century: A Primer, coordinated by Melissa N. Diaz.
Industry observers frequently describe the U.S. oil and gas industry as having three primary
segments—an upstream segment (exploration and extraction); a midstream segment (supply of
crude oil and raw gas to refineries and processing plants, and long-distance transmission
pipelines); and a downstream segment (petroleum refining and fuel distribution to end users).
These correspond approximately with national critical functions outlined above that are specific
to the oil and gas, and pipeline subsectors: exploration and extraction of fuels; fuel refining and

16 PDD-63, op. cit., p. 3.
17 See ANSI, “How Do Government Agencies Incorporate Sector Standards?” https://www.standardsportal.org/usa_en/
standards_system/standards_system_faq.aspx#privatesector.
18 See 1 C.F.R. §51, “Incorporation by Reference.”
19 For example, see Center for Offshore Safety, “Find a COS-Accredited ASP,”
https://www.centerforoffshoresafety.org/SEMS-Audit-Providers/Find%20a%20COS%20Accredited%20ASP .
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processing fuels; storage of fuel and maintenance of reserves; and transport of materials by
pipeline.
Infrastructure of the oil and gas subsector consists of oil and gas wel s, refineries, processing
plants, and storage terminals, al of which are highly integrated with pipeline and ICT networks.
Over 2.8 mil ion miles of domestic pipeline infrastructure—along with terrestrial and maritime
transport systems spanning the globe—links the three segments of the oil and gas supply chain
together.20 The critical functions of the oil and gas subsector therefore rely upon highly
interconnected systems, assets, and networks for production and distribution.
Exploration and Extraction of Fuels
Many U.S. oil and gas companies have a global footprint. However, in recent years domestic
producers have increased exploration and production in the United States through use of
hydraulic fracturing and horizontal dril ing, unlocking oil and natural gas resources from
“unconventional” formations, especial y shale. According to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA), the United States was a net annual petroleum exporter in 2020.21
Approximately 71% of domestical y produced crude oil comes from five states, led by Texas with
a 43.0% share of the national total, followed by North Dakota (10.4%), New Mexico (9.2%),
Oklahoma (4.1%), and Colorado (4.0%). Offshore oil production in the Gulf of Mexico accounts
for an additional 14.6% of the national total.22
Natural gas extraction is similarly concentrated among top producing states, with about 69%
coming from five states: Texas (23.9%); Pennsylvania (21.1%); Louisiana (9.5%); Oklahoma
(7.6%); and West Virginia (7.1%). Although there is significant geographic overlap with major oil
production centers, there are notable differences. Offshore dril ing in the Gulf of Mexico is less
dominant in the gas sector, providing 2% of total domestic production.23
Fuel Refining and Processing of Fuels
The primary products of crude oil refineries are fuels for transportation, constituting roughly 85%
of output.24 They also provide necessary feedstock for petrochemical manufacturing, lubricants,
and other products. Refining capacity is concentrated near Gulf of Mexico seaports, accounting
for nearly half of national production of refined fuels. Texas alone accounts for nearly a quarter of
this production, with much of its capacity concentrated in the Houston area.25 Major refineries
also exist on the West Coast and in the Midwest to serve regional markets. Between 2000 and
2018, the number of operable domestic refineries decreased from 158 to 129—an 18% drop—
while total refining capacity increased by about 9%.26 Higher utilization of fewer refining assets

20 PHMSA, “PHMSA by the Numbers,” https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/.
21 Energy Information Administration (EIA), “Oil and Petroleum Products Explained: Oil Imports and Exports,”
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/imports-and-exports.php, accessed October 19, 2021.
22 EIA, “Oil and Petroleum Products Explained: Where Our Oil Comes From,” https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/
oil-and-petroleum-products/where-our-oil-comes-from.php, accessed October 19, 2021.
23 EIA, “Natural Gas Explained: Where Our Natural Gas Comes From,” https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-
gas/where-our-natural-gas-comes-from.php.
24 American Geosciences Institute, “Oil Refining and Gas Processing: Products of Oil Refining,”
https://www.americangeosciences.org/geoscience-currents/oil-refining-and-gas-processing.
25 Greater Houston Partnership, “Data, Insight & Analysis: Gulf Coast Refining Capacity,” https://www.houston.org/
houston-data/gulf-coast -refining-capacity.
26 Based on time series data from EIA, “Number and Capacity of Petroleum Refineries,” https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/
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decreases reserve capacity, while increasing the likelihood of supply disruptions, according to
experts.
Natural gas usual y undergoes field processing to remove associated oil and condensate near the
extraction site before being transported via pipeline to gas processing plants. Processing capacity
is concentrated in the Gulf Coast region (states with Gulf of Mexico shoreline), accounting for
51% of national capacity.27 Natural gas has a variety of uses, including for electric power
generation, industrial and commercial enterprises, and residential customers. Commercial y
valuable by-products of this process include natural gas liquids such as ethane, propane, and
butane, which can be used for fuel, plastics, or petrochemical feedstock, among other uses.28
Pipeline Transport
The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), a Department of
Transportation (DOT) agency, regulates 2.8 mil ion miles of pipelines.29 Approximately 2.6
mil ion miles of this total consists of natural gas pipelines, with the remainder used for petroleum,
refined fuels, and other hazardous liquids. The U.S. natural gas industry uses thousands of miles
of largely unregulated (and therefore uncounted) gathering pipelines to transport gas to gas
processing plants nationwide.30 Gathering pipelines typical y have lower diameters and operate at
lower pressures than long-distance transmission pipelines. After processing, a transmission
pipeline network totaling nearly 300 thousand miles is used to transport gas across long distances
to regional distribution nodes.31 A distribution network totaling 2.3 million miles supplies gas to
end users.
The rapid growth of U.S. natural gas and crude oil production from shale in the mid-2000s has
led to a corresponding realignment and expansion of the nation’s pipeline system. Between 2004
and 2019, developers added over 58 thousand miles of hazardous liquids transmission pipeline in
the United States, an increase of about 35% in total reported mileage, not counting the expansion
of capacity on existing pipelines. Much of this expansion was used to connect major new
production regions, such as the Marcel us (Pennsylvania) for natural gas and the Bakken (North
Dakota) for oil shale basins, to traditional oil and gas markets, fundamental y reconfiguring oil
and natural gas flows throughout North America. During the same period, total mileage for U.S.
natural gas transmission remained flat.32 Oil production from the Bakken increased much faster

PET _PNP_CAP1_DCU_NUS_A.htm.
27 EIA, “Gulf of Mexico Fact Sheet,” https://www.eia.gov/special/gulf_of_mexico/, accessed October 19, 2021.
28 EIA, “What Are Natural Gas Liquids and How Are T hey Used?” https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=
5930, April 20, 2012. Also see CRS Report R45398, Natural Gas Liquids: The Unknown Hydrocarbons, by Michael
Ratner.
29 PHMSA, “PHMSA By the Numbers,” https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/.
30 On November 15, 2021, PHMSA announced it was issuing a final rule, effective May 16, 2022, to require pipeline
operators to report safety information for all gas gathering lines—a total of 425 thousand additional miles of pipeline.
See PHMSA, “New Federal Regulations Add More T han 400,000 Miles of “Gas Gathering” Pipelines Under Federal
Oversight,” press release, November 15, 2021, https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/news/new-federal-regulations-add-more-
400000-miles-gas-gathering-pipelines-under-federal-oversight ; and PHMSA, “ Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Gathering
Pipelines,” 86 Federal Register 63266, September 14, 2021.
31 PHMSA, “Annual Report Mileage Summary Statistics,” web tables, September 1, 2020, accessible at
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/annual-report-mileage-summary-statistics; and “ Gathering
Pipelines FAQs,” web page, https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/faqs/gathering-pipelines-faqs.
32 For more information, see “ Pipeline Network Expansion from the Shale Boom,” in CRS Report R46723, U.S. Energy
in the 21st Century: A Prim er, coordinated by Melissa N. Diaz.
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than pipeline infrastructure could be developed, so rail and trucking also have been used for some
time to move significant volumes of oil to market. Natural gas from the Bakken was flared at the
production site in significant quantities due to lack of infrastructure to transport it and process it
economical y.33
Fuel Storage and Reserves
Storage facilities are critical to the operation of pipeline networks, and help moderate imbalances
between supply and demand in the marketplace.34 Much of U.S. storage capacity is located in the
Gulf Coast and adjacent Midwest states.35 The United States’ largest onshore oil storage and
energy market hub is located in Cushing, OK, which has a working capacity of over 75 mil ion
barrels—about 13% of national storage capacity.36 Cushing is a major pipeline terminal that
connects North American oil fields with Gulf Coast refineries, and is the physical delivery point
for widely-referenced West Texas Intermediate oil futures contracts.37
Risk in the Oil and Gas Subsector
Oil and gas production networks are potential y susceptible to a wide range of failures, such as
operator error, mechanical breakdowns, design errors, sensor error or malfunction, and
mismanagement of critical data. In addition, deliberate attacks or natural events may target or
otherwise affect key vulnerabilities of cyber or physical infrastructure. This section describes
several characteristics of the oil and gas subsector that may create structural vulnerabilities
affecting process safety, physical security, cybersecurity, and supply-chain risk to varying
degrees. These include:
 Complex interdependencies of oil and gas infrastructure and supply-chain (third
party) risk, and prevalence of hazardous industrial processes throughout the
subsector.
 Limited redundancy or spare capacity of production, storage, or transmission
assets.
 Decentralized ownership and responsibility structures.
 Geographic concentration of critical systems and assets.
 Increased integration of information and communications technology (ICT) and
operational technology (OT).
Exposure of industry production, processing, and distribution systems to specific intentional
threats, such as cyberattacks, or generalized hazard phenomena, such as extreme weather and sea-
level rise caused by climate change, or pandemic disease, may lead to supply disruptions. The

33 Production site flaring refers to controlled combustion using flare stacks to burn off excess gas.
34 T he National Petroleum Council, Dynamic Delivery: America’s Evolving Oil and Natural Gas Transportation
Infrastructure, Chapter 2, “ Infrastructure Resiliency, Mapping, and Analysis,” January 25, 2021, p. 29,
https://dynamicdelivery.npc.org/downloads.php.
35 Regional designations for oil and gas infrastructure follow Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts (PADD)
conventions. See EIA, “PADD Regions Enable Regional Analysis of Petroleum Product Supply and Movements,”
February 7, 2012, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=4890.
36 Irina Slav, “T he Most Critical Oil Storage in the United States,” Oilprice.com , May 2, 2020, https://oilprice.com/
Energy/Crude-Oil/T he-Most -Critical-Oil-Storage-In-The-United-States.html.
37 Ibid.
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following subsections summarize the characteristics listed above and highlight potential
vulnerabilities to relevant threats and hazards.
Complex Interdependencies of Oil and Gas Infrastructure and
Supply-Chain Risk
The networked structures of oil and gas infrastructure may increase the probability that the local
effects of accidents, attacks, and other process disruptions wil affect elements of the production
and distribution systems, creating supply disruptions. The nation’s vast pipeline network connects
many key production nodes that process corrosive and flammable hydrocarbons under high
temperature and pressure and that are subject to wide variability in operating conditions. These
networks are increasingly automated and rely on ICT that may be vulnerable to malicious
exploitation. Likewise, in many cases the global shipping network relies upon passage of large
vessels through canals and natural chokepoints, which present other hazards. Disruptions,
whether intentional, accidental, or from natural causes, may propagate through the global supply
chain creating instability in oil and gas markets and disrupting provision of critical inputs to other
CI sectors (see text box below).
Limited Redundancy or Spare Capacity
Accidents and other disruptions are relatively commonplace in the oil and gas industry.38 In many
cases, these events affect oil and gas wel s, processing plants, and refineries, and may lead to
disruptions of proximate upstream or downstream infrastructure. In such cases, the networked
character of oil and gas infrastructure may provide some redundancies and resilience. However,
some industry observers have questioned whether levels of redundancy and resilience are truly
adequate.
A 2018 aviation industry report noted that major airports had been “dangerously close to running
out of fuel” after recent pipeline explosions, and that storage scarcity at product terminals had
placed airports in a “precarious fuel shortage situation.”39 Independent analyses covering the
subsector also identified capacity limitations as a risk factor. A 2017 analysis of 10-K filings by
the largest U.S. publicly traded oil and gas companies echoed these concerns, finding that that
89% of respondents reported “insufficient refining, pipeline, storage or trucking capacity” as a

38 According to congressional testimony by a systems safety expert in response to the Deepwater Horizon incident,
“Referring to accidents as ‘low probability, high consequence’” is common in the industry, despite a record that
indicates otherwise. See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Oil and Gas
Development, Hearing on domestic oil and gas production, safety, and environmental protection, 112 th Cong., 1st sess.,
May 17, 2011, S. Hrg. 112-51 (Washington: GPO, 2011), p. 54. For a searchable database of major oil and gas industry
incidents investigated or under investigation by the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB), see CSB, “Investigations,”
https://www.csb.gov/investigations/. Additionally, many law firms specialize in oil and gas personal injury cases,
claiming to have won billions in damages. For example, Zehl & Associates claims over $1 billion recovered for clients
in connection with the Deepwater Horizon explosion and a ho st of lesser known incidents. “ Oil Rig Accident and
Platform Explosion Lawyers,” https://www.zehllaw.com/practice-areas/offshore-injuries/oil-rig-explosions/.
39 Airlines for America, Jet Fuel: From Well to Wing, April 2018, p. 9, https://airlines.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/
jet-fuel_spreads.pdf. T his is an apparent reference to an October 2016 blast in Alabama that affected Colonial Pipeline
facilities. See Devika Krishna Kumar, “Colonial May Open Key U.S. Gasoline Line by Saturday After Fatal Blast,”
Reuters, October 31, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pipeline-blast-alabama/colonial-may-open-key-u-s-
gasoline-line-by-saturday-after-fatal-blast-idUSKBN12V2FC. According to Reuters, a gasoline spill from the pipeline
the previous month caused a 12-day interruption to supplies. According to NPC, Washington/Baltimore airports “ came
within hours of a stock out” as a result of the spill. See NPC, op. cit., p.40.
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risk.40 Likewise, the 2017 analysis found that 85% of respondents reported reliance on third party
owned processing facilities and transportation as a concern.41
The National Petroleum Council (NPC), a federal y chartered and privately funded advisory
committee, noted in a 2021 report that there had been an increase of U.S. refinery utilization
between 2009 and 2019 from 83% to 93% capacity.42 “High utilization is preferred for
operational and economic efficiency, but high utilization can be seen as a concern when viewed
from the perspective of energy resiliency,” it said. “With minimal slack in the system, loss of
capacity can be significant and create cascading constraints on upstream production.”43
Incidents affecting fuel delivery to electricity generation plants and gas stations have highlighted
this vulnerability. A severe cold weather event in February 2021 disrupted natural gas supplies to
electric power plants in Texas—one of several factors that caused extended statewide blackouts
leading to loss of life. The May 2021 ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline Company and
subsequent fuel shortages highlighted the lack of spare capacity to transport fuel from the Gulf
Coast states to East Coast markets.
Pandemic disease may place additional stresses on limited industry production, processing, and
distribution capacity for extended periods. During the early months of the Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic in the United States, public officials issued numerous emergency
directives closing nonessential businesses and facilities, limiting travel, and instructing
nonessential workers to stay home. These orders frequently exempted oil, gas, and pipeline
facilities, as essential businesses. Nonetheless, countermeasures introduced to slow the spread of
COVID-19 and protect the health of essential workers, as wel as the unpredictable nature of
serious outbreaks, presented chal enges to the subsector as a whole in staffing existing essential
facilities and constructing new ones.44
Ownership and Responsibility Structures in the Oil and Gas
Subsector
According to observers, the general y fragmented ownership and responsibility structure of the oil
and gas industry may present risk—particularly as global supply-chain relationships knit together
a wide array of suppliers, contractors, and asset owners in a web of complex interdependencies.45
Upstream dril ing operations require as many as 45 different services, ranging from seismic
surveys to facilities engineering and economic analysis.46 Additional y, upstream operations

40 BDO, 2017 BDO Oil and Gas Riskfactor Report, 2017, p. 1, https://www.bdo.com/getattachment/a1bf67be-1beb-
42b1-8f0c-f3db2446c6ed/attachment.aspx?2017-Oil-Gas-Riskfactor-Report-Brochure_WEB.pdf; 10-K refers to annual
reports filed by publicly traded companies to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, which contain information
on company performance and risk factors, among other parameters.
41 Ibid.
42 T he National Petroleum Council (NPC), Dynamic Delivery: America’s Evolving Oil and Natural Gas Transportation
Infrastructure, Chapter 2, “ Infrastructure Resiliency, Mapping, and Analysis,” January 25, 2021, p. 2-24,
https://dynamicdelivery.npc.org/downloads.php.
43 Ibid.
44 CRS In Focus IF11476, COVID-19: Response of the Oil and Gas Pipelines Sector, by Paul W. Parfomak.
45 For example Elizabeth Paranhos, T racy G. Kozak, and William Boyd, Highly Reliable Organizations in the Onshore
Natural Gas Sector: An Assessm ent of Current Practices, Regulatory Fram eworks, and Select Case Studies, Joint
Institute for Strategic Energy Analysis, NREL/SR-6A50-67941, July 2017, p. ix.
46 Christopher M. Chima, “Supply-Chain Management Issues In the Oil and Gas Industry,” Journal of Business &
Econom ics Research, vol. 5, no. 6 (June 2007), p. 28.
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depend upon transport of heavy industrial
Unmanaged Risk and Disruption of
equipment, chemicals, concrete, and other supplies
Critical Supply Functions
across sometimes remote and chal enging
A series of explosions and fires at the Enterprise
geographies.47 Separate companies—each
Products Midstream Gas Plant in Pascagoula, MS,
competing within the broader sector—provide
on June 27, 2016, caused extensive damage and
many of these services.
took the facility offline for six months. Upstream
production from offshore dril ing platforms was
rerouted via pipeline to other processing
According to one academic analysis of supply-
facilities, but capacity restrictions forced
chain risk in the oil and gas industry, competitive
curtailment of offshore gas production during this
business pressures may complicate collective
period from 400 mil ion cubic feet per day to 330
mil ion cubic feet per day—an 18% reduction.48
efforts to improve security within the oil and gas
sector as a whole. “One of the weaknesses of a
A report by the U.S. Chemical Safety Board
(CSB), a nonregulatory accident investigation
supply-chain is that each company is likely to act
agency, determined that the proximate cause of
in its best interests to optimize its profit,” with no
the incident was failure of industrial equipment
single entity responsible for management of the
due to thermal stress after an unplanned
supply-chain as a whole.49 Additional y, the
production halt. The production halt itself was
caused by a lightning strike downstream of the
prevalence of separate information systems may
plant that disabled pipeline operations, leaving the
present management chal enges and complicate
plant unable to offload its production of natural
information sharing. “Difficulties can arise when
gas liquids and fuel.
oil and gas companies make technology decisions
The investigation also highlighted systemic risk-
independently along their supply-chains,” the study
management issues that may have increased the
states. “Thus, their information systems are neither
facility’s vulnerability to contingent events, such
as unplanned shutdowns. Although the plant
coordinated nor compatible, and information is not
operators were required to administer a process
readily shared back and forth along the supply-
safety management program under 29 C.F.R.
chain.”50
§1910, the regulation gave them discretion to
apply “appropriate” industry standards.
Development and deployment of new ICT
Several relevant technical standards developed by
technology may help mitigate some of these risks.
different SDOs were “not ful y consistent with
For example, ICT OT are increasingly integrated
each other and lacking in clarity.” Additional y,
throughout the oil and gas subsector, which may
CSB found that many oil and gas companies had
enable better communication and coordination
systematical y withheld relevant process safety
data from each other in order to safeguard
between multiple owners, managers, operators,
proprietary information and avoid potential
contractors, and subcontractors managing complex
regulatory consequences. Plant operators
projects. According to one analyst, “oil and gas
therefore failed to ful y understand equipment
companies are creating a stronger and more
vulnerabilities or their overal risk exposure.
comprehensive connection between field
operations staff and remote experts” by using
“digital oilfield” technologies based on use of real-time production data and automated workflow
and data management tools.51 However, such technologies may create cybersecurity
vulnerabilities, even as they may increase supply-chain transparency and coordination.
Additional y, some analysts have suggested that risks associated with fragmented ownership and
responsibility structures are mitigated to a degree by vertical integration within the oil and gas

47 Chima, ibid.
48 Jeff Amy, “Pascagoula Natural Gas Plant Still Closed After June 27 Fire,” Tuscaloosa News, July 8, 2016,
https://www.tuscaloosanews.com/business/20160708/pascagoula-natural-gas-plant -still-closed-after-june-27-fire.
49 Chima, ibid, p. 34.
50 Ibid.
51 Roberta Bigliani, Reducing Risk in Oil and Gas Operations, White Paper, May 2013, p. 9.
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industry across industry segments, which may facilitate standardization and institution of
centralized risk-management.52 Sometimes referred to as oil majors, these companies own assets
in al segments of the value chain linking oil and gas fields with end markets. However, other
observers question whether corporate ownership of diverse assets across industry segments
necessarily translates into increased operational integration of those assets.53 Furthermore, some
analyses indicate that current trends in the industry indicate increased specialization across
segments, rather than integration—in part because specialization may be more economical y
efficient at the company level and provide higher returns to investors.54
According to the Natural Gas Council, an industry group, several operational capabilities lower
supply risk due to failures of any given system, asset, or network. These include extensive
networked interconnections that al ow rerouting of deliveries; paral el pipelines to al ow bypass if
needed; “line packing” to compress excess gas in pipelines, and geographical y dispersed
production and storage.55
Geographic Concentration of Critical Systems and Assets
The concentration of oil and gas extraction, processing, and transport facilities in the Gulf Coast
region raises concerns among many about exposure to increasingly frequent extreme weather
events and persistent coastal flooding, which most scientists attribute to sea level rise and long-
term weather patterns caused by climate change. Large-scale removal of offshore underground
hydrocarbons by oil and gas dril ing also increases risk of coastal flooding.56 Hurricanes may
force preemptive closure of offshore dril ing assets. In addition, they may directly damage
dril ing platforms, refineries, and pipeline infrastructure, or indirectly affect their operations by
damage to the electric grid or disruptions to local communities that provide essential workers and
services. Post-storm impacts may potential y persist for weeks or months afterwards, causing fuel
shortages and price spikes, prompting the industry to develop financial risk-management tools.57

52 For an early example of this analysis, see Mead, David E. “Effect of Vertical Integration on Risk in the Petroleum
Industry,” The Quarterly Review of Econom ics and Business, 18, no. 1 (1978).
53 T yler Crowe, “Integrated Oil and Gas Isn’t Really T hat Integrated Anymore,” The Motley Fool, September 1, 2014,
https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/09/01/integrated-oil-gas-isnt-really-that-integrated-any.aspx.
54 See Kearney, Challenging the Integrated Oil and Gas Model, https://www.kearney.com/energy/article/?/a/
challenging-the-integrated-oil-and-gas-model; and Fernando Barrera-Rey, The Effects of Vertical Integration on Oil
Com pany Perform ance, T he Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, WPM 21, October 1995,
https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/WPM21-
T heEffectsofVerticalIntegrationonOilCompanyPerformance-FBarreraRey-1995.pdf.
55 American Petroleum Institute, American Gas Association, and Interstate Natural Gas Association of America,
Natural Gas: Reliable and Resilient, August 2018, p. 2, http://ongsubsector.com/documents/NaturalGasResilience-
Whitepaper.pdf, also NPC, op. cit., p. 60.
56 Council on Foreign Relations, Climate Risk Impacts on the Energy System , June 14, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/
report/climat e-risk-impacts-energy-system; also T he National Petroleum Council, Dynam ic Delivery: Am erica’s
Evolving Oil and Natural Gas Transportation Infrastructure, Chapter 2-Infrastructure Resiliency, Mapping, and
Analysis, January 25, 2021, https://dynamicdelivery.npc.org/downloads.php. T he report outlines infrastructure
hardening efforts, but states “the fact remains that geographic concentration of refineries is a vulnerability and threat to
resiliency,” p.28. See p.78, ibid, for a description of similar vulnerabilities of Gulf Coast natural gas processing plants
and natural gas liquids fractionators to hurricanes and seismic events.
57 See Negar Dahitaleghani, “Analysis of Disruptions in the Gulf of Mexico Oil and Gas Industry Supply Chain and
Related Economic Impacts,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College,
2016), pp. 11-19, https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4966&context=gradschool_dissertations.
For a recent example, see EIA, “T oday in Energy: Hurricane Ida Disrupted Oil Production and Refining Activity,”
September 16, 2021, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=49576.
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Weather-related disruptions may also affect the supply of petrochemicals used in the chemical
and critical manufacturing sectors.58
Seismic events may affect infrastructure assets located wel inland, but connected to the Gulf
Coast refineries. A 2015 study funded through the U.S. Geological Survey’s National Earthquake
Hazards Reduction Program highlighted risks from man-made earthquakes to the major oil
storage complex and pipeline hub in Cushing, OK, which supplies many Gulf Coast refineries
(see “Fuel Storage and Reserves” section). According to the study, wastewater injection from
local oil and gas production operations in Oklahoma might produce significant seismic hazards
that could cause “moderate to heavy damage to storage tanks in the Cushing facility” in the event
of a moderate-magnitude earthquake.59 Significant damage or other disruptions to the complex
may upset oil markets, given the role it plays in setting prices. In 2020, reports that storage
facilities in Cushing, OK, were approaching capacity led to an oil price collapse during the
economic downturn caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.60
Integration of Information and Communications Technology
As in other sectors, increased integration of electronic sensing, automation, and connectivity, may
create potential attack surfaces for malicious actors.61 A 2018 report by the Oil and Natural Gas
(ONG) SCC states, “The natural gas and oil industry faces the threat of cyberattacks from a
variety of malicious actors including nation states, criminal organizations and unaffiliated bad-
actors seeking to steal intel ectual property and/or compromise industrial control systems (ICS),
among many other nefarious goals.”62 According to the report, threats include automated
cyberattacks, insider attacks, cyber supply-chain tampering or disruption, and counterfeit devices
with embedded malware.63

58 For example, Rebecca T rager, “Polar Storm Paralyses U.S. Gulf Coast Petrochemical Sector,” Chemistry World,
February 24, 2021, https://www.chemistryworld.com/news/polar-storm-paralyses-us-gulf-coast -petrochemical-sector/
4013306.article.
59 D.E. McNamara, G.P. Hayes, and H.M. Benz, et al., “Reactivated Faulting Near Cushing, Oklahoma: Increased
Potential for a T riggered Earthquake in an Area of United States Strategic Infrastructure,” Geophysical Research
Letters, vol. 42, no. 20 (October 8, 2015).
60 “Oil Prices Collapse Again,” New York Times, April 28, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/27/business/
coronavirus-stock-market -tracker.html; and CRS Insight IN11354, Crude Oil Futures Prices Turn Negative, by
Michael Ratner and Heather L. Greenley.
61 See Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Dragonstone Strategy—State of Cybersecurity in the Oil &
Natural Gas Sector, LLNL-T R-805864, February 5, 2020, pp. 10 and 14 (hereinafter, LLNL Report). The Oil and
Natural Gas (ONG) ISAC shared a 2017 cybersecurity analysis with its members that highlighted an attack, which
targeted industrial control systems (ICS) and was designed to cause physical damage and shutdown operations. T he
sophistication of the attack indicated state sponsorship. According to the analysis, increasing integration of autonomous
sensing and controls with process control and information system networks that allow remote operation of industrial
processes is increasing risk. See Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, and Marina Krotofil, et al., Attackers Deploy New ICS
Attack Framework ‘Triton’ and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure, Mandiant, December 14,
2017, https://www.mandiant.com/resources/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.
62 Oil and Natural Gas Sector Coordinating Council (ONG SCC), Defense in Depth: Cybersecurity in the Natural Gas
and Oil Industry, 2018, p. 8, https://www.api.org/-/media/Files/Policy/Cybersecurity/2018/Defense-in-Depth-
Cybersecurity-in-the-Natural-Gas-and-Oil-Industry.pdf.
63 Ibid, p. 8.
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A 2020 report submitted by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to DHS on the
state of cybersecurity in the oil and gas sector noted several subsector-specific characteristics of
the oil and gas industry that may increase vulnerability to cyber-related threats:64
 Wide geographic distribution, including offshore and other hard-to-access
locations, heightening reliance on potential y vulnerable remote-access process
monitoring and controls;
 Data networks between on and offshore facilities, and insufficient segmentation
of data networks—breaches in one network may compromise others;
 Interconnected assets at al stages of production process (upstream, midstream,
downstream);
 Large quantity of legacy assets lacking cybersecurity features, and widespread
reliance on consumer-grade operating systems and software with known
vulnerabilities;
 Use of computer technology focusing on productivity; cybersecurity is “an
afterthought”;
 Underdeveloped capacity to find or track malware, al owing adversaries to
maintain presence in systems “for months or years to collect data and identify
weaknesses”;65
 Poor physical security of data storage facilities; and
 Limited “cybersecurity culture.”66
Risk Management in the Oil and Gas Subsector
Coordinated risk-management programs based on voluntary consensus standards and practices in
the oil and gas industry vary within critical functional areas (exploration and extraction; fuel
refining and processing; storage and reserves; and pipeline transit), and risk-management
category (process safety; physical security; cybersecurity; and supply-chain security and
resilience). Programs and practices in each critical functional area may also be informed by
formal and informal information sharing—or in some cases mandatory disclosure requirements—
which also vary by segment and domain.
Federal regulation in some form is present in nearly every functional area of the subsector, but
varies in how and where it is applied. (See Table 1 above for summary of regulatory authorities.)
In general, prescriptive regulatory mandates are favored across industries where incident impacts
are potential y catastrophic and elicit broad public concern.67 By contrast, industry-led efforts
may apply more broadly “as risks become more privatized” and “harms are more divisible and
isolated with respect to their impacts.”68

64 LLNL Report, p. 12.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 See P. W. Huber, “T he Bhopalization of U.S. T ort Law,” Issues in Science and Technology, 2/1, 1985, pp. 73–82;
David Demeritt, Henry Rothstein, Anne-Laure Beaussier, and Michael Howard, “ Mobilizing Risk: Explaining Policy
T ransfer in Food and Occupational Safety Regulation in the UK,” Environm ent and Planning, A 47, no. 2, 2015, pp.
373-391.
68 May, Peter J., and Chris Koski, “Addressing Public Risks: Extreme Events and Critical Infrastructures,” Review of
Policy Research, vol. 30, no. 2, 2013, p. 156.
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Development of specific regulatory regimes in the oil and gas industry follow this general rule,
with new regulations often mandated in the wake of widely publicized incidents that cause
multiple fatalities or wide scale economic disruption. Examples include the catastrophic loss of
the Deepwater Horizon offshore dril ing rig in 2010, and more recently, the 2021 ransomware
attack on the Colonial Pipeline that disrupted fuel supplies on the East Coast. Conversely,
increased regulation has not occurred in the wake of less publicized incidents in more remote
locations—particularly in onshore dril ing and exploration.
Federal Regulatory Regimes
This section provides an overview of regulation-based risk-management programs within each of
the functional areas of the oil and gas industry summarized in Table 2 below.69 Not al areas are
subject to regulation, and the scope, organization, and extent of regulatory programs varies across
areas.
Table 2. Oil and Gas Subsector Regulation by Risk Type and Critical Function
Lead federal regulatory agencies

Process Safety
Physical Security
Cybersecurity
Supply Chain
Exploration and
BSEE
USCG
USCG

Production
(offshore)
Exploration and

Production
(onshore)
Fuel Refining and
OSHA
CISA
CISA

Processing
Storage and
OSHA
CISA
CISA

Reserves
Pipeline
PHMSA
TSA
TSA

Transport
Source: CRS analysis of federal agency sources and relevant sections of C.F.R.
Notes: Blank cel s indicate no federal regulatory oversight of risk-management plans or practices. CISA
oversight applies only to designated high risk facilities subject to CFATS requirements for facility security plans.
TSA has not issued physical security regulations for pipelines. Abbreviations: BSEE=Bureau of Safety and
Environmental Enforcement, Interior; CISA=Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Homeland
Security; OSHA=Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Labor; PHMSA=Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration, Transportation; TSA=Transportation Security Administration, Homeland
Security; and USCG=U.S. Coast Guard, Homeland Security.
As described in the four subsections below, regulatory regimes vary in their scope and extent.
Regulation of Exploration and Production of Oil and Gas
The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) implements regulations codified under the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA). Regulations cover physical security and cybersecurity for
offshore instal ations and related onshore (or maritime facing) facilities. USCG requires regulated
entities to conduct a security assessment and submit a facility security plan every five years,

69 Onshore and offshore exploration and production—a single function in the CISA National Critical Function Set —are
shown separately here for clarity.
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which covers a wide range of physical security requirements. Examples include layout and access
points of the covered facility; number, reliability, and security duties of facility personnel; and
procedures for controlling keys and other access prevention systems. Specific cybersecurity
guidance is limited to two provisions requiring regulated entities to describe measures to protect
“radio and telecommunication systems, including computer systems and networks” as part of the
assessment that informs the facility security plan.70 A subsequent USCG Navigation and Vessel
Inspection Circular provided voluntary guidelines to describe how general security provisions
might be specifical y applied to cybersecurity.71
The Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), a Department of the Interior
agency, implements regulations codified under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)
that cover safety of production systems.72 BSEE provides detailed regulatory guidance on process
safety and incident reporting for offshore dril ing instal ations, including industry-developed
voluntary consensus standards incorporated by reference into the Code of Federal Regulations,
which include both prescriptive specifications for equipment, testing, and operational protocols,
and risk-based performance standards. Although both are mandatory, the Safety and
Environmental Management System (SEMS) framework codified in subpart S of 30 C.F.R. §250
(see the “Federal Regulatory Authorities” section) aligns more closely with risk-management
approaches promoted via the voluntary CISR framework outlined in PPD-21 and the 2013 NIPP.
In recent years, regulations for Oil and Gas Production Safety Systems under subpart H of 30
CFR §250, which mandates compliance with regulations, codes, and standards for process safety,
have been subject to repeated rulemakings. They have general y faced greater industry resistance
than subpart S, which describes risk-management mandates. BSEE characterized the most recent
rulemaking in 2017—which revised an earlier 2016 rule—as necessary to simplify requirements
and relieve industry of unnecessary compliance burdens.73 Some environmental groups and
industrial safety advocates raised concerns over certain revisions relaxing third-party certification
requirements, incident reporting, and BSEE acceptance of revised voluntary consensus standards
developed by the American Petroleum Institute (API)—which acts both as an industry advocacy
group and ANSI-certified SDO.74
No industry-specific federal regulations for physical or cybersecurity, process safety, or supply
chain risk management exist for onshore production facilities—which tend to be regulated by
state agencies. However, state regulations do not necessarily address the risk categories listed
above.75 Furthermore, the onshore dril ing industry is exempt from OSHA’s Process Safety
Management (PSM) Standard, which regulates handling of hazardous chemicals in a wide range
of covered industries.76

70 33 C.F.R. 105.305.
71 Admiral Karl L. Schultz, Commandant, Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular, U.S. Coast Guard, No. 01-20,
Washington, DC, February 26, 2020, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5p/5ps/NVIC/2020/
NVIC_01-20_CyberRisk_dtd_2020-02-26.pdf?ver=2020-03-19-071814-023.
72 30 C.F.R. §250.
73 Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), “Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations on the Outer
Continental Shelf—Oil and Gas P roduction Safety Systems,” 83 Federal Register 49216, September 28, 2018.
74 BSEE, ibid, “General Comments on Incorporation by Reference of Industry Standards,” p. 49223.
75 See U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB), Investigation Report, “Gas Well Blowout and Fire
at Pryor T rust Well 1H-9,” June 12, 2019, p. 107, https://www.csb.gov/pryor-trust-fatal-gas-well-blowout -and-fire/.
76 For discussion of regulatory history for process safety in the onshore upstream segment, see CSB, ibid., pp. 101 -107,
https://www.csb.gov/pryor-trust-fatal-gas-well-blowout -and-fire/.
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Regulation of Fuel Refining and Processing of Fuels
OSHA requires covered entities such as oil refineries and natural gas processing facilities to
develop a process safety management plan under 29 C.F.R. §1910, to be updated every five years.
The plan must include process hazard analysis, employee training, incident investigation, and
reporting, among other components. Physical systems covered include pressure vessels and
storage tanks; piping systems and valves; relief and vent systems and devices; emergency
shutdown systems; controls (including monitoring devices and sensors, alarms, and interlocks);
and pumps. The regulation contains prescriptive elements, but also requires implementation of
risk-management programs for process safety. It grants covered entities wide discretion in
applying available standards to risk-management activities. Published implementation guidance
names several industry SDOs as possible sources for standards, but does not incorporate specific
standards into the regulation by reference.77
CISA administers the Chemical Facility Antiterrorism Standards (CFATS) program under 6
C.F.R. §27. Under the program, al facilities that store or process threshold amounts of certain
“chemicals of interest” must notify CISA. CISA may designate certain facilities as high-risk,
using an agency risk assessment methodology. Depending on risk tier (1-4), facility owner-
operators must submit a vulnerability assessment and site security plan that meets the CISA risk-
based performance standards for physical security and cybersecurity. CISA conducts inspections
of regulated facilities to ensure compliance. CISA does not publicly disclose vulnerability or
threat information provided by covered facilities.78 In the oil and gas subsector, CFATS applies
primarily to certain storage facilities, gas processing, and petroleum refineries in midstream and
downstream segments meeting high risk criteria.79
Regulation of Fuel Storage and Reserves
PHMSA, a Department of Transportation (DOT) agency under 49 C.F.R. §192,80 regulates large
underground natural gas storage facilities under the Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines
Enhancing Safety (PIPES) Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-183). Among other provisions in the PIPES Act,
Congress mandated new regulations in response to the 2015 Aliso Canyon incident in
California—a large natural gas leak from an underground salt cavern being used as a storage
facility that caused health hazards and “serious energy-supply chal enges for the region.”81
PHMSA issued a final rule on February 12, 2020, that modified an earlier interim final rule issued
on December 19, 2016.82 Both rules incorporated by reference two API recommended practices
already in wide use.83 The interim rule required that recommended practices in the API

77 See 29 C.F.R. §1910.119, “Appendix C.”
78 See CISA, “CFAT S Process”, https://www.cisa.gov/cfats-process.
79 Letter from Frank Macchiarola, Vice President, Downstream and Industry Operations, American Petroleum Institute;
Christina Sames, Vice President, Operations and Engineering, American Gas Association ; and Dave Schryver,
Executive Vice President, American Public Gas Association, et al., op. cit., p. 3.
80 CRS Insight IN11162, PHMSA’s Pipeline Safety Reauthorization: Funding Issues, by Paul W. Parfomak.
81 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Underground Natural Gas
Storage Facilities,” 85 Federal Register 8107, February 12, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/02/
12/2020-00565/pipeline-safety-safety-of-underground-natural-gas-storage-facilities.
82 Ibid, “Summary of the Major Provisions,” pp. 8104-8127.
83 See API RP 1170, “Design and Operation of Solution-Mined Salt Caverns Used for Natural Gas Storage” (First
Edition, July 2015); and API RP 1171, “Functional Integrity of Natural Gas Storage in Depleted Hydrocarbon
Reservoirs and Aquifer Reservoirs” (First Edition, September 2015).
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documents be applied as mandatory. However, the final rule relaxed this provision, making
recommended practices voluntary. PHMSA also relaxed deadlines for operators to develop
integrity management programs and conduct baseline risk assessments, among other changes.84
Regulation of Pipeline Transport
Gathering pipelines—considered part of the midstream segment—are used to transport oil and
gas from extraction sites to central collection points for processing. These are not currently
regulated outside of populated areas or defined “unusual y sensitive” areas that include a drinking
water source or ecological resource.85
PHMSA regulates long-distance transmission and regional distribution pipelines, with a focus on
enforcing mandatory safety standards. This regulatory mission correlates most closely with the
process safety risk category (see the “Organization, Methods, and Scope of Report” section).
Readers interested in further information on pipeline safety regulations may refer to CRS Report
R44201, DOT’s Federal Pipeline Safety Program: Background and Key Issues for Congress, by
Paul W. Parfomak.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within DHS administers the federal program
for pipeline security—both physical and cyber. (Additional y, pipelines connected to certain
facilities covered by CFATS are considered part of those facilities and therefore are subject to
CISA regulation under 6 C.F.R. §27.)
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-71), which established TSA,
authorized the agency “to issue, rescind, and revise such regulations as are necessary” to carry out
its functions (§101). The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
(P.L. 110-53) directs TSA to promulgate pipeline security regulations and carry out necessary
inspection and enforcement if the agency determines that regulations are appropriate (§1557(d)).
TSA in the past favored industry compliance with voluntary guidelines for pipeline physical
security and cybersecurity.86 Both TSA and the pipeline industry maintained that regulations were
unnecessary because pipeline operators voluntarily implemented security programs.87 For more
information on the historical and current federal role in pipeline cybersecurity, see CRS Report
R46903, Pipeline Cybersecurity: Federal Programs, by Paul W. Parfomak and Chris Jaikaran.
The May 2021 ransomware attack against the Colonial Pipeline Company spurred panic buying
and fuel shortages along the Eastern Seaboard. Although the attack did not appear to target
pipeline control systems, it forced the temporary suspension of fuel shipments via a major
pipeline network, according to a company statement.88 In the wake of this incident, the Biden
Administration announced Executive Order (E.O.) 14028, “Improving the Nation’s
Cybersecurity,” on May 12, 2021, which created cybersecurity and information-sharing

84 Ibid, pp. 8104-8105. On November 15, 2021, PHMSA announced new regulation s. See footnote 31 for details.
85 See PHMSA, “Fact Sheet: Gathering Pipelines,” https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/factsheets/
fsgatheringpipelines.htm. On November 15, 2021, PHMSA announced it was issuing a final rule, effective May 16,
2022, to increase regulations on gathering pipelines. See footnote 31 for details.
86 T ransportation Security Administration (T SA), Pipeline Security Guidelines, March 2018, p. 1, https://www.tsa.gov/
sites/default/files/pipeline_security_guidelines.pdf.
87 See CRS Insight IN11667, Colonial Pipeline: The DarkSide Strikes, by Paul W. Parfomak and Chris Jaikaran, for
more info.
88 See, Colonial Pipeline Company, “Media Statement Update: Colonial Pipeline System Disruption,” press release,
May 17, 2021, https://www.colpipe.com/news/press-releases/media-statement -colonial-pipeline-system-disruption. An
earlier statement released on May 7, 2021, announcing the disruption is no longer on the company website.
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requirements applicable to federal agencies and government contractors. Administration officials
voiced hopes that the E.O. 14028 would compel private-sector owner-operators of pipelines and
other infrastructure to improve risk-management and information-sharing practices in these areas
as a condition of doing business with the federal government.89
Additional y, TSA issued an emergency security directive—which has the effect of a regulation—
for pipeline cybersecurity in May 2021 following the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack. TSA
Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01, issued under authorities provided by 49 C.F.R. §114,
required regulated pipeline operators to report cybersecurity incidents, provide a cybersecurity
coordinator to liaise with TSA and CISA as needed “to coordinate cybersecurity practices and
address any incidents that arise,” and to review current activities against TSA voluntary
guidelines and to implement mitigation measures, and report results to TSA and CISA.90 A second
directive in July 2021 elaborated on requirements in the first directive.91 Although existing
authorities also cover physical security, TSA has not similarly exercised those authorities to date.
Voluntary Consensus Standards, Public-Private Partnerships, and
Information Sharing
In recent decades, a variety of public-private partnerships for risk management and information
sharing have developed in the oil and gas subsector. These programs and activities include
development of voluntary consensus standards, public-private partnerships for policy or
operational coordination, and information-sharing programs. These programs and activities may
encompass one or more risk categories covered in this report (i.e., process safety; physical
security; cybersecurity; supply-chain security and resilience), and may likewise apply to a
specific critical functional area of the oil and gas subsector, the oil and gas subsector as a whole,
or critical infrastructure in general.

89 T he White House, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on Executive Order Charting a New
Course to Improve the Nation’s Cybersecurity and Protect Federal Government Networks,” press release, May 12,
2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/05/12/background-press-call-by-senior-
administration-officials-on-executive-order-charting-a-new-course-to-improve-the-nations-cybersecurity-and-protect-
federal-government -networks/; also CRS Insight IN11683, Critical Infrastructure Policy: Inform ation Sharing and
Disclosure Requirem ents After the Colonial Pipeline Attack, by Brian E. Humphreys.
90 T ransportation Security Administration, Security Directive Pipeline 2021-01, Enhancing Pipeline Security,
Springfield, VA, May 28, 2021, p. 1.
91 See T ransportation Security Administration, Security Directive Pipeline 2021-02, Pipeline Cybersecurity Mitigation
Actions, Contingency Planning, and T est ing, Springfield, VA, May 28, 2021. T he directive is not officially available to
the public. For a summary, see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: TSA Is
Taking Steps to Address Som e Pipeline Security Program Weaknesses, GAO-21-105263, July 27, 2021, p. 1,
https://www.dwt.com/-/media/files/blogs/privacy-and-security-blog/2021/08/gao-critical-infrastructure-protection-july-
2021.pdf.
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Voluntary Consensus Standards and Recommended Practices in the Oil and
Gas Subsector
Voluntary consensus standards and
recommended practices for infrastructure risk
Figure 3. BSEE Standards Development
management in the oil and gas subsector have
Process
developed unevenly across industry segments
Agency and Private-Sector Col aboration
over time, focusing primarily on those
segments with a history of federal regulatory
oversight or interest, such as offshore
production facilities, refineries, and pipeline
networks. Federal regulatory regimes, public-
private coordination programs and activities,
and voluntary consensus standards within the
subsector often develop in conjunction with
each other, via both formal and informal
processes.
In some cases, industry standards and
recommended practices are developed with
participation of regulatory agencies in
accordance with standing federal policy
guidance promulgated under authority of the
National Technology Transfer and

Advancement Act (NTTAA) of 1995 (P.L.
Source: Adapted from BSEE Standards Development
104-113), and may either be incorporated into
Section, https://www.bsee.gov/what-we-do/offshore-
the C.F.R. by reference, or else left for
regulatory-programs/the-standards-development-
private-sector entities to adopt on a voluntary
section-sds.
basis.92
For example, BSEE maintains an office for joint standards development with private-sector
stakeholders, known as the Standards Development Section (SDS). According to an agency
website, “BSEE has a long history of using industry standards to supplement and enhance its
regulatory program.” Further, “As of December 2020, BSEE has incorporated by reference 125
industry standards in its regulations”93 Figure 3 (above) il ustrates the BSEE standards
development process.94

92 According to OMB Circular 119, “ Agencies must consult with voluntary consensus standards bodies, both domestic
and international, and must participate with such bodies in the development of voluntary consensus standards when
consultation and participation is in the public interest and is compatible with their missions, authorities, priorities, and
budget resources,” Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President, OMB-119: Federal
Participation in the Developm ent and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conform ity Assessm ent Activities ,
Washington, DC, January 2016, p. 27, https://www.nist.gov/system/files/revised_circular_a-119_as_of_01-22-
2016.pdf. See Appe ndix B in this report for further detail.
93 BSEE Standards Development Section, “Standards, Safety, and Industry Cooperation,” https://www.bsee.gov/what-
we-do/offshore-regulatory-programs/the-standards-development-section-sds.
94 Other relevant agencies similarly report participation in standards development. See USCG,
http://www.dco.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Assistant -Commandant -for-Prevention-Policy-CG-5P/Commercial-
Regulations-standards-CG-5PS/; DOT , “ Standards Incorporated by Reference,” https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/standards-
rulemaking/pipeline/standards-incorporated-reference.
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In other cases, voluntary consensus standards and recommended practices are not formal y
incorporated into a regulatory framework. For example, a 2021 revised edition of API Standard
1164,“Pipeline Control Systems Cybersecurity,” intended for regulated pipeline operators, was
based on nonmandatory guidance from TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines (March 2018) and the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Framework for Improving Critical
Infrastructure Cybersecurity.95 Even though TSA has long had the authority to regulate pipeline
physical security and cybersecurity, it relied on voluntary industry adoption of its cybersec urity
guidelines through the consensus process as the preferred means to advance CISR goals until
2021.96 Industry groups have argued that incorporation of federal voluntary guidelines into
voluntary consensus standards is preferable to regulation.97 However, the Colonial Pipeline
ransomware attack appeared to contradict this argument, prompting TSA to revise its stance on
regulatory restraint and issue its mandatory cybersecurity directives.98
API standards and recommended practices for risk management across national critical functions
in the oil and gas industry largely align with existing regulatory oversight programs.99 A CRS
review of relevant API documents il ustrates the general pattern of alignment between industry-
led standards development and regulatory requirements for risk management. Table 3
summarizes voluntary consensus standards and recommended practices for risk management
developed by API.100

95 See API Publications Store, Pipeline Control Systems Cybersecurity; T hird Edition, August 2021,
https://www.apiwebstore.org/publications/item.cgi?49847b7d-0a43-4d96-b0e2-b56d9acb6f2e.
96 CRS Insight IN11060, Pipeline Security: Homeland Security Issues in the 116th Congress, by Paul W. Parfomak.
97 For example, see Interstate National Gas Association of America, Pipeline Cyber & Physical Security, 2021,
https://www.ingaa.org/File.aspx?id=34999&v=5c0904b.
98 Some Senate Members have since expressed concerns that T SA may have exercised its authorities improperly by not
fully engaging in established consultative and collaborative processes with pipeline industry stakeholders. See Letter
from Hon. Rob Portman, Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Hon. James
Lankford, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Government Operations and Border Management, Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Hon. M. Michael Rounds, U.S. Senator, to Hon. Joseph V. Cufari,
Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, October 28, 2021, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
2021-10-28%20RP%20Lankford%20Rounds%20to%20Cuffari%20re%20TSA%20Security%20Directives.pdf .
99 In its investigation of a 2018 oil rig explosion in Oklahoma, CSB noted that the well operator did not use API
Bulletin 97, Well Construction Interface Guidelines, a potentially applicable process safety document, because, “ API
Bulletin 97 implies it applies solely to the offshore drilling industry, not the onshore drilling industry. Application and
implementation of AP I Bulletin 97 guidance could have helped to prevent the incident. T here is also no regulatory
requirement for developing a Well Construction Interface Document for land drilling operations. Such a requirement
could improve the safety of U.S. land drilling operations.” See CSB, Investigation Report, Gas Well Blowout and Fire
at Pryor T rust Well 1H-9, Washington, D.C., June 12, 2019, p. 100, https://www.csb.gov/pryor-trust-fatal-gas-well-
blowout -and-fire/.
100 Analysis of performance-based risk-management standards and recommended practices from API standards catalog.
CRS reviewed the following catalog sections: “Exploration and Production”; “Marketing”; “T ransportation”;
“Refining”; and “Safety and Fire Protection.” See API, “Purchase API Standards and Software,” https://www.api.org/
products-and-services/standards/purchase?.
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Table 3. API Standards Documents by Risk Type and Critical Function
Voluntary Consensus Standards for Risk Management in the Oil and Gas Subsector

Process Safety
Physical Security
Cybersecurity
Supply Chain
Exploration and
API RP 14J,
RP 70, Security for

Extraction of
Recommended
Offshore Oil and
Fuels (Offshore)
Practice for Design
Natural Gas
and Hazards
Operations (33
Analysis for
C.F.R. §105)a
Offshore
Production Facilities
(30 C.F.R. §250)a

RP 75, Safety and
RP 70I, Security for

Environmental
Worldwide
Management
Offshore Oil and
System (SEMS) for
Natural Gas
Offshore
Operations
Operations and
Assets (30 C.F.R.
§250)a

Bul 97, Wel

Construction
Interface Document
Guidelines
Exploration and
Bul 75L Guidance

Extraction of
Document for
Fuels (Onshore)
SEMS for Onshore
ONG Production
Fuel Refining and
RP 580, Risk-Based

Processing of
Inspection
Fuels
(Refineries)

RP 752,

Management of
Hazards Associated
with Location of
Process Plant

RP 754, Process

Safety Performance
Indicators for
Refining and
Petrochemical
Industries
Fuel Storage and
Std 2350, Overfil

Reserves
Protection for
Storage Tanks in
Petroleum Facilities

RP 1170, Design

and Operation of
Solution-Mined Salt
Caverns Used for
Natural Gas
Storage (49 C.F.R.
§60141)a
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Process Safety
Physical Security
Cybersecurity
Supply Chain

RP 1171, Functional

Integrity of Natural
Gas Storage in
Depleted
Hydrocarbon
Reservoirs and
Aquifer Reservoirs
(49 C.F.R. § 60141)a
Pipeline
RP 1173, Pipeline

Std 1164, Pipeline

Transport
Safety Management
Control Systems
Systems
Cybersecurity

RP 1160, Managing

System Integrity for
Hazardous Liquid
Pipelines
Source: CRS analysis of performance-based risk-management standards and recommended practices from API
standards catalog. See API, “Purchase API Standards and Software,” https://www.api.org/products-and-services/
standards/purchase?. CRS reviewed the fol owing catalog sections: “Exploration and Production ,” “Marketing,”
“Transportation,” “Refining,” and “Safety and Fire Protection.”
Notes: Does not include ANSI/API Standard 780, “Security Risk Assessment Methodology for the Petroleum
and Petrochemical Industries,” a generic security risk assessment methodology applicable to physical and cyber
systems and assets. The document focuses on threats and hazards to maritime-facing distribution facilities, oil
refineries, pipelines, and truck and rail transportation. Abbreviations: Std=standard; RP=recommended practice,
Bul =bul etin.
a. C.F.R. references in parentheses denote incorporation of voluntary consensus standard by reference.
This general relationship between regulatory regimes and development of recommended practices
and voluntary consensus standards depicted above is reflected across the risk categories covered
in this report:
 12 of 15 standards or recommended practices focus on process safety, the most heavily
regulated risk category across industry segments.
 API recommended practices for management of physical security risks apply to offshore
production and maritime-facing facilities—which are subject to USCG regulatory
oversight under MTSA—but not to other oil and gas industry segments where physical
security is not regulated.
 The API generic standard for security risk assessments focuses on regulated maritime
facilities, refineries, and pipeline networks.
 General API recommended practices for risk management in the industry focus on
process safety in regulated offshore facilities, refineries, storage facilities, and pipeline
networks.
 The API cybersecurity standard applies exclusively to pipelines, which are increasingly
subject to regulatory oversight from PHMSA and TSA in the w ake of the Colonial
Pipeline incident.101

101 See CRS Insight IN11683, Critical Infrastructure Policy: Information Sharing and Disclosure Requirements After
the Colonial Pipeline Attack, by Brian E. Humphreys. Also see footnote 31 for description of expanded PHMSA
oversight.
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Other nonindustry-specific SDOs have produced relevant standards and recommended practices
that have been widely adopted across the oil and gas subsector, according to industry sources.102
The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) publishes generic standards for industrial
control systems security, which draw upon risk-based approaches.103 Additional y, the
International Standards Organization (ISO) has jointly published generic standards with IEC for
information security management systems, as wel as standards for SCRM specific to the oil and
gas industry.104
Organization of Public-Private Partnerships for Coordination and Information
Sharing in the Oil and Gas Subsector
DHS is the lead federal agency for coordinating CISR partnerships with the private-sector (see
the “Federal Nonregulatory Authorities” section). Several coordination and information-sharing
bodies organized under the PPD-21 framework provide a nexus for public-private collaboration
for CISR in the oil and gas, and transportation systems (pipelines) critical infrastructure
subsectors.
Sector Coordinating Councils
SCCs in the oil and natural gas subsector and pipeline subsector are self-organized by
nongovernmental stakeholders as the counterpart to GCCs (see “Federal Nonregulatory
Authorities”). The Energy GCC—co-chaired by the DOE and DHS—is the government
counterpart to both recognized energy subsectors’ coordinating councils. The Oil and Gas
Subsector Coordinating Council (ONG SCC), organized under the NIPP framework and CIPAC
charter, the government counterpart to ONG SCC. According to its charter, ONG SCC provides
“a private forum for effective coordination of oil and natural gas security strategies and activities,
policy, and communication across the sector to support the nation’s homeland security
mission.”105
The ONG SCC also includes the Pipeline Working Group (PLWG), which serves as the subject
matter advisory group to the ONG SCC for security matters and information sharing, including
intel igence. (As the Pipeline Sector Coordinating Council (PSCC), the same group serves as the
industry counterpart to the Transportation Systems—Pipeline Modal GCC, which is organized
under Transportation Systems GCC auspices.)106 Additional y, the ONG SCC maintains working
groups for cybersecurity, information sharing, cross-sector coordination, regulatory engagement,
and emergency management.107 Membership of the ONG SCC and PLWG is comprised primarily
of industry trade groups for policy advocacy and standards setting, as wel as other industry
representatives from major oil and gas companies.

102 ONG SCC, Defense-in-Depth, op. cit., p. 16.
103 International Electrotechnical Commission IEC 62433. See IEC, “IEC Webstore”, https://webstore.iec.ch/.
104 For example, ISO 29001-2020 and ISO/IEC 27000 family.
105 ONG SCC, Governance Principles and Operating Procedures, August 2020, p. 1, http://ongsubsector.com/
documents/ONG-SCC-Charter-082020a.pdf.
106 Pipeline Working Group, Pipeline Sector Coordinating Council, Charter, November 2014, https://www.cisa.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/Pipeline-SCC-Charter-508.pdf; and ONG SCC Governance Principles, op. cit., p. 6,
which reads “ Due to the dual coverage of pipelines under the NIPP within both the Energy and T ransportation Sectors,
a standing Pipeline Working Group has been established as a working group under the ONG SCC. T he Pipeline
Working Group under the ONG SCC also serves as the Pipeline SCC for the T ransportation Sector.”
107 See ONG SCC, “About the ONG SCC: Working Groups,” http://ongsubsector.com/.
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Information Sharing and Analysis Centers
The Oil and Natural Gas (ONG) ISAC is an industry owned and operated nonprofit, which serves
as “a central point of coordination and communication” across industry segments for sharing
cyber threat information among member organizations and government partners.108 A
membership committee adjudicates applications according to organizational bylaws governing
eligibility. Eligible entities include public and private oil and natural gas companies; certain ICT
service providers, technology integrators, control systems service providers, and security
providers; and certain trade or industry associations, other ISACs and information-sharing
organizations, academic institutions, and research organizations.
Access to shared information is restricted by membership category using the Traffic Light
Protocol (TLP).109 Information labeled “red,” the most restricted category, is shared only “in the
room” with smal defined groups—apparently representatives of large oil and gas firms with
upper-tier memberships. “Amber,” or confidential information, is available on a limited basis to
other members at lower tiers, such as ICT service providers and nonprofit groups, but is not
shared outside the ISAC membership. “Green” information may be shared with members,
relevant government entities, and “strategic partners.” “White” information may be shared with
the general public subject to copyright rules.110
Membership dues vary by service tier and member type. Large for-profit firms with annual
revenue greater than $15 bil ion pay $50,000 annual y for the “platinum” package, while
nonprofits pay $2,000 for the “nonprofit plus” package or $0 for a basic package.111 Platinum
members have full access to shared information. Information sharing with nongovernmental
entities at lower membership tiers and government agencies is restricted to varying degrees. This
tiered membership structure based on pricing and organization type potential y creates
information asymmetries among ISAC members in favor of large for-profit firms.
The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-113) contains several relevant
provisions that govern exchange of information on cyber threats between private-sector
organizations—such as the ONG SCC—and government agencies at the federal, state, and local
levels.112 The legislation requires federal agencies to provide classified cyber threat information
to private-sector partners with appropriate security clearances. Additional y, it exempts any
information provided by private-sector entities under the statute from disclosure under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA; P.L. 89-487) and other statutes governing public access to
government records, as wel as from any use in litigation, antitrust actions, or regulatory
enforcement.

108 See Oil and Natural Gas Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ONG ISAC), “Protecting Critical Infrastructure:
ONG-ISAC Mission,” https://ongisac.org/.
109 For information on T LP, see CISA, “T raffic Light Protocol (TLP) Definitions and Usage,” https://www.cisa.gov/tlp.
110 See ONG-ISAC, “Protecting Critical Infrastructure: T raffic Light Protocol,” https://ongisac.org/.
111 See ONG-ISAC, “Industry Membership,” https://ongisac.org/membership/industry-membership/#.
112 ONG SCC states, “In 2015, the natural gas and oil industry was a leading supporter of the first -ever legal
framework to govern cybersecurity information sharing. T he Cybersecurity Act of 2015 enabled cybersecurity threat
indicators to be shared between and among companies and the U.S. Government, established the legal requirements
and protections for such sharing, and established DHS as the hub for government and private -sector cybersecurity
information sharing.” See ONG SCC and Natural Gas Council, Defense-in-Depth: Cybersecurity in the Natural Gas &
Oil Industry, 2018, p. 18, http://naturalgascouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Defense-in-Depth-Cybersecurity-in-
the-Natural-Gas-and-Oil-Industry.pdf.
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The Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) provides similar protections
for confidentiality, as wel as limitations on use of protected information in legal or regulatory
proceedings. Information may relate to systems, assets, and networks in any designated
infrastructure sector. Under this authority, DHS created the Protected Critical Infrastructure
Information (PCII) program, which is currently administered by CISA.
In addition to the ONG ISAC, the Downstream Natural Gas (DNG) ISAC serves natural gas
utility (distribution) companies in coordination with the Electricity ISAC, “facilitating
communications between participants, the federal government and other critical
infrastructures.”113 For more information on federal agency pipeline cybersecurity activities, see
CRS Report R46903, Pipeline Cybersecurity: Federal Programs, by Paul W. Parfomak and Chris
Jaikaran. For more information on E-ISAC and federal agency electric grid cybersecurity
activities, see CRS Report R45312, Electric Grid Cybersecurity, by Richard J. Campbel .
Federal Advisory Committees
As of December 2021, DOE—the SRMA for the energy sector—manages 22 federal advisory
committees in accordance with FACA provisions. Advisory committee members typical y
represent a variety of stakeholder groups, consisting of “the users, industries, and organizations in
the public and private sectors that could be directly affected by the work of the committee.”114
The National Petroleum Council (NPC) is the Oil and Natural Gas Advisory Committee to the
Secretary of Energy. According to NPC, “The sole purpose of the Council is, at the Secretary of
Energy’s request, to advise, inform, and make recommendations to the Secretary, and through the
Secretary, to the Executive Branch, on matters pertaining to oil and natural gas or to the oil and
gas industries.”115
DHS manages the National Offshore Safety Advisory Committee (NOSAC). According to its
charter, NOSAC provides “advice to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security on
matters relating to activities directly involved with, or in support of, the exploration of offshore
mineral and energy resources, to the extent that such matters are within the jurisdiction of the
Coast Guard.”116 The Coast Guard regulates offshore exploration and extraction safety and
security under MTSA (see the “Regulation of Exploration and Production of Oil and Natural Gas”
section).
Coordination and Information-Sharing Activities
Standards development, public-private coordination, and information-sharing activities take place
under the federal CISR voluntary framework, both across the oil and gas subsector and with
relevant government agencies. Some are specific to the oil and gas subsector, while others apply
general y across critical infrastructure sectors, but have been adopted by some oil and gas
subsector stakeholders.

113 See “Downstream Natural Gas ISAC,” https://www.isao.org/information-sharing-group/sector/downstream-natural-
gas-isac/.
114 See DOE, “Federal Advisory Committee Management,” https://www.energy.gov/management/office-management/
operational-management/federal-advisory-committee-management.
115 National Petroleum Council, “Department of Energy Calls Industry Pandemic Performance Invaluable,” press
release, December 15, 2020, https://www.npc.org/NPC-postmtg-121520.pdf.
116 DHS and USCG, National Offshore Safety Advisory Committee Charter, July 1, 2021, p. 1, https://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/2021_nosac_charter.pdf.
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Examples of Public-Private Coordination
In 2011, API and other industry stakeholders founded the Center for Offshore Safety (COS) to
provide “tools, peer learning opportunities, good practices, and support for companies on the U.S.
Outer Continental Shelf” and to help industry “meet its safety and sustainability objectives” under
the SEMS process.117 In May 13, 2021, testimony to the Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources, the COS Director—a former USCG officer and lead regulator for offshore oil
and gas safety, security, and environmental compliance—described integration of COS
information-sharing initiatives with regulatory requirements, saying: “The COS is playing a
central role in both advancing a culture of safety in offshore operations and providing an
important interface with government regulators,”118 Activities include collection and analysis of
SEMS third-party audit data, incident data, and safety performance data, which in turn have been
posted on the COS public website and shared with regulators.119
In the onshore segment, API works with other SDOs and maintains an active membership in the
National Service, Transmission, Explorations and Production Safety (nSTEPS) Network,
“founded in 2003 in South Texas by OSHA and industry to reduce injuries and fatalities.”
According to API, it meets regularly with other stakeholders to share information and best
practices related to workplace safety.120 Additional y, API has sponsored the OSHA Oil and Gas
Safety Conference.121
In 2014, NIST published a widely-referenced cybersecurity framework (“the NIST framework”)
for critical infrastructure in fulfilment of White House Executive Order (E.O.) 13636, “Improving
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.”122 The NIST framework cal s for development of industry-
specific profiles, which it describes as “an organization’s unique alignment of their organizational
requirements and objectives, risk appetite, and resources against the desired outcomes of the
Framework Core.” Further, “Profiles can be used to identify opportunities for improving
cybersecurity posture by comparing a ‘Current’ Profile with a ‘Target’ Profile.”123 As described
below, the NIST framework has been widely used to inform development of cyber risk-

117 See Center for Offshore Safety (COS), “Who We Are,” https://www.centerforoffshoresafety.org/About-COS/Who-
We-Are; also API, “ API: Board of Directors Approves Industry Center for Offshore Safety,” press release, March 17,
2011, https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/api-board-of-directors-approves-industry-center-for-offshore-safety-
118198374.html.
118 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Testimony of Russell Holmes, Director, Center
for Offshore Safety, Full Committee Hearing to Examine Offshore Energy Development, 117 th Cong., 1st sess., May 13,
2021, pp. 4-5, https://www.energy.senate.gov/services/files/16817187-8CDB-4806-BC57-28062DF95AF5.
119 Ibid, p.4.
120 API, API Commitment to Safety: Onshore Oil and Gas Extraction, 2016, pp. 1-2, https://www.api.org/-/media/Files/
Policy/Safety/14-Industry-commitment-to-onshore-safety.pdf.
121 API is listed as the “Pinnacle Sponsor” of the 2021 Oil and Gas Safety and Health Conference. According to the
event website, the conference “ will focus on two regulated segments in the oil and gas industry: safety and health and
environmental. As always, the conference will provide a platform to exchange new ideas and concepts related to the oil
and gas industry, all with the overriding goal of achieving better safety and environmental operations and regulatory
com pliance [emphases added].” See University of T exas, Arlington, “ Oil & Gas Safety and Health Conference 2021
OSHA Exploration & Production,” https://web.cvent.com/event/026fff5e-30a0-47af-bed6-32487a092a4a/summary?rt=
NR4KMwT QrEC83OCoRg_T JA.
122 Executive Order 13636, “Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States: Barack H. Obam a (Washington: GPO, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/
2013/02/12/executive-order-improving-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity.
123 See NIST , “Cybersecurity Framework: An Introduction to the Components of the Network,” https://www.nist.gov/
cyberframework/online-learning/components-framework.
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management guidance for the critical infrastructure enterprise general y, and the oil and gas
subsector specifical y.
USCG—consulting with ONG SCC and other industry partners—used the NIST framework to
develop a profile for the Maritime Bulk Liquids Transfer (MBLT) and Offshore Facilities mission
areas regulated under MTSA authorities.124 The profile was intended as “nonmandatory guidance”
for industry partners to aid compliance with 33 C.F.R. 154-156, which regulates a range of MBLT
and offshore facilities’ systems and operations related to handling of oil and other hazardous
materials.125 The profiles identified potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities relating to regulated
systems and operations, and provided users with guidance on making risk assessments and
implementing cybersecurity plans.
Since 2012, DOE has developed the Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) for
industry partners in the energy critical infrastructure sector, including the oil and gas subsector.
C2M2 is developed in reference to the NIST Framework. The 2021 update to C2M2 lists ONG
SCC and the Electricity SCC as the primary private-sector sponsors of the document, and lists
dozens of oil and gas industry representatives from al segments as contributors.126 Unlike the
USCG cybersecurity profiles described above, C2M2 does not refer to a regulatory framework
and is not intended to facilitate regulatory compliance.127 DOE and its private-sector partners
designed C2M2 to be used by relevant industries in conjunction with an online self-evaluation
tool to benchmark current capabilities or “maturity” of cybersecurity programs and practices, and
plan for future improvements.128 It covers several related domains, such as risk management,
third-party (or supply-chain) risk management, and threat and vulnerability management.129
As noted above (see “Voluntary Consensus Standards and Recommended Practices”), TSA has
issued a series of voluntary Pipeline Security Guidelines (“the guidelines”), most recently in
2018. TSA developed the guidelines in collaboration with industry representatives and the
Pipeline GCC and SCC.130 These guidelines were developed to inform voluntary TSA
consultations with pipeline sector stakeholders, and were intended to be advisory rather than
regulatory in nature.131 The guidelines recommend that pipeline operators should “consider the
approach outlined in the NIST Framework and the guidance issued by DHS and the Department
of Energy along with industry-specific or other established methodologies, standards, and best
practices.”132
Members of the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, which represent the majority of
interstate natural gas pipeline operators in the United States, have committed to following the

124 USCG, Maritime Bulk Liquids Transfer, Offshore Operations, and Passenger Vessel Cybersecurity Framework
Profiles, Version 3, Washington, D.C., December 2017, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-FAC/Documents/
Cyber%20Profiles%20Overview.docx.
125 Ibid, p. vi.
126 DOE, Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2), Version 2.0, Washington, DC, July 2021, p. iii,
https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/C2M2%20Version%202.0%20July%202021_508.pdf .
127 Ibid, p. vi.
128 Ibid, p. 5.
129 See DOE, Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, “Components of the C2M2,”
https://www.energy.gov/ceser/cybersecurity-capability-maturity-model-c2m2.
130 T ransportation Security Administration (T SA), Pipeline Security Guidelines, March 2018, p. 1, https://www.tsa.gov/
sites/default/files/pipeline_security_guidelines.pdf.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid, p. 22.
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guidelines and the NIST Framework.133 Voluntary commitments have since been superseded in
part by the first of two TSA security directives issued in the wake of the Colonial Pipeline
incident. The May 2021 directive requires covered pipeline operators to:134
 review Section 7 of the guidelines;
 assess whether current practices and activities to address cyber risks to
Owner/Operators Information and Operational Technology systems align with
the guidelines;
 identify any gaps; and
 identify remediation measures that wil be taken to fil those gaps and a timeline
for implementing these remediation measures.
Examples of Information Sharing
A table in a 2018 report, titled “Defense in Depth: Cybersecurity in the Natural Gas & Oil
Industry,” ONG SCC lists several examples of “information sharing with industry partners”—two
of which were facilitated by ONG-ISAC.135 In the first case, an oil and natural gas company
shared information via the ONG-ISAC about a phishing campaign. The ONG-ISAC used the
information to identify and notify other companies being targeted. In the second case, an oil and
natural gas company analyst researched “known personalities, their associates and supporters
involved in il egal activities during global natural gas and oil protests”—apparently a reference to
anti-industry protestors that target oil and gas infrastructure with disruptive and potential y il egal
tactics. The company shared a “threat information package” via DNG-ISAC, which included
examples of “successful legal mitigations used by Federal, State, Local, Tribal and Territorial
partners.”136
The overal nature and scope of information sharing between ONG-ISAC and its governmental
and private-sector partners is unclear from these two examples. However, the report states:
Industry works closely with the government agencies responsible for cybersecurity
throughout each of these segments—from Coast Guard regulatory oversight in maritime
and maritime-facing facilities to Transportation Security Administration (TSA) regulatory
oversight of pipelines, as well as bi-directional sharing with the U.S. intelligence
community via the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/NIST’s National
Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), DOE, FBI and others—
ensuring collaboration and communication at every point.137
Broader federal efforts to increase sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures
between the private sector and federal agencies on a larger scale via automated means have
produced modest results, according to a 2019 interagency report to Congress in compliance with
the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015.138 According to the report, “as of June 2019,

133 ONG SCC, Defense in Depth, op. cit., p. 23; and Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, “Commitments to
Pipeline Security,” https://www.ingaa.org/File.aspx?id=34310&v=836b69e4.
134 See T ransportation Security Administration, Security Directive Pipeline 2021-01, Enhancing Pipeline Security,
Springfield, VA, May 28, 2021, p. 4.
135 Ibid, p. 21. T he report lists a total of five examples. T wo involve ONG ISAC, two involv e other peer-to-peer
sharing, and one involves E-ISAC. It is unclear from the examples in the ONG SCC report what additional information
may have been shared by ONG-ISAC with private-sector or public-sector partners.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid, p. 7.
138 See Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (OIGIC), Unclassified Joint Report on the
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only four Federal and six non-Federal entities used AIS to share cyber threat information.” (AIS
refers to the Automated Indicator System—the automated capability mandated by the act, which
is provided by CISA.)139 The report identified several obstacles to greater information sharing,
including restrictive classification processes; limited interoperability of relevant ICT systems;
industry liability concerns; and perceived quality and relevance of information shared via
automated means.140 In response to these concerns, CISA began adding context to AIS data and
has developed an industry engagement plan, according to the report.141
The PCII program (see the “Information Sharing and Analysis Centers” section) has also faced
obstacles to widespread adoption by private-sector stakeholders, according to a 2006 Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report.142 More recently, DHS initiated a rulemaking process in
2016 to update PCII program regulations codified under 6 C.F.R. Part 29. (An updated rule has
not been published as of December 2021.) DHS received a total of 11 responses during the
comment period from corporate entities and individuals.143 The response from Berkshire
Hathaway Energy—the only energy company to submit comments—offered both praise and
criticism for the PCII program.144
Berkshire Hathaway Energy organizations have used the PCII protections as key
confidence-building measure in engagements involving numerous Department of
Homeland Security offices as well as other related partners including the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy, Department of Defense, Federal Bureau
of Investigation and numerous state law enforcement agencies. PCII provides a common
framework across multiple political and administrative boundaries for establishing a key
baseline set of reasonable protections.
Berkshire Hathaway Energy stated that it had participated “in more than a dozen” PCII
engagements. However, the company also expressed concerns about persistent obstacles to
information sharing.
The most significant concern is that regulatory discretion by the Department of Homeland
Security PCII authorities could expose sensitive information that was offered in good faith
and with the expectation of PCII protections submitted in the future .... The U.S.
government’s track record of protecting both classified and non-classified information
leaves room for improvement.

Im plem entation of the Cybersecurity Inform ation Sharing Act of 2015 , AUD-2019-005-U, Washington, DC, December
19, 2019, p. 11, https://www.oversight.gov/report/icig/unclassified-joint -report-implementation-cybersecurity-
information-sharing-act-2015.
139 See CISA, “Automated Indicator Sharing,” https://www.cisa.gov/ais.
140 OIGIC, op. cit., pp. 3 and 11.
141 Ibid, p. 11.
142 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More
Widespread Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical Infrastructure Inform ation , GAO-06-383, April 2006,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-06-383.pdf.
143 See Regulations.gov, “Proposed Rule: Updates to Protected Critical Infrastructure Program,”
https://www.regulations.gov/document/DHS-2016-0032-0001, posted by DHS on April 21, 2016; and Regulations.gov,
“Proposed Rule: Updates to Protected Critical Infrastructure Program,” https://www.regulations.gov/document/DHS-
2016-0032-0003, posted by DHS on May 13, 2016.
144 Berkshire Hathaway Energy, Comments on Proposed Updates to Protected Critical Infrastructure Program , July
18, 2016, pp. 1-2.
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Discussion and Analysis
The federal CISR policy framework affords significant autonomy to the private sector, which
owns and operates much of the nation’s critical infrastructure. In many instances relevant federal
agencies rely upon private-sector partners to develop and implement voluntary consensus
standards and recommended practices to manage risk across each of the 16 official y recognized
critical infrastructure sectors, and to engage in voluntary public-private partnerships.
In public communications, oil and gas subsector stakeholders frequently present the compulsory
and voluntary aspects of the federal CISR enterprise in binary terms, wherein more of one
necessarily means less of the other. For example, the ONG SCC states in its 2018 cybersecurity
report, “The reliance upon voluntary mechanisms, including ... proven frameworks and public-
private collaboration, rather than compulsory standards or regulations, is the most effective and
robust way to bolster the cybersecurity of industry companies and the critical infrastructure they
operate.”145
Such statements echo those made by successive presidential administrations since the creation of
the modern CISR enterprise in the late 1990s. These have general y advocated for voluntary
public-private collaboration and coordination as the preferred and most efficient means to
leverage industry expertise in highly complex and dynamic critical infrastructure sectors (see the
“Balancing Coordination and Regulatory Authorities” section). Relevant executive orders,
strategy documents, and agency programs in recent decades have therefore general y sought to
preempt potential regulatory burdens through collaborative development of risk-based standards,
best practices, and information sharing with private-sector partners.
The apparent alignment of voluntary public-private partnerships with emerging or evolving
regulatory regimes in the oil and gas subsector as described in this report suggests that—in actual
practice—private-sector participation in voluntary CISR programs and activities is significantly
conditioned by the structure of federal regulatory authorities and oversight. Voluntary best
practices and information-sharing initiatives and regulatory regimes are frequently co-constituted
as elements of a common enterprise, and coexist within specific functional areas of the oil and
gas subsector (see the “Coordination and Information-Sharing Activities” section).146
Federal participation in the voluntary consensus standards development process in the oil and gas
subsector occurs most among agencies such as PHSMA, USCG, and BSEE that have significant
regulatory roles (see “Voluntary Consensus Standards and Recommended Practices” section).147
For example, USCG—the DHS agency that enforces security regulations under MTSA—states in
the 2018 annual DHS agency report to NIST required under NTTAA that participation in
voluntary consensus standards processes “helps the Coast Guard fulfil its regulatory functions
more efficiently, develop the Government/industry partnerships crucial to stewardship, and gain
valuable public feedback necessary for effective policy development.”148 CISA and TSA—DHS

145 ONG SCC, Defense-in-Depth, op. cit., p. 26.
146 For a theoretical discussion of this process, see Rebecca Slayton and Aaron Clark -Ginsberg, “Beyond Regulatory
Capture: Coproducing Expertise for Critical Infrastructure Protection,” Regulation & Governance, vol. 12, no. 1
(March 2018).
147 See NIST , “NT T AA Reports,” https://standards.gov/NT TAA/Report/viewAgencyReport.aspx, for access to
congressionally-mandated annual federal agency reports to NIST .
148 See “Department of Homeland Security Fiscal Year 2018 Agency Report ,” https://standards.gov/NT TAA/Report/
viewAgencyReport.aspx. By contrast, the report indicates that other DHS agencies (CISA and T SA) focus on IT ICT
cybersecurity standards and aviation security technology respectively.
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agencies with lesser regulatory footprints in the oil and gas subsector—used the report to
highlight activities in other critical infrastructure sectors.
Major industry SDOs have general y developed risk-management standards in critical functional
areas and risk categories where regulatory concerns exist (see the “Voluntary Consensus
Standards and Recommended Practices” section), either to pursue incorporation of voluntary
consensus standards documents by reference into existing regulatory regimes or preemption of
regulation in the first place. There may be less impetus for voluntary consensus standards
development in unregulated or lightly regulated areas of the subsector.
The record indicates that API and other industry organizations have been most active in
developing risk-management standards and investing in voluntary public-private partnerships in
heavily regulated industry segments, such as offshore fuel exploration and extraction. For
example, the Center for Offshore Safety (COS) industry safety group provides aggregated
incident data to industry regulators. BSEE claims to have used this data to inform regulatory
oversight, and many regulatory filings cite examples of public-private coordination and
collaboration under COS auspices.149 By contrast, safety programs for the onshore exploration
and extraction segment, such as the nSTEPS Network described in the “Examples of Public-
Private Coordination” section, do not appear to have produced comparable public-private
partnerships, or publicly available safety and security data.
Private-sector stakeholders in the oil and gas subsector often claim that—regardless of regulatory
requirements—applicable standards for process safety, security (both physical and cyber), and
SCRM enjoy wide adoption throughout the industry. For example, in its 2018 cybersecurity
report, ONG SCC states that, “Cybersecurity in the natural gas and oil industry applies
throughout the value chain, extending from wel heads to pipelines and through to the supply of
natural gas to an electric power generation facility or gas utility, or the supply of oil to a refinery
and through to a gasoline station.”150
Assessing the accuracy of such statements is beyond the scope of this report. However, the
limited availability of relevant information that could potential y be used for an assessment of
cybersecurity or other CISR risk profiles in the oil and gas subsector is a source of concern for
some observers. For example, the LLNL report states:
Strict cybersecurity regulations govern power, chemical and nuclear facilities, but no
federal laws impose such standards in the ONG industry.151 When ONG companies have
been compromised, they aren’t required to report the cyber incident. Even when they turn
to federal authorities for help, the specifics are typically kept secret because companies
disclose information in exchange for anonymity and discretion. The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) publishes aggregated data on cyber-attacks within the ONG
sector, but with no mandatory reporting requirements for asset owners, the data may be
representative of only a small share of the cyberattacks against the energy industry.152
Information sharing among competing entities within the private sector, and between private-
sector owner-operators of critical infrastructure and federal security agencies, were among the

149 See BSEE, “Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Con tinental Shelf: Safety and Environmental
Management Systems Revisions,” 78 Federal Register 20427, April 5, 2013.
150 ONG SCC, Defense in Depth, op. cit., p. 17.
151 For overview of electric grid cybersecurity enforceable standards, see CRS Report R45312, Electric Grid
Cybersecurity, by Richard J. Campbell; CRS In Focus IF10853, Chem ical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, by Frank
Gottron; and CRS Report R42853, Nuclear Energy: Overview of Congressional Issues, by Mark Holt .
152 LLNL Report, op. cit. p. 13.
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core policy concerns that gave impetus to the CISR enterprise from its earliest days. Key
legislation, such as the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 and the Cybersecurity
Information Act of 2015, have sought to elicit sharing of sensitive information by limiting federal
oversight authorities and providing assurances of confidentiality and certain immunities to owner-
operators of critical infrastructure. However, results appear to be modest (see “Information
Sharing and Analysis Centers”). As seen in the 2016 plant explosion in Pascagoula, MS,
information secrecy can have catastrophic consequences (see text box, “Unmanaged Risk and
Disruption of Critical Supply Functions”).153
Information and data gaps may affect risk-management activities in several ways, according to
experts. First, such gaps may hinder public and private-sector stakeholders from developing a
consensus understanding of relevant risks based on accurate assessments of hazards and
vulnerabilities affecting critical systems, assets, and networks. Second, such gaps may obscure
understanding of both the technical content of risk-management programs, and the manner and
extent of their implementation across the oil and gas subsector. This in turn may hinder
assessment of the appropriateness and effectiveness of voluntary consensus standards,
recommended practices, and guidelines as applied in practice, especial y when multiple standards
may be applicable and stakeholder consensus is weak (see the “Voluntary Consensus Standards
and Recommended Practices” section).154
The structure of voluntary guidance, and its relationship to relevant regulatory frameworks, may
affect information sharing. Again, comparison of offshore and onshore exploration and extraction
segments may be il ustrative. The offshore segment, regulated under OCSLA and MTSA
authorities, provides a notable contrast with other segments. For example, the USCG
cybersecurity profiles for operators of offshore and MBLT facilities are intended as
nonmandatory guidance to aid compliance with 33 C.F.R. 154-156, which covers safety standards
for maritime oil and gas transfer facilities. However, they are structured in such a way that
private-sector entities using them would necessarily provide information about cybersecurity
vulnerabilities and mitigations to USCG regulators under the reporting requirements of 33 C.F.R.
105-106. Additional y, SEMS requirements have apparently led to industry development of a
robust community of interest for information sharing and analysis under COS auspices (see
“Examples of Information Sharing”).
By contrast, the DOE C2M2 model is designed primarily to facilitate information sharing within
organizations using the self-assessment tool (see “Examples of Information Sharing”). Although
the model applies to al critical infrastructure within the energy sector with cyber-interfaces—
including the various critical functional areas of the oil and gas subsector—it specifical y
excludes integration with regulatory compliance regimes that would facilitate sharing information
about cybersecurity vulnerabilities or mitigations with external entities, including federal
agencies.
The appropriate purpose, scope, extent, and content of regulation in the oil and gas subsector, and
its implications for development of CISR communities of interest, remain salient concerns for oil
and gas subsector stakeholders. Many subsector stakeholders view increased regulatory burdens
as its own category of risk.155 For such stakeholders, ensuring that critical infrastructure risk-
management continues to be largely based on voluntary public-private collaboration, rather than
regulation, is likely to be a priority. Advocates for this approach frequently claim that owner-

153 CSB, Case Study: Loss of Containment, Fires, and Explosions at Enterprise Products Midstream Gas Plant, No.
2016-02-I-MS, February 13, 2019, p. 38. https://www.csb.gov/assets/1/6/final_case_study_-_enterprise.pdf.
154 Ibid, pp. 31, 38-39.
155 BDO 2017, op. cit., p.6.
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operators are best positioned to assess and manage risks to their critical systems, assets, and
networks. Overly prescriptive approaches, they say, may make risk management less efficient—
i.e., expending more resources for less overal risk mitigation.
Others question whether the existing emphasis on voluntary industry participation and consensus
is achieving necessary levels of risk reduction or mitigation in a high-risk critical infrastructure
subsector. Among federal agencies, CSB in particular has often exercised its advisory authorities
to highlight regulatory gaps and to advocate setting and enforcing specific risk reduction goals for
oil and gas infrastructure operators.156 The 2021 incidents affecting electricity supply in Texas and
fuel supplies on the East Coast, described above, focused congressional attention on perceived
failures of the voluntary CISR framework. Numerous hearings and legislative proposals raised
the issue of new regulatory authorities and functions to protect critical infrastructure.157 However,
significant congressional support stil exists for the voluntary public-private partnership model.158
117th Congress Legislation
Congress enacted a number of provisions to improve cybersecurity of the bulk power system
under Subtitle B, “Cybersecurity,” of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58),
focusing on voluntary assessments, information sharing, investment incentives, grants, and
technical assistance from DOE, DHS, and other federal agencies. One provision specifical y
includes elements of the oil and gas subsector. “Modeling and Assessing Energy Infrastructure
Risk,” directs the Secretary of Energy, in coordination with other federal agencies, to develop a
$50 mil ion program to improve vulnerability assessments and modeling capabilities, research
infrastructure and hardening solutions, conduct exercises, and update the DOE C2M2 model to
include physical security (see “Examples of Public-Private Coordination”). The purpose of the
program is to secure electric, natural gas, and oil exploration, transmission, and delivery networks
“in the face of natural and human-made threats and hazards, including electric magnetic pulse and
geomagnetic disturbances.”
The Ransom Disclosure Act (S. 2943) would require certain entities to disclose ransom payments
to DHS. Specifical y, within 48 hours of paying a ransom, disclosure must be made to DHS by
any entity that (1) is engaged in interstate commerce, (2) is engaged in an activity affecting
interstate commerce, or (3) receives federal funds. DHS must annual y publish information
disclosed, including the total dollar amount paid, without revealing identifying information.
Although not specific to the oil and gas subsector, this legislation would affect Colonial Pipeline
Company and other subsector companies subjected to ransomware attacks.
The Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2021 (H.R. 5440) would establish
a new CISA Cyber Incident Review Office responsible for collecting and reviewing incident data
from covered critical infrastructure entities, as wel as facilitating bidirectional information
sharing between relevant private-sector stakeholders and government intel igence agencies.

156 For example, U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, Drilling Rig Explosion and Fire at the
Macondo Well, vol. 4, Washington, DC, April 20, 2017.
157 For example, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, National
Cybersecurity Strategy: Protection of Federal and Critical Infrastructure System s, 117th Cong., 1st sess., September 23,
2021, and U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure
Protection, and Innovation, Stakeholder Perspectives on the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of
2021, 117th Cong., 1st sess., September 1, 2021.
158 See Portman et al., op. cit., p. 1. T he letter to the DHS Inspector General in response to T SA directives f or pipeline
security in 2021 reads in part, “Our critical infrastructure must be secured and protected against cyberattacks. However,
securing critical infrastructure requires a collaborative approach with the experts in these industries—the people who
operate this critical infrastructure and who are charged with implementing these directives.”
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Covered critical infrastructure entities would be subject to certain requirements (subject to agency
rulemaking) for reporting cybersecurity incidents to the Cyber Incident Review Office.
The Defense of United States Infrastructure Act of 2021 (S. 2491) would establish a National
Cyber Resilience Assistance Fund, “to improve the ability of the Federal Government to assist in
enhancing critical infrastructure cyber resilience, to improve security in the national cyber
ecosystem, to address Systemical y Important Critical Infrastructure, and for other purposes.” The
proposed grant program would al ow DHS to award cybersecurity resilience improvement grants
to eligible private-sector entities under three conditions:
 presence of “clearly defined cybersecurity risk” affecting critical infrastructure
 insufficient private-sector incentives to mitigate risk
 clear need for federal responsibility to mitigate identified risks
The proposed legislation also contains provisions for cloud based information sharing across
federal agencies, a product certification program for designated “critical information and
communications technology” based on to-be-developed consensus standards, and establishment
of a Bureau of Cybersecurity Statistics with DHS to track and analyze cyber incident data.
Several bil s in the 117th Congress would affect federal pipeline cybersecurity programs,
including the Pipeline Security Act (H.R. 3243), the Pipeline and LNG Facility Cybersecurity
Preparedness Act (H.R. 3078), the Promoting Interagency Coordination for Review of Natural
Gas Pipelines Act (H.R. 1616), and the Energy Product Reliability Act (H.R. 6084). These bil s
primarily deal with federal agency roles and responsibilities in the pipeline sector, and
interagency coordination. For discussion of these bil s and related issues, see the “Issues for
Congress” section in this report.159
116th Congress Legislation
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260), enacted under the 116th Congress,
contains the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act (the Act), named after a Massachusetts resident
kil ed in a residential natural gas explosion. The Act directed the Secretary of Transportation to
promulgate regulations to require new standards for downstream gas distribution operators’
integrity management plans for low-pressure pipelines. Among other provisions, it required
operators to assess hazards of cast iron pipes and mains (if present) and system pressure
anomalies, and to consider factors other than past anomalies when making assessments.
Additional y, it specifical y prohibited operators from determining that there are no consequences
associated with low-probability events without appropriate engineering or other justification.
Issues for Congress
With respect to critical infrastructure risk management in the oil and gas sector, Congress may
consider several specific issues of potential interest: the role of federal agencies in industry-led
standards development processes and reliance on industry associations to provide standards used
for regulatory purposes; information sharing and incident disclosure requirements and the
structure and governance of information-sharing bodies; and optimization of regulatory,
nonregulatory, or hybrid frameworks that combine voluntary guidance and public -private
coordination with risk-management mandates.

159 For additional information (except H.R. 6084), see CRS Report R46903, Pipeline Cybersecurity: Federal
Program s, by Paul W. Parfomak and Chris Jaikaran.
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Legislation introduced or enacted in the 116th and 117th Congresses may have implications for al
of these issues, both within the oil and gas subsector (including pipelines) and among other
critical infrastructure sectors and subsectors. Taken together, this legislation indic ates
congressional focus on several key areas:
 directly supporting private-sector risk mitigation investments, particularly in
cybersecurity;
 closing data gaps through creation of new agency functions and regulatory
requirements for cybersecurity incident reporting;
 revised agency roles and responsibilities for critical infrastructure security and
resilience; and
 expanded scope of mandatory physical and cybersecurity standards.
The Voluntary Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Framework
Some legislation suggests a fundamental y altered approach to critical infrastructure security and
resilience risk management as a national enterprise. For example, the current framework places
primary responsibility for risk management for privately owned systems, assets, and networks on
owner-operators—including the costs of risk mitigation. S. 2491 identifies market failures as
having potential to discourage necessary infrastructure security and resilience investments by the
private sector, and proposes a government funding mechanism—i.e., a new series of homeland
security grants—to address identified gaps. It is perhaps a tacit acknowledgement that private-
sector business imperatives may not necessarily align with national risk-management goals in al
or most cases—a key assumption of the existing framework. In any case, federal funding for
private-sector risk mitigation would represent a new direction for the critical infrastructure
enterprise, placing increased responsibility on the federal government to support private-sector
investment in critical infrastructure security and resilience.
H.R. 3078 would elevate the role of DOE in voluntary risk-management programs “through
councils or other entities in sharing, analysis, or sector coordinating, to ensure the security,
resiliency, and survivability of natural gas pipelines (including natural gas transmission and
distribution pipelines), hazardous liquid pipelines, and liquefied natural gas facilities.” Similar
functions are currently carried out by TSA and DOT in the Transportation Systems Sector, which
includes the Pipeline Modal Subsector. The bil contains a savings clause which preserves
existing agency authorities while modifying DOE authorities and mandates in the subsector. In
the FY2020 NDAA, Congress mandated DHS updates to critical infrastructure sectors and
SRMAs. As of this writing, no updates have been publicly released that would indicate revised
roles and responsibilities of SRMAs.
Information Sharing, Data Gaps, and Incident Reporting Requirements
Congress continues to show interest in information sharing as a key component of efforts to make
relevant data for risk management more widely available to critical infrastructure sector
stakeholders. Existing programs described in this report are predicated upon industry wil ingness
to share critical information if the federal government eliminates or mitigates certain barriers to
information sharing by providing assurances of anonymity and discretion. The comparatively
modest results of these programs have increased congressional interest in mandates to compel
disclosure of critical infrastructure vulnerabilities or incidents, such as those proposed in S. 2943
and H.R. 5440, described above.
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In recent years, Congress has enacted a number of strategy development and risk assessment
requirements for federal agencies entrusted with critical infrastructure security and resilience.
Congress has likewise created agencies and offices to exercise necessary analytical functions to
fulfil these requirements—the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act of 2018 that
created CISA is one such example. The Bureau of Cybersecurity Statistics proposed under S.
2491 would further centralize federal functions for critical infrastructure risk analyses and
assessments, while also creating a new demand signal for critical infrastructure data.
Regulatory Authorities and Oversight of Pipeline Security
Pipeline security continues to elicit congressional attention, particularly in the wake of the 2021
Colonial Pipeline Company ransomware attack and other widely publicized failures. Issues of
agency jurisdiction, mission, and coordination with other agencies were raised in legislation
introduced in the 117th Congress. H.R. 3243 revises TSA duties, requiring it to enhance pipeline
security operations in coordination with CISA, and creating a pipeline security section with TSA.
This mandate presupposes a more assertive regulatory role and capability for TSA. Prior to the
Colonial Pipeline incident, TSA general y focused on cultivating public-private partnerships with
pipeline operators and promulgating voluntary guidelines.
H.R. 6084 would fundamental y restructure the regulatory framework for pipeline infrastructure
security and resilience, proposing a framework that closely paral els the one currently in force in
the electricity subsector. It would give the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), an
independent agency within DOE, authority to create an independent industry reliability
organization (the “Energy Product Reliability Organization”) responsible for developing and
implementing mandatory pipeline reliability standards for cybersecurity, physical security, and
supply coordination (for electricity generation facilities), under agency regulatory oversight.
FERC’s current regulatory role in the pipeline subsector focuses on siting and rate-setting issues.
However, FERC already oversees an industry reliability organization (the “Electricity Reliability
Organization”) in the electricity subsector which performs a function similar to that proposed in
H.R. 6084.

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Appendix A. Oil and Gas Subsector Supply-Chain
Diagrams
Figure A-1. Hydrocarbon Liquids (Oil) Supply Chain

Source: National Petroleum Council
Notes: See National Petroleum Council, Enhancing Emergency Preparedness: Government and Oil & Natural Gas
Industry Actions to Prepare, Respond, and Recover, p. H-2, Washington, DC, 2014.

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Figure A-2. The Natural Gas and Natural Gas Liquids Supply Chain

Source: National Petroleum Council.
Notes: See National Petroleum Council, Enhancing Emergency Preparedness: Government and Oil and Natural Gas
Industry Actions to Prepare, Respond, and Recover, p. G-2, Washington, DC, 2014.

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Appendix B. The National Standards System:
Federal Roles, Authorities, and Policies
The origins of the national standards development process date back more than a century. Public
and private-sector stakeholders developed the system to facilitate increased industrial efficiency
and expansion of domestic and global markets for U.S. goods.160 Stakeholder categories include
individual enterprises; industry groups; accredited standards developing organizations (SDOs);
public-private coordinating bodies; and regulatory agencies.
The federal government supports, but does not directly administer, the national standards system.
The American National Standards Institute (ANSI), a private nonprofit organization, coordinates
private-sector standards development through its accreditation process. Industry participation is
voluntary. However, only ANSI-accredited SDOs may seek recognition of proposals as American
National Standards. Private-sector entities may use the ANSI process to develop American
National Standards to facilitate recognition and acceptance by federal and international regulatory
bodies. According to ANSI, American National Standards are based on several factors, including
industry consensus; an open and transparent development process; balance among stakeholders;
and due process. (SDOs may also publish recommended practices that may meet some, but not
al , requirements for ANSI standards.) The national standards system is both decentralized and
competitive—i.e., private-sector SDOs seek wide recognition and acceptance for proprietary
voluntary consensus standards offered for sale to interested stakeholders.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), a Department of Commerce agency,
provides technical support to private-sector accreditation bodies and domestic SDOs, but does not
set voluntary consensus standards in most cases, except for cybersecurity. Under the
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-274), Congress directed NIST to “on an
ongoing basis, facilitate and support the development of a voluntary, consensus-based, industry-
led set of standards, guidelines, best practices, methodologies, procedures, and processes to cost-
effectively reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure ... to coordinate closely and regularly with
relevant private-sector personnel and entities, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and
other relevant industry organizations, including Sector Coordinating Councils and Information
Sharing and Analysis Centers, and incorporate industry expertise.” [emphasis added]
The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA) of 1995 (P.L. 104-113) and
OMB Circular A-119 together provide legislative and national standards policy guidance to
federal agencies. Specifical y, federal agencies are required to participate in the deliberations of
standards-setting bodies and to use voluntary consensus standards developed under the national
system “whenever practicable and appropriate.” The OMB circular does not directly reference
critical infrastructure security and resilience. It focuses on reducing burdens to private-sector
contractors caused by competing federal agency and private-sector standards. Nonetheless,
relevant regulatory agencies have cited it when developing risk-based performance standards in
partnership with regulated entities. Many of the largest oil and gas industry associations that
exercise both standards development and policy advocacy functions are members of relevant
PPD-21 coordination bodies.

160 Maureen A. Breitenberg, The ABC’s of Standards Activities, National Institute of Standards and T echnology
(NIST ), NIST IR 7614, Gaithersburg, MD, August 2009.
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Author Information

Brian E. Humphreys

Analyst in Science and Technology Policy

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
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