U.S. Climate Change Policy

U.S. Climate Change Policy

U.S. Climate Change Policy
October 28, 2021
The greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere trap radiant energy, warming earth’s surface
and oceans. Scientific assessments conclude that GHGs very likely have been the main driver of
Kate C. Shouse,
warming of the earth’s lower atmosphere since 1979. The most recent global assessment
Coordinator
projected that surface temperature would continue to rise until at least mid-century even under
Analyst in Environmental
the lowest GHG emission scenarios considered. A range of actions to mitigate GHG emissions
Policy
and the risks of climate change (i.e., for adaptation or resilience) are under way or being

developed on the international, national, and subnational levels. U.S. federal policymakers and
stakeholders have different viewpoints regarding what, if anything, to do about future climate

change and related impacts.
Brief History of U.S. Climate Policy
Historically, the United States has demonstrated varying approaches and intent with regard to addressing climate change
generally and to participating in GHG abatement under the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC). International negotiations led to, among other agreements, the adoption of the Paris Agreement (PA) in 2015.
President Obama accepted the PA without submitting it to the Senate for advice and consent, and the United States became a
Party to the agreement when the PA entered into force in 2016. President Trump announced U.S. withdrawal from the PA in
June 2017, which became effective in November 2020. President Biden again accepted the PA, and the United States became
a Party on February 19, 2021.
U.S. climate change policy has involved actions implemented under various legal authorities. Prior to 2007, the federal
government implemented voluntary programs to address climate change and regulatory programs that indirectly limited GHG
emission increases from vehicles, appliances and equipment, and buildings. A shift toward direct regulation of GHG
emissions occurred following the 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, in which the Supreme Court found that the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has authority to regulate GHG emissions from motor vehicles as air pollutants
under the Clean Air Act. EPA subsequently issued rules to limit GHGs from various sources, although not all have been
implemented. State and local governments have also taken a variety of actions, including emission controls on power plants
and vehicles and building codes.
U.S. Legislation
Members of Congress have historically expressed a range of perspectives regarding climate change issues. Legislative
proposals have included carbon pricing frameworks (e.g., carbon taxes or cap-and-trade programs), sectoral approaches such
as a clean energy standard, research funding or tax policies that support GHG-abating technology development and
deployment, efforts to increase adaptation, and international cooperation. On the other hand, introduced resolutions have
expressed that the multisector carbon pricing approaches are not in the economic interests of the United States. Votes on
comprehensive climate change policy have been relatively rare in either chamber of Congress. Examples of enacted
legislation involving climate change issues include tax incentives to promote renewable energy sources and carbon capture
and sequestration efforts.
Executive Branch Approach to Climate Change
Policies and actions influencing future U.S. GHG emissions are in flux. In addition to rejoining the PA, President Biden
announced a new GHG target for the United States: to reduce net GHG emissions by 50%-52% below 2005 levels by 2030.
The Administration has also centralized executive branch organizations to identify and coordinate climate-related actions,
and issued directives with a view toward decisions that support meeting the Administration’s GHG reduction targets.
Issues for Congress
Congress may consider issues concerning U.S. GHG targets, policy approaches, and funding. For example, U.S. participation
in the PA raises issues that Congress may consider concerning the ambition, relative level of effort, and performance of other
parties’ GHG mitigation, adaptation, technology, and financing associated with the PA. Differences in parties’ GHG policies
may have implications for trade. For example, several national governments and the EU have discussed imposing border
carbon adjustments (i.e., tariffs) on imported goods from countries that do not make similarly ambitious efforts to reduce
GHG emissions.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
U.S. Emission Trends ................................................................................................................ 2
History of U.S. Federal Climate Policy ........................................................................................... 4
Mostly Voluntary or Indirect Federal Approaches Until 2010 .................................................. 6
Federal Regulation of GHGs Under Existing Authorities, 2010 to 2021 .................................. 8
Vehicle Fuel Economy and GHG Standards ....................................................................... 9
Power Plants and GHG Standards .................................................................................... 10
Oil and Natural Gas Systems, Solid Waste Landfills, and GHG Standards ...................... 10
Climate Mitigation Activities in U.S. States................................................................................... 11
U.S. Legislative Action ................................................................................................................. 13
Recently Enacted Legislation Related to GHGs ..................................................................... 14
Legislative Proposals in the 117th Congress ............................................................................ 14
Adaptation ......................................................................................................................... 17
Energy ............................................................................................................................... 18
Equity ................................................................................................................................ 18
Finance .............................................................................................................................. 18
Land Use ........................................................................................................................... 18
Executive Branch Approach to Climate Change Mitigation ......................................................... 19
GHG Targets ........................................................................................................................... 19
Announced Policies and Rulemakings .................................................................................... 20
Executive Order 13990, Protecting Public Health and the Environment and
Restoring Science To Tackle the Climate Crisis ............................................................ 20
Executive Order 14008, Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad...................... 22
Executive Order 14027, Establishment of the Climate Change Support Office ............... 24
Executive Order 14030, Climate-Related Financial Risk ................................................. 24
Executive Order 14037, Strengthening American Leadership in Clean Cars
and Trucks ...................................................................................................................... 25
FY2022 Budget Request ......................................................................................................... 25
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 28
GHG Targets and International Commitments ........................................................................ 29
U.S. Federal Policy Approaches .............................................................................................. 30
Climate Change Funding ......................................................................................................... 31

Figures
Figure 1. U.S. GHG Emissions: 1990-2019 .................................................................................... 4
Figure 2. U.S. Net GHG Emissions (1990-2019) and Selected Emissions Targets ....................... 20

Tables

Table A-1. Selected Climate Change Legislation in the 117th Congress ....................................... 34

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Appendixes
Appendix A. Climate Change Legislation in the 117th Congress: Search Methodology ............... 33
Appendix B. Selected Additional Actions in the Executive Branch .............................................. 38

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 43

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U.S. Climate Change Policy

Introduction
Millions of discrete sources throughout the U.S. economy produce carbon dioxide (CO2) and
other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.1 These sources include motor vehicles, electric power
plants, industrial facilities, commercial buildings, and households, among others. Human-related
GHG emissions have increased since the beginning of the industrial era, unequivocally increasing
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs.2 For example, atmospheric concentrations of CO2 have
increased by over 45% compared to preindustrial levels.3 Methane has increased by 156% over
the same time frame.4
The GHGs in the atmosphere trap infrared radiation as heat, warming earth’s atmosphere, land,
and ocean. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded in 2021 that “[i]t
is very likely that well-mixed GHGs were the main driver of tropospheric warming since 1979”5
and that “[g]lobal warming of 1.5°C and 2°C [compared with preindustrial temperatures] will be
exceeded during the 21st century unless deep reductions in CO2 and other GHG emissions occur
in the coming decades.”6
The increasing atmospheric concentrations of GHGs have led to various changes to the climate:
increases in average global temperature and related rising sea levels, changes in precipitation, and
increases in frequency and intensity of some extreme weather events. The latest major U.S.
scientific assessment, known as the Fourth National Climate Assessment (NCA4), concluded that
the increase in GHGs is driving global land and ocean warming and other climate changes that
are now unprecedented in the history of modern civilization. The second volume of the NCA4,
published in 2018, concluded, inter alia, that human-induced climate change is affecting U.S.
communities across the country through extreme weather events and generally warmer
temperatures, more variable precipitation, and other observed trends.7 The NCA4 describes
continued and increasing disruption to infrastructure, economic, and social systems, including
economic disparities. According to its assessment, projected climate change impacts are affecting,
and are virtually certain to increasingly affect, the U.S. economy, trade, and other essential U.S.
interests. Some stakeholders, as well as some Members of Congress, consider that the resulting

1 The primary greenhouse gases (GHGs) emitted by human activities—and estimated by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) in its annual inventories—include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane, nitrous oxide, sulfur
hexafluoride, chlorofluorocarbons, hydrofluorocarbons, and perfluorocarbons. Other GHGs include carbonaceous and
sulfuric aerosols, hydrochlorofluorocarbons, and elevated tropospheric ozone pollution generated by emissions of
nitrogen oxides and volatile organic compounds, such as solvents.
2 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “AR6 Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis,”
August 9, 2021, p. SPM-5, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/. (Hereinafter, IPCC AR6 Science.)
3 The IPCC reported that from 1750 to 2019, CO2 concentrations increased 47%. IPCC AR6 Science, pp. SPM-9 and 2-
20.
4 IPCC AR6 Science, pp. SPM-9 and 2-20.
5 IPCC AR6 Science, p. SPM-6. The IPCC was established in 1988 under the auspices of the United Nations
Environment Programme and the World Meteorological Organization to provide them with assessments of climate
change science. For more background, see IPCC, “History of the IPCC,” https://www.ipcc.ch/about/history/.
6 IPCC AR6 Science, pp. SPM-16 to SPM-17. See also IPCC, Global Warming of 1.5°C, Special Report, 2018; U.S.
Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), “Volume II: Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States,” in
Fourth National Climate Assessment, eds. D. R. Reidmiller, C. W. Avery, D. R. Easterling, et al. (Washington, D.C.:
USGCRP, 2018), doi: 10.7930/NCA4.2018; and CRS Report R45086, Evolving Assessments of Human and Natural
Contributions to Climate Change, by Jane A. Leggett.
7 USGCRP, “Volume II: Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States,” in Fourth National Climate Assessment,
eds. D. R. Reidmiller, C. W. Avery, D. R. Easterling, et al. (Washington, D.C.: USGCRP, 2018), doi:
10.7930/NCA4.2018.
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impacts of climate change in the United States and abroad are and would be modest and
manageable.
A range of actions that seek to reduce GHG emissions are currently under way or being
developed by international and subnational entities (e.g., financing by multilateral development
banks, or U.S. state actions or regional partnerships), as well as by the U.S. federal government
(e.g., support for carbon capture technologies). Nonetheless, Members of Congress and
stakeholders have different viewpoints concerning what, if anything, to do about future climate
change and related impacts. President Joseph Biden’s Administration has increased the ambition8
of U.S. GHG reduction targets and announced a whole-of-government approach to addressing
climate change. In the legislative branch, numerous Members of Congress have expressed a range
of perspectives regarding climate change issues. Some Members seeking to take action on climate
change have proposed a variety of legislative approaches.
This report provides an overview of U.S. climate change policy as of September 2021. It begins
with background on U.S. emission trends and a brief history of U.S. climate change policy, and
discusses emissions mitigation activities at the subnational level, including state and regional
programs. Next, the report discusses legislative developments, including recently enacted
legislation related to climate change and legislative proposals in the 117th Congress. The report
also considers executive branch actions and presents information about the Biden
Administration’s GHG targets, announced policies, proposals for legislative action, and examples
of other policy actions. The report concludes with issues for Congress.
This report does not provide a comprehensive summary of these actions, given their breadth and
continuously evolving nature. Rather, it aims to provide a snapshot of the current climate change
policy landscape. Upcoming international discussions, strongly held public opinions, expected
forthcoming scientific and economic reports, and other factors make it likely that climate change
may continue to be a topic of deliberation and proposed actions in Congress. Moreover,
developments may occur rapidly.
U.S. Emission Trends
The most recent U.S. GHG Inventory prepared by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) reports annual emissions and emission sinks from 1990 through 2019.9 EPA’s inventory
includes gross and net emission levels.10 As illustrated in Figure 1, the highest level of gross U.S.
GHG emissions—15.6% above 1990 levels—occurred in 2007. Gross U.S. GHG emissions in
2019 were 6,558 million metric tons of carbon dioxide-equivalent emissions (MMTCO2e),11

8 Ambition with regard to GHG targets is a term used internationally with regard to the magnitude of limitations or
reductions sought by countries or other actors.
9 Emission sinks, such as forests, vegetation, and soils, remove CO2 from the atmosphere and store the carbon. EPA,
Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/inventory-us-greenhouse-
gas-emissions-and-sinks.
10 Gross emissions refer to total emissions from all sources, and it does not account for net removals of CO2 emissions
from the atmosphere by vegetation and other sinks. U.S. sinks removed about 789 million metric tons (MMT) in 2019,
about 12% of gross emissions. EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2019, April 14,
2021, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/draft-inventory-us-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-sinks-1990-2019.
(Hereinafter, U.S. GHG Inventory, 1990-2019.)
11 Million metric tons of CO2 equivalent (MMTCO2e) is used because GHGs vary by global warming potential (GWP).
GWP is an index that allows comparisons of the heat-trapping ability of different gases over a period of time.
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which is 1.8% higher than 1990 GHG emission levels and 11.6% below 2005 levels—the year the
United States uses as a benchmark for its international GHG pledges.12
Figure 1 also shows the gross emissions contributions and trends by sector. The electricity sector
historically accounted for the largest percentage of U.S. GHG emissions from fossil fuel
combustion. As the figure indicates, emissions in the electricity sector decreased by 33% between
2005 and 2019. As the side-by-side comparison in Figure 1 illustrates, the decrease in total U.S.
GHG emissions over the past 15 years was largely related to decreases in the electricity sector.
The evolving electricity generation portfolio played a key role in the emissions decrease in the
electricity sector. Different fossil fuels, like coal and natural gas, generate different amounts of
GHGs per unit of generated electricity. For example, a natural-gas unit typically yields about 40%
of the GHG emissions of a coal-fired unit per megawatt-hour of electricity. Some sources of
electricity generation, such as nuclear power, wind, and solar, emit no GHG emissions at the point
of power generation. Over the past decade, coal’s contribution to electricity generation decreased,
while natural gas and renewable generation both increased. Several factors likely played a role in
this change, including technological advances, particularly hydraulic fracturing, as well as federal
tax incentives for renewable energy and renewable portfolio standards in the states. These and
other factors have affected the relative price differences between sources of electricity,
influencing their deployment in the electricity sector.13
Due to declines in the electricity sector emissions over the past decade, emissions from the
transportation sector surpassed those from electricity in 2016.14 In 2019, the transportation sector
accounted for 29% of total U.S. GHG emissions, and the electricity and industrial sectors
accounted for 25% and 23%, respectively.

12 U.S. GHG Inventory, 1990-2019.
13 For more discussion, see CRS Report R45453, U.S. Carbon Dioxide Emissions in the Electricity Sector: Factors,
Trends, and Projections, by Jonathan L. Ramseur.
14 For more discussion, see CRS Report R45453, U.S. Carbon Dioxide Emissions in the Electricity Sector: Factors,
Trends, and Projections, by Jonathan L. Ramseur.
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Figure 1. U.S. GHG Emissions: 1990-2019
Total U.S. Emissions and Emissions by Sector

Source: Prepared by CRS; data from EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2019, April
14, 2021, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/draft-inventory-us-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-sinks-1990-2019.
Notes: The scales of the y-axes in the above figures are different. The figure presents gross emissions (i.e., the
total emissions from all sources), and it does not account for net removals of CO2 emissions from the
atmosphere by vegetation and other sinks. U.S. GHG emissions can be categorized in a variety of ways. This
figure uses the economic sectors from EPA’s Inventory. EPA’s Inventory (Table 2-12) also presents emissions by
economic sector, with the emissions from the electricity sector distributed to each sector based on the sector’s
electricity use.
History of U.S. Federal Climate Policy
The United States has historically demonstrated varying approaches and intent with regard to
addressing climate change generally and to participating in GHG abatement under the 1992
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).15 While the United
States was instrumental in establishing the negotiations toward that treaty, it did not support
binding GHG “targets and timetables” and financial assistance to lower-income countries to
reduce their emissions and adapt to climate change. The UNFCCC did not contain binding
targets.

15 U.N. Treaty Collection, Chapter XXIII. The U.S. Senate’s ratification of the UNFCCC in October 1992 was second
among signatories and the first by an industrialized country. President George H. W. Bush transmitted the signed treaty
to the Senate for its advice and consent in 138 Congressional Record 23902 (September 8, 1992). The U.S. Senate gave
its advice and consent to ratification in 138 Congressional Record 33527 (October 7, 1992). See also S. Treaty Doc.
102-38 (1992); S. Exec. Rept. 102-55. President Bush signed the instrument of ratification and submitted it to the
United Nations on October 13, 1992. Depositary notification C.N.148.1993.
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Why “Net-Zero” Emissions Targets?
The UNFCCC stated an objective that effectively established a col ective “net zero” GHG emissions commitment
among parties to the agreement, with no specific target date. The UNFCCC objective is “to stabilize GHG
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that wil prevent dangerous human interference with the climate
system, in a time frame which allows ecosystems to adapt naturally and enables sustainable development.”
Stabilizing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere requires that the balance of “gross” emissions of GHG minus
the removals of GHG from the atmosphere reach “net zero” in order to halt any accumulation of emissions in the
atmosphere that leads to climate change. The date would be determined by a policy decision (i.e., balancing more
considerations than science alone) on what constitutes “dangerous . . interference in the climate system.” For more
information, see CRS In Focus IF11821, Net-Zero Emissions Pledges: Background and Recent Developments, by Michael
I. Westphal.
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC included binding GHG targets for the industrialized
countries, including the United States, listed in its Annex I (“Annex I Parties”), but no new
commitments for developing countries.16 The United States signed but did not ratify this treaty.
Following a stalemate in 2009 toward negotiation of a legal instrument that would include the
United States, China, and other major emitting countries, the Barack Obama Administration led
development of a more collaborative and bilateral relationship with China and others.17 This more
collaborative process resulted in adoption of the Paris Agreement (PA) in 2015.18 President
Obama accepted the agreement without submitting it to the Senate for advice and consent, and the
United States became a Party to the agreement when the PA entered into force in 2016.19
President Donald Trump announced U.S. withdrawal from the PA in June 2017, which, following
the procedures of the treaty, became effective in November 2020. On President Biden’s first day
in office, he accepted the PA, and the United States again became a Party on February 19, 2021.
To date, U.S. climate change policy has involved actions—such as standards, investments, tax
incentives, programs, and support for technology innovation—implemented under various legal
authorities. Congress has previously deliberated comprehensive authority to address climate
change, but votes on such legislation have been relatively rare. One example is H.R. 2454 in the
111th Congress, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (“Waxman-Markey”),
which would have established an economy-wide cap-and-trade system to reduce GHG emissions.
The House passed H.R. 2454 in 2009. Although companion legislation in the Senate, S. 1733,

16 United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter XXVII: Environment, “7.a. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change,” December 12, 2015, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-a&chapter=27&clang=_en. The United States signed the Kyoto Protocol on
November 12, 1998. However, in the “Byrd-Hagel” Resolution (S.Res. 98, 105th Congress, agreed to by a 95-0 vote),
the Senate expressed its opposition by stating that the United States should not sign a treaty that (1) “would mandate
new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other
agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for
Developing Country Parties,” or (2) “would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States.” The Kyoto
Protocol was never submitted to the Senate for ratification. For background on international treaties, see CRS Report
RL32528, International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S. Law, by Stephen P. Mulligan.
17 For a historical perspective, see CRS In Focus IF10296, New Climate Change Joint Announcement by China and the
United States, by Jane A. Leggett.
18 United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter XXVII: Environment, “7.d. Paris Agreement,” December 12, 2015,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-a&chapter=27&clang=_en. U.S.
depositary notification C.N.10.2021. See also CRS In Focus IF11746, United States Rejoins the Paris Agreement on
Climate Change: Options for Congress, by Jane A. Leggett.
19 Obama Administration officials concluded that the PA “does not require submission to the Senate because of the way
it is structured. The targets are not binding; the elements that are binding are consistent with already approved previous
agreements.” See U.S. Department of State, “Background Briefing on the Paris Climate Agreement,” December 12,
2015, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/12/250592.htm.
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was ordered reported from the Committee on Environment and Public Works, the bill was not
brought to the Senate floor for consideration. In the absence of new comprehensive legislative
authority to reduce GHGs, the Obama Administration pursued GHG emissions abatement under
existing authorities.20 State and local governments have also historically implemented a variety of
climate change actions (see “Climate Mitigation Activities in U.S. States”).
Mostly Voluntary or Indirect Federal Approaches Until 2010
From negotiation of the UNFCCC through the mid-2000s, the federal government primarily
relied on “no regrets” programs to address climate change, along with some efficiency regulation
that also limited GHGs.21 The programs assisted agencies and nonfederal partners in achieving
voluntary GHG reductions using technical assistance and reputational incentives offered by the
EPA, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).
Examples include Energy Star, AgStar, and EPA’s Center for Corporate Climate Leadership
programs.22 A number of studies, however, concluded that voluntary action alone could not
substantially reduce GHG emissions.23
Several regulatory programs indirectly limited GHG emission increases from vehicles, appliances
and equipment, and buildings. These continue, and largely have had increasing influence on
reducing GHG emissions as standards tightened over time. For example, the Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) set fuel economy targets, in miles per gallon, for newly manufactured
passenger cars and light trucks sold in the United States. These standards have the co-benefit of
reducing GHG emissions from these vehicles.
DOE’s conservation and energy efficiency programs provide another example of standards that
indirectly limit GHGs. Congress has enacted several broad energy policy laws—including
support for energy conservation and energy efficiency—since the 1970s, most recently the
Energy Act of 2020 (Division Z of P.L. 116-260). The Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(EPCA; P.L. 94-163) authorized a federal program to establish minimum energy conservation
standards for consumer products and industrial equipment, among other provisions. EPCA, as
amended, authorizes DOE’s Appliance and Equipment Standards Program, which sets efficiency
standards for approximately 60 product categories.24 The Energy Conservation and Production
Act (ECPA; P.L. 94-385) established federal voluntary performance standards for new residential
and commercial buildings and encouraged state and local governments to adopt and enforce

20 White House, “Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address,” February 12, 2013.
21 A no regrets approach generally refers to policies that would provide benefits, such as economic, human health, or
environmental benefits, regardless of future climate change.
22 See, for example, EPA, Voluntary Energy and Climate Programs, 2008, archived web page, 2017, at
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climatechange/voluntary-energy-and-climate-programs_.html. See also EPA,
Business Guide to EPA Climate Partnership Programs, https://archive.epa.gov/partners/web/pdf/
biz_guide_to_epa_climate_partnerships.pdf.
23 See, among other resources, Thomas P. Lyon and John W. Maxwell, “Environmental Public Voluntary Programs
Reconsidered,” Policy Studies Journal, vol. 35, no. 4 (2007): pp. 723-750, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-
0072.2007.00245.x; Richard D. Morgenstern and William A. Pizer, Reality Check: The Nature and Performance of
Voluntary Environmental Programs in the United States, Europe, and Japan (Routledge, 2010); and Katie Southworth,
“Corporate Voluntary Action: A Valuable but Incomplete Solution to Climate Change and Energy Security
Challenges,” Policy and Society, vol. 27, no. 4 (March 1, 2009), pp. 329-350, https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.polsoc.2009.01.008.
24 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11354, Department of Energy Appliance and Equipment Standards
Program, by Corrie E. Clark.
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standards through building codes, among other provisions. ECPA, as amended, also established
federal building energy efficiency standards.25
Congress established requirements for the federal government related to GHGs. The Energy
Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT 2005; P.L. 109-58) established a renewable electricity goal for the
federal government. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA; P.L. 110-140)
required agencies to report GHG emissions, although it did not specify what types of emissions.
EPACT 2005 also established the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), which mandates that U.S.
transportation fuels contain a minimum volume of renewable fuel; EISA subsequently expanded
the RFS mandate.26 The RFS mandate requires that transportation fuels sold or introduced into
commerce in the United States contain an increasing volume of a predetermined suite of
renewable fuels.27 In order to be eligible for the RFS, a renewable fuel has to meet a GHG
emission reduction threshold, among other criteria. The statute required 4.0 billion gallons of
renewable fuel in 2006, ascending to 36.0 billion gallons required in 2022, with EPA determining
the volume amounts after 2022 in future rulemakings.28
After the mid-2000s, tax incentives and federal grants, including for research and development,
increasingly supported renewable energy generation, biomass fuels, and lower-emission
vehicles.29 Administrations, over decades, have supported research to develop technologies, such
as renewable energy systems, that could achieve deeper GHG reductions and reduce the cost of
doing so. Increases in tax incentives for technology deployment, along with growing competition
among manufacturers, led to increased efficiencies and reduced costs of many technologies,
including wind and solar electricity generation.30
In late 2007, Congress directed EPA to establish a GHG reporting program. Specifically, the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161), provided $3.5 million for EPA to develop
and publish a rule that would “require mandatory reporting of greenhouse gas emissions above
appropriate thresholds in all sectors of the economy of the United States.” In response to the
congressional directive, EPA established the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP). It
requires reporting from facilities in nearly all categories of direct emitters and from suppliers of
certain fuels and manufactured GHGs (e.g., fluorinated GHGs) in the United States. The broad
scope of emissions data collected from these sources allows the agency to assess trends in
emissions over time and within industry sectors for use in agency policy and programs. The

25 Several laws have amended ECPA over the years. For more information on federal building energy requirements, see
CRS Report R46719, Green Building Overview and Issues, by Corrie E. Clark.
26 EPACT established RFS as an amendment to the Clean Air Act; see 42 U.S.C. §7545(o).
27 For more information, see CRS Report R43325, The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS): An Overview, by Kelsi
Bracmort.
28 EPA has the authority to waive the RFS requirements, in whole or in part, if certain conditions outlined in statute
prevail. For more information, see CRS Report R44045, The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS): Waiver Authority and
Modification of Volumes, by Kelsi Bracmort.
29 Most of the value of energy-related tax incentives supported fossil fuel until the mid-2000s, when the value of those
supporting renewables increased. For more information, see CRS Report R44852, The Value of Energy Tax Incentives
for Different Types of Energy Resources, by Molly F. Sherlock.
30 For example, see Lazard, Levelized Cost of Energy, Levelized Cost of Storage, and Levelized Cost of Hydrogen,
October 18, 2020, https://www.lazard.com/perspective/lcoe2020. In addition, there have been tax credits for alternative
fuel vehicles, such as hybrids, and more recently for plug-in electric vehicles. For more information, see CRS In Focus
IF11017, The Plug-In Electric Vehicle Tax Credit, by Molly F. Sherlock.
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GHGRP does not impose emissions limits, but reporting programs may create transparency
incentives for sources to limit their emissions due to public or reputational pressures.31
Federal Regulation of GHGs Under Existing Authorities, 2010 to
2021
A shift toward direct federal regulation of GHG emissions occurred following the 2007 decision
in Massachusetts v. EPA, in which the Supreme Court found that EPA has authority to regulate
GHG emissions from motor vehicles as air pollutants under the Clean Air Act (CAA).32 In the 5-4
decision, the Court’s majority concluded that EPA must decide whether GHG emissions from
new motor vehicles contribute to air pollution that may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare—or provide a reasonable explanation why it cannot or will not make that
decision. On December 15, 2009, EPA promulgated findings that six GHGs33 endanger both
public health and welfare and that GHG emissions from new motor vehicles contribute to that
endangerment. These findings are collectively referred to as the “endangerment finding.”
Of the six GHGs discussed in EPA’s endangerment finding, CO2 is the most prevalent,
accounting for about 80% of U.S. GHG emissions, on a CO2-equivalent basis, from human
activities in 2019.34 The second-most-prevalent gas in the United States in terms of emissions is
methane (10% of U.S. GHG emissions in 2019), followed by nitrous oxide (7% in 2019).35 In
2019, about two-thirds of domestic CO2 emissions were produced by the combustion of fossil
fuels for energy and transportation.36 The primary sources of U.S. methane emissions include oil
and natural gas systems, agriculture, and landfills,37 and the primary source of nitrous oxide
emissions is agricultural soil management.38
The endangerment finding triggered EPA’s duty under CAA Section 202(a) to promulgate
emission standards for new motor vehicles, which are discussed below.39 EPA has also since
issued rules to limit GHGs under other CAA authorities. For example, the agency promulgated
regulations under CAA Section 111 to limit GHGs from the electricity sector, the oil and gas

31 CRS In Focus IF11754, EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program, by Angela C. Jones.
32 549 U.S. 497 (2007). The Court held that GHGs are air pollutants within the Clean Air Act’s (CAA’s) definition of
that term and that EPA must regulate their emissions from motor vehicles if the agency finds that such emissions cause
or contribute to air pollution that may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. See CRS Report
R43699, Key Historical Court Decisions Shaping EPA’s Program Under the Clean Air Act, by Linda Tsang. The Clean
Air Act is codified as 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.
33 The six GHGs are CO2, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride.
34 U.S. GHG Inventory, 1990-2019.
35 Prevalence reported on a CO2-equivalent basis. U.S. GHG Inventory, 1990-2019.
36 EPA attributed 35% of U.S. CO2 emissions to transportation and 31% to electricity. U.S. GHG Inventory, 1990-2019.
See also EPA, Overview of Greenhouse Gases, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases.
37 Two agricultural sources of methane are livestock (e.g., some animals produce methane through the digestive
process, known as enteric fermentation) and management of animal manure. EPA attributed 27% of methane emissions
in 2019 to enteric fermentation and 9% to manure management. EPA also estimated that 30% of methane emissions
were produced by oil and natural gas systems in 2019, and 17% by landfills in 2019. U.S. GHG Inventory, 1990-2019.
See also EPA, Overview of Greenhouse Gases, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases.
38 EPA reported that agricultural soil management (e.g., application of fertilizers, manure management, or burning of
agricultural residues) accounted for 75% of domestic nitrous oxide emissions in 2019. U.S. GHG Inventory, 1990-
2019. See also EPA, Overview of Greenhouse Gases, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases.
39 EPA, “Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air
Act; Final Rule,” 74 Federal Register 66496, December 15, 2009.
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industry, and municipal solid waste landfills. EPA also finalized, in consultation with the Federal
Aviation Administration, CO2 emission standards for civilian aircraft under CAA Section 231 in
January 2021.40 EPA developed the aircraft standards in line with the internationally negotiated
standards agreed to by parties to the International Civil Aviation Organization.
The remainder of this section discusses GHG rules for vehicles, power plants, oil and natural gas
systems, and municipal solid waste landfills that were promulgated prior to the Biden
Administration.
Vehicle Fuel Economy and GHG Standards
As noted previously, transportation emissions are currently the largest source of GHG emissions
in the United States.41 In 2010, the Obama Administration brokered an agreement among 13 auto
manufacturers, the State of California,42 the United Auto Workers union, and other interested
parties for GHG emission standards for automobiles and light trucks. EPA promulgated these
GHG standards, which aligned with NHTSA’s CAFE program, as well as with those developed
by California to facilitate a “single national standard” for manufacturers.43 EPA and NHTSA also
promulgated two phases of fuel efficiency and GHG standards for newly manufactured heavy-
duty vehicles and engines (e.g., long-haul tractor-trailers, buses, and construction and utility
vehicles).44
In 2020, EPA and NHTSA promulgated the SAFE Vehicles Rule, which relaxed the GHG and
fuel economy standards for light-duty vehicles.45 EPA also withdrew the waiver that had allowed
California to set GHG emission standards stronger than the national standards to meet
“compelling and extraordinary conditions,” as authorized under the CAA.46 Various states, local
governments, and environmental and consumer organizations filed petitions for review in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit challenging the SAFE Vehicles Rule.

40 EPA, “Control of Air Pollution From Airplanes and Airplane Engines: GHG Emission Standards and Test
Procedures,” 86 Federal Register 2136, January 11, 2021. For background, see CRS In Focus IF11696, Aviation and
Climate Change, by Richard K. Lattanzio.
41 U.S. GHG Inventory, 1990-2019.
42 The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, as amended, and the CAA, as amended, generally preempt states
from adopting their own fuel economy and emission standards for new motor vehicles. However, CAA Section 209(b)
allows the State of California to request a preemption waiver for its vehicle emission standards provided that they are at
least as stringent as federal standards and, among other things, are necessary to meet “compelling and extraordinary
conditions.” For this reason, California has typically been involved in all federal vehicle emissions rulemakings.
43 For model years 2012-2016, see EPA and NHTSA, “Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule,” 75 Federal Register 25323, May 7, 2010. For model years 2017 and
later, see EPA and NHTSA, “2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule,” 77 Federal Register 62624, October 15, 2012.
44 Phase 1 rule: EPA and NHTSA, “Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel-Efficiency Standards for Medium-
and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles,” 76 Federal Register 57106, September 15, 2011. Phase 2 rule: EPA and
NHTSA, “Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel-Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines
and Vehicles—Phase 2,” 81 Federal Register 73478, October 25, 2016.
45 EPA and NHTSA, “The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks,” 85 Federal Register 24174, April 30, 2020.
46 EPA and NHTSA, “The Safer, Affordable, Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule, Part One: One National Program,”
84 Federal Register 51310, September 27, 2019. See also CRS In Focus IF10871, Vehicle Fuel Economy and
Greenhouse Gas Standards, by Richard K. Lattanzio, Linda Tsang, and Bill Canis.
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Power Plants and GHG Standards
To limit CO2 from the electricity sector, currently the second-largest emitting source category in
the United States,47 EPA in 2015 promulgated New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) for
new and modified fossil-fuel-fired power plants48 and—for existing plants—the Clean Power
Plan (CPP).49 The CPP was the subject of ongoing litigation and was never implemented. While
the NSPS remain in place, the Trump Administration repealed the CPP and finalized a new rule,
the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) rule, to limit CO2 from existing power plants. The ACE rule
applied a narrower interpretation than the CPP of the “best system of emission reduction,”
defining it as on-site “heat rate improvement” measures, also known as efficiency improvements,
for existing coal-fired units.50 In January 2021, a federal appellate court vacated and remanded
the ACE rule to EPA, and it remains unclear how EPA may act on the rule.51 The CPP and ACE
rules, issued under separate Administrations, relied on different interpretations of EPA’s CAA
authority, which may raise questions about EPA’s potential approach to regulating GHG
emissions under the CAA.
Although federal requirements to limit GHG emissions in the electricity sector have not been
implemented,52 GHG emissions in the sector declined by 33% between 2005 and 2019, as
discussed earlier in this report. See “U.S. Emission Trends” and Figure 1.
Oil and Natural Gas Systems, Solid Waste Landfills, and GHG Standards
Under the Obama Administration, federal activities in support of GHG emissions reductions in
various industrial sectors became a cornerstone of President Obama’s “Climate Action Plan.” The
Administration promulgated several regulations to address these emissions, including
 EPA standards to reduce methane emissions from new and modified activities
and equipment in the oil and natural gas sector (finalized on June 3, 2016);53
 EPA standards to reduce methane emissions from new and existing municipal
solid waste landfills (finalized on August 29, 2016);54 and

47 U.S. GHG Inventory, 1990-2019.
48 EPA, “Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units,” Final Rule, 80 Federal Register 64509, October 23, 2015.
49 EPA, “Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Final Rule,” 80 Federal Register
64661, October 23, 2015.
50 CRS Report R46568, EPA’s Affordable Clean Energy Rule: In Brief, coordinated by Kate C. Shouse.
51 The court directed EPA to reconsider its interpretation of its CAA Section 111(d) authority to regulate GHGs from
existing power plants. The court also vacated the CPP repeal but stayed its mandate until the EPA responds to the
court’s remand in a new rulemaking action.
52 Under the ACE rule, states were to establish performance standards for designated facilities through state plans. A
federal appellate court vacated and remanded the ACE rule to EPA before the date—July 8, 2022—that state plans
were due to EPA.
53 EPA, “Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources,” 81 Federal
Register 35824, June 3, 2016.
54 For new landfills, see EPA, “Standards of Performance for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills,” 81 Federal Register
59332, August 29, 2016. For existing landfills, see EPA, “Emission Guidelines and Compliance Times for Municipal
Solid Waste Landfills,” 81 Federal Register 59276, August 29, 2016.
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 Bureau of Land Management (BLM) standards to prevent the waste of gas (i.e.,
methane) through venting and flaring during oil and natural gas production on
public lands (finalized on November 18, 2016).55
President Trump subsequently signed Executive Order 13783 on March 28, 2017, requiring
agencies to review existing regulations and “appropriately suspend, revise, or rescind those that
unduly burden” domestic energy production and use. Further, the federal courts reviewed
provisions in the Obama-era standards and the Trump Administration’s revisions. As a result, the
status of federal methane regulation was as follows by the end of the Trump Administration:
 EPA rescinded the 2016 methane standards for the oil and gas sector (September
14, 2020).56 (See also “Recently Enacted Legislation Related to GHGs” for
related legislative action undertaken in 2021, in particular, S.J.Res. 14 and P.L.
117-23, which disapproved the 2020 policy revisions of EPA’s 2016 methane
standards for the oil and natural gas sector. Although most of the requirements
under EPA’s 2016 rule are back in force, their fate remains unclear because of
pending legislative, executive, and judicial actions.57)
 The 2016 methane standards for new and existing municipal solid waste landfills
remain in effect.58 Stakeholders have challenged the 2016 methane standards for
existing landfills in court, but the litigation is on hold.59
 BLM rescinded the 2016 waste prevention standards for the oil and gas sector
(September 28, 2018). A California federal district court vacated the rescission
(July 15, 2020);60 however, a Wyoming federal district court subsequently
vacated all provisions in the 2016 rule related to the loss of gas (October 8,
2020).61 Appellate litigation is ongoing.62
Climate Mitigation Activities in U.S. States
In the absence of comprehensive federal controls on GHG emissions, state and local governments
have taken a variety of actions―both legal mandates and voluntary efforts―for nearly 20 years.
Generally, these efforts include emission controls on power plants and vehicles; building codes;

55 Bureau of Land Management, “Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation,” 81
Federal Register 83008, November 18, 2016.
56 EPA, “Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources Review,” 85
Federal Register 57018, September 14, 2020.
57 For more information, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10622, Looking Ahead: Regulating Methane from the Oil and
Natural Gas Sector, by Linda Tsang.
58 Since 2016, EPA has taken actions related to the timing and implementation of the landfill methane standards.
However, on April 5, 2021, the D.C. Circuit granted EPA’s request to vacate and remand the 2019 rule, which had
extended the timing for state plan requirements for existing landfills. Environmental Def. Fund v. EPA, No. 19-1222
(D.C. Cir. April 5, 2021). In 2021, EPA finalized federal plan requirements to implement the standards for existing
landfills; see EPA, “Federal Plan Requirements for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills That Commenced Construction
On or Before July 17, 2014, and Have Not Been Modified or Reconstructed Since July 14, 2014,” 86 Federal Register
27756, May 21, 2021.
59 Order, National Waste & Recycling Ass’n v. EPA, No. 16-1371 (D.C. Cir. April 17, 2018). See also CRS Report
R44615, EPA’s Methane Regulations: Legal Overview, by Linda Tsang.
60 California v. Bernhardt, 472 F. Supp. 3d 573 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
61 Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 493 F. Supp. 3d 1046 (D. Wyo. 2020).
62 Congressional clients may contact Linda Tsang, CRS Legislative Attorney, for more information.
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and other actions. In particular, a number of U.S. states have mandatory GHG reduction
programs, including the following:
 California has a GHG emissions cap-and-trade program that went into effect in
2013 that applies to electric power, selected industries, and fossil fuel
distributors.63 The program is linked with a cap-and-trade program in the
Canadian province of Quebec. The program is a key component of the state’s
plan to meet its legislated target of reducing GHG emissions 40% below 1990
levels by 2030.64
 Eleven U.S. states participate in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI),65 a cap-and-trade program on CO2 emissions from electric power that
went into effect in 2009. The RGGI states have revised their program over time.
The most recent revision aims to reduce power-sector emissions in the 11 states
to 30% below 2020 levels by 2030.66
 Thirty states, three U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia have mandatory
electricity portfolio standards (clean energy standards or renewable portfolio
standards), which require a minimum amount of electricity be generated by
eligible sources such as renewables. Of these, 11 jurisdictions are to ultimately
require 100% of electricity to come from eligible clean sources.67
 Regarding vehicle emissions, California set standards in 2009, jointly with the
federal government, to increase fuel efficiency and reduce GHG emissions from
many types of on-road vehicles.68 California also set standards to require auto
manufacturers to increase the number of zero emission vehicles (ZEVs) sold in
the state.69 Fourteen other states and the District of Columbia adopted
California’s vehicle standards.70 California’s authority to set these standards
under the CAA was preempted by the Trump Administration, but related

63 For more information, see the California Air Resources Board website, https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/
cap-and-trade-program.
64 See California Senate Bill 32 (signed September 8, 2016); for a discussion of how the state intends to meet these
goals, see California Air Resources Board, California’s 2017 Climate Change Scoping Plan, https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/
sites/default/files/classic/cc/scopingplan/scoping_plan_2017.pdf.
65 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) states are Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Vermont. Through executive branch action,
Pennsylvania is seeking to join RGGI. Some policymakers in Pennsylvania’s legislative bodies have voiced strong
opposition to joining RGGI and the governor’s actions to join the program without enacting new legislation.
66 See RGGI 2016 program review materials, https://www.rggi.org/program-overview-and-design/design-archive/2016-
materials.
67 The 11 jurisdictions with 100% clean energy standards are California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Hawaii,
Massachusetts, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Virginia, and Washington. For additional information,
see CRS Report R46691, Clean Energy Standards: Selected Issues for the 117th Congress, by Ashley J. Lawson.
68 California Air Resources Board, “Low Emissions Vehicle Program,” https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/
low-emission-vehicle-program.
69 California Air Resources Board, “Zero-Emission Vehicle Program,” https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/
zero-emission-vehicle-program.
70 The CAA allows other states to adopt California’s motor vehicle emission standards under certain conditions (42
U.S.C. §7507). Section 177 requires, among other things, that such standards be identical to the California standards for
which a waiver has been granted. States are not required to seek EPA approval under the terms of Section 177.
Fourteen other states and the District of Columbia have adopted California’s GHG standards under these provisions:
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and the District of Columbia.
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litigation paused in February 2021 so the incoming Biden Administration could
review and potentially revise the rule. Additionally, 45 states and the District of
Columbia provide incentives for electric vehicles and/or hybrids. The incentives
range from tax credits or rebates to fleet acquisition goals, exemptions from
emissions testing, or favorable electricity rate treatment.71 Further, seven states
have some version of a low carbon fuel standard or alternative fuel standard.72
Additionally, 13 Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states plus the District of Columbia
have sought policies to reduce carbon emissions from the transportation sector,
and are seeking to use a policy modeled on RGGI and coordinated through the
Transportation and Climate Initiative.73
When President Trump announced in June 2017 his intention to withdraw the United States from
the PA, some U.S. mayors, county executives, governors, tribal leaders, college and university
leaders, businesses, faith groups, and investors formed the We Are Still In organization to pledge
and demonstrate nonfederal climate change actions to the international community.74 In addition,
the U.S. Climate Alliance, which includes governors from 24 states and Puerto Rico, announced a
commitment to reduce net GHG emissions from their states at least 50%-52% below 2005 levels
by 2030 and to achieve net-zero GHG emissions no later than 2050.75 The degree to which state
and local governments can achieve these targets without federal action is uncertain, as the legal
authorities and jurisdictions over GHG emissions sources may be limited in some cases.
U.S. Legislative Action
Members of Congress have historically expressed a range of perspectives regarding climate
change issues and have proposed a variety of legislative approaches. Legislative proposals have
included
 carbon pricing frameworks (e.g., carbon taxes or cap-and-trade programs)76 that
would address a majority of U.S. GHG emissions;
 sectoral approaches, such as a clean energy standard;
 funding or tax policies that support GHG-abating technology development and
deployment;
 efforts to increase adaptation to climate change; and
 international cooperation.

71 For more detail, see National Conference of State Legislatures, “State Policies Promoting Hybrid and Electric
Vehicles,” https://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/state-electric-vehicle-incentives-state-chart.aspx.
72 California and Oregon have low carbon fuel standards; Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and
Washington have alternative fuel standards. For a summary, see Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, “Low
Carbon and Alternative Fuel Standard,” https://www.c2es.org/document/low-carbon-fuel-standard/.
73 For more information, see Transportation and Climate Initiative, https://www.transportationandclimate.org/.
74 “We Are Still In,” accessed April 11, 2021, https://www.wearestillin.com/about. In 2021, We Are Still In joined
America’s Pledge and formed a new coalition, America Is All In; see https://www.americaisallin.com/about/.
75 United States Climate Alliance, “U.S. Climate Alliance Commits to Achieve Net-Zero Emissions No Later than
2050,” https://www.usclimatealliance.org/publications/newtargets.
76 For background on carbon pricing, see CRS Report R45625, Attaching a Price to Greenhouse Gas Emissions with a
Carbon Tax or Emissions Fee: Considerations and Potential Impacts, by Jonathan L. Ramseur and Jane A. Leggett.
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On the other hand, some Members have introduced resolutions expressing that the multisector
carbon pricing approaches are not in the economic interests of the United States.77
Votes on comprehensive climate change proposals have been relatively rare in either chamber of
Congress, although votes on proposals that may indirectly address climate change have been
more common. For example, Congress has repeatedly enacted legislation with tax incentives for
renewable energy and carbon capture and sequestration efforts.78
Recently Enacted Legislation Related to GHGs
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260), contained measures relevant to
reducing GHG emissions, including the Energy Act of 2020 (Division Z) and the American
Innovation and Manufacturing (AIM) Act of 2020 (Division S, §103). The Energy Act of 2020
promotes increased energy efficiency in homes, schools, and federal buildings; expands research
and development in nuclear energy, energy storage, electric vehicles, renewable energy, and
carbon capture utilization and storage (CCUS); and promotes energy storage development, among
other provisions.79
The AIM Act of 2020 establishes a 15-year timeline to reduce domestic hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs), a potent class of GHGs used in air conditioning and refrigeration equipment, and directs
the EPA to implement the requirements, including through regulations. AIM’s phasedown
schedule appears to align with international commitments to phase down HFCs under the Kigali
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol to the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer.80 EPA has begun developing a program to phase down HFCs under AIM Act
authorities.81
The 117th Congress passed, and President Biden signed into law, S.J.Res. 14 (P.L. 117-23), on
June 30, 2021, disapproving of the Trump Administration’s 2020 policy revisions of EPA’s 2016
methane standards for the oil and natural gas sector. Although most of the requirements under
EPA’s rule are back in force, their fate remains unclear because of pending legislative, executive,
and judicial actions.82
Legislative Proposals in the 117th Congress
Majority leadership in both the House and the Senate in the 117th Congress have called for whole-
of-chamber approaches to addressing climate change.83 Members have introduced many

77 For example, see H.Con.Res. 41 in the 116th Congress and S.Res. 472 in the 114th Congress.
78 For more information, see CRS Report R46865, Energy Tax Provisions: Overview and Budgetary Cost, by Molly F.
Sherlock; and CRS Report R44902, Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) in the United States, by Peter Folger.
79 For more information, see CRS Report R46723, U.S. Energy in the 21st Century: A Primer, coordinated by Melissa
N. Diaz.
80 The United States is a Party to the Montreal Protocol (MP). As of September 2021, the United States is not a Party to
the Kigali Amendment. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11779, Hydrofluorocarbon Phasedown: Issues for
Congress, by Kate C. Shouse.
81 For example, see EPA, “Phasedown of Hydrofluorocarbons: Establishing the Allowance Allocation and Trading
Program under the American Innovation and Manufacturing Act,” 86 Federal Register 55116, October 5, 2021.
82 For more information, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10622, Looking Ahead: Regulating Methane from the Oil and
Natural Gas Sector, by Linda Tsang.
83 See, for example, Speaker Nancy Pelosi, “Pelosi Remarks at Press Event Introducing H.R. 9, Climate Action Now
Act,” March 27, 2019, https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/32719; and Senate Democrats, “Majority Leader Schumer
Floor Remarks Providing An Update On The Senate Organizing Resolution And Instructing All Relevant Committees
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proposals that address climate change in some capacity, and climate change legislation has been
referred to more than 35 committees.
Among these proposals is legislation intended to modernize U.S. infrastructure and fund
initiatives that may also increase climate resilience or reduce GHGs. In June 2021, a group of
Senators reached agreement with President Biden on the “Bipartisan Infrastructure Framework”
(BIF), a $1.2 trillion plan that would authorize $579 billion in new spending on transportation
infrastructure, power infrastructure, climate resiliency, and other initiatives.84 The BIF served as
the basis for the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), a substitute amendment (S.Amdt.
2137) to H.R. 3684, which the Senate passed on August 10, 2021. IIJA is both an authorizing bill
and an appropriations bill,85 and it would authorize funds for federal-aid highways, highway
safety programs, water and electricity infrastructure, broadband, and other initiatives. IIJA would
also provide funds intended to promote, among other things, clean energy and increased
resilience of U.S. infrastructure, such as schools and ports. For example, IIJA would authorize
funds for a Port Infrastructure Development Program, which would include projects “that
improve the resiliency of ports to address sea-level rise, flooding, extreme weather events,
earthquakes, and tsunami inundation, as well as projects that reduce or eliminate port-related
criteria pollutant or greenhouse gas emission.”86 As of September 2021, the House had not
considered IIJA.
Congress has also considered climate change spending through its work on FY2022 budget
reconciliation. Both chambers agreed to a $3.5 trillion budget resolution, S.Con.Res. 14, which
established the congressional budget for FY2022, set budgetary levels for FY2023-FY2031, and
provided reconciliation instructions to committees in the House and Senate.87 Among other
things, S.Con.Res. 14 sought to authorize spending that would support the President’s goals of
“80 percent clean electricity and 50 percent economy-wide carbon emissions reductions by
2030.”88 It set a September 15, 2021, deadline for House and Senate committees to submit
legislative language to their respective Budget Committees for the reconciliation package. The
House Budget Committee combined the House committee markups into one bill, H.R. 5376,

To Hold Hearings On The Climate Crisis In Preparation For Enacting President Biden’s Build Back Better Agenda |
Senate Democratic Leadership,” February 3, 2021, https://www.democrats.senate.gov/news/press-releases/majority-
leader-schumer-floor-remarks-providing-an-update-on-the-senate-organizing-resolution-and-instructing-all-relevant-
committees-to-hold-hearings-on-the-climate-crisis-in-preparation-for-enacting-president-bidens-build-back-better-
agenda.
84 Sen. Mitt Romney, “Senators’ Joint Statement and Framework on Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal,” press release, June
24, 2021, https://www.romney.senate.gov/senators-joint-statement-framework-bipartisan-infrastructure-deal. See also
Sen. Mark R. Warner, “Warner, President Biden & Senate Colleagues Announce Bipartisan Agreement on
Infrastructure,” press release, June 24, 2021, https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2021/6/warner-
president-biden-senate-colleagues-announce-bipartisan-agreement-on-infrastructure.
85 Congress has established a process that provides for two separate types of measures—authorization measures and
appropriation measures. These measures perform different functions. Authorization acts establish, continue, or modify
agencies or programs. An authorization act may also explicitly authorize subsequent appropriations for specific
agencies and programs, frequently setting spending ceilings for them. See CRS Report R42388, The Congressional
Appropriations Process: An Introduction, coordinated by James V. Saturno.
86 IIJA, Division J, Title VIII, “Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies”; see
“Maritime Administration.”
87 S.Con.Res. 14, “A concurrent resolution setting forth the congressional budget for the United States Government for
fiscal year 2022 and setting forth the appropriate budgetary levels for fiscal years 2023 through 2031.” The Senate
agreed to S.Con.Res. 14 on August 11, 2021. The House adopted S.Con.Res. 14 on August 24, 2021. For more
information, see CRS Report R46893, S.Con.Res. 14: The Budget Resolution for FY2022, by Megan S. Lynch.
88 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Budget, Concurrent Resolution on the Budget Fiscal Year 2022, committee
print, prepared by Committee on the Budget, 117th Cong., August 2021, S. Prt. 117-16, p. 7.
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which is also referred to as “The Build Back Better Act.” H.R. 5376 would provide funding,
establish programs, and modify various “provisions relating to a broad array of areas, including
education, labor, child care, health care, taxes, immigration, and the environment.” Among other
things, the bill would provide funding for energy efficiency and weatherization projects; electric
vehicles and zero-emission, heavy-duty vehicles; and transit services and “clean energy projects”
in low-income communities. It also includes provisions for a methane fee for certain oil and
natural gas facilities. As of September 27, 2021, the House Budget Committee approved H.R.
5376 and reported it to the House of Representatives.
Members of Congress have also introduced many other proposals addressing climate change in
the 117th Congress. CRS identified over 750 bills in Congress.gov that address climate change in
some capacity in the 117th Congress, as of September 27, 2021.89 CRS searched for bills by
identifying climate-related key words in five broad categories: equity; land use; energy (including
electricity, transportation, and energy efficiency); adaptation; and finance. These categories are
summarized below.90 The categories are not mutually exclusive, given that many bills contain
provisions that fall under more than one category. In particular, CRS identified seven bills, listed
below, that appeared in all of the five broad categories, indicating that these bills span a
potentially wide range of climate change topics. (See Appendix A for details about the search
methodology.)
 S. 283, “National Climate Bank Act,” sponsored by Senator Markey, and referred
to the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. Latest action:
Hearings held by Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works,
Subcommittee on Clean Air, Climate, and Nuclear Safety (April 27, 2021).
 S. 685, “America’s Clean Future Fund Act,” sponsored by Senator Durbin. Latest
action: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance (March 10, 2021).
 S. 1201, “United States Climate Leadership in International Mitigation,
Adaptation, and Technology Enhancement Act of 2021,” sponsored by Senator
Menendez. Latest action: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations (April 19, 2021).
 H.R. 1512, “Climate Leadership and Environmental Action for our Nation’s
Future Act,” or CLEAN Future Act, sponsored by Representative Pallone. Latest
action: Referred to multiple House committees and subcommittees (March 3,
2021).91
 H.R. 1848, “Leading Infrastructure For Tomorrow’s America Act,” or “LIFT
America Act,” sponsored by Representative Pallone. Latest action: Referred to

89 Of the over 750 bills identified, 616 were introduced by Democrats, 9 by Independents, and 159 by Republicans;
these numbers refer to primary sponsors and do not reflect cosponsors.
90 CRS searched Congress.gov using a number of terms associated with climate change—including terms related to
emissions reduction, adaptation, and equity, among others. For detailed search information, congressional clients may
contact CRS Senior Research Librarian Kezee Procita.
91 Referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on Transportation and
Infrastructure; Oversight and Reform; Education and Labor; Ways and Means; Natural Resources; Armed Services;
Foreign Affairs; Science, Space, and Technology; Intelligence (Permanent Select); and Financial Services, for a period
to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the
jurisdiction of the committee concerned. For more details, see https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-
bill/1512/all-actions.
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five subcommittees of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
(March 12, 2021).92
 H.R. 4309, “Clean Energy Innovation and Deployment Act of 2021,” sponsored
by Representative DeGette. Latest action: Referred to the Subcommittee on
Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials of the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure (July 2, 2021).
 H.R. 4350, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022,”
sponsored by Representative Smith. Latest action as of the end of September:
The Clerk was authorized to correct section numbers, punctuation, and cross
references, and to make other necessary technical and conforming corrections in
the engrossment of H.R. 4350 (September 23, 2021).
Thirty-four of the more than 750 legislative proposals that CRS identified received floor
consideration, as of September 27, 2021.93 Many of these bills fit into multiple broad topic
categories. Also, some bills may contain only small provisions addressing climate change, while
others are solely focused on a particular climate change topic in one or more of the five
categories. Two of these bills (H.R. 3684 and H.R. 4350) fell into all five categories. Twenty-
seven of the 34 fell into the energy category, and 18 of the 34 fell into the adaptation category.
The remainder of this section briefly describes each category and presents the status of proposals
that have at least received floor consideration as of September 27, 2021. Table A-1 in Appendix
A also provides a complete list of the bills that have at least received floor consideration.
Additional CRS reports examine certain legislative approaches under consideration by some in
the 117th Congress and prior Congresses:
 CRS Report R45472, Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction
Legislation: 108th Through 117th Congresses, by Jonathan L. Ramseur.
 CRS Report R46691, Clean Energy Standards: Selected Issues for the 117th
Congress, by Ashley J. Lawson.
Adaptation
As of September 27, 2021, CRS identified 197 bills introduced in the 117th Congress that seek to
address adaptation in some capacity.94 This category includes proposals to address natural

92 Subcommittees are as follows: Water Resources and Environment; Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation;
Highways and Transit; Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management; and Aviation. For
more details, including list of other House Committees to which the bill was referred, see https://www.congress.gov/
bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1848/all-actions.
93 Floor consideration includes House and Senate bills that have received consideration on the floor of either chamber
including taking up, amending, debate, voting, passage, amendments between chambers, and conference actions. This
bill status does not include actions taken in committees. For more information, see https://www.congress.gov/help/
action-search-scope-notes.
94 Scientific and programmatic literature defines adaptation in various ways. In addition, CRS has observed a general
shift from a prevalence in federal use of the term climate change adaptation to a rise in the term resilience in the
context of climate change. Adaptation often implies altering a system to accommodate persistent or long-term
anticipated changes in the climate; this may involve system alterations that may not be necessary to enhance resilience
to a static climate condition. Resilience is sometimes (but not always) considered as withstanding a hazard with a return
to predisturbance conditions, or “bouncing back.” For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11827, Climate Change:
Defining Adaptation and Resilience, with Implications for Policy, by Jane A. Leggett.
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disasters, extreme weather events, coastal resilience, sea level rise, and more. Eighteen of these
197 bills received at least floor consideration.
Energy
As of September 27, 2021, CRS identified 682 bills introduced in the 117th Congress that seek to
address energy issues related to climate change. These bills represent the majority of the bills
identified in all of the searches. For the purposes of this research, CRS defined energy broadly to
include GHG emissions mitigation efforts in the electricity generation, residential and
commercial, and transportation sectors. Examples of mitigation efforts include renewable energy
incentives, energy efficiency incentives, methane emission reduction efforts, and proposals to
alter fossil fuel production practices, among others. Bills in this category propose a wide range of
policy options, including carbon pricing, tax incentives, grants, R&D, and others. Twenty-seven
of these 682 bills received at least floor consideration. Of these, H.R. 1319 became law (The
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, P.L. 117-2).95
Equity
As of September 27, 2021, CRS identified 104 bills introduced in the 117th Congress that seek to
address equity issues related to climate change.96 Bills identified in this search may include either
an international or a domestic focus, or both. These bills include provisions to address issues such
as community resilience, “just transitions” for the energy workforce, infrastructure,
environmental justice, and other topics. Seven of these 104 bills received at least floor
consideration and one, H.R. 1319, became law (The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, P.L. 117-
2).97
Finance
As of September 27, 2021, CRS identified 48 bills introduced in the 117th Congress concerning
climate change and the financial industry. These bills include provisions regarding climate change
risk disclosure and proposals to create climate or green banks, among others. Seven of these 48
bills received floor consideration.
Land Use
As of September 27, 2021, CRS identified 117 bills introduced in the 117th Congress that seek to
address land use issues related to climate change. These bills address deforestation, propose
carbon sequestration efforts through forestry and agricultural practices, and include provisions
regarding coastal resilience and adaptation, among others. Ten of these 117 bills received at least
floor consideration.

95 The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA) is part of a series of legislative packages to address the impacts of
the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic on the economy, public health, state and local governments,
individuals, and businesses (P.L. 117-2). ARPA provisions potentially relevant to energy and climate change issues
include funding through FY2022 for the low-income home energy assistance program (Title II, §2911) and funding for
public transportation agencies (Title III, §3401).
96 While there is no single definition of equity in the context of climate change impacts, many define equity as entailing
“fair” treatment of people according to their different circumstances.
97 ARPA provided $100 million to EPA “to address health outcome disparities from pollution and the COVID-19
pandemic” (P.L. 117-2, Title VI, §6002). For more information about EPA’s ARPA implementation, see EPA,
“American Rescue Plan (ARP),” https://www.epa.gov/arp.
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Executive Branch Approach to Climate Change
Mitigation
GHG Targets
Executive branch policies and actions influencing future U.S. GHG emissions are dependent on
the policy objectives of each administration. After the United States rejoined the PA, the Biden
Administration communicated a new Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the Paris
Agreement,98 which contains a new GHG target for the United States: to reduce net GHG
emissions by 50%-52% below 2005 levels by 2030.99 According to the Biden Administration, the
NDC “exceeds a straight-line path to achieve net-zero emissions, economy-wide, by no later than
2050.”100 For comparison, the previous U.S. NDC, released in 2015, set a target of 26%-28%
below 2005 levels by 2025, which President Obama had indicated was on a straight-line
trajectory to a reduction of 80% below 2005 levels by 2050. The content of NDCs is nationally
determined and nonbinding, but it should reflect what a Party to the PA intends to achieve.
Figure 2 shows historical net GHG emissions with the 2015 and 2021 NDCs and the Biden
Administration’s net-zero emissions goal for 2050. In 2019, U.S. GHG emissions, after
accounting for removals by carbon sinks, were 5,769 MMTCO2e.101 The 2019 net GHG
emissions are about 13% below net 2005 levels and about 4% above net 1990 levels.

98 A key requirement of the Paris Agreement (PA) is that all Parties communicate their “Nationally Determined
Contributions” (NDC) every five years, containing a GHG reduction pledge and actions, although this content of an
NDC is not binding. As the United States has newly (again) become a Party, the United States must submit a new
NDC.
99 The White House, “The United States of America Nationally Determined Contribution Reducing Greenhouse Gases
in the United States: A 2030 Emissions Target,” April 22, 2021, https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/
PublishedDocuments/United%20States%20of%20America%20First/
United%20States%20NDC%20April%2021%202021%20Final.pdf. (Hereinafter, 2021 U.S. NDC.)
100 2021 U.S. NDC, p. 22.
101 As previously noted, U.S. gross emissions (not net of sinks) were 6,558 MMTCO2e in 2019. U.S. sinks removed
about 789 MMT in 2019, about 12% of gross emissions (U.S. GHG Inventory, 1990-2019).
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Figure 2. U.S. Net GHG Emissions (1990-2019) and Selected Emissions Targets

Source: Prepared by CRS; historical emissions from EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks:
1990-2019, 2021, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/inventory-us-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-sinks.
Notes: Net GHG emissions include net carbon sequestration from land use, land use change, and forestry. This
involves carbon removals from the atmosphere by photosynthesis and storage in vegetation. Mil ion metric tons
of CO2 equivalent (MMTCO2e) is used because GHGs vary by global warming potential (GWP). GWP is an
index that allows comparisons of the heat-trapping ability of different gases over a period of time. Consistent
with international GHG reporting requirements, EPA’s most recent GHG inventory (April 2021) uses the GWP
values presented in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2007 Fourth Assessment Report for
warming potential over 100 years.
The 2021 NDC also sets a goal to eliminate carbon emissions from the electricity sector by 2035.
The Biden Administration reports that it will seek to decarbonize the energy sector in various
ways, “including by cutting energy waste; shifting to carbon pollution-free electricity; electrifying
and driving efficiency in vehicles, buildings, and parts of industry; and scaling up new energy
sources and carriers.”102
Announced Policies and Rulemakings
In many respects, early executive orders and actions directed by the Biden Administration may be
viewed as reinstatement and expansion of policies of the Obama Administration on climate
change, with some important differences. In his first three months in office, President Biden
rejoined the PA, announced U.S. GHG reduction targets, and centralized executive branch
organizations to identify and coordinate climate-related actions. The remainder of this section
describes the Biden Administration executive orders addressing climate change, as of September
2021. Appendix B provides examples of additional climate-related policy actions, as summarized
by White House statements, as of September 2021.
Executive Order 13990, Protecting Public Health and the Environment and
Restoring Science To Tackle the Climate Crisis
Executive Order (E.O.) 13990 of January 20, 2021, outlined a federal policy
to improve public health and protect our environment; to ensure access to clean air and
water; to limit exposure to dangerous chemicals and pesticides; to hold polluters

102 2021 U.S. NDC, p. 3.
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accountable, including those who disproportionately harm communities of color and low-
income communities; to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; to bolster resilience to the
impacts of climate change; to restore and expand our national treasures and monuments;
and to prioritize both environmental justice and the creation of the well-paying union jobs
necessary to deliver on these goals.103
To this end, the order directed all executive departments and agencies to immediately review and,
as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, consider suspending, revising, or rescinding
actions promulgated, issued, or adopted between January 20, 2017, and January 20, 2021. The
order specifically listed a number of climate-related actions by agencies to be reviewed by a
given date, including EPA’s methane standards for the oil and natural gas sector, EPA’s and
NHTSA’s GHG and fuel economy standards for passenger cars and light trucks, and several of
DOE’s efficiency improvements and appliance standards, among others.104 Further, the order
directed heads of agencies, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, to reinstate, or
move forward with, several other climate-related actions, including proposing new methane
guidelines on existing oil- and gas-sector sources, placing a temporary moratorium on the
implementation of the Coastal Plain Oil and Gas Leasing Program in the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge, establishing an interagency working group on the social cost of GHGs, and rescinding a
number of executive actions, including the March 2019 permit for the Keystone XL pipeline and
the Council on Environmental Quality’s 2019 draft GHG guidance on the National
Environmental Policy Act, among others. It also stated that it is the Administration’s policy “to
bolster resilience to the impacts of climate change,” and effectively reinstated several Obama
Administration presidential documents related to climate change adaptation.105

103 Executive Office of the President, “Executive Order 13990 of January 20, 2021, Protecting Public Health and the
Environment and Restoring Science To Tackle the Climate Crisis,” 86 Federal Register 7037-7043, January 25, 2021.
Quoted text from E.O. 13990, Section 1.
104 The full list of actions cited in the order is “Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New,
Reconstructed, and Modified Sources Reconsideration,” 85 Federal Register 57398 (September 15, 2020), by
September 2021; “The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National Program,” 84
Federal Register 51310 (September 27, 2019), by April 2021; and “The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE)
Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks,” 85 Federal Register 24174 (April 30,
2020, Start Printed Page 70382020), by July 2021; “Energy Conservation Program for Appliance Standards:
Procedures for Use in New or Revised Energy Conservation Standards and Test Procedures for Consumer Products and
Commercial/Industrial Equipment,” 85 Federal Register 8626 (February 14, 2020), with major revisions proposed by
March 2021 and any remaining revisions proposed by June 2021; “Energy Conservation Program for Appliance
Standards: Procedures for Evaluating Statutory Factors for Use in New or Revised Energy Conservation Standards,” 85
Federal Register 50937 (August 19, 2020), with major revisions proposed by March 2021 and any remaining revisions
proposed by June 2021; “Final Determination Regarding Energy Efficiency Improvements in the 2018 International
Energy Conservation Code (IECC),” 84 Federal Register 67435 (December 10, 2019), by May 2021; “Final
Determination Regarding Energy Efficiency Improvements in ANSI/ASHRAE/IES Standard 90.1-2016: Energy
Standard for Buildings, Except Low-Rise Residential Buildings,” 83 Federal Register 8463 (February 27, 2018), by
May 2021; “National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam
Generating Units—Reconsideration of Supplemental Finding and Residual Risk and Technology Review,” 85 Federal
Register 31286 (May 22, 2020), by August 2021; “Increasing Consistency and Transparency in Considering Benefits
and Costs in the Clean Air Act Rulemaking Process,” 85 Federal Register 84130 (December 23, 2020), as soon as
possible; and “Strengthening Transparency in Pivotal Science Underlying Significant Regulatory Actions and
Influential Scientific Information,” 86 Federal Register 469 (January 6, 2021), as soon as possible.
105 For example, it effectively reinstated E.O. 13653, “Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change,”
and E.O. 13693, “Planning for Federal Sustainability in the Next Decade.”
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Executive Order 14008, Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad
E.O. 14008 of January 27, 2021, ordered a whole-of-government approach to addressing climate
change and set forth a number of directives with a view toward decisions that support meeting the
Administration’s GHG reduction targets.106 The order created a new position of the Special
Presidential Envoy for Climate. To coordinate across agencies, E.O. 14008 established a White
House Office of Domestic Climate Policy (Climate Policy Office) within the Executive Office of
the President led by an Assistant to the President and National Climate Advisor.
E.O. 14008 also established a National Climate Task Force, which is chaired by the National
Climate Advisor and composed of departments and major agencies. The order instructed the
National Climate Task Force to organize the whole-of-government approach to addressing
climate change and to facilitate planning and implementation of federal actions. In particular,
E.O. 14008 instructed task force members to “prioritize action on climate change in their policy-
making and budget processes, in their contracting and procurement, and in their engagement with
State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments; workers and communities; and leaders across all
sectors of our economy.”107
E.O. 14008 called for additional actions, including the following:
 Adaptation. Federal agencies must develop Climate Action Plans to improve
adaptation and resilience to climate changes. After review by the Federal Chief
Sustainability Officer,108 agencies must report annually on their implementation
of the plans.
 Conservation, Agriculture, and Forestry. E.O. 14008 called for development
of certain strategies and reports related to conservation, agriculture, and forestry.
It called for a strategy to create a Civilian Climate Corps to provide jobs and
training for conservation, restoration, resilience, carbon sequestration, and other
objectives.109 The E.O. called for a report recommending steps to achieve
conservation of at least 30% of U.S. lands and waters by 2030, and included
mechanisms to measure progress toward that goal. A preliminary report was
released on May 6, 2021.110 E.O. 14008 also addressed the potential role of
farming in addressing climate change and reducing GHG emissions, highlighting
opportunities to promote carbon sequestration in soils and to source sustainable
bioproducts and biofuels. It required USDA to solicit stakeholder input and issue
a report—within 90 days—making recommendations for a climate strategy for
agriculture and forestry. USDA released this report on May 20, 2021.111
 Energy and Public Lands. E.O. 14008 directed the Secretary of the Interior to
identify actions that would increase renewable energy production on public lands

106 Executive Office of the President, “Executive Order 14008 of January 27, 2021, Tackling the Climate Crisis at
Home and Abroad,” 86 Federal Register 7619-7633, February 1, 2021.
107 E.O. 14008, §203.
108 A role within the White House Council on Environmental Quality. The Federal Chief Sustainability Officer is to
coordinate the review with the Office of Management and Budget.
109 For more information, see CRS Insight IN11654, Biden Administration Proposes New Civilian Climate Corps, by
Mark K. DeSantis.
110 DOI, USDA, DOC, and CEQ, Conserving and Restoring America the Beautiful, May 6, 2021, https://www.doi.gov/
sites/doi.gov/files/report-conserving-and-restoring-america-the-beautiful-2021.pdf.
111 USDA, Climate-Smart Agriculture and Forestry Strategy: 90-Day Progress Report, May 2021,
https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/climate-smart-ag-forestry-strategy-90-day-progress-report.pdf.
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and in offshore waters, with a goal to double offshore wind production by
2030.112 It also directed the Secretary to pause new oil and gas leases on public
lands or offshore waters pending review and reconsideration of federal oil and
gas leasing and permitting practices. It directed the Secretary to consider, among
other things, potential climate and other impacts associated with oil and gas
activities on federal lands and to consider adjusting royalty rates for coal, oil, and
gas extracted from public lands or to take other actions to account for climate
costs.113
 Foreign Policy and National Security. E.O. 14008 increased the prioritization
of international actions on climate change, as compared to actions under
President Obama and President Trump, establishing the policy that “climate
considerations shall be an essential element of United States foreign policy and
national security.”114 The Special Presidential Envoy for Climate sits on the
National Security Council (NSC), representing the first time the NSC includes a
principal fully dedicated to climate change.115 E.O. 14008 also called for relevant
federal agencies to coordinate with the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate to
develop strategies and implementation plans for integrating climate
considerations into their international work.116
 Infrastructure. E.O. 14008 directed the Chair of the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
to (1) ensure that investments in federal infrastructure reduce GHGs; (2) require
that permitting decisions consider GHG emission impacts; and (3) identify steps
to accelerate clean energy and transmission projects.117
 Procurement. E.O. 14008 established a policy to align management of federal
procurement and real property to “support robust climate action.”118 In particular,
it called for the National Climate Advisor and National Climate Task Force,
assisted by the heads of relevant federal agencies, to develop a plan that uses
available procurement authorities to achieve or facilitate a decarbonized
electricity sector by 2035 and the use of clean and zero-emission vehicles for
federal, state, local, and tribal government fleets.119
 Transition and Equity (Energy Communities). E.O. 14008 established an
Interagency Working Group on Coal and Power Plant Communities and
Economic Revitalization (IWG). The order directed the IWG, which is housed
within DOE, to coordinate the delivery of federal resources “to revitalize the
economies of coal, oil and gas, and power plant communities,” develop strategies

112 E.O. 14008, §207.
113 E.O. 14008, §208.
114 E.O. 14008, §101.
115 U.S. Department of State, “John Kerry, Special Presidential Envoy for Climate,” https://www.state.gov/biographies/
john-kerry/.
116 E.O. 14008, §103.
117 E.O. 14008, §213.
118 E.O. 14008, §204.
119 E.O. 14008, §205.
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for economic and social recovery, and evaluate “opportunities to ensure benefits
and protections for coal and power plant workers.”120
 Transition and Equity (Justice40 Initiative). E.O. 14008 established the
Justice40 Initiative to recommend, in consultation with disadvantaged
communities, how to direct certain federal investments such that 40% would flow
to “disadvantaged communities.”121 The Administration published “initial
recommendations” on July 20, 2021.122 According to the order, the scope of those
federal investments includes clean energy and energy efficiency; clean transit;
affordable and sustainable housing; training and workforce development;
remediation and reduction of legacy pollution; and critical clean water
infrastructure. The initiative must publish an annual Environmental Justice
Scorecard.
Executive Order 14027, Establishment of the Climate Change Support Office
E.O. 14027 of May 7, 2021, established, within the Department of State, a temporary
organization called the Climate Change Support Office (CCSO).123 The purpose of the CCSO is
to support “bilateral and multilateral engagement to advance the United States’ initiative to
address” climate change.124 The CCSO is also intended to “support efforts that go beyond the
climate work currently carried out by the Department of State across a wide range of international
fora that address clean energy, aviation, shipping, the Artic [sic], the ocean, sustainable
development, and migration.”125
Executive Order 14030, Climate-Related Financial Risk
E.O. 14030 of May 20, 2021, directed federal agencies, including financial regulators, to analyze
and mitigate the risks that climate change poses to financial stability.126 It called for the
development of a comprehensive, government-wide strategy that identifies climate-related
financial risk to government programs, assets, and liabilities. It also required the strategy to
identify financing needs associated with climate change goals, including achieving net-zero
greenhouse gas emissions for the U.S. economy by no later than 2050. The order directed
financial regulators to assess climate-related financial risks and issue a report that discusses
current federal efforts to incorporate climate-related risks into policies and programs. The order
also directed agencies to consider taking actions to protect life savings and pensions from
climate-related financial risk, and to consider updating procurement and budgetary processes to
account for climate-related risk analyses.

120 E.O. 14008, §218.
121 E.O. 14008, §223.
122 Memorandum from Shalanda D. Young, Acting Director, Office of Management and Budget; Brenda Mallory,
Chair of the Council on Environmental Quality; and Gina McCarthy, National Climate Advisor, to Heads of
Departments and Agencies, July 20, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/M-21-28.pdf.
123 Executive Office of the President, “Executive Order 14027 of May 7, 2021, Establishment of the Climate Change
Support Office,” 86 Federal Register 25947-25948, May 12, 2021.
124 E.O. 14027, §1.
125 E.O. 14027, §1.
126 Executive Office of the President, “Executive Order 14030 of May 20, 2021, Climate-Related Financial Risk,” 86
Federal Register 27967-27971, May 25, 2021.
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Executive Order 14037, Strengthening American Leadership in Clean Cars
and Trucks
E.O. 14037 of August 5, 2021, set a nonbinding goal for electrification in the transportation
section, namely that 50% of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission
vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles.127 The
order also directed EPA and NHTSA to begin work on future rulemakings for multipollutant
emissions, including for greenhouse gas emissions, and fuel economy standards for light- and
medium-duty vehicles beginning with model year (MY) 2027 and extending at least through MY
2030. Further, the agencies are to begin work on new nitrogen oxides standards beginning in MY
2027, updated GHG emission standards for MYs 2027-2029, and new GHG emission and fuel
efficiency standards beginning in MY 2030, for heavy-duty engines and vehicles.
In conjunction with the release of E.O. 14037, the Biden Administration proposed amendments to
the existing CAFE and light-duty vehicle GHG emission standards through MY 2026.128 The
proposal was not a joint rulemaking. EPA and NHTSA released their proposals separately, with
different MY requirements, target stringencies, and compliance flexibilities. However, both
proposals would increase in stringency by approximately 25% between MYs 2023 and 2026,
achieving a projected fleet-wide, sales-weighted fuel economy of roughly 48 miles per gallon in
2026. In addition to the amended standards, NHTSA has proposed to fully repeal the SAFE
Vehicles Rule, Part One: One National Program,129 and EPA has announced that it is
reconsidering the 2019 withdrawal of California’s CAA preemption waiver.130
FY2022 Budget Request
E.O. 14008 identifies the budget process as another task through which agencies shall, to the
extent permitted by law, prioritize action on climate change.131 The President’s FY2022 budget
request, released May 28, 2021, included specific proposals aimed at reducing GHG emissions.
For example, the FY2022 budget request included an Administration initiative on infrastructure,
the American Jobs Plan, which would invest in climate and clean infrastructure projects, among
other things.132 For more information, see Appendix B.
The President’s FY2022 budget request stated that in addition to the American Jobs Plan, the
Administration proposed an increase of over $14 billion of federal funding, compared to FY2021,
to support GHG reductions and increasing adaptation or resilience to climate-related impacts.133

127 Executive Office of the President, “Executive Order 14037 of August 5, 2021, Strengthening American Leadership
in Clean Cars and Trucks,” 86 Federal Register 43583-43585, August 10, 2021.
128 EPA, “Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards,” 86 Federal
Register 43726, August 10, 2021; and NHTSA, “Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards for Model Years 2024-
2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks,” 86 Federal Register 49602, September 3, 2021.
129 NHTSA, “Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Preemption: Proposed Rule,” 86 Federal Register 25980,
May 12, 2021.
130 EPA, “California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Advanced Clean Car Program; Reconsideration
of a Previous Withdrawal of a Waiver of Preemption; Opportunity for Public Hearing and Public Comment,” 86
Federal Register 22421, April 28, 2021.
131 E.O. 14008, §203.
132 White House, Statements and Releases: The American Jobs Plan, March 31, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-american-jobs-plan/.
133 Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2022, May 28, 2021, p. 20,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/budget_fy22.pdf. (Hereinafter, FY2022 Budget Request.)
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The President’s FY2022 budget request included, among other proposals, the following:134
 Clean Energy Projects and Workforce Development. The President’s FY2022
budget states that it would provide $2 billion for “welders, electricians, and other
skilled laborers” to build clean energy projects.135
 Clean Energy, Energy Storage, and Transmission Projects in Rural
Communities. The President’s FY2022 budget states that it would provide $6.5
billion for lending.136
 Agriculture and Conservation. The President’s FY2022 budget states that it
would provide more than $300 million in “new investments in the next
generation of agriculture and conservation,” which would include support for
voluntary private lands conservation, renewable energy grants and loans, and
creation of the Civilian Climate Corps.137
 Efficiency Grants. The President’s FY2022 budget states that it would provide
$1.7 billion for retrofits to homes, schools, and federal buildings.138
 Environmental Justice. The President’s FY2022 budget states that it would
provide more than $1.4 billion to support “marginalized and overburdened
communities,” including $936 million toward a new initiative, Accelerating
Environmental and Economic Justice.139 The FY2022 budget also proposes an
increase of more than $450 million to support climate mitigation, resilience,
adaptation, and environmental justice projects in Indian Country.140
 Federal Procurement and Electric Vehicles. The President’s FY2022 budget
states that it would provide $600 million for federal zero-emission vehicles and
charging infrastructure.141
 GHG Reductions Under Existing Authorities. The President’s FY2022 budget
requests $1.8 billion for EPA programs to address climate change, a $100 million
increase for air quality grants to states and tribes to implement programs and
reduce GHGs under the Clean Air Act, and an additional $60 million to research
climate change impacts on health and the environment.142
 International Climate Change Financing. The President’s FY2022 budget
requests $2.5 billion for international climate change programs.143 It includes a

While the budget request stated that the $14 billion increase was in addition to the American Jobs Plan, some of the
specified climate change projects are also listed as American Jobs Plan projects.
134 Unless otherwise specified, the proposed spending figures were reported in the narrative to the President’s FY2022
budget request.
135 FY2022 Budget Request, p. 20.
136 FY2022 Budget Request, p. 21.
137 FY2022 Budget Request, p. 21.
138 FY2022 Budget Request, p. 20.
139 FY2022 Budget Request, p. 21.
140 FY2022 Budget Request, p. 20.
141 FY2022 Budget Request, p. 20.
142 EPA’s FY2022 budget request does not clearly state whether the $1.8 billion for climate change programs includes
the $100 million increase for air quality grants to state and local agencies. EPA, Fiscal Year 2022: Justification of
Appropriation Estimates for the Committee on Appropriations, May 2021, pp. i-ii, https://www.epa.gov/planandbudget/
fy-2022-justification-appropriation-estimates-committee-appropriations.
143 FY2022 Budget Request, p. 22.
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$1.2 billion contribution to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and $485 million to
support other multilateral climate initiatives, including $100 million for
international climate adaptation programs.144 Also the President’s budget requests
about $700 million for the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International
Development to assist developing countries in adapting to climate disruptions, to
invest in clean energy, and to reduce GHG “landscape emissions.”145
 Methane Reductions from Oil and Gas Systems. The President’s FY2022
budget requests over $580 million to “remediate thousands of abandoned oil and
gas wells and reclaim abandoned mines” in order to reduce methane leakage.146
 Technology Research, Development, and Demonstration. The President’s
FY2022 budget requests more than $10 billion in “clean energy innovation across
nondefense agencies.”147 For example, DOE requested more than $8 billion in
clean energy and climate innovation to develop “advanced” nuclear energy
technologies,148 electric vehicles, “green hydrogen,”149 and innovative
approaches to air conditioning and refrigeration.150 The President’s budget
request includes a total of $1 billion to establish a new Advanced Research
Projects Agency for Climate (ARPA-C), and invest in the existing Advanced
Research Projects Agency-Energy, which would both support high-risk funding
of climate change adaptation/resilience and GHG mitigation technology
development.151 The Administration expects to house ARPA-C at DOE.152
Additional agencies contributing to ARPA-C include the departments of
Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development,
the Interior, and Transportation, and EPA.153 Secretary of Energy Jennifer

144 FY2022 Budget Request, p. 22.
145 FY2022 Budget Request, p. 22. The budget request does not define landscape emissions but appears to refer to
avoiding or reducing emissions from soils and vegetation, or increasing removals of CO2 from the atmosphere by
photosynthesis. For example, the Administration discusses pursuing “natural climate solutions, such as improving the
conservation and management of carbon-rich tropical forests and other important landscapes”; see Department of State,
Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year
2022, pp. 88 and 131, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/FY-2022-State_USAID-Congressional-
Budget-Justification.pdf.
146 FY2022 Budget Request, p. 21.
147 FY2022 Budget Request, p. 21.
148 The term advanced nuclear reactor is defined by the Energy Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-260, Division Z) as a fission
reactor that has “significant improvements” over existing commercial reactors, and any fusion reactor. For more
information about advanced nuclear technology, see CRS Report R42853, Nuclear Energy: Overview of Congressional
Issues, by Mark Holt.
149 Some refer to hydrogen produced from fossil fuels as “blue hydrogen,” if the separated carbon is captured and
sequestered, and “gray hydrogen” if it is not; and hydrogen produced from renewable processes as “green hydrogen.”
For more information, see CRS Report R46436, Hydrogen in Electricity’s Future, by Richard J. Campbell.
150 DOE, Department of Energy: FY 2022 Congressional Budget Request: Budget in Brief, May 2021, p. 7,
https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-05/doe-fy2022-budget-in-brief.pdf. (Hereinafter, DOE FY2022 Budget
Justification.)
151 FY2022 Budget Request, p. 22.
152 DOE’s FY2022 Budget Justification requested $200 million to establish the ARPA-C office. See DOE, FY2022
Congressional Budget Request, Volume 3, Part 2, p. 357, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/doe-
fy2022-budget-volume-3.2-v3.pdf.
153 DOE FY2022 Budget Justification, p. 15.
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Granholm indicated that the current proposal would initiate “a path to quadruple
clean energy research government-wide in four years.”154
 Transportation Incentives. The President’s FY2022 budget requests a $174
billion investment in the electric vehicle market, including support for domestic
manufacturing of batteries and electric vehicles, consumer point-of-sale rebates
and tax incentives to purchase electric vehicles manufactured in the United
States, and establishment of grants and incentive programs to build a network of
electric vehicle chargers.155 The President’s FY2022 budget also proposes to
invest $80 billion for rail improvements, including the development and adoption
of clean energy rail propulsion systems, such as near-zero emission diesel
locomotives, battery technology, and electrification.156
As of September 2021, congressional debate has continued on annual appropriations for FY2022.
Appropriators in each chamber have supported some of the Biden Administration’s proposals to
varying degrees. For more information, see the CRS collection of reports on FY2022
appropriations.157
Congress has also considered climate change spending through its work on FY2022 budget
reconciliation. Both chambers agreed to a $3.5 trillion budget resolution, S.Con.Res. 14, which
established the congressional budget for FY2022, set budgetary levels for FY2023-FY2031, and
provided reconciliation instructions to committees in the House and Senate.158 For more
information, see “Legislative Proposals in the 117th Congress.”
Issues for Congress
The Biden Administration has increased the ambition of domestic GHG reduction goals compared
to previous Administrations, aiming to achieve “net zero” emissions in the next three decades. It
has signaled it will pursue its GHG reduction goals through a variety of climate change actions,
including both regulatory and nonregulatory measures. Some observers have expressed
skepticism that the Administration’s GHG reduction goals can be reached absent new or
enhanced authorities and appropriations from Congress. As the Biden Administration begins to
implement a whole-of-government approach to climate change, Congress may consider issues
concerning U.S. GHG targets, policy approaches, and funding.

154 Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm, “Statement by Secretary Granholm on the President’s FY22 Discretionary
Funding Request,” Energy.gov, April 9, 2021, https://www.energy.gov/articles/statement-secretary-granholm-
presidents-fy22-discretionary-funding-request.
155 U.S. Department of Transportation, 2022 Budget Highlights, May 28, 2021, pp. 16-17,
https://www.transportation.gov/mission/budget/fiscal-year-2022-budget-highlights. (Hereinafter, DOT FY2022 Budget
Justification.)
156 DOT FY2022 Budget Justification, pp. 13, 60-61.
157 For example, see CRS Report R46857, Energy and Water Development: FY2022 Appropriations, by Mark Holt and
Corrie E. Clark; CRS Report R46908, Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies: Overview of FY2022
Appropriations, by Carol Hardy Vincent; and more at CRS, “Appropriations,” https://www.crs.gov/iap/appropriations.
158 S.Con.Res. 14, “A concurrent resolution setting forth the congressional budget for the United States Government for
fiscal year 2022 and setting forth the appropriate budgetary levels for fiscal years 2023 through 2031.” The Senate
agreed to S.Con.Res. 14 on August 11, 2021. The House adopted S.Con.Res. 14 on August 24, 2021. For more
information, see CRS Report R46893, S.Con.Res. 14: The Budget Resolution for FY2022, by Megan S. Lynch.
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GHG Targets and International Commitments
The Biden Administration rejoined the PA, which seeks to hold the GHG-induced “increase in
global average temperature to well below 2o Celsius (C)” and to try to limit it to 1.5oC.159 In
particular, the PA includes a collective commitment to achieve approximately net-zero GHG
emissions in the second half of this century.160 The United States established a new pledge to
reduce its economy-wide net GHG emissions by 50%-52% below the 2005 level by 2030, in a
required communication, the U.S. Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the PA. See
Figure 2 for historical net GHG emissions compared with these goals.161 The target itself is not
binding. The U.S. NDC also stated that the target “exceeds a straight-line path to achieve net-zero
emissions, economy-wide, by no later than 2050.”162 The pledges made in the U.S. NDC and
other parties’ NDCs to 2030 are intended to support near-term steps in a multidecadal process to
avoid adverse impacts on people, economies, and the environmental systems on which societies
depend.
U.S. participation in the PA raises issues that Congress may consider, such as the ambition of the
U.S. NDC and assessment of other parties’ NDCs. Members may be interested in the actions
required to fulfill the U.S. NDC, the efficacy of such actions, and the economic and equity
implications of such actions. Congress may consider assessing the ambition, relative level of
effort, and performance of other parties’ GHG mitigation, adaptation, technology, and financing
associated with the PA. It could request the executive branch to provide such analysis, conduct its
own assessment, or rely on third parties.
Differences in the scope, stringency, and timing of parties’ GHG policies may raise concerns for
policymakers. One concern many have is that U.S. policies could raise U.S. prices more than the
prices of goods manufactured in countries with relatively less stringent climate policies,
potentially creating a competitive disadvantage for some domestic businesses. Certain businesses
could potentially become less profitable, lose market share, and reduce jobs. In addition, climate
policy differences between countries could potentially lead to emissions leakage, which “occurs
when economic activity is shifted as a result of the emission control regulation and, as a result,
emission abatement achieved in one location [e.g., the United States] that is subject to emission
control regulation is [diminished] by increased emissions in unregulated locations.”163
Policymakers might consider approaches to address these potential outcomes in several ways.
One approach that has received interest in recent years is a border carbon adjustment (BCA)
mechanism. Several national governments and the EU have discussed imposing BCAs on
imported goods from countries that do not make similarly ambitious efforts to reduce GHG
emissions. A BCA would likely apply a tariff to emission-intensive imported goods such as steel,

159 PA, Article 2.
160 In order to achieve the PA’s “long-term temperature goal,” parties aim to make their GHG emissions peak as soon
as possible and then reduce them rapidly “so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and
removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century”; see PA, Article 4. For more information, see
CRS Report R44609, Climate Change: Frequently Asked Questions About the 2015 Paris Agreement, by Jane A.
Leggett and Richard K. Lattanzio.
161 The United States of America, “Nationally Determined Contribution - Reducing Greenhouse Gases in the United
States: A 2030 Emissions Target,” United Nations Climate Change NDC Registry (interim), April 21, 2021,
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/pages/Party.aspx?party=USA.
162 2021 U.S. NDC, p. 23.
163 EPA, Office of Air and Radiation, Tools of the Trade: A Guide to Designing and Operating a Cap and Trade
Program for Pollution Control, 2003, Glossary.
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aluminum, cement, and certain chemicals. Also, China, South Korea, European countries, and
others are pursuing investment in low-GHG-emitting technologies in advanced energy, materials,
electronics, vehicles, and other sectors that they expect to provide future competitiveness
advantages.164
Transparency and verification of GHG reductions is another issue potentially of interest to
Congress. Some Members may be concerned about whether parties to the PA are taking actions
and will achieve their GHG targets. Scientific advances in remote sensing systems, ground-based
measurements, and modeling can help the United States and other countries independently verify
where entities may be meeting their GHG targets, and where they may be falling behind.
Congress may be interested in the federal and international programs that support, or could
enhance support for, greater transparency of reporting, verification, and review of GHG emissions
and related actions.
U.S. Federal Policy Approaches
If Congress seeks to limit or remove GHG emissions from the atmosphere, then there are a range
of policy options it may consider.165 For example, options include carbon pricing, regulatory
approaches, investment in research and development, tax incentives, and federal procurement
requirements. A number of these policy tools are currently being implemented in the United
States—as discussed earlier in this report—and in other countries, to varying degrees and to
support a range of policy objectives.
If there is interest in legislating a national climate mitigation strategy, Congress may assess a
range of potential concerns and how particular policies could be designed to address them.
Members frequently raise questions about the potential costs of policies and alternative policy
designs. Congress may also consider options that help alleviate some of the expected negative
consequences from certain emissions mitigation policies. These consequences may include
economy-wide impacts, disproportionate costs to lower-income households, and job losses in
certain industries, among others. When examining these concerns, policymakers may wish to
evaluate the tradeoff between the estimated consequences from mitigation policies and the
benefits of reducing emissions and avoiding climate change, among other considerations.
Many actions to reduce GHG emissions may bring co-benefits—positive effects beyond the
intended GHG reduction benefits. An example is reduced health care costs and mortality
associated with improvements in air quality (e.g., from reductions in non-GHG emissions).
Factors relevant to the extent of co-benefits include policy design and depth of GHG reductions.
Congress, in its oversight role, may also consider the feasibility, challenges, and economic
impacts associated with the Biden Administration’s GHG targets. Some recent studies have
examined pathways that rely partly on federal policies to reduce domestic GHG or CO2 emissions
in the next decade.166 While a synthesis of these studies is beyond the scope of this report, such

164 See, for example, Innovation and Networks Executive Agency, “Innovation Fund,” European Commission, June 14,
2020, https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/innovation-fund.
165 For further discussion, see CRS In Focus IF11791, Mitigating Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Selected Policy Options,
by Jonathan L. Ramseur et al.
166 For example, see (1) Nathan Hultman, Leon Clarke, and Carla Frisch, et al., “Fusing subnational with national
climate action is central to decarbonization: the case of the United States,” Nature Communications, vol. 11 (October
16, 2020); (2) Nathan Hultman, Leon Clarke, and Haewon McJeon, et al., Working Paper: Charting an Ambitious U.S.
NDC of 51% Reductions by 2030, University of Maryland Center for Global Sustainability, March 2021; (3) John
Larsen, Noah Kaufman, and Peter Marsters, et al., Expanding the Reach of a Carbon Tax: Emissions Impacts of
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studies highlight issues for congressional consideration, including options and incentives to
accelerate development and deployment of decarbonization technologies and regulations for
sector-specific or economy-wide emissions targets, should that be a goal. In particular, studies
indicate that achieving these emission reduction targets would generally rely on, among other
things, increasing use of renewable energy and decreasing use of unabated coal for power
generation (i.e., coal-fired generation that does not use carbon capture and sequestration),
electrification of end-uses (i.e., replacing technologies that rely on fossil fuel combustion with
electrical ones), energy efficiency improvements, reductions in methane leaks in the oil and gas
sector, and maintenance of the carbon sink in natural and working lands.167
A question policymakers may consider is whether economy-wide or sectoral targets—such as
decarbonization of the electricity sector—could be achieved under existing federal authorities as
well as through state and local climate change actions. Examples of existing authorities include
Clean Air Act regulations, energy efficiency standards, and renewable portfolio standards. Among
other considerations, it is unclear whether one of these existing authorities—the Clean Air Act—
is well-suited to the Administration’s climate change goals or whether it could achieve the more
ambitious targets supported by some Members and stakeholders. Members supporting
decarbonization might consider legislative options, should existing authorities appear inadequate
to achieve emission reduction objectives. As discussed in “Legislative Proposals in the 117th
Congress,” Congress continues to deliberate new authorities and spending to set and achieve
specific GHG reductions, provide tax and other financial incentives to businesses and consumers,
and set regulatory performance standards (including clean energy standards), among other policy
options.
Climate Change Funding
Congress may consider how federal funding, including appropriations, might influence the
Administration’s climate change actions. Congress is currently deliberating FY2022
appropriations and budget reconciliation options. As discussed in this report, President Biden
directed agencies to prioritize action on climate change through the budget process, among other
things, and his Administration’s FY2022 budget request included specific proposals aimed at
reducing GHG emissions. The Administration’s American Jobs Plan appeared to anticipate that
hundreds of billions of dollars in new federal funding and tax incentives would stimulate
technological advancements and enhance competitiveness of low- or no-GHG emitting
technologies, and hence facilitate a long-term transition to a substantially modified and net-zero-
emissions economy. Senate Majority Leader Schumer released a letter to colleagues with
preliminary estimates of reductions from proposed provisions in the Infrastructure Investment and
Jobs Act and budget reconciliation.168 While the bills have not been enacted as of September
2021, he reported that, with
the combined impact of both the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and the Budget
Resolution’s instructions, we are on track to reduce U.S. emissions to approximately 45
percent beneath 2005 levels by 2030. When you add Administrative actions being planned

Pricing Combined with Additional Climate Actions, Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University and
Rhodium Group, October 20, 2020; (4) Mei Yuan, Alex Barron, and Noelle Selin, et al., Meeting Potential New U.S.
Climate Goals, MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Climate Change, Report 351, April 2021; and (5) Eric
Larson, Chris Greig, and Jesse Jenkins, et al., Net-Zero America: Potential Pathways, Infrastructure, and Impacts,
Princeton University, Interim Report, December 15, 2020, https://netzeroamerica.princeton.edu/the-report.
167 Ibid.
168 Senate Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer, “Dear Colleague,” August 25, 2021,
https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dear%20Colleague%2008.25.21%20(FINAL).pdf.
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by the Biden Administration and many states - like New York, California, and Hawaii - we
will hit our 50 percent target by 2030.
The federal government has long supported research and development efforts beyond those the
private sector pursues, with investments in, among other areas, science, technology development,
and economic research. Federal research funding could help shape the direction and pace of
technological developments that many expect could achieve significant reductions in emissions,
or could lower costs, compared with current commercial technologies. Some advocate that further
innovation would be useful, and in some instances required, to abate emissions from the industrial
sector.169 Congress may look to provide funding for alternative technologies, whether through
research and development, or infrastructure planning. Congress may also consider options to
incentivize consumer purchases, either through tax incentives, mandates, or government
procurement policies.
Members of Congress have expressed differing viewpoints concerning the scope of IIJA and the
Build Back Better Act and each proposal’s spending priorities.170 Some Members of Congress
have called for greater spending on climate change and social programs, such as education and
health care. Other Members of Congress have raised concerns that total proposed spending levels
are too high and that these legislative proposals invest in climate change and social programs at
the expense of programs, such as roads and bridges, they regard as higher priorities.
Finally, Congress appropriates funds for the State Department’s and Department of the Treasury’s
contributions to foreign assistance. Further, Congress has sole authority to lay tariffs and regulate
foreign commerce—the most direct way being through Trade Promotion Authority. That is, it is
the authority that Congress uses to establish trade-negotiating objectives. The most recent
authority (P.L. 114-26) expired on July 1, 2021. Congress may consider whether any new
authority should be written to include objectives on climate.

169 For further information on the potential role of research and development, see GHG-related sections in CRS Report
R46787, Science and Technology Issues in the 117th Congress, coordinated by Frank Gottron and Brian E. Humphreys.
170 Members of Congress have also disagreed about various other provisions of the legislative proposals, such as the tax
provisions in the Build Back Better Act.
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Appendix A. Climate Change Legislation in the
117th Congress: Search Methodology
The “Legislative Proposals in the 117th Congress” section of this report identified bills by
running a number of searches in Congress.gov, an authoritative and up-to-date resource for
legislation, which is updated daily when Congress is in session. Initial searches were run in May
2021 and subsequent searches were run to update legislation until September 27, 2021. CRS
compiled a list of search terms related to adaptation, greenhouse gas emissions (including sources
of emissions by economic sector), climate change mitigation (including technologies), climate
change impacts, climate change economics, climate change finance, and research and
development. CRS also sought to include terms relevant to climate change policy at an
international scale (such as potential U.S. participation in international agreements or bilateral or
multilateral funding assistance). CRS grouped these terms within five broad categories:
adaptation, energy, equity, finance, and land use. Each of the five searches was run in the full text
of all legislation introduced in the 117th Congress, and results were downloaded into Excel for
analysis.171 Individual search results were tagged with the broad topic tag associated with the
search from which they resulted (i.e., “adaptation” or “finance”). Duplicate bills (i.e., bills that
were identified in more than one search) were assigned a broad topic tag for each search in which
they were identified, and then all but one listing was removed from analysis. Amendments and
resolutions were also removed from the spreadsheet. CRS identified a number of bills as not
relevant—meaning these bills contained search terms but did not translate to relevant
provisions—by reviewing titles, summaries (where available), and full text. CRS removed these
bills from consideration. CRS also included all relevant related and companion bills (as identified
in Congress.gov) in analysis. Additional searches were run using the “introducedDate:” function
in Congress.gov to identify both newly introduced legislation as well as updated bill status and
other metadata that may have changed since the prior search.
Bill Status Table
Table A-1 was created by using Congress.gov’s “Status of Legislation” filter in each set of search
results. Each set of results was limited to the following statuses: Became Public Law, Passed Both
Chambers, Passed One Chamber, or Floor Consideration. Thirty-four of the more than 750
legislative proposals that CRS identified progressed beyond introduction in the legislative
process, as of September 27, 2021, and are identified in Table A-1. Many of these bills fit into
multiple broad topic categories. Also, some bills may contain relatively small provisions
addressing climate change, while others are solely focused on that topic in one or more sectors.
Twenty-seven of the 34 bills fell within the energy category, and 18 of the 34 fell within the
adaptation category. Table A-1 reflects the September 27, 2021, search, the most recent search
conducted for this report.

171 Search results available at the following links: Adaptation: https://go.usa.gov/xMhxN; Energy: https://go.usa.gov/
xMhxR; Equity: https://go.usa.gov/xMhxn; Finance: https://go.usa.gov/xMhxQ; and Land use: https://go.usa.gov/
xMhxU.
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Table A-1. Selected Climate Change Legislation in the 117th Congress
Status of bills that have at least received floor consideration
Broad Sector
Vote Information
Last Action if not
Bill No.
Title
Tag(s)
(date)
vote (date)
S. 914
Drinking Water and
Adaptation, energy,
Passed Senate 89-2
Committee report
Wastewater
equity
(4/29/21); Record
filed; Report No.
Infrastructure Act
Vote Number 178
117-20 (5/10/2021)
of 2021
S. 1251
Growing Climate
Energy, land use
Passed Senate 92-8
Received in House
Solutions Act of
(6/24/21); Record
and held at desk
2021
Vote Number 251
(6/24/21)
S. 1260
United States
Adaptation, energy,
Passed Senate 68-32
Innovation and
finance
(5/28/21); Record
Competition Act of
Vote Number 226
2021
S. 2093
For the People Act
Adaptation, energy
Cloture not invoked Cloture motion on
of 2021
(6/22/21); Record
the motion to
vote 246
proceed to the
measure withdrawn
by unanimous
consent in Senate
(9/15/2021)
H.R. 1
For the People Act
Adaptation, energy
Passed House 220-
Received in the
of 2021
210 (3/3/21); Rol
Senate (3/11/21)
call vote number 62
H.R. 447
National
Adaptation, energy,
Passed House 247-
Received in Senate
Apprenticeship Act
equity
173 (2/5/21); Roll
and referred to
of 2021
call vote number 31
Committee on
Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions
(2/25/21)
H.R. 610
San Francisco Bay
Adaptation, energy
Passed/agreed to in
Received in Senate
Restoration Act
House under
and referred to
suspension of the
Committee on
rules (6/15/2021)
Environment and
Public Works
(6/16/2021)
H.R. 803
Protecting
Energy, equity, land
Passed House 227-
Received in Senate
America’s
use
200 (2/26/21); Rol
and referred to
Wilderness and
call vote number 45
Committee on
Public Lands Act
Energy and Natural
Resources
(3/2/2021)
H.R. 1144
Promoting United
Adaptation, energy
Passed/agreed to in
Received in Senate
Government Efforts
House under
and referred to
to Save Our Sound
suspension of the
Committee on
Act
rules (6/15/2021)
Environment and
Public Works
(6/16/2021)
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Broad Sector
Vote Information
Last Action if not
Bill No.
Title
Tag(s)
(date)
vote (date)
H.R. 1157
Department of
Energy
Passed/agreed to in
Received in Senate
State Authorization
House under
and referred to
Act of 2021
suspension of the
Committee on
rules (5/18/2021)
Foreign Relations
(5/19/2021)
H.R. 1187
Corporate
Adaptation, energy,
Passed House 215-
Received in Senate
Governance
finance
214 (6/16/21); Rol
and Referred to
Improvement and
call vote number
Committee on
Investor Protection
169
Banking, House, and
Act
Urban Affairs
(6/17/2021)
H.R. 1319
American Rescue
Energy, equity
Many votes held;
Became P.L. 117-2
Plan Act of 2021
see Congress.gov
(3/11/21)
for details.
H.R. 1374
Enhancing State
Energy
Passed House 389-
Received in Senate
Energy Security
21 (6/22/2021); Rol
and referred to
Planning and
call vote number
Committee on
Emergency
173
Energy and Natural
Preparedness Act of
Resources
2021
(6/23/2021)
H.R. 1447
COAST Research
Energy
Passed under
Received in Senate
Act of 2021
suspension of the
and referred to
rules (5/18/21)
Committee on
Commerce,
Science, and
Transportation
(5/19/2021)
H.R. 1490
504 Modernization
Energy
Passed House 400-
Received in Senate
and Small
16 (4/15/2021); Rol
and referred to
Manufacturer
call vote number
Committee on
Enhancement Act of
116
Small Business and
2021
Entrepreneurship
(4/19/2021)
H.R. 1603
Farm Worker
Adaptation, energy
Passed House 247-
Received in the
Modernization Act
174 (3/18/21); Rol
Senate and referred
of 2021
call vote number 93
to Committee on
Judiciary
(3/22/2021)
H.R. 2225
National Science
Adaptation, energy
Passed House 345-
Received in Senate
Foundation for the
67 (6/28/2021); Rol
and referred to
Future Act
call vote number
Committee on
186
Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions
(7/12/2021)
H.R. 2467
PFAS Action Act of
Energy
Passed House 241-
Received in Senate
2021
183 (7/21/2021);
and referred to
Rol call vote
Committee on
number 217
Environment and
Public Works
(7/22/2021)
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Broad Sector
Vote Information
Last Action if not
Bill No.
Title
Tag(s)
(date)
vote (date)
H.R. 2471
Haiti Development,
Adaptation, energy
Passed/agreed to in
Received in Senate
Accountability, and
House under
and referred to
Institutional
suspension of the
Committee on
Transparency
rules (6/29/21)
Foreign Relations
Initiative Act
(4/21/2021)
H.R. 2533
NEAR Act of 2021
Adaptation, energy
Passed/agreed to in
Received in Senate
House under
and referred to
suspension of the
Committee on
rules (5/18/21)
Commerce,
Science, and
Transportation
(5/19/2021)
H.R. 2931
Enhancing Grid
Energy
Passed/agreed to in
Received in Senate
Security through
House by voice
and referred to
Public-Private
vote (7/19/2021)
Committee on
Partnership Act
Energy and Natural
Resources
(7/20/2021)
H.R. 3119
Energy Emergency
Energy
Passed/agreed to in
Received in Senate
Leadership Act
House by voice
and referred to
vote (7/19/2021)
Committee on
Energy and Natural
Resources
(7/20/2021)
H.R. 3593
Department of
Adaptation, energy
Passed House 351-
Received in Senate
Energy Science for
68 (6/28/2021); Rol
and referred to
the Future Act
call vote number
Committee on
187
Energy and Natural
Resources
(7/12/2021)
H.R. 3684
Infrastructure
Adaptation, energy,
Passed Senate 69-30 House – Postponed
Investment and Jobs
equity, finance
(8/10/2021); Record Proceedings
Act
vote number 314
(9/28/2021)
H.R. 4350
National Defense
Adaptation, energy,
Passed House 316-

Authorization Act
equity, finance
113 (9/23/2021);
for Fiscal Year 2022
Rol call vote
number 293
H.R. 4373
Department of
Energy, finance
Passed House 217-
Received in Senate
State, Foreign
212 (7/28/2021);
(7/29/2021)
Operations, and
Rol call vote
Related Programs
number 243
Appropriations Act,
2022
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Broad Sector
Vote Information
Last Action if not
Bill No.
Title
Tag(s)
(date)
vote (date)
H.R. 4502
Labor, Health and
Adaption, energy,
Passed House 219-
Received in Senate
Human Services,
equity
208 (7/29/2021);
(8/3/2021)
Education,
Rol call vote
Agriculture, Rural
number 247
Development,
Energy and Water
Development,
Financial Services
and General
Government,
Interior,
Environment,
Military
Construction,
Veterans Affairs,
Transportation, and
Housing and Urban
Development
Appropriations Act,
2022
Source: CRS, compiled from Congress.gov.
Notes: This table provides a complete list of the bil s that have at least received floor consideration, and was
last updated September 27, 2021. “Floor consideration” includes House and Senate bil s that have received
consideration on the floor of either chamber including taking up, amending, debate, voting, passage, amendments
between chambers, and conference actions. This bil status does not include actions taken in committees. For
more information see https://www.congress.gov/help/action-search-scope-notes.
Search Limitations
These searches reflect the best available information from Congress.gov within the specified time
frame, but there are some limitations. First, there are many ways to define, consider, and address
climate change. Legislative proposals may specify climate change as an objective. Other
proposals that may be considered directly or indirectly relevant to climate change may not
expressly state climate change as an objective. Some bills may contain only small provisions that
met search criteria, while others are solely focused on addressing climate change in one or more
sectors. Stakeholders may also disagree about the extent to which proposals may be relevant to
climate change. CRS designed broad searches in an effort to capture the many ways that
Members of Congress and stakeholders have considered climate change. Given the broad scope
and variability of the subject matter, these and any other searches for “climate change legislation”
should be viewed as illustrative rather than a definitive record.
Second, the search results should be viewed as a snapshot in time. Bills typically change as they
move through the legislative process, both in content and for procedural reasons. In some
instances, the searches may not have captured all such revisions. As previously noted, the
Congress.gov database is updated daily when Congress is in session, but the full text of different
bill versions and additional metadata may be added over time, affecting search results.

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link to page 18 U.S. Climate Change Policy

Appendix B. Selected Additional Actions in the
Executive Branch
The Biden Administration has begun implementing its whole-of-government approach to
addressing climate change. This appendix identifies examples of climate-related policy actions as
summarized by the following White House statements, in alphabetical order, as of September
2021. The actions and proposals summarized in this section do not constitute a comprehensive list
of efforts by the Biden Administration.
 American Jobs Plan. The Administration’s American Jobs Plan proposed a total
of $2 trillion in federal funding and outlined many incentives and investments in
U.S. jobs, infrastructure, and market competitiveness. The plan targeted 40% of
the benefits of climate and clean infrastructure investments to disadvantaged
communities. The plan also proposed to invest in rural communities and
communities affected by the market-based transition to clean energy, among
other climate change initiatives.172 It called on Congress to fund $35 billion “to
achieve technology breakthroughs that address the climate crisis and position
America as the global leader in clean energy technology and clean energy
jobs.”173 Congressional deliberations subsequently focused on a different but
related infrastructure plan, known as the “Bipartisan Infrastructure Framework”
(BIF), a $1.2 trillion plan that would authorize $579 billion in new spending on
transportation infrastructure, power infrastructure, climate resiliency, and other
initiatives.174 A group of Senators reached agreement with President Biden on the
BIF and drafted legislation. See “Legislative Proposals in the 117th Congress”
for more information.
 Building Modernization Proposals. There are a number of proposals to fund
building modernization. For example, CEQ, DOE, the General Services
Administration (GSA), and EPA announced $30 million in new federal
investments to modernize and upgrade the nation’s residential and commercial
buildings to be affordable, resilient, accessible, energy efficient, and
electrified.175 As another example, DOE requested an increase of $387 million
for the Federal Energy Efficiency Fund to improve the climate resilience of
federal buildings.176

172 White House, Statements and Releases: The American Jobs Plan, March 31, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-american-jobs-plan/. (Hereinafter, American Jobs Plan
Fact Sheet.)
173 American Jobs Plan Fact Sheet.
174 Sen. Mitt Romney, “Senators’ Joint Statement and Framework on Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal,” press release,
June 24, 2021, https://www.romney.senate.gov/senators-joint-statement-framework-bipartisan-infrastructure-deal. See
also Sen. Mark R. Warner, “Warner, President Biden & Senate Colleagues Announce Bipartisan Agreement on
Infrastructure,” press release, June 24, 2021, https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2021/6/warner-
president-biden-senate-colleagues-announce-bipartisan-agreement-on-infrastructure.
175 White House, “Biden Administration Accelerates Efforts to Create Jobs Making American Buildings More
Affordable, Cleaner, and Resilient,” fact sheet, May 17, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2021/05/17/fact-sheet-biden-administration-accelerates-efforts-to-create-jobs-making-american-buildings-
more-affordable-cleaner-and-resilient/.
176 DOE, FY2022 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 3, Part 1, p. 198, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/
2021-06/doe-fy2022-budget-volume-3.1-v3.pdf.
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 Climate Innovation Working Group Formation. The Administration
announced a Climate Innovation Working Group and discussed funding to
support “transformational low-carbon energy technologies.”177
 Coal and Power Plant Community Economic Revitalization Plan. The
Administration released a report that identifies communities affected by coal
mine and power plant closures (“energy communities”) that should be prioritized
for federal investment, details existing resources for these communities, and
provides recommendations for further actions.178
 Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure Plan. The departments of
Transportation and Energy, and the GSA, announced a suite of actions intended
to accelerate the deployment of electric vehicles and charging stations.179
 Financial Sector Oversight (Assessing Climate Risks and Disclosures). U.S.
financial regulators and the Biden Administration have taken public steps toward
focusing financial regulatory attention on assessing climate risks to the financial
system, including whether, and how, current standards for disclosure of climate
risks are being followed and how they might be updated. The Biden
Administration is reportedly working on a government-wide strategy, under an
upcoming executive order, to better assess climate-related risks for public and
private financial assets.180 Several key financial agencies have announced they
are looking at updating existing climate-related risk guidance. Treasury Secretary
Janet Yellen flagged climate change as “an existential threat” and the biggest
emerging risk to the health of the U.S. financial system, at the first meeting of the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), established after the 2008
financial crisis so the heads of financial agencies could coordinate regarding
emerging risks.181 She reiterated in a July 11, 2021, speech that the FSOC would
assess the potential risk climate change may pose to the financial stability of the
United States, and would complement the SEC’s work on improved financial
disclosures of climate-related risks.182

177 White House, “Biden-Harris Administration Launches American Innovation Effort to Create Jobs and Tackle the
Climate Crisis,” press release, February 11, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/
2021/02/11/biden-harris-administration-launches-american-innovation-effort-to-create-jobs-and-tackle-the-climate-
crisis/.
178 White House, “Biden Administration Outlines Key Resources to Invest in Coal and Power Plant Community
Economic Revitalization,” fact sheet, April 23, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/
2021/04/23/fact-sheet-biden-administration-outlines-key-resources-to-invest-in-coal-and-power-plant-community-
economic-revitalization/. See also National Energy Technology Laboratory, Initial Report to the President on
Empowering Workers Through Revitalizing Energy Communities, April 2021, https://netl.doe.gov/IWGInitialReport.
179 White House, “Biden Administration Advances Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure,” fact sheet, April 22,
2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/22/fact-sheet-biden-administration-
advances-electric-vehicle-charging-infrastructure/.
180 The strategy is to be drafted by the National Economic Council and National Climate Advisor Gina McCarthy, in
coordination with Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and the Office of Management and Budget, according to media
reports. See, for example, Jenny Leonard, “Biden Plans to Order Climate Risk Strategy for Financial Assets,”
Bloomberg News, April 8, 2021, at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-08/biden-plans-to-order-
climate-risk-strategy-for-financial-assets. See also Climate 21 Project, Transition Memo, https://climate21.org/
documents/C21_OMB.pdf.
181 Victoria Guida, “Janet Yellen: Climate Change Poses ‘Existential Threat’ To Financial Markets,” Politico, March
31, 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/03/31/yellen-climate-change-fsoc-478769.

182 Remarks by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen at the Venice International Conference on Climate, July 11,
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 Financial Sector Oversight (Federal Reserve). On January 25, 2021, the
Federal Reserve announced the creation of an internal Supervision Climate
Committee (SCC) to “strengthen the Federal Reserve’s capacity to identify and
assess financial risks from climate change” and to “develop an appropriate
program to ensure the resilience of supervised firms to climate-related financial
risks.”183 In March 2021, the Federal Reserve announced the creation of a
Financial Stability Climate Committee (FSCC) to identify, assess, and address
climate-related risks to financial stability from a macro-prudential perspective.184
On July 11, 2021, Fed Vice Chair for Supervision Randall Quarles flagged the
Financial Stability Board’s (FSB’s) publication of a roadmap for addressing
climate-related financial risks.185 The FSB roadmap is aimed at supporting
international coordination of climate disclosures for standard-setting bodies
internationally,186 although Quarles did not specifically address any additional
steps by the United States or the Federal Reserve. On December 15, 2020, the
Federal Reserve Board joined the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for
Greening the Financial System (NGFS), a group of central banks and supervisory
authorities from around the world developing best practices on climate risk
management for the financial sector.187
 Financial Sector Oversight (Securities Disclosures). On July 28, 2021,
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chair Gary Gensler said he had
requested that the SEC’s staff develop a mandatory climate risk disclosure rule
proposal for the commission’s consideration by the end of 2021.188 He noted that
such mandatory disclosures should be “consistent and comparable,” enabling
investors to compare both qualitative and quantitative metrics across
companies.189 He suggested quantitative disclosures could include metrics related
to greenhouse gas emissions, financial impacts of climate change, and progress
toward climate-related goals.190 In February 2021, the former Acting Chair of the
SEC, Allison Herren Lee, directed the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance to

2021, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0271.
183 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Kevin Stiroh to Step Down as Head of New York Fed Supervision to Assume
New System Leadership Role at Board of Governors on Climate,” press release, January 25, 2021,
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/aboutthefed/2021/20210125.
184 Federal Reserve Board Governor Lael Brainard, “Financial Stability Implications of Climate Change,” speech at
“Transform Tomorrow Today” Ceres 2021 Conference, Boston, March 23, 2021, https://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/brainard20210323a.htm.
185 Federal Reserve Vice Chair for Supervision Randal K. Quarles, “Disclosures and Data: Building Strong
Foundations for Addressing Climate-Related Financial Risks,” speech at the Venice International Conference on
Climate Change, Venice, Italy, July 11, 2021, https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
quarles20210711a.htm.
186 See Financial Stability Board, “FSB Roadmap For Addressing Climate-Related Financial Risks,” July 7, 2021,
https://www.fsb.org/2021/07/fsb-roadmap-for-addressing-climate-related-financial-risks/.
187 Federal Reserve Board, “Federal Reserve Board Announces It Has Formally Joined the Network of Central Banks
and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System, or NGFS, as a Member,” press release, December 15, 2020,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20201215a.htm.
188 SEC Chair Gary Gensler, “Prepared Remarks Before the Principles for Responsible Investment ‘Climate and Global
Financial Markets’ Webinar,” July 28, 2021, Washington, DC, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/gensler-pri-2021-07-
28. (Hereinafter, Gensler, “Prepared Remarks.”)
189 Gensler, “Prepared Remarks.”
190 Gensler, “Prepared Remarks.”
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enhance its focus on climate-related disclosure in public company filings.191 She
noted that the SEC would assess compliance related to disclosure of climate
change risks under the SEC’s existing 2010 guidance, and would start updating
that 2010 SEC guidance.192 The SEC also announced in March 2021 the creation
of a “Climate and ESG [Environmental, Social and Governance] Task Force”
within the SEC’s Division of Enforcement to identify ways to proactively
identify ESG-related misconduct.193
 International Climate Finance Plan. U.S. agencies that work with development
partners (e.g., the departments of State and the Treasury, U.S. Agency for
International Development, the Millennium Challenge Corporation) announced a
plan containing directives to (1) mobilize financial resources, both public and
private, to assist developing countries to reduce and/or avoid greenhouse gas
emissions and build resilience and adapt to the impacts of climate change; (2)
scale back public investments in carbon-intensive fossil-fuel-based energy; (3)
make international capital flows consistent with low-emissions, climate-resilient
pathways; and (4) better define, measure, and report U.S. international climate
finance. The plan states an intention to double, by 2024, the U.S. annual public
climate finance to developing countries, including tripling its annual adaptation
finance, “relative to the average level during the second half of the Obama
Administration.”194 According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the
average annual funding for climate change international assistance over the
period 2013-2016 was $1.177 billion.195
 Offshore Wind Energy Plan. The U.S. departments of the Interior, Energy,
Commerce, and Transportation announced new leasing, funding, and
development goals to accelerate and deploy offshore wind energy.196
 Paris Agreement Accession. The Administration accepted on behalf of the
United States the Paris Agreement, the second major subsidiary agreement for
international cooperation under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change.197

191 Acting SEC Chair Allison Herren Lee, “Statement on the Review of Climate-Related Disclosure,” February 24,
2021, https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-statement-review-climate-related-disclosure.
192 Acting SEC Chair Allison Herren Lee, “Statement on the Review of Climate-Related Disclosure,” February 24,
2021, https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-statement-review-climate-related-disclosure. Since total market
capitalization of the U.S. stock market at the end of 2020 was roughly $50.8 trillion, the financial implications of
adequate disclosure of risks from climate change for equity investors is potentially large. The $50.8 trillion figure
represents the total market capitalization of all U.S.-based public companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
Nasdaq Stock Market, or OTCQX U.S. Market, according to Siblis Research, “Total Market Value of U.S. Stock
Market,” https://siblisresearch.com/data/us-stock-market-value/.
193 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), “SEC Announces Enforcement Task Force Focused on Climate
and ESG Issues,” press release 2021-42, March 4, 2021, https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-42.
194 White House, “Executive Summary: U.S. International Climate Finance Plan,” April 22, 2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/22/executive-summary-u-s-international-
climate-finance-plan/.
195 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Climate Change: Analysis of Reported Federal Funding, GAO-18-223,
April 2018, p. 84, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-18-223.
196 White House, “Biden Administration Jumpstarts Offshore Wind Energy Projects to Create Jobs,” fact sheet, March
29, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/29/fact-sheet-biden-administration-
jumpstarts-offshore-wind-energy-projects-to-create-jobs/.
197 White House, “Paris Climate Agreement, Acceptance on Behalf of the United States of America,” January 20, 2021,
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 President Biden’s Leaders Summit on Climate. The Administration convened
a summit with “heads of state and government, as well as leaders and
representatives from international organizations, businesses, subnational
governments, and indigenous communities” to discuss international climate
ambition, among other things.198
 Resilience Funding. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
announced three pre-disaster funding opportunities intended to help states and
communities increase their preparedness in advance of climate-related extreme
weather events and other disasters, and improve their ability to recover after
these events. The FEMA initiatives include (1) $1 billion in funding for its
Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) program for FY2021;
(2) $3.46 billion in funding for its Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP);
and (3) $160 million in funding for its Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) grant
program for FY2021.199
 U.S.-Germany Climate and Energy Partnership. President Biden and German
Chancellor Angela Merkel jointly launched the U.S.-Germany Climate and
Energy Partnership.200

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/paris-climate-agreement/. For more
information, see CRS In Focus IF11746, United States Rejoins the Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Options for
Congress, by Jane A. Leggett.
198 White House, “President Biden’s Leaders Summit on Climate,” April 23, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/23/fact-sheet-president-bidens-leaders-summit-on-climate/.
199 White House, “Biden Administration Announces Nearly $5 Billion in Resilience Funding to Help Communities
Prepare for Extreme Weather and Climate-Related Disasters,” fact sheet, August 9, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/09/fact-sheet-biden-administration-announces-nearly-5-billion-in-
resilience-funding-to-help-communities-prepare-for-extreme-weather-and-climate-related-disasters/.
200 White House, “U.S.-Germany Climate and Energy Partnership,” fact sheet, July 15, 2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/07/15/fact-sheet-u-s-germany-climate-and-
energy-partnership/.
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Author Information

Kate C. Shouse, Coordinator
Corrie E. Clark
Analyst in Environmental Policy
Analyst in Energy Policy

Richard K. Lattanzio
Genevieve K. Croft
Specialist in Environmental Policy
Analyst in Agricultural Policy

Jane A. Leggett
Rena S. Miller
Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy
Specialist in Financial Economics

Kezee Procita
Michael I. Westphal
Senior Research Librarian
Analyst in Environmental Policy

Jonathan L. Ramseur

Specialist in Environmental Policy

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
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copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
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