Russian Arms Sales and Defense Industry

Russian Arms Sales and Defense Industry

Russian Arms Sales and Defense Industry
October 14, 2021
Arms sales are a central element of Russia’s foreign policy and are closely controlled by
the government to advance economic and strategic objectives. Russian arms sales
Andrew S. Bowen
provide an important source of hard currency, promote Russia’s defense and political
Analyst in Russian and
relations with other countries, and support important domestic industries. Given this
European Affairs
prominent role, trends in Russia’s global arms sales are of enduring interest to Congress.

Some Members of Congress have expressed concern that Russian arms sales support

aggressive and malign Russian activity, foster conflicts and regional insecurity, and
compete with U.S. arms sales. In addition, U.S. Administrations and Congress have imposed sanctions against
Russia’s defense industry and arms exports.
Russia is the world’s second-largest arms exporter, behind the United States. Russia exports arms to over 45
countries and has accounted for around 20% of global arms sales since 2016. Many countries have long-standing
arms relationships with Russia, some dating back to the Soviet Union. Despite its global presence, Russia exports
a majority of its arms to five states (listed in alphabetical order): Algeria, China, Egypt, India, and Vietnam. India
has been the largest importer of Russian arms since 2016. Russia is attempting to broaden its client base and is
aggressively pursuing new markets in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.
Russia exports a variety of weaponry, including legacy and advanced aircraft, air defense systems, naval vessels
and submarines, radars, missiles, tanks, armored vehicles, small arms, and artillery. According to official Russian
statistics, aircraft make up 50% of Russian arms exports. Most current Russian arms are updated versions of
legacy systems, but Russia is increasingly marketing its most technologically advanced systems.
In addition to creating arms for export, Russia’s defense industry provides the country with upgraded and modern
military equipment for its own military. Since 2007, Russia has consolidated most defense companies into various
holding companies under the control of a state-run conglomerate, Rostec. Despite producing modern and
technologically advanced systems, Russia’s defense industry has numerous challenges, such as inefficiency, low
production capacity, lack of a modern machinery base, limited innovation, and efforts to diversify into civilian
and dual-use technologies.
In response to malign Russian activities, Congress has imposed sanctions on Russia’s defense industry and arms
exports. Congress has targeted Russia’s arms exports for sanctions pursuant to Section 231 of the Countering
Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017, Title II of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA; P.L. 115-44; 22 U.S.C. §§9501 et seq.). CAATSA grants the President waiver
flexibility, if the President deems a waiver would be in the U.S. national security interest and determines, among
other provisions, that the government in question is significantly reducing the proportion of its total defense
equipment from Russia.
In addressing the Russian defense industry and arms exports, this report provides an overview of selected weapon
systems, profiles Russia’s arms relationships with its top five importers, and assesses related issues for Congress
and U.S. policy. For background information on Russia, see CRS Report R46761, Russia: Foreign Policy and
U.S. Relations, by Andrew S. Bowen and Cory Welt; CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia, coordinated
by Cory Welt; and CRS In Focus IF11589, Russian Armed Forces: Capabilities, by Andrew S. Bowen.

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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Historical Overview .................................................................................................................. 3
Recent State of Russian Defense Industry and Arms Sales ....................................................... 5
Arms Sales .......................................................................................................................... 8
Overview of Major Weapon Systems ............................................................................................ 10
Aircraft and Air Defense ......................................................................................................... 10
Fighter/Ground Attack Aircraft ......................................................................................... 10
Helicopters ......................................................................................................................... 11
Air Defense Systems .......................................................................................................... 11
Armored Vehicles ..................................................................................................................... 11
Naval Systems ......................................................................................................................... 12
Selected Country Profiles .............................................................................................................. 12
Algeria ..................................................................................................................................... 13
China ....................................................................................................................................... 15
Egypt ....................................................................................................................................... 17
India ........................................................................................................................................ 19
Vietnam ................................................................................................................................... 21
U.S. Sanctions and Considerations for Congress .......................................................................... 22
Sanctions Impact ............................................................................................................... 23
Future Questions ..................................................................................................................... 24

Figures
Figure 1. Trend Indicator Value of Arms Exports from Russia to Algeria, 1991-2020 ................. 13
Figure 2. Trend Indicator Value of Arms Exports from Russia to China, 1991-2020 ................... 15
Figure 3. Trend Indicator Value of Arms Exports from Russia to Egypt, 1991-2020 ................... 17
Figure 4. Trend Indicator Value of Arms Exports from Russia to India, 1991-2020 ..................... 19
Figure 5. Trend Indicator Value of Arms Exports from Russia to Vietnam, 1991-2020 ............... 21

Tables

Table A-1. Major Russian Arms Orders and Deliveries to Algeria ............................................... 26
Table A-2. Major Russian Arms Orders and Deliveries to China .................................................. 28
Table A-3. Major Russian Arms Orders and Deliveries to Egypt .................................................. 30
Table A-4. Major Russian Arms Orders and Deliveries to India ................................................... 31
Table A-5. Major Russian Arms Orders and Deliveries to Vietnam .............................................. 32

Appendixes
Appendix. Major Russian Arms Orders and Deliveries ................................................................ 26
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Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 33

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Introduction
Russia uses arms sales to advance its foreign policy interests, including developing defense
relationships and enhancing Russia’s regional and global influence.1 Since 2000, Russia has been
one of the top five arms exporters in the world in dollar-value terms (often behind only the United
States), averaging $13-$15 billion in reported annual sales, according to official Russian statistics
and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), a nongovernmental
organization.2 Russia conducts foreign arms sales through Rosoboronexport, a subsidiary of the
state-owned corporation Rostec. Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation
(FSMTC) is the governmental body that oversees arms sales.3
Russia benefits from long-standing defense and arms export relationships with numerous
countries. Many of these relationships originated during the Cold War. Maintaining defense
relationships is important for Russia to project global military, diplomatic, and political power,
and such relationships are part of Russia’s foreign policy.4 According to some analysts, Russia
uses these relationships to induce other countries to include Russia in discussions and
negotiations and may use them to undermine or hedge against U.S. influence.5
Arms sales are a component of Russia’s defense relationships.6 Russia exports a wide range of
military systems, including small arms, aircraft, tanks and armored vehicles, artillery, air defense,
missiles, and ships.7 Many of these systems are upgraded versions of Soviet-era or early Russian
systems, but they increasingly also include advanced weaponry, such as new Su-35S fighters and
S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
Russian arms appear attractive to buyers for various reasons. First, long-standing defense
relationships are seen to contribute to established arms relations between Russia and other
countries.8 Importing militaries often are familiar with Russian weaponry, easing training and
maintenance requirements. Second, observers note that Russian weaponry may be less expensive
and easier to operate and maintain relative to Western systems.9 Third, Russia reportedly extends

1 Stephen Blank and Edward Levitzky, “Geostrategic Aims of the Russian Arms Trade in East Asia and the Middle
East,” Defence Studies, vol. 15, no. 1 (2015), pp. 63-80.
2 In 2020, state-owned arms exporter Rosoboronexport stated it sold $180 billion worth of arms to foreign customers
over the last 20 years. Rostec stated the current portfolio of orders was $53.8 billion as of June 2021. Interfax,
“Portfolio of Foreign Orders for Russian Weapons Reached $53.8 Billion, Last Year the Volume of Deliveries
Exceeded $13 Billion-Rostec,” June 24, 2021; SIPRI, Arms Transfer Database, at https://www.sipri.org/databases/
armstransfers.
3 The Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC) is subordinated to the Russian Ministry of
Defense. See FSMTC at http://www.fsvts.gov.ru/materialsf/1C815146FD9FD6DDC325789E0036249F.html.
4 Richard Connolly and Cecilie Sendstad, Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter: The Strategic and Economic Importance
of Arms Exports for Russia, Chatham House, March 20, 2017 (hereinafter cited as Connolly and Sendstad, Russia’s
Role as an Arms Exporter).
5 See, for example, Yury Barmin, “What Smoke Signals Are Russia’s Arms Deals Sending?” Moscow Times, May 2,
2018. For further discussion, see CRS Report R46761, Russia: Foreign Policy and U.S. Relations, by Andrew S.
Bowen and Cory Welt.
6 Sergey Denisentsev, Russia in the Global Arms Market: Stagnation in a Changing Market Landscape, Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), August 2017 (hereinafter cited as Denisentsev, Russia in the Global Arms
Market).
7 TASS, “Russia to Feature over 200 Weapon Systems at Aero India Air Show,” February 1, 2021.
8 Viljar Veebel, “The Future of Russia’s Military Industry: Can ‘Special Deliveries,’ Desperate Needs, Generous Loan
Deals, and ‘Old Love’ from Soviet Times Keep Partnerships Running?” Global Affairs, vol. 6, no. 4-5 (2020), pp. 10-11.
9 Amanda Macias, “Russia Is Luring International Arms Buyers with a Missile System That Costs Much Less Than
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flexible financing options, such as loans with favorable terms.10 Finally, in contrast to U.S. arms
exports, Russia generally exports weapons regardless of a country’s human rights record or
internal political situation.11
Russia’s defense industry faces challenges in conducting arms sales, including competition from
Western arms manufacturers and U.S. sanctions targeting significant transactions with Russia’s
defense and intelligence sectors.12 Additionally, the growth of domestic arms industries in India
and China, Russia’s largest export markets, may negatively affect future Russian arms sales.
Russia’s defense industry is capable of producing advanced systems across most weapons
categories. At the same time, some sectors of Russia’s defense industry struggle with slow
production, limited production capacity, and quality control issues. Since 2011 and amid a
massive state armament program, the defense industry has produced, deployed, and upgraded
numerous systems under design since the 1990s, but it still struggles to produce wholly new
designs.13 Production of new Russian designs faces cost overruns, design flaws, and failure to
produce on time, issues that also apply to other countries’ defense industries. Russia’s 2014
invasion of Ukraine and the imposition of Western sanctions reinforced an existing tendency of
self-sufficiency, with Russia’s defense industry attempting to become even more self-reliant.
An understanding of Russia’s defense industry provides context to the role Russian arms sales
play in Russian foreign policy. This report focuses on Russia’s defense industry, arms sales,
selected weapon systems, and arms exports to Russia’s top five clients.14 It also presents an
analysis of related congressional and U.S. policy issues. Data in this report are based on official
and unofficial open sources.15 To assess the value of arms transfers, this report uses data from
SIPRI. SIPRI records data using a common unit, the trend indicator value (TIV). According to
SIPRI, “the TIV is based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons and is

Models Made by American Companies,” CNBC, November 19, 2018.
10 Matthew Bodner, “Influence or Profit? Russia’s Defense Industry Is at a Crossroads,” Defense News, July 22, 2019.
11 Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia Hoping to Boost Arms Sales After Syrian Usage,” Defense News, August 30, 2017;
Henry Foy and Eli Meixler, “Russia Seeks Deeper Ties with Myanmar Military Junta,” Financial Times, March 26,
2021; Luke Hunt, “Russia Focuses on Arms Sales to ‘Like-Minded’ Generals in Myanmar,” Diplomat, June 2, 2021
(hereinafter cited as Hunt, “Russia Focuses on Arms Sales.”
12 See Section 231 of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017, Title II of the Countering
America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA; P.L. 115-44; 22 U.S.C. §§9501 et seq.).
13 For example, construction on the lead ship of the Yasen class nuclear powered cruise missile submarine,
Severodvinsk, began in 1993; the ship was delivered to the Russian Navy in 2013. The second submarine in the class
was not accepted into service until 2021. Kyle Mizokami, “This Russian Submarine Is More Than a Match for the U.S.
Navy,” National Interest, February 17, 2020
14 This study uses dollars to estimate reported value of arms sales; however, the actual value is often greater if using
purchasing power parity (PPP) estimates rather than market exchange estimates. PPP measures the relative cost of
production for similar goods. Because Russian costs of production are in rubles (due to primarily domestic inputs for
production), the actual profit of a foreign sale conducted in dollars may be greater when converted into rubles
domestically. For more on the benefit of using PPP estimates, see Richard Connolly, Russian Military Expenditure in
Comparative Perspective: A Purchasing Power Parity Estimate, CNA, 2019; Michael Kofman and Richard Connolly,
“Why Russian Military Expenditure Is Much Higher Than Commonly Understood (as Is China’s),” War on the Rocks,
December 16, 2019.
15 This includes data from SIPRI’s Arms Trade Database and official press releases from Russian defense industry
officials. TASS, “Russia’s Portfolio of Arms Orders Exceeds $55 Bln as of Early 2020,” July 22, 2020; TASS,
“Russia’s Rosoboronexport to Deliver Armaments Worth $13 Bln in 2020,” August 23, 2020; TASS, “Russia’s State
Arms Exporter Delivers Military Hardware Worth $180 Bln over 20 Years,” November 2, 2020.
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intended to represent the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the
transfer.”16
Historical Overview
Russia, and other countries arising from the former Soviet republics, inherited the former Soviet
Union’s defense-industrial complex.17 Long reliant on massive defense spending and state
support, the former Soviet defense industry lacked access to easily available credit amid
reductions in government spending.18 The industry’s role as a large source of employment
presented a complicated domestic issue for Russia’s new leaders after the breakup of the Soviet
Union.
Like the rest of Russia’s economy, the defense industry suffered during Russia’s transition from a
state-run economy to a market economy.19 The Russian government apparently reduced the
volume of orders and reportedly failed to fully pay for services and products.20 The reduced state
support highlighted aspects of inefficiency within the Russian defense industry, where companies
duplicated production.21 Privatization and the changing nature of state support contributed to
changes in the Russian defense industry, including closure of certain companies and reported
delays in or termination of certain weapons systems.
Aiming to revitalize the defense industry, the Russian government supported a conversion
program to switch companies from producing military goods to creating civilian goods.22 By
1997, Russia’s conversion program had largely failed. Many scientists and technicians in the
defense industry went abroad or left for work in other sectors. The number of companies and
production output plummeted as the lack of domestic orders and government support threatened
even the largest defense producers.23
Consequently, foreign arms sales became crucial to Russia’s defense industry. Arms sales
provided vital hard currency and allowed companies to keep production lines open.24 According

16 For more on SIPRI’s methodology, see SIPRI, “Arms Transfer Database—Methodology,” at https://www.sipri.org/
databases/armstransfers/background.
17 Julian Cooper, “The Defense Industry and Civil-Military Relations,” in Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Military
Relations from Brezhnev to Gorbachev, eds. Timothy J. Colton and Thane Gustafson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1990), pp. 164-191.
18 Vitaly Shlykov, “The Economics of Defense in Russia and the Legacy of Structural Militarization,” in The Russian
Military: Power and Policy, eds. Steven E. Miller and Dmitri Trenin (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 157-182.
19 Clifford G. Gaddy, “No Turning Back: Market Reform and Defense Industry in Russia—Who’s Adjusting to
Whom?,” The Brookings Institution, June 1, 1996.
20 Antonio Sanchez-Andres, “Privatization, Decentralization and Production Adjustment in the Russian Defence
Industry,” Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 50, no. 2 (March 1998), pp. 241-255.
21 Vitaly Shlykov, “Economic Readjustment Within the Russian Defense-Industrial Complex,” Security Dialogue, vol.
26, no. 1 (1995), pp. 19-34.
22 Antonio Sanchez-Andres, “Privatization, Decentralization and Production Adjustment in the Russian Defence
Industry.”
23 According to one estimate, the “number of enterprises under the control of the Ministry for Defense Industries
dropped from 1,800 in 1991 to 500 in 1997; in addition, their aggregate military and civilian output fell by 82 percent.”
Alexei G. Arbatov, “Military Reform in Russia: Dilemmas, Obstacles, and Prospects,” International Security, vol. 22,
no. 4 (1998), p. 110.
24 Antonio Sanchez-Andres, “Arms Exports and Restructuring in the Russian Defence Industry,” Europe-Asia Studies,
vol. 56, no. 5 (2004), p. 691 (hereinafter cited as Sanchez-Andres, “Arms Exports and Restructuring”).
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to one estimate, between 1992 and 2000, at least 60% of all defense orders were for foreign
clients.25
Starting during Vladimir Putin’s first term as president in 2000, the Russian government launched
a program to increase state control over the defense sector. In 2000, the Russian government
created Rosoboronexport, the state-controlled agency for arms sales.26 Plans to reorganize
Russia’s defense industry followed with the Russian government adopting a Program for the
Reform and Development of the Defense-Industrial Complex 2002-2006. This program
reportedly sought to reestablish state control over the defense sector, increase efficiency, and
gradually consolidate the defense industry into a series of holding companies.27 The plan called
for the creation of integrated structures to oversee the various companies, manufacturers, and
design bureaus involved in defense production and in research and development (R&D).28 The
plan’s premise was that streamlined management systems would improve efficiency and increase
competitiveness. For example, Russia consolidated its shipyards and shipbuilding capacity into
the United Shipbuilding Corporation and its aircraft industry (such as the MiG, Sukhoi, and
Tupolev companies) into the United Aircraft Corporation, later incorporated under Rostec.29
Over the next decade, Russian state control over the defense industry and arms exports further
increased. The defense industry also includes Roskosmos (the Russian State Corporation for
Space Activities) and Rosatom (the State Atomic Energy Corporation, which oversees civilian
and military nuclear production). In 2004, Russia created the FSMTC to oversee arms sales and
military cooperation.30 In 2006, the Russian government established a Military-Industrial
Commission under the control of then-Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov to oversee the defense
industry. Efforts by the Russian government to consolidate the defense industry into several
holding companies also continued. In 2007, Putin created Rostec, a state-owned corporation
under the control of Sergei Chemezov; Rostec, with Roskosmos and Rosatom, controls an
estimated 80% of companies in the defense sector, including Rosoboronexport, either directly or
through equity shares.31
Arms exports grew from a low in the late 1990s through the end of 2010. China and India
accounted for over half of Russia’s arms exports from 2000 to 2010.32 During the same period,
increased Chinese and Indian defense spending created buyers capable of purchasing more
advanced weaponry. This, in turn, led Russian defense firms to market and sell upgraded versions
of Soviet-era weapons. These weapons spanned multiple types, from aircraft, such as the MiG-29,

25 Sanchez-Andres, “Arms Exports and Restructuring,” pp. 689-691.
26 Presidential Decree No. 1834, November 4, 2000. See Rosoboronexport, “History of the Company,” at http://roe.ru/
eng/rosoboronexport/history/.
27 Julian Cooper, “Appendix 9C: Developments in the Russian Arms Industry,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2006 (Stockholm:
SIPRI, 2006), pp. 437-439.
28 Johan Engvall, Russia’s Military R&D Infrastructure: A Primer, Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI), April
2021, p. 17.
29 See “Economics and Industry,” in Russia’s Military Modernization: An Assessment, eds. Douglas Barrie and James
Hackett (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 2020), pp. 167-174 (hereinafter cited as Barrie and
Hackett, eds., Russia’s Military Modernization).
30 Mathieu Boulegue, “Russia’s Shifting Defense Establishment,” National Interest, July 24, 2018; Pavel Luzin, “The
Inner Workings of Russia’s Military Industrial Behemoth,” Riddle, March 27, 2019 (hereinafter cited as Luzin, “Inner
Workings”); TASS, “Official Unveils Amount of Russian Military-Technical Cooperation in Dollar Terms for 2020,”
June 7, 2021.
31 Rostec’s 2019 annual report lists over 800 companies under Rostec’s management structure; see Rostec, “About,” at
https://rostec.ru/en/about/.
32 Denisentsev, Russia in the Global Arms Market, pp. 8-10.
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Su-27, and Su-30 fighter/ground attack aircraft (FGA); helicopters; tanks and infantry fighting
vehicles (IFVs); and various missile systems.33 Analysts assert that Russia’s export strategy
through 2010 often was to sell certain second-best systems rather than its most advanced,
technologically sophisticated ones.34 Russia also was willing to include joint-development and
technology sharing as part of its arms sales. For example, Russia agreed to local and joint
production with India of the Su-30MKI FGA and the BrahMos missile system.35
Recent State of Russian Defense Industry and Arms Sales
Russia’s defense industry remains a domestically important sector, employing several million
workers and supporting foreign arms sales.36 The government controls almost all of the defense
industry, either directly or through equity shares.37 In 2011, Russia launched a 10-year armament
program, known as GPV-2020, with a goal to modernize the military’s weaponry.38 According to
external analysis, the program funding allowed the sector to recapitalize many of its stagnant
sectors, import precision tools, recruit a high-quality workforce, increase production, and resume
development of R&D programs that had been on hold since the 1990s.39
According to Russian officials, the defense industry has largely achieved the goals of GPV-2020
and developed capabilities to produce systems across all major weapons categories.40 Russia
asserts it has increased its ability to serially produce upgraded systems, increase production
volumes, and innovate new designs (such as hypersonic and cruise missiles, electronic warfare,
and air defense systems).41 Analysts generally consider such new systems to be formidable,
increasing Russia’s military capability and competitiveness in foreign arms sales.42 Many of
Russia’s newest systems have been under development since the 1990s and only recently entered
state trials and serial production.43

33 SIPRI, Arms Transfer Database.
34 Dmitry Gorenburg, “An Emerging Strategic Partnership: Trends in Russia-China Military Cooperation,” Marshall
Center Security Insights, no. 54 (April 2020) (hereinafter cited as Gorenburg, “Emerging Strategic Partnership”).
35 Denisentsev, Russia in the Global Arms Market, pp. 13-14.
36 Estimates of the size of the workforce range from 2 million to 3 million. Connolly and Sendstad, Russia’s Role as an
Arms Exporter, p. 3; Tor Bukkvoll, Tomas Malmlof, and Konstantin Makienko, “The Defence Industry as a
Locomotive for Technological Renewal in Russia: Are the Conditions in Place?” Post-Communist Economies vol. 29,
no. 2 (2017), p. 234 (hereinafter cited as Bukkvoll, Malmlof, and Makienko, “Defence Industry as a Locomotive”);
Pavel Luzin, Russia’s Defense Industry: Between Political Significance and Economic Inefficiency, Foreign Policy
Research Institute, 2020, p. 3 (hereinafter cited as Luzin, Russia’s Defense Industry).
37 Luzin, “Inner Workings.”
38 State Armament Programs (GPV in Russian) are 10-year plans, reviewed every 5 years, that set out procurement
priorities for each service arm, type of system, and R&D schedule. GPV-2020 called for $700 billion (at 2011
exchange rates) to fund the procurement of modern equipment and the development of new systems over the life of the
program.
39 Julian Cooper, Russia’s State Armament Programme to 2020: A Qualitative Assessment of Implementation 2011-
2015, FOI, March 2016.
40 “Economics and Industry,” in Barrie and Hackett, eds., Russia’s Military Modernization; TASS, “Russia Boasts
Highest Level of New Military Hardware Among World’s Armies—Shoigu,” July 14, 2021.
41 TASS, “Russia’s State Arms Seller to Offer Almost 50 New Weapon Systems to World Market,” August 23, 2020.
42 Tomas Malmlof and Johan Engvall, “Russian Armament Deliveries,” in Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year
Perspective-2019, eds. Fredrik Westerlund and Susanne Oxenstierna (Stockholm: FOI, 2019), pp. 115-136; CRS In
Focus IF11603, Russian Armed Forces: Military Modernization and Reforms, by Andrew S. Bowen.
43 Examples of delayed development of new systems include the Su-57 fighter/ground attach aircraft, Bulava submarine
launched ballistic missile, and Lada class submarine, many of which Russia had been designing since the 1990s.
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The Russian defense industry appears to be focusing on two main reforms: (1) increasing civilian
and dual-use goods and (2) import substitution.44 Increasing the share of civilian goods produced
by the defense industry aims to support wider economic growth. The Russian government views
the defense industry as a key driver of technological growth and innovation.45 In 2015, Putin said
the defense industry should “set the bar for technological and industrial development and
continue to remain one of the main locomotives for innovation.”46 Government efforts to direct
the defense industry to increase the production share of civilian and dual-use goods have met with
questionable success.47
Despite positive official statements, most analysts point to significant challenges in Russia’s
conversion effort.48 These challenges include high market consolidation in both civilian and
defense sectors, an undiversified civilian economy, a lack of emphasis on fundamental research
and applied R&D (in the civilian sector, partly as a result of low levels of academic and
university-based research), and resistance to technology transfers between sectors. A particular
challenge identified by nongovernmental organizations is innovation.49
The Russian government and senior government officials have directed an extensive import
substitution program to shift the defense industry toward a reliance on domestically produced
components.50 Import substitution could reduce the defense industry’s exposure to foreign
sanctions, improve the purchasing power of domestic military expenditure, and increase profit
from foreign arms sales. This policy has become more important now that European and U.S.
sanctions have limited Russian access from key suppliers and Ukraine has severed access to its
defense industry.51
Russia’s import substitution program has been somewhat successful in replacing Western
components and developing domestic manufacturing and production expertise; before 2014,
Russia relied on Western producers for dual-use goods, especially high-end technology.52 The
sanctions levied following Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine led Russia to experience a loss of
access to Western expertise and equipment; analysts assert that this loss remains. Many analysts

44 Import substitution refers to replacing foreign components with domestic manufacturing and reducing the industry’s
exposure to risk from foreign suppliers.
45 Mark Ashby et al., Defense Acquisition in Russia and China, RAND Corporation, 2021, pp. 3-15 (hereinafter cited as
Ashby et al., Defense Acquisition).
46 TASS, “Putin: Russia Nuclear Forces Will Replenish More Than 40 New Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles,” June
15, 2021.
47 Maria Shagina and Mathieu Boulegue, “Russia Wants Its Civil and Military Sectors to Cooperate. So Far, Not So
Much,” Defense One, July 9, 2020.
48 For example, see Mathieu Boulegue, “Disentangling the Ups and Downs of Russia’s Military-Industrial Complex,”
National Interest, June 27, 2017.
49 According to the Global Innovation Index, Russia ranks 45th out of 132 economies in 2021. Bukkvoll, Malmlof, and
Makienko, “Defence Industry as a Locomotive.”
50 Alexander Bratersky, “How COVID-19 and Sanctions Harmed Russian Defense Biz—and How the Country Could
Recover,” Defense News, July 12, 2021; TASS, “Share of Domestic Products in Russian Defense Industry Can Grow
2.5 Times by 2025,” August 6, 2021.
51 Gustav Gressel, “The Sanctions Straitjacket on Russia’s Defense Sector,” European Council on Foreign Relations,
February 13, 2020.
52 Maria Shagina, Drifting East: Russia’s Import Substitution and Its Pivot to Asia, Center for Eastern European
Studies, Working Paper No. 3 (April 2020).
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contend that such expertise and equipment are crucial to the development and production of new
and advanced systems.53
In comparison, Russia’s defense industry has been increasingly successful in reducing its reliance
on systems and components produced in Ukraine before 2014.54 Prior to Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine, the Ukrainian defense industry provided materiel such as helicopter engines, transport
aircraft, rockets and missiles, and gas turbine engines and power components for naval vessels.55
The loss of Ukrainian engines affected Russia’s shipbuilding, with delays and cancellations of
ships under construction. For example, the loss of Ukrainian producers appears to have led Russia
to sell Project 11356 frigates to India and to have contributed to delays in the production of
Project 22350 Admiral Gorshkov class frigates. Russia has begun to replace imported diesel/gas
turbine engines with domestically produced ones.56 The shift to domestically produced
components has delayed projects and the fulfillment of foreign arms sales.
Russia’s defense industry faces other structural limitations and deficiencies. Despite some
improvements and investments, most plants and equipment are older or outdated, which
constrains production output.57 Although the defense industry’s consolidation has streamlined
management structures, high market concentration has reduced incentives for innovation, further
constraining R&D of new systems.58 The industry also grapples with an aging workforce,
contributing to lower worker productivity.59
The Russian defense industry has high debt levels.60 Analysts cite a combination of poor
management, existing loans, low profitability from domestic orders, and incorrect pricing
estimates as responsible for the industry’s debt load.61 In 2019, Deputy Prime Minister Yuri
Borisov, who oversees the defense industry, remarked that the industry is “living from hand to
mouth.”62 In 2020, Putin agreed to write off a portion of the industry’s collective debt, much of
which is held by commercial banks.63 Some analysts also believe the Russian government

53 Maria Kolomychenko, “Russian High Tech Project Flounders After U.S. Sanctions,” Reuters, October 17, 2018;
Viljar Veebel, “Precision Sanctions: Is Moscow in Trouble Because of Targeted Sanctions? A Deeper Glance at the
Progress of the Russian Military Sector over the Past Decade,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 33, no. 3 (2020),
pp. 335-354; Ashby et al., Defense Acquisition; Ben Aris, “Russia’s Sanctions Soft Underbelly: Precision Machine
Tools,” BNE Intellinews, June 13, 2021.
54 Charles Recknagel, “Complex Ties: Russia’s Armed Forces Depend on Ukraine’s Military Industry,” RFE/RL,
March 28, 2014.
55 Andrey Frolov, “Defense Technologies and Industrial Base,” in Defense Industries in Russia and China: Players and
Strategies, eds. Richard A. Bitzinger and Nicu Popescu (EU Institute for Security Studies, 2017), pp. 11-15 (hereinafter
cited as Bitzinger and Popescu, eds., Defense Industries in Russia and China).
56 TASS, “Russian Tech Corporation Delivers 1st Fully Domestic Power Unit for Latest Frigates,” November 24, 2020;
TASS, “Russian Navy Cutting-Edge Frigate Gets Fully Domestic Diesel/Gas Turbine Power Unit,” August 4, 2021.
57 Keith Crane, Olga Oliker, and Brian Nichiporuk, Trends in Russia’s Armed Forces: An Overview of Budgets and
Capabilities, RAND Corporation, 2019, p. 25.
58 Gustav Gressel, “Strategy and Challenges,” in Bitzinger and Popescu, eds., Defense Industries in Russia and China,
pp. 33-35.
59 Gustav Gressel, “Strategy and Challenges,” in Bitzinger and Popescu, eds., Defense Industries in Russia and China,
p. 35; Pavel Luzin, “Russia’s Arms Manufacturers Are a Financial Black Hole,” Riddle, January 30, 2020.
60 Fenella McGerty, “Budget and Pandemic Present Challenges to Russia’s Industrial Base,” Defense News, August 17,
2020 (hereinafter cited as McGerty, “Budget and Pandemic Present Challenges”).
61 Andrey Biryukov and Evgenia Pismennaya, “Putin’s Huge Military Buildup Leaves Industry with Debt Hangover,”
Bloomberg, July 16, 2019.
62 McGerty, “Budget and Pandemic Present Challenges.”
63 The plans and decree were not publicly disclosed, but some analysts estimate the total writeoff at close to $11 billion.
Roger McDermott, “Putin Agrees to Major Write-Off of Russia’s Defense Industry Debt,” Eurasia Daily Monitor,
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recognizes and is taking steps to address these issues, including paying down the industry’s debt
level by including larger payments beyond what is officially cited for procurement and R&D.64
Sanctions have affected Russia’s procurement process, as well. After 2014, Russian banks
reportedly became concerned about their potential exposure to Western sanctions when
underwriting funding of companies in the Russian defense industry. In response, the Russian
government nationalized and repurposed an existing bank, Promsvyazbank, to fund the defense
industry and insulate other commercial Russian banks.65
Arms Sales
As Russia’s defense industry grew and consolidated under Russian government control, so did its
foreign arms sales. Russia is the world’s second-largest arms exporter, behind only the United
States. Russia exports a wide range of systems, including naval vessels, and is increasingly
willing to consider export of its most technologically advanced systems, consider joint
production, and include technology transfer as part of its arms sales packages, a change from
Russia’s previous policy of selling second-best systems.66 As a result, Russia has aggressively
marketed new systems, grown its portfolio of customers, and acquired new market share.67
In 2020, according to official data, Russia’s arms exports totaled over $15 billion, with more than
$50 billion on order, roughly the same as in 2019.68 According to SIPRI, from 2016 to 2020,
Russia exported arms to 45 countries and was responsible for 20% of global arms exports.
Overall, based on SIPRI data, Russian arms exports were 22% lower in 2016-2020 than in 2011-
2015, when exports peaked, and were similar to arms export levels in the 2000s. The reduction in
2016-2020 correlates with a 53% drop in arms exports to India. Regionally, during the same
period, 55% of Russian arms exports were to Asia, 21% to the Middle East, and 18% to Africa.69
Russia’s biggest share of systems by value are aircraft and air defense systems; according to
official figures, aircraft make up roughly half of arms exports and air defense systems make up
25%.70
Russian arms sales benefit from path dependency, the provision of upgraded versions of already
purchased legacy systems. Additionally, Russia continues to market newer, advanced designs.
One example is the Su-75 Checkmate fighter, a single-engine stealth fighter marketed as a

February 19, 2020.
64 E-mail correspondence with Michael Kofman, 2021.
65 Luzin, Russia’s Defense Industry, p. 8.
66 An example where this transfer did not occur would be in 2018 when India withdrew from a joint development
program of the Su-57, reportedly over Indian concerns that Russia was refusing to share software and computer codes.
Connolly and Sendstad, Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter, pp. 7-9; Christopher Jolliffe, “The Future of Russia’s Su-
47: Few Customers and Little Interest Abroad,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 4, 2020; TASS, “Russia in
Talks on Export Deliveries of Su-57 Fifth-Generation Fighter,” July 21, 2021.
67 Alexey Khlebnikov, “Russia Looks to the Middle East to Boost Arms Exports,” Middle East Institute, April 8, 2019;
Matthew Bodner, “Russia Targets Mideast Market with First-Ever Offerings of Defense Systems Beyond Its Border,”
Defense News, February 15, 2019.
68 Official Russian statements are often contradictory or unsupported in their assertions. TASS, “Official Unveils
Amount of Russian Military-Technical Cooperation in Dollar Terms for 2020,” June 7, 2021.
69 SIPRI, Trends in International Arms Transfers 2020, March 2021 (hereinafter cited as SIPRI, Trends). Russia
reportedly has identified Africa and the Middle East as potential growth opportunities for arms exports. Tatiana
Kondratenko, “Russian Arms Exports to Africa: Moscow’s Long-Term Strategy,” Deutsche Welle, May 29, 2020;
TASS, “Russia’s Military Exports to Middle East and North Africa Hit $6 Billion,” February 21, 2021.
70 TASS, “Aircraft Made Up 50% of Russia’s Arms Exports Last Year, Says Defense Official,” March 12, 2021.
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cheaper alternative to the F-35, with which Russia hopes to attract investors for joint
production.71 Russia markets its arms as dependable, durable, and cheaper than most Western
alternatives. This approach makes Russian arms more attractive to clients that want advanced,
capable systems but cannot afford to purchase or sustain more complex and expensive Western
systems. Russia also promotes itself as a more reliable arms supplier than Western countries,
which often attach conditionality related to issues such as human rights or internal political
conditions.72 In addition, Russia is seen as making deals more quickly than Western countries,
partly due to the lack of bureaucratic or legislative oversight that certain Western countries
require to ensure proper end user and human rights conditions.
Russian arms exports face multiple challenges. First, analysts note that customers remain
concerned about Russia’s production capacity and its ability to balance fulfillment of domestic
and export orders. Potential clients fear Russia will prioritize domestic orders and question
whether the defense industry can sustain serial production to complete export contracts.73 Second,
Russia traditionally does not provide training and support services in its arms sales packages,
which could decrease the attractiveness of Russian arms. This practice contrasts with, for
example, the U.S. Total Package Approach to arms sales, which aims to ensure foreign military
sales customers have access to comprehensive training, technical, and support expertise. Third,
the growth of China and India’s domestic defense industries has increased competition and
reduced the attractiveness of foreign, including Russian, arms to those countries.
Increasingly, Russia has included the transfer of advanced systems and technology, as well as
joint development, in its arms sales. Some observers contend that these practices may negatively
affect future arms exports as traditional customers, such as China and India, continue to develop
their own defense industries, which ultimately may reduce their dependency on purchasing
Russian arms.74
Russian arms exports also face significant costs due to the imposition of U.S. sanctions. In June
2021, FSMTC head Dmitry Shugayev stated that Russia is “up against unprecedented pressure
and ... witnessing that ... [its] partners are under very serious pressure as well.”75 Russia appears
to be attempting to move away from conducting deals in U.S. dollars to reduce exposure to U.S.
sanctions. For example, in 2017, Russia and Indonesia announced a $1.1 billion deal for 11
advanced Su-35 fighters.76 Instead of using dollars, Russia agreed to a barter system for coffee,
palm oil, and other commodities in exchange for the fighters. In 2020, reports emerged that
Indonesia asked the Trump Administration to waive potential sanctions on an order of Su-35S
fighters. Media reports stated the Trump Administration denied the request, and Indonesia
decided not to continue with the purchase.77

71 TASS, “Foreign Countries Eye Russia’s State-of-the-Art Checkmate Light Fighter,” July 30, 2021; Brett Forrest,
“Russia’s New Jet Fighter Aims to Rival U.S. in Air—and on Geopolitical Map,” Wall Street Journal, August 9, 2021
(hereinafter cited as Forrest, “Russia’s New Jet Fighter”).
72 Anna Borshchevskaya, “The Tactical Side of Russia’s Arms Sales to the Middle East,” Jamestown Foundation,
December 20, 2017; Hunt, “Russia Focuses on Arms Sales”; Brett Forrest, “Russia Emerges as Ley Backer of
Myanmar’s Military Post-Coup,” Wall Street Journal, July 16, 2021.
73 Denisentsev, Russia in the Global Arms Market, p. 21; Ashby et al., Defense Acquisition, p. 7.
74 Paul Schwartz, The Changing Nature and Implications of Russian Military Transfers to China, CSIS, June 2021
(hereinafter cited as Schwartz, Changing Nature).
75 TASS, “Russia Under Unprecedented Pressure in Military-Technical Cooperation—Official,” June 7, 2021.
76 Bloomberg, “Indonesia Barters Coffee and Palm Oil for Russian Fighter Jets,” August 7, 2017.
77 Karlis Salna and Arys Aditya, “Trump Threat Spurred Indonesia to Drop Russia, China Arms Deal,” Bloomberg,
March 12, 2020.
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Overview of Major Weapon Systems78
Aircraft and Air Defense
Russia’s traditional military equipment export strengths have been in aircraft and air defense
systems. Russia exports a wide range of fighter/ground attack aircraft (FGA); attack and transport
helicopters; and short-, medium-, and long-range air defense systems. Additionally, various
aircraft and helicopter engines, as well as multiple types of air-to-air missiles, remain attractive to
customers. Many of these systems are upgraded versions of legacy systems, but they also include
the most advanced arms produced by Russia.
Fighter/Ground Attack Aircraft
Two of Russia’s most widely sold exports have been the Soviet-era MiG-29 and Su-27 FGA. In
the 1990s, the Su-27 was largely replaced by the Su-30, a two-seat multi-role fighter. Russia
currently offers multiple variants to clients, such as the Su-30MKI to India. Russia upgraded the
Su-30 to the Su-30SME standard, with improved avionics, in 2016.79 Russia also exports the
YAK-130 jet trainer and light attack fighter, the Su-32 (export version of the fighter/bomber Su-
34), MiG-29M, and naval aviation variant MiG-29K.
Russia’s most advanced FGA is the Su-35S. Described as a Four + + generation multi-role
fighter, the Su-35S is an advanced derivative of the Su-27.80 According to analysts, the Su-35S’s
excellent maneuverability, improved avionics and information control, and wide range of payload
options make it a capable fighter.81 Russia also is developing the MiG-35, reportedly a Four +
generation fighter. Analysts note, however, that production delays and the success of the Su-35S
make the MiG-35’s future uncertain.82
In addition, Russia markets two new fifth-generation fighters: the Su-57 (a single-seat twin-
engine fighter under design since 2002) and the prototype Su-75 Checkmate (a single-seat single-
engine fighter) still under development. These fighters are intended to compete with the F-22 and
the F-35, respectively. However, design and production delays have hampered deliveries for the
Su-57, which is reported to be in serial production.83

78 Sources for the weapon systems described in this report include IISS, “Middle East and North Africa,” in Military
Balance 2021 (London: Routledge for IISS, 2021), hereinafter cited as IISS, Military Balance 2021; and
Rosoboronexport’s catalog http://roe.ru/eng/catalog/.
79 Dave Majumdar, “For Sale: A New Version of Russia’s Deadly Su-30 Flanker,” National Interest, April 3, 2017;
Interfax, “Rosoboronexport Signs 13 Export Contracts Worth over 1 Bln Euros at MAKS 2021—General Director
Mikheyev,” July 22, 2021.
80 Fourth and fifth generation refer to the level of sophistication and technology incorporated into the aircraft. To be
classified as fifth generation, generally the aircraft must combine advanced radar and sensors, thrust vectoring, and
stealth technology. See CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah Gertler.
81 Peter Suciu, “Why Russia’s Su-35 Fighter Is Truly Special,” National Interest, November 26, 2020.
82 Thomas Newdick, “Why Russia’s MiG-35 Is Starting to Look Like a Dead Duck,” The Drive, August 8, 2020.
83 Michael Kofman, “Russia’s Su-57 Fighter Program—It’s Worth Following,” Russia Military Analysis Blog, May 27,
2019; Ryan Bauer and Peter A. Wilson, “Russia’s Su-57 Heavy Fighter Bomber: Is It Really a Fifth-Generation
Aircraft?,” RAND Corporation, August 17, 2020.
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Helicopters
According to Rosoboronexport, Russia has exported $20 billion worth of helicopters in the last 10
years.84 Russian models, such as the Mi-8/17, are some of the world’s most widely used
helicopters. Many newer designs are modernized versions of legacy designs. Russia markets the
Ka-52 reconnaissance/attack, Mi-28NE attack, Mi-35M transport/attack, Mi-171Sh and Mi-17-
V5 transport, Ka-226T light utility, and Mi-26T2 heavy transport helicopter for export.85
Air Defense Systems
After aircraft, air defense systems are Russia’s most widely exported systems. Russia has an array
of long-, medium-, and short-range systems, largely produced by Almaz-Antey (a company
subject to U.S. sanctions).86 Most analysts consider Russian air defense systems to be effective
and high quality.87 Russia’s long-range systems include the S-300PMU1/2, S-400, Antey-2500,
and Antey-4000 air defense systems.88 Both the S-400 and the Antey 2500/4000 are reported to
have some anti-ballistic missile capability, and the S-400 reportedly can be equipped with various
missiles to enhance its capabilities at multiple ranges.89 Russia also is marketing for export its
latest design, the S-500, which is undergoing testing. Questions remain about the industry’s
ability to meet domestic and export orders for the S-500.90 For medium range, Russia exports the
Buk-M2E and an export version of the Buk-M3, the 9K317ME Viking.91 Russia also exports
multiple short-range or point-defense systems, including the Pantsir-S1/M and the Tor-M2E.92
Armored Vehicles
Russia exports a wide range of tanks, IFVs, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and other
armored vehicles.93 One of its most popular designs is a modernized version of the T-72 main
battle tank (MBT). Russia also offers its latest tank, the T-90 S/MS, for export.94 For IFVs, Russia
markets new and modernized versions of existing designs, such as the BMP-2M, BMPT-72, and
BMP-3/3F. For APCs, Russia offers the long-standing BTR-80 and the upgraded BTR-82A, along
with multiple new armored vehicles, such as the Tigr and Typhoon vehicles.
Russia is developing its next-generation universal combat platform, Armata. The Armata’s
modular construction is designed to enable easier production and maintenance. The Armata series
includes the T-14 MBT, T-15 IFV, 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV self-propelled artillery, VPK-7829

84 TASS, “Russia’s State Arms Seller Exports Helicopters Worth $20 Billion over Past Ten Years,” May 19, 2021.
85 Rosoboronexport, “Rosoboronexport Increases Exports of Military Helicopters,” press release, September 15, 2020.
86 Missile Defense Project, “Russian Air and Missile Defense,” Missile Threat, CSIS, August 3, 2021.
87 Janes Intelligence Briefings, “Analyzing Russia’s SAM Capabilities,” March 19, 2020.
88 TASS, “Russian Defense Firm to Unveil Antey-4000 Anti-Aircraft Missile System Abroad,” February 19, 2021.
89 Guy Plopsky, “Are Russia’s Lethal S-400 SAMs Equipped with the Latest Long-Range Missiles?” National Interest,
January 19, 2017; Mark Episkopos, “Russia Wants to Take the S-400 Global,” National Interest, April 28, 2021.
90 Reuters, “Russia Releases Footage of New S-500 Air Defense System in Action,” July 20, 2021.
91 TASS, “Russia to Feature Kalibr Cruise Missiles, Viking Air Defense System at India Arms Show,” January 31,
2020.
92 TASS, “Russia’s Arms Exporter Inks 1st Deal on Upgraded Pantsir Air Defense System Delivery,” August 25, 2021.
93 Russia also offers a wide range of small arms, missiles, artillery systems, and electronic warfare systems. TASS,
“Russia Delivers Land Troops Hardware Worth $2.5 Billion to Foreign Customers in 2020,” August 25, 2021.
94 TASS, “Rosoboronexport Expects Production of Light Version of T-90 Tank for Export Market,” August 24, 2021.
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Bumerang, and Kurganets-25 IFV/APC.95 Despite first appearing during the 2015 Victory Day
Parade, the Armata series continues to experience production and design issues. Some analysts
believe the series has become less attractive, reportedly due to the Russian military changing
requirement and procurement priorities.96 Russian officials have said they will prioritize domestic
deliveries over exports, potentially limiting the Armata’s export potential.97
Naval Systems
Russia exports a variety of naval systems, including frigates, corvettes, submarines, and coastal
defense systems.98 It also exports advanced sensors and radars, air defense systems, anti-ship
missiles, and coastal defense cruise missiles. Russia has long developed and constructed
submarines.99 Recently, the commander of U.S. Northern Command, Air Force General Glen
VanHerck, stated that Russia has “developed capabilities that didn’t exist 20 years ago,... very
low radar cross-section cruise missiles [and] submarines on par with ... [U.S.] submarines.”100
One of Russia’s most marketed naval exports is the Project 636 Varshavyanka diesel-electric
attack submarine.101
Russia has been less engaged in exporting surface ships, with industrial capacity focused on
completing domestic orders and severed connections with Ukraine’s defense industry limiting the
construction of larger vessels.102 Instead, Russia has prioritized developing smaller vessels
equipped with a variety of missiles, such as the Project 22800 Karakurt corvette and Project
22160E patrol ship.103 Observers note that the aging infrastructure of Russia’s shipbuilding
industry and its focus on domestic orders may hinder further naval exports.104
Selected Country Profiles
The top five Russian arms importers in alphabetical order are Algeria, China, Egypt, India, and
Vietnam. Each profile below includes a figure showing total Russian arms imports from 1991 to

95 Mark Episkopos, “Russia Bets Big on T-14 Armata’s Military Prowess,” National Interest, August 21, 2021; TASS,
“Persian Gulf States Eager to Buy Russia’s Cutting-Edge Bumerang Combat Vehicle,” August 24, 2021.
96 Thomas Grove, “Putin Puts on Vast Victory Day Parade in Moscow,” Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2015.
97 Samuel Cranny-Evans, “T-14 Armata to Enter Series Production in 2022,” Janes Defense Weekly, July 6, 2021.
98 TASS, “Russia Increases Naval Technologies Exports-Defense Export Giant,” July 10, 2019; Nikolai Novichkov,
“Russia Unveils Export-Oriented Rubezh-ME Coastal Defense Missile System,” Janes Defense News, July 16, 2019.
99 Thomas Grove and James Marson, “Russian Submarines Test NATO in Icy North Atlantic,” Wall Street Journal,
July 2, 2020.
100 John Grady, “Russia Top Military Threat to U.S. Homeland, Air Force General Says,” USNI News, August 18,
2021.
101 Pavel Luzin, “Russian Diesel-Electric Submarines: A Classic Balance of Powers,” Riddle, July 28, 2021.
102 Konstantin Bogdanov and Ilya Kramnik, The Russian Navy in the 21st Century: The Legacy and the New Path,
CNA, October 2018. Russia sold six Project 11356 Admiral Grigorovich frigates to India, called Talwar class.
Construction of the ships was delayed due to the reliance on Ukrainian gas turbine engines. Naval News, “Russian
Naval Exports Reach 70 Platforms,” November 17, 2020.
103 Defense World, “Russia Eyes Vietnam, India, and China to Export Karakurt Corvettes,” July 30, 2018; Richard
Connolly, “The ‘Kalibrisation’ of the Russian Navy: Progress and Prospects,” Changing Character of War Centre,
February 2019; Martin Manaranche, “Russian Shipbuilder Unveils Export-Oriented Missile Corvette Project 22160E,”
Naval News, July 16, 2021.
104 Tim Ripley, “Russia’s Naval Shipbuilding Industry in Need of Modernization,” Janes Intelligence Review, May 26,
2021.
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2020. The Y-axis varies across each table. For more information on specific transactions, see
tables in the Appendix (the tables do not include arms under order but not delivered).
Algeria105
Figure 1. Trend Indicator Value of Arms Exports from Russia to Algeria, 1991-2020
(in millions of $)

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), using data from the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database.
Notes: A ‘0’ indicates a value of deliveries less than $0.5 mil ion. Trend indicator values (TIVs) are a unique
system developed by SIPRI to measure the volume of conventional weapons using a common unit to allow
comparison over time. They represent the transfer of military resources rather than sales prices for arms
transfers.
Algeria, a global energy exporter with Africa’s largest defense budget, is one of Russia’s top arms
export clients, behind only India and China. From 2016 to 2020, Algeria accounted for 15% of
Russian arms exports, according to SIPRI.106 Algeria’s warm ties with Russia are rooted in the
Cold War era, when Algeria fought a lengthy struggle for independence from France and
subsequently adopted a leftist economic system. The two countries’ foreign policies do not
always align.107 Algeria’s military relies overwhelmingly on Russian arms, and the country has
used its vast oil and natural gas exports to finance extensive arms purchases since embarking on a

105 CRS In Focus IF11116, Algeria, by Alexis Arieff and Sarah R. Collins.
106 SIPRI, Trends. With a population of 43 million, Algeria reportedly had the world’s third-highest military
expenditures as a share of GDP in 2020 (SIPRI, Trends in World Military Expenditure 2020, April 2021).
107 See, for example, Al-Monitor, “Algeria Buys Russian Arms but Keeps Moscow at Arm’s Length,” March 25, 2015;
Frederic Wehrey and Andrew S. Weiss, “Reassessing Russian Capabilities in the Levant and North Africa,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, August 31, 2021, pp. 10-12.
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military modernization effort in the early 2000s.108 Algeria imports a wide range of Russian arms
across all major weapons categories, including some of the most advanced systems available,
such as Iskander-E short-range ballistic missiles and Project 636 submarines.109 Russia appears
determined to keep its market share in Algeria due to Algeria’s high demand and ability to pay for
the latest Russian weapons.110 The overthrow of Muammar al Qadhafi, previously a key Russian
arms client, and continued instability in Libya have increased Algeria’s importance as a Russian
client.111
In 2006, Russia greed to write off Algeria’s existing $4.6 billion debt in return for signing
$7.5 billion in new arms contracts. As a result, Russia accounted for 80% of Algeria’s arms
imports from 2006 to 2013, according to SIPRI.112 Algeria purchased air defense systems, such as
the S-300PMU2 and Pantsyr-S1; anti-tank missiles; Yak 130 and Su-30MK FGA; transport and
combat helicopters; T-90S MBTs; and Project 636 submarines. However, some tension between
the countries existed during this time, as Algeria returned MiG-29 fighters for being substandard
and of poor quality.113 Russia gradually began to lose market share in Algeria after 2011 as
Algeria began to diversify its arms imports. According to the most recent version of The Military
Balance, the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ annual assessment of various countries’
military capabilities,
The [Algerian] army’s and air force’s inventories consist of a core of modern, primarily
Russian-sourced equipment, though China has also supplied equipment, including self-
propelled artillery.... However, while Algeria is largely dependent on foreign suppliers for
new equipment, it has in recent years made significant investments towards developing a
domestic defense industry. This has led to a number of joint ventures with foreign partners,
such as with Italy’s Leonardo and Germany’s Rheinmetall.114
Since 2014, Russia has aggressively sought to reaffirm its role as Algeria’s primary arms supplier.
Russia has agreed to contracts for new Su-30MK and MiG-29M FGA Mi-26 and Mi28N
helicopters, BMPT-72 IFVs, a TOS-1A thermobaric multiple launch rocket system, two further
Project 636 submarines, and reportedly four regiments of Iskander-E short-range ballistic
missiles.115

108 IISS, “Middle East and North Africa,” in Military Balance 2021.
109 Reportedly, Algeria ordered Russia’s new Su-34 fighter-bomber/strike aircraft and is considering purchasing the Su-
57. John Psaropoulos, “In Arms Race for Air Superiority, Russia Challenges U.S. Hegemony,” Al Jazeera, May 3,
2021.
110 Arms sales also may allow Russia to advance other aspects of its economic relationship with Algeria, such as
helping to develop Algeria’s oil and natural gas fields. Joanna Pritchett, Less Than a Full Deck: Russia’s Economic
Influence in the Mediterranean, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 21, 2021, pp. 5, 8.
111 See CRS Report RL33142, Libya: Conflict, Transition, and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
112 SIPRI, Arms Transfer Database.
113 Lamine Chikhi, “Algeria Spat Shows Challenge to Russian Arms Sales,” Reuters, April 1, 2008.
114 IISS, “Middle East and North Africa,” in Military Balance 2021.
115 Andrew McGregor, “Defense or Domination? Building Algerian Power with Russian Arms,” Eurasia Daily
Monitor, September 5, 2018; SIPRI, Arms Transfer Database.
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China
Figure 2. Trend Indicator Value of Arms Exports from Russia to China, 1991-2020
(in millions of $)

Source: CRS, using data from SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.
Notes: A ‘0’ indicates a value of deliveries less than $0.5 mil ion. TIVs are a unique system developed by SIPRI to
measure the volume of conventional weapons using a common unit to allow comparison over time. They
represent the transfer of military resources rather than sales prices for arms transfers.
China is Russia’s second-largest arms export client, importing 18% of all Russian arms from
2016 to 2020.116 Russian arms were crucial to the development of China’s military and defense
industry. Russian exports reached a peak in the mid-2000s, when China relied on Russian systems
to modernize its military capabilities. During this period, Russia supplied China with Su-27S and
Su-30MK FGA; numerous classes of missiles, radars, SAM systems, helicopters, Project-956
Sovremenny class destroyers; and Project 636 Varshavyanka submarines. Although capable, these
systems were Russia’s older, second-best ones and did not include more-advanced
technologies.117 Many indigenous Chinese systems are based on Russian designs, and Russian
weapons and technologies were particularly important for the development of China’s navy and
air force.118

116 SIPRI, Trends.
117 Gorenburg, “Emerging Strategic Partnership.”
118 For example, China’s construction of surface vessels relies heavily on Russian designs, technology, and
components. Analysts have noted that both of China’s indigenous vessels, the Type 052C Luyang II destroyer and the
Type 054A Jiangkai II frigate, rely heavily on Russian shipbuilding expertise and technology. See Dallas Boyd,
Advanced Technology Acquisition Strategies of the People’s Republic of China, Defense Threat Reduction Agency,
Report No. ASCO 2010 021, September 2010, p. 19; Paul Schwartz, Russia’s Contribution to China’s Surface Warfare
Capabilities, CSIS, August 2015, pp. 17-18.
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After 2006, Russian arms exports to China dropped dramatically. Analysts have identified several
reasons for this shift,119 including that China’s reliance on Russian weaponry weakened as
China’s own defense industry matured and developed. China became unwilling to accept older
technology as it became increasingly able to produce many of the systems it previously imported,
which some analysts argued was the product of reverse engineering while others noted the
possibility of joint production agreements between Russia and China.120
In 2012, China and Russia agreed to increase military cooperation, including in arms sales. Arms
sales between the two countries picked up dramatically after 2015. Russia and China signed a
road map for military cooperation in 2017, and joint military exercises in 2021 highlighted an
increased cooperative relationship.121 Geopolitical considerations (including after Russia’s
invasion and occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea region in 2014) appear to have contributed to a
mutual desire to increase military cooperation and arms sales, despite ongoing complications.122
Most recently, Russian exports to China focus on a smaller number of deals for advanced
systems, including the S-400 and Su-35S.123 Each country relies on the other for key components;
Russia relies on China for machine tools and electronic components, and China relies on Russia
for fighter engines, air defense systems, missiles, submarine technology, and heavy helicopters.124
China’s interest is gaining access to technologies and expertise that it struggles to produce and
replicate domestically.125 Going forward, most analysts predict a move away from arms sales to
more joint production and development. As one expert notes, “China’s growing industrial
potential in the defense sector is likely to change the nature of defense cooperation from
transactional arms sales to more joint development, defense services, and transfer of
technology.”126 As a result, Russia’s technological advantage over China is likely to weaken in the
future, especially as China’s defense industry continues to develop.

119 Schwartz, Changing Nature.
120 For Russian concerns on selling advanced technology to China, see Ethan Meick, China-Russia Military-to-Military
Relations: Moving Toward a Higher Level of Cooperation, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
March 20, 2017, pp. 12-13 (hereinafter cited as Meick, China-Russia Military-to-Military Relations).
121 DD Wu, “China and Russia Sign Military Cooperation Roadmap,” Diplomat, June 30, 2017; Kathrin Hille and
Henry Foy, “Joint Russian and Chinese Military Exercise Stirs U.S. Unease,” Financial Times, August 9, 2021; TASS,
“Russian, Chinese Armies to Boost Military Cooperation to Protect Peace—Defense Chief,” August 13, 2021.
122 For example, China does not recognize Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s occupied Crimea region. Michael Kofman,
“The Emperors League: Understanding Sino-Russian Defense Cooperation,” War on the Rocks, August 6, 2020
(hereinafter cited as Kofman, “Emperors League”); Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky, “Chinese-Russian Defense
Cooperation Is More Flash Than Bang,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 17, 2021.
123 Moscow Times, “Russia Completes Delivery of Su-35 Fighter Jets to China for $2.5 Billion,” April 17, 2019; Franz-
Stefan Gady, “Russia Completes Delivery of Second S-400 Regiment to China,” Diplomat, February 3, 2020.
124 Meick, China-Russia Military-to-Military Relations, pp. 13-16; Kofman, “Emperors League”; Schwartz, Changing
Nature, pp. 3-4.
125 CRS Report R46808, China’s Military: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), by Caitlin Campbell.
126 Kofman, “Emperors League.”
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Egypt127
Figure 3. Trend Indicator Value of Arms Exports from Russia to Egypt, 1991-2020
(in millions of $)

Source: CRS, using data from SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.
Notes: A ‘0’ indicates a value of deliveries less than $0.5 mil ion. TIVs are a unique system developed by SIPRI to
measure the volume of conventional weapons using a common unit to allow comparison over time. They
represent the transfer of military resources rather than sales prices for arms transfers.
Under President Abdel Fattah al Sisi, Egypt’s foreign policy has been more active after a period
of dormancy during the latter years of the late President Hosni Mubarak and the tumultuous 2½-
year transition that followed Mubarak’s resignation in 2011. Egypt and Russia, close partners in
the early years of the Cold War, have again strengthened bilateral ties under President Sisi, who
has promised to restore Egyptian stability and international prestige. His relationship with
Russian President Putin, in the words of one observer, has benefitted from “a romanticized
memory of relations with Russia during the Nasser era.”128
Since 2014, Egypt and Russia have strengthened their ties in numerous ways, including through
arms deals. Reportedly, Egypt is upgrading its aging fleet of legacy Soviet MiG-21 aircraft to a
fourth-generation MiG-29M variant.129 Egypt also purchased 46 standard Ka-52 Russian attack
helicopters for its air force, along with the naval version of the Ka-52 for use on Egypt’s two
French-procured Mistral class helicopter dock vessels and the S-300VM surface-to-air missile
defense system from Russia.130 In June 2020, Egyptian media reported the Egyptian Army had

127 Written by Jeremy Sharp, CRS Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.
128 Michael Wahid Hanna, “The United States and the Future of Egyptian-Russian Relations,” Caravan, Hoover
Institution, March 9, 2017.
129 See Janes Sentinel Security Assessment, Air Force- Egypt, August 7, 2018.
130 “Egyptian S-300VM SAM Delivery Confirmed,” Janes Defence Weekly, June 6, 2017.
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agreed to purchase 500 Russian T-90S Main Battle Tanks; reportedly, though, both sides are still
negotiating whether the tanks can be assembled in Egypt (M1A1 tanks have been assembled in
Egypt).131
Part of Egypt’s effort to rebalance its foreign policy may be a quest to secure the most advanced
hardware on the most generous financing terms available. With U.S. Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) grants relatively unchanged since 1987 (Congress has appropriated $1.3 billion a year
since then),132 the purchasing power of U.S. military aid has decreased substantially, given the
rising costs of major defense systems. Moreover, U.S. defense technology, particularly fighter
aircraft, has evolved to the point where Egypt cannot afford the latest generation of U.S. fighters
(such as the F-35), lacks the technical expertise to maintain the most advanced technology, or
may be prohibited from purchasing certain items if those items negate Israel’s Qualitative
Military Edge.133 In recent years, Egypt has turned to Russia and France to source naval and air
force acquisitions and has used U.S. assistance to maintain its existing stocks of U.S. materiel.
Since 2018, there have been periodic reports of Egyptian plans to purchase Russian Sukhoi Su-35
Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft, a move that could trigger U.S. sanctions under Section 231 of the
Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017, Title II of the Countering
America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA; P.L. 115-44; 22 U.S.C. §§9501 et
seq.). In May 2020, TASS Russian News Agency reported the Gagarin Aircraft Manufacturing
Association in Komsomolsk-on-Amur had started production of the aircraft under a contract
signed in 2018.134 As of September 2021, U.S. officials had not publicly confirmed that Egypt and
Russia are moving ahead with the deal. In February 2021, in a phone call with the Egyptian
foreign minister, Secretary of State Antony Blinken “raised concerns over human rights, which he
emphasized would be central to the U.S.-Egypt bilateral relationship, and Egypt’s potential
procurement of Su-35 fighter aircraft from Russia.”135 In May 2021, a report suggested Russia
had delivered five Su-35s to Egypt.136 In June 2021, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Borisov said
11 Su-35 aircraft would be delivered to Egypt this year.137

131 See Janes World Armies, Egypt, March 17, 2021.
132 See CRS Report RL33003, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
133 See CRS Report R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab
Emirates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti.
134 Derek Bisaccio, “Su-35 Production for Egypt Begins,” Defense and Security Monitor, May 18, 2020.
135 U.S. State Department, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Egyptian Foreign Minister Shoukry,” February 23, 2021.
136 Dan Arkin, “Egyptian Air Force Starts to Receive Su-35 Fighter,” Israel Defense, May 7, 2021.
137 Jeremy Binnie, “Russian Official Indicates Egypt Will Receive 11 Su-35s This Year,” Janes Defence Weekly, June
23, 2021.
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India138
Figure 4. Trend Indicator Value of Arms Exports from Russia to India, 1991-2020
(in millions of $)

Source: CRS, using data from SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.
Notes: A ‘0’ indicates a value of deliveries less than $0.5 mil ion. TIVs are a unique system developed by SIPRI to
measure the volume of conventional weapons using a common unit to allow comparison over time. They
represent the transfer of military resources rather than sales prices for arms transfers.
Since 2010, Russia has been the source of nearly two-thirds (62%) of all Indian arms imports and
India has been the largest Russian arms importer and has accounted for nearly one-third (32%) of
all Russian arms exports, according to SIPRI. Between 2016 and 2020, India accounted for nearly
one-quarter (23%) of Russia’s total arms exports and Russia accounted for roughly half (49%) of
Indian imports.139
According to The Military Balance 2021, India’s present military arsenal is heavily stocked with
Russian-made or Russian-designed equipment. The Indian Army’s main battle tank force is
composed predominantly of Russian T-72M1 (66%) and T-90S (30%). The Indian Navy’s sole
operational aircraft carrier is a refurbished Soviet-era ship, and its entire complement of fighter
and ground attack aircraft are Russian-made or produced in India on license (the Navy’s fighter
fleet comprises 43 MiG-29K/KUBs). Four of the Navy’s 10 guided-missile destroyers are
Russian Kashin class, and 6 of its 17 frigates are Russian Talwar class. The Navy’s sole nuclear-
powered submarine is on lease from Russia, and 8 of the service’s 14 other submarines are
Russian-origin Kilo class. Finally, the Indian Air Force’s 667-plane FGA fleet is 71% Russian-

138 Written by Alan Kronstadt, CRS Specialist in South Asian Affairs.
139 SIPRI, Trends.
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origin (39% Su-30s, 22% MiG-21s, 9% MiG-29s). All six of the service’s air tankers are Russian-
made Il-78s.140
In 2019, Russia and India launched a dedicated joint venture, Indo-Russian Rifles Private
Limited, to mass-produce AK-203 assault rifles in northern India. In mid-2020, India’s Defense
Research and Development Organization signed a technology development contract with Russia’s
Rosoboronexport for development of Advanced Pyrotechnic Ignition Systems, high-performance
propulsion systems to power rockets and missiles.141 The two countries also jointly manufacture
the BrahMos missile system and licensed production in India of Su-30 aircraft and T-90 tanks. In
February 2021, India’s foreign secretary described these efforts as “standout examples of our
cooperation with Russia.”142
Many analysts in India and beyond conclude that the Indian military cannot operate effectively
without Russian-supplied equipment and will continue to rely on Russian weapons systems in the
near and middle terms. As put by one senior American observer, New Delhi’s continuing
purchases “remain one of the few levers of influence that India still possesses vis-à-vis
Moscow.”143 In this sense, much of Moscow’s influence in India comes through its willingness to
provide weapons systems and technologies that no other country will export to India. Russia also
continues to offer advanced weapons platforms at relatively attractive rates.144
India’s plan to purchase Russian-made S-400 air defense systems, in progress since 2016, could
trigger U.S. sanctions on India under Section 231 of CAATSA. Indian planners appear to have
concluded that alternatives to the S-400 offered by Washington—the Patriot and THAAD
systems—lack the purported range and versatility of the Russian equipment.145 Despite a trend
away from Russian arms imports, India in late 2019 submitted $800 million toward the full $5.4
billion contract for S-400 systems (it also entered a new $3.1 billion contract for indigenous
production of 464 Russian-designed T-90S tanks).146 Recent press reports indicate New Delhi is
going “full steam ahead” with S-400 induction—the first deliveries are set for autumn 2021, to be
completed by early 2023.147 In August 2021, Russian officials said S-400 deliveries would begin
by the end of 2021.148 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Robert Menendez
publicly asked Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to dissuade India from completing the S-400 deal,

140 IISS, Military Balance 2021.
141 See Government of India, Ministry of Defense (MOD), Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO),
“DRDO Signs Technology Development Contract with Rosoboronexport Russia,” press release, February 7, 2020, at
https://tinyurl.com/2czfufz2.
142 See Government of India, MOD, “RM Reviews Operationalisation of JV Indo Russian Rifles Private Limited,”
press release, July 16, 2019, at https://tinyurl.com/v8wfb4w7; and Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs,
“Foreign Secretary’s Speech at the Russian Diplomatic Academy, Moscow (February 17, 2021),” February 18, 2021, at
at https://tinyurl.com/tcmfkkrz.
143 Ashley Tellis, “How Can U.S.-India Relations Survive the S-400 Deal?,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, August 29, 2018. See also Ajai Shukla, “India Caught in the Crossfire as U.S. Congress Squeezes Trump on
Russia (op-ed),” Business Standard (New Delhi), May 8, 2018.
144 Franz-Stefan Gady, “Ajai Shukla on the Current and Future State of India’s Military,” Diplomat, September 25,
2019.
145 See Sameer Ali Khan, “The United States Has Few Good Options When It Comes to India’s Plans to Purchase
Russian-Made Missile Defense System,” Atlantic Council, June 27, 2019.
146 Joe Gould, “India Watching U.S. for Sanctions on Turkey,” Defense News, December 2, 2019; Reuters, “Russia
Says in Talks to Make More Military Equipment in India,” April 6, 2021.
147 “U.S. Curbs Loom, But India Looks to Induct Russia S-400 Systems,” Times of India (Delhi), January 11, 2021;
Reuters, “India’s Friction with U.S. Rises over Planned Purchase of Russia S-400 Defense Systems,” January 15, 2021.
148 TASS, “S-400 Will Begin to Be Delivered to India by Yearend—Almaz-Antey,” August 23, 2021.
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saying such a purchase would “clearly constitute a significant, and therefore sanctionable,
transaction with the Russian defense sector under Section 231 of CAATSA.”149
Vietnam150
Figure 5. Trend Indicator Value of Arms Exports from Russia to Vietnam, 1991-2020
(in millions of $)

Source: CRS, using data from SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.
Notes: A ‘0’ indicates a value of deliveries less than $0.5 mil ion. TIVs are a unique system developed by SIPRI to
measure the volume of conventional weapons using a common unit to allow comparison over time. They
represent the transfer of military resources rather than sales prices for arms transfers.
For decades, Russia has been Vietnam’s dominant military partner and provider of military
equipment. In the 2000s, Hanoi and Moscow began to deepen their security relationship, although
the relationship never became as close as it was during the Cold War. In 2001, Russia became
Vietnam’s first strategic partner, a designation Vietnam subsequently used with other countries as
it more aggressively implemented the strategy of diversifying its international relationships. In
2012, Vietnam and Russia upgraded their relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership, the
second-highest level in Hanoi’s hierarchy of official partnerships and one shared only with
India.151 As part of this close military relationship, Vietnam purchased large amounts of Russian

149 Lara Seligman, “Austin Hints India’s Purchase of Russian Missile System Could Trigger Sanctions,” Politico,
March 20, 2021; U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, “Menendez Urges Secretary Austin to Use Upcoming
Trip to India to Discuss Democracy, Human Rights, and Opposition to S-400 Missile System,” press release, March 17,
2021, at https://go.usa.gov/xH9j9.
150 Written by Mark Manyin, CRS Specialist in Asian Affairs.
151 China has a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership with Vietnam and is the only country to have this
status. The United States and Vietnam have a comprehensive partnership. During Vice President Kamala Harris’s
August 2021 visit to Vietnam, the two governments reportedly discussed elevating the U.S.-Vietnam relationship to a
strategic partnership. Alexandra Jaffe, “Harris Urges Vietnam to Join U.S. in Opposing China ‘Bullying,’” AP News,
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arms, many of which were among Russia’s latest and most advanced systems. These weapons
included the six Project 636 submarines, Su-30MK2 and Yak-130 aircraft, the K-300 Bastion-P
coastal defense system, Gepard-3 class frigates, multiple types of missiles, and T-90S MBT.
Although Vietnam has remained heavily dependent on Russia for big-ticket military equipment
and weapons, Hanoi also has sought to diversify its defense relationships over the past decade to
include India, Israel, Australia, Japan, the United States, and others.152 The People’s Army of
Vietnam often has tried to integrate its older Russian systems with new Western weapons and
equipment. It also has purchased new Western equipment—such as unmanned aerial vehicles
(e.g., from Italy), missiles (e.g., from Israel), maritime patrol aircraft (e.g., from Canada), and
small arms (e.g., from Israel)—to complement its existing Russia-based equipment.153 However,
tensions with China have forced Vietnam to continue purchasing Russian arms to increase its
deterrent posture.
U.S. Sanctions and Considerations for Congress
Successive U.S. Administrations and Congresses have expressed concern about Russian arms
sales, both directly and indirectly. Sanctioning Russia’s defense industry and arms sales to punish
and deter Russia from conducting malign activities generally has received bipartisan support. In
recent years, Congress and multiple Administrations have imposed sanctions on specific Russian
defense companies and on the industry as a whole in response to certain Russian activities,
including weapons proliferation and Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine.
In response to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, the Obama Administration, in coordination
with the European Union and others, imposed sanctions on a broad range of targets. Executive
Orders 13661 and 13662 targeted the Russian defense industry, among others. Under these orders,
the Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on JSC Almaz-Antey (air defense and
missiles), Kalashnikov Concern (small arms), Uralvagonzavod (tanks and armored vehicles), and
United Shipbuilding Corporation.154 In addition, sectoral sanctions prohibit U.S. persons from
engaging in most lending transactions with those Russian entities and others in the defense and
related materiel sector, as identified by Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC),
including Rostec and its subsidiaries.
Congress also took action to address Russian arms exports. In December 2014, the Ukraine
Freedom Support Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-272, as amended by P.L. 115-44; 22 U.S.C. §§8921 et
seq.) established sanctions on Rosoboronexport and any Russian entities that transfer weapons to
Syria or, without consent, to Ukraine and other countries. Rosoboronexport is also subject to
sanctions for supporting the Syrian government. In addition, under the Iran, North Korea, and
Syria Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178; 50 U.S.C. §1701 note), Rosoboronexport and several
other Russian defense entities, including Instrument Design Bureau (precision-guided weapons)

August 25, 2021; Derek Grossman, Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific: Vietnam
(RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, CA, 2020), p. 44 (hereinafter cited as Grossman, Regional Responses).
152 Carlyle Thayer, “Russia: A Military Base at Cam Ranh Bay?,” C3S India, February 27, 2017. RAND Corporation
researcher Derek Grossman reports that in 2017, some Vietnamese experts said India had replaced Russia as Vietnam’s
“most reliable” defense partner. Grossman, Regional Responses, p. 46.
153 Zachary Abuza and Nguyen Nhat Anh, “Vietnam’s Military Modernization,” Diplomat, October 28, 2016.
154 Material in this section draws on CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia, coordinated by Cory Welt, as well
as CRS Report R44984, Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy,
coordinated by Clayton Thomas.
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and NPO Mashinostroyenia (rockets and missiles), are denied most U.S. government procurement
contracts, export licenses, and trade in U.S. Munitions List-controlled items.
Section 231 of CAATSA established sanctions against individuals or entities “engaging in
significant transactions with Russia’s defense and intelligence sectors.” As amended by the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for FY2019 (P.L. 115-232, §1294), Section 231
gives the President the ability to waive such sanctions, provided the President certifies, among
other things, that the transaction does not directly threaten U.S. interests and the country is taking
steps to reduce its reliance on Russian weaponry.
As of 2021, the United States has sanctioned China and Turkey under Section 231 for engaging in
“significant transactions” with Russia’s defense sector. In September 2018, OFAC sanctioned the
Equipment Development Department of China’s Central Military Commission for receiving 10
Su-35 fighters and S-400 air defense systems. In December 2020, the Trump Administration
sanctioned Turkey for its purchase of S-400 systems, originally ordered in 2017. Turkey’s
purchase of S-400 systems caused significant issues in its relations with the United States and
NATO; due to concerns over potential Russian intelligence collection, the United States removed
Turkey from the F-35 program.155 Turkey reportedly signed a contract for a second batch of S-400
systems, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan saying on August 29, 2021, “we [Turkey]
have no hesitation regarding these matters. We have taken many steps with Russia, whether it be
the S-400 or the defense industry.”156 The statement came after Secretary of State Blinken warned
Turkey that purchasing additional systems could result in further sanctions.157
Sanctions Impact
A consideration for Congress, as it may address additional measures to sanction Russia’s defense
industry, is the extent to which such sanctions are an effective deterrent. Observers remain
divided as to the effect of sanctions on Russian arms exports. The State Department noted in 2018
that sanctions have “deterred billions of dollars-worth of arms exports from Russia,” without
providing specific examples.158 It is difficult for analysts to assess the effect of U.S. sanctions in
this sector.159 In some cases, Russian arms may have been competitive prior to sanctions, but
potential clients consider Russian arms less attractive with sanctions in place. In other cases, it is
possible that sanctions do not directly dissuade potential Russian clients but provide a plausible
reason for not purchasing Russian arms.
Some evidence indicates sanctions are having the desired effect of making Russian arms less
attractive on the global market and imposing costs on Russia for its malign activities. As noted,
Russian officials have acknowledged sanctions pressure has posed difficulties for the country’s
arms exports and potential clients.160 Additionally, Russian arms deals appear to be becoming less

155 For more on Turkey’s purchase of the S-400, see CRS Report R44000, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In
Brief, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
156 Daily Sabah, “No Hesitation over Purchase of 2nd Batch of S-400s: Erdogan,” August 29, 2021.
157 Tal Axelrod, “Blinken Warns Turkey, U.S. Allies Against Purchasing Russian Weapons,” The Hill, April 28, 2021.
158 U.S. Department of State, “CAATSA Section 231: ‘Addition of 33 Entities and Individuals to the List of Specified
Persons and Imposition of Sanctions on the Equipment Development Department,’” media note, September 20, 2018.
159 Jeffrey Mankoff, “U.S. Sanctions Against Russia: What You Need to Know,” CSIS, October 31, 2018.
160 TASS, “Russia Under Unprecedented Pressure in Military-Technical Cooperation—Official,” June 7, 2021.
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public, as illustrated by the example of Egypt’s reported purchase of Su-35S FGA. Russian
officials also appear less willing to publicize specific details than general information.161
Some analysts are concerned that sanctions may unintentionally push Russian-arms-importing
states toward closer relations with Russia.162 Many states rely heavily on Russian weaponry, and
immediately divesting from Russian arms would be challenging for these states. Sanctions
pressure may create negative responses from an importing country, potentially undermining other
U.S. policy objectives. In addition, some analysts argue sanctions may complicate coordination
with allies,163 which could undermine a multilateral approach toward countering certain Russian
activities and ultimately could weaken any U.S. response. As such, many observers argue
policymakers need to be aware of the potential implications and unintended consequences of
sanctions.164
Other analysts note sanctions can be less effective against countries such as Russia that have
greater resources to resist and deflect the impact of sanctions.165 Gradually, these analysts warn,
sanctions may become less effective should Russia continue efforts to insulate itself from
exposure to sanctions, such as import substitution and consolidating lending to sanctioned
industries in isolated financial institutions.
Future Questions
Congress and the executive branch have expressed concerns about Russian arms sales. Members
of Congress may confront related issues concerning Russian arms sales, oversight of executive
branch action, and implementation of congressional legislation. Key questions raised by the issue
of Russian arms sales include the following:
 What strategies can the United States pursue to make Russian arms less
attractive? To what extent should the United States offer its own arms exports to
countries considering purchasing Russian arms?
 How do sanctions and pressure on Russian arms sales fit into the wider U.S.
foreign policy strategy toward Russia?
 What is the threshold for “significant transactions” to trigger CAATSA
sanctions? Does threshold vagueness give the executive branch too much
flexibility in applying sanctions, and should Congress signal more specific intent
in legislation? Alternatively, does a broad definition increase effectiveness by
injecting uncertainty into the risk assessment of potential Russian arms clients?

161 Such specific details include types and numbers of systems, production details and delivery dates, and the client.
TASS, “Russia Delivers Terminator Combat Vehicles to African Country—Military Cooperation Chief,” August 25,
2021; TASS, “Russia’s Arms Exporter Inks 1st Deal on Upgraded Pantsyr Air Defense System Delivery,” August 25,
2021.
162 See, for example, Sameer Lalwani and Tyler Sagerstrom, “Avoiding a Collision Course with India,” War on the
Rocks, September 12, 2021.
163 See, for example, Janis Kluge, “Taking Stock of U.S. Sanctions on Russia,” Foreign Policy Research Institute,
January 14, 2019.
164 See, for example, Jarrett Blanc and Andrew S. Weiss, U.S. Sanctions on Russia: Congress Should Go Back to
Fundamentals, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 3, 2019.
165 See, for example, Daniel W. Drezner, “The United States of Sanctions: The Use and Abuse of Economic Coercion,”
Foreign Affairs, September/October 2021.
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 To what extent do sanctions deter Russian arms sales at the risk of the wider U.S.
bilateral relationship with potential arms importers? To what extent does Russia’s
reliance on a few customers increase or decrease U.S. leverage?
 How will Russia’s import substitution efforts affect the effectiveness of U.S.
sanctions? Will they increase Russia’s resistance to U.S. pressure?
 What other measures could increase the pressure on and isolation of Russia’s
defense industry?

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Appendix. Major Russian Arms Orders and
Deliveries
Table A-1. Major Russian Arms Orders and Deliveries to Algeria
Weapon
Additional
Quantity
System
Year Ordered
Year Delivered
Deal Value
Information
4000
9M133 Kornet
2005
2006-2020

For BMP-1
Anti-Tank Missile
modernization to
BMP-1M
400
Berezhok IFV
2005
2006-2010

For BMP-1
Turret
modernization to
BMP-1M
300
48N6 SAM
2006
2008-2011

For S300PMU-2
SAM
900
57E6 SAM Missile
2006
2012-2016

For Pantyr-S1
Air Defense
System
5
Kasta-2E2 Radar
2006
2012-2016

For Pantyr-S1
Air Defense
System
38
96K9 Pantsyr-S1
2006
2012-2016

Air Defense
System
40
53-65 Torpedo
2006
2010

For Pantyr-S1
Air Defense
System
40
TEST-71 Torpedo
2006
2010

For use on
Project 636 Kilo
Class Submarine
500
Metis-M Anti-
2006
2009-2013

Tank Missile
2
Project-636E/Kilo
2006
2010
$400 mil ion

Submarine
3
S-300 PMU2
2006
2008-2011

Favorit SAM
System
16
Yak-130
2006
2011
$200-$250

Trainer/Combat
mil ion
Aircraft
2
Garpun Radar
2001
2011-2012

4
Pozitiv-ME 1.2
2007
2011-2012

Radar
20
TEST-771
2007
2011-2013

Torpedo
30
Kh-35 ASM
2009
2011-2013

16
Su-30MK FGA
2010
2011-2012
$0.8-$1 bil ion

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Weapon
Additional
Quantity
System
Year Ordered
Year Delivered
Deal Value
Information
120
T-90S Tank
2011
2012-2014
$470 mil ion

12
9P78 Iskander
2013
2017

Client reported
Launcher for
as “state in
Short-Range
Middle East or
Ballistic Missile
North Africa”
1000
9M120 Ataka
2013
2016-2018

Anti-Tank Missile
100
9M317 SAM
2013
2017

1
Buk-M2 SAM
2013
2017

6
Mi-26 Transport
2013
2015
$2.7 bil ion

Helicopter
42
Mi-28NE Combat
2013
2016-2018
$2.7 bil ion

Helicopter
4000
9M133 Kornet
2014
2015-2017

Anti-Tank Missile
360
Berezhok IFV
2014
2015-2017

Turret
2
Project-636E/Kilo
2014
2018

Submarine
203
T-90S Tank
2014
2015-2016

40
TEST-71 Torpedo
2014
2018

8
Mi-26T2
2015
2017

Transport
Helicopter
14
Su-30MK FGA
2015
2016-2018

11
Tigr Armored
2015
2016-2017

Personnel Vehicle
4
TOS-1 Self-
2015
2016

Propelled
Thermobaric
MLRS
3500
9M120 Ataka
2016
2020

Anti-Tank Missile
300
BMPT-72
2016
2020

Armored Fighting
Vehicle
14
MiG-29M
2019
2020

(includes MiG-
29M2 Trainer
Version) FGA
16
Su-30MK FGA
2019
Ongoing

Source: CRS, using data from SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.
Notes: ASM = anti-ship missile; FGA = fighter/ground attack aircraft; IVF = infantry fighting vehicle; MLRS =
multiple launch rocket system; SAM = surface-to-air missile.
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Table A-2. Major Russian Arms Orders and Deliveries to China
Weapon
Year
Additional
Quantity
System
Year Ordered
Delivered
Deal Value
Information
72
AK-176 76mm
2010
2013-2020

Naval Gun
200
Kh-59MK ASM
2004
2008-2015

120
MR-90 Fire
2004
2005-2018

Control Radar
54
Mi-171E
2005
2007-2012

Transport
Helicopter
9
Ka-27PL ASW
2006
2009-2010

Helicopter
9
Ka-31 Airborne
2006
2010-2011

Early Warning
Helicopter
122
AL-31 Turbofan
2009
2009-2012

AL-31FN version
Engine
for J-10 combat
aircraft produced
in China;
probably
including spare
engines
55
D-30 Turbofan
2009
2009-2012

For H-6K
Engine
bomber aircraft
produced in
China and
possibly for
modernization of
Il-76 transport
aircraft
Mi-171E
2009
2010-2011

32
Transport
Helicopter
123
AL-31 Turbofan
2011
2013-2016
$500 mil ion
AL-31FN version
Engine
for J-10 combat
aircraft produced
in China;
probably
including spare
engines
125
AL-31 Turbofan
2011
2013-2017

AL-31F version
Engine
for J-15 combat
aircraft produced
in China
184
D-30 Turbofan
2011
2012-2017

For H-6K
Engine
bomber aircraft
and Y-20
transport aircraft
produced in
China and for
modernization of
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Russian Arms Sales and Defense Industry

Weapon
Year
Additional
Quantity
System
Year Ordered
Delivered
Deal Value
Information
Il-76 transport
aircraft
5
IL-76M
2011
2013-2015

Transport
Aircraft
52
Mi-171E
2012
2012-2014

Transport
Helicopter
80
AL-31 Turbofan
2014
2017-2020

AL-31F-M2
Engine
version for J-20
combat aircraft
produced in
China
300
48N6 SAM
2015
2018-2019

Part of $3 bil ion
deal for eight S-
400 SAM systems
8
S-400 Triumf
2015
2018-2019
$3 bil ion

SAM System
10
AL-31 Turbofan
2015
2016-2018

Engine
7
IL-76M
2015
2017-2019

Transport
Aircraft
240
R-77 BVRAAM
2015
2017-2019

24
Su-35S FGA
2015
2016-2018
$2 bil ion

125
AL-31 Turbofan
2016
2016-2020

AL-31FN version
Engine
for J-10 combat
aircraft produced
in China
68
Mi-171E
2019
2020

Transport
Helicopter
18
Mi-17V-7
2019
2020

Transport
Helicopter
18
Mi-171Sh
2019
ongoing

Transport
Helicopter
Source: CRS, using data from SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.
Notes: ASM = anti-ship missile; ASW = anti-submarine warfare; BVRAAM = beyond visual range anti-air missile;
FGA = fighter/ground attack aircraft; SAM = surface-to-air missile.
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Table A-3. Major Russian Arms Orders and Deliveries to Egypt
Weapon
Year
Additional
Quantity
System
Year Ordered
Delivered
Deal Value
Information
1
EgyptSat-2
2009
2014

Also has civilian
Reconnaissance
applications
Satellite
10
Mi-8MT/Mi-17
2009
2012-2013

Part of $100 mil ion
Transport
deal; also armed
Helicopters
Mi-17V-5 version
40
9M82M SAM
2014
2016-2017

For use on S-
300VM-Antey 2500
or SA-23 SAM
System
150
9M83M SAM
2014
2016-2017

For use on S-
300VM-Antey 2500
or SA-23 SAM
System
1000
9A1472
2015
2017-2019

For use on Ka-52K
Vikhr/AT-16
Combat Helicopter
Anti-Tank
Missile
1000
9M120 Ataka
2015
2017-2019

For use on Ka-52K
Anti-Tank
Combat Helicopter
Missile
1
EgyptSat-2
2015
2019

Also has civilian
Reconnaissance
applications
Satellite
46
Ka52/Hokum-B
2015
2017-2019

Ka-52K version
Combat
Helicopter
50
Mig-29M FGA
2015
2017-2019

Includes Mig-29M2
Trainer/Combat
Version
10
P-270 Moskit
2015
2015-2016

ASM
1
1 Project 1241
2015
2016

Tarantul Class
Corvette
1
Protivnik-GE
2015
2016

Radar
300
R-73 BVRAAM
2015
2017-2020

For Mig-29M2 FGA
300
R-77 BVRAAM
2015
2017-2020

For Mig-29M2 FGA
3
S300VM/SA-23
2015
2016-2017
$0.5 bil ion

SAM
Source: CRS, using data from SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.
Notes: ASM = anti-ship missile; BVRAAM = beyond visual range anti-air missile; FGA = fighter/ground attack
aircraft; SAM = surface-to-air missile.
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Russian Arms Sales and Defense Industry

Table A-4. Major Russian Arms Orders and Deliveries to India
Year
Additional
Quantity
Weapon System
Year Ordered
Delivered
Deal Value
Information
826
BrahMos ASM
1998
2006-2020 (545

Mainly Russian
delivered)
tech produced
under license in
India
140
Su-30MK FGA
2001
2005-2020
$3-$5.4 bil ion
MKI version
produced under
license in India
1
Aircraft Carrier
2004
2013
$2.3 bil ion
Russian
Gorshkov, now
INS
Vikramaditya
1
Nuclear Submarine
2004
Inducted in

2012 on a 10-
year lease as
INS Chakra
16
MiG-29S FGA
2005
2010-2011
$252-$740

mil ion
300
T-90S Tanks
2006
2009-2018

3
Talwar Class Frigates
2006
2012-2013
$1.2-$1.9 bil ion

40
Su-30MK FGA
2007
2009-2012
$1.5-$1.6 bil ion
MKI version
produced under
license in India
347
T-90S Tanks
2007
2008-2012
$1.2 bil ion
Most assembled
in India
63
MiG-29SMT FGA
2008
2012-2020 (30
$850-$965
Most produced
delivered)
mil ion
under license in
India
216
216 BrahMos ASM

25,000
9M119 Anti-Tank
2013
2014-2020
$474 mil ion
Most to be
Missiles
(9,000
produced in
delivered)
India
29
MiG-29S FGA
2010
2012-2016

500
R-77 BVRAAMs
2011
2012-2013
~$463 mil ion

10,000
9M113 Konkurs/AT-
2012
2013-2017
$225 mil ion

5 Anti-Tank Missiles
740
AL-31 Turbofans
2012
2013-2020 (560

For Su-30 MKI
delivered)
modernization
42
Su-30MK FGA
2012
2013-2017
$1.6 bil ion
Assembled in
India from kits
236
T-90S Tanks
2013

$950 mil ion
To be produced
in India
4,331
9M113 Konkurs/AT-
2019
2019-2020

Produced under
5 Anti-Tank Missiles
(1,500
license in India
delivered)
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Russian Arms Sales and Defense Industry

Year
Additional
Quantity
Weapon System
Year Ordered
Delivered
Deal Value
Information
500
9M114 Anti-Tank
2019
2019
$29 mil ion
Deal for
Missiles
mounting on
Mi-35
helicopters
Source: CRS, using data from SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.
Notes: ASM = anti-ship missile; BVRAAM = beyond visual range anti-air missile; FGA = fighter/ground attack
aircraft.
Table A-5. Major Russian Arms Orders and Deliveries to Vietnam
Year
Year
Additional
Quantity
Weapon System
Ordered
Delivered
Deal Value
Information
8
Project 1241
2004
2008-2016

Produced in Vietnam
Corvettes
250
Kh-35 ASM
2004
2008-2016

2
Gepard-3 Frigates
2006
2011

200
9M311 SAM
2006
2011

For use on Gepard
Class Frigates
30
Kh-35 ASM
2006
2011

For use on Gepard
Class Frigates
2
K-300P Bastion-P
2007
2009-2011

Part of reported $300
Coastal Defense
mil ion deal
Systems
40
Yakhont ASM
2007
2009-2011

For Bastion Coastal
Defense System, part of
a reported $300 mil ion
deal
6
Project-10412
2007
2011-2012

Svetlyak Class
Patrol Boats
6
Project-636E/Kilo
2009
2013-2017
$1.8-$2.1 bil ion

Class Submarines
25
3M-14E Club
2009
2013-2016

For use in Project-636
Missiles
(Kilo) Submarines
25
3M-54E Club Missile
2009
2013-2016

For use in Project-636
(Kilo) Submarines
80
53-65 AS
2009
2013-2016

For use in Project-636
Torpedoes
(Kilo) Submarines
80
TEST-71 AS/ASW
2009
2013-2016

For use in Project-636
Torpedoes
(Kilo) Submarines
8
Su-30MK2V Aircraft
2009
2010-2011

Part of a $400-$500
mil ion package
250
R-73 BVRAAMs
2009
2010-2012

For use with Su-30MK2
Combat Aircraft
80
Kh-31A1 ASM
2009
2011-2012

For use with Su-30MK2
Combat Aircraft
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Russian Arms Sales and Defense Industry

Year
Year
Additional
Quantity
Weapon System
Ordered
Delivered
Deal Value
Information
200
KAB-500/1500
2009
2011-2012

Guided Bombs
12
Su-30MK2V Aircraft
2010
2011-2012

Part of $1bil ion
package
30
Kh-35 ASM
2011
2019-2020

SIPRI states the missiles
were “probably
assembled or produced
under license” in
Vietnam as KCT-15 or
VCM-1
4
FC-54 Patrol
2012
2012-2014

Designated in Vietnam
Vessels
as the TT400TP
2
Gepard-3 Class
2012
2017-2018

Frigates
30
Kh-35 ASM
2012
2017-2018

For use on Gepard
Frigates
30
TEST-71 AS/ASW
2013
2018-2019

For use on Gepard
Torpedoes
Frigates
12
Su-30MK2V Aircraft
2013
2014-2016
$450-$600

mil ion
64
T-90S Tanks
2017
2018-2019

12
Yak-130
2019

$350 mil ion

Trainer/Combat
Aircraft
Source: CRS, using data from SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.
Notes: AS = anti-ship; ASM = anti-ship missile; ASW = anti-submarine warfare; BVRAAM = beyond visual range
anti-air missile; FGA = fighter/ground attack aircraft; SAM = surface-to-air missile.
.

Author Information

Andrew S. Bowen

Analyst in Russian and European Affairs

Acknowledgments
Michael Kofman provided generous comments, and Research Assistant Rachel Martin contributed
producing the graphs and tables in this report.
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Russian Arms Sales and Defense Industry

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Congressional Research Service
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