Ethiopia’s Transition and the Tigray Conflict

Ethiopia’s Transition and the Tigray Conflict

Ethiopia’s Transition and the Tigray Conflict
September 9, 2021
The conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region has fueled a large-scale humanitarian crisis and attracted
international concern, amid reports of starvation and atrocities. The war has taken a heavy human
Lauren Ploch Blanchard
and economic toll, and it is spreading beyond Tigray. The Ethiopian government has resisted
Specialist in African Affairs
various calls for peace talks with Tigrayan insurgents, led by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation

Front (TPLF). The TPLF, a party representing one of Ethiopia’s ethnic minorities, had been the
dominant political party in the country’s ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic

Front (EPRDF) coalition for almost three decades, until Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took office
in 2018. The TPLF was the ruling party in the regional state of Tigray when the conflict began.
Repression and abuses of power under the EPRDF, which some Ethiopians attribute specifically to the TPLF, fueled
grievances and spurred a mass protest movement that brought Prime Minister Abiy to power. Abiy, a member of the EPRDF,
pledged to open the country politically and economically, and commenced reforms. His efforts to mend ties with neighboring
Eritrea, long strained by a border conflict and an antagonistic relationship between the TPLF and the Eritrean regime, won
him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019. Later that year, Abiy merged the EPRDF coalition into a new Prosperity Party. The TPLF
opposed the party’s creation, viewing it as part of an agenda to shift Ethiopia from a federal to a unitary state. Tensions
between the TPLF and Abiy’s government rose, and an election dispute in 2020 led federal and Tigray regional authorities to
challenge each other’s legitimacy. On November 4, 2020, Abiy announced military operations in Tigray, following an attack
by Tigrayan forces on a military base in the region. The federal government described the attack as unprovoked and
constituting treason, while the Tigray government asserted that its forces were acting in self-defense against a planned federal
assault. Federal authorities have since accused the TPLF of orchestrating ethnic violence across Ethiopia to make it
ungovernable. In May 2021, the Ethiopian government designated the party as a terrorist group.
The conflict has evolved into an apparent civil war in northern Ethiopia. It pits an array of armed groups aligned with the
federal government—including the militaries of Ethiopia and Eritrea, paramilitary forces from Ethiopia’s regional states, and
informal militia—against an ethnic insurgent force led by a former head of Ethiopia’s military and composed of former
soldiers, Tigray regional security forces, militia, and civilian recruits. Abuses against civilians in Tigray by government-
aligned forces have reportedly fueled insurgent recruitment. The conflict was initially concentrated in Tigray, parts of which
have been occupied by forces from the neighboring Amhara region and by Eritrean troops, but an insurgent offensive in June
2021 led the federal government to withdraw its military from much of the region and declare a temporary ceasefire. The
self-declared Tigrayan Defense Forces (TDF) have since launched incursions into Amhara and Afar regions in what they
describe as an effort to break a government-imposed blockade on their region and press the government into negotiations.
Federal and regional authorities, meanwhile, have launched a mass recruitment drive and deployed paramilitary units from
other regional states to the front lines, and Eritrea has deployed more troops into northern Ethiopia. A new defense agreement
with Turkey, and reported acquisitions from Iran, may provide Ethiopia’s military with additional capabilities.
The war has had a devastating impact on Tigray, and increasingly threatens surrounding areas. United Nations (U.N.)
Secretary-General António Guterres has called the humanitarian situation in Tigray, where 5.2 million people need food aid
and hundreds of thousands are facing starvation, “hellish.” U.N. and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
officials have described a de facto humanitarian blockade on Tigray. Aid agencies reported their food stocks in Tigray
depleted in August. Health facilities have been damaged and looted, and lack basic medicines and supplies. Humanitarian
access has been a problem throughout the conflict. Aid agencies say they now have access to deliver assistance inside Tigray,
but their ability to bring aid supplies into the region is extremely restricted. Without sufficient supplies, the U.N.
Humanitarian Coordinator warned in early September that the humanitarian situation was set to worsen dramatically.
U.N. officials assert that all parties to the Tigray conflict have committed serious abuses, including widespread sexual
violence, extrajudicial executions, mass killings, and forced displacement, some of which may amount to war crimes and
crimes against humanity. They have described the use of rape and starvation as weapons of war. State Department officials
suggest Ethiopian security forces have committed acts of ethnic cleansing and accuse forces aligned with the federal
government of a violent campaign of collective punishment against the people of Tigray. Reports indicate that ethnic
Tigrayans have been targeted based on their ethnicity, and hate speech and dehumanizing language are rising. Aid workers
and Eritrean refugees have also been attacked in Tigray, and concerns about revenge attacks have grown as the TDF has
moved into Amhara and Afar. “Inflammatory rhetoric and ethnic profiling are tearing apart the social fabric of the country,”
Secretary-General Guterres warned in August. The U.N. Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has expressed alarm
over the situation in Tigray, where some observers say atrocities may constitute genocide.
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Ethiopia’s Transition and the Tigray Conflict

The war in northern Ethiopia overlaps with other conflicts in the country, including in Abiy’s home region of Oromia, where
his government has faced rising political discontent and a growing insurgency. Reports of a nascent military alliance between
the Tigrayan and Oromo insurgents, and possibly other armed groups, raises the prospect of a wider war and adds to concerns
over Ethiopia’s stability. Eritrea's involvement in the Tigray conflict and rising tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan also
fuel concerns about a potential regional conflict. Ethiopia-Sudan border tensions have been exacerbated by the Tigray
dispute, further complicating efforts to resolve a dispute between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan over a new dam on the Nile.
The Tigray conflict has also strained Ethiopia’s role as a leading troop contributor to peace and stabilization operations in the
region, including in Somalia, from which Ethiopia has withdrawn some of its forces to reinforce operations in the north.
The Tigray conflict has had a negative impact on U.S. relations with Ethiopia, long viewed as a strategic regional partner and
currently the largest recipient of U.S. humanitarian and development assistance in the world. The United States has called on
the warring parties to negotiate a cessation of hostilities and withdraw their respective forces from areas into which they have
advanced since the conflict began. U.S. officials have also called for unfettered humanitarian access and an end to attacks
against aid workers. The Biden Administration has restricted security assistance and some economic aid to Ethiopia based on
human rights grounds, and it has imposed some sanctions on individuals in Ethiopia and Eritrea involved in human rights
abuses in Tigray. The Administration says there is “overwhelming” evidence that Eritrea’s military “has engaged in a pattern
of serious human rights abuse in Tigray,” and it is undertaking a review to determine whether human rights violations in the
region constitute crimes against humanity or genocide.

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Contents
Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1
Background: The Transition and Prelude to Conflict ...................................................................... 3
The Conflict in Tigray ..................................................................................................................... 5
The Conflict Spreads ................................................................................................................. 6
Tigray: Humanitarian and Human Rights Concerns ..................................................................... 10
Eritrean Refugees in Tigray .................................................................................................... 13
Human Rights Concerns ......................................................................................................... 14
Beyond Tigray: Concerns of a Wider War and State Collapse ...................................................... 17
Elections amid Insecurity and Polarization ............................................................................. 17
Economic Troubles Worsen..................................................................................................... 19
Regional Impacts ..................................................................................................................... 20
Tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan .............................................................................. 21
U.S. Policy and Assistance ............................................................................................................ 22
U.S. Assistance to Ethiopia ..................................................................................................... 25

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Ethiopia ............................................................................................................... 3

Figure A-1. Access to People in Need of Food Aid in Tigray ....................................................... 26
Figure A-2. Access to People in Need (Changes by Zone) ........................................................... 26
Figure A-3. Changes in Aid Access During the Tigray Conflict ................................................... 27

Appendixes
Appendix. Aid Access in Tigray .................................................................................................... 26

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 28

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Overview
The election of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in early 2018 by Ethiopia’s parliament marked the
beginning of a political transition in the East African country, almost three decades after the
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition took power following the
collapse of a brutal Marxist military regime known as the Derg. The EPRDF had grown
increasingly authoritarian and intolerant of dissent, and it won 100% of the seats in parliament in
Ethiopia’s 2015 elections.1 Abiy, chosen as the EPRDF’s new leader in response to popular
protests and unrest, promised a transition to multiparty democracy. He was hailed as a reformer in
his first year in office, and won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 after reconciling with neighboring
Eritrea. His leadership has since come under scrutiny amid concerns of backsliding on reforms,
an unfolding civil war in northern Ethiopia, and violence in other areas of the country.2
The conflict in Tigray—a region of six million people—and surrounding areas of northern
Ethiopia has drawn international concern in light of a worsening humanitarian crisis and reported
atrocities. It is not Ethiopia’s only conflict: over 800,000 people were estimated to have been
displaced by other conflicts in the first half of 2021.3 “Increasing intercommunal and interethnic
conflicts across the country are putting Ethiopia’s unity and territorial integrity at risk,” a State
Department official told Congress in June, describing the Tigray conflict as the worst of them.4
Instability in Ethiopia has implications for U.S. interests there and in the broader region. Ethiopia
is routinely one of the largest annual recipients of U.S. humanitarian and development aid. The
level of need in the country was already high before the Tigray conflict began in late 2020, in a
region struggling with overlapping natural disasters, conflicts, and Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19). Ethiopia is Africa’s second most populous country, and among a population of over
110 million, almost 24 million people are estimated to need humanitarian aid in 2021.5 The
number of Ethiopians in need is almost three times what it was in early 2020.
The U.N. estimates that over 5.2 million people in Tigray, roughly 90% of its population, need
emergency food aid. Experts estimate that between 400,000 and 900,000 people are already
facing famine conditions.6 In June, the U.N.’s top humanitarian official accused Eritrean forces,
who are aligned with Ethiopia’s troops, of blocking aid and using starvation as a weapon of war.7
Ethiopian officials reject reports of famine and allegations that aligned forces have restricted aid.8

1 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch (HRW), “One Hundred Ways of Putting Pressure”: Violations of Freedom of
Expression and Association in Ethiopia, March 24, 2010; International Crisis Group (ICG), Ethiopia After Meles,
August 22, 2012; and Yosef Badwaza, “Ethiopia: The election that isn’t,” Freedom House, April 28, 2015.
2 Cara Anna, “Peace was swift in Ethiopia under Abiy. War was, too,” Associated Press (AP), November 17, 2020 and
Samuel Getachew, “Ethiopia could return to its dark days as ‘Abiy-mania fades,” Washington Post, December 3, 2020.
3 CRS tally of displacements reported in the International Organization for Migration Displacement Tracking Matrix.
4 Statement of Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Robert F. Godec, House Committee on Foreign
Affairs (HFAC), The Conflict in Ethiopia, hearing, June 29, 2021.
5 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian Needs Overview: Ethiopia,
February 2021 and Daily Briefing Highlights, May 12, 2021.
6 Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, Ethiopia: IPC Acute Food Security Analysis, June 2021; Statement of
USAID Acting Assistant Administrator Sarah Charles, HFAC, The Conflict in Ethiopia, hearing, June 29, 2021.
7 “UN: Hunger, Rape Rising in Ethiopia’s Tigray,” VOA News, April 15, 2021; “UN official accuses Eritrean forces of
deliberately starving Tigray,” Reuters, June 14, 2021.
8 “Ethiopia’s Tigray crisis: Abiy Ahmed denies reports of hunger,” BBC News, June 21, 2021.
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The humanitarian response to the crisis in Tigray has been constrained not only by armed actors,
but by bureaucratic impediments. A temporary ceasefire declared by the Ethiopian government in
late June 2021 has not improved the humanitarian outlook: U.N. officials have since described
Tigray as under a de facto humanitarian aid blockade.9 The government has cut electricity,
telecommunications, and banking services for the region and blocked commercial transit, and aid
agencies face extensive hurdles in moving supplies and personnel into Tigray.10 The expansion of
the conflict into neighboring regions in July and mass mobilization of fighters add to concerns as
security conditions deteriorate. In August, Abiy called for all eligible civilians to join the armed
forces to fight the Tigrayan forces, who announced a nascent alliance with another rebel group.
The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) asserts that multiple
actors in the conflict, including the Ethiopian military, have committed abuses that may amount to
war crimes and crimes against humanity, including widespread sexual violence, extrajudicial
executions, mass killings, and forced displacement.11 Cultural heritage sites have been damaged
and looted, as have health facilities, factories, and other civilian structures.12 Armed actors have
reportedly blocked aid and destroyed crops, livestock, and food stocks.13 A European envoy says
Ethiopia’s leaders spoke to him of an intention to “wipe out Tigrayans for 100 years,” in what
“looks...like ethnic cleansing.”14 U.S. officials assert that Ethiopian security forces have
committed acts of ethnic cleansing and have accused Eritrean forces of a violent campaign that
amounts to the collective punishment of Tigray’s people.15
The U.N. Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has expressed alarm over the situation
in Tigray and other parts of the country, highlighting concern with hate speech, ethnic profiling,
and attacks on civilians based on religion and ethnicity. She cautioned in early 2021 that “the risk
of atrocity crimes in Ethiopia remains high and likely to get worse,” absent an urgent response.16
The Special Adviser cited “a failure to address ethnic violence, stigmatization, hate speech,
religions tensions” as contributing factors. She warned of a deteriorating situation in late July,
noting that communal violence had reached an unprecedented level and described dehumanizing
language by top political leaders in relation to the Tigray conflict as being of “utmost concern.”17
The United States “will not stand by in the face of horrors in Tigray,” a senior State Department
official asserted in June.18 USAID Administrator Samantha Power traveled to Ethiopia in August,

9 U.N. Security Council, Remarks by U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, August 26, 2021; U.N., Statement by
Acting Humanitarian Coordinator for Ethiopia Grant Leaity, September 2, 2021.
10 “EU decries Ethiopia ‘siege of Tigray,’” AFP, July 6, 2021; ICG, “The Dangerous Expansion of Ethiopia’s Tigray
War,” July 30, 2021; Declan Walsh, “This Ethiopian road is a lifeline for millions. Now it’s blocked.” New York Times,
July 29, 2021; Philip Kleinfeld, “Tigray response hit by suspensions, blockade,” New Humanitarian, August 9, 2021.
11 Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR), “Ethiopia: Persistent, credible reports of grave
violations in Tigray underscore urgent need for human rights access – Bachelet,” March 4, 2021.
12 “‘No more sacred places’: Heritage sites under siege in Tigray conflict,” AFP, April 30, 2021 and “In Tigray’s war,
ancient Christian and Muslim houses of worship are increasingly under attack,” The Globe and Mail, May 10, 2021.
13 World Peace Foundation, Starving Tigray, April 6, 2021; “EU decries Ethiopia ‘siege of Tigray’,” AFP, July 6, 2021.
14 “EU envoy: Ethiopian leadership vowed to ‘wipe out’ Tigrayans,” AP, June 18, 2021.
15 HFAC, The Biden Administration’s Priorities for U.S. Foreign Policy, hearing, March 10, 2021 and Statement of
Acting Assistant Secretary Godec, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (SFRC), Ethiopia in Crisis: U.S. Strategy
and Policy Response, hearing, May 27, 2021.
16 U.N., Statement by the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide on Ethiopia, February 5, 2021.
17 U.N., Statement by the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide on the continued deterioration of the situation
in Ethiopia, July 30, 2021.
18 Statement of Acting Assistant Secretary Godec, HFAC, The Conflict in Ethiopia, op. cit. and USAID Administrator
Samantha Power (@PowerUSAID), Twitter, June 9, 2021, 8:54 am EST.
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and on behalf of the Biden Administration called on the warring parties to negotiate a cessation of
hostilities and withdraw their forces from areas taken since November, to hasten aid delivery, and
to end what she termed a commercial blockade of Tigray.19 The Administration has restricted
security assistance to Ethiopia on human rights grounds and imposed sanctions on individuals in
Ethiopia and Eritrea involved in human rights abuses in Tigray. It is conducting a review to
determine whether abuses committed there constitute crimes against humanity or genocide.
Figure 1. Map of Ethiopia

Source: CRS graphic. Some borders shown are contested.
Background: The Transition and Prelude to Conflict
The EPRDF, a coalition of ethno-regional parties, was dominated by the Tigray Peoples’
Liberation Front (TPLF), one of the ethnically based rebel groups that united to oust the Derg.
Under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, the TPLF chairman who led Ethiopia for two decades until
his death in 2012, members of his Tigrayan ethnic group (estimated at 7% of the population) held
a disproportionate number of top government and security posts. The TPLF’s dominance in the
coalition continued under Meles’s successor, Hailemariam Desalegn (who is ethnic Wolayta), and
abuses of power by the government generated resentment within Ethiopia’s broader population.
Prime Minister Abiy’s election in 2018 came in response to mounting pressure on the EPRDF
after more than two years of protests led by the country’s largest ethnic group, the Oromo, and by
members of the second largest group, the Amhara. These protests were fueled by historic
grievances, state violence, and mass arrests. Abiy, the EPRDF’s first Oromo leader, committed to
opening Ethiopia politically and economically. His government released political prisoners,
removed terrorist designations on opposition groups, and loosened media and civil society
restrictions. He replaced top security chiefs and appointed an unprecedented number of women to
senior posts. Abiy invited political dissidents in exile to return, and brought some into
government. He also sought peace deals with the country’s insurgent groups and initiated a

19 USAID, Administrator Samantha Power holds press conference, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, August 4, 2021.
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rapprochement with Eritrea that formally ended a decades-long border dispute—efforts that
earned Abiy the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019.
Abiy faced growing concerns about the direction of the transition.20 Alongside reforms, ethnic
conflict in Ethiopia increased during his tenure, driving displacement. U.N. officials say the
ethnic violence in the country has reached “an alarming level” in recent years, and the
stigmatization of certain ethnic groups has “significantly contributed to ethnic intolerance.”21
Ethnic Amhara, for example, have raised alarm about targeted violence against their community;
some say Abiy’s government has not done enough to address the threat.22 Others contend the
government’s response to ethnic conflicts has fueled intercommunal rivalries.23 Some regional
officials say Ethiopia’s conflict prevention and resolution tools are inadequate, while Human
Rights Watch suggests efforts to pursue justice and reconciliation have been insufficient.24
Condemning what he characterized as divisive ethnic politics, Abiy led a merger of the EPRDF’s
ethno-regional parties and allied ones into a new Prosperity Party in late 2019, formally ending
the EPRDF coalition. The TPLF objected and refused to join the new party. Some in Abiy’s
Oromo Democratic Party also objected, calling the merger rushed and lacking consultation.25
Some proponents of Ethiopia’s ethnic federal system and greater cultural and regional autonomy
viewed the creation of a new party that centralized decision-making as a sign of Abiy’s intent
ultimately to move away from multinational federalism to a unitary, centralized state.26 (Ethnic
federalism, in which regions are defined by ethnicity, is a topic of intense debate in Ethiopia: one
recent survey found that a majority of Ethiopians favor a federal system of government but are
divided on whether regions should be defined by ethnicity or geography.27)
With Abiy’s dissolution of the EPRDF, relations with the TPLF—already strained—frayed
further. While many Ethiopians cheered efforts to prosecute former officials and elites for abuses
and alleged corruption, the TPLF viewed the anti-corruption prosecutions as excessively targeting
Tigrayans and TPLF-linked businesses, and saw the party increasingly cast as a scapegoat for the
country’s ills.28 Ethnic Tigrayans, meanwhile, suggest they felt increasingly isolated and unsafe.29

20 Freedom House, “Ethiopia Working Group: Ethiopia’s path to a more stable and democratic future is increasingly at
risk,” August 12, 2020; “Ethiopia’s democratic transition is in peril,” The Economist, September 19, 2020; ICG,
Keeping Ethiopia’s Transition on the Rails, December 19, 2019 and “War and repression in Ethiopia make national
dialogue ever more pressing,” January 29, 2021.
21 U.N., “UN officials express deep concern over escalating ethnic tensions in Ethiopia,” November 12, 2020.
22 Robbie Corey-Boulet, ‘It was a war’: Ethnic killings cloud Ethiopia’s election buildup,” AFP, June 3, 2021.
23 See, e.g., Statement by Acting Assistant Secretary Godec, op. cit.
24 U.N. Security Council, Statement by Ambassador Martin Kimani, Permanent Representative of Kenya on Behalf of
the A3+1, August 26, 2021; Latitia Bader, “To heal, Ethiopia needs to confront its violent past,” HRW, May 28, 2020.
25 Salem Solomon, “Efforts to end Ethiopia’s ruling party draw criticism from within,” VOA News, December 4, 2019.
26 TPLF critics contend that federalism was only nominally practiced under the EPRDF, which centralized power
despite its advocacy for the right to self-rule. For more on the new party’s formation, see, e.g., Teferi Mergo, “The war
in Tigray is a fight over Ethiopia’s past—and future,” Foreign Policy, December 18, 2021; Awol Allo, “Why Abiy
Ahmed’s Prosperity Party could be bad news for Ethiopia,” Al Jazeera, December 5, 2019. For more on the ethnic
federalism debate, see, e.g., Goitom Gebreluel, “Should Ethiopia stick with ethnic federalism,” April 5, 2019, and
Addisu Lashitew, “How to stop ethnic nationalism from tearing Ethiopia apart,” Foreign Policy, February 11, 2021.
27 According to the survey, 6 out of 10 Ethiopians favor a federal over a unitary system, while almost 4 in 10 view
federalism as too divisive. If federalism is maintained, roughly half favor regions based on ethnicity. Afrobarometer,
“Ethiopians embrace federalism but are split over whether it should be ethnic or geographic,” August 25, 2020.
28 “How Abiy’s effort to redefine Ethiopia led to war in Tigray,” World Politics Review, December 8, 2020.
29 See, e.g., James Jeffrey, “Power shift creates new tensions and Tigrayan fears in Ethiopia,” February 14, 2019.
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After an expansion of political rights and civil liberties during the first half of Abiy’s term, human
rights groups began reporting signs of closing political space, such as renewed restrictions,
arbitrary arrests, and harassment of opposition party members and journalists.30 Some critics
accused Abiy, a former military officer and senior intelligence official, of trying to consolidate
power and steering Ethiopia back toward authoritarian rule.31 Among the most prominent of
Abiy’s critics has been media mogul-turned-politician Jawar Mohammed, a dual national who
renounced his U.S. citizenship in 2020 to qualify as a candidate for parliament. Jawar and several
other opposition politicians were arrested in mid-2020 (discussed below) and remain in detention.
In early 2020, citing COVID-19 concerns, Abiy’s government postponed the general elections
that were scheduled for August 2020 and extended its term—an act that the TPLF dismissed as
unconstitutional. The TPLF-led regional government proceeded with Tigray’s state council
elections in September, despite federal objections and warnings from Abiy and parliament.32 The
election disputes led federal and regional authorities to challenge each other’s legitimacy, with the
federal government reducing federal budget support to the region and the Tigray regional
government declaring that federal authorities lacked legal authority. A subsequent federally
ordered change of command for military forces stationed in Tigray became a flashpoint.33
The Conflict in Tigray
On November 4, 2020, Prime Minister Abiy announced the start of military operations in Tigray,
following a TPLF attack on a military base that Abiy asserted had forced the federal government
into a military confrontation.34 His government described the TPLF attack as high treason and
termed the military’s actions “law enforcement operations.”35 Federal authorities have since
accused the TPLF of instigating conflicts along ethnic and religious lines to make Ethiopia
“ungovernable,” and in May 2021 designated the party a terrorist group.36 The TPLF denies
initiating the conflict, asserting that the government had massed troops on Tigray’s borders days
beforehand and that Tigray forces moved to take the base after officers defected and warned of a
pending attack.37 The TPLF accused Abiy of starting a war “to consolidate his personal power.”38
The International Crisis Group (ICG), which had warned for months of a looming conflict, says
that while Tigray’s government may have “struck first,” assertions that the federal intervention
was prepared beforehand have merit.39 Press reports suggested movements of federal troops in the

30 HRW, World Report 2021, January 23, 2021, and Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2020, March 2020.
31 Abel Abate Demissie and Ahmed Soliman, “Unrest threatens Ethiopia’s transition under Abiy,” Chatham House,
July 24, 2020; Jawar Mohamed, “How Ethiopia’s transition to democracy derailed,” Addis Standard, October 28, 2020
and Jawar Mohamed, “The war in Tigray is a result of Ethiopia’s mismanaged transition,” November 2020.
32 In May 2020, when the TPLF declared it would proceed with elections for its state council (the state-level legislative
body), Abiy warned that “the government will be forced to take any measures to assure the safety of the people and the
country,” if Tigray held elections unilaterally. “A message on current affairs,” video, YouTube, May 7, 2020.
33 “Crisis staring Tigray, Federal governments in the eye as army caught in mix,” Addis Standard, October 31, 2021.
34 Office of the Prime Minister, “TPLF attacks Ethiopian National Defense Forces base in Tigray,” November 4, 2020.
35 Office of the Prime Minister, “The Ongoing Law Enforcement Operations in Tigray,” November 14, 2020.
36 Office of the Prime Minister, “Updates on the unfolding developments in Ethiopia,” November 6, 2020.
37 Declan Walsh, “’I didn’t expect to make it back alive’: An interview with Tigray’s leader,” New York Times, July 23,
2021.
38 Jason Burke, “Ethiopian troops ‘liberate’ key town in Tigray, claim officials,” The Guardian, November 16, 2020.
39 ICG, “Toward an end to Ethiopia’s federal-Tigray feud,” August 14, 2020, “Steering Ethiopia’s Tigray crisis away
from conflict,” October 30, 2020, “Finding a path to peace in Ethiopia’s Tigray region,” February 11, 2021; “As
Ethiopian troops exit Tigray, time to focus on relief,” July 9, 2021; ICG Senior Analyst William Davison
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days before the TPLF attack, and senior Sudanese officials say they discussed the prospective
conflict with Abiy a week before it started, when Abiy asked them to secure the border.40 By some
accounts, operations against the TPLF were planned in coordination with Eritrea.41 The day
before fighting began, Tigray’s regional president held a press conference, declaring that his
government had prepared its regional force “not in need of a war, but if the worst comes, to
defend ourselves.”42 (Each of Ethiopia’s regional states administers its own paramilitary “special
forces.”) A European Union (EU) statement issued that day expressed deep concern with the
mounting tensions and warned all parties” to “abstain from provocative military deployments.”43
The fighting in Tigray turned members of Ethiopia’s security forces against each other, along
ethnic lines. Tigray regional security forces and informal militia, joined by Tigrayans in the army,
reportedly seized heavy weapons from the federal forces at the onset of the fighting. The
Ethiopian military, supported by Eritrean troops and regional security forces and ethnic militia
from the neighboring Amhara region, carried out ground operations and airstrikes. Human rights
groups reported that indiscriminate artillery fire on urban areas resulted in civilian casualties; the
military denies targeting civilian areas.44 The TPLF accused the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of
supporting Ethiopia with armed drones flown from Eritrea.45 (Abiy maintains Ethiopia has used
its own drones during the conflict, for surveillance.) The TPLF launched several rocket attacks on
installations in Eritrea’s capital in November, in stated retaliation for Eritrea’s role in the conflict.
The TPLF also fired rockets at airports in Amhara that it stated were supporting air operations.
The federal government claimed victory after taking Tigray’s capital, Mekele, in late November
and publicly declared an end to military operations, installing an interim regional administration
in Mekele. The conflict continued, however, and security conditions deteriorated in Tigray as the
warring parties vied for control of territory. The Abiy administration rejected calls for peace talks
and denied the presence of Eritrean forces in Tigray for months—despite reports of abuses
attributed to them—before publicly stating in March that Eritrean soldiers were acting to secure
their border.46 The Eritrean presence has extended beyond the border area, and reports, which
U.S. officials call credible, suggest Eritrean forces have sometimes donned Ethiopian uniforms.47
The Conflict Spreads
A major shift in the conflict occurred in June 2021, when the Tigrayan insurgents, who call
themselves the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF), launched a new offensive, taking Mekele and other
parts of the region. The TDF’s commander, General Tsadkan Gebretensae led Ethiopia’s military

(@wdavison10), Twitter, August 27, 2021, 8:44 am.
40 “Is Ethiopia headed for civil war?” Foreign Policy, November 5, 2020; Cameron Hudson, “The unintended
consequence of Ethiopia’s civil war might be a border war with Sudan,” Atlantic Council, March 3, 2021; “Sudanese
troops have been deployed on the border in agreement with Ethiopia’s PM,” Sudan Tribune, January 17, 2021.
41 Mesfin Hagos, “Eritrea’s role in Ethiopia’s conflict and the fate of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia,” African Arguments,
December 4, 2020.
42 “‘We have prepared our military of special force not in need of a war, but if the worst comes,’ Debretsion
Gebremichael,” Addis Standard, November 2, 2020.
43 European External Action Service, “Ethiopia: Statement by the High Representative/Vice President Josep Borrell on
the latest developments,” November 2, 2020.
44 HRW, “Ethiopia: Unlawful shelling of Tigray urban areas,” January 11, 2021.
45 TPLF Spokesman Getachew Reda (@reda_getachew), Twitter, November 15, 2020, 2:20 am EST.
46 Abiy Ahmed Ali (@AbiyAhmedAli), Twitter, March 26, 2021, 12:46 am EST.
47 See, e.g., “‘Our Season’: Eritrean troops kill, rape, and loot in Tigray,” AP, May 28, 2021; U.S. Mission to the U.N.,
Statement by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield on the Situation in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region, April 15, 2021.
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from 1991 to 2001. He describes the resistance in Tigray as being led by “the duly elected
Government of Tigray,” not solely by the TPLF, which he says remains Tigray’s ruling party.48
While TPLF leaders play a key role in the leadership of the insurgent force, the TDF appears to
draw support from beyond the party among Tigrayans.49 (Ethiopian authorities object to the use of
the term TDF: the federal media authority briefly revoked the license of a local media outlet in
July for using it, contending that it advanced the agenda of a terrorist group.50)
Less than two weeks after the TDF launched its operation in June, Ethiopia’s army withdrew
from much of Tigray, and federal authorities announced a temporary ceasefire on June 28.
Officials declared that the ceasefire would facilitate aid distribution and allow farmers in Tigray
to plant, asserting that the TPLF was “no longer an existential threat” to the country and that its
military and organizational capacity had been “obliterated.”51 They acknowledged that they faced
an insurgency, however, saying that the army was “not ready to exchange fire with people in
Tigray who have been misled by TPLF propaganda,” and that the ceasefire “would help the
people of Tigray to reflect on the pros and cons of colluding with a terrorist group.” Some reports
suggest that the army suffered major losses in June.52 The TDF claims to have routed eight
divisions and captured 8,000 prisoners of war; it marched thousands through Mekele after taking
the city.53
The government’s declaration of a ceasefire did not end the war. Tigrayan leaders dismissed it as
cover for military losses rather than a humanitarian gesture, and they denounced the continued
presence of forces from Amhara in western Tigray—which the Amhara government has sought to
claim as its territory (discussed below)—and pledged to “liberate” the area. The warring parties
traded blame for the destruction of bridges on two of the four roads into Tigray when the military
withdrew, which has blocked aid access via those routes. Some observers suggest that Amhara
forces sabotaged the bridges to stymie TDF efforts to retake Western Tigray.54 Eritrean forces,
meanwhile, reportedly withdrew from much of Tigray but remained in border areas. By August
the United States reported that “large numbers” had re-entered Ethiopia.55 The TDF asserts that it
will fight until the federal government lifts the blockade on Tigray and agrees to dialogue on a
political solution to the conflict.56

48 “Tigray crisis: A conversation with General Tsadkan Gebretensae, Tigray Defense Force Central Command,” The
Elephant, July 9, 2021. Tsadkan, who had fallen out with the TPLF during a leadership split in 2001, had been critical
of what he described as authoritarianism and state brutality under the EPRDF. He had publicly welcomed Abiy’s initial
reforms, but had also warned of troubles in the Tigray-federal relationship and concerns over Abiy’s deal with Eritrea.
He says he joined the resistance after the conflict began, because the government had “invited foreign forces to invade
our country.” “‘Ethiopia is in transition defined by no clear direction’: Tsadkan Gebretensae,” Ethiopia Observer,
January 8, 2021 and “Former TPLF General reveals hopes and fears in Tigray,” TesfaNews, August 22, 2018.
49 See, e.g., interviews cited in William Davison (@wdavison10), Twitter, September 3, 2021, 9:34 am EST.
50 Addis Standard, Statement of fact on the suspension of Addis Standard, July 19, 2021.
51 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Media Briefing by State Minister Redwan Hussien and General Bacha Debele briefed
media on unilateral ceasefire in Tigray, June 30, 2021. In the June 30 address, Prime Minister Abiy noted the
challenges facing the army in fighting an insurgency and suggested a pause would give the population time to reflect.
52 Declan Walsh, “How local guerrilla fighters routed Ethiopia’s powerful army,” New York Times, July 11, 2021.
53 Declan Walsh, “”Tigrayan forces parade Ethiopian soldiers through regional capital,” New York Times, July 2, 2021.
54 ICG, “As Ethiopian troops exit Tigray, time to focus on relief,” July 9, 2021.
55 OCHA, Tigray: Humanitarian Access Snapshot (July 2021), August 13, 2021 and Treasury Department, Treasury
Sanctions Eritrean Military Leader in Connection with Serious Human Rights Abuse in Tigray, August 23, 2021.
56 “Ethiopia’s Tigray crisis: Rebels vow to fight on until blockade ends,” BBC, August 2, 2021.
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In July, regional forces from other parts of Ethiopia reportedly deployed to the Afar-Tigray border
to reinforce the army.57 The TDF moved into Afar in what it said was an operation against the
amassing forces.58 Some observers speculated that the TDF might seek to cut off the road and rail
line to Djibouti’s port, through which 95% of Ethiopia’s maritime trade transits, in an effort to
force the federal government into negotiations. (That route—through Afar—was blocked for days
in July by protests and violence between communities in Afar and Ethiopia’s eastern Somali
region, who are involved in a simmering border dispute unrelated to the Tigray conflict).59
Regional authorities in Amhara, Afar, and Oromia called for civilians to take up arms in July,
signaling a further escalation of the conflict. In early August, the TDF, which also advanced south
into Amhara, took Lalibela, a UNESCO World Heritage site home to 13th century rock-hewn
churches, reportedly without any shooting.60 Heavy fighting has been reported in other areas of
Amhara, however, and some reports suggest Tigrayan forces have razed villages killed civilians,
and looted aid supplies during their offensive; the TDF denies targeting civilians and has called
for an independent investigation of the incidents.61 Amidst this fighting, a minority group in
Amhara, the Qemant, have accused Amhara forces and militia of attacking their communities and
displacing thousands, some who have fled as refugees to Sudan.62 Amhara officials assert some
Qemant have become a proxy force for the TPLF (an allegation Ethiopian officials have also
made against armed groups in other regions).63 With all sides mobilizing civilians to fight,
distinguishing civilians from combatants has become more challenging for journalists and human
rights monitors as reports of possible new atrocities emerge.64
The expansion of the conflict into Afar and Amhara has displaced over 300,000 people and made
another 1.7 million people food insecure.65 The TDF says it will accept a ceasefire when its
conditions are met, and in the interim it will take “appropriate measures to ensure the safety and
security of our people.”66 The Tigrayan forces aver that they prefer a peaceful resolution to the
crisis and are willing to negotiate. They have also called for a “transitional arrangement and an
inclusive political process... to address the political and constitutional problems afflicting the

57 “Three more regions reinforce Ethiopian army, Amhara against Tigray forces,” Reuters, July 16, 2021.
58 “Ethiopia’s Afar region urges civilians to fight Tigray rebels,” AFP, July 23, 2021.
59 “Protesters block Ethiopia rail link after clashes leave 300 dead,” Bloomberg, July 27, 2021.
60 “Lalibela: Ethiopia’s Tigray rebels take Unesco world heritage town,” BBC, August 5, 2021.
61 In early September, after U.S. officials implicated Tigrayan forces in looting aid supplies in Amhara, they clarified
that USAID had verified one incident of “a combination of TPLF fighters and local community members” looting a
partner aid agency’s warehouse, and had unconfirmed reports of two other incidents. On reported TDF abuses, see, e.g.,
Zecharias Zelalem, “‘They are out for revenge’: Evidence of war crimes as rebels road out of Ethiopia’s Tigray
region,” The Telegraph, August 11, 2021. On reports of looting, see Declan Walsh (@DeclanWalsh), Twitter,
September 7, 2021, 2:45 am EST; U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia, Access to Humanitarian Assistance, September 3, 2021.
62 “Caught in the crossfire, Ethiopian minority flees to Sudan,” AFP, August 21, 2021.
63 Officials in the Benishangul-Gumuz region have similarly referred to ethnic Gumuz insurgents as “TPLF agents” and
termed them an associated “terrorist group.” See, e.g., “Benishangul Gumuz Regional State vows to take ‘final
measures’ against ‘TPLF agents,’” Addis Standard, September 9, 2021. For more context, see Maria Gerth-Niculescu,
“Anger, fear run deep after months of ethnic violence in western Ethiopia,” The New Humanitarian, February 23, 2021.
64 See, e.g., “Tigray forces killed 120 civilians in village in Amhara – Ethiopian officials,” Reuters, September 9, 2021.
65 WFP, “WFP expands emergency response as up to 7 million people face hunger crisis in northern Ethiopia,”
September 7, 2021.
66 In early July, Tigrayan leaders identified the following conditions for a ceasefire: the withdrawal of forces from
Amhara and Eritrea to pre-war territories, unimpeded aid access and the return of telecommunications, electricity and
other services, the release of political prisoners and detained Tigrayan members of the military, and accountability for
atrocities. In late July, they added a call for a transitional arrangement and inclusive political process. Getachew Reda
(@reda_getatchew), Twitter, July 4, 2021, 5:43 am EST; July 7, 2021, 10:04 am EST; and July 29, 2021, 4:00 am EST.
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country.” In early August the TDF announced talks over a preliminary military alliance with an
Oromo rebel group that seeks Abiy’s ouster; the extent of their cooperation is unclear.67

67 “Ethiopia’s Tigray forces seek new military alliance,” Reuters, August 11, 2021.
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Communications Blackouts, Media Access, and Contested Narratives
Communications cuts, access restrictions, propaganda, and disinformation have made it difficult to confirm
information on developments in Tigray. Phone and internet connections were cut when the conflict began, and the
parties trade blame for the outages. Communications were later restored in some areas. Groups that monitor
internet freedom attribute the shutdown to the federal government—there have been at least 13 internet
shutdowns in Ethiopia under the Abiy administration.68 All communications were cut again in late June, and the
military dismantled U.N. satellite communications equipment in Mekele.
Federal authorities did not grant journalists access to Tigray during the first four months of the conflict, and access
since has been subject to authorization. Journalists covering the war have faced threats, intimidation, and arrest.
Ethiopian journalists are especial y vulnerable, but foreign correspondents and researchers also have reported
harassment.69 The government expelled ICG’s Ethiopia analyst in November and in May revoked the accreditation
of a New York Times reporter whose coverage of abuses by government-aligned forces was reportedly seen as
creating diplomatic pressure.70 When reports of troops blocking aid emerged in May 2021, Secretary Blinken
issued a statement of concern, cal ing Eritrean and Amhara forces’ conduct particularly problematic and urging
their withdrawal.71 Days later, the Foreign Ministry alleged the existence of “a concerted campaign to exert undue
pressure against Ethiopia,” referencing “unfair and unwarranted” international statements on the humanitarian and
human rights situation and refuting reports of a crackdown on the press.72 (On the same day, CNN reported that
Ethiopian troops had threatened the staff of a Tigray hospital for “tarnishing Ethiopia’s image” in media reports.73)
The warring parties and their supporters disagree on basic facts, some academics note: “How it started, who is to
blame. . the relative strength of the combatants, the opinions of the people of Tigray, and whether any atrocities
have been committed (and if so, by whom) are all matters of vigorous dispute.”74 Both sides have sought to shape
the public narrative on the conflict through their media outlets and social media.75 Activists and diaspora members
also use social media to circulate information about the crisis and influence public discourse.76
Federal authorities issue “Fact Check” statements to contradict what they characterize as misrepresentations in
international media.77 The government alleges that the TPLF has infiltrated the refugee camps in Sudan to spread
disinformation, and its statements discounting abuses reported by refugees have led some observers to accuse the
government of a systematic campaign to discredit refugee accounts.78 Pro-government social media accounts allege
that the TPLF has infiltrated media and human rights organizations or provided them with false information.79
The Prime Minister’s spokesperson has accused unnamed foreign actors of an “orchestrated attack that is
condescending in nature, often patronizing in tone; belligerent in approach and destructive in the outcome.” She
asserts that Ethiopia is the victim of false narratives spread by TPLF “sympathizers” abroad.80 Abiy has accused the
international community of ignoring TPLF crimes and suggests that some seek “to resuscitate and use the terrorist
group for their own agenda.”81 Eritrean officials have made similar accusations against the United States.82 Some
Ethiopian officials have alleged a regime change conspiracy by the West, while others have accused aid
organizations of smuggling weapons to the TPLF.83
Tigray: Humanitarian and Human Rights Concerns
The situation in Tigray is one of the worst food emergencies globally: aid agencies estimate that
5.2 million people there need food aid.84 USAID’s Famine Early Warning Systems Network

68 Netblocks, “Internet disrupted in Ethiopia as conflict breaks out in Tigray region,” November 4, 2020, and Access
Now, Open letter to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali, June 18, 2021.
69 See, e.g., “Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict and the battle to control information,” Al Jazeera, February 16, 2021, and
reports by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) on Ethiopia.
70 ICG, “Ethiopia expels crisis group senior analyst,” November 22, 2020, and Abdi Latif Dahir and Declan Walsh, “As
Ethiopia fights in Tigray region, a crackdown on journalists,” New York Times, May 13, 2021.
71 State Department, “Continuing atrocities and denial of humanitarian access in Ethiopia’s Tigray,” May 15, 2021.
72 Ethiopian MFA, Press statement, May 18, 2021.
73 “Ethiopian soldiers armed with guns and grenades raid hospital featured in CNN report,” CNN, May 18, 2021.
74 Nic Cheeseman and Yohannes Woldemariam, “Ethiopia’s perilous propaganda war,” Foreign Affairs, April 8, 2021
75 Tessa Knight, “How Twitter became a battlefield to shape Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict narrative,” Daily Maverick,
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(FEWS NET) reported in May that some Tigrayans were experiencing famine conditions, and in
June, the U.N. and aid partners released analysis indicating that over 350,000 people were facing
catastrophic conditions and warning that the situation was expected to worsen.85 After the
Ethiopian government challenged that analysis, an international committee of humanitarian
experts concluded in July that, despite data gaps, there was clear evidence to support an estimate
of 400,000 people in catastrophic conditions.86 USAID assesses that the number already in famine
conditions may be up to 900,000 people.87 The U.N. Secretary-General has described the situation
as “hellish.”88 UNICEF reports that over 2.2 million children in northern Ethiopia are acutely
food insecure and estimates a ten-fold increase in Tigray’s annual caseload of children needing
treatment for acute malnutrition over the next year.89 UNICEF also reports that almost half of all
pregnant and breastfeeding women in Tigray are acutely malnourished. Farmers in much of the
region missed the planting season, and the next harvest is expected to be a fraction of normal
yields. Roughly a third of Tigray’s population, over two million people, are internally displaced.
Aid delivery has been constrained by bureaucratic impediments, movement restrictions and
threats by armed actors, hostilities, and infrastructure damage.90 Eritrean troops reportedly have
restricted or blocked access to parts of the region, and have been implicated in rapes, killings, and
the looting and destruction of medical facilities, food stocks, crops, and livestock.91 U.S. officials
assert that the Ethiopian and Eritrean militaries have “laid waste to Tigray’s food supply,” and
accuse Ethiopia’s military allies of seeking to “eliminate livelihoods.”92 In March, Médecins Sans

April 23, 2021 and Claire Wilmot, Ellen Tveteraas, Alexi Drew, Dueling information campaigns: The war over the
narrative in Tigray, The Media Manipulation Casebook available at mediamanipulation.org.
76 Ibid.
77 See, e.g., State of Emergency Fact Check (@ETFactCheck), Twitter, November 28, 2020, 8:33 am EST and Ethiopia
Current Issues Fact Check (@ETFactCheck), Twitter, August 11, 2021, 5:01 am EST.
78 See, e.g., State of Emergency Fact Check (@ETFactCheck), Twitter, November 24, 2020, 10:30 am EST; Office of
the Prime Minister (@PMEthiopia), Twitter, November 30, 2020, 5:08 am EST; Ethiopian MFA, Statement regarding
the latest report by Amnesty International, August 11, 2021; and Will Brown and Judd Devermont, “The UN Must End
the Horrors of Ethiopia’s Tigray War, Foreign Policy, March 8, 2021.
79 Wilmot, Tveteraas, Drew, Dueling information campaigns, op. cit.
80 Office of the Prime Minister, Press Briefing Transcript, June 3, 2021.
81 Office of the Prime Minister, Statement on Current Affairs and a National Call, August 10, 2021.
82 “Eritrea blames US support for Tigray’s leaders for the war,” AP, June 8, 2021.
83 See, e.g., State Minister of Peace Frealem Shibabaw (@FrealemShibabaw), Twitter August 1, 2021, 1:21 am EST;
Ethiopian MFA, Government statement on factors that stall the unilateral humanitarian ceasefire, July 15, 2021.
84 World Food Programme (WFP), “UN agencies concerned by looming famine in Northern Ethiopia,” June 10, 2021
and “Ethiopia Food Security Outlook, June 2021 to January 2022,” August 2021.
85 A famine declaration requires evidence of that at least 20% of the population in an area faces an extreme lack of
food, 30% of children are acute malnourishment in 30% of children, and a crude death rate over 2 deaths per 10,000
people in the affected area per day. Households may be facing famine conditions even if the area is not classified as in
famine. Data limitations can constrain famine declarations. FEWS NET, “Many in Tigray face food security
Emergency as national needs reach five-year high,” May 17, 2021.
86 IPC Global Famine Review Committee, Famine Review of the POC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis, July 2021.
87 USAID, Statement by Administrator Samantha Power on the Humanitarian Situation in Ethiopia, August 19, 2021.
88 “UN says humanitarian conditions ‘hellish,’” AP, August 19, 2021.
89 UNICEF, Press Briefing, Geneva, July 30, 2021.
90 OCHA reports on access issues in a monthly report, Tigray: Humanitarian Access Snapshot.
91 See, e.g., Robbie Corey-Boulet, “Eritrean troops block, loot food aid in Tigray: documents,” AFP, April 27, 2021,
and “Anti-farming ‘campaign’ under way in Tigray,” AFP, May 11, 2021.
92 USAID, Administrator Power at the U.S.-EU High level roundtable on the Humanitarian Emergency in Tigray, June
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Frontièrs (MSF) reported a “deliberate and widespread attack on health care,” documenting
facilities that had been looted, vandalized and destroyed, with much of the damage appearing
intended “to render them nonfunctional.”93 “Health workers are threatened, mobile health teams
are systematically prevented from accessing certain populations, health facilities remain unsafe,”
the U.N. reported in May.94 That report noted armed actors accusing aid workers of “supporting
the former government [the TPLF], and carrying weapons.” Three MSF staff were killed in June.
U.N. reports indicate that restrictions by military forces severely impeded humanitarian access to
rural areas—where needs are most severe—until their withdrawal.
The change in territorial control has enabled expanded humanitarian access within Tigray since
late June: aid agencies report that access internally is now largely “feasible and secure, with some
75% of the region fully accessible” (the U.N. categorized most of Tigray as only partially
accessible or hard to reach earlier in the conflict; see figures in the Appendix.)95 Access into
Tigray is significantly restricted, however. From July through August, one road into Tigray was
passable, and “insecurity, extended delays with clearances of humanitarian supplies, and intense
searches at checkpoints” have severely limited the movement of humanitarian cargo into the
region.96 Aid experts have called federal government protocols for approving humanitarian
supplies and personnel entering the region “a major impediment.”97 USAID says a de facto
blockade has resulted, and it has accused the government of “obstructing humanitarian aid and
personnel, including land convoys and air access.”98 U.S. diplomats have warned that the denial
of humanitarian access is a violation of international humanitarian law and can constitute a war
crime. In an August U.N. Security Council briefing, the U.N. Secretary-General also referred to
the situation in Tigray as a “de facto humanitarian blockade.”
OCHA reports that a minimum of 100 trucks of food and nonfood aid supplies must enter Tigray
daily to sustain humanitarian operations. From early July through August, however, 335 trucks—
roughly 9% of what was needed—were able to cross into the region.99 Prepositioned food stocks
ran out in mid-August, and during the last two weeks of the month no trucks were able to move
into Tigray, per U.N. officials, due to federal and regional administrative constraints. The
government eased some impediments in early September allowing several convoys to enter, but
whether aid agencies will be able to sufficiently increase and maintain humanitarian cargo flows
into the region to prevent the situation from significantly worsening remains to be seen.
With Tigray’s banking, telecommunications, and electricity services cut, aid agencies are
struggling with a lack of fuel, cash, and access to communications.100 Fuel is needed not only to
distribute aid, but to run generators for health facilities and water services. Aid agencies need
cash to sustain operations. The military dismantled the satellite connections of U.N. agencies in
Mekele when it left the city, and authorities have since prohibited communications equipment
from being brought into Tigray. The commercial blockade, meanwhile, has resulted in severe

10, 2021.
93 MSF, “Widespread destruction of health facilties in Ethiopia’s Tigray region,” March 15, 2021.
94 OCHA, Tigray: Humanitarian Access Snapshot (May 2021), June 11, 2021.
95 OCHA, Ethiopia – Tigray Region Humanitarian Update, August 19, 2021.
96 Ibid.
97 IPC Global Famine Review Committee, op. cit.
98 USAID, Ethiopia – Tigray Crisis, Fact Sheet #10, FY 2021, July 30, 2021 and Statement by Administrator Samantha
Power on the Humanitarian Situation in Ethiopia, August 19, 2021.
99 U.N., Statement by Acting Humanitarian Coordinator for Ethiopia, September 2, 2021.
100 Local authorities partially restored power to major towns via a hydroelectric plant in Tigray on August 21, 2021.
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shortages of basic commodities and many Tigrayans can no longer afford necessities.101 Federal
officials have said the resumption of services is dependent on the TPLF declaring a ceasefire.102
The federal government has denied responsibility for humanitarian access problems,
contradicting the reports of aid agencies, the U.N., and USAID.103 In July 2021, the government
suspended the operations of the MSF Holland and the Norwegian Refugee Council, accusing the
groups of disseminating misinformation, work permit violations, and unauthorized satellite
communications equipment.104 Experts warn that the suspensions may further inhibit reporting by
aid agencies for fear of reprisals by the government against their organizations and staff.105
Threats and violence against aid workers have increased over the course of the conflict, during
which at least 23 aid workers in Tigray have been killed.106 Drivers transporting aid cargo have
reported increasing harassment, threats, and looting along the route to Tigray. U.N. officials have
warned that accusations by Ethiopian authorities alleging that aid workers are biased or “arming
the other side” are dangerous; USAID Administrator Power has called rhetoric from Ethiopian
officials against humanitarians “troubling and harmful.”107
Eritrean Refugees in Tigray
The U.N. refugee agency (UNHCR) has repeatedly raised alarm over the safety of Eritrean
refugees in Tigray, many of whom fled forced military conscription and other abuses in Eritrea.108
Tigray was home to over 95,000 refugees when the conflict began, most living in camps and
reliant on aid. Two camps near the Eritrean border—hosting nearly 34,000 refugees—were
reported to have been “systematically destroyed” in early 2021; UNHCR says refugees were
caught in the crossfire and some may have been killed or forced by Eritrean forces to return to
Eritrea.109 Some refugees fled to other camps, but thousands are missing. Accounts of new attacks
on refugees in the remaining camps emerged in July; the State Department says reports that
“armed forces affiliated with the TPLF and Tigrayan militias” were responsible are credible.110
The attacks have elevated concerns for safety of the 25,000 Eritreans in those camps, given their
proximity to ongoing hostilities and the prospect that refugees may become scapegoats for abuses
some Tigrayans attribute to Eritrean forces. UNHCR has commenced an effort to relocate them.

101 OCHA, Ethiopia – Tigray Region Humanitarian Update, September 2, 2021.
102 Peter Mwai, “Ethiopia: What do we know about aid going into Tigray,” BBC News, August 15, 2021.
103 “Aid access to Tigray remains stalled, despite ceasefire,” The New Humanitarian, July 12, 2021.
104 Kaamil Ahmed, “Ethiopia suspends aid groups for ‘spreading misinformation,’” The Guardian, August 6, 2021.
105 Philip Kleinfeld, “Tigray aid response hit by suspensions, blockade,” The New Humanitarian, August 9, 2021, and
Kelly Moss and Jacob Kurtzer, “Humanitarian suspensions and the politicization of aid in Ethiopia,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies, August 12, 2021.
106 U.N. Country Team in Ethiopia, Statement on the killing of 23 aid workers, September 1, 2021.
107 “Claims of bias against aid workers in Tigray ‘dangerous’, says UN,” Al Jazeera, August 4, 2021, and USAID,
Statement by Administrator Power, op. cit.
108 UNHCR, Statement attributable to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi on the situation in
Ethiopia’s Tigray region,” December 11, 2020.
109 Zecharias Zelalem, “Refugee camps in Ethiopia appear to have been systematically destroyed,” VICE News,
February 3, 2020, UNHCR, Remarks by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi at the press
conference in Addis Ababa, February 1, 2021.
110 State Department, Press Briefing, August 5, 2021.
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Human Rights Concerns
Access and communications problems in Tigray have inhibited reporting on human rights
violations.111 In March 2021, OHCHR announced the launch of a joint investigation with a state
entity, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), into reported abuses during the
conflict. The U.N. High Commissioner noted that “deeply distressing reports of sexual and
gender-based violence, extrajudicial killings, widespread destruction and looting of public and
private property by all parties continue to be shared with us.” She said that her office had
corroborated information on several incidents, including the shelling of cities and mass killings
by Eritrean forces in Axum and Dengelat.112 Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and
EHRC have each documented the killing of civilians in Axum.113 Among other incidents, as many
as 160 people in the town of Bora may have been executed by Ethiopian troops in January, and in
February, over 180 civilians in Abi Adi were reportedly killed in house-to-house searches by
Ethiopian and Eritrean forces.114 A military airstrike on Togoga, a market town, killed dozens and
wounded almost 200 in June, according to health workers, who say soldiers blocked first
responders. A military spokesman said those injured were fighters in civilian clothes.115
Ethiopian officials cite a mass killing that occurred early in the conflict, in the western Tigray
town of Mai Kadra, among their justifications for operations against the TPLF. An early EHRC
report suggested that at least 600 people were killed; a subsequent federal investigation reported
229 deaths.116 Some witnesses say Tigrayan youth militia and local security forces killed
hundreds of ethnic Amhara civilians.117 Other witnesses have implicated pro-government forces
in the violence, suggesting that Amhara militia targeted Tigrayans after the military took the
town.118 A Reuters investigation suggests there were two rounds of killing—first of Amhara by
ethnic Tigrayans and then revenge killings of Tigrayans by Amhara forces—leaving over 700
dead in total.119 The EHRC has acknowledged reprisal attacks against Tigrayans, noting that it did
not have enough information on them when it issued its original report.120

111 Will Brown, “Massacres, rapes and starvation: Breaking through the blackout to expose Tigray’s ‘crimes against
humanity,’” The Telegraph, May 15, 2021.
112 OHCHR, op. cit.
113 According to Ethiopia’s Attorney General, a federal investigation determined that 110 civilians were killed by
Eritrean troops in Axum, but he suggested 70 of them “might have been irregular combatants.” Amnesty International
(AI), Ethiopia: The Massacre in Axum, February 26, 2021; HRW, “Eritrean forces massacre Tigray civilians,” March
5, 2021; EHRC, “Tigray: Killing of Civilians in Axum,” February 26, 2021; and Attorney General of Ethiopia, “A
Summary of Efforts to Ensure Accountability Regarding Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Other
Legal Norms in the Regional State of Tigray,” May 21, 2021.
114 Lucy Kassa and Nabih Bulos, “In an out-of-sight war, a massacre comes to light,” Los Angeles Times, March 19,
2021 and Lucy Kassa, “‘Their bodies were torn into pieces’: Ethiopian and Eritrean troops accused of massacre in
Tigray,” The Telegraph, April 7, 2021.
115 Jason Burke, “Scores killed in Ethiopian airstrike on Tigray market,” The Guardian, June 24, 2021.
116 Attorney General of Ethiopia, “A Summary of Efforts to Ensure Accountability Regarding Violations of
International Humanitarian Law and Other Legal Norms in the Regional State of Tigray,” May 21, 2021.
117 AI, “Ethiopia: Investigation reveals evidence that scores of civilians were killed in massacre in Tigray state,”
November 12, 2020; EHRC, Rapid Investigation into Grave Human Rights Violation in Maikadra, November 24, 2020.
118 “Questions linger among the corpses of an Ethiopian massacre,” AFP, November 25, 2020, and “En Ethiopie, le
mystère du village de Maïkadra révèle la profondeur des conflits ethniques,” Le Monde, November 30, 2020.
119 “How ethnic killings exploded from an Ethiopian town,” Reuters, June 7, 2021.
120 “Ethiopia’s human rights chief as war rages in Tigray: ‘We get accused by all ethnic groups,’” The Guardian, June
2, 2021.
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Mai Kadra is located in Welkait, a part of western Tigray that ethnic Amhara claim as their
traditional land, and a long-running territorial dispute over the area underlies the communal
violence and reports of forced displacement and other abuses that have occurred there since the
war began.121 In February, the New York Times reported allegations of ethnic cleansing, citing
internal U.S. government reporting that Amhara forces were “deliberately and efficiently
rendering western Tigray ethnically homogeneous through the organized use of force and
intimidation” and that “whole villages were severely damaged or completely erased.”122 In
March, Tigray’s interim authorities accused Amhara regional forces of “forcibly removing people
of Tigrayan origin” from western Tigray and relocating them to the town of Shire, home to the
largest concentration of IDPs in Tigray (over 400,000, most of them from western Tigray).123
More than 100,000 people fled or were relocated from western Tigray during the exodus from
February through March, amid reports of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, and
disappearances, particularly of young men.124 Secretary Blinken noted “acts of ethnic cleansing,
which we’ve seen in western Tigray” in congressional testimony during that period.”125
The relocations occurred in the context of claims by Amhara regional officials that Abiy had
approved the incorporation of disputed territories in western and southern Tigray into Amhara.
Interim regional officials that Abiy appointed to lead the Tigray government disputed the Amhara
claim, contending that forces from Amhara “took advantage of the security gap” to “invade and
forcibly occupy our land.” Amhara officials assert that the land “was taken by force and now has
been returned by force.”126 In July, after the TPLF reclaimed Mekele, its leader used similar
words: “They have taken the land by force, so we will take it back by force.”127
Federal and Amhara regional forces remain in control of much of Western Tigray, despite the
military’s withdrawal from the rest of the region in late June. In late July, bodies—some showing
signs of torture and execution-style killings, according to doctors and forensics experts—began
appearing in the river that flows from Tigray into Sudan. Some reports suggest they are evidence
of ongoing atrocities in Western Tigray.128 Refugees who have fled Humera, a city near the
Sudanese border, say thousands ethnic Tigrayans are being held in detention facilities in the city.
U.N. officials have noted “widespread and systematic” rape and sexual assault in Tigray, which
they say has been used as a weapon of war, perpetrated by Ethiopian and Eritrean troops, Amhara
Special Forces, and aligned militia.129 The U.N. Special Representative on Sexual Violence in
Conflict has cited acts of sexual violence “with a level of cruelty beyond comprehension.”130 U.S.
officials contend that Ethiopia’s military, with allied forces, “launched a campaign to shatter

121 ICG reported in mid-2020, “At worst, some senior Ethiopian politicians warn, such a scenario could lead to ‘war’,
pitting the Tigray region and its supporters in the federal army against the Amhara region and possibly the central
government itself.” ICG, Bridging the Divide in Ethiopia’s North, June 12, 2020.
122 Declan Walsh, “Ethiopia’s war leads to ethnic cleansing in Tigray region, U.S. report says,” New York Times,
February 26, 2021.
123 “Thousands kicked off contested land in Ethiopia’s Tigray: Official,” AFP, March 8, 2021.
124 “Land dispute drives new exodus in Ethiopia’s Tigray,” Al Jazeera, March 31, 2021; OCHA, Ethiopia – Tigray
Region Humanitarian Update, March 13, 2021.
125 HFAC, The Biden Administration’s Priorities for U.S. Foreign Policy, op. cit.
126 Samuel Gebre, “Ethiopia’s Amhara seizes disputed territory amid Tigray war,” Bloomberg, March 16, 2021.
127 Declan Walsh, “’I didn’t expect to make it back alive’: An interview with Tigray’s leader,” op. cit..
128 “Men are marched out of prison camps. Then corpses float down the river,” CNN, September 8, 2021.
129 “UN warns sexual violence being used as weapon of war in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, RFI, April 16, 2021.
130 Remarks by U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict Pramila Patten,
“The crisis in Tigray: Women and girls under violent assault,” April 22, 2021.
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families and destroy the reproductive and mental health of their victims.”131 Journalists and
human rights groups have documented accounts of rape victims who say they were targeted by
members of these forces based on their ethnicity.132 One report suggests the existence of “rape
camps.”133 In August 2021, Amnesty International released a report suggesting “a pattern” of
sexual abuse featuring torture, insults, and ethnic slurs by Ethiopian and Eritrean troops and allied
militia, and noting “sadistic brutality” in some attacks, mostly attributed to Eritrean soldiers.134
Ethiopian officials say soldiers implicated in rape are being prosecuted; several members of The
Elders, a group of world leaders founded by Nelson Mandela, say the prosecutions have been “far
from adequate given the scale of reported abuses.”135
Outside Tigray, human rights groups and journalists have reported ethnic profiling and
harassment, arbitrary detentions, and forcible disappearances of Tigrayans, including in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital.136 Authorities have reportedly closed dozens of Tigrayan-owned
businesses in the city. Ethiopian soldiers of Tigrayan ethnicity have been detained, and are
reportedly being held with other Tigrayans in detention centers across the country.137 Over 135
Ethiopian soldiers of Tigrayan origin have reportedly sought asylum in Sudan and South Sudan,
where they were deployed as U.N. peacekeepers.138
The head of Ethiopia’s Orthodox Church, an ethnic Tigrayan, asserted in May that a genocide
was underway, citing killings and rapes and suggesting “they want to destroy the people of
Tigray.”139 Former U.N. official Dr. Mukesh Kapila, who raised the alarm on atrocities in Darfur,
observed,
If you look at the pattern of killings and other incidents including sexual violence, use of
starvation—there is a pattern of genocidal events. They’re taking place in close
juxtaposition to each other. This points to a degree of orchestration. The fact that these
genocidal acts are taking place in repeated places – points toward an organization, it points
toward a strategy.”140
Tigrayan activists and some outside observers have also raised concern about possible acts of
genocide in Tigray, as have some Members of Congress.141 Rhetoric by Ethiopian officials,

131 USAID, Administrator Power at the U.S.-EU High Level Roundtable, op. cit.
132 See, e.g., Amnesty International, “I don’t know if they realized I was a person”: Rape and other sexual violence in
the Conflict in Tigray, Ethiopia, August 11, 2021; Cara Anna, “‘Leave no Tigrayan’: In Ethiopia, an ethnicity is
erased,” AP, April 7, 2021; and Lynsey Addario and Rachel Hartigan, “A grave humanitarian crisis is unfolding in
Ethiopia. ‘I never saw hell before, but now I have.’” National Geographic, June 1, 2021.
133 Hayelom Mekonnen, Bridget Conley, Alex de Waal, Delia Burns, “What ‘rape as a weapon of war’ in Tigray really
means,” World Peace Foundation, August 10, 2021.
134 Amnesty International, “I don’t know if they realized I was a person...” op. cit.
135 The Elders, “The UN and AU must act now to prevent famine and end atrocities in Tigray, Ethiopia,” June 14, 2021.
In late May, Ethiopia’s Attorney General reported that three soldiers had been convicted of rape and 25 others indicted.
“Ethiopia convicts 3 troops of rape, charges 28 for killings, Associated Press, May 21, 2021.
136 “Ethiopia’s crackdown on ethnic Tigrayans snares thousands, Reuters, May 7, 2021; “‘Purely ethnic profiling’: New
wave of Tigrayans detained,” AP, July 13, 2021; and HRW, “Ethnic Tigrayans forcibly disappeared,” August 18, 2021.
137 “Cara Anna, ‘Clean out our insides’: Ethiopia detains Tigrayans amid war,” April 29, 2021
138 “Ethnic profiling of Tigrayans heightens tensions in Ethiopia,” The New Humanitarian, December 16, 2020 and
“Ethiopian peacekeepers moved to Sudanese refugee camp after seeking asylum,” Reuters, May 11, 2021.
139 “Ethiopian Orthodox Church Patriarch condemns Tigray ‘genocide,’” CNN, May 8, 2021.
140 Will Brown, “Massacres, rapes and starvation: Breaking through the blackout to expose Tigray’s ‘crimes against
humanity’” The Telegraph, May 15, 2021.
141 Will Brown, “Massacres, rapes and starvation,” op. cit.; Senator Patrick Leahy, “Statement on the Situation in
Tigray, Ethiopia, June 5, 2021; and remarks by Representatives Gregory Meeks and Michael McCaul in HFAC, The
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including Prime Minister Abiy—who publicly referred to the TPLF as a “cancer” and a “weed”
that must be uprooted—has drawn concern from U.S. officials, among others, regarding the
prospect for dehumanizing language to incite ethnically-motivated atrocities.142
Beyond Tigray: Concerns of a Wider War and State
Collapse
The war in northern Ethiopia overlaps with other conflicts in the country, including in Abiy’s
home region of Oromia, where his government has faced a growing insurgency and rising
discontent. Reports of a nascent military alliance between the Tigrayan and Oromo insurgents,
and possibly other armed groups, raise the prospect of a wider war and add to concerns over
Ethiopia’s stability. Abiy’s ruling Prosperity Party won an overwhelming victory in the June 2021
elections (discussed below), but violence across the country underscores deep divisions.
Eritrea’s involvement in the war and rising tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan also fuel
concerns about a regional conflict. The Tigray conflict has exacerbated the Ethiopia-Sudan border
tensions, further complicating efforts to resolve a dispute between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan
over a new dam on the Nile. The Tigray conflict has also strained Ethiopia’s role as a leading
troop contributor to peace and stabilization operations in the region, including in Somalia, from
which Ethiopia has withdrawn some of its forces to reinforce operations in northern Ethiopia.
Elections amid Insecurity and Polarization
Amidst the fighting in Tigray, Ethiopia held what Prime Minister Abiy termed the country’s “first
attempt at free and fair elections” on June 21, 2021.143 The elections took place against the
backdrop of multiple security crises, not only in Tigray, and voting did not occur in roughly a
fifth of the 547 constituencies, leaving millions of Ethiopians unable to participate. Elections
were not held in Tigray. Election officials cited security concerns, “malfeasance,” and logistical
problems in their decision to postpone elections in other parts of the country as well. Elections in
two regions, Somali and Harari, and dozens of constituencies (82 in total, not including Tigray’s
38) were postponed until September 30, 2021. Two major opposition parties boycotted the June
polls, leaving ruling party candidates running unopposed in some constituencies.
Where elections were held, Abiy’s party won 410 parliamentary seats while opposition and
independent candidates won 15. The party also dominated the regional council elections. Voter
turnout reportedly exceeded 90% in most regions, prompting questions about the genuineness of
the vote.144 The election process is not yet complete, but the Prosperity Party’s parliamentary
wins in June position Abiy for reelection as prime minister in early October.
In addition to Tigray, other parts of Ethiopia were under states of emergency during the elections
due to insurrections or ethnic violence, and Ethiopians had debated whether the country could

Conflict in Ethiopia, hearing, June 29, 2021.
142 Abiy Ahmed Ali (@AbiyAhmedAli), Twitter, July 18, 2021, 3:48 am EST and USAID, Administrator Samantha
Power Holds Press Conference, August 4, 2021.
143 “Ethiopia votes in test for PM Abiy amid reports of abuses,” AP, June 21, 2021.
144 The election board reported turnout of 99% in Addis Ababa, 97% in Afar, 96% in Oromia—rates that election
observers say are extremely high—and above 90% in all but one region. The International Republican Institute (IRI)
and the National Democratic Institute (NDI), Ethiopia June 21, 2021 National Elections Report, August 5, 2021.
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hold credible elections amidst the range of security and other challenges.145 Abiy’s government
had commenced some political reforms, but the detention of high-profile opposition politicians,
reports of harassment and interference in opposition parties’ campaigns, and narrowing media
space prompted questions about the ruling party’s commitment to democracy.146 Ethiopia’s top
election official noted that despite efforts to level the playing field, opposition candidates faced
“restricting challenges” in some areas and “malfeasance” led to election delays.147
The United States expressed “grave concern” with the pre-election environment.148 According to
one international observer mission, the June elections “showed important improvements over past
elections,” but “the electoral environment fell short of key standards concerning human and civil
liberties, electoral campaigning, adequate security for all parties, and overall peace and
security.”149 The United States described the process as “not free and fair for all Ethiopians” and
stressed the need for the country to “come together to confront growing divisions.”150
The Abiy administration has struggled with growing political discontent in Oromia, Ethiopia’s
most populous regional state. The grassroots movement among ethnic Oromo that brought Abiy
to power fueled expectations there, amid surging Oromo nationalist sentiment and hopes of
greater regional autonomy. The return of the exiled Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), a political
party and former insurgent movement that signed a peace deal with Abiy’s government in 2018,
had initially spurred optimism about electoral options for voters in the region. Abiy’s creation of
the Prosperity Party, however, fueled concerns among some Oromo about a return to centralized
rule. Abiy spoke critically of ethnic nationalism, including among Oromo, and his pan-Ethiopian
orientation led some Oromo to view him as increasing allied with Amhara elites.151
Tensions in Oromia escalated in 2020. The murder of a popular Oromo musician and activist—
who had become critical of Abiy—triggered mass protests and violent unrest in the region in mid-
2020; over 250 people were killed, some reportedly in ethnically-targeted attacks.152 The
government blocked the internet for weeks and arrested thousands, including journalists, activists,
and opposition leaders. Among those still detained are politicians Jawar Mohammed, Bekele
Gerba, and Eskinder Nega, who face charges of inciting ethnic violence and “terrorism.” The two
leading Oromo opposition parties, the OLF and the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), ultimately
decided to boycotted the elections, citing the harassment and detention of their leaders,
candidates, and members, among other concerns.153 Oromia has the largest block of seats in the
lower house of parliament (almost a third), and with the Prosperity Party’s main rivals in Oromia
not on the ballot, its candidates dominated the region’s polls.

145 See, e.g., “Adem Abebe, “Ethiopia’s encumbered elections,” International Politics and Society, June 14, 2021;
Tsedale Lemma, “”He promised peace. Then he tore his country apart.” New York Times, June 21, 2021; and Awol
Allo and Feven Girmay, “Why Ethiopia’s elections should be postponed,” Al Jazeera, June 18, 2021.
146 “Ethiopia’s next poll could be more competitive. But big challenges remain,” The Conversation, February 8, 2021;
Nic Cheeseman and Yohannes Woldemariam, “Ethiopia’s dangerous slide toward civil war,” Foreign Affairs,
November 12, 2020; USIP, “Ethiopia: Contemplating elections and the prospects for peaceful reform,” April 29, 2021.
147 Birtukan Mideksa, “Ethiopia’s elections: A new life for an old hope,’ The National Interest, June 20, 2021
148 State Department, “Elections in Ethiopia,” June 11, 2021.
149 IRI/NDI, op. cit
150 State Department, “Building a Stronger Democracy in Ethiopia,” June 25, 2021.
151 Ermias Tasfaye, “Ethiopia: The fate of Oromia under Abiy’s Prosperity Party,” The Africa Report, August 30, 2021.
152 EHRC, “‘It did not feel like we had a government’: Violence & human rights violations following musician Hachalu
Hundessa’s Assassination,” January 1, 2021.
153 “OLF officially out of upcoming election, continues call for release of jailed leaders, members,” Addis Standard,
March 10, 2020, and Oromo Federalist Congress, Statement Regarding Ethiopia’s Upcoming Elections, March 4, 2021.
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Abiy faces armed opposition in Oromia. Rebel activity and counterinsurgency operations have
caused mass displacement there and in surrounding areas. Mass detentions, extrajudicial killings,
and other abuses attributed to security forces have reportedly fueled support for the opposition.154
As noted above, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) announced in August a new military alliance
with the TPLF. The OLA is a splinter faction of the OLF that did not disarm in 2018 and later
renewed its rebellion, accusing the government of reneging on commitments in the peace deal.
The government calls the faction OLF-Shene, or “Shene,” and has designated it, alongside the
TPLF, as a terrorist organization. These terrorist designations are the first since the government
rescinded designations on opposition groups after Abiy took office. The prospect of an alliance
between the TPLF and OLA, which reportedly made territorial gains in 2021, increases concerns
about a widening war. The two groups say their partnership is based on principles of “respect for
self-determination and human rights.”155 Historically, the TPLF and OLF were both strong
proponents of the constitutional right to ethno-regional self-determination.156 The TPLF is
reportedly debating whether it now seeks secession. Its leader says the decision depends on
“politics at the center,” but he suggests “If they don’t want us, why should we stay?”157
Economic Troubles Worsen
The war in northern Ethiopia has taken a heavy economic toll on Ethiopia, and concerns about the
country’s security and stability have had an impact on foreign investment inflows and economic
growth, compounding effects from the COVID-19 pandemic.158 The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) forecasts GDP growth of just under 2% for 2021, down from 6% in 2020, after averaging
over 9% during the last decade. The Tigray conflict has cost the government over $1 billion, and
as the conflict expands, the cost will rise.159 Ethiopia is struggling with an acute foreign currency
shortage, and the inflation rate has surged.160 In what may signal a cash crunch, the Foreign
Ministry has announced the closure of over 30 diplomatic missions abroad. In August, the central
bank directed banks to suspend lending based on collateral, as officials suggested “economic
sabotage” was destabilizing the economy.161 Ethiopia is soliciting contributions for the war,
including from the diaspora. Federal authorities have asked banks and other businesses to
contribute; civil servants have reportedly been asked to donate a month’s salary.162

154 “A hidden war threatens Ethiopia’s transition to democracy,” The Economist, March 21, 2020; “Ethiopia’s Oromia
conflict: Why a teacher was killed ‘execution-style,’” BBC, January 16, 2021; and AI, Beyond law enforcement: human
rights violations by Ethiopian security forces in Amhara and Oromia, May 29, 2020.
155 Simon Marks, “New armed alliance challenges Ethiopia premier as crisis worsens,” Bloomberg, August 11, 2021.
156 Ethiopia’s 1995 constitution provides for the right of any nation, nationality or people in Ethiopia to self-
determination and to secession, For more on this, see, e.g., Marishet Mohammed Hamza, “TPLF-OLA alliance is a
prelude to Tigray’s secession,” September 2, 2021, and Amanda Cats-Baril, Constitutional Brief: Self –Determination,
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), September 2018.
157 Declan Walsh, “‘I didn’t expect to make it back alive,’” op. cit.
158 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Ethiopia’s sheen begins to tarnish,” August 19, 2021; “Ethiopia’s economy battered
by Tigray war,” BBC News, August 30, 2021.
159 U.N. Security Council, Remarks by U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, August 26, 2021.
160 Official inflation was 30% in August, but economist Steve Hanke of Johns Hopkins University, who calculates
implied inflation rates using a purchasing power parity (PPP) model, suggested an annual measured inflation rate of
over 45% in early September. He argues that a government’s official statistics don’t capture the reality of inflation.
Steve Hanke (@Steve_Hanke), Twitter, August 13, 2021, 10:54 am EST.
161 “Ethiopia suspends loans using asset-based collateral, citing ‘economic sabotage,’” Reuters, August 12, 2021.
162 “Bankers perplexed by war contributions, request clarification,” Addis Fortune, August 14, 2021.
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China’s Exim Bank is withholding $339 million in credit over concern that it will exacerbate
Ethiopia’s growing debt and repayment problems (China is the country’s biggest lender and
trading partner).163 Ethiopia seeks to restructure its external debt, estimated at $25 billion in 2020
and which includes a $1 billion Eurobond due in 2024, under the G20’s Common Framework.
Several of Abiy’s economic reforms, including efforts to open the telecommunications sector, are
progressing: a U.S.-backed consortium of global telecom companies won an $850 million
operating license bid in May. Planned U.S. funding for the bid, however, could be affected by
U.S. concerns related to the Tigray conflict.164 Alongside donor concerns, reports suggest the
uncertainty around Ethiopia’s stability may be deterring some foreign investors.165
Regional Impacts
Ethiopia’s increasing fragility affects the broader region. Ethiopia has often been characterized as
an anchor state in the Horn, and it ranked for several years—until 2020—as the world’s largest
peacekeeping troop contributor, with forces deployed in U.N. missions in neighboring Sudan and
South Sudan, and in Somalia as part of a U.N.-backed African Union (AU) mission, AMISOM, to
counter the Al Qaeda affiliate Al Shabaab and stabilize the country.166 Reports suggest that
Ethiopia reinforced its operation in Tigray by recalling a large number of troops from Somalia
(where thousands have been deployed both under national command and as part of AMISOM),
with possibly security implications for Somalia.167 Escalating bilateral tensions with Sudan,
which have been exacerbated by the Tigray conflict, have led the Sudanese government to call for
the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Abyei, a contested
area between Sudan and South Sudan. Ethiopia has been the mission’s main troop contributor
since its inception a decade ago.
New arms deals could further elevate tensions in the Horn. In August, Ethiopia and Sudan both
reached military cooperation agreements with Turkey, which seeks to increase its influence in the
region. Bellingcat and Janes have meanwhile reported on open source analysis suggesting that
Ethiopia may have acquired combat-capable UAVs from Iran for the Tigray conflict.168

163 “China’s EximBank witholds $339 mln to Ethiopia, cites debt repayment pressures,” Reuters, August 16, 2021.
164 “U.S. sanctions muddle vodafone funding for Ethiopian entry,” Bloomberg, May 24, 2021.
165 Bidding has opened for a second telecom license. MTN, Africa’s largest wireless carrier, which bid in the first
round, is not expected to participate, reportedly viewing the risk as outweighing the benefit. “Africa’s largest wireless
carrier to shun Ethiopian bid,” Bloomberg, August 5, 2021. See also, “Instability may make Ethiopia a hard sell to
foreign investors,” Al Jazeera, February 5, 2021.
166 Ethiopia lost its position as the top U.N. troop contributor in 2020.
167 “Ethiopia withdraws thousands of troops from neighboring Somalia,” Bloomberg, November 13, 2020 and “UN
fears Ethiopia purging ethnic Tigrayan officers from its peacekeeping missions,” Foreign Policy, November 23, 2020.
168 Wim Zwijnenburg, “Is Ethiopia flying Iranian-made armed drones?” Bellingcat, August 17, 2021; Jeremy Binnie,
“Ethiopia may have Iranian UAVs,” Janes, August 18, 2021; and Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, “Iranian Mohajer-6
drones spotted in Ethiopia,” Oryx Blog, August 11, 2021.
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The Nile Dam Dispute
The Tigray conflict coincides with a high-stakes standoff among Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan over management of the
Nile waters. The long-running dispute has flared as Ethiopia moves toward completion of the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam (GERD), Africa’s largest hydroelectric power project. The GERD is expected to significantly
expand Ethiopia’s domestic power capacity and allow the country to sell excess electricity to its neighbors. The
project has been a source of national pride, and a rallying point amid domestic troubles. For Egypt, which relies on
the Nile for hydropower, agriculture, and most of its
water needs, the prospect of upstream countries
control ing the river’s flow is viewed as an existential
threat. For nearly a century, Egypt has been the main
beneficiary of international agreements—to which
upstream countries were not party—apportioning
shares of the Nile’s waters. Roughly 85% of the water
flowing into Egypt comes from the Blue Nile, which
originates in Ethiopia.
Ethiopia’s decision to begin fil ing the dam’s reservoir
in July 2020 before reaching an agreement with Egypt
and Sudan on the GERD’s fil ing and operations
sparked outrage downstream. The Trump
Administration tried to mediate a deal on the GERD’s
fil ing and operations, but the talks stalled in early
2020 after Ethiopia accused the United States of bias
toward Egypt. The AU has since tried, unsuccessful y,
to break the deadlock with new talks. Egypt and
Sudan, with support from the Arab League, have
sought U.N. Security Council intervention. The
Council has, to date, deferred to the existing AU
mediation effort but indicated U.N. wil ingness to
provide support to resolve the dispute. Ethiopia has
accused Egypt of trying to destabilize Ethiopia and
supporting the TPLF and other armed groups.169
Tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan
Sudan hosts over 60,000 refugees from Tigray, and tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan have
risen in the past year over al-Fashaga, a contested border area that runs along the western edge of
Tigray and Amhara regions. The border there has never been formally demarcated, but under
colonial-era treaties al-Fashaga was Sudanese territory.170 Under a compromise deal between the
two governments in 2008, Ethiopia acknowledged the boundary (favoring Sudan), and Sudan
allowed Amhara farmers to remain and cultivate the land, which has significant agricultural
potential. When the TPLF lost power in 2018, ethnic Amhara condemned the deal as having been
made in secret, without consulting Amhara officials. Sporadic clashes between Sudanese forces
and Amhara militia have since occurred, and in late 2020—as Sudan increased its military
presence on the border to monitor refugee flows and TPLF troop movements—the countries’
militaries clashed in the contested region. Sudan’s military destroyed several Ethiopian
administrative facilities and army outposts and expelled Amhara farmers from the area.171

169 See, e.g., “‘Egypt working to destabilize Ethiopia, East Africa,’” Anadolu Agency, January 23, 2021.
170 The United States considers the territory part of Sudan, according to the State Department.
171 Alex de Waal, “Why Ethiopia and Sudan have fallen out over al-Fashaga,” BBC, January 3, 2021; and Yasir Zaidan,
“Ethiopia-Sudan border skirmishes spark fears of a wider war,” World Politics Review, March 1, 2021.
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Talks between the governments stalled as Ethiopia took a harder line, accusing Sudan’s military
of invading Ethiopian land and insisting that Sudan recognize the territory as Ethiopia’s. Both
sides have strengthened their border deployments, increasing the prospect of direct conflict.172
Ethiopia and Sudan have also traded accusations of proxy support for rebel groups.173 The dispute
further complicates the Nile dam talks; Ethiopian officials have accused Egypt of conspiring with
Sudan’s military to undermine Ethiopia, including through support to the TPLF.174
U.S. Policy and Assistance
Successive U.S. Administrations have described Ethiopia as an important development and
regional security partner, while periodically expressing concern regarding political space, human
rights, and unrest. Relations have centered on efforts to alleviate food insecurity and poverty,
improve health indicators, and counter terrorism and instability in the region. The Tigray conflict
has strained the relationship.
U.S. officials viewed Ethiopia’s political transition in 2018 as an opportunity to improve and
deepen bilateral ties, make inroads for U.S. investment and trade, and advance other foreign
policy objectives, including in the context of rising global power competition in the region.175 The
United States welcomed Abiy’s initial efforts to promote reforms and peace in the region, and
pledged support for several of his initiatives. His replacement of long-serving security chiefs in
2018 improved the security relationship, which had been constrained by human rights concerns,
among other issues. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), encouraged by Ethiopia’s
reforms, determined in late 2018 that the country was eligible for an MCC threshold program.176
The State Department hosted an Ethiopian Partnerships Forum in 2019 to “raise awareness of
Ethiopia’s recent economic reforms and emerging business opportunities, accelerate American
investments to transform Ethiopia’s economy, and envision a new future of engagement between
the two countries.”177 In early 2020, Ethiopia announced that the U.S. International Development
Finance Corporation (DFC) was poised to facilitate up to $5 billion in U.S. investment there.178
The humanitarian crisis and reported atrocities in Tigray have raised concerns among U.S.
policymakers and some Members of Congress, who have pressed Secretary Blinken and other
senior officials for greater U.S. engagement on the situation in hearings, correspondence, and
legislation.179 S.Res. 97, which the Senate passed by Unanimous Consent in May, called on the
Administration to push for a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Eritrean forces, to

172 “Eritrea forces deployed in disputed Sudan-Ethiopia area, UN says,” Bloomberg, March 24, 2021.
173 “Ethiopia provides military support to Sudanese rebels in Blue Nile state: official agency,” Sudan Tribune, March 8,
2021 and “Security forces kill scores of civilians, Ethiopia accuses Egypt & Sudan for persistent violence,” Addis
Standard, March 8, 2020.
174 “Sudan and Ethiopia trade accusations in border conflict,” Reuters, February 20, 2021.
175 Jason Mosley, Ethiopia’s Transition: Implications for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea Region, SIPRI, March
2020 and USIP, Final Report and Recommendations of the Senior Study Group on Peace and Security in the Red Sea
Arena, October 29, 2020.
176 The MCC requires a country to pass 10 of 20 indicators to be considered for a compact (threshold program
requirements are lower). The MCC determined Ethiopia to have passed eight in FY2019, but only six in FY2021.
177 State Department Office of Global Partnerships, “Ethiopia Partnerships Forum,” May 15, 2019.
178 David Pilling, “US ready to back Ethiopian reform with $5bn investment,” Financial Times, March 5, 2020.
179 SFRC, The Nomination of Antony Blinken to be Secretary of State, hearing, January 19, 2021; The Nomination of
Linda Thomas-Greenfield to be U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., hearing, January 27, 2021; and Pending Nominations,
hearing, March 3, 2021; and HFAC, U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities, op. cit.
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mitigate the humanitarian crisis, to support an inclusive national dialogue process, to pursue
accountability for abuses in Tigray, and to use “all diplomatic, developmental, and legal tools” to
prevent further ethnic-based violence and promote multi-party democracy in Ethiopia. H.Res. 445
similarly calls for the removal of Eritrean forces and for all belligerents to cease hostilities,
improve humanitarian access, and cooperate with human rights investigations. It also calls for
Secretary Blinken to urgently determine whether atrocities in Tigray amount to war crimes and
crimes against humanity, and urges targeted sanctions on those responsible for atrocities. Both
resolutions express strong disapproval of the escalation of political tensions into armed conflict.
In March 2021, Senator Chris Coons traveled to Ethiopia at President Biden’s request to convey
the Administration’s “grave concerns about the humanitarian crisis and human rights abuses in
the Tigray region and the risk of broader instability in the Horn.”180 Prime Minister Abiy rejected
a U.S. call conveyed by Senator Coons for a ceasefire, but acknowledged publicly for the first
time that Eritrean troops were in Tigray, asserting that Eritrea had agreed to withdraw them.
The State Department subsequently named former U.S. diplomat and U.N. official Jeffrey
Feltman as the first U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa. Secretary Blinken has described
the appointment as demonstrating the Administration’s commitment to “lead an international
diplomatic effort to address the interlinked political, security, and humanitarian crises in the
Horn,” with Ethiopia among the envoy’s top priorities.181 Feltman has expressed deep concern
about “increasing political and ethnic polarization throughout the country,” and suggested that the
Tigray crisis is “symptomatic of a broader set of national challenges that have imperiled
meaningful reforms.”182 He says the United States will work with partners to secure a ceasefire,
end the conflict, provide humanitarian aid, and hold accountable those responsible for abuses.
The withdrawal of Eritrean forces has been a priority for the Biden Administration, which has
sought to coordinate with like-minded governments on the Tigray crisis. In March, the EU
imposed sanctions on Eritrea’s intelligence agency over human rights violations, after suspending
budget support for Ethiopia over aid access restrictions in Tigray. The Group of Seven (G7)
countries and the EU High Representative have called the presence of foreign forces in Tigray
“deeply disturbing and destabilizing” and pressed for Eritrea’s swift withdrawal.183 The statement
also called for an inclusive political process in Tigray, and a broader inclusive political process in
Ethiopia “to enable credible elections and wider national reconciliation.”

180 Statement by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on Senator Coons Travel to Ethiopia, March 18, 2021.
181 Secretary of State Blinken, “Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa,” April 23, 2021.
182 State Department, Travel by U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Jeffrey Feltman, May 14, 2021.
183 G7 Foreign and Development Ministers’ Meeting: Communique, May 5, 2021.
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U.N. Security Council and African Union Engagement on Tigray
The U.N. Security Council has been unable to reach consensus on Tigray.184 Russia, citing respect for Ethiopia’s
sovereignty, and China have reportedly blocked efforts to put Ethiopia on the Council’s formal agenda. The
Council has held two open briefings on the situation, under the “peace and security in Africa” agenda item. Human
rights groups and some international leaders have called on the Security Council, and the African Union
(headquartered in Ethiopia), to do more.
In November 2020, shortly after the conflict began, then-AU chairman Cyril Ramaphosa deployed three former
African heads of state to Addis Ababa in an effort to resolve the crisis, but Abiy rejected their mediation offer.185
In December, AU Commission head Moussa Faki described Ethiopia’s military operation in Tigray as legitimate,
while noting that the human suffering there was cause for concern.186 AU engagement on the Tigray conflict has
since been muted. Faki and Ethiopia’s foreign minister agreed in March to have an AU entity, the African
Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR), conduct an investigation into human rights abuses in Tigray,
but when the ACHPR launched its commission of inquiry in June, the foreign ministry denounced it as outside the
scope of the government’s invitation—for a joint investigation with an Ethiopian entity—and lacking legal basis.187
The Elders, a group of former world leaders, have called for the AU “to recognize the true gravity of the situation,
and fulfil its mandate to ensure peace and stability on the continent. The spil -over effects of the Tigray conflict,
including the forced displacement of people across borders, directly threaten regional stability.”188 Former Liberian
president El en Johnson Sirleaf, an Elders member, has urged the AU leadership to facilitate a political solution to
the crisis. In late August, former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo was named as the AU High
Representative for the Horn of Africa region. While the war in northern Ethiopia is not specifically cited in his
mandate, he is expected to “intensify” AU engagements to advance peace and stability in the Horn, and African
diplomats say pursuing a peace process in Ethiopia is on his agenda.189
In May, the Biden Administration announced visa restrictions for “current or former Ethiopian or
Eritrean government officials, members of the security forces, or other individuals—to include
Amhara regional and irregular forces and members of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front
(TPLF)—responsible for, or complicit in, undermining resolution of the crisis in Tigray,”
including those who have conducted abuses or hindered aid access.190 “Should those
responsible... fail to reverse course,” the State Department warned, “they should anticipate further
actions from the United States and the international community.”
In August, the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on the Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF)
chief of staff, General Filipos Woldeyohannes, pursuant to Executive Order 13818, which
implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Title XII, Subtitle F of P.L.
114-328).191 The designation is based on his command of the EDF, which the United States has

184 For more on Council dynamics, see, e.g., Security Council Report, “Ethiopia (Tigray): Open Briefing, What’s In
Blue, July 2, 2021 and Richard Gowan, “Learning to live with a limited Security Council, ICG, July 29, 2021.
185 Shewit Woldemichael, “The reality of the AU’s response to crises,” Institute for Security Studies, January 7, 2021.
186 “African Union says Ethiopia acted legitimately in Tigray,” AP, December 21, 2020.
187 Ethiopian MFA, Press Statement, June 17, 2021.
188 The Elders, “The UN and AU must act now to prevent famine and end atrocities in Tigray,” June 14, 2021. See also
a May 2021 letter from José Ramos-Horta, Ban Ki-moon, Danilo Turk, Tarja Halonen, Lakhdar Brahimi, Gunnar
Stålsett, and Adama Dieng at https://thecommunity.com/global-leaders-to-prime-minister-abiy-ahmed-the-letter/.
189 African Union, The Chairperson of the AU Commission appoints former President H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo of
Nigeria as High Representative for the Horn of Africa, August 26, 2021; U.N. Security Council, Statement by
Ambassador Martin Kimani, Permanent Representative of Kenya on Behalf of the A3+1, August 26, 2021.
190 These restrictions were imposed pursuant to authority under Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. See 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(C). State Department, Actions to Press for the Resolution of the Crisis in the
Tigray Region of Ethiopia, May 23, 2021.
191 For background on this sanctions tool see CRS In Focus IF10576, The Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act, by Michael A. Weber and Edward J. Collins-Chase.
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found to be responsible for “massacres, looting and sexual assaults” in Tigray.192 Citing IDP
accounts, the Treasury Department has attributed to the EDF “a systematic effort... to inflict as
much harm on the ethnic Tigrayan population as possible;” the use of sexual violence as a
weapon of war and “a means to terrorize and traumatize the entire population;” and “a ‘scorched
earth’ policy intended to prevent IDPs from returning home.”
The Biden Administration has imposed restrictions on economic and security assistance for
Ethiopia and new defense trade controls, based on the human rights situation in Tigray.193
Humanitarian aid is exempt from the restrictions, as is assistance for health, food security, basic
education, women and girls, human rights and democracy, good governance, and conflict
mitigation (which together compose the bulk of U.S. aid to Ethiopia). The United States is
withholding support for new multilateral development bank lending that does not address basic
human needs and has asked partners to do the same. The conflict and humanitarian crisis could
affect Ethiopia’s African Growth and Opportunity Act eligibility if unaddressed, U.S. trade
officials say. Broad restrictions on assistance to Eritrea were already in place.
“I am deeply concerned by the escalating violence and the hardening of regional and ethnic
divisions in multiple parts of Ethiopia…. Political wounds cannot be healed through force of
arms,” President Biden said in May, urging Ethiopian authorities to promote reconciliation,
human rights, and respect for pluralism.194 The United States has called for withdrawal of Amhara
forces from western Tigray, the TPLF from Amhara and Afar, and Eritrean forces from Ethiopia;
unfettered aid access and an end to the commercial blockade; and a negotiated ceasefire.
U.S. Assistance to Ethiopia
Ethiopia is currently the largest recipient of U.S. humanitarian and development assistance in the
world.195 The United States is Ethiopia’s top humanitarian donor, providing over $650 million in
FY2020 emergency aid and over $893 million to date in FY2021.196 Of these funds, the United
States has provided almost $600 million for the Tigray response since the war began. Separately,
bilateral development and other nonemergency aid totaled over $640 million in FY2019, most of
it for health, development, and food security programs. The Trump Administration allocated over
$700 million in FY2020 bilateral aid, but later “paused” more than $170 million in assistance, as
well as additional prior-year funds (over $270 million was frozen in total) in response to
Ethiopia’s decision to begin filling the GERD without an agreement with the downstream
countries. The Biden Administration delinked the aid suspension from the GERD dispute, but
some funds remain suspended in light of the deteriorating humanitarian and human rights
crisis.197 The Administration has yet to indicate whether DFC engagement will be affected, but it
has suspended security assistance for Ethiopia, citing a consistent pattern of gross human rights
violations by Ethiopia’s government.198 The FY2022 aid request of $304 million does not include
International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding for the first time in years.

192 Treasury Department, Press Release, August 23, 2021.
193 State Department, “United States’ actions to press for the resolution of the crisis in the Tigray region...,” op. cit.
194 White House, Statement by President Joe Biden on the Crisis in Ethiopia, May 26, 2021.
195 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Remarks at a U.N. Security Council Briefing on Ethiopia and the Situation in
Tigray, August 26, 2021.
196 USAID, Ethiopia – Complex Emergency Fact Sheet, Fact Sheet #3 FY 2021, August 9, 2021.
197 “U.S. continues assistance pause to pressure Ethiopia to end Tigray conflict,” VOA News, April 27, 2021.
198 Sec. 116 and Sec. 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended.
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Appendix. Aid Access in Tigray
Figure A-1. Access to People in Need of Food Aid in Tigray
Changes from March to July 2021

Figure A-2. Access to People in Need (Changes by Zone)

Source: OCHA, Tigray: Humanitarian Access Snapshots. Graphs by CRS Research Assistant Sarah R. Col ins and
Amber Wilhelm.
Notes: Figures as of March 31, May 31, and July 12, 2021

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Figure A-3. Changes in Aid Access During the Tigray Conflict

Source: OCHA, Tigray: Humanitarian Access Snapshots
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Author Information

Lauren Ploch Blanchard

Specialist in African Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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Congressional Research Service
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