S.Con.Res. 14: The Budget Resolution for FY2022

S.Con.Res. 14: The Budget Resolution for FY2022

S.Con.Res. 14: The Budget Resolution for
September 1, 2021
FY2022
Megan S. Lynch
In August 2021, the House and Senate adopted S.Con.Res. 14, a budget resolution for FY2022.
Specialist on Congress and
The budget resolution generally represents an agreement between the House and Senate on a
the Legislative Process
budgetary plan for the upcoming fiscal year and allows Congress the ability to employ the budget

reconciliation process.

For Congress to use the reconciliation process, it must first adopt a budget resolution that
includes reconciliation directives. Title II of S.Con.Res. 14 includes reconciliation directives to 25 House and Senate
committees instructing each to develop and report legislation within their jurisdictions increasing or decreasing the deficit by
a specified amount by September 15, 2021.
This report provides a summary of the provisions of S.Con.Res. 14, including the reconciliation directives.

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Contents
Legislative History .................................................................................................... 1
Budgetary Totals ....................................................................................................... 1
Reconciliation Directives ............................................................................................ 2
Reserve Funds........................................................................................................... 5
Other Provisions........................................................................................................ 7

Tables
Table 1. Budgetary Totals Included in S.Con.Res. 14 ............................................................ 2
Table 2. House Committee Reconciliation Instructions in S.Con.Res. 14.................................. 4
Table 3. Senate Committee Reconciliation Instructions in S.Con.Res. 14 ................................. 5

Contacts
Author Information ......................................................................................................... 9

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S.Con.Res. 14: The Budget Resolution for FY2022

General y, the budget resolution establishes an annual agreement between the House and Senate
on budgetary levels for the upcoming fiscal year (and at least four additional years). The budget
resolution does not become law, and no money is spent or collected as a result of its adoption.
Instead, it is an agreement between the House and Senate meant to assist Congress in developing
federal budget policy. It also al ows Congress to trigger and employ a powerful legislative
process referred to as the budget reconciliation process.
In August 2021, the House and Senate adopted S.Con.Res. 14, a budget resolution for FY2022
(the fiscal year that begins October 1, 2021). This report provides a summary of the provisions of
S.Con.Res. 14, including the reconciliation directives.
In February 2021, Congress adopted S.Con.Res. 5, a budget resolution for FY2021. Although
FY2021 began on October 1, 2020, the House and Senate had not yet adopted a budget resolution
for FY2021. When the 117th Congress began on January 3, 2021, an opportunity for a budget
resolution for FY2021, therefore, remained available. Employing a budget resolution for the
fiscal year that had already begun al owed Congress to maximize use of the budget reconciliation
process in calendar year 2021. S.Con.Res. 5 triggered the reconciliation process, under which the
American Rescue Plan Act (P.L. 117-2) was developed. For more information on that budget
resolution, see CRS Report R46675, S.Con.Res. 5: The Budget Resolution for FY2021, by Megan
S. Lynch and James V. Saturno.
Legislative History
S.Con.Res. 14 was introduced on August 9, 2021, and referred to the Senate Budget Committee,
which was automatical y discharged from consideration of the resolution pursuant to Section 300
of the Congressional Budget Act (P.L. 93-344, as amended).1 The next day, the Senate agreed to a
motion to proceed to the consideration of S.Con.Res. 14 by a vote of 50-49. The measure was
considered by the Senate on August 10 and into the early morning of August 11. Twenty-nine
amendments were agreed to before the Senate ultimately adopted S.Con.Res. 14 by a vote of 50-
49 on August 11.
On August 24, the House Rules Committee reported H.Res. 601, which stated that upon adoption
of H.Res. 601, the budget resolution S.Con.Res. 14 would automatical y be adopted. This meant
that S.Con.Res. 14 could be agreed to by the House without requiring a separate vote on its
adoption. H.Res. 601 was adopted later that day, on August 24, by a vote of 220-212.
Budgetary Totals
A budget resolution is required to include levels of budget authority, outlays, revenue, deficits,
and debt for the upcoming budget year2 and at least four additional years.3 Once the budget
resolution has been agreed to by both chambers, certain levels contained in it may be enforced

1 By precedent, if the Senate Budget Committee has not reported a budget resolution by April 1, as set out in Section
300, the committee will be discharged from consideration of any resolution referred to it . Floyd M. Riddick and Alan S.
Frumin, Riddick’s Senate Procedure: Precedents and Practices, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., S.Doc. 101-28 (Washington:
GPO, 1992), p. 599. For more information, see CRS Insight IN11693, The Budget Resolution and the Senate’s
Autom atic Discharge Process, by James V. Saturno and Megan S. Lynch .
2 Generally, the budget year refers to the upcoming fiscal year but may refer to the fiscal year already in progress if the
budget resolution is adopted after the start of the fiscal year on October 1.
3 In current practice, it is typical for budget resolutions to cover a 10-year period, although they are required to cover
only five years.
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through points of order.4 Budgetary levels that are enforceable include spending and revenue
aggregates as wel as committee spending al ocations.5 Certain budgetary totals included in
S.Con.Res. 14 are included below in Table 1.
The levels in the budget resolution represent federal aggregates and do not include programmatic
spending details. Assumptions concerning some major programs may be noted in documents
accompanying the budget resolution, but these assumptions are not binding on the committees of
jurisdiction.6
Table 1. Budgetary Totals Included in S.Con.Res. 14
In mil ions of dol ars
Debt Held by the
Fiscal Year
Revenues
Outlays
Deficits
Public
2022
$3,401,380
$4,698,391
$1,297,011
$24,622,000
2023
$3,512,947
$4,671,457
$1,158,510
$25,826,000
2024
$3,542,298
$4,714,709
$1,172,411
$27,153,000
2025
$3,565,871
$4,936,110
$1,370,239
$28,678,000
2026
$3,773,174
$5,087,789
$1,314,615
$30,219,000
2027
$3,995,160
$5,288,850
$1,293,690
$31,776,000
2028
$4,090,582
$5,635,713
$1,545,131
$33,737,000
2029
$4,218,130
$5,667,301
$1,449,171
$35,521,000
2030
$4,352,218
$6,024,068
$1,671,850
$37,692,000
2031
$4,505,614
$6,322,190
$1,816,576
$39,987,000
Source: S.Con.Res. 14, Title I.
Reconciliation Directives
If Congress intends to use the reconciliation process, reconciliation directives (also referred to as
reconciliation instructions) must be included in the budget resolution. These directives instruct
individual committees in the House and Senate to develop and report legislation that would
change laws within their jurisdictions to accomplish a specific budgetary goal. Such

4 T his means that if legislation is being considered on the House or Senate floor that would violate certain levels
contained in the budget resolution, a Member may raise a point of order against the consideration of that legislation.
Points of order can be raised against bills, resolutions, amendments, or conference reports. If such a point of order is
raised against legislation for violating levels in the budget resolution, the presiding officer makes a ruling on the point
of order based on estimates provided by the relevant budget committee. T he process for waiving points of order varies
by chamber. Generally, such points of order can be waived in the House by a simple majority of Members and in the
Senate by three-fifths of all Senators.
5 T he Budget Act requires that the budget resolution allocate total spending among committees, typically referred to as
302(a) allocations. T he allocations act as a limit on the total spending within a specific committee’s jurisdiction and are
required to be included in the joint explanatory statement accompanying the conference report on the budget resolution.
Section 4006 of S.Con.Res. 14 requires that if a budget resolution is adopted without the House and Senate engaging in
a conference committee (and therefore issuing a joint explanatory statement) , the House and Senate budget committee
chairs must submit a statement for publication in the Congressional Record establishing committee allocations.
6 For example, see Senate Committee on the Budget, Committee Print to Accompany S.Con.Res. 14, August 2021,
Senate Print 117-16.
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reconciliation legislation is then eligible to be considered under special expedited procedures in
both the House and Senate. These procedures are especial y important in the Senate, as they
include a 20-hour limit on debate time and therefore mean that a reconciliation bil does not
require the support of three-fifths of Senators to bring debate to a close.7
Title II of S.Con.Res. 14 includes reconciliation directives to 25 House and Senate committees
instructing them each to develop and report legislation within their jurisdictions increasing or
decreasing the deficit by a specified amount. House and Senate committees and their specified
budgetary instruction are listed below in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively. Each committee is
directed to submit its legislative recommendations to its chamber’s Budget Committee, which is
then to package the committee responses into an omnibus budget reconciliation bil and report the
measure to its respective chamber without “any substantive revision.”8
S.Con.Res. 14 directs the specified House and Senate committees to submit their legislative text
to the Budget Committees of their respective chambers not later than September 15, 2021.9 There
is no procedural mechanism for requiring a committee to report reconciliation legislation in
response to its directive. Each chamber, however, may employ methods of moving forward with
reconciliation legislation and include legislative language that fal s within the non-reporting
committee’s jurisdiction in the event that the committee has not reported by the September 15
deadline.10
The directives to the 12 Senate committees total $1.75 tril ion in potential deficit increases over
the 10-year period, while the directives to the 13 House committees total approximately $1.975
tril ion in potential deficit increases over the 10-year period. The House Budget Committee has
indicated that the “total of Committee instructions does not equal the total cost of the package
because the instructions reflect offsets and overlapping jurisdictions.”11
The reconciliation directives included in S.Con.Res. 14 specify the dollar amount by which
reconciliation legislation should alter deficit levels. Directives to reduce the deficit (given only to
the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance in S.Con.Res.
14) include a dollar amount that in practice is considered a minimum amount of deficit reduction,

7 For more information on the reconciliation process, see CRS Report R44058, The Budget Reconciliation Process:
Stages of Consideration, by Megan S. Lynch and James V. Saturno.
8 Pursuant to Section 310(b)(2) of the Budget Act. In fulfilling this requirement, the Budget Committee will typically
hold a business meeting before voting to report t o the chamber, and while amendments are not in order during the
markup, members of the Budget Committee may still communicate support or concern related to the underlying
legislation.
9 Historically, most committees have responded to their reconciliation directives by the date specified, but the Budget
Committee may wait for additional committees to respond to their directives, if necessary, with no impact on the
privileged status of the reconciliation bill. For more, see CRS Report R41186, Reconciliation Directives: Com ponents
and Enforcem ent, by Megan S. Lynch; and CRS Report R41151, Budget Reconciliation Process: Tim ing of Com m ittee
Responses to Reconciliation Directives, by Megan S. Lynch.
10 In the House, if a committee has not responded to a reconciliation directive, Section 310(d)(5) of the Budget Act
states that the House Rules Committee may make in order amendments to a reconciliation bill to satisfy reconciliation
directives if a committee has not submitted reconciliation legislation. In the Senate, if a committee has not responded to
a reconciliation directive, it may still be possible to consider reconciliation legislation on the Senate f loor that would
satisfy the committee’s directive. For example, by precedent, it would be in order for a Senator to offer a motion to
recommit the bill to that committee with instructions that it report the measure back to the Senate forthwith with an
amendment. Unlike amendments to the reconciliation bill, the motion to recommit would not have to be germane if it
were made in this situation.
11 U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Budget, The 2022 Budget Resolution and Reconciliation: How We Will
Build Back Better, 117th Cong., 1st sess., August 2021, https://budget.house.gov/publications/report/2022-budget-
resolution-and-reconciliation.
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sometimes referred to as a floor, meaning that the committees may report greater deficit reduction
but not less. Conversely, directives to increase deficits are considered a maximum, sometimes
referred to as a ceiling, meaning that the committees may report legislation with lower levels of
deficit increases but not greater. It should also be noted that compliance with reconciliation
instructions is measured on a net basis. This means that a committee’s response might include
both deficit increases and deficit decreases so long as, taken as a whole, the legislative text is in
compliance with the instruction. For example, in this case the House Committee on Ways and
Means received an instruction to reduce the deficit by at least $1 bil ion. The committee could,
therefore, include in its response legislation that would increase spending by any amount so long
as there were corresponding offsets included that would reduce the deficit by at least $1 bil ion.
Al of the reconciliation directives in S.Con.Res. 14 are framed in terms of increasing or
decreasing the deficit and do not include directives related to amending the public debt level. It is,
therefore, not anticipated that any resulting reconciliation bil would include an adjustment to the
public debt limit.12
Table 2. House Committee Reconciliation Instructions in S.Con.Res. 14
To submit to the House Budget Committee by September 15, 2021
Committee
Budgetary Direction
Amount
Agriculture
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$89.10 bil ion
Education and Labor
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$779.50 bil ion
Energy and Commerce
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$486.50 bil ion
Financial Services
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$339.00 bil ion
Homeland Security
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$0.50 bil ion
Judiciary
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$107.50 bil ion
Natural Resources
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$25.60 bil ion
Oversight and Reform
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$7.50 bil ion
Science, Space, and Technology
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$45.51 bil ion
Smal Business
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$17.50 bil ion
Transportation and Infrastructure
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$60.00 bil ion
Veterans Affairs
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$18.00 bil ion
Ways and Means
 Decrease the deficit by not less than
$1.00 bil ion
Total Potential Deficit
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$1.975 trillion
Change
Source: S.Con.Res. 14, §2002.
Note: Committees are instructed to increase or decrease the deficit by such amounts over the period of
FY2022-FY2031.

12 If such a reconciliation bill were to include changes to the debt limit, it may cause the reconciliation bill to lose its
privilege in the Senate or be in violation of the Senate’s Byrd rule. For related floor debate, see Senator Domenici,
Congressional Record, daily edition, October 17, 1986, p. 33257. For more information on the Senate’s Byrd rule, see
CRS Report RL30862, The Budget Reconciliation Process: The Senate’s “Byrd Rule”, by Bill Heniff Jr.
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Table 3. Senate Committee Reconciliation Instructions in S.Con.Res. 14
To submit to the Senate Budget Committee by September 15, 2021
Committee
Budgetary Direction
Amount
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$135.000 bil ion
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$332.000 bil ion
Commerce, Science, and Transportation
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$83.076 bil ion
Energy and Natural Resources
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$198.000 bil ion
Environment and Public Works
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$67.264 bil ion
Finance
 Decrease the deficit by not less than
$1.000 bil ion
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$726.380 bil ion
Homeland Security and Government Affairs
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$37.000 bil ion
Indian Affairs
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$20.500 bil ion
Judiciary
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$107.500 bil ion
Smal Business and Entrepreneurship
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$25.000 bil ion
Veterans Affairs
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$18.000 bil ion
Total Potential Deficit Increase
 Increase the deficit by no more than
$1.749 trillion
Source: S.Con.Res. 14, §2001.
Note: Committees are instructed to increase or decrease the deficit by such amounts over the period of
FY2022-FY2031.
Reserve Funds
Congress frequently includes “reserve funds” in the annual budget resolution. These provisions
are not technical y reserves or funds but instead give the chairs of the House or Senate budget
committees the authority to adjust the budgetary levels included in the budget resolution in the
future if the chamber is considering a specified legislative policy. General y, the procedural effect
of a reserve fund is to al ow certain legislative policies to be considered on the floor without
triggering a point of order for violating levels in the budget resolution. Often, reserve funds
require that the net budgetary impact of the specified future legislation not increase the deficit and
are referred to as “deficit neutral” reserve funds.
While reserve funds may have a budget procedure effect, they do not provide funding for any
specific policy. Additional y, they do not require Congress to include such a policy in future
legislation, nor do they prohibit Congress from taking future action on a policy. They have
sometimes been characterized as a way for Senators to receive a non-binding vote on a certain
policy or to signal support (or lack of support) for a certain policy, in the same manner as a “sense
of the Senate” provision.13

13 Paul M. Krawzak, “Biden Coronavirus Relief Plan Clears Senate Budget Hurdle After ‘Vote-a-Rama’,” Roll Call,
February 5, 2021. Senators have sometimes expressed concern regarding reserve funds and whether their presence
would result in a situation in which legislative questions, which would otherwise have required a three-fifths threshold
in the Senate, could be agreed to with only a simple majority. Such a reserve fund provision, however, would have an
impact only on whether a budgetary point of order could be made. It would not affect the Senate’s other rules and
procedural requirements, such as the cloture process, and the possibility that the measure would need three -fifths of the
Senate to agree to end debate on a legislative question, such as final passage. A colloquy on this subject occurred on the
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Title III of S.Con.Res. 14 includes more than 30 reserve funds, most of which apply solely in the
Senate (see below). Two reserve funds apply in both the House and the Senate. One al ows the
House and Senate budget committee chairs to adjust budgetary levels in the resolution to
accommodate a reconciliation bil developed pursuant to the reconciliation instructions included
in the budget resolution. In addition, the provision exempts such a reconciliation bil from other
budgetary chamber rules.14 Another reserve fund al ows the House and Senate budget committee
chairs to adjust budgetary levels in the resolution to accommodate unspecified legislation that
would not increase the deficit over the period of FY2022-FY2031.
Other Senate reserve funds were also included in S.Con.Res. 14. These provisions provide the
Senate Budget Committee chair with the authority to adjust the budgetary levels included in the
budget resolution in the future if the chamber is considering certain legislative policy. Such
legislative policy is described in S.Con.Res. 14 as legislation that would:
 not raise taxes on people making less than $400,000;
 prohibit the Green New Deal;
 address the crisis of climate change;
 support privately held businesses, farms, and ranches;
 promote U.S. competitiveness and innovation by supporting research and
development;
 protect taxpayer privacy while ensuring those evading the tax system pay what
they owe;
 prohibit the Council on Environmental Quality and the Environmental Protection
Agency from promulgating rules or guidance that bans fracking in the United
States;
 facilitate improved internet service for Cuban citizens;
 adjust federal funding for local jurisdictions;
 honor the Capitol Police, the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police, and first
responders;
 support or expedite the deployment of carbon capture, utilization, and
sequestration technologies;
 prohibit the Department of Agriculture from making fossil-fuel-burning plants
ineligible for financing;
 relate to the provisions of the American Rescue Plan;
 relate to means-testing electric vehicle tax credits;

Senate floor. Senators Portman and Murray, “ Budget Act Section 114(c),” Congressional Record, daily edition, vol.
160, part 2 (January 7, 2014), p. S67. For more information on the cloture process, see CRS Report 98-425, Invoking
Cloture in the Senate, by Christopher M. Davis.
14 In the House, Section 3002(b)(2) provides that any reconciliation bill would be exempt from the House PAYGO rule
(House Rule XXI, clause 10). For more information on the House PAYGO rule, see CRS Report R41510, Budget
Enforcem ent Procedures: House Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) Rule, by Bill Heniff Jr. In the Senate, Section 3002(a)
provides an exemption from the Senate PAYGO rule as well as the Senate’s short -term deficit point of order and long-
term deficit point of order. For more information on those points of order, see CRS Report RL31943, Budget
Enforcem ent Procedures: The Senate Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) Rule, by Bill Heniff Jr., and CRS Report 97-865,
Points of Order in the Congressional Budget Process, by James V. Saturno.
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 relate to, prohibit, or limit the issuance of costly Clean Air Act permit
requirements on framers and ranchers in the United States or the imposition of
new federal requirements on livestock;
 fund the Office of Foreign Assets Control;
 relate to abortion funding;
 ensure robust, secure, and humane supply chains sourced by the United States
and its al ies for renewable energy materials, technology, and critical minerals;
 prohibit funding to purchase materials, technology, and critical minerals
produced, manufactured, or mined with forced labor;
 relate to Great Lakes ice-breaking operational improvements;
 relate to immigration enforcement and addressing the humanitarian crisis at the
southern border;
 provide quality education for children;
 relate to hiring 100,000 new police officers;
 prevent electricity blackouts and improve electricity reliability;
 protect migrant and local communities against COVID-19;
 relate to studying and providing for tax equivalency under the payments-in-lieu-
of-taxes program;
 prevent tax increases on smal businesses;
 provide sufficient resources to detain and deport a higher number of aliens who
have been convicted of crimes; or
 maintain the current law tax treatment of like kind exchanges.
Other Provisions
S.Con.Res. 14 includes various other procedural provisions, some of which are commonly
included in a budget resolution. S.Con.Res. 14 includes the following:
 A provision stating that the budgetary effects of spending designated as an
emergency “shal not count” for the purposes of enforcing budgetary rules in the
House and Senate. It also removes the previous ability of a Senator to raise a
point of order against an emergency designation.15
 Provisions related to points of order in the House and Senate prohibiting advance
appropriations with certain exceptions.16
 Provisions granting the chairs of the House or Senate budget committees the
authority to adjust the budgetary levels included in the budget resolution for
legislation providing appropriations for continuing disability reviews and
redeterminations, Internal Revenue Service enforcement;, health care fraud and
abuse control, reemployment services and eligibility assessments, wildfire
suppression, disaster relief, and veterans’ medical care.17

15 S.Con.Res. 14, §4001. T he previous Senate rule was in Section 4112, H.Con.Res. 71. Section 314(e) of the Budget
Act provides the authority for any Senator to raise a point of order against an emergency designation related to the
discretionary spending limits, which are no longer in effect after FY2021.
16 S.Con.Res. 14, §4002 and §4003.
17 S.Con.Res. 14, §4004 and §4005.
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 A provision relating to committee spending al ocations. The Budget Act requires
that the budget resolution al ocate total spending among committees, typical y
referred to as 302(a) al ocations. The al ocations act as a limit on the total
spending within a specific committee’s jurisdiction and are required to be
included in the joint explanatory statement accompanying the conference report
on the budget resolution. This provision states that in the event that S.Con.Res.
14 were agreed to without the House and Senate engaging in a conference
committee (and therefore issuing a joint explanatory statement) the House and
Senate Budget Committee chairs must submit a statement for publication in the
Congressional Record establishing committee al ocations.18
 A provision specifying the timing of when any adjustments of budgetary levels
made by the House and Senate budget committee chairs (pursuant to authority
granted in the resolution) should occur and requiring that the adjustments be
published in the Congressional Record as soon as practicable. The provision also
specifies that for the purposes of enforcing the budgetary levels in the resolution,
budgetary amounts are determined on the basis of estimates made by the House
and Senate budget committee chairs.19
 A provision granting authority to the House and Senate budget committee chairs
to make adjustments to the budget resolution to account for changes in concepts
and definitions.20
 Provisions granting authority to the House and Senate budget committee chairs to
make adjustments to the budget resolution to reflect budgetary changes resulting
from the enactment of specified infrastructure legislation.21
 A provision stating that the adjustments provided in the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 901(b)) shal not apply to the
levels established pursuant to this concurrent resolution.22
 A provision requiring that the House and Senate appropriations committees
receive separate al ocations for discretionary administrative expenses of off-
budget entities (the Social Security Administration and the U.S. Postal Service).23
 A provision granting to the House Budget Committee chair the authority to adjust
budgetary levels in accordance with the budget resolution.24
 A provision granting authority to the House Budget Committee chair to make
adjustments to the budget resolution to account for changes resulting from
updates from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to its baseline for FY2022-
FY2031.25

18 S.Con.Res. 14, §4006. Requirements associated with 302(a) allocations can be found in Section 301(e)(2) of the
Budget Act.
19 S.Con.Res. 14, §4007.
20 S.Con.Res. 14, §4008.
21 S.Con.Res. 14, §4009 and 4010.
22 S.Con.Res. 14, §4011.
23 S.Con.Res. 14, §4012.
24 S.Con.Res. 14, §4013.
25 S.Con.Res. 14, §4014.
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 A provision stating that during the 117th Congress, in the Senate, for the purposes
of cost estimates for non-discretionary spending legislation related to any child
care or pre-kindergarten legislation, CBO shal assume that funding for programs
under the Head Start Act continue at baseline levels.26
 A provision noting that the budget resolution is being adopted as an exercise of
Congress’s constitutional rulemaking authority and should therefore be
considered as if it were a part of the rules of the House and Senate.27

Author Information

Megan S. Lynch

Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process

Acknowledgments
James V. Saturno contributed significant analysis and recordkeeping. This report draws on
information provided in CRS Report R46675, S.Con.Res. 5: The Budget Resolution for FY2021,
by Megan S. Lynch and James V. Saturno.

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
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26 S.Con.Res. 14 §4015.
27 S.Con.Res. 14 §4016.
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