Inflation in the Wake of COVID-19

Inflation in the Wake of COVID-19

Inflation in the Wake of COVID-19
September 1, 2021
The Federal Reserve defines stable prices to be inflation (the general rise in the price of goods
and services) of 2% annually. After decades of low inflation, inflation has been above the Fed’s
Marc Labonte
2% target since March 2021 and is projected to exceed 3% for 2021 as a whole.
Specialist in
Macroeconomic Policy
For inflation to be problematic from a policy perspective, the increase has to be sustained and

sizeable. To date, the increase has arguably not met either criteria, although some inflation
Lida R. Weinstock
measures are higher than others. The Fed and other forecasters project that inflation will return to
around the Fed’s 2% target in 2022 under current policy. Critics believe these forecasts are too
Analyst in Macroeconomic
Policy
optimistic for a number of reasons, including the proposed path of fiscal and monetary policy and

changing expectations.

Some of the causes of the recent increase in inflation relate to the disruptions to supply caused by
the COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing consumer spending rebound in certain sectors. As such, there are reasons to believe
that some of these price pressures are temporary. Nevertheless, there are concerns that higher inflation could become
sustained if the rapid rates of gross domestic product (GDP) growth experienced since the second half of 2020 cause the
economy to overheat and inflationary expectations rise. At present, the economy is still operating below its potential, but the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that output could exceed potential by 2022 if rapid growth continues. Overall
employment is still below pre-pandemic levels, and overall wages are not rising faster than inflation, but certain industries
have experienced labor shortages that could be indicative of an overheating economy if they became widespread.
Unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus helped an economy where output fell by about one-third due to COVID-19.
Keeping fiscal and monetary stimulus in place helps insure against the risk of the recovery faltering, particularly in light of
the emergence of the Delta variant. But there is also the risk that keeping st imulus in place when the economy is now
growing rapidly could contribute to an overheating economy that leads to a sustained increase in inflation. The Fed has
signaled that it intends to keep stimulative monetary policy in place for the time being. Fiscal policy is scheduled to start
unwinding this year under current law, but fiscal packages that have seen legislative action (such as and the Senate -passed
version of) could potentially add more stimulus, depending on the details.
Prior to the pandemic, the Fed’s focus had shifted from a concern that inflation would be too high to a concern that it would
persistently be too low, as inflation had repeatedly fallen short of its 2% target since the 2007-2009 “Great Recession.” In
2020, the Fed announced that it would tolerate periods of inflation above 2% following periods below 2% in order to achieve
an average inflation target of 2% over time. As such, inflation in the 3% range in 2021 would help bring average inflation
closer to its target. This may help explain why the Fed has not tightened monetary policy in response to higher inflation.
History provides mixed examples of periods where inflation has and has not been easily contained by policymakers. Inflation
was high during World War II and the Korean War but fell rapidly afterward. In the “Great Inflation,” from the mid -1960s to
the early-1980s, a series of supply shocks, changes in inflation expectations, and a failure to sufficiently tighten monetary
policy ultimately resulted in double-digit inflation. Inflation fell only after a long and deep downturn featuring very high
interest rates. Since then, inflation has been consistently low, and a moderate rise in inflation in one year has not been
predictably followed by higher inflation in the next year. The last time inflation was above average for a number of months
was 2008; by 2009, prices had fallen slightly (called deflation). A key difference between the Great Inflation and now is tha t
inflationary expectations of individuals have been relatively low, although they have risen modestly this year.

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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
What Is Inflation? ........................................................................................................... 1
Costs of Inflation ............................................................................................................ 2
Anticipated vs. Unanticipated Costs ............................................................................. 3
Distributional Costs ................................................................................................... 4
Optimal Level of Inflation........................................................................................... 4
What Causes Inflation? .................................................................................................... 5
Demand-Pull Inflation ................................................................................................ 5
The Role of Monetary Policy in Responding to Inflation ............................................ 6
Cost-Push Inflation .................................................................................................... 6
Expectations ............................................................................................................. 7
Inflation Trends .............................................................................................................. 8
“Great Inflation” ....................................................................................................... 8
Wars ...................................................................................................................... 10
1980s-2020............................................................................................................. 11
Current Outlook............................................................................................................ 13
Effect of Pandemic Disruptions.................................................................................. 13
An Overheating Economy? ....................................................................................... 15
The Post-Pandemic Labor Market .............................................................................. 17
Inflation Expectations ......................................................................................... 20
Fiscal and Monetary Stimulus.................................................................................... 20
Conclusion................................................................................................................... 23

Figures
Figure 1. Annual Inflation, 1960-1983 ................................................................................ 8
Figure 2. Annual Inflation, 1939-1959 .............................................................................. 11
Figure 3. Annual Inflation, 1984-2020 .............................................................................. 12
Figure 4. Projected Output Gap, 2019:Q4-2022:Q4 ............................................................ 16
Figure 5. Employment and Unemployment Situation .......................................................... 17
Figure 6. Nominal Average Hourly Earnings ..................................................................... 19
Figure 7. Real Average Hourly Earnings ........................................................................... 19

Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 23

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Inflation in the Wake of COVID-19

Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to many unexpected and unprecedented economic
developments.1 One of those developments is higher price inflation than the United States has
experienced in recent decades. According to several measures, including the Consumer Price
Index (CPI) and the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) Index, prices have risen more
rapidly than usual on both a monthly and an annual basis for several months, most notably since
March 2021. CPI inflation is the more commonly cited measure in the media, whereas PCE
inflation is the Federal Reserve’s preferred measure. PCE inflation is typical y somewhat lower
than CPI inflation but nonetheless has also been relatively high of late—the last time PCE
inflation ran as high as it has been during 2021 was 2008. For 2021 as a whole, Federal Reserve
leadership is projecting that PCE inflation wil be between 3% and 3.9%.2 This is comparable to
projections by private sector economists and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).
Inflation is a policy concern for Congress in multiple ways. First, higher prices affect spending on
government programs and the capacity of government programs at a given spending level.
Second, high inflation is unpopular with the general public because it erodes purchasing power.
Third, rising inflation might be a leading signal of an overheating economy.3 As such, an
infrastructure bil (the Senate-passed version of H.R. 3684) and a budget resolution (S.Con.Res.
14) that would al ow for a $3.5 tril ion budget reconciliation bil have seen legislative action in
2021, and Congress has debated their potential effects on inflation. Final y, Congress has
oversight responsibilities for the Federal Reserve, and Congress has mandated that the Fed
achieve stable prices.4 Inflation is currently higher than the 2% threshold that the Fed has chosen
as its definition of price stability.
But is al inflation undesirable in al circumstances? The consensus view among economists is
that inflation warrants a policy response only if it is high and sustained—exactly how high and
for how long is open to debate. If the Fed’s projections are correct, inflation wil return to around
2% by 2022, making the current increase temporary, modest over the year as a whole, and self-
correcting. Some critics believe that the Fed is being too optimistic, however, and that a monetary
and fiscal policy course correction are necessary now to avoid high inflation becoming endemic.
This report begins by explaining what inflation is and how it is measured. It then discusses the
costs of inflation, as wel as the costs of inflation being too low. Next, it discusses the potential
causes of inflation. Then it discusses the history of inflation in the United States since World War
II. Final y, it analyzes the causes and implications of the current situation and prospects for future
inflation.
What Is Inflation?
Inflation refers to the general increase in the price of goods and services (not including asset
prices) across the economy. As inflation occurs, individuals can purchase fewer goods and
services with the same amount of money—thus, inflation can also be thought of as a general
decrease in the value of money. Measures of inflation are used to adjust monetary figures to keep

1 See CRS Report R46606, COVID-19 and the U.S. Economy, by Lida R. Weinstock.
2 Federal Reserve, Summary of Economic Projections, June 16, 2021, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
files/fomcprojtabl20210616.pdf.
3 See CRS Report R45723, Fiscal Policy: Economic Effects, by Lida R. Weinstock.
4 See CRS In Focus IF11751, Introduction to U.S. Economy: Monetary Policy, by Marc Labonte.
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purchasing power constant over time, al owing for more accurate comparisons across disparate
time periods. Monetary figures that have been adjusted for inflation are referred to as real, and
non-inflation-adjusted figures are referred to as nominal.
The rate of inflation can be measured by observing changes in the average price of a consistent
set of goods and services, often referred to as a market basket. Inflation is general y measured
using a price index, such as the CPI or PCE. A price index was constructed by dividing the price
of a market basket in a given year by the price of the basket in a base year. Chain weighting
considers changes in spending habits. The rate of inflation is then measured by calculating the
percentage change in the price index across different periods.5
Different price indices use different goods and services within their market baskets and are
general y used for different purposes. For example, CPI includes consumer goods and services
typical y purchased by households, which is often used to adjust household income over time. By
contrast, the gross domestic product (GDP) deflator, which is general y used to adjust GDP for
inflation over time, measures inflation for al final goods and services produced in the United
States. Likewise, PCE measures inflation for al final goods and services purchased by consumers
in the United States. Because of methodological differences, inflation as measured by CPI is
slightly higher than as measured by PCE. PCE inflation is the Federal Reserve’s preferred
measure of inflation. There are a number of additional measures of inflation, including the
Producer Price Index, Employment Cost Index, and Import/Export Price Index. For the purposes
of this report, PCE inflation wil be used moving forward.
Inflation is often characterized by one of two measurements: headline inflation or core inflation.
Headline inflation includes the full set of goods and services within a given market basket,
whereas core inflation excludes energy and food prices. Researchers often use core inflation in
place of headline inflation due to the volatile nature of the price of food and energy, which can
mask the longer-term trends in headline inflation that concern policymakers and economists.
However, headline inflation can provide a more accurate sense of the price changes that
individuals actual y face.6
As inflation measures the general increases in prices across the economy, a change in price of any
single good or service does not equate to overal inflation. However, goods and services in a
particular basket are given different weights to convey the relative importance of that item to the
overal economy. For example, a category of greater relative importance to the economy, such as
food, wil be weighted more heavily in determining overal inflation than a category of lesser
importance, such as apparel.7
Costs of Inflation
In general, inflation can be costly to the economy—especial y when it is unexpected—because it
tends to interfere with pricing mechanisms in the economy, resulting in individuals and
businesses making less than optimal spending, saving, and investment decisions. Additional y,
economic actors often engage in actions to protect themselves from the negative impacts of
inflation, diverting resources from other, more productive activities.

5 See CRS In Focus IF10477, Introduction to U.S. Economy: Inflation, by Lida R. Weinstock.
6 See CRS In Focus IF10477, Introduction to U.S. Economy: Inflation, by Lida R. Weinstock.
7 Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Consumer Price Data, https://www.clevelandfed.org/our-research/center-for-
inflation-research/consumer-price-data.aspx.
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Note that some of the costs of inflation also apply to deflation (fal ing prices), although they may
manifest themselves in different ways. Most economists believe deflation to be even more costly
to the economy than inflation is, as it is often associated with recessionary conditions, and
therefore a smal amount of inflation is considered to be ideal so as to make potential deflation
less likely.
This section describes several potential types of costs of inflation and the difficulty in measuring
some of these costs. Many costs of inflation wil increase the higher or more sustained the
inflation is. The discussion that follows provides a general description of potential costs, which
may be felt more or less keenly depending on the particular circumstances.8 In a case where
inflation rises only temporarily and moderately, the costs described below would be expected to
be modest.
Anticipated vs. Unanticipated Costs
Some costs are incurred only when inflation is unanticipated, while other costs arise even when
the inflation is fully anticipated. When unanticipated, price signals can become misinterpreted,
and this can reduce economic efficiency. But once individuals adjust to the new higher inflation
rate, accurate price signals are restored, and so this cost is only temporary. Individuals can
safeguard themselves against some of the effects of inflation if they expected the inflation. For
example, if inflation is expected to rise, workers can demand an increase in nominal wages, or
lenders can require that the interest rate they receive be tied to the rate of inflation in some way.
In reality, inflation is never entirely predictable, and, as such, individuals and businesses tend to
attempt to put safeguards in place, especial y when inflation is high. Some costs occur only
because of the absence of appropriate safeguards: for example, the absence of indexed contracts.
In a fully indexed economy—one in which al contracts are adjusted for changes in the price
level—inflation can impose only two real costs: the less efficient arrangement of transactions that
result from holding smal er money balances and the necessity to change posted prices more
frequently (“menu costs”).9 Both individuals and businesses hold money balances in cash or bank
accounts because it al ows each to arrange transactions in an optimum or least costly way (e.g.,
for business this involves paying employees, holding inventories, bil ing customers, maintaining
working balances) and to provide security against an uncertain future. Holding wealth or assets in
a money form, however, incurs an opportunity cost—that is, what is given up when one action is
taken opposed to another. The opportunity cost of holding money is the nominal interest rate
(equal to the real interest rate plus the inflation rate) that could be earned if the excess money
were used to purchase an interest earning asset. Thus, when the rate of inflation rises, holding
money becomes more costly. Individuals and businesses then attempt to get by with smal er
money balances. For businesses, this may mean bil ing customers more frequently. For
employees, it may mean demanding to be paid more frequently. The new patterns are less
efficient: They use more time or more resources to effect a given transaction. Similarly, efficiency
is lost when more time and resources are used to frequently adjust prices to match inflation. This
is an example of a permanent cost of inflation, which rises as inflation rises.

8 Richard G. Anderson, Inflation’s Economic Cost: How Large? How Certain?, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
July 1, 2006, https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/july-2006/inflations-economic-cost-how-
large-how-certain.
9 T o some extent, the advent of certain technologies have decreased menu costs. T he name comes from the costs of
restaurants to print new menus—which, prior to personal computing, would have to have been contracted out to a
printing service—but refers more generally to the costs to producers of changing their nominal prices.
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In an economy that is not fully indexed, inflation can lower the real value of income and the real
rate of return on investments, both of which can distort incentives for individuals to work and
businesses to grow their capital. For example, some parts of the tax system are indexed for
inflation, but others are not. Consider what happens to the real after-tax rate of return on business
capital during inflation. For tax purposes, the depreciation of business plant and equipment is
based on actual or historical costs. When inflation rises, charging depreciation based on historical
cost raises the nominal profits of businesses and the basis on which corporate profits taxes are
levied. As a result, the after-tax real rate of return fal s, and this discourages businesses from
adding to their stock of plant, equipment, and structures—a basis for future economic growth.
This is another example of a permanent cost associated with higher inflation.
Distributional Costs
Costs of inflation to individuals may not impose a burden on the overal economy because they
are in the nature of a redistribution of either income or wealth: What is lost by some is gained by
others. Nevertheless, these redistributions can have real effects on the individuals affected.
According to the Bank of International Settlements, that redistribution is likely to be regressive
from lower income households to higher income households, because the latter are more capable
of protecting themselves against inflation.10 The bank’s logic states that relatively low income
households largely hold their savings as cash (which earns no return and thus has a value that
fal s by the full rate of inflation) or in bank accounts (which typical y earn no or low returns
unlikely to keep up with inflation), whereas relatively high income households avail themselves
of a wider array of investment options, a number of which better control for inflation or have
values that typical y rise along with prevailing inflation.
In addition to savers, there is some amount of real redistribution of wealth felt by lenders and
borrowers when inflation increases. Inflation lessens the value of money and therefore can be
seen to benefit borrowers in the case where the terms of repayment do not account for inflation—
the borrower, for al intents and purposes, wil pay the lender back with money that is worth less
than it was when the money was first borrowed.
Optimal Level of Inflation
Many economists have argued that low and stable inflation is conducive to higher long-term
economic growth, because it minimizes the costs of inflation and reduces the risk of costly
deflationary periods.11 How exactly to define low and stable is subject to debate. High levels of
inflation are clearly not optimal. For example, economies experiencing hyperinflation (when
annual inflation reaches triple or quadruple digits) have historical y experienced costly
disruptions to the normal functioning of the economy. However, there is little consensus among
economists over whether, say, 0%, 2%, or 4% inflation is preferable, although there is general y
agreement that stable and predictable inflation is preferable. Since 2012, the Federal Reserve has
identified an average inflation rate of 2% (as measured by the PCE) as optimal.12 In practice,

10 Bank for International Settlements, Annual Economic Report, 2021, ch. 2, https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/
ar2021e2.pdf.
11 T estimony of Fed chairman Ben Bernanke before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, in
U.S. Congress, November 15, 2005.
12 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Guide to Changes in the 2020 Statement on Longer -Run Goals
and Monetary Policy Strategy,” in Review of Monetary Policy Strategy, Tools, and Communications,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/guide-to-changes-in-statement -on-longer-run-goals-monetary-policy-
strategy.htm.
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inflation always fluctuates a little from year to year, and since the early 1980s a rise in inflation in
one year has not been predictably followed by higher inflation in the next year.
What Causes Inflation?
There are several potential causes of inflation in an economy. Inflation can be demand or supply
driven and, in the long run, is related to monetary policy. This section discusses in greater detail a
few causal categories of inflation and the role of monetary policy in controlling inflation in the
short and long term.
Demand-Pull Inflation
Inflation that is caused by an increase in aggregate demand (overal spending) absent a
proportional increase in aggregate supply (overal production) is known as demand-pull inflation.
When aggregate demand increases by more than its trend rate, typical y the productive capacity
of the economy does not immediately adjust to meet higher demand, particularly if the economy
is at or near full employment.13 In response to the increased demand in the economy, producers
wil attempt to increase the quantity of goods and services they provide. To increase production,
producers may attempt to hire more workers, increase pay for current workers (who may need to
work longer hours), or invest in more equipment, al of which increase production costs.
Assuming producers are not wil ing to eat into profits in order to ramp up production, they are
likely to increase the prices of their final goods and services to compensate themselves for the
increase in production costs, thereby creating inflation.14 Inflation can work to lower demand and
increase supply and thus can be the means to bring supply and demand back into equilibrium,
particularly in an overheating economy in which demand has risen above what the economy can
produce at full employment.
Any number of factors could contribute to increases in aggregate demand, including the normal
ebbs and flows of the business cycle, consumer and investor sentiment, the value of the dollar,
and fiscal and monetary policy, among others. Given the unprecedented policy response to the
pandemic,15 the role of expansionary fiscal and monetary policy in contributing to inflation has
been of particular interest to many economists and policymakers. Expansionary fiscal policies
include an increase in the budget deficit by lowering taxes or increasing government spending or
transfers to individuals. Such policies work to increase overal spending in the economy by
driving up consumer demand. This in turn can lead to increased production and decreasing
unemployment levels. The downside to achieving these benefits through expansionary fiscal
policy is that it can result in demand-pull inflation in the short term, particularly if the economy is
at full employment. Expansionary fiscal policy is unlikely to cause sustained inflation, as
expansionary policy typical y involves temporary increases in spending. Such one-time increases
may produce similar one-time increases in inflation but would be likely to cause persistent

13 In an economy that is not near full employment, an increase in aggregate demand would be less likely to create
inflation as this would imply that the economy is not working at its full productive capacity. In other words, if
aggregate demand is lower than aggregate supply, aggregate demand has some room to increase before outstripping
aggregate supply.
14 Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, What Are Some of the Factors That Contribute to a Rise in Inflation? ,
October 2002, https://www.frbsf.org/education/publications/doctor-econ/2002/october/inflation-factors-rise/.
15 See CRS Report R46729, Federal Deficits, Growing Debt, and the Economy in the Wake of COVID-19, by Lida R.
Weinstock; and CRS Report R46411, The Federal Reserve’s Response to COVID-19: Policy Issues, by Marc Labonte.
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increases in inflation only if such policy were persistently applied. Additional y, monetary policy
can potential y be used to offset the inflationary effects of such policy.
The Role of Monetary Policy in Responding to Inflation
Economists general y believe that, in the long run, inflation is tied to monetary policy. The
Federal Reserve, which ultimately controls the supply of money, is tasked with maintaining stable
prices in the economy. In other words, the Fed has a mandate to keep inflation in check. The Fed
has tools to control inflation, mainly the federal funds interest rate—the overnight rate at which
banks lend to one another. Other interest rates in the economy tend to move in the same direction
as the federal funds rate, with shorter-term rates moving more closely with it and longer-term
rates less so. Changes in interest rates affect overal economic activity by changing the demand
for interest-sensitive spending (goods and services that are bought on credit). The main categories
of interest-sensitive spending are business physical capital investment (e.g., plant and equipment),
consumer durables (e.g., automobiles, appliances), and residential investment (i.e., new housing
construction). Al else equal, higher interest rates reduce interest-sensitive spending, and lower
interest rates increase interest-sensitive spending.
Interest rates also influence the demand for exports and imports by affecting the value of the
dollar. Al else equal, higher interest rates increase net foreign capital inflows as U.S. assets
become more attractive relative to foreign assets. To purchase U.S. assets, foreigners must first
purchase U.S. dollars, pushing up the value of the dollar. When the value of the dollar rises, the
price of foreign imports declines relative to U.S. import-competing goods, and U.S. exports
become more expensive relative to foreign goods. As a result, net exports (exports less imports)
decrease. When interest rates fal , al of these factors work in reverse and net exports increase, al
else equal.
Business investment, consumer durables, residential investment, and net exports are al
components of GDP. Thus, if expansionary monetary policy causes interest-sensitive spending to
rise, it increases GDP in the short run. This increases employment, as more workers are hired to
meet increased demand for goods and services. Most economists believe that monetary policy
cannot permanently change the level or growth rate of GDP or employment, because long-run
GDP is determined by the economy’s productive capacity (the size of the labor force, capital
stock, and so on). However, monetary policy can permanently change the inflation rate. If
monetary policy pushes demand above what the economy can produce, then inflation should
eventual y rise to restore equilibrium.16 Unless contractionary monetary policy is then used to
slow economic activity, inflation is likely to remain at its new, higher level—in which case
monetary policy is said to have accommodated higher inflation. When setting monetary policy,
the Fed must take into account the lags between a change in policy and economic conditions.
Otherwise, high inflation can become endemic, which might then require monetary policy to
become contractionary enough to cause a recession to root it out.
Cost-Push Inflation
Inflation that is caused by a decrease in aggregate supply as a result of increases in the cost of
production absent a proportional decrease in aggregate demand is known as cost-push inflation.
An increase in the cost of raw materials or any of the factors of production—land, labor, capital,

16 Olivier Blanchard and David R. Johnson, “T he Phillips Curve, the Natural Rate of Unemployment, and Inflation,” in
Macroeconom ics, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, 2013), p. 171.
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entrepreneurship—wil result in increased production costs.17 Assuming producers’ productivity
is at or near its maximum, producers wil not be able to maintain profit margins in response.
Much the same as the demand side issue, if producers cannot or wil not accept lowered profits,
they wil raise prices.18
The classic example of cost-push inflation is the result of a commodity price shock, which
sharply decreases the supply of a given commodity and increases it price. Certain commodities
are inputs in the production process, and as the price of an important input good increases, so
does the price of the final goods and services, resulting in inflation. Cost-push inflation,
especial y when caused by a supply shock, tends to result only in a temporary increase in inflation
unless accommodated by monetary policy. Supply disruptions are often al eviated natural y, and
for inflation to be persistently high, supply shock after supply shock would need to occur.19
One of the reasons a commodity shock in particular is a widely cited example of something that
causes cost-push inflation is that demand for many commodities is considered to be inelastic. The
elasticity of demand refers to how consumers’ appetite for a good changes given the price it is
offered at.20 A completely inelastic good is one that consumers would purchase at the same rate
regardless of the price. For example, demand for oil and other petroleum products are general y
fairly inelastic: Not only are such products directly used by consumers; they are also inputs in the
production and transport process with few substitutes readily available.
Another commonly cited example of cost-push inflation is caused by increases in the cost of
labor, often referred to as wage-push inflation. An increase in the federal minimum wage, for
example, could theoretical y cause inflation. When producers need to pay their workers more,
they may opt to pass that cost along to the consumer or decrease the amount of workers they
employ to keep costs even, assuming they are able to do so without changing the quantity of
goods or services they supply. The extent to which an increase in wages affects the price level
depends largely on how many workers are affected by the wage increase and the size of the
increase. In the case of the minimum wage, very few workers or very many workers could be
affected, depending on the level of increase.
Expectations
Inflation expectations can add to inflationary pressures and become self-fulfil ing. When
individuals expect prices to rise, they general y behave according to this belief. For example, if a
consumer expects prices to rise in the future, that person may decide to spend more today, before
the purchasing power of the dollar decreases. If expectations change across the economy, this can
lead to increased levels of spending and therefore increased aggregate demand, which, al else
equal, would result in demand-driven inflation. Likewise, workers may demand wage increases to
compensate themselves for future inflation, which can result in cost-push inflation, particularly in
the situation in which wage growth outstrips inflation. When expectations are met, this serves to
further ingrain expectations that inflation wil persist or even accelerate, which in turn leads to
more inflation, and so on and so on. This situation is often referred to as a wage-price spiral in

17 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “ Factors of Production,” in The Economic Lowdown Podcast Series,
https://www.stlouisfed.org/education/economic-lowdown-podcast -series/episode-2-factors-of-production.
18 Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, What Are Some of the Factors That Contribute to a Rise in Inflation?
19 Dallas S. Batten, Inflation: The Cost-Push Myth, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, June 1981, p. 21,
https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/review/81/06/Inflation_Jun_Jul1981.pdf.
20 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Price Elasticities of Demand, https://research.stlouisfed.org/dashboard/9575.
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the case when wage and price growth continue to cause each other to increase, leaving the
potential for inflation to become increasingly high and hard to reduce.21
Inflation expectations can be measured by surveying consumers or professional economists, or it
can be gleaned from market data, such as Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities. Historical
experience suggests that individuals respond to a significant increase in actual inflation by
increasing their expectations of future inflation, although this may not occur instantaneously.
Another determinant of expectations is how credible individuals find the Fed’s commitment to
low inflation.
Inflation Trends
Much of the concern about the possibility of higher inflation today stems from high inflation
experiences in U.S. history. A closer look at those episodes may help determine what to expect
today. There are two notable types of high inflation periods to consider: the “Great Inflation”
from the mid-1960s to early 1980s and some shorter-lived inflationary episodes surrounding U.S.
wars.
“Great Inflation”
As shown in Figure 1, after averaging around 1% in the first half of the 1960s, inflation (as
measured by the PCE) began rising to 2.5% in 1966, above 4.5% in 1970, nearly 10.5% in 1974,
and above 10.5% in 1980. (CPI showed a similar, but somewhat higher pattern.) Inflation then
began declining rapidly, with PCE fal ing below 4% in 1984, and it has been mostly low ever
since (see Figure 3).
Figure 1. Annual Inflation, 1960-1983
PCE Index

Source: CRS calculations using U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis data.

21 Blanchard and Johnson, “T he Phillips Curve, the Natural Rate of Unemployment, and Inflation,” p. 164.
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Economists attribute this “Great Inflation” to several causes.22 In thinking about those causes, it
can be helpful to distinguish between “supply shocks” that caused short-term spikes in inflation
during that period and causes of the long-term upward trend in inflation.23 Short-term causes
include the removal of wage and price controls (implemented in 1971 and completely removed in
1974),24 the end of fixed exchange rates in 1971 and subsequent depreciation of the dollar in real
terms,25 oil price shocks in 1973-1974 and 1979, and food price shocks in the 1970s. Inflation
reached a new high after each of these shocks, which would have been unlikely to occur in their
absence. But each of these factors would be expected to increase inflation only temporarily. A
one-time increase in the price of oil in isolation, for example, would lead to a one-time increase in
the inflation rate, but if oil prices then level ed off at the higher level, it would make no further
contribution to inflation in later years (because inflation measures the change in prices, not the
level of prices).
The long-term upward trend in inflation over the entire period is attributed to monetary policy
that was persistently too “easy” (i.e., stimulative) and the unmooring of inflation expectations.26
(Fiscal stimulus was employed sporadical y over this period but not consistently enough to
explain the long-term upward trend and not in the years with the largest increases in inflation.)
The reason why policy was too easy differed in the 1960s and 1970s. During the 1960s,
policymakers attempted to exploit the Phil ips Curve—a belief that lower unemployment could be
achieved at the cost of higher inflation. At first, this seemed to work—unemployment fel from
4.5% in 1965 to 3.5% in 1969—but then unemployment began rising and did not return to 4.5%
again for the remainder of the Great Inflation. Once inflation expectations rose,27 higher inflation
no longer yielded lower unemployment, and higher unemployment was not sufficient to bring
inflation down to low levels.28 In the 1970s, when inflation rose in response to oil shocks, the Fed
faced a tradeoff between raising interest rates to mitigate the inflationary effects or
“accommodating” inflation to mitigate the negative effects on growth and employment. The Fed
largely chose the latter option throughout the decade. The high inflation period was brought to an
end when the Fed sharply tightened monetary policy under new Fed Chair Paul Volcker in the
early 1980s, bringing inflation expectations back under control but triggering a deep recession in
the process.
Because equilibrium interest rates, economic growth rates, and unemployment rates are not
constant over time, it should be noted that it was not obvious during the Great Inflation that

22 Michael Bryan, “T he Great Inflation,” Federal Reserve History, November 2013,
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great -inflation.
23 Alan S. Blinder and Jeremy B. Rudd, “T he Supply‐Shock Explanation of the Great Stagflation Revisited,” in
Michael D. Bordo and Athanasios Orphanides, eds., The Great Inflation: The Rebirth of Modern Central Banking ,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, June 2013), https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c9160/c9160.pdf.
24 T he removal of wage and price controls allowed pent -up price increases to occur, causing inflation to rise.
25 T he depreciation of the dollar caused import prices to rise and increased demand for exports, which put upward
pressure on overall inflation.
26 Allan Meltzer, “Origins of the Great Inflation,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, vol. 87, no. 2, Part 2
(March/April 2005), pp. 145-175, https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/review/05/03/part2/Meltzer.pdf.
27 Data on inflation expectations going back to the 1960s is limited, but what is available seems to confirm this view.
See Jan J. J. Groen and Menno Middeldorp, “Creating a History of U.S. Inflation Expectations,” Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, August 21, 2013, https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2013/08/creating-a-history-of-us-
inflation-expectations/.
28 One lesson taken from this experience was that persistently keeping labor m arkets “too hot” would not yield any
lasting benefits in terms of labor market outcomes. T he experience of keeping labor markets “too hot” without any
noticeable increase in inflation in the years before the pandemic (and, to a lesser extent, in the 1990s) casts doubt on
whether this lesson still holds.
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monetary policy was too easy. Although short-term interest rates rose at times in nominal terms,
monetary policy remained easy because interest rates did not increase quickly enough to keep up
with inflation, so real rates were low or even negative.29 In hindsight, real rates compatible with
the stable inflation experienced in periods before and after turned out to be too low during the
Great Inflation, as wil be discussed in more detail below. Further, equilibrium growth rates were
fal ing and unemployment rates were rising, but because policymakers did not realize it quickly
enough, they were stil aiming to achieve what had become unachievable growth and
unemployment rates. By current standards, budget deficits were also smal —they exceeded 3% of
GDP in only two years of the Great Inflation. Thus, the main evidence after the fact that policy
was too easy is that inflation was too high, not that interest rates were lower or budget deficits
were higher than in other periods.
Wars
An analogy has been drawn between the pandemic’s economic effects and wars—both involve
disruptions to supply (both production and the workforce) and sudden shifts in demand for certain
goods and services that could initial y increase inflation. For example, a shift to a wartime
economy can lead to a sudden increase in the production of military equipment and a sudden
reduction in the production of nonmilitary goods and services and, in some cases, temporarily
high household saving as a result.30 In addition, some wars featured large increases in government
spending and budget deficits that were accommodated by monetary stimulus, similar to the
pandemic. Thus, some have suggested looking at the inflation experience during wartime to gain
insight into how inflation might respond to the pandemic.
The Vietnam War occurred during the Great Inflation period, covered in the previous section.
This experience would seem to lend credence to the idea that wars can have long-lasting effects
on inflation, but as the previous section outlines, several other factors are seen as the primary
causes of high inflation at that time. Instead, the best examples of wars leading to inflationary
pressures are World War II and the Korean War.
As shown in Figure 2, inflation was high during and after World War II. It was above 4% each
year from 1941 to 1948, peaking at 12% in 1942 and 10% in 1947, as measured by the PCE.
Prices then fel in 1949 and remained low until the late 1960s.31 The one year when inflation was
high in that period (almost 7% in 1951) was during the Korean War.32 By 1952, inflation was
below 2% again, where it would remain through 1956. The economy did not experience the same
unmooring of inflation expectations and long-lasting wage-price spiral as the Great Inflation. This
may be because a recession occurred shortly after both wars (in 1948-1949 and 1953-1954) that
contributed to the decline in inflation. This is one key difference between these episodes and the
pandemic: The pandemic triggered a deep recession followed by a rapid recovery. Thus, if the
economy continues its rapid recovery today, there would be no comparable force pulling inflation
down. Another key feature of these wars was a decline in government spending and the budget
deficit after the war ended. CBO projects that both spending and the deficit wil decline as a share

29 T he federal funds rate was not the Fed’s policy target at the time, but rates that the Fed set directly, such as the
discount rate, were also increased.
30 Laura Nicolae, “ US Daily: Pent-Up Savings and Inflation After World War 2,” Goldman Sachs Research, February
25, 2021.
31 World War I featured an even more extreme case of high inflation followed by deflation. T hat experience may be
less relevant to today, however, because monetary policy was then governed by the gold standard.
32 Joseph E. Gagnon, “Inflation Fears and the Biden Stimulus: Look to the Korean War, Not Vietnam,” Peterson
Institute for International Economics, February 25, 2021, https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/
inflation-fears-and-biden-stimulus-look-korean-war-not-vietnam.
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of GDP in FY2022 under current policy, but Congress is currently debating legislation that could
alter that projection if enacted. Nevertheless, both episodes demonstrate that a rise in inflation
does not necessarily have to be persistent.
Figure 2. Annual Inflation, 1939-1959
PCE Index

Source: CRS calculations using U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis data.
More recent wars—such as the first and second Iraq Wars and the Afghanistan War—were
arguably too smal in terms of military expenditures and economic impact to have a significant
effect on inflation.
1980s-2020
Since the recessions of the early 1980s, the economy has not experienced comparably high
inflation again. From 1984 to 1991, it averaged about 3.5%. On an annual basis, inflation (as
measured by the PCE) has been below 3% since 1992 and has averaged a little under 2% from
1992 to 2020. (As measured by CPI, inflation has been slightly higher.) As a result, many
economists and policymakers believed high inflation was no longer likely enough to present
serious concern.
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Figure 3. Annual Inflation, 1984-2020
PCE Index

Source: CRS calculations based on U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis data.
Notes: In 2012, the Fed instituted an inflation target of 2%, as measured by the PCE index.
Since the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the Federal Reserve, as wel as many economists and
policymakers, have been more concerned that inflation has been too low. Since the Fed identified
its ideal longer-run goal for inflation to be 2% in 2012, inflation was modestly below 2% each
year except for 2018 through 2020. This persistent undershooting led the Fed to switch its focus
(in terms of achieving its price stability mandate) from preventing too high inflation to preventing
too low inflation. As a result, the Fed changed its monetary policy strategy in 2020 by explicitly
stating that it would try to overshoot 2% inflation after periods when inflation has been below 2%
in order to achieve a 2% average over time.33
The highest annual inflation rate since 1992 was in 2008, when it nearly reached 3%. This was
mainly driven by a 14% increase in energy prices that year. That episode also featured three
consecutive months of unusual y rapid price increases, similar to the present. The Fed did not
react to this increase in inflation—in the midst of the deepest and longest recession since the
Great Depression—by tightening monetary policy.34 Instead, the Fed was engaged in a then-novel
asset purchase program (popularly referred to as “quantitative easing”) that caused an
unprecedented increase in the monetary base, which many critics worried would lead to runaway
inflation. Critics’ fears were not realized. In 2009, the economy experienced slight price deflation.
This example il ustrates that inflation can temporarily rise even during an unusual y deep
recession but that a rise in inflation does not necessarily lead to sustained high inflation. In
hindsight, some believe that a mistaken concern with inflation that never materialized led

33 Federal Reserve, 2020 Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, August 27, 2020,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications-
statement -on-longer-run-goals-monetary-policy-strategy.htm. For more information, see CRS Insight IN11499, The
Federal Reserve’s Revised Monetary Policy Strategy Statement, by Marc Labonte.
34 As this example illustrates, the Fed has typically been more concerned with core inflation than headline inflation.
Core inflation was only 2% in 2008. Unlike the 1970s, increases in food and en ergy prices did not feed through to
increases in core inflation in the low inflation period, because inflation expectations remained stable and energy was
less important to production.
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policymakers to tighten fiscal and monetary policy prematurely, leading to a weaker recovery and
prolonged return to full employment after the Great Recession.
Many economists believe that monetary policy was too easy during the Great Inflation, and some
believe it was too tight during and after the Great Recession. Yet the federal funds rate averaged
6.8% from 1968 to 1978 and 0.7% from 2008 to 2020. This il ustrates that the interest rate
consistent with stable inflation is not itself constant over time. For one thing, interest rates need to
be adjusted for inflation, but even once this is taken into account, “real” interest rates were higher
(0.9%) from 1968 to 1978—when monetary policy was viewed as too easy—than from 2008 to
2020 (-0.9%, meaning nominal rates were on average lower than inflation)—when policy was
viewed as too tight.35 Thus, arguments that monetary policy is too easy today cannot be based
solely on the fact that interest rates are zero.36
Current Outlook
As discussed above, inflation has been abnormal y high in each month since March 2021. Using
PCE instead of CPI and core inflation instead of headline inflation yields a lower inflation rate
but stil above the Fed’s 2% target. A key policy question is whether this increase wil be
persistent or self-correcting. The Fed has argued that a number of temporary factors, described
below, explain why inflation has risen, but those factors are unlikely to cause high inflation to
persist in the future.37 In June 2021, the median member of the Federal Open Market Committee
projected that PCE inflation wil rise to 3.4% in 2021 for the year as a whole before fal ing to
2.1% in 2022.38 Private sector forecasts were similar. But there are several reasons why skeptics
believe that these forecasts that the rise in inflation wil prove moderate and fleeting are too
optimistic.
Effect of Pandemic Disruptions
Since March 2020, the pandemic has disrupted businesses’ ability to produce goods and services
and consumers’ spending patterns. These supply and demand disruptions have caused changes in
the relative prices of affected goods that has caused overal prices to first fal and then rise
unusual y quickly. This pattern has also distorted 12-month measures of inflation since March
2021, because the year-earlier time period had unusual y low prices, referred to as “base effects.”
The pandemic caused numerous long-lasting business and supply-chain disruptions due to
shutdowns, business interruptions, shortages, and social distancing. Some of these resulted in
prices of component parts increasing and additional costs on businesses (such as extra cleaning
costs), which may be passed through to consumers. The producer price index, which measures the
price of inputs, increased by 1% in one month (i.e., an annualized rate of 12%) and 7.3% over the

35 Adjusted using actual headline PCE.
36 One challenge that the Fed has experienced since the Great Recession of 2007-2009 is the limits on monetary policy
imposed by the “zero lower bound.” T he Fed has been limited in how much stimulus it can provide by lowering the
federal funds rate, because it cannot be reduced below zero. As a result, the federal funds rate has been essentially zero
from December 2008 to December 2015 and again since March 2020. Arguably, this limit on conventional monetary
policy has made it more difficult for the economy to recover and has made the Fed reliant on unconventional policy to
stimulate the economy.
37 Federal Reserve, Monetary Policy Report to Congress, July 2021, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
files/20210709_mprfullreport.pdf.
38 T he Federal Open Market Committee consists of Federal Reserve System governors and presidents and is the
committee that sets monetary policy. June 2021 projections are available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/
monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20210616.pdf.
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12 months prior to June 2021. Some of these disruptions have been long lasting, such as a
shortfal in microchip production, which is expected to continue for some time. Microchips are no
longer limited to information technology products. With the proliferation of smart devices,
microchips are now found in numerous types of consumer goods, including household appliances
and vehicles. As a result, supply disruptions have emerged across a range of products. For
example, the supply of new automobiles has been constrained by the shortage, part of the reason
that new and used auto prices have risen sharply.
Individual supply disruptions, supply shocks, and bottlenecks are, by their nature, likely to be
temporary and therefore would cause only a temporary increase in inflation. Goldman Sachs
estimates that supply-constrained product categories are currently boosting core inflation by
about 1 percentage point but only temporarily: By 2022, those categories are expected to decrease
core inflation by about half a percentage point.39 However, if these supply factors become
ubiquitous and persistent enough, it may indicate that in the aggregate they are actual y being
driven by demand factors.
The pandemic also disrupted consumer spending patterns. For example, closures, social
distancing, virus fears, and other restrictions in 2020 caused a dramatic decline in some categories
of services that could be consumed only in person. Restaurants, hotels, and air travel are
prominent examples. Prices for many of these products also experienced sizeable declines in
2020. Now that the economy is reopening, there is pent-up demand for categories of spending
that were restricted in 2020. Prices for these categories are now recovering or, in cases where
supply or labor disruptions are also an issue, even surpassing 2020 levels. This pent-up demand
may not in and of itself cause persistent inflation in the future, however. A family that skipped
vacation travel in 2020 may decide to take an extra vacation or spend more on vacation in 2021
but probably not in future years.
This is an example of how “base effects” affect inflation in the short term. Because monthly
inflation data are “noisy” (i.e., they rise and fal quickly while not being indicative of a longer-
term trend), economists tend to look at inflation over the previous 12 months. In March, April,
and May of 2020, prices fel , and prices did not fully recover until August 2020, according to the
CPI. (According to the PCE, prices fel in March and April 2020.) As a result, 12-month CPI
inflation rates for March to August 2021—especial y in March to May 2021—wil appear high
because the “base” of the calculation is a 2020 index number that is artificial y low. Nevertheless,
the rapid one-month increase in inflation in March, April, May, and June 2021 means that base
effects do not explain the entire rise in inflation in those months.
Other goods and services, such as consumer durables (which had 28% growth in output in four
quarters ending with the first quarter of 2021), were in greater demand as a result of the
pandemic, as consumers could not spend on certain services and were spending more time at
home. Sudden shifts in demand for certain goods can lead to short-term inflation, but in some
cases, supply can eventual y adjust to push prices back down. An example of this is lumber
prices, which spiked when demand rose in the second half of 2020 but have subsequently
declined.40 Even if the demand shift for a particular good causes the price increase to be
permanent, this does not mean that the price of the good wil continue to rise in the future. If it

39 David Mericle and Laura Nicolae, “Supply Chain Disruptions and the Inf lation Outlook,” Goldman Sachs, US
Econom ics Analyst, June 27, 2021.
40 Ryan Dezember, “ Lumber Prices Are Way Down—but Don’t Expect New Houses to Cost Less,” Wall Street
Journal, July 14, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/lumber-prices-are-way-downbut -dont -expect -new-houses-to-cost-
less-11626260401.
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does not, then the price increase wil not contribute to future inflation. This underlines the fact
that long-term inflation is caused by general price increases, not relative price increases.
The rise in demand for consumer durables also appears to be driven by the increase in personal
income caused by economic impact payments (often referred to as “stimulus checks”) from
pandemic relief legislation.41 Because stimulus checks are one-offs, they are unlikely to cause
persistent inflation.
A close look at the price of any one good or service tends to be explainable by certain unique
factors. For example, some have focused on the large rise in used car prices since April 2021. But
nearly every major category in the CPI has shown an above average increase in either the past
three months or past 12 months to June 2021. The question is whether, when added together,
these various factors point to a more general and longer lasting overheating of the economy.
Rising Asset Prices and Inflation
Asset prices are not included in the calculation of inflation, which is meant to measure only the change in the price
of goods and services. Notably, houses are considered assets, so rising house prices do not factor directly into
inflation. However, “owners’ equivalent rent” is a large share of consumer price inflation measures and represents
the hypothetical rent that homeowners would pay if they rented their houses.42
Equity (stock) prices, housing prices, and prices of alternative assets, such as cryptocurrencies, have al increased
significantly since initial y declining at the beginning of the pandemic. Because assets are not inclu ded in inflation
measures, the rise in asset prices has no direct effect on inflation. Nonetheless, rising asset prices could potential y
add to inflationary pressures. This connection is most direct in residential housing. If home prices rise, that may
cause rents to go up, which would cause owners’ equivalent rent and hence inflation to rise. More broadly, there
can be a “wealth effect” on consumption when owners of assets, such as stocks, that have risen in value decide to
spend more in response to their newfound wealth, which can add to inflationary pressures.
An Overheating Economy?
After the historical y large decline in GDP in the second quarter of 2020, the economy grew at a
historical y rapid rate in the third quarter. Since then, it has continued to grow rapidly—albeit not
at historical rates but at the highest three-quarter average since 1984—and is projected to
continue growing rapidly through the first half of 2022. One might wonder why extremely rapid
economic growth in the second half of 2020 did not cause inflation, but lower projected growth in
2021 is causing inflation concerns. The difference is attributable to where the economy is
operating relative to its potential then compared to now.
As discussed above, rising inflation can reflect an overheating economy where the economy is
operating at full potential and demand is stil outpacing supply. One way to measure this is cal ed
the output gap. The output gap measures the difference between actual GDP and potential GDP
(the most the economy could produce on a sustained basis) and is expressed as a percentage of
potential GDP. When the output gap is negative, this indicates that actual GDP is that percentage
below potential GDP. When positive, actual GDP is that percentage above potential GDP, and the
economy is said to be at risk of “overheating.” With a large negative output gap, inflationary
pressures are subdued by unused resources and spare capacity. Very high growth rates are likely
to be a sign that the economy is overheating only if the output gap is smal or positive.
As seen in Figure 4, the halt in economic activity at the beginning of the pandemic caused a
sudden increase in the output gap—from +0.5% in the fourth quarter of 2019 to -10.5% in the

41 See CRS Insight IN11546, Personal Income Growth During the COVID-19 Pandemic, by Lida R. Weinstock.
42 It is not based on house prices or mortgage payments, which determine what homeowners actually pay out of pocket
for their housing costs. It is imputed using actual rents of similar ren ted properties.
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second quarter of 2020. The economy grew very rapidly in the second half of 2020, but a
relatively large output gap remained: -3.7% in the fourth quarter of 2020. In other words, rapid
growth in the second half of 2020 represented idle resources being brought back into production
rather than the economy overheating. However, CBO projected that rapid growth in 2021 would
close the remaining output gap and that, by the third quarter, actual GDP would exceed potential
GDP based on its projection that GDP growth would exceed 6% in the first and fourth quarter and
8% in the second and third quarter of 2021.43
Figure 4. Projected Output Gap, 2019:Q4-2022:Q4
As a Percentage of Potential GDP

Source: CBO, 10-Year Economic Projections, July 2021, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2021-07/51135-2021-
07-economicprojections.xlsx.
Notes: See text for details.
Because the growth pattern since the beginning of the pandemic has been unprecedented, an open
question is whether growth can smoothly transition to a sustainable pace as the economy
approaches full potential or whether it wil overheat. CBO projected that, beginning in the first
quarter of 2022, actual GDP wil exceed potential by over 2% for five straight quarters (shown in
the figure as a positive output gap), which could indicate sustained overheating of the economy
that could result in higher inflation. As of July, CBO did not project that high inflation would
persist beyond the first half of 2021, however.
The output gap and potential GDP are inferred rather than directly observed, however, and
projections are always subject to uncertainty. Therefore, CBO may be overestimating how
quickly the output gap wil be closed even if its projections for actual growth prove correct.
Namely, it is uncertain if the pandemic did any lasting damage to GDP or if potential GDP
returned to its pre-pandemic course or even a higher growth course once the economy reopened.
CBO estimated a modest and temporary decline in potential GDP growth during the pandemic,
which would reduce the inferred output gap and cause a faster return to potential and greater
inflationary pressures. Alternatively, if potential GDP were not stil negatively affected by the

43 Actual growth in the second quarter of 2021, released after CBO’s projection, was 6.5%, so the output gap is likely
modestly higher in the second quarter than CBO projected.
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pandemic, then it would take longer for actual GDP to exceed potential than CBO projected,
reducing inflationary pressures.
One reason that potential GDP during the pandemic may have fal en is because of the decline in
labor force participation: With a smal er labor force, the economy is not capable of producing as
much. Whether potential GDP recovers wil depend on whether those unexpected dropouts return
to the labor force, discussed in the next section.
The Post-Pandemic Labor Market
The output gap is only one indicator of the economic recovery and possible economic
overheating. Another primary indicator is the labor market, and the labor force has shown less
recovery from the pandemic than GDP has to date. Nevertheless, current trends in the labor
market have some economists and policymakers concerned that recent increases in the inflation
rate are resulting, in part, from increasing wages and tight labor markets. As discussed previously,
wage growth can impact inflation.
As shown in Figure 5, the level of employment was relatively high and the unemployment rate
relatively low prior to the pandemic. Following the start of the pandemic, the unemployment rate
increased rapidly to levels not seen since the Great Depression. Employment levels dropped over
20 mil ion in April 2020 alone. While the employment situation has improved since April 2020,
the unemployment rate as of July 2021 remained about two percentage points higher than in
February 2020, before shutdowns went into effect, and the number of employed persons remained
about 6 mil ion lower over the same period. Al else equal, this would imply a “looser” labor
market—that is, one featuring a high amount of available labor relative to job openings and less
upward wage pressure—in 2021 than in 2019.
Figure 5. Employment and Unemployment Situation
January 2019 to July 2021

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey.
Despite the relatively “loose” conditions in the labor market overal —as evidenced by higher
unemployment, lower employment, and lower labor force participation relative to pre-pandemic
labor market conditions—some industries, such as leisure and hospitality or manufacturing, have
shown characteristics of a “tighter” labor market, such as difficulty in hiring, increased worker
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bargaining power, and nominal wage growth.44 Despite the number of employed workers being
relatively low, the worker-quit rate is higher than it was before the pandemic, and the ratio of
available job openings to workers seeking jobs has risen significantly to the highest level in this
century.45 In terms of wage growth, Figure 6 shows the nominal average hourly earnings (i.e.,
wages) of al private sector employees and employees in the leisure and hospitality sector, an
industry that took relatively severe employment losses and has yet to recover in terms of
employment levels.46
Average hourly earnings increased substantial y in April 2020 as lower-wage workers lost their
jobs at a higher rate than higher-wage workers at the onset of the pandemic, thereby increasing
the average wage.47 Wages began to normalize somewhat in May when overal hourly earnings
dropped quickly, but they remained elevated compared to what they would have been had they
continued on their pre-pandemic trajectory. Earnings growth largely returned to its previous long-
term rate beginning in June 2020, although growth has been especial y strong in recent months. It
is, as of yet, too early to know if this recent increased rate wil be sustained.
In contrast, specific components within the total private sector experienced more severe losses
during the pandemic and higher rates of wage increase in recent months than the average. Taking
the leisure and hospitality sector as an example, earnings losses following the early spike were
more severe and the early recovery less robust as demand for in-person services was significantly
dampened by restrictions and concerns over the spread of the virus. However, wages in this sector
have increased at a more rapid rate in 2021 than the overal private average. In this case, the
increase in wages is, in large part, an effort to attract workers, some of whom switched jobs48
during the pandemic or are taking advantage of current labor market conditions to switch
industries.49 Thus, wage pressures in this industry may be driven more by a change in the relative
attractiveness in an industry that is particularly exposed to the pandemic than emblematic of
conditions in the overal labor market.

44 Andrew Van Dam, “T he Seven Industries Most Desperate for Workers,” Washington Post, June 15, 2021,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/06/15/industries-with-worker-shortages/.
45 Data available at https://www.bls.gov/charts/job-openings-and-labor-turnover/hire-seps-rates.htm and
https://www.bls.gov/charts/job-openings-and-labor-turnover/job-openings-unemployment-beveridge-curve.htm.
46 See CRS Insight IN11564, COVID-19: Employment Across Industries, by Lida R. Weinstock.
47 Chair Cecilia Rouse and Martha Gimbel, The Pandemic’s Effect on Measured Wage Growth, White House Counsel
of Economic Advisers, April 29, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/blog/2021/04/19/the-pandemics-effect -on-
measured-wage-growth/.
48 Heather Haddon, T e-Ping Chen, and Lauren Weber, “Customers Are Back at Restaurants and Bars, but Workers
Have Moved On,” Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/customers-are-back-at-restaurants-
and-bars-but-workers-have-moved-on-11626168601.
49 Chair Cecilia Rouse et al., Distinguishing Between Signal and Noise in Recent Jobs Data , White House Council of
Economic Advisers, June 29, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/blog/2021/06/29/distinguishing-between-signal-
and-noise-in-recent -jobs-data/.
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Figure 6. Nominal Average Hourly
Earnings
Figure 7. Real Average Hourly Earnings
January 2019-July 2021
January 2019-July 2021

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current
Employment Survey.
Employment Survey.
Labor market tightness—and thus wage pressures—is likely to persist as long as economic
growth is strong and labor force participation is low. Significant numbers of individuals dropped
out of the labor force during the pandemic for a variety of reasons, including a lack of available
child care,50 fears of the virus (for those with jobs necessitating in-person interaction), and early
retirements.51 The labor force participation rate is stil below what it was prior to the pandemic,
and there is some evidence to suggest that some of this loss may be persistent, at least in the near
term.52
The data above may suggest that demand for labor amidst the recovery from the pandemic could
be putting some upward pressure on wages.53 This, in turn, could put upward pressure on prices.
Wage growth may also slow if supply becomes less constrained. That said, causality between
wages and inflation is not unidirectional. Increased wages can put upward pressure on prices, but
increased prices can also signal to workers that they should demand higher wages to compensate
themselves for inflation. Should expectations of high inflation become ingrained in the public, it
is likely that workers would do so, thereby putting further upward pressure on prices. As shown in
Figure 7, overal wage gains have not outstripped inflation yet54 and are thus unlikely to
contribute to sustained increases in inflation at this point, although there have been some real
gains in the leisure and hospitality sector in the past several months. Some amount of real wage
growth is sustainable when it reflects gains in worker productivity. However, if labor market

50 Lauren Bauer, Mothers Are Being Left Behind in the Economic Recovery from COVID-19, Brookings Institution,
May 6, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/05/06/mothers-are-being-left-behind-in-the-economic-
recovery-from-covid-19/.
51 T he impact of unemployment insurance is not being considered because the unemployed are part of the labor force.
52 Comparing supplemental data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to overall data, only a minority of those
unemployed and of the increase in individuals not in the labor force attribute their status to the effects of COVID. See
Bureau of Labor Statistics, “ Supplemental Data Measuring the Effects of the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic on
the Labor Market,” T able 4 and T able 9, https://www.bls.gov/cps/effects-of-the-coronavirus-covid-19-pandemic.htm.
53 Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index, July 30, 2021,
https://www.bea.gov/data/personal-consumption-expenditures-price-index.
54 Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index, July 30, 2021.
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conditions become too tight overal , surpassing full employment, wage growth may spur
accelerating rates of inflation.55
Inflation Expectations
As discussed above, economists believe that inflation expectations are a key factor in determining
whether higher inflation wil persist. In the near term, expectations have risen but by less than the
actual rise in inflation. For example, one survey of consumers’ inflation expectations measured
4.8% over the next 12 months in June 2021—lower than actual inflation of 5.4% as measured by
the CPI but higher than actual inflation of 4% as measured by the PCE.56 Expectations for
inflation over the next five or 10 years have shown a smal er increase that may not be
significant.57 But the fact that short-term expectations have already risen may mean that long-
term expectations could also rise quickly if actual inflation persists.
Fiscal and Monetary Stimulus
In response to the pandemic, Congress and the President enacted fiscal stimulus of unprecedented
size, and the Federal Reserve implemented monetary stimulus of unprecedented size.58 The
budget deficit (14.9% of GDP in 2020) reached double digits as a share of GDP for the first time
since World War II, and the Fed has maintained interest rates near zero and its balance sheet
increased by about $3 tril ion from March to June 2020.59
As discussed above, stimulus is not in and of itself inflationary, but stimulus can lead to high
inflation if it causes the economy to overheat. Stimulus helped stabilize an economy where output
fel by about one-third in the first half of 2020 without causing inflation to rise. But now that the
output gap is projected to close rapidly, economists have debated whether continued stimulus is
necessary to support the economic recovery or whether it is contributing to overheating and high
inflation.
Under current law, fiscal stimulus is mostly temporary and is scheduled to begin being withdrawn
in 2021, a process that wil reduce budget deficits gradual y but stil leave them historical y high
relative to GDP in coming years. In July 2021, CBO projected that, under current policy, deficits
wil decline from 14.9% of GDP in 2020 to 13.4% in 2021 to 4.7% in 2022 before fal ing to more
normal shares of GDP in 2023.60 By one measure, fiscal policy became contractionary in the
second quarter of 2021.61 However, more fiscal stimulus may be enacted in the 117th Congress.

55 Laurence Ball and N. Gregory Mankiw, “T he NAIRU in T heory and Practice,” Journal of Economic Perspectives,
vol. 16, no. 4 (Fall 2002), pp. 115-136, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/mankiw/files/jep.ballmankiw.pdf.
56 Gwynn Guilford, “ A Key Gauge of Future Inflation Is Easing,” Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2021,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-key-gauge-of-future-inflation-is-easing-11627291800. Data available at
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MICH.
57 Federal Reserve, Monetary Policy Report to Congress, July 2021, p. 20, https://www.federalreserve.gov/
monetarypolicy/files/20210709_mprfullreport.pdf.
58 International Monetary Fund (IMF), United States 2021 Article IV Consultation—Press Release; Country Report No.
21/162, July 2021, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2021/07/22/United-States-2021-Article-IV-
Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report -and-Statement-by-the-462540?cid=em-COM-123-43429.
59 For details, see CRS Report R46729, Federal Deficits, Growing Debt, and the Economy in the Wake of COVID-19,
by Lida R. Weinstock; and CRS Report R46411, The Federal Reserve’s Response to COVID-19: Policy Issues, by
Marc Labonte.
60 CBO, An Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook: 2021 to 2031 , July 2021, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/
2021-07/57218-Outlook.pdf.
61 Brookings Institution, “Hutchins Center Fiscal Impact Measure,” July 30, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/
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On August 24, 2021, the House agreed to a rule (H.Res. 601) that adopted a FY2022 budget
resolution (S.Con.Res. 14) and began debate on a major infrastructure bil (the Senate-passed
version of H.R. 3684). The budget resolution included reconciliation instructions al owing for
$3.5 tril ion in spending over 10 years in future legislation. Until enacted, it is premature to
predict what effect, if any, these legislative proposals might have on the economy and inflation.
The plans’ effects on inflation are not the only, or even the primary, consideration in evaluating
their costs and benefit. Nevertheless, in terms of inflationary effects, the main question is what
level of fiscal stimulus is consistent with a brisk return to full employment without overheating
the economy. Some economists have argued that the existing stimulus already enacted alone is
too large relative to the current output gap, increasing the risk of high inflation.62 Additional
stimulus would add to those risks. Theoretical y, if inflation were to prove persistent, other fiscal
or monetary policy measures could be taken to reduce the level of stimulus. In practice, political
considerations could make that difficult.
The Fed has also signaled that it does not intend to withdraw monetary stimulus in the near term.
In July 2021, the Fed stated that it did not intend to raise interest rates above zero “until labor
market conditions have reached levels consistent with the Committee’s assessments of maximum
employment and inflation … is on track to moderately exceed 2 percent for some time” and
would not reduce its asset purchases for the time being.63
The Fed has a statutory mandate to achieve maximum employment and stable prices, which it
defines as 2% inflation as measured by the PCE. Higher inflation creates a conflict in how the
Fed should approach its two statutory goals—it could tighten policy in response to higher
inflation or maintain stimulus to address the employment shortfal .
There are several reasons the Fed believes that maintaining the stimulus currently in place is
necessary. First, employment—almost 7 mil ion below its pre-pandemic level—is stil below
what the Fed believes maximum employment to be. Second, the pandemic, in the midst of the
Delta surge, stil poses risks to the economic recovery. Third, although higher inflation has
already materialized, the Fed does not believe that high inflation wil persist or that inflationary
expectations wil rise. Fed leadership projected in June that inflation wil fal to around 2% by
2022. Fourth, the measures of inflation that the Fed is focused on show lower rates of increase
than does headline CPI, which attracts the most media attention. The Fed focuses on PCE, and the
Fed typical y responds more to movements in core than headline. Core inflation—while stil
above average—has been lower than headline inflation. Core PCE has recently been about two
percentage points lower than headline CPI.
Fifth, in 2020 the Fed announced that it would aim to achieve an average inflation target of 2%
that features periods of above 2% inflation to compensate for periods of below 2% inflation.
Higher inflation in 2021 is consistent with this strategy. Because inflation has been below 2% by
the Fed’s preferred measure (PCE) in most years since the 2007-2009 financial crisis, a period of

interactives/hutchins-center-fiscal-impact-measure.
62 See, for example, Lawrence H. Summers, “T he Biden Stimulus Is Admirably Ambitious. But It Brings Some Big
Risks, T oo,” Washington Post, February 4, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/02/04/larry-
summers-biden-covid-stimulus/; Olivier Blanchard, “ In Defense of Concerns over the $1.9 T rillion Relief Plan,”
Peterson Institute for International Economics, February 18, 2021, https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-
issues-watch/defense-concerns-over-19-trillion-relief-plan. T he IMF projects that if the American Rescue Plan,
American Jobs Plan, and American Families Plan were enacted, inflation would rise from below 2% to above 3% in
2021 before falling below 3% in 2022. T he IMF also projects that GDP would be higher and unemployment would be
lower. IMF, United States 2021 Article IV Consultation—Press Release.
63 Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement, press release, July 28, 2021,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20210728a.htm.
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inflation above 2% is needed to return to an average inflation rate of 2%. How much higher and
for how long depends on the starting point. For example, the last time headline PCE exceeded
2%, it was 2.1% in 2018. If 2019 is taken as the starting point, average inflation would average
almost exactly 2% from 2019 to 2021 if the Fed’s median June projection for 2021 (3.4%) is
correct. In other words, an inflation rate of 3.4% in 2021 is necessary to achieve a three-year
average inflation target of 2%. As inflation was below 2% for several years before 2018, one
could also pick an earlier starting point for the average inflation target, such as 2012. To average
2% inflation over the period 2012-2021, inflation would have to be 7.6% in 2021 to make up for
the larger shortfal . Alternatively, inflation would have to be 3% every year from 2022 through
2025 to reach an average of 2% (assuming the Fed’s projection for 2021 is correct). One can
disagree with the Fed’s strategy, but if the Fed reacted to the current increase in inflation by
tightening policy, it would make it less likely that average inflation would reach its target of 2%
because of past shortfal s.
The decision to not withdraw stimulus in reaction to inflation that is already above its 2% target
underlines how its strategy for achieving price stability has changed. From the 1980s to the
financial crisis, the Fed’s strategy for achieving price stability was to tighten monetary policy
preemptively before higher inflation had emerged. It believed that this was necessary because of
lags in the time it took for a change in monetary policy to affect inflation and in order to keep
inflationary expectations contained. Now, the Fed is signaling it would wait until after higher
inflation has proven to be persistent to raise rates.
The Fed may be correct in its assessment today that higher inflation wil not persist, but if it is
wrong, it might not realize until it is too late and higher inflation has become embedded. In that
case, it could be costly to the economy to get the “inflation genie back in the bottle” down the
road. To some critics, this change in philosophy is a sign that the Fed no longer has the same
commitment to ensuring price stability. This could be an issue, because if individuals stop
believing the Fed is committed to low inflation, it makes it harder for the Fed to achieve low
inflation because it keeps inflationary expectations anchored.
Will Money Supply Growth Lead to High Inflation?
Some commentators are concerned that current monetary policy wil cause high inflation based on a “monetarist”
explanation of inflation—that inflation rises when the money supply persistently and significantly outpaces the
demand for money. The Fed’s policies during the pandemic have been mostly financed by a rapid increase in the
monetary base (currency and bank reserves). Currently, monetary base growth is mainly being caused by the Fed’s
$120 bil ion monthly purchases of Treasury securities and MBS. Increases in the monetary base can lead to
increases in the broader money supply, and one measure of the money supply (M2) increased 16% from February
2020 to May 2020 and an additional 14% in the 12 months after that.64 However, rapid increases in the money
supply (albeit not as rapid as the growth between February and May 2020) did not result in higher inflation during
the Great Recession, and the Fed has introduced new tools, such as paying interest on bank reserves and the
Overnight Reverse Repurchase Agreement Facility, to contain inflationary pressures caused by growth in t he
monetary base.65 In the Fed’s view, the growth in the money supply to date has few implications for inflation.66

64 M1 cannot be used over this time period, because a definitional change to include savings accounts caused it to
quadruple.
65 T he Fed’s goal in expanding the monetary base was to put downward pressure on interest rates and, in the spring of
2020, prevent a liquidity crisis by flooding the financial system with liquidity. It does not assess its policies based on
their effect on t he money supply.
66 Federal Reserve, Historical Approaches to Monetary Policy, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
historical-approaches-to-monetary-policy.htm.
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Conclusion
The economy has not yet fully recovered from the pandemic, but GDP is recovering quickly.
Rising inflation reflects factors unique to the pandemic and the rapid recovery, aided by the
unprecedented fiscal and monetary policy implemented since early 2020. If projections are
correct, the increase in inflation would be moderate, fleeting, and self-correcting. If so, policy
changes that were overreacting to the increase could be harmful to the recovery. For example,
with employment stil low compared to before the pandemic, changing policy in reaction to a
temporary increase in inflation could prolong the return to full employment.
Withdrawing stimulus prematurely poses risks—namely, that the recovery wil falter without
fiscal and monetary support or it wil become necessary if another deterioration in public health
causes another dip in economic activity. To il ustrate these risks, some would argue that the
tightening of fiscal and monetary policy after the Great Recession led to a weaker recovery and a
prolonged return to full employment. But leaving stimulus in place too long also poses risks—an
increase in inflation that becomes entrenched and costly to dislodge in the future, as wel as
exacerbating sectoral imbalances in the short run. The Great Inflation ended after the Fed’s
policies resulted in the federal funds rate reaching as high as 19%, causing a deep and prolonged
“double dip” recession. Beginning to withdraw stimulus now might prolong the return to full
employment, but the economy has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to eventual y return to full
employment so long as expansions last long enough.

Author Information

Marc Labonte
Lida R. Weinstock
Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy
Analyst in Macroeconomic Policy

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
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