Funding Conditions: Constitutional Limits on Congress’s Spending Power

Funding Conditions: Constitutional Limits on Congress’s Spending Power

Funding Conditions: Constitutional Limits on
July 1, 2021
Congress’s Spending Power
Victoria L. Killion
The Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 8, Clause 1) gives Congress
Legislative Attorney
broad power to authorize spending for the “general Welfare.” The Necessary and Proper Clause

(Article I, Section 8, Clause 18) supplements Congress’s spending authority, allowing Congress
to restrict how federal funds are used. Congress can also place requirements on the recipients of

federal funds to regulate their conduct in exchange for federal funding.
While funding conditions such as these are common, they are subject to constitutional limitations. First, funding conditions
must provide clear notice to the recipient of what actions are required in exchange for federal funds and the consequences of
noncompliance. Second, funding conditions must be related to the purposes of the federally funded program or activity—
though the required degree of connection is unsettled. Third, although Congress may incentivize states to adopt a particular
policy in order to obtain specific federal funds, it may not coerce state participation. Congress may not, for example, tie an
existing funding source on which a state has come to rely on compliance with a new kind of requirement. Fourth, the funding
condition may not violate an independent constitutional bar or the related unconstitutional conditions doctrine. For example,
Congress may not require governmental recipients, as a condition of receiving federal funds, to take an action that would
violate an individual’s freedom of speech or free exercise of religion.
Whether a funding recipient is a state or a private entity may affect the applicability of these four general limits on funding
conditions. While federalism—that is, the division of power between the federal government and the states—is a basis for
many of these constitutional limits, the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed whether each limit applies regardless of
whether the recipient is a state.
Additional considerations arise when the executive branch, rather than Congress, imposes a funding condition. Congress
often delegates the authority to administer grant programs and disburse financial assistance to federal agencies. Ultimately,
however, the “power of the purse” belongs to the legislative branch, not the executive branch. Accordingly, when a federal
agency places a condition on federal funding, that condition could give rise to constitutional (i.e., separation-of-powers) or
statutory (e.g., Administrative Procedure Act) challenges if the condition arguably exceeds the scope of the agency’s
delegated authority.
Thus, while Congress’s power to authorize and condition federal spending is expansive, a funding condition that exceeds the
limits discussed in this report could run afoul of the Constitution.

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Contents
Broad Spending Power for the General Welfare ............................................................................. 1
Not Limited to Enumerated Powers .......................................................................................... 1
Deference to Congress’s Judgment on General Welfare Needs ................................................ 2
Conditions Permitted ................................................................................................................. 3
General Constitutional Limits on Federal Funding Conditions ....................................................... 5
Clear Notice .............................................................................................................................. 5
Pennhurst’s Clear Notice Standard ..................................................................................... 6
Private Remedies for Violations of Funding Conditions .................................................... 7
Relatedness .............................................................................................................................. 13
Anti-Coercion .......................................................................................................................... 15
Independent Constitutional Bar ............................................................................................... 17
Two General Formulations ............................................................................................... 18
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine .............................................................................. 19
Conditions on States Versus Private Funding Recipients .............................................................. 20
Conditions from the Executive Branch ......................................................................................... 23
Litigation over Byrne JAG Program Conditions ..................................................................... 24
Litigation over HHS’s 2019 Conscience Rule ........................................................................ 27
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 29

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 31

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Funding Conditions: Constitutional Limits on Congress’s Spending Power

ongress’s spending power comes from the Taxing and Spending Clause of the
Constitution, which gives Congress the power to spend federal funds to “provide for the
C common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”1 The Supreme Court has
interpreted this authority to include the power to place conditions on federal funding. The
conditions need not be limited to how the funds are spent. Congress can, and often does, use its
spending power to incentivize states to adopt Congress’s preferred policies or practices. The
focus of this report is the constitutional limit of this authority.
This report begins with a discussion of the broad reach of the Spending Clause, whose only
express, textual limitation is the requirement that federal spending be in pursuit of the national
defense or general welfare. Beyond that, there are four general limits on Congress’s authority to
condition federal funding, discussed in the second part of this report. Those limits are the
requirements of: (1) clear notice; (2) relatedness; (3) anti-coercion; and (4) consistency with any
independent constitutional bar. The third part of this report examines whether the four general
limits on funding conditions apply equally to conditions on state and private recipients. The
fourth part of the report discusses limitations on the executive branch’s ability to impose federal
funding conditions, including the separation-of-powers principle and the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).
Broad Spending Power for the General Welfare
In the earliest Spending Clause cases, the Supreme Court considered both whether Congress’s
spending power was limited to matters on which Congress had the express constitutional
authority to legislate and who determines the needs of the “general Welfare.”2 As explained
below, both of these questions were resolved in favor of Congress’s broad spending authority. In
addition, the Court has long affirmed Congress’s authority to place conditions on federal funding,
reasoning that the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to ensure that funds are used to
advance federal interests.
Not Limited to Enumerated Powers
Because the Constitution provides Congress with a limited set of enumerated powers,3 an early
debate emerged among the Framers over whether the Constitution limits Congress’s spending
power to areas in which Congress could legislate directly, such as matters of interstate
commerce.4 James Madison believed the Spending Clause’s reference to “general Welfare” in the
first clause of article I, section 8 “amounted to no more than a reference to the other powers
enumerated in the subsequent clauses of the same section.”5 In other words, Madison maintained
that Congress could only exercise its spending power to carry out other powers that the
Constitution expressly granted to Congress, such as the power to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce or to establish post offices.6 In contrast, Alexander Hamilton “maintained the clause

1 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
2 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
3 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
4 Butler, 297 U.S. at 65.
5 Id.
6 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”); id. § 8, cl. 7 (granting Congress the power to “establish Post
Offices and post Roads”).
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confers a power separate and distinct from those later enumerated” and that “Congress
consequently has a substantive power to tax and to appropriate, limited only by the requirement
that it shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare of the United States.”7
In the 1936 case of United States v. Butler, the Supreme Court settled on “the Hamiltonian
position.”8 The Court held that while “the power to tax is not unlimited, its confines are set in the
clause which confers it, and not in those of § 8 which bestow and define the legislative powers of
the Congress.”9 Thus, “the power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for
public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the
Constitution.”10 The Butler Court nevertheless cautioned that this “broader construction leaves
the power to spend subject to limitations,” including that federal spending be in pursuit of the
“common defence” or “general welfare.”11
Deference to Congress’s Judgment on General Welfare Needs
Courts have the ultimate authority to determine whether an appropriation is “in aid of the ‘general
welfare’” within the meaning of the Spending Clause in light of their constitutional duty to “say
what the law is.”12 However, the Supreme Court has emphasized that in deciding “whether a
particular expenditure is intended to serve general public purposes, courts should defer
substantially” to Congress’s judgment.13
Helvering v. Davis, decided a year after Butler, illustrated this deference to Congress’s
judgment.14 There, the Court upheld the Social Security Act’s provision of “old age benefits,”
which primarily took the form of a monthly pension payable to a retiree 65 years of age or older,
funded by mandatory, wage-based contributions from employees and employers.15 The Court
rejected a Tenth Amendment challenge to this statutory scheme because it came within
Congress’s power to spend for the general welfare.16 Courts should not second-guess Congress’s
decision, the Supreme Court stated, unless its “choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary
power, not an exercise of judgment,” such that there is “no reasonable possibility” that the
“legislation fall[s] within the wide range of discretion permitted to the Congress.”17 The Court

7 Butler, 297 U.S. at 65–66.
8 Id. at 66.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Butler Court ultimately held that the challenged statute (the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933) violated the Tenth Amendment because it sought to regulate indirectly what
Congress could not regulate directly: “subjects within the states’ reserved jurisdiction.” Id. at 74–75. The Court
expressed concern that if it allowed the Spending Clause to be an end-run around other constitutional checks on
Congress’s power, Congress could “become the instrument for total subversion of the governmental powers reserved to
the individual states.” Id. at 75.
12 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
13 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
14 Helvering, 301 U.S. 619.
15 Id. at 634–36, 641.
16 Id. at 640.
17 Id. at 640–41 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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also observed that the general welfare is not a “static” concept because “[w]hat is critical or
urgent changes with the times.”18
The Court then cited two reasons to defer to Congress’s judgment with respect to the Social
Security Act. First, the Court concluded that the statute was not “a display of arbitrary power”:
“Congress did not improvise a judgment when it found that the award of old age benefits would
be conducive to the general welfare.”19 Instead, Congress had held hearings and made legislative
findings showing that the “number of persons” aged 65 and older in the United States who are
“unable to take care of themselves [was] growing at a threatening pace.”20 Second, the Court saw
the “problem” as “plainly national in area and dimensions,” and beyond the capacity of individual
states to handle “effectively.”21 The Court reiterated its limited role in evaluating whether
spending legislation comports with the Spending Clause: “Whether wisdom or unwisdom resides
in [this] scheme of benefits ... is not for us to say. . . . Our concern here, as often, is with power,
not with wisdom.”22
Thus, while the Spending Clause’s reference to “general Welfare” is technically a limit on
Congress’s spending authority, the Supreme Court has interpreted the concept broadly and with
deference to Congress’s judgment.23
Conditions Permitted
Complementing its discretion to spend funds for a variety of purposes, Congress has “wide
latitude to attach conditions to the receipt of federal assistance in order to further its policy
objectives.”24 This latitude is reflected in the range of spending conditions that Congress has
enacted over time. For example:
 Congress has required universities receiving federal funds to provide military recruiters
with the same level of campus access as other recruiters;25
 Congress has made it a crime to bribe officials of state and local entities that receive a
certain level of federal funding;26

18 Id. at 641.
19 Id. at 640–41.
20 Id. at 642.
21 Id. at 644.
22 Id.
23 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (describing the “first” limitation on Congress’s spending power
as originating from the “language of the Constitution itself: the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of
‘the general welfare,’” but stating that in “considering whether a particular expenditure is intended to serve general
public purposes, courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress”).
24 United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 203 (2003) (plurality opinion); see also Dole, 483 U.S. at 206
(“Incident to this [spending] power, Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds, and has repeatedly
employed the power ‘to further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by
the recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives.’” (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474
(1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.))).
25 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 70 (2006) (holding that 10 U.S.C. § 983 did
not violate the First Amendment).
26 Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 602, 608 (2004) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) did not exceed Congress’s
authority under the Spending Clause).
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 Congress has required libraries to install filtering software in order to receive federal
funds to expand internet access for patrons;27
 Congress has prescribed milestones for the disposal of radioactive waste in exchange for
money generated by federally authorized state surcharges on that waste;28
 Congress has incentivized states to adopt a minimum drinking age of 21 by withholding a
percentage of federal highway funds;29 and
 Congress has required state and local officials working on federally funded activities to
comply with the Hatch Act’s limitations on government officials’ participation in political
campaign activities.30
The Supreme Court has upheld each of these laws when challenged on Spending Clause or other
constitutional grounds.31
Congress’s authority to condition the receipt of federal funds on compliance with certain
mandates stems in part from the Necessary and Proper Clause, which supplements all of
Congress’s legislative powers.32 The Necessary and Proper Clause states that “Congress shall
have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”33 This Clause, the
Court has held, authorizes Congress to attach conditions to federal funds to ensure “that taxpayer
dollars appropriated under that power are in fact spent for the general welfare.”34
In the seminal case McCulloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court adopted a permissive standard for
assessing whether a regulation is “necessary and proper” to carry out a federal power: “Let the
end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”35 While individual Justices have at times
questioned whether a spending condition was “necessary and proper,”36 the Supreme Court has

27 Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 214 (plurality opinion) (concluding that 20 U.S.C. §§ 9134(f)(1)(A)(i) and (B)(i) and
47 U.S.C. §§ 254(h)(6)(B)(i) and (C)(i) did not violate the First Amendment rights of libraries or their patrons).
28 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171–73 (1992) (holding that 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021e(d)(2)(A)–(B) did not
exceed Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause).
29 Dole, 483 U.S. at 206 (holding that 23 U.S.C. § 158 did not exceed Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause).
30 Oklahoma v. U.S. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 142–43 (1947) (holding that § 12(a) of the Hatch Act did not
violate the Tenth Amendment).
31 See supra notes 25–30 for case citations.
32 See New York, 505 U.S. at 158–59 (“The Court’s broad construction of Congress’ power under the Commerce and
Spending Clauses has of course been guided, as it has with respect to Congress’ power generally, by the Constitution’s
Necessary and Proper Clause . . . .”). See generally CRS Report R45323, Federalism-Based Limitations on
Congressional Power: An Overview, coordinated by Andrew Nolan and Kevin M. Lewis.
33 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
34 Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004).
35 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819); see also United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 394 (2013)
(“As we have come to understand these words [from McCulloch] and the provision they explain, they ‘leav[e] to
Congress a large discretion as to the means that may be employed in executing a given power.’” (quoting Lottery Case,
188 U.S. 321, 355 (1903))).
36 See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 727 n.2 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (positing that although the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) “is entirely consonant with the Establishment Clause,
it may well exceed Congress’ authority under either the Spending Clause or the Commerce Clause,” citing his
concurring opinion in Sabri v. United States for the proposition that “for a Spending Clause condition on a State’s
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never explicitly invalidated a spending condition for failure to meet that standard.37 However, the
Court has recognized other constitutional provisions and principles that limit Congress’s
authority to condition federal spending, which are discussed in the next section.
General Constitutional Limits on Federal Funding
Conditions
The Supreme Court has identified four constitutional limits on Congress’s power to attach
conditions to federal funding.38 First, Congress must provide clear notice of the funding
condition. Second, the condition must relate to the program or funding stream it restricts. Third,
the condition may not be unduly coercive. And fourth, the condition may not induce the recipient
to violate an independent constitutional provision, such as the First Amendment’s Free Speech or
Establishment Clauses. These four constraints on Congress’s spending power generally stem from
constitutional provisions outside of the Spending Clause itself, such as the Tenth Amendment,
which limits Congress’s legislative power vis-à-vis the states, and other principles of state
sovereignty reflected in the Constitution’s text and structure.39 Because of the centrality of
federalism concerns in the Supreme Court’s Spending Clause cases, the discussion below
frequently refers to Congress’s obligations when imposing conditions on states in exchange for
federal funding. However, as discussed later in the report, some of these restrictions may also
apply to funding conditions imposed on private entities.40
Clear Notice
The clear notice principle requires conditions on federal funding to be unambiguous and
prospective so that states have an opportunity to accept or reject the terms of the funding
arrangement.41

receipt of funds to be ‘Necessary and Proper’ to the expenditure of the funds, there must be ‘some obvious, simple, and
direct relation’ between the condition and the expenditure of the funds” (quoting Sabri, 541 U.S. 600, 613 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment))).
37 In the Commerce Clause context, however, the Court has suggested that laws that violate the principle of state
sovereignty also violate the Necessary and Proper Clause because they are not a “proper” means of executing
Congress’s enumerated authority. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–24 (1997); cf. Pierce Cty. v. Guillen, 537
U.S. 129, 147 n.9 (2003) (concluding that because the Commerce Clause authorized the statutory provisions at issue,
the Court “need not decide whether they could also be a proper exercise of Congress’ authority under the Spending
Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause”).
38 E.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08, 211 (1987).
39 See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”). See generally CRS Report R45323, supra note
32, at 2 (explaining that “beyond the internal limits on Congress’s powers,” in the form of its enumerated powers in
article I, section 8 of the Constitution, “the Constitution also imposes ‘external’ constraints on congressional action—
that is, affirmative prohibitions found elsewhere in the text or structure of the document”).
40 See infra “Conditions on States Versus Private Funding Recipients.”
41 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 25 (1981). Retroactive conditions can also be coercive.
See infra “Anti-Coercion.”
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Pennhurst’s Clear Notice Standard
The seminal case on the clear notice standard is Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman.42 In Pennhurst, the Supreme Court considered a statute in which Congress provided
funding for states to provide services to individuals with developmental disabilities.43 As part of
the plan, states had to make “satisfactory” “assurances” that they would “protect[]” the “rights” of
persons with developmental disabilities “consistent with” the findings section of the act.44 The
statute also required states to take certain other actions “as a condition” of receiving assistance.45
The parties disagreed, however, on the scope of the conditions. A findings section in the statute
provided that persons with developmental disabilities “have a right to appropriate treatment” and
that such treatment “should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the person’s
personal liberty.”46 The case presented the question whether these findings stated a condition on
the federal funding.
In the course of considering this question, the Court examined “the possible sources of
Congress’[s] power to legislate,” including the Spending Clause.47 The Court likened spending
laws with conditions to a contract:
[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract:
in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.
The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on
whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’ There can,
of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to
ascertain what is expected of it.48
The Court held that “if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it
must do so unambiguously.”49 Applying this rule, the Court concluded that “Congress fell well
short of providing clear notice to the States” that “by accepting funds under the Act, [they] would
indeed be obligated to comply with [the findings section].”50 Viewing this section in the context
of the statute as a whole, the Court reasoned that the findings reflected “general statements of
federal policy, not newly created legal duties.”51 By contrast, the Court observed, in other parts of
the statute, Congress used “clear terms” like “condition” when it intended to impose a
requirement on a state in exchange for federal funding.52 The Court further noted that the statute
lacked the typical method of enforcing a funding condition because it did not authorize the

42 Pennhurst, 451 U.S. 1.
43 Id. at 11.
44 42 U.S.C. § 6063(b)(5)(C) (1976 ed. & Supp. III).
45 See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 12–13 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6005 (requiring recipients to hire qualified individuals with
disabilities); id. § 6009 (requiring states to submit a plan to evaluate services provided under the statute); id.
§ 6011(a) (requiring states to provide “satisfactory assurances that each [funded] program” has “a habilitation plan” in
place for each person receiving services under the program); and § 6012(a) (requiring states to “have in effect a system
to protect and advocate the rights of persons with developmental disabilities”).
46 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976 ed. & Supp. III).
47 See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 15.
48 Id. at 17 (internal citations omitted).
49 Id.
50 See id. at 25.
51 Id. at 23.
52 Id. The Court reasoned that requiring that state plans include “assurances” that program beneficiaries would be
“protected consistent with” the findings section “would be unnecessary if . . . all state programs were required to fund
the rights described” in that section. Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
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federal government to withhold funds for noncompliance with the findings section.53 Accordingly,
the Court concluded that the statute did not require states to provide for “appropriate treatment”
in the “least restrictive” environment in exchange for federal funds.54
The Pennhurst Court framed the clear notice principle as a “rule of statutory construction”—that
is, in interpreting funding legislation, a reader should look for a clear expression of Congress’s
intent to impose a condition before concluding that the statute imposes one.55 Nevertheless, the
Court suggested that the “appropriate treatment” provision would violate the Constitution if it
were a condition because it provided inadequate notice to the states of their obligations in
accepting federal funds.56 It is evident from the Court’s Pennhurst discussion and the application
of the clear notice principle in subsequent cases that clear notice is a constitutional requirement,
not just an interpretive aid in construing statutory language.57
Private Remedies for Violations of Funding Conditions
The clear notice requirement applies not only to the condition itself, but also to the remedy that a
law imposes for a state’s violation of that condition.58 As the Pennhurst Court observed, “the
typical remedy for state noncompliance with federally imposed conditions” is “action by the
Federal Government to terminate funds to the State.”59 Some litigants, however, have argued that
funding conditions may state generally applicable legal requirements that may be enforced in
other ways, such as by private parties in court.
Supreme Court decisions applying the clear notice principle in the context of litigation by private
parties have generally fallen into three categories. The first category involves cases where the
plaintiff alleges that violation of a funding condition gives rise to a private cause of action—that
is, a right to sue the violator in court to recover monetary damages or obtain injunctive relief.60
The second category involves cases where parties dispute the scope of liability or remedies under
an available private right of action. The third category involves cases where the plaintiff argues
that a state has waived its sovereign immunity from suit.

53 Id. at 23. The Court further concluded that the statute’s legislative history suggested that Congress intended the
findings section “to be hortatory, not mandatory.” Id. at 24.
54 Id. at 27.
55 Id. at 24.
56 Id. at 25.
57 See id. at 17 (“The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the
State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’” (citing Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548, 585–98 (1937); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980))); Terry Jean Seligmann, Muddy Waters: The Supreme
Court and the Clear Statement Rule for Spending Clause Legislation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1067, 1079 (2010) (stating that
the “Pennhurst canon of statutory construction took on constitutional overtones in 1987 when the Rehnquist Court set
the modern boundaries for Spending Clause legislation in South Dakota v. Dole”).
58 See, e.g., Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287 (1998) (“When Congress attaches conditions to
the award of federal funds under its spending power, . . . we examine closely the propriety of private actions holding
the recipient liable in monetary damages for noncompliance with the condition. Our central concern in that regard is
with ensuring ‘that the receiving entity of federal funds [has] notice that it will be liable for a monetary award.’”
(internal citations omitted)).
59 Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 28.
60 Right of Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “private right of action” as an “individual’s
right to sue in a personal capacity to enforce a legal claim”).
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Private Right of Action
Congress may create a private right of action against violators of a funding condition through
express language in the authorizing legislation.61 However, in the absence of express text, a court
will not readily infer the existence of a private right of action. Instead, a court will ask, first,
whether Congress intended to create a private right, and second, whether Congress intended to
create a private remedy.62 Pennhurst’s clear notice standard guides both of these inquiries when
the statute at issue is spending legislation.63
For example, a federal statute, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA),
provided that “[n]o funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any
educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of
education records . . . of students without the written consent of their parents.”64 In Gonzaga
University v. Doe, the Supreme Court considered whether this requirement, stated as a funding
condition, would allow a student to sue a private university for the unauthorized release of his
education records.65 After overhearing allegations that the plaintiff had sexually assaulted another
student, a university employee disclosed the allegations, without the plaintiff’s knowledge, to
state officials considering his application for a teaching certification.66 The plaintiff sued the
university for a violation of FERPA pursuant to “Section 1983”—a federal law that allows private
individuals to sue persons who, acting “under color of” law, deprived them of their constitutional
rights.67
Citing Pennhurst, the Court held that “unless Congress ‘speaks with a clear voice,’ and manifests
an ‘unambiguous’ intent to confer individual rights, federal funding provisions provide no basis
for private enforcement by § 1983.”68 The Court acknowledged that “[p]laintiffs suing under
§ 1983 do not have the burden of showing an intent to create a private remedy because § 1983
generally supplies a remedy for the vindication of rights secured by federal statutes.”69 However,
such plaintiffs still have to demonstrate the existence of a private, federal right.70 In the Court’s
view, there was “no question that FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions fail[ed] to confer
enforceable rights.”71 For one, the Court reasoned, the provisions “lack[ed] the sort of ‘rights-
creating’ language” present in other laws, such as Titles VI and IX,72 which state that “no person

61 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (stating that “[a]ny party aggrieved by” certain findings and decisions under the
act “shall have the right to bring a civil action ... which action may be brought in any State court of competent
jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy”).
62 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001).
63 Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 356–58 (1992).
64 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 279 (2002) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)).
65 Id. at 276.
66 Id. at 277.
67 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 277.
68 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280.
69 Id. at 284 (emphasis added).
70 Id. at 283.
71 Id. at 287.
72 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., which prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, which prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sex, are two prominent examples of spending laws enacted pre-Pennhurst for which the Supreme Court has
recognized a private right of action. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979). However, these examples
do not illustrate the Court’s current approach to implied rights of action, which requires clear notice of both a private
right and a private remedy. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001).
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shall be subjected to discrimination.”73 Instead, the Court observed, “FERPA’s provisions speak
only to the Secretary of Education, directing that ‘no funds shall be made available’” to an
institution with a noncompliant policy, and thus lacked a focus on individual students’ interests.74
Moreover, the Court reasoned, the plaintiff was not without recourse because FERPA empowered
the Secretary to investigate violations of the act and terminate funds under certain
circumstances.75
Scope of Liability or Remedy
Even if a spending condition establishes a privately enforceable right, a court may still need to
determine the scope of liability or the available remedies if that right is violated. In particular, a
court may need to decide whether the law allows for compensatory damages, punitive damages,
or certain costs or fees.76 The Supreme Court has held that funding recipients’ potential liability,
like the condition itself, “must be set out ‘unambiguously.’”77 The reviewing court must “view the
[statute] from the perspective of a state official who is engaged in the process of deciding whether
the State should accept [the statute’s] funds and the obligations that go with those funds.”78 The
relevant consideration is “whether such a state official would clearly understand” that the state
might incur the type of liability in question in the event of a statutory violation.79 Increasingly, the
Supreme Court has required the text of the statute to supply the requisite notice, particularly for
laws enacted after Pennhurst.
In Barnes v. Gorman, the Court considered whether a plaintiff could recover punitive damages for
discrimination in violation of certain provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.80 Both sets of provisions adopted the remedial scheme
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, under which, per a prior Supreme Court decision, “a
federal court may order any appropriate relief.”81 Until Barnes, however, the Court had not
elaborated on the meaning of “appropriate relief.”82
The Barnes Court reasoned that given the “contractual nature” of spending legislation, “a remedy
is ‘appropriate relief’ only if the funding recipient is on notice that, by accepting federal funding,
it exposes itself to liability of that nature.”83 The Court stated that a “funding recipient is
generally on notice that it is subject not only to those remedies explicitly provided in the relevant
legislation, but also to those remedies traditionally available in suits for breach of contract,”

73 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 289.
76 See CRS In Focus IF11291, Introduction to Tort Law, by Kevin M. Lewis (stating that “compensatory damages ...
attempt to make an injured plaintiff ‘whole,’” while punitive damages, which exceed compensatory damages, “punish
the defendant for his conduct”).
77 Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
78 Id.
79 Id.; see, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 256 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (asking
whether, under the Spending Clause, “the obligations set forth” in the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 “are
unambiguous such that a state official would clearly understand her responsibilities under the Act”).
80 Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 183 (2002) (citing ADA § 203, 42 U.S.C. § 12133, and Rehabilitation Act
§ 505(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2)).
81 Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 69 (1992).
82 Barnes, 536 U.S. at 183.
83 Id. at 187.
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which include compensatory damages and injunctive relief, but “generally not” punitive
damages.84 Accordingly, the Court held that punitive damages were not available for violations of
the nondiscrimination provisions in the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.85
Three years later, in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, the Supreme Court again
suggested that “notice” to a funding recipient of its potential liability for violating a funding
condition need not come from the statute alone.86 The Jackson Court listed three reasons why
states were on notice that they could be liable in a private Title IX action for intentional
retaliation.87 First, the Court noted that its decisions since the late 1970s apprised states that they
could be liable for “diverse forms of intentional sex discrimination” in violation of Title IX.88
Second, “regulations implementing Title IX clearly prohibit[ed] retaliation and ha[d] been on the
books for nearly 30 years.”89 Third, appellate courts had ruled that Title IX covered retaliation at
the time of the conduct in question in the case.90 In these circumstances, the Court concluded, the
school board “could not have realistically supposed that . . . it remained free to retaliate against
those who reported sex discrimination.”91
Although the Barnes and Jackson Courts recognized remedies not “explicitly provided in the
relevant legislation,”92 both cases involved statutes whose remedial schemes were adopted before
Pennhurst. In contrast, the Supreme Court demanded more textual clarity in Arlington Central
School District Board of Education v. Murphy—a case involving a post-Pennhurst statute that
expressly provided for a private right of action.93 In Arlington Central, the Court held that the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) did not provide “clear notice” to the states
that, by accepting funds under IDEA, they might be liable for the prevailing parties’ expert fees in
litigation brought under IDEA.94 The statute authorized the award of “reasonable attorneys’ fees
as part of the costs” to a prevailing party.95 The Court reasoned that neither “attorneys’ fees” nor
“costs” clearly encompassed expert fees.96

84 Id. Observing that punitive damages could well exceed the amount of a recipient’s funding, the Court also expressed
doubt that “funding recipients would have agreed to exposure to such unorthodox and indeterminate liability” or
“would even have accepted the funding if punitive damages liability was a required condition.” Id. at 188.
85 Id. at 189.
86 544 U.S. 167, 182–83 (2005).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 183.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 183–84.
92 Barnes, 536 U.S. at 187.
93 548 U.S. 291 (2006). Although parts of IDEA predated Pennhurst, Congress added the relevant cause of action in
2004. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, P.L. 108-446, tit. I, § 101, 118 Stat. 2647,
2723.
94 Arlington Cent., 548 U.S. at 300.
95 Id. at 297 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)).
96 Id. at 297–300. A year later, the Court held that “IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable rights” to sue on
their own behalf. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 533 (2007). While the school district argued that
IDEA did not provide adequate notice of these types of actions, the Court reasoned that the case presented “a different
issue” than Arlington Central because recognizing suits by parents did not expand “the basic measure of monetary
recovery.” Id. at 534.
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While the Court cited its prior opinions on the meaning of “costs” as strong support for its
interpretation,97 it concluded that a contrary statement of congressional intent in the legislative
record did not supply the requisite notice to funding recipients. Specifically, the conference
committee report for IDEA stated: “The conferees intend that the term ‘attorneys’ fees as part of
the costs’ include reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses and the reasonable costs of
any test or evaluation which is found to be necessary for the preparation of the ... case.”98
“Whatever weight this legislative history would merit in another context,” the Court reasoned, “it
is not sufficient here.”99 The Court stated that “[i]n a Spending Clause case, the key is not what a
majority of the Members of both Houses intend but what the States are clearly told regarding the
conditions that go along with the acceptance of those funds.”100
Thus, the Court today is likely to demand explicit statutory language to indicate that Congress has
authorized a particular remedy beyond agency action to terminate funding. Such questions,
however, will be decided on a case-by-case basis under the principles discussed above: for
example, at least one lower federal court has cited judicial decisions as putting funding recipients
“on notice” of their obligations under an express, post-Pennhurst condition.101
Waiver of State Sovereign Immunity
The Supreme Court has held that under the Constitution, states retain sovereign immunity—that
is, immunity from lawsuits filed by private citizens.102 The Eleventh Amendment is “one
particular exemplification of” this principle,103 providing that courts may not entertain federal
actions “commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States” by private citizens.104
Although individual states are free to waive their sovereign immunity and consent to certain types
of lawsuits, Congress can only abrogate—or remove—a state’s sovereign immunity under limited
circumstances.105
Even if Congress cannot waive the states’ sovereign immunity for a particular purpose, it may use
its spending power to incentivize states to waive their own immunity. Specifically, Congress may

97 Arlington Cent., 548 U.S. at 300–303 (finding “perhaps the strongest support for” the Court’s interpretation of IDEA
in previous Supreme Court decisions interpreting the term “costs” to exclude expert fees); see also Forest Grove Sch.
Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 246 (2009) (suggesting that even if the statute did not place school districts on notice that
failure to provide a “free appropriate public education,” a funding condition, could make them liable for private
education costs in a specific factual scenario, states had “in any event been on notice” since a Court decision allowing
such reimbursement in “appropriate circumstances”).
98 Arlington Cent., 548 U.S. at 304 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-687, at 5 (Conf. Rep.)).
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 See Religious Sisters of Mercy v. Azar, No. 3:16-cv-00386, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9156, at *72 (D.N.D. Jan. 19,
2021) (concluding that North Dakota “possessed sufficient notice” that Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act,
enacted in 2010, “could prohibit discrimination based on gender identity,” reasoning that even though the statute
prohibited “sex discrimination” without explicitly mentioning gender identity, “[b]y March 2010, a host of federal
courts had determined that laws banning sex discrimination equally barred discrimination based on gender identity”).
102 See CRS Report R45323, supra note 32 (“The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity”).
103 FMC v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753 (2002).
104 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Although the text of the Eleventh Amendment bars suits only by citizens of “another State”
or “any Foreign State,” the broader principle of sovereign immunity encompasses suits by citizens of the defendant
state. See CRS Report R45323, supra note 32.
105 See CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10465, Copyright and State Sovereign Immunity: The Allen v. Cooper Decision, by
Kevin J. Hickey.
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condition the receipt of federal funds on a state’s consent to be sued in certain types of actions.106
Effectuating such a waiver requires a “clear statement from Congress and notice to the States”
that, by accepting federal funds, the states agree to give up their immunity from suits by private
citizens.107 It is well settled that “the mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a State
has consented to suit in federal court.”108 Nor does a state “necessarily consent[] to suit in federal
court by participating in programs funded under the statute.”109 Instead, the Supreme Court has
held that a “State’s consent to suit must be ‘unequivocally expressed’ in the text of the relevant
statute”—consistent with Pennhurst’s clear notice standard.110
The Supreme Court applied this rule in the 2011 case Sossamon v. Texas. In that case, the Court
considered whether an inmate at a state correctional facility could sue the State of Texas, a federal
funding recipient, for money damages for alleged violations of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA).111 RLUIPA grants institutionalized persons at
federally funded facilities a right of action against state entities for actions that “substantial[ly]
burden” their religious exercise.112 An individual that prevails on a RLUIPA claim can “obtain
appropriate relief against a government.”113
The Supreme Court concluded that this language failed to show that Texas waived its immunity
from private suits for damages.114 Specifically, it held that “RLUIPA’s authorization of
‘appropriate relief against a government,’ is not the unequivocal expression of state consent that
our precedents require.”115 The Court described the language as “open-ended and ambiguous
about what types of relief it includes.”116 In light of this ambiguity, the Court reasoned, it must
apply the background rule that waivers of sovereign immunity are construed narrowly, in favor of
the sovereign, and thus did not allow actions for damages.117
Although a state’s waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear from the text of the spending law
(rather than its structure or purpose), that does not necessarily mean that Congress must employ
“magic words” to effect such a waiver.118 At least two federal appellate courts have held that
Congress need not use words like “condition” or “waiver” to validly effect a waiver of state
sovereign immunity in spending legislation.119 In 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that a state university consented to waive its sovereign immunity in Title IX suits as a

106 Gruver v. La. Bd. of Supervisors for the La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll., 959 F.3d 178, 182 (5th Cir. 2020).
107 Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 291 (2011).
108 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246–47 (1985).
109 Id. at 247.
110 Sossamon, 563 U.S. at 284.
111 Id. at 280–82.
112 Id. at 281–82 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)).
113 Id. at 282 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a)).
114 Id. at 285.
115 Id. (internal citation omitted).
116 Id. at 286.
117 Id. at 285–87; see also Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 279 (5th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (reasoning that
“[w]hen the condition requires a state to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity, Dole’s requirement of an
unambiguous statement of the condition and its proscription on coercive inducements serve a dual role because they
ensure compliance with [the Supreme Court’s] requirement that waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity must be (a)
knowing and (b) voluntary”).
118 Pace, 403 F.3d at 281.
119 See id. (calling the state’s argument that “absent talismanic incantations of magic words, there can be no waiver”
“little more than frivolous”).
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condition of receiving federal education funds under a 1986 statute.120 The 1986 law provided
that a “State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution ... from suit
in Federal court for a violation of” certain federal statutes, including Title IX.121 The Fifth Circuit,
sitting en banc (i.e., as a full panel), reached a similar conclusion in 2005 when interpreting the
interplay between the 1986 provision and another law that it referenced: section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.122 Importantly, however, both appellate cases involved laws that Congress
explicitly listed in the 1986 provision, putting states on notice that they could be sued under those
laws if they accepted federal funds. In contrast, the 1986 provision did not expressly list RLUIPA,
and the Supreme Court in Sossamon therefore rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the 1986 law
had put Texas “on notice that it could be sued for damages under RLUIPA.”123
Pennhurst’s clear notice standard thus serves as the test for evaluating whether a spending law
adequately apprises a state of requirements tied to that funding as well as the state’s potential
legal exposure for violations of those conditions. Under that standard, Congress should state
expressly whether it intends for a funding condition also to create a private right of action, and
such a clear and unequivocal statement is even more critical if Congress intends to authorize
private suits against state governments.
Relatedness
A second consideration that a court would likely include in determining the constitutionality of a
spending condition is whether the condition is related to the underlying purpose of the spending.
The Supreme Court has suggested that “federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated
‘to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs,’” but has set a relatively low
bar for the relationship between the condition and the federal interest.124 In South Dakota v. Dole,
the Court held that Congress permissibly conditioned certain federal highway funds on states’
adoption of a national minimum drinking age because the condition was “directly related” to the
federal government’s interest in highway safety.125 The Dole Court did not need to examine the
precise interests served by the individual highway grants tied to the condition, reasoning that a
minimum drinking age related to “one of the main purposes for which highway funds are
expended—safe interstate travel” and that “[t]his goal ... had been frustrated by varying drinking
ages among the States.”126
A spending condition may also satisfy the relatedness requirement if the purpose of the condition
is to ensure that federal funds are “properly spent.”127 In Sabri v. United States, the Supreme
Court upheld a statute that prohibited the “bribery of state, local, and tribal officials of entities
that receive at least $10,000 in federal funds,” even without specific proof of a “connection with

120 Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 555 (4th Cir. 1999).
121 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1).
122 Pace, 403 F.3d at 281.
123 Sossamon, 563 U.S. at 291.
124 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)
(plurality opinion)).
125 Id. at 208.
126 Id. at 208–09 (citing 23 U.S.C. § 101(b)).
127 Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy’s Reservation v. Dep’t of Interior, 900 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 2018)
(reasoning that because the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act’s “whistleblower procedures are designed to
ensure that stimulus funds are properly spent, they relate directly to Congress’s interest in ensuring that vast quantities
of federal funds are used for their intended purpose”).
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federal money as an element of the offense.”128 While the Court framed its discussion in terms of
Congress’s authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause rather than the relatedness
limitation, the Court still focused on the link between the bribery offense and the government’s
interest.129 The Necessary and Proper Clause, the Court reasoned, gives Congress the authority
“to see to it that taxpayer dollars . . . are in fact spent for the general welfare, and not frittered
away in graft or on projects undermined when funds are siphoned off or corrupt public officers
are derelict about demanding value for dollars.”130
Lower courts have extended Sabri’s reasoning to uphold nondiscrimination requirements in
federal spending legislation against relatedness challenges. The D.C. Circuit has concluded, for
example, that “Congress reasonably can insist that decisions regarding the expenditure of federal
funds not be based on irrational discrimination.”131 The Third Circuit has suggested that limiting a
nondiscrimination requirement to programs or activities receiving federal funds “helps ensure the
waiver accords with the ‘relatedness’ requirement articulated in Dole.”132
In practice, the relatedness requirement is a “low bar.”133 Neither before nor after Dole has the
Supreme Court struck down a spending condition as insufficiently related to the underlying
purpose of the spending.134 While lower courts sometimes have concluded that a condition fails to
satisfy the relatedness prong,135 in general, they have not interpreted the relatedness standard to
be particularly demanding.136 For example, the Ninth Circuit has cited the Supreme Court’s
description of the relatedness requirement in New York v. United States (decided five years after
Dole), in concluding that “the conditions need only ‘bear some relationship to the purpose of the
federal spending.’”137 Other courts, such as the Tenth Circuit, have described the “required
degree” of connection between the condition and the federal interest in the funded program as
“one of reasonableness or minimum rationality”—a low standard in legal terms.138 At least one

128 Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 602, 605 (2004).
129 See id. at 605–08.
130 Id. at 605. Although not every bribe would be “traceabl[e]” to federal dollars, given the fungible nature money, it
was “enough” in the Court’s view, that the statute “condition[ed] the offense on a threshold amount of federal dollars
defining the federal interest” and on a bribe of at least $5,000 in value, which “goes well beyond liquor and cigars.”
Id. at 606.
131 Barbour v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 374 F.3d 1161, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (reasoning that “[s]uch
discrimination ‘fritters away’ federal funds, just like the graft discussed in Sabri” (quoting Sabri, 541 U.S. at 605)); see
also, e.g., Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 608 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that “Congress has an interest in allocating
federal funds to institutions that do not engage in discriminatory behavior or in conduct that infringes impermissibly
upon individual liberties”).
132 Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 176 (3d Cir. 2002).
133 City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1163, 1176 (9th Cir. 2019).
134 See id. at 1175 (noting that “the Court has never struck down a condition on federal grants based on this relatedness
prong”); CRS Report R45323, supra note 32, at 30–31.
135 See, e.g., Colorado v. DOJ, 455 F. Supp. 3d 1034, 1055 (D. Colo. 2020) (finding that two conditions “intended to
assist federal immigration enforcement efforts” were “not sufficiently related” to the program’s purpose “to assist state
and local law enforcement in addressing the most urgent criminal justice matters in their own communities”).
136 City of Los Angeles, 929 F.3d at 1175.
137 Id. (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992)).
138 E.g., Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1199–1200 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF) program, which “provides financial support for low-income families,” was “clearly related to
the IV-D [Child Support Enforcement] program and its requirements, which assist low-income families in collecting
child support from absent parents,” observing, inter alia, that both programs were “set forth in the same subchapter of
the Social Security Act, which bears the heading ‘Grants to States for Aid and Services to Needy Families with
Children and for Child-Welfare Services’”).
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Supreme Court Justice, Justice Thomas, has framed the relatedness standard in a potentially more
stringent way, suggesting that “there must be ‘some obvious, simple, and direct relation’ between
the condition and the expenditure of the funds.”139 The Sixth Circuit, however, has observed that
notwithstanding Justice Thomas’s formulation of the standard, “Dole remains the controlling law
on conditional grants of federal money.”140
Anti-Coercion
The third element of judicial review of spending conditions is whether the condition is
unconstitutionally coercive. Generally speaking, Congress can offer states “powerful
incentive[s]” to carry out federal policies as long as states remain free to opt out by declining the
federal funding.141 Congress may not, however, “compel” states to adopt federal policies due to a
constitutional doctrine called anti-commandeering.142
The anti-commandeering doctrine reflects “a fundamental structural decision” in the
Constitution—“the decision to withhold from Congress the power to issue orders directly to the
States.”143 Under the U.S. system of “dual sovereignty,” both the federal government and the
states “wield sovereign powers.”144 The Constitution allocates powers between the federal and
state governments in a number of ways. The Supremacy Clause of Article VI provides that federal
law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land,” giving Congress the power to preempt state law.145
At the same time, Congress’s legislative authority is limited to powers enumerated in the
Constitution.146 The Tenth Amendment provides that all other legislative powers are “reserved to
the States.”147 The Supreme Court developed the anti-commandeering doctrine to help preserve
this structure by prohibiting Congress from commanding states to legislate or regulate—or to
refrain from legislating or regulating—on the federal government’s behalf.148

139 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 727 n.2 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring). In Cutter, Justice Thomas opined that
although the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) was “entirely consonant with the
Establishment Clause, it may well exceed Congress’ authority under either the Spending Clause or the Commerce
Clause.” Id. Justice Thomas reiterated his view, first stated in Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 613 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment), that “for a Spending Clause condition on a State’s receipt of funds to be
‘Necessary and Proper’ to the expenditure of the funds, there must be ‘some obvious, simple, and direct relation’
between the condition and the expenditure of the funds.” Id.
140 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 423 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding “nothing in Justice Thomas’s concurrence that alters
our evaluation” of RLUIPA under Dole’s relatedness prong, and holding that “RLUIPA satisfies the Dole relatedness
requirement”).
141 Kansas, 214 F.3d at 1203 (“In this context, a difficult choice remains a choice, and a tempting offer is still but an
offer.”).
142 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
143 Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475 (2018).
144 Id.
145 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
146 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
147 U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476 (“The Constitution confers on Congress not plenary
legislative power but only certain enumerated powers. Therefore, all other legislative power is reserved for the States,
as the Tenth Amendment confirms.”).
148 See New York, 505 U.S. at 149 (“[W]hile Congress has substantial power under the Constitution to encourage the
States to provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their borders, the Constitution does not
confer upon Congress the ability simply to compel the States to do so.”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925
(1997) (“[T]he Federal Government may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal
regulatory programs.”); Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478 (“It was a matter of happenstance that the laws challenged in New
York and Printz commanded ‘affirmative’ action as opposed to imposing a prohibition. The basic principle—that
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In the spending context, these same considerations undergird the anti-coercion analysis,149 which
essentially asks whether a state “has ‘a legitimate choice whether to accept the federal conditions
in exchange for federal funds.’”150 As the Supreme Court recognized in South Dakota v. Dole,
sometimes “the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the
point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”151 On the facts of that case, the Dole Court
concluded that Congress’s incentive for states to adopt the national minimum drinking age was
“relatively mild encouragement.”152 In Dole, non-acceptance would cost a state “a relatively small
percentage of certain federal highway funds”—in South Dakota’s case, “5% of the funds
otherwise obtainable under specified highway grant programs.”153
While the Supreme Court recognized the potential for coercion in Dole, it did not strike down a
spending condition on anti-coercion grounds until its 2012 decision in National Federation of
Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius.154 In that case, seven Justices, across two different
opinions, concluded that Congress violated the anti-coercion principle by conditioning all of a
state’s Medicaid funds on its acceptance of Medicaid expansion in the Affordable Care Act.155
Chief Justice Roberts authored a plurality opinion on the Spending Clause analysis on behalf of
himself and Justices Breyer and Kagan, while four Justices—Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
and Alito—discussed their reasoning in a joint dissent.156 Because the plurality concluded that the
condition was invalid on narrower grounds than the joint dissent, several appellate courts have
described Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion as precedential.157
The Chief Justice highlighted the states’ dependence on existing Medicaid funding and the
expansion’s resemblance, in the plurality’s view, to a “new health care program.”158 The plurality
noted that “[f]ederal funds received through the Medicaid program ha[d] become a substantial
part of state budgets, ... constituting over 10 percent of most States’ total revenue.”159 The
plurality observed, by comparison, that the highway funds at issue in Dole constituted less than

Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures—applies in either event.”).
149 See Religious Sisters of Mercy v. Azar, No. 3:16-cv-00386, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9156, at *74 (D.N.D. Jan. 19,
2021) (“The Spending Clause’s coercion backstop is closely linked to the Tenth Amendment concept that the federal
government may not commandeer the states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
150 New York v. DOJ, 951 F.3d 84, 115 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 578 (2012)).
151 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590
(1937))).
152 Dole, 482 U.S. at 211.
153 Id.
154 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861, 864
(2013) (stating that NFIB “marks ‘the first time ever’ that the Court has held that a spending condition
unconstitutionally coerced the states” (quoting NFIB, 567 U.S. at 625 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part))).
155 NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
156 NFIB, 567 U.S. at 575–89 (plurality opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer and Kagan, JJ.); id. at 671–89 (joint
opinion by Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
157 E.g., Mayhew v. Burwell, 772 F.3d 80, 88–89 (1st Cir. 2014); Gruver v. La. Bd. of Supervisors for the La. State
Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll., 959 F.3d 178, 185 n.5 (5th Cir. 2020); Miss. Comm’n on Envt’l Quality v. EPA, 790 F.3d
138, 176 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
158 NFIB, 567 U.S. at 584 (plurality opinion).
159 Id. at 542 (majority opinion); see also id. at 581 (plurality opinion).
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0.5% of South Dakota’s budget.160 Echoing the clear notice requirement, the plurality also
reasoned that Congress’s spending power to enact the Medicaid program did not permit it to
“surpris[e] participating States with postacceptance or ‘retroactive’ conditions.”161
Because the Court decided NFIB less than ten years ago, case law on the anti-coercion principle
is limited. Lower courts have used the facts and reasoning of Dole and NFIB as guideposts in the
anti-coercion analysis, asking: (1) whether a post-acceptance condition marked a change in
“degree” or “kind” for the program at issue;162 and (2) what percentage of a state’s budget was at
risk if the state did not comply with the condition.163 Additionally, some lower courts have
interpreted NFIB to say that the anti-coercion limit does not apply to conditions on how states use
funds—as opposed to policy requirements that might otherwise violate the anti-commandeering
doctrine if imposed directly. For example, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that a “direct restriction on
how a state uses federal funds” is not coercive, because it simply “‘ensures that the funds are
spent according to [Congress’s] view of the general Welfare.’”164
Thus, while the line between permissible incentive and unconstitutional coercion remains blurry,
the anti-coercion principle is now a recognized limit on Congress’s power to condition federal
funding.
Independent Constitutional Bar
Spending legislation that meets the clear notice, relatedness, and anti-coercion tests is
constitutional unless it violates some other “independent constitutional bar.” There are two
general formulations of the independent constitutional bar principle. Additionally, arguments
about the constitutionality of a funding condition often implicate a cross-cutting legal doctrine
called “unconstitutional conditions.”

160 Id. at 580–82 (plurality opinion).
161 Id. at 584 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981)) (reasoning that a “State
could hardly anticipate that Congress’s reservation of the right to ‘alter’ or ‘amend’ the Medicaid program included the
power to transform it so dramatically”).
162 See, e.g., Mayhew v. Burwell, 772 F.3d 80, 89 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding that the “maintenance-of-effort” provision in
the Affordable Care Act was not unconstitutionally coercive because “unlike the new Medicaid program expansion first
appearing in the ACA, [it] is not a new program”); New York v. HHS, 414 F. Supp. 3d 475, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)
(reasoning that “like the Medicaid expansion at issue in NFIB,” HHS’s 2019 rule regarding compliance with federal
“conscience” statutes “would substantively transform the existing regulatory regime”), appeal filed and held in
abeyance, No. 19-4254 (2d Cir. 2019).
163 See, e.g., Gruver v. La. Bd. of Supervisors for the La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll., 959 F.3d 178, 184 (5th Cir.
2020) (“The threat of LSU losing what amounts to just under 10% of its funding is more like the ‘relatively mild
encouragement’ of a state losing 5% of its highway funding (less than 0.5% of South Dakota’s budget) than the ‘gun to
the head’ of a state losing all of its Medicaid funding (over 20% of the average state’s budget).” (quoting NFIB, 567
U.S. at 580–82)); New York v. DOJ, 951 F.3d 84, 116 (2d Cir. 2020) (“This case is much more akin to Dole than to
NFIB. While [noncompliance] ... can result in the denial of any Byrne [JAG program] funding for that year, plaintiffs
do not—and cannot—claim that such a loss represents so significant a percentage of their annual budgets as to cross the
line from pressure to coercion.”); New York, 414 F. Supp. 3d at 570 (holding that an HHS rule on penalties for
noncompliance with federal “conscience” statutes was coercive, reasoning that NFIB was “a more apt analogy” than
Dole, because the HHS rule “threaten[ed] not a small percentage of the States’ federal health care funding, but literally
all of it”).
164 Gruver, 959 F.3d at 183 (quoting NFIB, 567 U.S. at 580).
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Two General Formulations
As articulated in South Dakota v. Dole, a funding condition runs afoul of an independent
constitutional bar when it would require or encourage the recipient to violate the Constitution.165
To use an example from Dole, if Congress were to condition funding for state prisons on the use
of a “cruel and unusual punishment[],” the Eighth Amendment would independently bar such a
condition because it prohibits states from using such forms of punishment.166 The Supreme Court
considered—and ultimately rejected—an independent constitutional bar argument of this nature
in United States v. American Library Association.167 In the Children’s Internet Protection Act,
Congress had required public libraries receiving federal assistance for internet and information
services to install filtering software on library computers to block patrons’ access to pornographic
websites and other materials deemed “harmful to minors.”168 Challengers to the law contended
that this condition required public libraries—which are governmental entities—to violate the First
Amendment rights of library users.169 Six Justices, for different reasons, concluded that the law
did not induce the libraries to violate their patrons’ First Amendment rights, and the condition for
receiving federal funds was therefore within Congress’s power.170
Some courts and litigants appear to take a broader view of the independent constitutional bar
principle than the Dole formulation, treating it as a catchall for analyzing not only whether a
condition induces the recipient to violate the Constitution, but also whether the condition itself
exceeds Congress’s authority. For example, according to the Eighth Circuit, this factor “requires a
consideration of whether other constitutional provisions prohibit these particular conditions on
federal funding.”171 States have sometimes invoked the “independent constitutional bar” language
to raise federalism-based objections, such as the argument that a funding condition violates states’
rights under the Tenth Amendment.172 However, because federalism considerations are already
embedded in the clear notice and anti-coercion principles,173 some courts have concluded that the
Tenth Amendment “does not apply” to otherwise “valid spending legislation” that clears these

165 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (describing “the ‘independent constitutional bar’ limitation” as “the
unexceptionable proposition that the [spending] power may not be used to induce the States to engage in activities that
would themselves be unconstitutional”). See also United States v. Hernandez, 615 F. Supp. 2d 601, 623 (E.D. Mich.
2009) (interpreting the “independent constitutional bar” discussed in Dole to “merely prevent[] Congress from
conditioning funds on behavior that the constitution prohibits the states from engaging in on their own”).
166 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.”); Dole, 483 U.S. at 210–11 (explaining that “a grant of federal funds conditioned on
invidiously discriminatory state action or the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment would be an illegitimate
exercise of the Congress’ broad spending power”).
167 United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 203, 214 (2003) (plurality opinion).
168 Id. at 201 (quoting 20 U.S.C. §§ 9134(f)(1)(A)(i) and (B)(i) and 47 U.S.C. §§ 254(h)(6)(B)(i) and (C)(i)).
169 Id. at 202.
170 See id. at 214 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.); id. at 214–15
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 215–16 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
171 Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 581 F.3d 639, 651 (8th Cir. 2009) (analyzing a separation-of-powers challenge to a spending
condition).
172 See, e.g., Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) did not violate the Tenth Amendment under the “independent constitutional
bar” prong of the analysis).
173 See West Virginia v. HHS, 289 F.3d 281, 286–87 (4th Cir. 2002) (“If the Congressional action amounts to coercion
rather than encouragement, then that action is not a proper exercise of the spending powers but is instead a violation of
the Tenth Amendment.”).
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initial hurdles.174 Other courts have analyzed Tenth Amendment objections as separate
constitutional claims.175
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine “examines the extent to which government benefits may
be conditioned or distributed in ways that burden constitutional rights or principles.”176 A core
principle of this doctrine is that once the government has established a benefit, it may not deny
that benefit to a person “on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests.”177
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine is not unique to the funding context. In contrast to the
four tests discussed above, it has developed as a constraint on Congress’s authority generally,
rather than the Spending Clause alone, and it has generated a large body of case law that touches
on a variety of Congress’s powers.178 However, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
frequently arises in cases involving funding conditions, especially conditions that restrict or
compel speech. In such circumstances, the Court generally has upheld conditions that “define the
limits of the government spending program—those that specify the activities Congress wants to
subsidize,” but it has applied heightened scrutiny to conditions that “seek to leverage funding” in
a way that burdens constitutional rights “outside the contours of the program itself.”179
Cases applying this test illustrate why the distinction is “not always self-evident.”180 In Rust v.
Sullivan, the Court upheld regulations prohibiting recipients of funding for family planning
projects under Title X of the Public Health Service Act from providing abortion services,
counseling, or referrals, or advocating for abortion through their written materials, speakers, or
lobbying efforts.181 Grantees had to maintain physical and financial separation, as defined in the
regulations, between the Title X project and any prohibited abortion-related activities.182 In the
Court’s view, the regulations did not amount to “suppress[ion]” of abortion-related expression,
but instead prohibited “a project grantee or its employees from engaging in activities outside of
the project’s scope,” consistent with Title X’s focus on family planning rather than prenatal
care.183
The Court also upheld a statutory funding condition against an unconstitutional conditions
challenge in American Library Association.184 As previously noted, that case involved a

174 Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1308 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that RLUIPA did not violate the Tenth
Amendment); accord Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 126–27 (4th Cir. 2006).
175 See, e.g., Hodges v. Thompson, 311 F.3d 316, 319 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that because “the Tenth Amendment itself
does not act as a constitutional bar to Congress’s spending power,” the court would “consider South Carolina’s Tenth
Amendment argument, not as a limitation related to the Spending Clause, but as an independent constitutional
challenge” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
176 Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 286 (5th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
177 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
178 See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (condition on qualification for tax-exempt
status was constitutional); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 353 (1976) (plurality opinion) (political patronage requirement
for non-policymaking government employees was unconstitutional).
179 Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 214 (2013).
180 Id. at 217.
181 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193–96 (1991).
182 Id. at 180–81.
183 Id. at 193–94.
184 United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 210–14 (2003) (plurality opinion).
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requirement that public libraries implement filtering software in exchange for funds to improve
internet services.185 The Court concluded that the condition did not violate the libraries’ First
Amendment rights.186 A plurality of the Court reasoned that, as in Rust, the condition defined the
limits of the funded program.187 By blocking online materials that libraries traditionally would
have excluded from their print collections, the Court reasoned, filtering software helps libraries to
“fulfill their traditional role of obtaining material of requisite and appropriate quality for
educational and informational purposes.”188
By contrast, the Court found it unconstitutional for Congress to require the recipients of funding
for global HIV/AIDs programs to have “a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex
trafficking.”189 The Court reasoned that the condition exceeded the program’s scope because it
forced grantees to “adopt—as their own—the Government’s view on an issue of public concern,”
which necessarily required fidelity to that view inside and outside of the program.190 It did not
matter that the federal government allowed funding recipients to work with organizations that did
not have the specified policy so long as the recipients retained “objective integrity and
independence from any affiliated organization.”191 The Court reasoned that this approach required
the recipient to either distance itself from its affiliate and the affiliate’s message, or clearly
identify with its affiliate while espousing the government’s message “only at the price of evident
hypocrisy.”192
Thus, the independent constitutional bar principle and the related unconstitutional conditions
doctrine both serve as a check on Congress’s authority to condition federal funding.193
Conditions on States Versus Private Funding
Recipients
Both governmental and nongovernmental entities may be subject to federal funding conditions,194
but many of the cases discussed above have arisen in the context of federal funding for states and

185 Id. at 199–201.
186 Id. at 210–14. The Court rejected this argument without resolving whether public libraries, as governmental entities,
have First Amendment rights. Id. at 210–11. Although only four Justices joined the main opinion, two additional
Justices concurred in the Court’s judgment. Id. at 214–15 (Kennedy, J.); id. at 215–20 (Breyer, J.).
187 Id. at 211 (plurality opinion).
188 Id. at 211–12. The plurality also reasoned that the condition did not “penalize” a recipient’s decision to “provide
[its] patrons with unfiltered Internet access”; it “simply reflect[ed] Congress’ decision not to subsidize” such access. Id.
at 212.
189 Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 208 (2013) (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f)).
190 Id. at 218.
191 Id. at 211 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 89.3).
192 Id. at 219.
193 See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547 (2001) (invaliding a condition on funding for legal services
that effectively barred attorneys from arguing, on behalf of their clients, that existing welfare laws were
unconstitutional, reasoning that it “distorts” the “usual functioning” of the legal system).
194 See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 278 (2002) (observing that Congress enacted the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) “under its spending power to condition the receipt of federal funds on certain
requirements relating to the access and disclosure of student educational records” and that FERPA “directs the
Secretary of Education to withhold federal funds from any public or private ‘educational agency or institution’ that fails
to comply with these conditions” (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1))).
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their political subdivisions.195 The foregoing discussion demonstrates that some of the limits on
Congress’s power to impose conditions are rooted in concerns about federalism. This notion
raises a question of whether each of those general, constitutional limits applies when a spending
provision and its corresponding conditions are directed solely at private-sector entities, rather
than states, or when a spending law regulates states and private entities “in an identical
manner.”196
The Supreme Court has never expressly confined the general limits on spending authority to
conditions placed on states. Additionally, as discussed below, some of those limits arguably
reflect or serve interests beyond those of preserving state sovereignty, such as preventing
Congress from infringing the individual liberties that the Constitution guarantees to the people.
With regard to the clear notice requirement, the Supreme Court often has referred to Spending
Clause legislation as akin to a “contract” between the federal government and a funding
recipient.197 The reasoning behind the contract analogy—the need for a clear offer and knowing
acceptance—does not appear to depend on the recipient being a state, even if the rule is often
framed in terms of federal-state funding arrangements.198 Thus, in Gonzaga University v. Doe, the
Supreme Court invoked the clear notice principle in rejecting a claim against a private university
receiving federal funds, suggesting that, at a minimum, the clear notice requirement applies
regardless of the public or private status of the funding recipient.199
The relatedness requirement reflects the structural decision of the Constitution to vest Congress
with specific, enumerated powers, and ultimately, appears to stem from federalism concerns. The
Supreme Court has reasoned that without a relatedness requirement, “the spending power could
render academic the Constitution’s other grants and limits of federal authority.”200 In other words,
Congress already has the power to fund legislative policies that it could not enact directly because
they fall outside of its enumerated powers.201 Allowing Congress to impose conditions untethered

195 For simplicity, this section refers to state and local governmental entities collectively as “states.”
196 Religious Sisters of Mercy v. Azar, No. 3:16-cv-00386, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9156, at *75 (D.N.D. Jan. 19, 2021).
197 E.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 181–82 (2005); Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526
U.S. 629, 640 (1999); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). But cf. Sossamon v. Texas,
563 U.S. 277, 290 (2011) (“We have acknowledged the contract-law analogy, but we have been clear ‘not [to] imply ...
that suits under Spending Clause legislation are suits in contract, or that contract-law principles apply to all issues that
they raise.’ We have not relied on the Spending Clause contract analogy to expand liability beyond what would exist
under nonspending statutes, much less to extend monetary liability against the States.... ” (quoting Barnes v. Gorman,
536 U.S. 181, 188 n.2 (2002)).
198 See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 (“The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power thus rests
on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’ There can, of course, be no knowing
acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it. Accordingly, if
Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.” (internal
citations omitted)).
199 In Gonzaga, the Court held that a federal statute authorizing funding to public and private educational institutions
did not include a private right of action against such institutions for noncompliance. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 290. The
Court reasoned that Pennhurst and its progeny do not “permit anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to
support a cause of action brought under § 1983.” Id. at 283. The Court also has applied the Pennhurst clear notice
standard in cases brought by public entities involving programs with public and private funding recipients. See Jackson,
544 U.S. at 181–84 (Title IX).
200 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).
201 See supra “Broad Spending Power for the General Welfare.”
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to the purpose of the spending legislation could enlarge Congress’s powers to a degree that
encroaches on powers that the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states.202
The third test discussed above, the anti-coercion principle, was also developed out of the
constitutional principles of federalism that apply to the relationship between Congress and the
states.203 The test relies on the principle that Congress, despite its power to compel or prohibit
private behavior in some areas, cannot compel state action.204 At least one federal court has
questioned whether a private party can raise an anti-coercion claim. That case involved a
challenge by private, long-term care facilities to certain Medicare and Medicaid requirements
involving arbitration agreements with residents.205 In a ruling that has been appealed, the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Arkansas concluded that the plaintiffs’ asserted
dependence on Medicare and Medicaid funding was of their own making, stating that “Courts of
Appeals have held time and time again that the participation of private entities in Medicare and
Medicaid is always voluntary.”206 The court also observed that “no part” of the NFIB decision
“touched on the government’s power to place conditions on private entities.”207 In the district
court’s view, the Eighth Circuit is unlikely to “conclude that private entities are protected from
coercion by the federal government on the same terms as states.”208 Thus, it seems unlikely that a
court would apply the anti-coercion rationale in a challenge to a spending condition that applies
solely to private parties, though the Eighth Circuit may weigh in on the question.
Under the Dole formulation, the independent constitutional bar principle concerns conditions that
induce a state or other governmental entity to violate the Constitution.209 Under its broader

202 In South Dakota v. Dole, Justice O’Connor raised federalism concerns in arguing for a more rigorous relatedness
requirement. 483 U.S. 203, 213 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). She posited that if “the spending power is to be
limited only by Congress’ notion of the general welfare, the reality ... is that the Spending Clause gives ‘power to the
Congress to tear down the barriers, to invade the states’ jurisdiction, and to become a parliament of the whole people,
subject to no restrictions save such as are self-imposed.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936)).
203 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577–78 (2012) (plurality opinion) (“Congress may use its
spending power to create incentives for States to act in accordance with federal policies. But when ‘pressure turns into
compulsion,’ the legislation runs contrary to our system of federalism.” (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548, 590 (1937))); Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 608 (2004) (reasoning that a funding condition was not
unconstitutionally coercive because it regulated the conduct of state and local officials as individuals and was “not a
means for bringing federal economic might to bear on a State’s own choices of public policy”).
204 See supra “Anti-Coercion.”
205 Northport Health Servs. of Ark. v. HHS, 438 F. Supp. 3d 956, 963–64 (W.D. Ark. 2020), appeal filed, No. 20-1799
(8th Cir. 2020) (oral argument held on Jan. 15, 2021).
206 Id. at 970.
207 Id. Another district court did not find this feature of NFIB to preclude an anti-coercion argument from private parties
challenging a similar rule, reasoning that whether the rule was an incentive or “economic dragooning” was relevant to
the question of the agency’s statutory authority to adopt the rule. Am. Health Care Ass’n v. Burwell, 217 F. Supp. 3d
921, 929 (N.D. Miss. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In that case, the court reasoned that the
“plaintiffs’ basic point still stands: that nursing homes are so dependent upon Medicare and Medicaid funding that the
Rule in this case effectively amounts to a ban on pre-dispute nursing home arbitration contracts.” Id. In concluding that
the rule likely violated the Federal Arbitration Act, the court stated that the “Rule should, and likely will be, treated as
what it effectively is (i.e. a de facto ban), in determining whether it conflicts with the FAA.” Id.
208 Northport Health Servs. of Ark. v. HHS, No. 5:19-CV-5168, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76536, at *13 (W.D. Ark. Apr.
30, 2020). By comparison, another federal court rejected a state’s own anti-coercion argument in circumstances where
the spending condition applied equally to state and private entities. See Religious Sisters of Mercy v. Azar, No. 3:16-
cv-00386, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9156, at *75 (D.N.D. Jan. 19, 2021) (“‘The anticommandeering doctrine does not
apply when Congress evenhandedly regulates an activity in which both States and private actors engage.’ ... North
Dakota offers healthcare services alongside private entities, meaning the state must accept the universally applicable
regulations that follow.” (quoting Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018))).
209 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (stating that Congress’s spending power “may not be used to
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formulation, and the closely-related unconstitutional conditions doctrine, Congress also may not
use its spending power in ways that violate a private recipient’s constitutional rights.210
Accordingly, whether a condition violates a constitutional provision other than the Spending
Clause itself is an important consideration regardless of whether the intended funding recipients
are states or private entities.
Thus, while open questions remain, there are at least some grounds for a court to conclude that
the clear notice and independent constitutional bar limits apply to spending legislation that
imposes conditions on states, private recipients, or both. In contrast, because of the centrality of
federalism concerns to the relatedness requirement and the anti-coercion principle, it is less clear
whether those principles may limit the kinds of conditions that Congress imposes on funding to
private parties. However, some case law suggests that private funding recipients or beneficiaries
may have standing to raise a federalism-based objection under some circumstances.211
Conditions from the Executive Branch
In many of the cases discussed above, Congress has imposed a spending condition by statute, and
courts have considered whether that condition is constitutional. A spending condition may also
come from the executive branch—for example, from a federal agency in the course of
administering a federal program. In such cases, the courts may consider whether the executive
branch has statutory authority from Congress to impose the condition, and if so, whether that
condition is consistent with federal statutes and with the Constitution.
Because Congress alone holds the “power of the purse,” the executive branch cannot unilaterally
authorize spending or impose conditions on federal funding.212 To do so would violate the
constitutional separation of powers.213 A funding condition from the executive branch is
considered constitutional only if Congress has “delegated authority” to the executive branch to
impose that condition.214

induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional”).
210 See, e.g., Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 221 (2013) (holding that the funding
condition violated the First Amendment rights of domestic nonprofit organizations compelled to speak the
government’s message).
211 In Bond v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a person indicted for violating a federal statute had standing
to challenge the statute’s validity on the basis that it exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority and violated the
Tenth Amendment. 564 U.S. 211, 214 (2011). The Court stated that an “individual has a direct interest in objecting to
laws that upset the constitutional balance between the National Government and the States when the enforcement of
those laws causes injury that is concrete, particular, and redressable.” Id. at 222 (“Fidelity to principles of federalism is
not for the States alone to vindicate.”). At least one federal court has extended Bond’s reasoning to allow an individual
governor to challenge a spending condition on federalism grounds. Jindal v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 14-CV-534, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 23356, at *26–27 (M.D. La. Feb. 26, 2015) (holding that the Governor of Louisiana had standing to
challenge a Department of Education funding condition as unduly coercive, based, in part, on Bond).
212 Unlike some other areas of the Constitution, “[w]hen it comes to spending, the President has none of ‘his own
constitutional powers’ to ‘rely’ upon.” City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1233–34 (9th Cir. 2018)
(quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). As to federal
agencies, their power comes from Congress. See La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n
agency literally has no power to act ... unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”).
213 See, e.g., City & Cty. of San Francisco, 897 F.3d at 1235.
214 Oakley v. DeVos, No. 20-cv-03215, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106092, at *20–21 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2020) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
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As a practical matter, challenges to an agency’s decision to adopt or enforce a particular funding
condition often arise under the APA instead of, or in addition to, a separation-of-powers
challenge. Under the APA, courts have jurisdiction to set aside agency action that is “in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.”215 Challenges to an agency’s authority to impose
a funding condition therefore may be resolved on statutory, rather than constitutional grounds,
based on the APA and the underlying statute that established the spending program. Some case
law, however, has suggested that when an agency imposes a spending condition that Congress has
not authorized, it violates not only the underlying statute but also the Constitution.216
Other disputes over funding conditions may arise without any basis for direct statutory review
under the APA, and in such cases, constitutional considerations may be foremost. For example, on
January 25, 2017, President Donald Trump issued an executive order concerning “sanctuary
jurisdictions” that “willfully violate Federal law in an attempt to shield aliens from removal from
the United States.”217 The order directed the Attorney General and the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security to “ensure that jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply
with 8 U.S.C. 1373 (sanctuary jurisdictions) are not eligible to receive Federal grants, except as
deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes.”218 The referenced statute, Section 1373,
prohibited state and local officials from “in any way restrict[ing]” the exchange of information
regarding an individual’s immigration status with federal immigration authorities. In a
constitutional challenge to the order, the Ninth Circuit found that the Executive Order concerned
“funding that Congress ha[d] not tied to compliance with § 1373.”219 “Because Congress did not
authorize withholding of funds,” the court held, “the Executive Order violate[d] the constitutional
principle of the Separation of Powers.”220
In 2019 and 2020, courts around the country adjudicated separation-of-powers and APA
challenges to funding conditions in two, separate sets of cases. The first set of legal challenges
involved immigration-related conditions on state and local criminal justice funding under the
Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (Byrne JAG Program). The second set
of cases involved a Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) rule regarding grantee
noncompliance with federal “conscience” statutes. These cases illustrate the challenges of
discerning whether Congress has authorized an agency generally charged with administering a
program to impose conditions on program funds.
Litigation over Byrne JAG Program Conditions
The Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program is “the primary source of federal
criminal justice funding available to state and local governments.”221 Administered by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), the program provides federal grants to states and localities “to

215 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).
216 E.g., City of Chicago v. Barr, 961 F.3d 882, 931 (7th Cir. 2020); Am. Health Care Ass’n v. Burwell, 217 F. Supp. 3d
921, 946 (N.D. Miss. 2016) (“Congress did not enact the Rule in this case; a federal agency did, and therein lies the
rub. As sympathetic as this court may be to the public policy considerations which motivated the Rule, it is unwilling to
play a role in countenancing the incremental ‘creep’ of federal agency authority beyond that envisioned by the U.S.
Constitution.”).
217 Exec. Order No. 13768, § 1, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799 (Jan. 30, 2017).
218 Id. § 9, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801.
219 City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1234 (9th Cir. 2018).
220 Id. at 1235.
221 City of Chicago v. Barr, 405 F. Supp. 3d 748, 752 (N.D. Ill. 2019), aff’d, 961 F.3d 882 (7th Cir. 2020); see P.L. 109-
162, § 1111, 119 Stat. 2960, 3094 (2006) (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. §§ 10151–10158).
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provide additional personnel, equipment, supplies, contractual support, training, technical
assistance, and information systems for criminal justice” in eight program areas.222 While a
statutorily prescribed formula dictates the amount of funding that each state receives, states still
must apply for Byrne JAG funding.223 The application must include, among other items, a
“certification, made in a form acceptable to the Attorney General” that “the applicant will comply
with all provisions” of the Byrne JAG statute224 and “all other applicable Federal laws.”225
The Byrne JAG cases discussed in this section concerned grant conditions that the Attorney
General adopted for fiscal years 2017 and 2018.226 One of the challenged conditions—the
certification condition—required grantees to certify their compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.227 As
noted in the previous section, Section 1373 prohibits states and localities from restricting the
exchange of information about an individual’s citizenship or immigration status with federal
immigration authorities.228 In the litigation, DOJ argued that the Byrne JAG statute authorized the
condition because the statute itself requires applicants to certify compliance with “applicable
Federal laws” and, in DOJ’s view, Section 1373 was one such law.229
The First, Third, and Seventh Circuits disagreed, holding that DOJ’s grant condition was
inconsistent with the underlying Byrne JAG statute.230 They construed “applicable Federal laws”
to refer to laws that apply to Byrne JAG grant programs, rather than all laws that apply to Byrne
JAG applicants.231 Because Section 1373 generally applied to state and local governments and
officials without referencing grant programs or federal funding, the courts reasoned that it was

222 34 U.S.C. § 10152.
223 Id. §§ 10153, 10156.
224 Id. §§ 10151–10158.
225 Id. § 10153(a)(5)(D) (emphasis added).
226 Agency-imposed grant conditions may vary from year-to-year, or from Administration to Administration. See, e.g.,
CRS Report R41360, Abortion and Family Planning-Related Provisions in U.S. Foreign Assistance Law and Policy, by
Luisa Blanchfield (describing how various Administrations reinstated, expanded, or rescinded the “Mexico City
Policy” concerning abortion-related conditions on foreign assistance funding).
227 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE
GRANT PROGRAM: FY 2017 STATE SOLICITATION 23–24 (2017). The FY2018 conditions also required certification with
8 U.S.C. § 1644, whose language tracks § 1373. In the Byrne JAG litigation, DOJ “concede[d] that the two compliance
conditions are equivalent” and that a court’s “disposition as to one [would] control as to the other.” City of Chicago v.
Barr, 961 F.3d 882, 889 (7th Cir. 2020). The litigation also involved four other conditions on Byrne JAG grants. The
certification condition is discussed in this section for purposes of illustration.
228 See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a Federal, State, or
local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from
sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”).
229 See City of Chicago, 961 F.3d at 897 (“Under the Attorney General’s reasoning, Congress itself incorporated § 1373
into the Byrne JAG program by requiring compliance with ‘all other applicable federal laws.’”).
230 City of Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d 23, 45 (1st Cir. 2020); City of Philadelphia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d 276,
291 (3d Cir. 2019); City of Chicago, 961 F.3d at 909.
231 See, e.g., City of Providence, 954 F.3d at 39 (“We hold that ‘applicable Federal laws’ . . . are federal laws that apply
to state and local governments in their capacities as Byrne JAG grant recipients.”); City of Philadelphia, 916 F.3d at
289–90 (“[I]t would be reasonable to view ‘all other applicable Federal laws’ to refer specifically to laws that apply to
operations relating to the grant, not to require the City to certify compliance with every single law that might apply to
it.”); City of Chicago, 961 F.3d at 909 (“[B]ased on the language, structure, and purpose of the Act, the reference to ‘all
other applicable federal laws’ in § 10153 should be read as referencing any federal law that by its terms applies to
federal grants or grantees in that capacity.”).
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not an “applicable” federal law.232 Accordingly, these three circuits held that the Attorney General
exceeded his statutory authority in imposing the certification condition.233
One court, the Seventh Circuit, also characterized this as a constitutional violation. The Seventh
Circuit expressly held that, because of the lack of statutory authorization, “the Attorney General’s
decision to attach the conditions to the FY 2017 and FY 2018 Byrne JAG grants violated the
constitutional principle of separation of powers.”234
In contrast, in a lawsuit filed by New York City, the Second Circuit held that the Attorney General
neither exceeded his statutory authority nor violated the constitutional separation of powers by
imposing the certification condition.235 The court reasoned that the Byrne JAG statute authorized
the Attorney General to identify “other applicable Federal laws” for purposes of the compliance
certification by mandating certification in a “form acceptable to the Attorney General.”236 In the
court’s view, “form” embraced both format and content.237 The court also construed the phrase
“applicable Federal laws” to refer to laws applying to the grant program and laws applying to the
applicant.238 The court concluded that Section 1373 applied to the plaintiff-states and localities
that had applied for Byrne JAG grants.239 Even if Congress did not make the condition explicit,
therefore, DOJ’s condition fell within the discretionary authority that Congress had given to DOJ
to specify certification requirements for the Byrne JAG program.
The Second Circuit then rejected a Pennhurst-based Spending Clause challenge to the
certification condition, holding that the plaintiffs had adequate notice of the certification
condition.240 “To be sure,” the court observed, “that notice was provided by DOJ rather than
Congress.”241 However, the court did not find this distinction to be dispositive, pointing to cases
where the Supreme Court recognized that “Congress cannot always ‘prospectively resolve every
possible ambiguity concerning particular applications of the [program’s statutory]
requirements.’”242
Lastly, the Second Circuit rejected a Tenth Amendment, anti-coercion challenge to the
certification condition.243 Specifically, the court interpreted NFIB to focus on the “amount of
funding that a State would lose by not acceding to the federal conditions,” asking whether that
amount “is so significant to the [state’s] overall operations as to leave it with no real choice but to
agree.”244 For “most grant conditions,” the court posited, the potential “funding loss” does “not

232 City of Providence, 954 F.3d at 39; City of Philadelphia, 916 F.3d at 289; City of Chicago, 961 F.3d at 901.
233 City of Providence, 954 F.3d at 39; City of Philadelphia, 916 F.3d at 291; City of Chicago, 961 F.3d at 931. The
Ninth Circuit issued a narrower ruling. It affirmed an injunction barring DOJ from enforcing the certification condition
against the City and County of San Francisco, reasoning that the localities’ “respective sanctuary laws comply with 8
U.S.C. § 1373.” City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Barr, 965 F.3d 753, 764 (9th Cir. 2020), petition for cert. filed and
later dismissed sub nom. Wilkinson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 141 S. Ct. 1292 (2021).
234 City of Chicago, 961 F.3d at 931.
235 New York v. DOJ, 951 F.3d 84, 111 (2d Cir. 2020).
236 Id. at 104–05 (quoting § 10153(a)(5)).
237 Id. at 105.
238 Id. at 105–09.
239 Id. at 111.
240 Id. at 110.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 110 (quoting Bennett v. Kentucky Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 666, 669 (1985)).
243 Id. at 114–16.
244 Id. at 115.
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raise such coercion concerns.”245 The court found the certification condition at issue to be “much
more akin to Dole than to NFIB” because loss of the 2017 Byrne award would affect “less than
0.1%” of New York’s annual budget—less than the percentage loss at issue in Dole.246 While
New York City initially petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to resolve the circuit
split, the parties agreed to dismiss the case on March 4, 2021, after DOJ, under the Biden
Administration, reportedly “agreed to remove the challenged conditions” from Byrne JAG
grants.247
Litigation over HHS’s 2019 Conscience Rule
States also raised Spending Clause challenges after HHS issued a rule regarding steps that it
would take to enforce a range of “Federal conscience and antidiscrimination laws” (the 2019
Conscience Rule).248 One of the central issues in these cases was whether HHS could terminate
all HHS funding to a grant recipient for noncompliance with certain statutes.
In 2008, HHS issued a rule designating its Office for Civil Rights (OCR) to receive complaints of
alleged violations of three “federal health care conscience protection statutes” commonly referred
to by their sponsors’ names.249 The first statute, the Church Amendments, prohibits any entity that
receives funding under the Public Health Service Act from discriminating in the form of firing or
other employment actions against health care workers who perform or assist in the performance
of lawful abortions or sterilization procedures, or who refuse to do so on religious or moral
grounds.250 The second statute, the Coats-Snowe Amendment, prohibits federal funding recipients
from discriminating against health care entities that refuse to perform abortions or provide
training on abortion procedures, or individuals whose medical education did not include such
training.251 The third statute, the Weldon Amendment, is a provision that Congress has included in
every Labor-HHS appropriations act since 2004.252 The Weldon Amendment prohibits the
disbursement of federal funds to agencies, programs, or states that discriminate against health
care entities (including individual providers) because they do not “provide, pay for, provide
coverage of, or refer for abortions.”253

245 Id.
246 Id. at 116.
247 Press Release, Attorney General James Secures the Restoration of Over $30 Million in Public Safety Grants (May 4,
2021), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2021/attorney-general-james-secures-restoration-over-30-million-public-safety-
grants; see also City of New York v. DOJ, 141 S. Ct. 1291 (2021); Sarah Lynch, Justice Department Ends Trump-Era
Limits on Grants to Sanctuary Cities, REUTERS (Apr. 28, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/exclusive-us-justice-
department-ends-trump-era-limits-grants-sanctuary-cities-2021-04-28/.
248 Protecting Statutory Conscience Rights in Health Care; Delegations of Authority, 84 Fed. Reg. 23,170, 23,170
(2019) [hereinafter 2019 Conscience Rule].
249 Ensuring That Department of Health and Human Services Funds Do Not Support Coercive or Discriminatory
Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law, 73 Fed. Reg. 78,072, 78,101 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 Rule]; see
generally California v. Becerra, 950 F.3d 1067, 1079 (9th Cir. 2020) (describing the origins of the Church, Coats-
Snowe, and Weldon Amendments).
250 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c)(1).
251 Id. § 238n.
252 See Washington v. Azar, 426 F. Supp. 3d 704, 712 (E.D. Wash. 2019) (“The Weldon Amendment was added to the
annual 2005 health spending bill and has been included in subsequent appropriations bills.”).
253 E.g., Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019, and
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019, P.L. 115-245, Div. B., § 507(d).
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The 2008 rule required grantees to certify compliance with these nondiscrimination provisions
when applying for or renewing a grant, contract, or other funding instrument.254 In 2011, HHS
issued a new rule that “partially rescind[ed]” the 2008 rule by removing the certification
requirement.255 The 2011 rule retained OCR’s authority to “coordinate the handling of
[discrimination] complaints with the Departmental funding component(s) from which the entity”
named in the complaint “receives funding,” but did not specify the penalty for noncompliance.256
The 2019 Conscience Rule amended the 2011 rule to state expressly that HHS could enforce
compliance with more than 30 federal “conscience” provisions (including the Church, Coats-
Snowe, and Weldon Amendments) through the denial, temporary withholding, or termination of
HHS-administered federal funds.257 By its terms, the 2019 Conscience Rule was broad enough to
include the complete termination of all HHS funding, including Medicaid funds.258 The rule also
specifically authorized OCR to “[c]onduct investigations,” “[s]eek voluntary resolutions of
complaints,” “utilize existing regulations for involuntary enforcement,” and “coordinate other
appropriate remedial action.”259 If, following an investigation or compliance review, OCR found
that an entity violated a conscience provision, the rule allowed OCR to coordinate with the
relevant HHS funding component to “effect[]” compliance through laws governing contracts,
grants, and other funding arrangements.260
Three different district courts considered challenges to the conditions and the newly-stated
penalties in the 2019 Conscience Rule, and all three held those conditions to be invalid based on
the principles discussed above. First, on November 6, 2019, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that the 2019 rule violated both the APA and the Constitution.
As to the APA claim, the court concluded that the Church, Coats-Snowe, and Weldon
Amendments did not authorize HHS to promulgate substantive regulations, either expressly or by
implication.261 The court held that no statute authorized HHS to withhold or terminate all HHS
funding to noncompliant recipients—the rule’s termination penalty.262 The latter conclusion also
formed the basis for the court’s separation-of-powers analysis because, the court reasoned, an
“agency may not withhold funds in a manner, or to an extent, unauthorized by Congress.”263 By

254 2008 Rule, at 78,098–99.
255 Regulation for the Enforcement of Federal Health Care Provider Conscience Protection Laws, 76 Fed. Reg. 9,968,
9,973–74 (2011).
256 Id. at 9,976–77 (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 88.2 (2011)).
257 2019 Conscience Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,272.
258 See id. at 23,272 (stating that compliance “may be effected” through “[t]erminating Federal financial assistance or
other Federal funds from the Department, in whole or in part” (emphasis added) (codified at 45 C.F.R.
§ 88.7(i)(3)(iv)); New York v. HHS, 414 F. Supp. 3d 475, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (reasoning that “[o]n its face,
§ 88.7(i)(3)(iv) allows HHS to terminate all of a recipient’s HHS funding,” including “Medicaid and Medicare
reimbursements”).
259 2019 Conscience Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,271 (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 88.7(a)(3), (5), (7)–(8)).
260 Id. at 23,271–72 (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 88.7(i)(2)–(3)).
261 New York, 414 F. Supp. 3d at 532. As a threshold matter, the court rejected HHS’s argument that the rule was a
“housekeeping” statute authorized by the Secretary’s authority to “prescribe regulations for the government of his
department,” 5 U.S.C. § 301; to “issue orders and directives ... necessary to carry out” a regulation on public buildings,
property, and works, 40 U.S.C. § 121(c); or to issue “regulations necessary to the administration of the [Public Health]
Service,” 42 U.S.C. § 216. See New York, 414 F. Supp. 3d at 527 (calling the 2019 Conscience Rule “heavily
substantive” and concluding that it “cannot be justified based on HHS’s authority under housekeeping statutes”).
262 New York, 414 F. Supp. 3d at 534.
263 Id. at 562.
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adopting the termination penalty without statutory authority, the rule “aggrandize[d] the
Executive Branch at Congress’s expense” in violation of the separation of powers.264
The district court also held that the termination penalty violated the clear notice and anti-coercion
principles from the Supreme Court’s Spending Clause jurisprudence. In particular, citing NFIB,
the court expressed concern that a state that had “organized its programs (e.g., its Medicaid
program) in anticipation of a promised outlay” would have “no way to know at the time it
accepted such funds that HHS would later claim the right to close these spigots based on a breach
of a Conscience Provision.”265 The court found coercion because of the “scale of funding” at
stake and the “new standards of conduct” the rule imposed.266 However, the court concluded that
the rule did not violate the relatedness principle or another independent constitutional bar.267
Second, on November 19, 2019, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
held, consistent with the Southern District of New York, that HHS exceeded its authority in
issuing the 2019 Conscience Rule “by adding expansive definitions in conflict with the statutes
and imposing draconian financial penalties.”268 Because the court vacated the rule on APA
grounds, it declined to reach the constitutional claims presented.269
Third, on November 21, 2019, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington
expressly adopted the Southern District of New York’s conclusions, holding that the 2019
Conscience Rule exceeded HHS’s authority and violated the Constitution.270
Appeals from the New York, California, and Washington cases are pending before the Second and
Ninth Circuits.271 The appellate courts have postponed oral arguments at the government’s request
so that new leadership at HHS can evaluate the government’s position in the litigation.272
As the litigation over the Byrne JAG certification condition and the 2019 Conscience Rule
illustrates, an agency that imposes a new condition on federal funding or an enhanced penalty for
grantee noncompliance must have express or implied statutory authority from Congress to take
those actions. Otherwise, the challenged action may violate the APA or the Constitution’s
separation of powers.
Conclusion
Congress has broad constitutional authority to authorize spending for the general welfare. In
exercising that authority, Congress may place conditions on federal funding given to states and

264 Id.
265 Id. at 568.
266 Id. at 571.
267 Id. at 571–72.
268 City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Azar, 411 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
269 Id. at 1025.
270 Washington v. Azar, 426 F. Supp. 3d 704, 720 (E.D. Wash. 2019).
271 New York v. HHS, No. 19-4254 (2d Cir. 2019); City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Becerra, No. 20-15398 (9th Cir.
2020) (consolidated with Washington v. Becerra, No. 20-35044; County of Santa Clara v. Becerra, No. 20-15399; and
California v. Becerra, No. 20-16045).
272 See Order, New York, No. 19-4254 (2d Cir. Feb. 5, 2021), ECF No. 435 (adjourning oral argument, holding the
appeal in abeyance, and directing the appellants to file stay status letters every 30 days); Order, City & Cty. of San
Francisco, No. 20-15398 (9th Cir. Jun. 2, 2021), ECF No. 117 (granting the government’s motion to keep the cases in
abeyance for an additional 60 days and requiring a status report by August 2, 2021).
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private entities. However, courts reviewing the constitutionality of a condition generally assess
whether the condition meets these four general constitutional limits: (1) the statute provides clear
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notice of the condition; (2) the condition is related to the purposes of the underlying spending;
(3) the condition does not coerce state or local governments; and (4) the condition does not
violate any independent constitutional bar, or the related unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
While many of these principles are rooted in federalism concerns (i.e., states’ rights), taken
together, they cabin Congress’s authority to condition funding to states and private entities.
Lastly, the specificity with which Congress has addressed a spending condition in a statute, and
the degree of discretion it has accorded to the executive branch, likely will affect the legality of
an executive order, agency rule, or other executive branch action that imposes or enforces a
requirement as a spending condition.

Author Information

Victoria L. Killion

Legislative Attorney

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