Russia: Foreign Policy and U.S. Relations

Russia: Foreign Policy and U.S. Relations

Russia: Foreign Policy and U.S. Relations
April 15, 2021
Since Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rise to leadership more than 20 years ago, tensions have
increased steadily between Russia and the United States. Some observers attribute Russian
Andrew S. Bowen
foreign policy actions to the personality and individual interests of Putin and certain hawkish
Analyst in Russian and
advisers. Some contend Russian authorities are focused mainly on reclaiming Russia’s status as a
European Affairs
great power. Others argue Russian foreign policy is centered on protecting the country’s status as

the dominant power in the post-Soviet region and defending against foreign interference in
Russia’s domestic affairs. Whatever the motivations, most observers agree Russia’s natural
Cory Welt
resources and military modernization program, launched in 2008, provide Russia’s leadership the
Specialist in Russian and
European Affairs
means to conduct a flexible and often aggressive foreign policy, as well as to project force in

neighboring countries and further afield (such as in the Middle East).

Russia’s foreign policy priorities traditionally have focused on the post-Soviet region and the
West, including relations and tensions with NATO, the United States, and Europe. However, Russia under Putin (like the
Soviet Union before it) also pursues a global foreign policy. As relations with its neighbors and Western countries have
become more adversarial, Russia—seeking to balance against U.S. and European power and interests—has cultivated deeper
relations with China and other countries.
Russian authorities have demonstrated a capacity and willingness to use force to accomplish its foreign policy goals. In 2014,
Russia invaded Ukraine’s Crimea region and instigated an ongoing insurgency in eastern Ukraine. In 2015, Russia intervened
to support the government of Syrian President Bashar al Asad, including through the use of “private” military companies that
Russia has deployed in conflicts elsewhere. Russia has been linked to numerous malicious cyber operations, including
interference in U.S. elections. Russia uses disinformation and propaganda to undermine opponents and promote favorable
narratives. Its intelligence agencies reportedly conduct wide-ranging and often brazen operations against perceived
opponents, including assassinations and the use of chemical weapons.
Energy exports, primarily oil and natural gas, are a pillar of Russian foreign policy. Energy resources are central to the
Russian economy, help fund military modernization, and give Russia leverage over energy -importing countries. Russian
authorities seek to increase Russia’s market share and access by constructing natural gas pipelines, such as Nord Stream 2
(under construction to Germany), TurkStream (to Turkey and southeastern Europe), and the Power of Siberia (to China).
Russia also conducts an aggressive and often militarized approach to the Arctic to exert control over current and potential
energy deposits and shipping routes. Russia’s arms exports, behind only the United States in monetary value, also are an
important source of hard currency and fulfill key foreign policy objectives.
Significant tensions in the U.S.-Russia relationship include Russia’s use of force against its neighbors; cyber and influence
operations, including interference in U.S. elections; targeted attacks on political opponents; and involvement in numerous
conflicts worldwide. Congress and successive U.S. Administrations have imposed several ro unds of sanctions against Russia
in response to various malign activities. To reassure allies and deter further aggression in the wake of Russia’s 2014 invasion
of Ukraine, the United States increased its military presence in Europe, enhanced military coop eration with NATO allies and
non-NATO partners, and provided lethal weaponry to countries such as Ukraine and Georgia. Despite tensions, U.S. and
Russian authorities have stated the importance of continued engagement on certain issues of common interest.
The Biden Administration and the 117th Congress continue to respond to Russian malign activities while considering the
contours of the U.S. relationship with Russia. The Biden Administration has imposed sanctions on Russia or Russian persons
for the poisoning and arrest of opposition figure Alexei Navalny, 2020 U.S. election interference, the so-called SolarWinds
cyberattack, and other malign activities. In recent years, Congress has called on the executive branch to address various
issues, including Russia’s use of energy exports as a foreign policy tool, deployment of private military companies, global
influence operations, money laundering and corruption, and human rights abuses. Key recent Russia -related legislation is
included in the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA; P.L. 115-44, Title II), the FY2020
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 116-92), and the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283).
For information on Russia’s domestic politics, human rights situation, and economy, see CRS Report R46518, Russia:
Domestic Politics and Economy. On U.S. sanctions on Russia, see CRS In Focus IF10779, U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An
Overview, and CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia.
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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
Foreign Policymaking Institutions and Processes ................................................................. 2
Presidential Administration ......................................................................................... 3
Security Council........................................................................................................ 4
Intel igence Agencies ................................................................................................. 5
Foreign Relations ............................................................................................................ 7
Post-Soviet States ...................................................................................................... 7
NATO and the European Union ................................................................................... 9
NATO................................................................................................................. 9
European Union ................................................................................................. 11
China..................................................................................................................... 12
Global Engagement ................................................................................................. 13
Use of Force and Military Power ..................................................................................... 15
Ukraine .................................................................................................................. 15
Crimea.............................................................................................................. 16
Eastern Ukraine ................................................................................................. 17
Maritime Conflict............................................................................................... 17
Conflict Resolution............................................................................................. 18
Georgia .................................................................................................................. 19
Moldova ................................................................................................................ 21
Syria...................................................................................................................... 23
Power Projection ..................................................................................................... 25
Arctic .................................................................................................................... 29
Private Military Companies....................................................................................... 31
Targeted Overseas Attacks ........................................................................................ 33
Influence Operations and Cyber Operations ...................................................................... 33
Influence Operations ................................................................................................ 33
Cyberespionage and Cyberattacks .............................................................................. 35
U.S. Election Interference ......................................................................................... 37
2016 U.S. Presidential Election ............................................................................ 37
2018 U.S. Midterm and 2020 Presidential Elections................................................. 39
Energy and Arms Sales .................................................................................................. 40
Energy ................................................................................................................... 40
Defense Industry and Arms Sales ............................................................................... 42
U.S.-Russia Relations .................................................................................................... 44
Historical Overview ................................................................................................. 45
U.S. Policy During the Trump Administration .............................................................. 46
U.S. Policy During the Biden Administration ............................................................... 47
Congressional Action in the 116th Congress ................................................................. 50
Selected Issues in U.S.-Russia Relations ........................................................................... 51
Countering Russian Aggression ................................................................................. 51
U.S. Policy Toward Russia’s Conflicts ........................................................................ 52
Ukraine............................................................................................................. 52
Georgia and Moldova.......................................................................................... 53
Deconfliction in Syria .............................................................................................. 54
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Diplomatic Reductions ............................................................................................. 55
Arms Control .......................................................................................................... 57
Outlook ....................................................................................................................... 58

Figures
Figure 1. Russian Federation............................................................................................. 6
Figure 2. Ukraine .......................................................................................................... 18
Figure 3. Georgia .......................................................................................................... 20
Figure 4. Russia’s Military Presence Abroad ..................................................................... 27

Tables
Table 1. Selected World Rankings of Russia’s Energy Portfolio, 2019 ................................... 40

Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 59

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Russia: Foreign Policy and U.S. Relations

Introduction
The Russian Federation (Russia) is a global power with a multifaceted and often contentious
relationship with the United States. Russia is the world’s largest country by territory; a permanent
member of the U.N. Security Council; a European, Asian, Arctic, and Pacific power; a leading
nuclear-armed power, military spender, and arms exporter; and a leading producer and exporter of
oil and natural gas. Russia’s economy is the 11th largest in the world (6th on a purchasing-power-
parity basis). In international fora, Russia engages on global issues such as nonproliferation,
including addressing the nuclear weapons programs of Iran and North Korea; counterterrorism;
counterpiracy; and global health chal enges.
Although Russian foreign policy has become increasingly sophisticated and aggressive under
Russian President Vladimir Putin, observers note that some of its guiding principles have been
consistent since the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. One such principle is to reestablish Russia
as the center of political gravity for the post-Soviet region and to minimize the influence of rival
powers, particularly NATO and the European Union (EU). A second principle is to assert Russia’s
role as one of a handful of dominant powers in global politics, capable in particular of
competing—and, as necessary, cooperating—with the United States.
Most observers agree that Russia’s capabilities to conduct a sophisticated foreign policy have
increased over Putin’s tenure. In particular, Russia’s natural resources and the military
modernization program it launched in 2008 have provided its leadership the means to conduct a
flexible and often aggressive foreign policy, as wel as to project force in neighboring countries
and further afield (such as in the Middle East).
Russia’s foreign policy actions have fluctuated over time, however, and have prompted debates
on related issues. These issues include the following: whether strong responses by outside powers
can deter Russian aggression, or whether these responses run a risk of escalating conflict; how
much states that disagree with Russia on key issues can cooperate with Moscow; whether the
Russian government is primarily implementing a strategic vision or reacting to circumstances and
the actions of others; the extent to which Russian leadership takes actions abroad to strengthen its
domestic position; and whether conditions can emerge for Russian foreign policy to be less
aggressive and more in line with U.S. interests over time.
For almost 30 years, the United States and Russia have struggled to develop a constructive
relationship. Tense relations worsened after Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. Relations
continued to fray with Putin’s return to the Russian presidency in 2012 (after serving as prime
minister from 2008). After Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, 2015 intervention in Syria, and
2016 interference in U.S. elections, successive U.S. Administrations and Congress focused
increasingly on countering aggressive Russian actions abroad. Despite tensions, U.S. and Russian
authorities have stated the importance of continued engagement on certain issues of common
interest.
This report focuses on Russian foreign policy, key issue areas, and related U.S. policy. The report
first addresses foreign policymaking institutions and processes within Russia. It next examines
Russia’s relations with key countries and regions. It follows with sections on Russia’s use of
force and military power; influence and cyber operations; and foreign economic policies. The
report then analyzes U.S.-Russia relations, including U.S. policy during the current and prior
Administrations and recent congressional actions. The report is compartmentalized, so that
readers primarily interested in a particular issue may find the relevant information in a subsection
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Russia: Foreign Policy and U.S. Relations

of the report. Russia’s domestic politics, human rights situation, and economy are not within the
scope of this report.1
Foreign Policymaking Institutions and Processes
Understanding the nature of policymaking in Russia is difficult, given the Russian government’s
opaque and personalized nature. President Putin is the most important figure responsible for
Russian foreign policy, but he does not decide or determine policy alone.2 Observers debate the
extent and nature of power among Russian foreign policy decisionmakers but often are unable to
definitively identify the policymaking process.3 Nevertheless, analysts have identified key
institutions, people, and interactions in Russian foreign policymaking.
Foreign policy decisionmaking in Russia is based on a mix of formal institutions, on the one
hand, and personal or informal relationships that cross and can supersede more formal
institutional processes, on the other.4 Russia’s security and defense institutions traditional y have
had an outsized role in domestic and foreign policymaking.5 In some situations and for certain
issues, informal and smal -group decisionmaking appears dominant; in others, policymakers
control policy through formal institutions and committees. Businesspeople, leaders of state-
owned enterprises, and religious or cultural figures al have been al eged or documented as being
involved in foreign policy decisionmaking.6
Two key policymaking institutions are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of
Defense. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs nominal y is responsible for conducting Russian
diplomacy. Reportedly, however, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov has been excluded
increasingly from key policy discussions and relegated to explaining Russian policies more than
formulating them.7 The Ministry of Defense, by contrast, has become increasingly important in

1 See CRS Report R46518, Russia: Domestic Politics and Economy, by Cory Welt and Rebecca M. Nelson.
2 Gleb Pavlovsky, “Russian Politics Under Putin: T he System Will Outlast the Master,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 95, no. 3
(2016); David W. Rivera and Sharon W. Rivera, “ T he Militarization of the Russian Elite Under Putin: What We Know,
What We T hink We Know (But Don’t), and What We Need to Know,” Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 65, no. 4
(2018), pp. 221-232; and Andrew Higgins, “ How Powerful Is Vladimir Putin Really?,” New York Tim es, March 23,
2019.
3 Kirill Petrov and Vladimir Gel’man, “Do Elites Matter in Russian Foreign Policy? T he Gap Between Self -Perception
and Influence,” Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 35, nos. 5-6 (2019), pp. 450-460; Dmitry Gorenburg, “Circumstances Have
Changed Since 1991, but Russia’s Core Foreign Policy Goals Have Not,” PONARS Eurasia, January 2019; and
Michael McFaul, “Putin, Putinism, and Domestic Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy,” International Security, vol.
45, no. 2 (2020), pp. 95-139.
4 Alena V. Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernize? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2013); and Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Krem lin
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2013).
5 Carolina Vendil Pallin, “T he Russian Power Ministries: T ool and Insurance of Power,” Journal of Slavic Military
Studies, vol. 20, no. 1 (2007), pp. 1-25; and Kimberly Marten, “ T he ‘KGB’ State and Russian Political and Foreign
Policy Culture,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 30, no. 2 (2017), pp. 131-151.
6 Kimberly Marten, “Informal Political Networks and Putin’s Foreign Policy: T he Examples of Iran and Syria,”
Problem s of Post-Com m unism , vol. 62, no. 2 (2015), pp. 71-87; Dmitry Gorenburg, “ T he Political Elite Under Putin,”
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (Marshall Center), April 2020; and T atiana Stanovaya,
“Unconsolidated: T he Five Russian Elites Shaping Putin’s T ransition,” Carnegie Moscow Center, November 2, 2020.
7 Reports suggest Lavrov has been requesting to retire for some time but Putin is hesitant to let him leave. Susan B.
Glasser, “Minister No: Sergei Lavrov and the Blunt Logic of Russian Power,” Foreign Policy, April 29, 2013; and
Mark Galeotti, “If Lavrov Goes, Can We Hope for Better from Russia’s Diminished Foreign Ministry?,” bne
Intellinews, October 22, 2020.
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Russian foreign policy. Over the last decade, the capabilities of Russia’s armed forces, led by
Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, have grown
dramatical y due to an ambitious modernization and reform program. Increased military
capabilities have helped support and implement an increasingly militaristic foreign policy.8
Additional y, Shoigu reportedly has a close personal relationship with Putin, increasing the
military’s influence.9
In Russia’s centralized presidential system, Putin is involved in al major decisions and policy
formulations and retains significant control and decisionmaking. Much of the lower and day-to-
day operations in the presidential administration are delegated to formal institutions and key
leaders and advisers, such as Security Council head Nikolay Patrushev. Institutions such as the
Ministry of Defense, intel igence agencies, and the Security Council can initiate or guide policy
independent of specific directives from Putin, as can some entrepreneurial stakeholders (e.g., Igor
Sechin, head of state-owned oil company Rosneft).10 Although some institutions (e.g., the
presidential administration and the Security Council) were created to coordinate policy, they often
do not exert direct authority and are not able to override the responsibilities of other institutions .11
Presidential Administration
In Russia’s centralized system of government, the presidency is the most powerful branch. To
manage and control politics and decisionmaking, Putin relies heavily on the presidential
administration, which observers consider to be “the true locus of power.”12 Anton Vaino, the head
of the presidential administration (i.e., chief of staff), is responsible for managing the flow of
information to the president and for communicating, executing, and monitoring policy. Due to its
formal position, the presidential administration is politically powerful. It is able to direct the flow
of information and people up to Putin and set the conditions and limits of policies and directives
for the wider government. However, it does not control direct briefings of Putin by certain agency
leaders (such as Federal Security Service, or FSB, head Alexander Bortnikov) or those with a
personal relationship to Putin (such as Minister of Defense Shoigu or businessmen Arkady and
Boris Rotenberg).13

8 See CRS In Focus IF11603, Russian Armed Forces: Military Modernization and Reforms, by Andrew S. Bowen; and
CRS In Focus IF11589, Russian Arm ed Forces: Capabilities, by Andrew S. Bowen. Also see Michael Kofman, “ T he
Moscow School of Hard Knocks: Key Pillars of Russian Strategy,” War on the Rocks, January 17, 2017; Alexander
Golts, Military Reform and Militarism in Russia (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2019); and Econom ist,
“Russian Military Forces Dazzle After a Decade of Reform,” November 2, 2020.
9 T atiana Stanovaya, “Meet Russia’s ‘Saviour-in-Chief,’” Riddle, November 13, 2019; and Roger McDermott,
“Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu Survives Government Reshuffle,” Eurasia Daily Monitor (February 5,
2020).
10 Fabian Burkhardt, “T he Institutionalization of Relative Advantage: Formal Institutions, Subconstitutional
Presidential Powers, and the Rise of Authoritarian Politics in Russia, 1994 –2012,” Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 33, no. 6
(2017), pp. 472-495; Mark Galeotti, “ Russia Has No Grand Plans, but Lots of Adhocrats,” bne Intellinews, January 18,
2017.
11 Russia’s legislature also plays a role in Russian defense, security, and foreign policy. Due to Russia’s centralized
presidential system of government, however, its influence is relatively limited and is confined to approving plans and
policies formulated by other stakeholders.
12 Karen Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2014), p. 2.
13 Although the presidential administration has a role in brokering, influencing, and directing information and people to
the president, most staffers are not intelligence analysts. Andrey Pertsev, “ Powerful, but Not Omnipotent,” Meduza,
November 3, 2020; Mark Galeotti, “ T he Presidential Administration: T he Command and Control Nexus of Putin’s
Russia,” Marshall Center, February 2020; and Fabian Burkhardt, “Institutionalizing Authoritarian Presidencies:
Polymorphous Power and Russia’s Presidential Administration,” Europe-Asia Studies (online version), May 6, 2020.
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The presidential administration
Security Council
handles both domestic and foreign
Leadership
policy. Reportedly, much of the
Vladimir Putin, President and Chairman of the Security Council
foreign affairs portfolio is controlled
by First Deputy Chief of Staff
Nikolay Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council
Alexei Gromov. Although Vaino and
Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council
Gromov are important officials, they
Permanent Members
reportedly lack the political
Alexander Bortnikov, Director of the Federal Security Service
influence and personal relationship
(FSB)
to Putin of their predecessor Sergei
Sergei Ivanov, Special Representative for Environmental
Protection, Ecology, and Transport
Ivanov, who led the presidential
administration from 2011 to 2016.
Vladimir Kolokoltsev, Minister of Internal Affairs

Sergei Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Valentina Matviyenko, Chairwoman of the Federation Council
Security Council
Mikhail Mishustin, Prime Minister
Most national security and foreign
Sergei Naryshkin, Director of the Foreign Intel igence Service
policy is handled by the Security
(SVR)
Council, which is nominal y part of
Sergei Shoigu, Minister of Defense
the presidential administration but
Anton Vaino, Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration
operates largely autonomously. The
Vyacheslav Volodin, Chairman of the State Duma
Security Council is led by Nikolay
Note: The Security Council also includes regional presidential
Patrushev, a former head of the FSB
plenipotentiary envoys; the governors of Moscow and St.
and close adviser to Putin. Original y
Petersburg; and other government officials, such as Viktor Zolotov,
head of the National Guard.
created in 1992, the Security
Source: President of Russia, at http://en.kremlin.ru/structure/
Council was not that significant until
security-council/members.
after Putin’s rise to power, when it
became a powerful institution able
to coordinate and formulate security policy. The Security Council is responsible for drafting high-
level policies, such as the National Security Strategy, and provides analytical support to the
presidential administration. It also holds formal meetings where members discuss policy and
resolve disputes.14 Informal y, the Security Council is a venue in which members and agency
leaders can meet to discuss and coordinate policy outside of formal meetings and institutional
processes. For example, Putin has stated that the decision to occupy Ukraine’s Crimea region in
2014 was made at a smal er meeting of Putin, Patrushev, Bortnikov, and former presidential
administration head Ivanov after a formal session of the Security Council.15
Observers and analysts report that although the Security Council’s formal role is to coordinate,
monitor, and broker among various security and intel igence agencies and stakeholders, the
council also plays a more political role by initiating, influencing, and directing policy. The
Security Council’s political role has become even more pronounced under Patrushev, a career
intel igence officer once referred to as “Russia’s most underestimated public figure.”16

14 Mark Galeotti, “Russia’s Security Council: Where Policy, Personality, and Process Meet,” Marshall Center, October
2019.
15 BBC News, “Putin Reveals Secrets of Russia’s Crimea T akeover Plot,” March 9, 2015.
16 Mikhail Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men: Inside the Court of Vladimir Putin (New York: Public Affairs, 2016), p. 342;
and Howard Amos, “Vladimir Putin’s Man in the Balkans,” Politico, June 21, 2017.
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Intelligence Agencies17
Russia’s intel igence agencies play a large role in Russian foreign policy. They are active and
influential, and they operate with significant support from the Kremlin. The relative power and
influence of the intel igence agencies often are shaped by their leaders’ close personal
connections to Putin and other policymakers.18
Observers suggest Russian intel igence agencies and personnel share various traits and
worldviews. Often referred to as siloviki (men of force), senior intel igence agency personnel do
not form a coherent bloc but do reflect a background in security, intel igence, or military services.
Observers and analysts note that Russian intel igence agencies tend to share a view that Russia
has an adversarial relationship with the West, believe in the utility of aggressive and
confrontational policies, and support the domestic status quo.19
Four main agencies—the FSB, Foreign Intel igence Service (SVR), Main Directorate of the
General Staff (GU, commonly referred to as the GRU), and Federal Protective Service (FSO)—
are responsible for the collection of foreign intel igence. The FSB, SVR, and FSO each provide
Putin with a daily briefing; the GRU also can brief the president directly.
 FSB. Led by Alexander Bortnikov, the FSB is Russia’s primary domestic
security agency. It combines domestic law enforcement and intel igence
operations, and it is responsible for counterintel igence and domestic political
security. In recent years, the FSB has expanded its foreign intel igence collection
capabilities.
 SVR. Led by Sergei Naryshkin, the SVR is Russia’s primary civilian agency
responsible for the collection of foreign intel igence. It uses a full range of
espionage tactics, including human, signals, and cyber. SVR officers operate
worldwide under legal (diplomatic) cover out of Russia’s embassies and under
il egal or nonofficial (without diplomatic) cover.
 GU (or GRU). Led by Admiral Igor Kostyukov, the GRU is Russia’s military
intel igence agency. It oversees Russia’s elite light infantry force (Spetsnaz) and
has significant cyber capabilities. Its intel igence officers operate under both
diplomatic and il egal or nonofficial cover.
 FSO. Led by Dmitry Kochnev, the FSO is responsible for guarding the president,
government officials, and state property. It controls the Presidential Security
Service. It also reportedly operates as an overseer of various security services,
helping to monitor infighting and the accuracy of intel igence reporting.

17 For more, see CRS Report R46616, Russian Military Intelligence: Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew
S. Bowen; CRS In Focus IF11647, Russian Law Enforcem ent and Internal Security Agencies, by Andrew S. Bowen;
and CRS In Focus IF11718, Russian Cyber Units, by Andrew S. Bowen.
18 Mark Galeotti, “Putin’s Hydra: Inside Russia’s Intelligence Services,” European Council on Foreign Relations, May
11, 2016; Mark Galeotti, “ Spooks in the Kremlin,” Foreign Policy, April 27, 2019; and Kimberly Marten, “ T he
Intelligence Agencies and Putin: Undermining Russia’s Security Strategy?,” in Routledge Handbook of Russian
Security, ed. Roger E. Kanet (New York: Routledge, 2019), pp. 192-202.
19 Amy Knight, Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB’s Successors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Brian D.
T aylor, “The Russian Siloviki & Political Change,” Daedalus, vol. 146, no. 2 (2017), pp. 53-63; Mark Kramer, “The
Soviet Legacy in Russian Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 134, no. 4 (2019/20), pp. 588-589; and
Mark Galeotti, “T he Intelligence and Security Services and Strategic Decision-Making,” Marshall Center, May 2019
(hereinafter, Galeott i, “ Intelligence and Security Services”).
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The intel igence agencies are not to be viewed as a singular bloc but as multiple and overlapping
entities that often compete—both directly and indirectly—for greater responsibilities, budgets,
and political influence.20 Putin reportedly supports competition to reduce the influence of and
reliance on one particular agency or agency leader.21
Although competition can incentivize initiative and risk-taking, it also can contribute to
uncoordinated and duplicated intel igence efforts. Competition has led to the ousting of agency
leaders, the creation of new agencies, and even the total dissolution of agencies. Competition
sometimes is factional, defined by personal relationships, or crosses organizational lines in
pursuit of opportunities for enrichment and political advancement. It also has led to temporary or
issue-specific cooperation between agencies, which occasional y unite to prevent or deny another
agency from gaining too much power or influence.22 Competition also reportedly results in
agencies providing intel igence that confirms policymakers’ worldviews instead of accurate, if
inconvenient, information.23
Figure 1. Russian Federation

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), using data from the Department of State and Esri.

20 Mark Galeotti, “ Russian Intelligence and Security Agencies Vie for Central Role,” Jane’s Intelligence Review,
August 29, 2018; Joss I. Meakins, “ Squabbling Siloviki: Factionalism Within Russia’s Security Services,” International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 31, no. 2 (2018), pp. 235-270; Peter Reddaway, Russia’s
Domestic Security Wars: Putin’s Use of Divide and Rule Against His Hardline Allies (London: Palgrave, 2018); and
T atiana Stanovaya, “Why the Kremlin Can’t Keep Its Chekists in Check,” Riddle, July 25, 2019.
21 Andrei Soldatov, “Putin’s Secret Services: How the Kremlin Corralled the FSB,” Foreign Affairs, May 31, 2018.
22 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russia’s Security State and the Enduring
Legacy of the KGB (New York: Public Affairs, 2010), pp. 13, 20; and Mark Galeotti, “ What Putin’s Security
Appointments Say About How Russia Works,” War on the Rocks, February 9, 2016.
23 Leonid Bershidsky, “Putin’s Spies Can’t Even Get Along with Each Other,” Bloomberg, July 17, 2018; and Galeotti,
“Intelligence and Security Services.”
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Foreign Relations
Russia’s foreign policy priorities traditional y have focused on the post-Soviet region and the
West, including relations and tensions with NATO, the United States, and Europe. However,
Russia (like the Soviet Union before it) also pursues a global foreign policy. As relations with its
neighbors and Western countries have become more adversarial, Russia—seeking to balance
against U.S. and European power and interests—has cultivated deeper relations with China and
other countries.
Post-Soviet States
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a consistent goal of Russian foreign policy has been to
retain and, where necessary, rebuild close ties with neighboring states that were once part of the
Soviet Union.24 Many observers inside and outside Russia interpret this policy as laying claim to
a traditional sphere of influence. Although Russian policymakers avoid reference to a sphere of
influence, they have used comparable terms at various times. In the early 1990s, Russia’s foreign
minister and other officials employed the term near abroad to describe Russia’s post-Soviet
neighbors. In 2008, Russia’s then-president, Dmitry Medvedev, referred to Russia’s neighbors as
constituting a “region” where Russia has “privileged interests.”25
The original mechanism for reintegrating the post-Soviet states was the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), which the presidents of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine established in
December 1991. The CIS has had limited success in promoting regional integration. It currently
includes as members or participants al post-Soviet states except the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania, al NATO and EU members), Georgia, and Ukraine.26
Russia has had some success developing multilateral relations with a narrower circle of states. In
recent years, Russia has accomplished this aim mainly via two institutions: (1) the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a security al iance that includes Russia, Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and (2) the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), an
evolving but limited single market that includes al CSTO members except Tajikistan (a
prospective candidate).27

24 See, for example, Alexander Cooley, Whose Rules, Whose Sphere? Russian Governance and Influence in Post-Soviet
States, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Carnegie Endowment), June 30, 2017; Paul Stronski, There Goes
the Neighborhood: The Lim its of Russian Integration in Eurasia , Carnegie Endowment, September 2020; Anna
Arutunyan, “In Russia’s Near Abroad, Its Influence Is More Optics T han Substance,” Moscow Times, October 19,
2020; and Dmitri T renin, “ Moscow’s New Rules,” Carnegie Moscow Center, November 12, 2020.
25 William Safire, “On Language: T he Near Abroad,” New York Times, May 22, 1994; and Economist, “Medvedev on
Russia’s Interests,” September 1, 2008.
26 T he full members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, T ajikistan, and Uzbekistan. T urkmenistan did not ratify the CIS charter in 1993 but
considers itself an “associate member” and participates on par with full members. Ukraine did not ratify the CIS
charter, but it signed various CIS treaties and participated in some CIS activities until Russia’s 2014 invasion, after
which Ukraine drew down its participation. Georgia withdrew from the CIS after Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia.
27 On the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), see CRS In Focus IF10309, Eurasian Economic Union, by Edward Y.
Gracia et al.; Evgeny T roitskiy, “ The Eurasian Economic Union at Five: Great Expectations and Hard T imes,” Wilson
Center, January 14, 2020; Andrei Yeliseyeu, The Eurasian Econom ic Union: Expectations, Challenges, and
Achievem ents, German Marshall Fund of the United States, May 2019; and Rilka Dragneva and Christopher A.
Hartwell, “T he Eurasian Economic Union: Integration Without Liberalisation?,” Post-Communist Economies (online
version), September 1, 2020.
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Current members of these organizations mostly have joined voluntarily, if not always
enthusiastical y.28 Their goals in joining have been diverse, including a desire to accommodate
Russia, ensure opportunities for labor migration, promote intergovernmental subsidies, and
bolster regime security. Their goals also include the facilitation of trade and investment and
protection against a variety of external threats (including terrorism and drug trafficking).
Russia dominates the CSTO and the EEU. It has almost 80% of the EEU’s total population, more
than 85% of EEU members’ total gross domestic product (GDP), and about 95% of CSTO
members’ military expenditures.29 Russia maintains active bilateral economic, security, and
political relations with CSTO and EEU member states. Observers consider these bilateral ties to
be of greater significance to Moscow than Russia’s multilateral relations in the region (see
“Power Projection,” below).
Russia’s relations with its CSTO and EEU partners are not always smooth. In addition to Russia’s
dominance in the two organizations, Russian authorities use the CSTO and the EEU to advance
Russia’s security and economic interests, limiting its al iance responsibilities and economic
integration when they perceive these contradict Russia’s interests. Russian trade with EEU
partners makes up less than 10% of Russia’s total trade. In recent years, Russia has sought to
deepen economic and political integration mainly with Belarus via a bilateral but largely
aspirational “union state” that official y came into effect in 2000.30
Russia’s partners have been reluctant to commit fully to the CSTO and EEU or to bind
themselves entirely to Russia on matters of foreign policy and economic development. Armenia
and Belarus remain dependent on Russia, albeit for different reasons. Armenia relies on Russia to
guarantee its security and that of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh, a disputed
region that was the focus of a war with Azerbaijan in 2020 (see “Power Projection,” below).31
Belarus’s authoritarian leader, Aleksandr Lukashenko, depends on Russia for support against
domestic opposition, although many observers believe his relationship with Putin is poor and that
Russian authorities would prefer a successor to Lukashenko who would deepen Belarus’s
integration with Russia. In Central Asia, Kazakhstan has cultivated relations with China and the
West, particularly in the energy sector, and China is Kyrgyzstan’s largest trading partner.32 Both
Armenia and Kazakhstan have established institutional partnerships with NATO; Armenia is a
troop contributor to the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan and Kosovo Force.
For more than 13 years, Kyrgyzstan hosted a major military base and transit center for NATO-led
coalition troops fighting in Afghanistan.
Russia has partnerships with three post-Soviet states that are not members of the CSTO or the
EEU: Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. These states largely seek to pursue independent
foreign policies.33 Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are significant energy producers; they partner
with Russia but have developed their own major alternative transit routes for oil (in Azerbaijan’s

28 See, for example, Richard Giragosian, “Armenia’s Strategic U-T urn,” European Council on Foreign Relations, April
2014; and T ASS, “No Option for Kyrgyzstan but to Join Customs Union —Kyrgyzstan President,” Oct ober 27, 2014.
29 World Bank, at https://data.worldbank.org; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Military
Expenditure Database, 2019.
30 CRS In Focus IF10814, Belarus: An Overview, by Cory Welt.
31 CRS Report R46651, Azerbaijan and Armenia: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, by Cory Welt and Andrew S.
Bowen.
32 CRS In Focus IF10251, Kazakhstan, by Maria A. Blackwood; and CRS In Focus IF10304, Kyrgyz Republic, by
Maria A. Blackwood.
33 T urkmenistan is constitutionally neutral. Uzbekistan was a member of the Collective Security T reaty Organization
from 2006 to 2012. Azerbaijan contributes troops to the NAT O-led Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan.
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case) and natural gas. Under new leadership since 2016, Uzbekistan has deepened security and
economic cooperation with Russia and is considering membership in the EEU; however, it also
seeks to balance Russian influence.34
Among Russia’s neighbors, Moscow’s relations with Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have been
the most strained. Russia has entered into armed territorial conflict with al three states and
stations military forces within their borders without their consent (see “Use of Force and Military
Power,” below). Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have sought to cultivate close ties with the West.
Georgia is pursuing NATO membership and served as one of NATO’s closest non-al ied partners
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ukraine also is a close NATO partner.35 Al three states have concluded
association agreements with the EU that include the establishment of free-trade areas and
encourage harmonization with EU laws and regulations.
NATO and the European Union
NATO36
NATO was established in the aftermath of World War II to provide a framework for coordinating
U.S., Canadian, and Western European defense against threats from the Soviet Union and Soviet
satel ite states in the Eastern Bloc.37 NATO’s mutual defense clause—enshrined in Article 5 of
NATO’s founding North Atlantic Treaty—sought to deter Soviet expansion and prevent the
Soviet Union from fracturing the al iance. After the fal of the Berlin Wal in 1989 and the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States and its al ies preserved NATO but with
a nonconfrontational posture based on a drawdown of military forces and the pursuit of
partnership with Russia and former Eastern Bloc states.
Although Russian authorities took steps toward partnership with NATO in the 1990s, they
general y opposed the decision to preserve the al iance and, especial y, the inclusion of former
Eastern Bloc states as members (by 2004, NATO had accepted 10 new states). They perceived
NATO enlargement both as a security threat and as an effort to marginalize Russia and were
skeptical of NATO claims to the contrary.38 Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 invasion
of Ukraine were at least partial y driven by fear of NATO’s growing influence and potential
further enlargement along Russia’s borders (see “Use of Force and Military Power,” below).
Despite tensions, NATO and Russia identified a number of areas for cooperation before 2014.
Russia al owed cargo transit over its territory for NATO’s International Security Assistance Force
in Afghanistan. Russia and NATO member states, in partnership with the U.N. Office on Drugs

34 CRS In Focus IF10303, Turkmenistan, by Maria A. Blackwood; and CRS In Focus IF10302, Uzbekistan, by Maria
A. Blackwood.
35 Georgia and Ukraine are two of NAT O’s Enhanced Opportunities Partners, a cooperative status currently granted to
six of NAT O’s close strategic partners. In 2008, NAT O members agreed that Georgia and Ukraine would become
members of NAT O, but neither state has been granted a clear path to membership. NAT O, “ Partnership Interoperability
Initiative,” updated November 3, 2020; and NAT O, “ Bucharest Summit Declaration,” April 3, 2008.
36 T his section draws on CRS Report R45652, Assessing NATO’s Value, by Paul Belkin. Also see CRS Report R46066,
NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress, by Paul Belkin.
37 In 1955, the Soviet Union and seven Eastern Bloc countries formed a military alliance commonly known as the
Warsaw Pact. Alliance members included Albania (until 1968), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany (until 1990),
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union.
38 Alexei K. Pushkov, “Don’t Isolate Us: A Russian View of NAT O Expansion,” National Interest, no. 47 (1997), pp.
58-63; and Ruslan Pukhov, “ NAT O is the Obstacle to Improving Russian-Western Relations,” Defense News, March
28, 2019.
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and Crime, jointly trained regional counternarcotics officers, with a view toward reducing drug
transit to and through Russia.39 In 2010, NATO and Russia agreed to pursue preliminary
cooperation on missile defense; negotiations were marked by disagreement, however, and Russia
increasingly opposed NATO’s missile defense plans.40
Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine led to what NATO leadership characterized as the greatest
reinforcement of NATO’s collective defense since the end of the Cold War. Three days after
Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region, NATO’s secretary-general declared NATO
could “no longer do business as usual with Russia.”41 NATO al ies established an Enhanced
Forward Presence of about 4,500 troops in the three Baltic states and Poland; bolstered NATO’s
naval and air presence in the region, including through NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission;
increased military exercises and training activities in Central and Eastern Europe; expanded the
NATO Response Force; and created a new rapid-reaction Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
and new NATO command and control facilities in Central and Eastern Europe.42 NATO members
also bolstered military cooperation with non-NATO countries Sweden and Finland to counter
Russian assertiveness in the Nordic region.43
The principal institutional mechanism for NATO-Russia relations is the NATO-Russia Council
(NRC), established in 2002. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO temporarily suspended
formal NRC meetings.44 NATO civilian and military cooperation with Russia remains suspended,
although NATO maintains channels of communication with Russia “to exchange information on
issues of concern, reduce misunderstandings and increase predictability.”45
NATO members have expressed concerns about destabilizing Russian military activities,
malicious cyber activities, and chemical weapon attacks. In 2019, NATO members concurred
with the United States that Russia was in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty (see “Arms Control,” below). They expressed full support for the U.S. decision to

39 In 2011, NAT O and Russia also established a Helicopter Maintenance T rust Fund to provide maintenance training
and spare parts for Afghanistan’s Russian-produced helicopters. NAT O, “ NAT O-Russia Counter-Narcotics T raining
Reaches Milestone,” April 19, 2012; and NAT O, “ NAT O-Russia Council Expands Helicopter Maintenance T rust Fund
Project for Afghanistan,” April 23, 2013.
40 Josh Rogin, “ Medvedev Announces Failure of U.S.-Russia Missile Defense T alks; T hreatens to Withdraw from New
ST ART ,” Foreign Policy, November 23, 2011. For background, see CRS Report RL34051, Long-Range Ballistic
Missile Defense in Europe, by Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek; and CRS In Focus IF10541, Defense Prim er: Ballistic
Missile Defense, by Stephen M. McCall.
41 NAT O, “A Strong NAT O in a Changed World,” speech by NAT O Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen,
Brussels Forum, March 21, 2014.
42 For details, see NAT O, “Boosting NAT O’s Presence in the East and Southeast,” updated October 20, 2020; NAT O,
“NAT O’s Enhanced Forward Presence,” fact sheet, October 2020; and NAT O, “NAT O Response Force,” updated
March 17, 2020.
43 Sweden and Finland both are NAT O Enhanced Opportunity Partners and have concluded host nation support
agreements to facilitate potential NAT O deployments on their territory for military assistance or training exercises.
Since 2014, Sweden and Finland also have taken part in numerous military exercises and have contribut ed to the
NAT O Response Force. CRS In Focus IF10740, The Nordic Countries and U.S. Relations, by Kristin Archick; Eli
Lake, “Finland’s Plan to Prevent Russian Aggression,” Bloomberg, June 12, 2019; T homas Erdbrink and Andrew E.
Kramer, “Sweden Raises Alarm over Russian Military Exercises,” New York Times, December 15, 2020; and Michael
M. Phillips and James Marson, “Russian Aggression Spurs Neighbors to Rebuild Defenses,” Wall Street Journal,
January 5, 2021.
44 NAT O also suspended formal NAT O-Russia Council meetings for several months after Russia’s invasion of Georgia
in 2008. NAT O, “NAT O-Russia Council,” updated March 23, 2020.
45 NAT O, “Relations with Russia,” updated October 9, 2020.
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withdraw from the treaty and stated, “Russia bears sole responsibility for [the treaty’s] demise.”46
Some European al ies retained concerns over the possible reintroduction of land-based,
intermediate-range missile systems in Europe.47
European Union48
Russian authorities oscil ate between declaring Russia an alternative—more conservative and
authoritarian—model of governance and center of gravity for European countries, on the one
hand, and asserting Russia’s unique status as a Eurasian global power, on the other. Russia seeks
to cultivate relations with the EU and European states in ways that can weaken or divide the
transatlantic relationship with the United States. Russian authorities also strive for EU members
to grant Russia’s regional integration projects as much legitimacy and status as they do their
own.49 Russia seeks to cultivate bilateral relations with particular EU member states, such as
Germany, Italy, and Austria, as wel as with conservative, far right, and far left European parties
and social movements.50 The EU as a whole is Russia’s largest trade partner; Russia is the EU’s
fifth-largest trade partner and main supplier of natural gas.
Crafting common EU policies toward Russia is chal enging, given EU member states’ varying
national histories and economic relations with Russia. Many in the EU have long advocated for a
pragmatic partnership with Russia based largely on commercial and energy ties, as wel as
cooperation on certain foreign policy issues. Those of this view contend that Russia is too big to
isolate or ignore and that Europe’s stability and security ultimately depend on forging good
relations with Moscow. Others view Russia more as a potential threat.
Views within the EU converged considerably after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, but some
differences in perspective persist. Some officials urge a robust NATO presence and support
maintaining strong sanctions on Russia. Others question the effectiveness and sustainability of
efforts to deter Russia and the long-term use of sanctions. Some stress the importance of a dual-
track approach to Russia that complements deterrence with dialogue. Senior EU officials
recognize the chal enge of engaging Russia. Following a controversial visit to Moscow in
February 2021, EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Josep Borel said
Russian authorities were not interested in “constructive dialogue” and “Europe and Russia are
drifting apart.”51 In response, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Russia at present has
“no relations with the EU as an organization.”52

46 NAT O, “Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces T reaty,” August 2,
2019; NAT O, “ Secretary General: NAT O Response to INF T reaty Demise Will Be Measured and Responsible,”
August 2, 2019; and NAT O, “NAT O and the INF T reaty,” updated August 2, 2019.
47 CRS In Focus IF11051, U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty: What’s Next?, by Amy F. Woolf.
48 Also see CRS Report R44249, The European Union: Ongoing Challenges and Future Prospects, by Kristin Archick;
and CRS Report R45745, Transatlantic Relations: U.S. Interests and Key Issues, coordinated by Kristin Archick.
49 Dmitry V. Suslov, “Without A ‘Common Space’: A New Agenda for Russia-EU Relations,” Russian in Global
Affairs, July 1, 2016; Vladimir Chizhov, “ A Russian Perspective: T he EU’s Only One Way to Suc ceed,” Euractiv, June
7, 2019; and Dmitry T renin, “Russia and Europe: T he Current Impasse and the Way Out,” Carnegie Moscow Center,
February 18, 2021.
50 Gustav Gressel, “Fellow T ravellers: Russia, Anti-Westernism, and Europe’s Political Parties,” European Council on
Foreign Relations, July 2017; and Andrew S. Weiss, With Friends Like These: The Krem lin’s Far-Right and Populist
Connections in Italy and Austria, Carnegie Endowment, February 27, 2020.
51 European External Action Service, “My Visit to Moscow and the Future of EU-Russian Relations,” February 7,
2021; and Michael Birnbaum, “An EU Diplomat Went to Moscow to Build Bridges. It Didn’t Go Well,” Washington
Post, February 9, 2021.
52 T ASS, “Moscow Has No Relations with EU As Organization T oday, Lavrov Says,” March 23, 2021.
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Like NATO and the United States, the EU expresses firm support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity and concern about Russia’s malicious cyber activities, influence operations,
chemical weapon attacks, and human rights abuses. After the 2014 downing over Ukraine of
Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (in which over 200 EU citizens died), the EU closely coordinated
with the United States to impose sanctions on Russia for its actions in Ukraine. The EU, like the
United States, has imposed sanctions in response to Russian chemical weapons attacks and
human rights abuses.
Russia’s energy diplomacy continues to divide European states. Some in the EU, including the
German and Austrian governments, support the construction of Russia’s Nord Stream 2 natural
gas pipeline to Germany (see “Energy,” below). Supporters of the pipeline argue it would
enhance EU energy security by increasing the capacity of a direct and secure supply route. Others
argue Nord Stream 2 would give Russia greater political and economic leverage over Germany
and other states that depend on Russian gas and leave some countries, like Ukraine, more
vulnerable to Russia.
China
The Russia-China partnership largely is the product of a long-term trend of closer alignment, after
two decades of estrangement during the Cold War.53 Russia and China have many reasons to
cooperate. Although tensions have arisen between the two countries on various issues, both aim to
counter what they consider to be U.S. hegemony, regional y and worldwide. Both are wary of the
U.S. military presence in Asia and have criticized efforts to upgrade the United States’ defense
capabilities with its treaty al ies Japan and South Korea. Both Russia and China hold vetoes on
the U.N. Security Council, and they often work together to adjust or oppose U.N. Security
Council resolutions Western states have supported, including on human rights issues.54
Despite occasional statements signaling a potential full-fledged al iance, Chinese and Russian
officials consider their relationship to be a strategic partnership.55 Beijing has not wanted to enter
into an explicitly anti-Western union; its trade volume with the United States dwarfs its trade with
Russia, and it has not sought to confront the West directly. Some observers, however, believe U.S.
efforts to counter China and Russia could lead the two countries to develop closer relations.56
China is Russia’s single largest trading partner (although Russia’s total trade with the EU is
larger), and Russia is China’s ninth-largest trading partner.57 Energy trade plays an important role
in the Russia-China relationship. Oil and petroleum products made up more than 50% of Russian
exports to China in 2020 (and almost 65% in 2019). In 2019, Russia and China opened a major

53 T his section draws in part on CRS Report R44613, Northeast Asia and Russia’s “Turn to the East”: Implications for
U.S. Interests, by Emma Chanlett -Avery.
54 Russia and China have cooperated tacitly on various issues at the United Nations. For example, analysts have noted
China generally has been willing to let Russia determine positio ns on Syria, whereas Russia often follows China’s lead
on North Korea (although differences have arisen over North Korea sanctions). Jeffrey Feltman, China’s Expanding
Influence at the United Nations – and How the United States Should React, Brookings Inst itution, September 2020.
55 Gustav Gressel, “T he Authoritarian Entente: Sino-Russian Security Cooperation,” European Council on Foreign
Relations, October 17, 2019 (hereinafter, Gressel, “ Authoritarian Entente”); Vladimir Isachenkov, “ Putin: Russia-China
Military Alliance Can’t Be Ruled Out,” Associated Press, October 22, 2020; and Alexander Gabuev, “Is Putin Really
Considering a Military Alliance with China?,” Carnegie Endowment, December 1, 2020.
56 Matthew Kroenig, “T he United States Should Not Align with Russia Against China,” Foreign Policy, May 13, 2020;
and Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky, “ Kissinger Revisited: Can the United States Drive a Wedge Between Russia
and China?,” Carnegie Endowment, March 2, 2021 .
57 China Customs Statistics, as presented in T rade Data Monitor.
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new pipeline, the Power of Siberia, to supply Russian natural gas to China. The two countries
have discussed additional gas pipeline routes.58
Security relations between Russia and China have advanced significantly in recent years.59 The
two countries conduct increasingly large and frequent military exercises. Under the auspices of
the multilateral Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Russia and China have conducted
annual military exercises, dubbed “Peace Mission,” since 2005.60 Most bilateral exercises focus
on improving strategic cooperation rather than tactical interoperability. China also sends troops to
Russia’s annual strategic exercises, most recently to Kavkaz 2020 in Russia’s Southern Military
District. Most large-scale exercises are naval exercises, with Russia and China conducting naval
exercises dubbed “Joint Sea” since 2012. Russian and Chinese strategic bombers began
conducting joint patrols over the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea in 2019.61
Defense sector cooperation between Russia and China continues to evolve. China may be
interested in purchasing advanced Russian air defense systems (such as the S-500 or recently
introduced S-350) and continues to purchase Russian aircraft engines (the United States has
imposed sanctions on China for purchasing S-400 air defense systems from Russia). As China’s
defense sector is developing, direct arms sales from Russia are decreasing. Cooperation
increasingly centers on joint production and development, potential y including advanced
technologies, such as missile defense and missile technologies (see “Defense Industry and Arms
Sales,” below).62 In addition, Russia and China signed an agreement in March 2021 to create an
International Scientific Lunar Station.63
Global Engagement
Over the last decade in particular, Russia has increased its global engagement, although observers
have debated the depth and sustainability of Russia’s global relations.64 Several reasons may
explain Russia’s increased global engagement. These include, to varying degrees, the following:
(1) growing alignment between Russia’s military capabilities and its aspiration to conduct foreign

58 CRS In Focus IF11514, Power of Siberia: A Natural Gas Pipeline Brings Russia and China Closer, by Michael
Ratner and Heather L. Greenley.
59 Vasily Kashin, “T he Current State of Russian-Chinese Defense Cooperation,” CNA, August 2018; Gressel,
“Authoritarian Entente”; and Andrea Kendall-T aylor, David Shullman, and Dan McCormick, “Navigating Sino -
Russian Defense Cooperation,” War on the Rocks, August 5, 2020.
60 T he Shanghai Cooperation Organization also includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, T ajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, and
Pakistan. Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, and Mongolia have observer status.
61 Michael Kofman, “T he Emperors League: Understanding Sino-Russian Defense Cooperation,” War on the Rocks,
August 6, 2020 (hereinafter, Kofman, “Emperors League”); Catherine Wong, “ Chinese T roops to T ake Part in Russia’s
Kavkaz 2020 Military Exercises,” South China Morning Post, September 10, 2020; Geoffrey F. Gresh, “T he New
Great Game at Sea,” War on the Rocks, December 8, 2020; and T ASS, “Russian, Chinese Strategic Bombers Carry Out
Joint Air Patrol in Asia-Pacific Region,” December 22, 2020.
62 Dmitry Stefanovich, “Russia to Help China Develop an Early Warning System,” The Diplomat, October 25, 2019;
and Dmitry Gorenburg, “ An Emerging Strategic Partnership: T rends in Russia-China Military Cooperation,” Marshall
Center, April 2020.
63 Matthew Bodner, “Russia and China Unveil Plans for Joint Lunar Space Station as Moscow Drifts away from
NASA,” NBC News, March 11, 2021.
64 Paul Stronski and Richard Sokolsky, The Return of Global Russia: An Analytical Framework, Carnegie Endowment,
December 2017; T homas Grove, “Russia Reaffirms Its Global Ambitions After Political T ransition,” Wall Street
Journal, January 17, 2019; Julia Gurganus and Eugene Rumer, Russia’s Global Am bitions in Perspective, Carnegie
Endowment, February 2019; Bryan Bender, “Russia Beating U.S. in Race for Global Influen ce, Pentagon Study Says,”
Politico, June 30, 2019; and Holly Ellyatt, “ From Africa to Azerbaijan, Here’s How Far Russia’s Global Influence
Stretches,” CNBC, February 10, 2020.
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relations befitting a great power; (2) a desire to cultivate diverse economic relations, given U.S.
and European sanctions; and (3) an opportunity to court authoritarian leaders who seek leverage
against U.S. pressures for democratization or harbor concerns about the reliability of U.S.
backing.
Russia has notably increased its engagement in the Middle East and North Africa, most
prominently through its military intervention in Syria (see “Syria,” below).65 Beyond Syria,
Russia has deepened relations with other key states in the Middle East, including Iran, Turkey,
and Israel, and has sought to build relations with both traditional Soviet-era partners (e.g.,
Algeria, Egypt, Libya) and former adversaries (e.g., Saudi Arabia). In Libya, Russia has provided
assistance to the Libyan National Army movement, based in the east of the country. Turkey is
Russia’s seventh-largest trading partner (amounting to $21 bil ion in 2020), and Russia has
secured new arms and energy deals (oil, gas, and nuclear) across the Middle East and North
Africa in recent years.66 With the exception of Turkey, Russia’s overal trade with the region is
relatively low and is dominated by Russian exports (including arms, grain, and oil). Egypt is
Russia’s second-largest regional trading partner, with Russia reporting total annual trade of $4.5
bil ion in 2020.
After a post-Cold War period of relative disengagement, Russia also has sought to cultivate
economic and security partnerships with a number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.67 Russia’s
defense and security relations with African states include military cooperation agreements, arms
and equipment sales, and the deployment of military advisers and private security contractors that
U.S. officials and other observers assert have close ties to the Russian government (see “Private
Military Companies,” below). In some cases, security cooperation has been accompanied by
increased access to African countries’ energy, mineral, and precious metal resources for Russian
firms, some of which have ties to Russia’s national security apparatus. In addition to new defense
markets and commercial interests, Russia has sought greater diplomatic influence in Africa and,
with the support of African countries, within U.N. bodies.
Russia also has increased engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean, although its
engagement is relatively limited compared with that of the United States and China.68 Venezuela,
Cuba, and Nicaragua are Russia’s primary regional security partners. In Venezuela, Russia
recognizes Nicolás Maduro as president and has provided Maduro’s government with security
and economic support, including by facilitating Venezuelan oil exports to third countries. In Latin
America, Brazil is Russia’s largest regional trading partner, with Russia reporting total annual
trade of $4 bil ion in 2020.

65 Kathrin Hille et al., “Russia’s Middle East Ambitions Grow with Syria Battlefield Success,” Financial Times,
January 9, 2017; Eugene Rumer, Russia in the Middle East: Jack of All Trades, Master of None, Carnegie Endowment,
October 2019; Becca Wasser, The Lim its of Russian Strategy in the Middle East, RAND, November 2019; Alec Luhn,
“Putin’s Game in the Middle East,” Politico, January 17, 2020; and Jalel Harchaoui, “T he Pendulum: How Russia
Sways Its Way to More Influence in Libya,” War on the Rocks, January 7, 2021 (hereinafter, Harchaoui, “Pendulum”).
66 T rade data in this section are from the Federal Customs Service of Russia, as presented in the Global T rade Atlas.
67 Paul Stronski, Late to the Party: Russia’s Return to Africa, Carnegie Endowment, October 2019; Eric Schmitt and
T homas Gibbons-Neff, “ Russia Exerts Growing Influence in Africa, Worrying Many in the West,” New York Tim es,
January 28, 2020; and Giovanni Faleg and Stanislav Secrieru, Russia’s Forays Into Sub-Saharan Africa, EU Institute
for Security Studies (EUISS), March 2020.
68 Julia Gurganus, Russia: Playing a Geopolitical Game in Latin America, Carnegie Endowment, May 2018; and
Andrey Pyatakov, Russia and Latin Am erica in the 21st Century: A Difficult Rapprochem ent, French Institute of
International Relations (IFRI), July 2020.
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In Asia, in addition to its ties to China, Russia has improved relations with Japan, with which it
has a territorial dispute over islands Russia annexed at the end of World War II. Russia also has
cultivated relations with India, Pakistan, Vietnam, and countries across Southeast Asia, again
building on Cold War-era ties.69 In Afghanistan, the Russian government has taken an active role
in efforts to bring that country’s internal conflict to a negotiated end. U.S. officials have
indicated, however, that Russia also has provided some measure of political and potential y
material support to the Taliban (see “Targeted Overseas Attacks,” below).70
Use of Force and Military Power
As Russia’s economic and military power has grown, Russian authorities have demonstrated a
capacity and wil ingness to use force to accomplish foreign policy goals, both in neighboring
countries and further afield. Russia also projects power abroad via an expansive and increasingly
aggressive posture of air and sea patrols, the use of “private” military companies, and targeted
attacks on perceived opponents. In addition, Russia conducts an often militarized approach in the
Arctic to exert control over current and potential energy deposits and shipping routes.
Ukraine71
Many observers believe that of al the post-Soviet states, Ukraine’s independence has been the
most difficult for Russians to accept. Many Russians traditional y considered much of Ukraine to
be a historical province of Russia and Ukrainians to be close ethnic brethren. In June 2019,
President Putin said, “Russians and Ukrainians are one people ... one nation.”72
Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine occurred soon after Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity, when
then-President Viktor Yanukovych fled to Russia. Russian government officials cast the
Revolution of Dignity as a Western-backed “coup” that, among other things, could threaten the
security of the ethnic Russian population in Ukraine’s Crimea region, could eject Russia’s Black
Sea Fleet from the region, and even could bring Ukraine into NATO. The Russian government
covertly deployed forces to Crimea and, after holding what most observers consider to have been
an il egal referendum, declared it was incorporating Crimea (with a population of about 2 mil ion)
directly into the Russian Federation (for a map, see Figure 2).
Moscow then engineered the rise of new separatist movements in eastern Ukraine (the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions, collectively known as the Donbas, with a population of about 6.6 mil ion in
2014). Militants forcibly took power in several cities and towns, announced the establishment of
two separatist entities, and gradual y expanded their control in the two regions. Ukrainian
government and volunteer forces fought back, restoring state control over a portion of each region
but suffering some major defeats, including in battles in which regular Russian forces reportedly
participated. In 2019, one study estimated that about half the pre-conflict population of the

69 Bennett Murray, Russia’s Struggle to Gain Influence in Southeast Asia, Foreign Policy Research Institute, August 31,
2020; and Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, and Aleksandar Vladicic, Russia in the Asia-Pacific: Less Than Meets the
Eye, Carnegie Endowment, September 3, 2020.
70 Philip Ewing, “ Why Is Russia Helping Anti-U.S. Insurgents in Afghanistan?,” NPR, February 13, 2017; T homas
Gibbons-Neff, “ Russia Is Sending Weapons to T aliban, T op U.S. General Confirms,” Washington Post, April 24, 2017;
Justin Rowlatt, “Russia ‘Arming the Afghan T aliban,’ Says U.S.,” BBC News, March 23, 2018; and David G. Lewis,
Return to Kabul? Russian Policy in Afghanistan , Marshall Center, June 2020.
71 For more, see CRS Report R45008, Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy, by Cory Welt.
72 Associated Press, “Putin: Russians, Ukrainians Are ‘One People,’” July 20, 2019.
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Donetsk and Luhansk regions (or 3.2 mil ion people) were living under the control of Russian
proxies.73
For Russia, the establishment of separatist entities in eastern Ukraine may have served multiple
purposes. The Russian government claimed it was seeking to “protect” relatively pro-Russian
populations in these regions. Many observers believe that Moscow sought to complicate
Ukraine’s domestic development and foreign policy and to increase Russian leverage in potential
negotiations over Ukraine’s future trajectory.74
The conflict’s intensity has declined since 2015, but fighting has continued. A July 2020 cease-
fire led to a reduced number of cease-fire violations and casualties for several months.75 However,
a new round of hostilities occurred in March 2021, as Russia reportedly amassed troops along its
border with Ukraine and in occupied Crimea. The size and sustained nature of Russian troop
deployments concerned Ukrainian and Western governments, and some observers speculated that
Russia could be preparing a new offensive.76
The conflict has led to about 10,000 combat deaths and 3,375 civilian fatalities.77 Ukraine has
registered more than 1.4 mil ion people as internal y displaced persons, although many have
returned to their homes. Ukrainian officials estimate that more than 375 Ukrainians remain in
il egal detention in Russian-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine, occupied Crimea, or Russia.78
Crimea
Since 2014, Russia has increased its military presence in Crimea and suppressed local dissent,
including by minority Crimean Tatars. Russia has deployed more than 30,000 armed personnel to
Crimea. Russia’s military forces in Crimea include ground, artil ery, coastal defense, air defense,
and fighter units.79 In March 2021, Russia announced plans to permanently move the 56th Air
Assault Brigade to Feodosia, Crimea, thereby increasing its power projection capabilities in the
region. Additional y, Russia has increased the size and capability of its Black Sea Fleet,

73 Yuriy Vyshnevskyy, “Demography of ORDLO (Separate Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions),” Delovaya
Stolitsa (Ukraine), n.d., at https://www.dsnews.ua/static/longread/donbas-eng/demography-of-ordlo.html; and
International Crisis Group, Peace in Ukraine (III): The Costs of War in Donbas, September 3, 2020.
74 Samuel Charap and T imothy J. Colton, Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet
Eurasia (New York: Routledge, 2017); and Andrew S. Bowen, “ Coercive Diplomacy and the Donbas: Explaining
Russian Strategy in Eastern Ukraine,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 42, no. 3-4 (2019), pp. 312-343.
75 Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Report on the Human Rights Situation in
Ukraine: 1 August 2020-31 January 2021, March 11, 2021.
76 Andrew E. Kramer, “Fighting Escalates in Eastern Ukraine, Signaling the End to Another Cease -Fire,” New York
Tim es, March 30, 2021; Michael Kofman, “ Russia’s Military Buildup near Ukraine is an Intimidation T actic,” Moscow
Tim es, April 3, 2021; and Isabelle Khurshudyan et al., “ On Ukraine’s Doorstep, Russia Boosts Military and Sends
Message of Regional Clout to Biden,” Washington Post, April 10, 2021.
77 T his count includes the 298 foreign nationals killed in the July 17, 2014, downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (or
MH17), a commercial aircraft en route from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur that was shot down in Ukrainian airspace.
OHCHR, Report on the Hum an Rights Situation in Ukraine: 16 Novem ber 2019-15 February 2020, p. 8; and OHCHR,
Report on the Hum an Rights Situation in Ukraine: 1 August 2020-31 January 2021, March 11, 2021, p. 7.
78 Stabilization Support Services, IDPs: Life Before and During the Coronavirus, July 2020; International Crisis Group,
Peace in Ukraine (III): The Costs of War in Donbas, September 3, 2020; and Ukrinform , “ 109 Ukrainian Political
Prisoners Jailed in Russia and Occupied Crimea,” February 2, 2021.
79 T his includes units equipped with the latest S-400 surface-to-air and Bastion-P coastal defense systems. Patrick
T ucker, “U.S. Intelligence Officials and Satellite Photos Detail Russian Military Buildup on Crimea,” Defense One,
June 12, 2019; and Ukrinform , “ Already 31,500 Russian T roops Deployed in Occupied Crimea,” November 7, 2019.
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headquartered in Sevastopol.80 Despite this growth in capabilities, most analysts assess that
military forces in Crimea are primarily defensively oriented and that Russia lacks the forces to
conduct sustained offensive operations without reinforcements.81
Much of the international community does not recognize Russia’s purported annexation of
Crimea. Many have condemned Russia’s occupation as a violation of international law and of
Russia’s own international commitments. Since 2014, the U.N. General Assembly has voted
several times to affirm Ukraine’s territorial integrity, most recently in December 2020.82 The
Ukrainian government and state-owned companies have pursued claims in international
arbitration courts concerning the violation of their rights in Crimea and nearby maritime waters.83
Eastern Ukraine
In contrast to its policy toward Crimea, Moscow official y recognizes the areas it controls in
eastern Ukraine as Ukrainian territory. Although the Russian government denies military
involvement in eastern Ukraine, in 2018, then-U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine
Negotiations Kurt Volker stated, “Russia has 100 percent command and control of what is
happening in the occupied areas there—military forces, political entities, and direct economic
activity.”84 In April 2020, Ukrainian officials estimated that more than 2,000 Russian military
forces, mostly in command and control positions, were fighting in eastern Ukraine, with the total
number of Russian-led fighters estimated at more than 30,000.85 In January 2020, Russian
officials stated that Russia had granted citizenship to more than 196,000 residents of Donetsk and
Luhansk (about 30% of whom live in areas controlled by Ukraine). In 2020, the number of new
applicants for Russian citizenship reportedly declined.86
Maritime Conflict
Russia seeks to establish greater control over maritime regions adjacent to Crimea and eastern
Ukraine, including in the Sea of Azov; the Black Sea; and the Kerch Strait, which connects the
two seas. In 2018, Putin opened a 12-mile-long bridge over the Kerch Strait linking Russia to

80 Dmitry Gorenburg, “Is a New Russian Black Sea Fleet Coming? Or Is It Here?,” War on the Rocks, July 31, 2018;
Igor Delanoe, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet: Toward a Multiregional Force, CNA, June 2019; and Mike Eckel, “ T he Guns
of April: Six Questions About the New Russia-Ukraine T ensions,” RFE/RL, April 7, 2021.
81 Michael Kofman, “T he Crimean Crisis and Russia’s Military Posture in the Black Sea,” War on the Rocks, August
19, 2016; and Gustav Gressel, “Occupational Hazards: T he Russian Military in Crimea,” European Council on Foreign
Relations, April 17, 2019.
82 U.N. General Assembly Resolutions A/RES/68/262, March 27, 2014, and A/RES/75/29, December 7, 2020.
83 Stuart Elliott, “Ukraine’s Naftogaz to Pursue $8 Billion Arbitration Case Against Russia over Crimea,” S&P Global,
February 10, 2020; Embassy of Ukraine in the Netherlands, “Permanent Court of Arbitration,” October 23, 2020; and
UNIAN, “Ukraine’s Oschadbank Loses Case vs. Russia on Compensation of Crimean Assets,” March 31, 2021.
84 U.S. Department of State, “Press Briefing with Kurt Volker, Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations,”
November 8, 2018.
85 Currently, Russian-led fighters are organized into two army corps, loosely modeled on the Russian army. Mark
Galeotti, Arm ies of Russia’s War in Ukraine (Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2019); International Crisis Group, Rebels Without a
Cause: Russia’s Proxies in Eastern Ukraine, July 16, 2019; T im Ripley, “Donbass Conflict Offers Pointers for Future
Russian Military Action,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, June 18, 2019; and Ukrinform , “ Joint Forces Commander: Over
2,000 Russian Career Officers Stationed in Occupied Donbas,” April 30, 2020.
86 UNIAN, “About 200,000 Donbas Residents Obtain Russian Citizenship in 2019 – Russian Media,” January 2, 2020;
and Hayla Coynash, “Putin’s Russian Passport Aggression Against Ukraine Fizzles in Occupied Donbas,” Kharkiv
Human Rights Protection Group, October 9, 2020. Also see Fabian Burkhardt, Russia’s “Passportization” of the
Donbas, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), August 2020.
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occupied Crimea. Russia interferes with commercial traffic traveling to and from Ukrainian ports
on the Sea of Azov in Mariupol and Berdyansk, which export steel, grain, and coal.87 Russia also
has bolstered its maritime forces in the Sea of Azov. In November 2018, Russia forcibly
prevented Ukrainian naval vessels from passing through the Kerch Strait to reach Ukrainian
shores and il egal y detained 24 crew members for 10 months.88
Figure 2. Ukraine

Source: CRS, using data from the Department of State, Esri, and DeLorme.
Conflict Resolution
With respect to eastern Ukraine, Russia and Ukraine participate in a conflict resolution process
structured around a set of measures known as the Minsk agreements (Russia refuses to engage in
a similar conflict resolution process with respect to Crimea, as Russia claims to have annexed that
region).89 A 2015 agreement commonly known as Minsk-2 includes measures to end hostilities.90
These measures largely remain unfulfil ed to date.

87 Oksana Grytsenko and Kostyantyn Chernichkin, “ Dangerous Waters: As Russia Monopolizes Azov Sea, Mariupol
Feels Heightened Danger,” Kyiv Post, August 3, 2018; Ukrinform , “ How Russia Violates Security in Azov-Black Sea
Region,” June 1, 2020; and Ihor Kabanenko, “ Russia’s Strategy in the Sea of Azov: T he Kerch Bridge, Artificial
Shipping Delays and Continued Harm to Ukraine,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, January 14, 2021.
88 Dmitry Gorenburg and Michael Kofman, “ Russia and Ukraine Had a Short Naval Battle. Here’s What You Need T o
Know,” Washington Post, November 28, 2018.
89 T he Minsk agreements were signed in 2014 and 2015 by representat ives of Russia, Ukraine, and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)—members of what is known as the T rilateral Contact Group—together
with Russian proxy authorities in eastern Ukraine.
90 “Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements,” February 12, 2015, at
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/UA_150212_MinskAgreement_en.pdf.
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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who came to power in 2019, initial y sought to
invigorate what had been a relatively dormant conflict resolution process. Ukrainian- and
Russian-led forces implemented one long-planned confidence-building measure: the withdrawal
of armed forces and hardware from three disengagement areas near populated areas.91 Several
major prisoner exchanges also have occurred.92 A cease-fire declared in July 2020 was more
successful than previous cease-fires.93 However, armed hostilities continue and efforts to settle
thornier issues, including withdrawal of Russian forces and the legal status of Russian-controlled
areas, have not been successful.
Georgia94
Since the 1990s, Georgia’s relations with Russia have been tense. Georgian authorities accuse
Moscow of obstructing Georgia’s Western integration. Many observers believe Russia has
supported the secession of Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to
prevent Georgia from joining NATO (for a map, see Figure 3).
Abkhazia and South Ossetia original y sought to secede from Georgia in the early 1990s, during
and after Georgia’s pursuit of independence from the Soviet Union.95 At the time, many observers
believed Soviet and, later, Russian authorities instigated the conflicts, assisted local forces to halt
Georgia’s efforts to distance itself from Russia, or both. After the conflicts ended, Russian
peacekeeping forces remained in both regions. As in occupied regions of Ukraine, Russia has
provided citizenship to residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.96
2008 Russia-Georgia War
Georgia’s relations with Russia worsened after former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili
came to power in 2003 and sought to accelerate Georgia’s integration with the West. The
Georgian government established greater control over Georgian-populated vil ages in South
Ossetia and the remote and thinly populated Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia. In 2004, new clashes
between Georgian and local forces occurred. After another round of escalation in 2008, Russia
invaded Georgia to prevent the Georgian government from reestablishing control over South
Ossetia. A five-day war in August 2008 led to the deaths of more than 800 civilians and military
personnel, the expulsion of some 20,000 Georgian residents from South Ossetia, the destruction
of vil ages, and Georgia’s loss of control over long-held areas.97 In Abkhazia, local forces took

91 International Crisis Group, Peace in Ukraine (II): A New Approach to Disengagement, August 3, 2020.
92 RFE/RL, “Ukraine, Russia-Backed Separatists Hold Another Prisoner Swap,” April 16, 2020.
93 Olha Polishchuk and Franklin Holcomb, “Breaking the Pattern: T he Relative Success of the Latest Ceasefire
Agreement in Ukraine,” Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, November 24, 2020.
94 For more, see CRS Report R45307, Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy, by Cory Welt.
95 Most Georgians were forced to flee Abkhazia during the 1992 -1993 war and became internally displaced persons.
Abkhazia’s population in the 1989 Soviet census was about 525,000, of which 46% were ethnic Georgians and 17%
were ethnic Abkhaz. Authorities in Abkhazia allege the region’s population in 2011 was about 240,000 (50% Abkhaz,
19% Georgian). Authorities in South Ossetia allege the region’s population in 2015 was about 54,000 (90% Ossetian,
7% Georgian). In the 1989 Soviet census, the region’s population was about 98,000 (66% Ossetian, 29% Georgian).
96 T oru Nagashima, “Russia’s Passportization Policy T oward Unrecognized Republics: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and
T ransnistria,” Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 66, no. 3 (2019), pp. 186-199.
97 Cory Welt, “T he T hawing of a Frozen Conflict: T he Internal Security Dilemma and the 2004 Prelude to the Russo -
Georgian War,” Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 62, no. 1 (2010), pp. 63-97; Council of the EU, Report of the Independent
International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (3 vols.), September 2009; and Ruslan Pukhov, ed., The
Tanks of August (Moscow: Centre for Analysis of Strategies and T echnologies, 2010).
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control of the Kodori Gorge. Russian forces temporarily occupied Georgian territory outside
Abkhazia and South Ossetia and recognized the latter as independent states.
Figure 3. Georgia

Source: CRS, using data from the Department of State, National Geospatial Intel igence Agency, Esri, and
DeLorme.
After the 2008 War and Recent Developments
Since 2008, Moscow has tightened control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In these two
regions, Russia has established military bases and border guard outposts that reportedly each
house 3,500-5,000 military and border guard personnel.98 Russian and local authorities have
constructed boundary fences, imposed transit restrictions, and frequently detained Georgian
citizens for “il egal” crossings. Since 2015, at least four Georgian citizens have been kil ed or
have died under suspicious circumstances while in detention or in incidents involving local armed
forces.99
In recent years, new tensions have arisen around South Ossetia. In 2019, Russian and local
authorities hardened and extended the boundary line. Georgian authorities responded by

98 T he 7th Military Base in Abkhazia is in Gudauta; the 4th Military Base in South Ossetia is in T skhinvali. T he
estimated number of armed forces does not include local military formations. Abkhazia maintains local forces under
the command of the Russian military; some local South Ossetian forces have been absorbed into the Russian military.
International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance 2020, p. 208; and Margarete Klein, Russia’s
Military Policy in the Post-Soviet Space: Aim s, Instrum ents, and Perspectives, SWP, January 2019.
99 In 2018, the Georgian government compiled a list of human rights offenders in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and
called for international sanctions. Agenda.ge, “ 327 Detained Illegally by Occupying Forces in Georgia Between 2017 -
19,” February 26, 2019; Civil Georgia, “Independent Expert Speaks of Preliminary Details of Kvaratskhelia’s Forensic
Examination,” March 17, 2019; Civil Georgia, “Government Unveils T atunashvili-Otkhozoria List,” June 27, 2018;
and Agenda.ge, “ Tbilisi Demands Release of Illegally Detained Citizens at Meeting with De Facto T skhinvali
‘Officials,’” March 5, 2021.
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establishing a new police checkpoint nearby, after which local authorities closed the crossing
point for one Georgian-populated area (with an estimated resident population of under 2,000 and
approximately 400 daily crossings). The closure reportedly has contributed to the deaths of at
least 16 residents who were unable to be transported for medical care.100 In 2020, authorities in
both regions enacted new crossing point closures, ostensibly related to Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19) concerns; authorities in Abkhazia occasional y have opened humanitarian corridors
across the boundary line.101
Conflict Resolution Process
The 2008 war ended with a six-point cease-fire plan and a follow-on implementation plan
brokered by then-French President Nicolas Sarkozy. The six-point plan included a nonuse of
force pledge and the return of Russia’s armed forces to the positions they held prior to the start of
hostilities.102 Regular Russian forces withdrew from areas they had occupied outside South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, but within the two regions Russia deployed new forces in greater numbers
and outside preexisting peacekeeping formats. As a result, U.S. officials and others consider
Russia to be in noncompliance with the six-point plan.103
Al parties to the conflict, together with the United States, the EU, the United Nations, and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), participate in the Geneva
International Discussions, convened quarterly to address issues related to the conflict. Parties to
the conflict, together with the United Nations and the OSCE, also participate in joint Incident
Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) to address local security issues and build
confidence. Abkhaz and South Ossetian representatives frequently suspend participation in the
IPRMs.104 The EU leads an unarmed civilian monitoring mission in Georgia that monitors
compliance with the cease-fire; Russian authorities do not permit the mission to operate in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.105
Moldova106
Since Moldova gained independence in 1991, it has coped with the de facto Russian-backed
secession of Transnistria, a multiethnic and predominantly Russian-speaking region with at least
10% of Moldova’s population and a substantial industrial base.107 Moldovan authorities support a

100 Giorgi Lomsadze, “Russia Advances Its Great Wall of Georgia,” Eurasianet, August 15, 2019; Human Rights
Center (Georgia), State of Hum an Rights Along the Dividing Lines of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 2019; Georgia
Today, “ Occupied Akhalgori Faces Humanitarian Crisis,” January 16, 2020; and Civil Georgia, “ Akhalgori Patient
Dies After Delayed T ransfer to Georgia Proper, T bilisi Says,” November 16, 2020.
101 Georgia Today, “Occupied T skhinvali, Abkhazia Close Entrances to Rest of Georgia,” February 28, 2020; and U.S.
Mission to the OSCE, “ Statement on the 51st Round of the Geneva International Discussions (Conflict in Georgia),”
December 17, 2020.
102 Council of the EU, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, vol. 3,
pp. 587-594.
103 U.S. Mission to the OSCE, “Joint Statement of the Group of Friends of Georgia,” December 4, 2020.
104 Civil Georgia, “Geneva T alks Co-Chairs Hold Meetings in T bilisi, T skhinvali, Sokhumi,” September 17, 2020; and
OSCE, “98th Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism Meeting T akes Place in Ergneti,” March 5, 2021.
105 EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, at https://eumm.eu.
106 For more, see CRS In Focus IF10894, Moldova: An Overview, by Cory Welt.
107 T ransnistria’s population has been estimated at about 350,000 -400,000. Authorities in T ransnistria allege that the
region’s population in 2015 was 34% Russian, 33% Moldovan, and 27% Ukrainian. T im Judah, “Moldova Faces
‘Existential’ Population Crisis,” Balkan Insight, January 16, 2020.
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special governance status for Transnistria, but Russian authorities and authorities in Transnistria
have resisted making an agreement on such a status.
Despite its separatist tendencies, Transnistria has strong economic links with the rest of Moldova
and the EU, the destination for about half of its exports.108 Residents who have retained
Moldovan citizenship may vote in Moldovan elections at polling stations outside Transnistria;
some 31,000 such residents of Transnistria reportedly voted in Moldova’s 2020 presidential
election.109
Russian Military Presence
In 1992, the ex-Soviet 14th Army, which came under Russian control, al ied with local forces to
fight a short secessionist conflict in Transnistria. After the conflict ended, Russian forces
remained in the region. Currently, Russia stations about 1,500 soldiers in Transnistria, a few
hundred of which Moldova accepts as peacekeepers.110 In 2017, Moldova’s Constitutional Court
ruled that Russia’s non-peacekeeping troop presence was unconstitutional and its parliament
adopted a declaration cal ing on Russia to withdraw these forces.111 In 2018, the U.N. General
Assembly passed a resolution cal ing on Russia to withdraw its troops from Moldova
“unconditional y and without further delay.”112
Conflict Resolution Process
A conflict resolution process operates in a “5+2” format under the chairpersonship of the OSCE,
with the OSCE, Russia, and Ukraine as mediators and the EU and the United States as
observers.113 The EU also supports conflict management through the EU Border Assistance
Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, which seeks to help the two countries combat transborder
crime; facilitate trade; and resolve the conflict over Transnistria, which shares a long border with
Ukraine.114
In 2016, the Moldovan government and Transnistrian leaders committed “to engage in a
substantive, result-oriented dialogue” focused on a set of practical issues and confidence-building
measures.115 The sides resolved several issues related to transit, education, agriculture, and the
recording of civil statistics.116 In 2020, restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic slowed

108 European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM), Annual Report (1 December 2018
- 30 Novem ber 2019), October 4, 2020.
109 Andrew Wilson, “Separate Ways: Contrasting Elections in Georgia and Moldova,” European Council on Foreign
Relations, November 19, 2020.
110 IISS, Military Balance 2020, p. 208.
111 Ana Maria T ourna, “Moldova Asks Russian T roops to Quit T ransnistria,” Balkan Insight, July 21, 2017.
112 U.N. General Assembly Resolution A/RES/72/282, June 22, 2018.
113 OSCE Mission to Moldova, “Conflict Prevention and Resolution,” at https://www.osce.org/mission-to-moldova/
104529.
114 See EUBAM, at http://eubam.org.
115 OSCE Mission to Moldova, “ Special Representative of the Austrian OSCE Chairmanship Reaffirms the Need for
Results-Oriented Dialogue in the T ransdniestrian Settlement Process,” January 20, 2017.
116 OSCE Mission to Moldova, “ OSCE Special Representative Lauds Progress in T ransdniestrian Settlement Process,
Calls for All Commitments to Become Reality,” September 10, 2018; and “ Head of OSCE Mission Praises Decision by
Moldova’s Government to Certify Civil Status Facts of T ransdniestrian Residents,” May 29, 2019.
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dialogue; nevertheless, in July 2020, the two sides agreed to discuss issues related to transit,
telecommunications, and financial connectivity.117
Syria118
Russia’s most prominent foreign engagement outside the post-Soviet region is the military
intervention it launched in Syria in 2015. From the onset in 2011 of civil conflict in Syria, Russia
provided military, financial, and diplomatic support to President Bashar al Asad’s beleaguered
government.119 The Asad government had responded with force to a domestic political uprising,
sparking an insurgency that drew foreign support and created space for extremist groups. The
United States cal ed for Asad’s resignation, provided support to Syrian opposition groups, and
considered using military force in response to Syrian chemical weapons use. In 2013, the Russian
government made a surprise proposal to work with the United States in establishing an
international mission to remove chemical weapons from Syria as a way to avoid U.S. military
intervention.120
In 2015, Moscow intensified its support of the Asad government with a gradual buildup of
personnel, combat aircraft, and military equipment. Russia then launched an active military
intervention in support of Asad’s government. The Syrian government forces’ significant
territorial losses, U.S. and other third-party security assistance to Syrian opposition groups, the
growth of the Islamic State organization in Syria, and the potential for broader U.S.-led coalition
military operations al may have contributed to Russia’s decision to enter the conflict directly.121
For Russia, the Asad government’s potential defeat would have had several negative implications.
Asad’s fal would have meant the loss of a key Russian partner in the Middle East, which would
have undermined Russia’s ability to strengthen its influence in the region. It also would have set
another precedent (after Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011) for a U.S.-backed forceful regime
transition in the Middle East, something Moscow firmly opposed.122 Final y, Russia feared that
Asad’s defeat would embolden Islamist extremists, including the Islamic State (IS, also known as

117 OSCE Mission to Moldova, “ OSCE Special Representative Welcomes Recent Meeting Between Moldovan
President and T ransdniestrian Leader and Hopes for Further ‘Constructive, Forward-Looking Dialogue,’” July 29,
2020.
118 Carla E. Humud, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, and Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle E astern
Affairs, contributed to this section. See CRS Report RL33487, Arm ed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response,
coordinated by Carla E. Humud.
119 Russian military involvement in Syria dates back to the 1950s. Former Syrian President Hafez al Asad (1971 -2000)
hosted Soviet military and economic advisers. Soviet and Russian naval forces have accessed a facility at the Syrian
port of T artus since the early 1970s, using it as a logistical hub to enable Mediterranean operations. Roy Allison,
“Russia and Syria: Explaining Alignment with a Regime in Crisis,” International Affairs, vol. 89, no. 4 (2013), pp.
795-823; and Dmitri T renin, The Mythical Alliance: Russia’s Syria Policy, Carnegie Endowment, February 2013.
120 Michael R. Gordon, “ U.S. and Russia Reach Deal to Destroy Syria’s Chemical Arms,” New York Times, September
14, 2013; and Paul F. Walker, “Syrian Chemical Weapons Destruction: T aking Stock and Looking Ahead,” Arms
Control Today, December 2014.
121 Paul Stronski, “Russia’s Fight in Syria Reflects the Kremlin’s Fears at Home,” Reuters, September 29. 2015;
Ekaterina Stepanova, Russia’s Policy on Syria After the Start of Military Engagem ent, PONARS Eurasia, February
2016; and Samuel Charap, Elina T reyger, and Edward Geist, “ Understanding Russia’s Intervention in Syria,” RAND,
2019.
122 Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, “What Kind of Victory for Russia in Syria?,” Military Review, January
2018; and Eugene Rumer, “Russia, the Indispensable Nation in the Middle East,” Foreign Affairs, October 31, 2019.
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ISIS/ISIL), who could then broaden their appeal to Muslim populations inside Russia and
neighboring Central Asia.123
Russian authorities also may have viewed the Syria intervention as a way to reassert Russia’s
global influence after facing heavy international criticism and sanctions for its invasion of
Ukraine.124 By intervening in Syria, Moscow could demonstrate its ability to project military
power, test existing and new capabilities, and make Russia a key diplomatic player.125
Since 2015, Russia has sought a longer-term security presence in Syria. It concluded agreements
with Damascus to maintain a military presence at the Tartus naval facility and Hmeimim airbase
in Lattakia. Russia maintains a force of reportedly 3,000-5,000 troops at its bases, supported by
some 20-50 combat aircraft and numerous attack and transport helicopters, as wel as air defense
systems.126 The Russian Navy’s Mediterranean Squadron also has been reestablished, furthering
Russia’s ability to project power in the region.127
Russia’s military intervention in support of Asad’s government has helped pro-Asad forces retake
control of much of the territory the regime lost after 2011. Russia’s intervention helped stabilize
the Asad regime’s control of Damascus and much of western Syria, including the city of Aleppo.
Russian officials have asserted that operations to secure the surrender of opposition groups in
different parts of Syria have been consistent with cease-fire and de-escalation agreements
al owing operations against terrorist targets. (Russia shares the Syrian government’s position that
al armed groups opposed to the government are terrorists.) Russia also has supported or created
local Syrian proxies (often former rebels) and deployed military police to help enforce cease-
fires. Russia also worked to modernize Syria’s armed forces, including through the creation of a
new 5th Assault Corps.128

123 Pavel Baev, “Why Russia Is Failing the ‘Syria T est’ for Counterterrorism Cooperation with the West,” PONARS
Eurasia, May 2018; and Anna Borshchevskaya, “ T he Russian Way of War in Syria: T hreat Perception and Approaches
to Counterterrorism,” in Russia’s War in Syria: Assessing Russian Military Capabilities and Lessons Learned ,” eds.
Robert E. Hamilton, Chris Miller, and Aaron Stein (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2020), pp. 15 -34
(hereinafter, volume cited as Hamilton, Miller, and Stein, Russia’s War in Syria).
124 Joshua Yaffa, “Putin, Syria, and Why Moscow Has Gone War-Crazy,” New Yorker, October 14, 2016; Dmitriy
Frolovskiy, “What Putin Really Wants in Syria,” Foreign Policy, February 1, 2019; and Dmitri T renin, “Russia’s
Comeback Isn’t Stopping with Syria,” New York Times, November 12, 2019.
125 In addition to testing new military systems and capabilities, Russia’s Syrian deployment has given its officer corps
considerable operational experience, with most senior officers rotating through Syria. It also has served as a testing
ground for new strategies. Dmitry Adamsky, “Russian Lessons from the Syrian Operation and the Culture of Military
Innovation,” Marshall Center, February 2020; Michael Kofman, “Syria and the Russian Armed Forces: An Evaluation
of Moscow’s Military Strategy and Operational Performance,” in Hamilton, Miller, and Stein, Russia’s War in Syria;
and Seth G. Jones, “Russian Goals and Strategy,” in Moscow’s War in Syria, ed. Seth G. Jones (Washington, DC:
Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], 2020), pp. 7 -17 (hereinafter, volume cited as Jones, Moscow’s
War in Syria).
126 T hese numbers do not include personnel from various Russian private military companies. Brian Katz and Nicholas
Harrington, “T he Military Campaign,” in Jones, Moscow’s War in Syria, p. 21.
127 Dmitry Gorenburg, “Russia’s Naval Strategy in the Mediterranean,” Marshall Center, July 2019; and Igor Delanoe,
“Russian Naval Forces in the Syrian War,” in Hamilton, Miller, and Stein, Russia’s War in Syria, pp. 111-126.
128 Russia has struggled to create an independent Syrian proxy force amidst competition with the Asad regime and Iran.
Neil Hauer, “Russia’s Military Police Face T heir T oughest Challenge Yet in North Syria,” Middle East Institute,
November 21, 2019; Alexey Khlebnikov, “Russian and Syrian Military Reform: Challenges and Opportunities,”
Carnegie Middle East Center, March 26, 2020; Anton Mardasov and Kirill Semyonov, “Russian Operation Goes
‘Offshore’ in Syria,” Riddle, August 17, 2020; and Anton Lavrov, “ The Efficiency of the Syrian Armed Forces: An
Analysis of Russian Assistance,” Carnegie Middle East Center, March 26, 2020.
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Observers have accused Russian forces in Syria of intentional y bombing civilian targets,
including hospitals and humanitarian aid convoys.129 Russia also has supported the Syrian
government’s denials that it used chemical weapons against civilian populations; it accused
opposition forces of such actions and cal ed into question the methods and results of
investigations into al eged chemical attacks.130
In 2019, the Russian government supported the drawdown of U.S. military forces from northern
Syria and the Syrian government’s return to the region.131 After an October 2019 Turkish military
incursion into Kurdish-controlled territory in northern Syria, Russia helped broker an agreement
between the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces and the Syrian government to deploy
government forces to the region. Today, Russian forces participate in joint patrols with Turkish
and Syrian forces in parts of northern Syria to monitor the agreement.132
In the winter of 2019-2020, Russia backed a Syrian government offensive in the northwestern
province of Idlib, the only area of Syria stil under the control of armed opposition groups
actively seeking the removal of Asad. In February 2020, some observers speculated that attacks
resulting in the deaths of dozens of Turkish soldiers may have been conducted in part by Russian
forces or with Russian involvement.133 In March 2020, Russia and Turkey agreed to a cease-fire
in the area, the establishment of a security corridor, and joint Russian-Turkish military patrols.134
Moscow also has played a leading diplomatic role in the Syria conflict. It seeks to resolve the
conflict on terms favorable to Asad while conducting a complex balancing act that accommodates
the interests of Damascus, Iran, and pro-regime forces, on the one hand, and other regional
actors—in particular Israel, Turkey, and Syrian Kurds—on the other.135 Russia has used its veto
power at the U.N. Security Council to restrict the reauthorization of cross-border humanitarian
assistance into Syria, which Russia argues should be funneled through the central government in
Damascus.136
Power Projection
Since 2008, Russia has undertaken an extensive military modernization effort. Military
improvements have bolstered Russia’s ability to project military power in support of foreign

129 Louisa Loveluck and T homas Gibbons-Neff, “ ‘Why Did T hey Wait T o Kill Us?’: How the Attack on the Aid
Convoy Near Aleppo Unfolded,” Washington Post, September 24, 2016; Evan Hill and Christiaan T riebert, “ 12 Hours.
4 Syrian Hospitals Bombed. One Culprit: Russia,” New York Times, October 13, 2019; and Danika Newlee, “T he
Punishment Campaign,” in Jones, Moscow’s War in Syria, pp. 41-51.
130 Richard Perez-Pena, “In a Chemical Weapons Debate, Russia T ries to Change the Subject,” New York Times, June
26, 2018; Nawal al-Maghafi, “ How Chemical Weapons Have Helped Bring Assad Close to Victory,” BBC News,
October 15, 2018; and U.S. Department of State, “ The Russian and Assad Regime’s False Allegations on Chemical
Weapons Use in Aleppo,” December 7, 2018.
131 Ben Hubbard et al., “In Syria, Russia Is Pleased to Fill an American Void,” New York Times, updated October 17,
2019; and Jonathan Spyer, “Putin Is the New King of Syria,” Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2019.
132 Kareem Fahim, Sarah Dadouch, and Will England, “Russia Patrolling Between T urkish and Syrian Forces After
U.S. T roops Withdraw,” Washington Post, October 15, 2019; and T om Balmforth and T uvan Gumrukcu, “ More
Russian Military Police Arrive in Syria Under Peace Deal,” Reuters, October 25, 2019.
133 Metin Gurcan, “Deciphering T urkey’s Darkest Night in Syria,” Al Monitor, February 28, 2020.
134 Reuters, “First Russian-T urkish Patrol on Syrian Highway Cut Short by Protests,” March 15, 2020.
135 Jamie Dettmer, “Russia Now Juggling Challenges of War-Wracked Syria,” Voice of America, January 4, 2019;
Carol R. Saivetz, “Russia Might Regret the U.S. Drawdown in Syria,” Lawfare, April 14, 2019; and Brian Katz, “T he
Diplomatic Campaign,” in Jones, Moscow’s War in Syria, pp. 52-63.
136 Edith M. Lederer, “ Russia and China Veto Cross-Border Aid to Syria’s Northwest,” Associated Press, July 7, 2020.
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policy objectives. Russia can both dominate its immediate neighbors militarily and deploy
expeditionary forces to conflict zones, such as in Syria.137
Russia’s military reforms have included an emphasis on recruiting professional soldiers,
increasing overal military readiness, and improving interoperability and command and control
among military branches. In addition, the reforms have focused on four areas that increase
Russia’s ability to deploy power quickly and efficiently in multiple strategic directions.138 First,
Russia has devoted efforts to streamlining and improving command and control structures to
enhance interoperability and coordination among service branches and to increase
responsiveness.139 Second, Russia has made the development of precision-strike capabilities
central to its military plans. As a result, it has developed subsonic and hypersonic weapons that
can be launched from a variety of platforms and increased the accuracy of artil ery by integrating
information and reconnaissance into targeting.140 Third, Russian military reforms have focused on
modernizing older Soviet- and Russian-era systems and deploying newer designs.141 These
reforms have increased the share of modern equipment across al branches of the military. Fourth,
Russia has increased its ability to deploy rapid-response forces. Russia’s Airborne, Marine
Infantry, and Spetsnaz units receive priority for funding, professional recruitment, and political
support.142
To many observers, Russia’s rapid-response forces are helping drive a strategy of limited action,
the pursuit of defined objectives by smal , wel -supported military task forces. This strategy is
based in part on the recognition that Russia lacks the strategic air and sea transport capabilities
needed to sustain larger expeditionary forces.143
At the same time, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reinforced the importance to the Russian
military of heavy, armored formations for nearby land operations. Many of these units are located
in Russia’s Western and Southern Military Districts bordering Europe and the Caucasus (see
Figure 4). Observers note the concentration of these units may reflect Russia’s expectations
regarding the type and location of future conflicts.144

137 For more, see CRS In Focus IF11589, Russian Armed Forces: Capabilities, by Andrew S. Bowen.
138 CRS In Focus IF11603, Russian Armed Forces: Military Modernization and Reforms, by Andrew S. Bowen.
139 Greg Whisler, “Strategic Command and Control in the Russian Armed Forces: Untangling the General Staff,
Military Districts, and Service Main Commands,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 33, no. 2 (2020), pp. 237-258.
140 Roger N. McDermott and T or Bukkvoll, “T ools of Future Wars—Russia Is Entering the Precision-Strike Regime,”
Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 31, no. 2 (2018), pp. 191-213; and Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, “ T he
Russian Reconnaissance Fire Complex Comes of Age,” Changing Character of War Centre, May 2018.
141 Russian Ministry of Defense, “Russian Defense Minister General of the Army Sergei Shoigu Holds T eleconference
with Leadership of Armed Forces,” December 25, 2020.
142 Jorgen Elfving, “T he T anks Are Coming: Russia Introduces T ank Units to Airborne Forces and Naval Infantry,”
Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 4, 2018; Michael Kofman, “ Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne
Forces,” Changing Character of War Centre, January 2019; and Mark Galeotti, “Spetsnaz: Operational Intelligence,
Political Warfare, and Battlefield Role,” Marshall Center, February 2020.
143 T his strategy is built upon Russia’s lessons in Syria and, to a lesser extent, Ukraine. Michael Kofman, “Raiding and
International Brigandry: Russia’s Strategy for Great Power Competition,” War on the Rocks, June 14, 2018; Roger
McDermott, “Gerasimov Unveils Russia’s ‘Strategy of Limited Actions,’” Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 6, 2019;
Dara Massicot, “Anticipating a New Russian Military Doctrine in 2020: What It Might Contain and Why It Matters,”
War on the Rocks, September 9, 2019; Dmitry Adamsky, “ Russian Lesson from the Syrian Operation and the Culture
of Military Innovation,” Marshall Center, February 2020; and Samuel Charap, “Moscow’s Calibrated Coercion in
Ukraine and Russian Strategic Culture,” Marshall Center, September 2020.
144 Many of these units are located deep inside Russia, making deployments noticeable and requiring significant
transport resources. Roger N. McDermott, “Deciphering the Lessons Learned by the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine,
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Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave wedged between Poland and Lithuania, is a key strategic territory
for Russia, al owing the country to project military power into NATO’s northern flank. The
territory has a heavy military presence, including Russia’s Baltic Fleet and two airbases. Russia
also has deployed 9K720 Iskander-M short-range bal istic missiles to Kaliningrad and is
upgrading its current land forces there into a new division.145
Figure 4. Russia’s Military Presence Abroad

Sources: Created by CRS. Troop estimates based on official and unofficial sources; citations available upon
request. Boundary data from the U.S. Department of State, Esri, the U.S. interagency Humanitarian Information
Unit, the U.N.-operated Humanitarian Data Exchange, and other sources.
Russia deploys forces abroad in regions of neighboring Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova without
the consent of these governments (see “Use of Force and Military Power,” above). In addition,

2014-2017,” in Russia’s Military Strategy and Doctrine, eds. Glen E. Howard and Matthew Czekaj (Washington DC:
Jamestown Foundation, 2019), pp. 345 -378; and Konrad Muzyka, “ Russian Forces in the Western Military District,”
CNA, December 2020 (hereinafter, Muzyka, “Russian Forces”).
145 Reuters, “Russia Deploys Iskander Nuclear-Capable Missiles to Kaliningrad,” February 5, 2018; Reuters, “Russia
Adds Firepower to Kaliningrad Exclave Citing NAT O T hreat,” December 7, 2020; and Muzyka, “Russian Forces,” pp.
42-51.
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Russia stations military troops by consent on the territory of CSTO member Armenia, which
hosts some 3,000-4,000 Russian troops at the 102nd Military Base in Gyumri and a contingent of
fighters and helicopters at an air base in Erebuni. Armenia has agreements with Russia on a joint
air defense system and a combined group of forces.146
In 2020, Russia deployed almost 2,000 military personnel to serve as peacekeepers in Nagorno-
Karabakh, a region with a majority-Armenian population that has sought to secede from
Azerbaijan. Russia deployed its forces with the consent of Azerbaijan and local officials as part of
an agreement to end the autumn 2020 war between Azerbaijan and Armenian/Nagorno-Karabakh
forces, which were defending Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding territories.147
In Central Asia, Russia maintains the 201st Military Base in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, with about
5,000 troops and helicopter support. Russia also maintains a smal aviation base of about 500
support staff and ground attack fighters in Kant, Kyrgyzstan.148
After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia adopted an increasingly aggressive posture of air and
sea patrols. Although Russia resumed long-range bomber patrols in 2007, the frequency of these
patrols and Russia’s ability to conduct such operations have increased dramatical y in recent
years. U.S. and al ied fighter jets have intercepted Russian aircraft flying near or into NATO
members’ airspace on numerous occasions, including near U.S. airspace.149 Russian fighters also
have intercepted U.S. and al ied flights and shipping in international territory or near Russian
airspace and territorial waters.150 Russia routinely conducts unsafe and dangerous maneuvers
during these interceptions, including flying dangerously close or “buzzing” U.S. warships and
aircraft.151
Russia also conducts aggressive naval maneuvers near U.S. and al ied warships and territorial
waters.152 Since 2008, Russia has prioritized modernization of its navy to conduct power-
projection missions.153 In addition to conducting long-range patrols, the Russian Navy has

146 Emil Danielyan, “Russia, Armenia Agree to Boost Joint Military Force,” RFE/RL, November 30, 2016; Eduard
Abrahamyan, “Russia and Armenia Establish Joint Ground Forces,” CACI Analyst, December 16, 2016; and IISS,
Military Balance 2020, p. 208.
147 CRS Report R46651, Azerbaijan and Armenia: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, by Cory Welt and Andrew S.
Bowen.
148 IISS, Military Balance 2020, p. 208.
149 Valerie Insinna, “British Air Force Charts a Rise in Russian Activity Around Baltic States,” Defense News, July 18,
2019; Corey Dickstein, “U.S. Jets Intercept Russian Bombers off Alaskan Coast for 14 th T ime T his Year,” Stars and
Stripes, October 20, 2020; and NAT O, “ NAT O Intercepts Hundreds of Russian Military Jets in 2020,” press release,
December 28, 2020.
150 Joseph T revithick, “Russia Sent T hree T ypes of Fighters to Intercept B-52s Flying Rare Mission into Sea of
Okhotsk,” The Drive, June 19, 2020; and Roger McDermott, “ Russian Fighter Jets Intercept U.S. Strategic Bombers,”
Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 16, 2020.
151 Ivan Watson and Sebastian Shukla, “Russian Fighter Jets ‘Buzz’ Warship in Black Sea, Photos Show,” CNN,
February 16, 2017; Elizabeth McLaughlin and Luis Martinez, “ A Look at the U.S. Military’s Close Calls with Russia in
the Air and at Sea,” ABC News, April 9, 2020; John Vandiver, “Russian Fighter Buzzes U.S. Aircraft for Second T ime
in Four Days,” Stars and Stripes, April 20, 2020; and Gina Harkins, “Russian Jets Blocked U.S. Plane in Unsafe
Maneuvers over Mediterranean, Navy Says,” Military.com, May 27, 2020.
152 Atle Staalesen, “30 Russian Naval Vessels Stage Show of Force near Coast of Norway,” Barents Observer, August
15, 2019; Reuters, “UK Navy Shadows Russian Warships After ‘High Levels of Activity,’” March 26, 2020; Mike
Baker, “‘Are We Getting Invaded?’ U.S. Boats Faced Russian Aggression near Alaska,” New York Times, November
12, 2020; and RFE/RL, “ Moscow Says U.S. Destroyer Forced Out of Russian Wat ers,” November 24, 2020.
153 Konstantin Bogdanov and Ilya Kramnik, “T he Russian Navy in the 21 st Century: T he Legacy and the New Path,”
CNA, October 2018; and T ASS, “Russian Navy Warship Returns Home After Arctic Deployment,” November 6, 2020.
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invested in long-range strike capabilities across multiple platforms; for example, it has conducted
operations in the Mediterranean and reported plans to establish a naval logistics base in Port
Sudan, Sudan, to sustain long-range missions.154 Russia also has deployed its naval fleet further
afield, including in the North Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Cuba.155
Strategic and Snap Military Exercises
In recent years, Russia has increased the frequency of large-scale strategic exercises and short-notice snap dril s,
which bolster the readiness of its forces, increase interoperability, rehearse a variety of contingencies in its
neighborhood, and provide experience in the rapid redeployment of large numbers of personnel and equipment.
Russia conducts one large strategic-level exercise per year, focusing on the movement and coordination of forces
and on command and control. This exercise rotates on a four-year basis among four Russian military districts:
Western (Zapad), Southern (Kavkaz), Central (Tsentr), and Eastern (Vostok).
Russian military exercises involve al branches of the military and often emphasize joint operations among various
branches. Sometimes, exercises involve 150,000 or more troops. Russia often hides the true size of exercises to
remain below reporting requirements to which it agreed as a signatory to the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe’s Vienna Document, which requires foreign observers for exercises involving more than
13,000 troops. Russia’s al ies in the Col ective Security Treaty Organization, as wel as China, often contribute
troops. Russia also conducts an annual strategic nuclear exercise cal ed Thunder ( Grom). In addition, Russia
conducts smal er snap or surprise combat readiness inspections, general y at the military district level, which often
involve high numbers of troops and various units, as wel as numerous smal er unit-level exercises. For 2021,
Russia plans to hold some 4,800 dril s.
In addition to using these exercises to test units’ readiness, mobilization procedures, equipment, and command
systems, Russia uses them to demonstrate deterrence capabilities. Russia also used military exercises as cover to
mass forces on the border of Ukraine for its invasion and occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea region in 2014. As
Russia has increased the frequency of exercises and dril s, NATO members have expressed concerns about a
repeat of tactics used during Russia’s occupation of Crimea, with putative exercises acting as a precursor to an
actual assault operation.
Sources: Diego Ruiz Palmer, Theatre Operations, High Commands, and Large-Scale Exercises in Soviet and Russian
Military Practice: Insights and Implications, NATO Defense Col ege, May 2018; Johan Norberg, Training for War:
Russia’s Strategic-Level Military Exercises 2009-2017, Swedish Defense Research Agency, October 2018; Pavel
Felgenhauer, “Russia Tests Combat Readiness Despite Pandemic,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 23, 2020; Vira
Ratsiborynska, Daivis Petraitis, and Valeriy Akimenko, Russia’s Strategic Exercises: Messages and Implications, NATO
Strategic Communications Center of Excel ence, July 2020; and TASS, “Russian Troops to Hold over 4,800 Dril s
Next Year,” December 4, 2020.
Arctic
The Arctic region is one of Russia’s top strategic priorities. As President Putin said in 2014, the
Arctic “has traditional y been a sphere of [Russia’s] special interest. It is a concentration of
practical y al aspects of national security—military, political, economic, technological,
environmental and that of resources.”156 In March 2020, the Russian government adopted a new
strategy document outlining plans to bolster Russia’s Arctic military capabilities, strengthen its

154 T he agreement describes a relatively small Russian naval presence of some 300 Russian sailors and up to four naval
ships. Stephen Blank, “New Missions and New Capabilities for Russia’s Navy,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 18,
2019; Reuters, “Russia Sends Warships t o Syria, Blames Ankara for Killing of T urkish T roops,” February 28, 2020;
Roger McDermott, “Russia’s Navy Invests in Cruise Missile Capability,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 29, 2020; and
Samuel Ramani, “Russia’s Port Sudan Naval Base: A Power Play on the Red Sea,” RUSI, December 7, 2020.
155 T ASS, “Russian Baltic Fleet Missile Frigate Enters Gulf of Aden on Anti-piracy Mission,” August 7, 2018; Michael
Weissenstein, Andrea Rodriguez, and Vladimir Isachenkov, “What’s an Advanced Russian Warship Doing in Havana
Harbor?” Associated Press, June 24, 2019; and T ASS, “Russian Navy Warship Wraps Up 5 -Month Atlantic
Deployment,” December 10, 2020.
156 President of Russia, “ Meeting of the Security Council on State Policy in the Arctic,” April 21, 2014.
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territorial sovereignty, and develop the region’s resources and infrastructure.157 The United States
recognizes the potential for increased competition with Russia in the Arctic; each U.S. service
branch has produced (or is in the process of producing) an Arctic strategy that addresses Russia’s
Arctic military power.158
An increasingly ice-free Arctic has the potential to open up approximately 4,000 miles of
Russia’s northern coastline. Changes to the Arctic brought about by warming temperatures likely
wil al ow more exploration for oil, gas, and minerals and could lead to increased commercial
shipping. To effectively administer increased shipping traffic along an expected ice-free Northern
Sea Route, Russia has been investing in the construction of ports and search-and-rescue facilities,
some of which are referred to as dual-use (civilian-military) facilities.159
Russia also has been upgrading or constructing new facilities in the Arctic and reactivating Soviet
bases that fel into disuse with the end of the Cold War. The deterioration of relations between
Russia and the West has led many Western analysts and officials to view military components of
Russia’s Arctic activities as part of an aggressive foreign policy and cause for concern.160 In 2019,
then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo criticized Russia’s militarized approach to the
international waters of the Northern Sea Route, noting that “Moscow already il egal y demands
other nations request permission to pass, requires Russian maritime pilots to be aboard foreign
ships, and threatens to use military force to sink any that fail to comply with their demands.”161
Russia’s Northern Fleet, which covers much of the Arctic, traditional y has received priority in
the Russian Navy. Since 2014, the Northern Fleet has represented an autonomous Joint Strategic
Command; in 2021, the Northern Fleet official y received a status identical to that of Russia’s
other four military districts (see Figure 4).162 The Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet house
Russia’s submarine-based nuclear deterrent. The Kola Peninsula, where the Northern Fleet is
based, is heavily defended to ensure Russia’s second-strike capability.163
In recent years, Russia has increased its air defense, naval, and ground forces in the Arctic region.
This buildup includes the formation of two Arctic motorized rifle brigades (200th and 80th) and the

157 Basic Principles of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic to 2035, March 5, 2020. T he Russian government
also issued Arctic strategy documents in 2008 and 2013: Foundations of the Russian Federation’s State Policy in the
Arctic Until 2020 and Beyond, September 18, 2008; and Russian Strategy of the Developm ent of the Arctic Zone and
the Provision of National Security Until 2020, February 8, 2013.
158 T he U.S. Air Force released an Arctic strategy in July 2020, and the U.S. Department of the Navy released an Arctic
strategy for the U.S. Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard in January 2021. T he U.S. Army is expected to release an Arctic
strategy in the near future. U.S. Department of the Air Force, Arctic Strategy, July 2020; and U.S. Department of the
Navy, A Blue Arctic: A Strategic Blueprint for the Arctic, January 2021.
159 Malte Humpert, “New Satellite Images Reveal Extent of Russia’s Military and Economic Build-Up in the Arctic,”
High North News, May 3, 2019.
160 Marlene Laruelle, Russia’s Arctic Policy: A Power Strategy and Its Limits, IFRI, March 2020; and Paul Goble, “As
Arctic Warms, Moscow Increasingly Shifts Focus T here from T rade to Security,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 20,
2020.
161 U.S. Department of State, “ Looking North: Sharpening America’s Arctic Focus,” remarks by Secretary of State
Michael Pompeo, May 6, 2019.
162 T ASS, “Russia’s Defense Ministry Establishes Arctic Strategic Command,” December 1, 2014; and T homas Nilsen,
“Putin Heightens the Strategic Role of the Northern Fleet,” Barents Observer, June 8, 2020.
163 Russian military strategy considers the region part of a “bastion defense” system that ensures Russia maintains the
ability to retaliate in the event of a nuclear attack. Kristian Atland, “The Introduction, Adoption, and Implementation of
Russia’s ‘Northern Strategic Bastion’ Concept, 1992-1999,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 50, no. 4 (2007),
pp. 499-528; and Matthew Melino, Heather A. Conley, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. “ T he Ice Curtain: Modernization on
the Kola Peninsula,” CSIS, March 2020.
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61st Naval Infantry Brigade. Nonetheless, relatively limited forces stil cover the region from
Murmansk to St. Petersburg.164
Private Military Companies
One notable area of growth in Russia’s global presence is the rise and deployment of so-cal ed
private military companies (PMCs), such as the Wagner Group, which the U.S. Treasury
Department characterizes as a “Russian Ministry of Defense proxy force” al egedly financed by
Putin colleague Yevgeniy Prigozhin.165 Observers consider PMCs such as the Wagner Group to
have close ties to the Russian government despite being il egal under Russian law.166 Analysts
have cited several possible motivations for Russia’s use of PMCs to conduct security policy,
including cost savings, tactical gains (speed and surprise), plausible deniability, avoidance of
military casualties, and unofficial personal and corporate enrichment opportunities.167
The U.S. government has imposed sanctions on Prigozhin, the Wagner Group, and/or related
individuals and entities for actions tied to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, U.S. election
interference, and malicious cyber activities. Entities and individuals subject to U.S. sanctions for
their connections to Prigozhin include those that conduct “dangerous and destabilizing
operations” in countries such as Ukraine, Syria, Sudan, Libya, the Central African Republic, and
Mozambique.168
Observers note that unlike most modern Western private security companies, Russian PMCs
conduct direct combat operations, in addition to training and asset-protection missions. Russian
PMCs have been identified fighting in conflicts global y, including in the following countries:
 Ukraine. Media reports and analysts documented the presence of Russian PMCs
conducting combat operations and overseeing separatist rebel forces during
Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine.169
 Syria. Russian PMCs reportedly played a considerable role supporting Russia’s
intervention in Syria.170 In 2018, Russian PMC contractors and Syrian

164 Mathieu Boulegue, Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic: Managing Hard Power in a “Low Tension”
Environm ent, Chatham House, June 2019; Dmitry Gorenburg, “ Russian Strategic Decision-Making in a Nordic Crisis,”
Marshall Center, July 2019; and Katarzyna Zysk, Russia’s Military Build-Up in the Arctic: To What End?, CNA,
September 2020.
165 U.S. Department of the T reasury, “ Treasury T argets Financier’s Illicit Sanctions Evasion Activity,” July 15, 2020
(hereinafter, T reasury, “Treasury T argets Financier”).
166 CRS In Focus IF11650, Russian Private Military Companies (PMCs), by Andrew S. Bowen. Also see Mike Giglio,
“Inside the Shadow War Fought by Russian Mercenaries,” BuzzFeed News, April 17, 2019; and Neil Hauer, “T he Rise
and Fall of a Russian Mercenary Army,” Foreign Policy, October 6, 2019.
167 Kimberly Marten, “Russia’s Use of Semi-state Security Forces: T he Case of the Wagner Group,” Post-Soviet
Affairs, vol. 35, no. 3 (2019), pp. 181-204; Candace Rondeaux, Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of
Private Military Security Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare, New America, November 2019; and Paul Stronski,
“Implausible Deniability: Russia’s Private Military Companies,” Carnegie Endowment, June 2, 2020.
168 T reasury, “T reasury T argets Financier”; U.S. Department of the T reasury, “Treasury Increases Pressure on Russian
Financier,” September 23, 2020.
169 Alec Luhn, “Volunteers or Paid Fighters? T he Vostok Battalion Looms Large in War with Kiev,” Guardian, June 6,
2014; and Sergey Sukhankin, Unleashing the PMCs and Irregulars in Ukraine: Crim ea and Donbas, Jamestown
Foundation, September 3, 2019.
170 Sergey Sukhankin, Russian PMCs in the Syrian Civil War: From Slavonic Corps to Wagner Group and Beyond,
Jamestown Foundation, September 18, 2019.
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government-linked fighters attacked U.S. and al ied forces inside Syria (see
“Deconfliction in Syria,” below).
 Libya. Russian PMCs reportedly have conducted direct combat operations and
training in support of the Libyan National Army movement. In 2020,
Commander of U.S. Africa Command General Stephen Townsend testified to
Congress that PMCs “with strong links to the Kremlin” were “leading the fight”
for Libyan partner forces.171 In March 2021, U.S. Secretary of State Antony
Blinken cal ed for “the immediate removal [from Libya] of al foreign forces and
mercenaries.”172
 Central African Republic (CAR). Russian PMCs have provided security
services, asset protection, and military training to the CAR government,
including personal protection for the president, since about 2018.173 Some 300
additional Russian “military instructors” reportedly have deployed to CAR at the
government’s request and have participated in operations to free parts of the
country from rebel control.174 Media reports have documented PMCs’ presence at
diamond mines and other natural-resource sites in the country.175
 Sudan. Since 2018, Sudan has pursued increased military assistance from and
security cooperation with Russia, including via Russian PMCs tied to Prigozhin,
in exchange for commercial agreements “spanning some of Sudan’s most
lucrative sectors such as oil, natural gas, agriculture, and gold.”176
 Mozambique. In 2019, Wagner Group personnel reportedly deployed to
Mozambique’s far north to train and support government forces against a local
Islamist insurgency with ties to the Islamic State. The Wagner Group appeared to
suffer serious losses and reportedly was no longer involved in such activity as of
late 2020.177

171 General Stephen T ownsend also said Russian contractors in Libya had “almost certainly” downed an unarmed U.S.
drone in late 2019. T estimony of General Stephen T ownsend, Commander, United States Africa Command, in U.S.
Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, United States Africa Com m and and United States Southern Com m and,
hearings, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., January 30, 2020; U.S. Africa Command, “ Russia and the Wagner Group Continued to
Be Involved in Both Ground and Air Operations in Libya,” press release, July 24, 2020 ; and Harchaoui, “ Pendulum.”
172 U.S. Department of State, “House of Representatives Vote on a Libyan Interim Government of National Unity,”
March 10, 2021.
173 A Russian national serves as the president’s national security adviser. U.N. Security Council, Midterm Report of the
Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic Extended Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2399 , U.N. doc.
S/2018/729, July 23, 2018; and Leslie Minney, Rachel Sullivan, and Rachel Vandenbrink, “ Amid the Central African
Republic’s Search for Peace, Russia Steps In. Is China Next?” U.S. Institute for Peace, December 19, 2019.
174 BBC News, “Russia Sends 300 Military Instructors to Central African Republic,” December 22, 2020; and Reuters,
“Central African Republic Retakes Rebel Stronghold in North,” February 24, 2021
175 Sergey Sukhankin, “Russia’s Hired Guns in Africa,” European Council on Foreign Relations, November 12, 2018 ;
Jack Margolin, “Paper T rails: How a Russia-Based Logistics Network T ies T ogether Russian Mining Companies and
Military Contractors in Africa,” C4ADS, June 13, 2019; and Dionne Searcey, “Gems, Warlords, and Mercenaries:
Russia’s Playbook in Central African Republic,” New York Times, September 30, 2019.
176 T reasury, “ T reasury T argets Financier”; and Reuters, “Russian Contractors Are T raining the Army in Sudan, Says
Moscow,” January 23, 2019.
177 Pjotr Sauer, “In Push for Africa, Russia’s Wagner Mercenaries Are ‘Out of T heir Depth’ in Mozambique,” Moscow
Tim es, November 19, 2019; and Samuel Ramani, “ Russia T akes Its Syrian Model of Counterinsurgency to Africa,”
RUSI Journal, September 9, 2020.
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Targeted Overseas Attacks
Elements of the Russian government have been accused of sponsoring targeted attacks against
perceived political opponents, such as Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny and other
adversaries, including overseas.178 Journalists, human rights activists, politicians, whistleblowers,
and others have been kil ed or have died under mysterious circumstances. Many attacks
reportedly have been linked to Russia’s military intel igence agency, commonly known as the
GRU.179 Al eged overseas assassinations include those of former Chechen leader Zelimkhan
Yandarbiyev in Qatar in 2004, former Russian spy Alexander Litvinenko in London in 2006,
Chechen fighters in Ukraine, and former Chechen military commander Zelimkhan Khangoshvili
in Berlin in 2019.180 Others, including British citizen Sergei Skripal, a former Russian military
intel igence officer once imprisoned in Russia for al egedly working as a double agent for the
United Kingdom (UK), have survived reported attacks.181
In 2020, media reports indicated U.S. intel igence officials had “concluded” the GRU had
provided payments, or “bounties,” to Taliban-linked militants to attack U.S. and other
international forces in Afghanistan.182 Trump Administration officials rejected the reporting’s
accuracy and decried what they characterized as intel igence leaks, without fully denying the
substance of the media reports. Reports suggested different U.S. intel igenc e agencies may have
assigned varying levels of confidence to related intel igence information, in part based on their
separate collection capabilities.183
Influence Operations and Cyber Operations
Influence Operations184
In recent years, Russia has used an array of tools, including cyber capabilities and social media,
to influence political discourse, policymaking, and electoral processes in the United States and
elsewhere, including countries in Europe and Africa (for more on the United States, see “U.S.

178 CRS Insight IN11596, Russia: Poisoning of Alexei Navalny and U.S. Policy, by Cory Welt; and Nate Schenkkan
and Isabel Linzer, Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach: The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression , Freedom
House, February 2021, pp. 27-30.
179 CRS Report R46616, Russian Military Intelligence: Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew S. Bowen.
180 See, for example, Luke Harding, A Very Expensive Poison: The Assassination of Alexander Litvinenko and Putin’s
War with the West (New York: Vintage Books, 2017); Shaun Walker, “ Russia Blamed for Attack on Chechen Pair
Who Fought with Ukrainians,” Guardian, October 31, 2017; Michael Schwirtz, “Russia Ordered a Killing T hat Made
No Sense. T hen the Assassin Started T alking,” New York Tim es, March 31, 2019; Bellingcat, “ ‘V’ For ‘Vympel’:
FSB’s Secretive Department ‘V’ Behind Assassination of Georgian Asylum Seeker in Germany,” February 17, 2020 ;
and Vladimir Esipov and Markian Ostapchuk, “Austria: Chechen Dissident Murdered in Vienna,” DW, July 10, 2020.
181 CRS In Focus IF10962, Russia, the Skripal Poisoning, and U.S. Sanctions, by Dianne E. Rennack and Cory Welt;
and Michael Schwirtz, “ How a Poisoning in Bulgaria Exposed Russian Assassins in Europe,” New York Tim es,
December 22, 2019.
182 Charlie Savage, Eric Schmitt , and Michael Schwirtz, “ Russia Secretly Offered Afghan Militants Bounties to Kill
U.S. T roops, Intelligence Says,” New York Times, June 26, 2020.
183 Gordon Lubold and Warren P. Strobel, “NSA Differed from CIA, Others on Russia Bounty Intelligence,” Wall
Street Journal, June 30, 2020; and Charlie Savage et al., “ New Administration Memo Seeks to Foster Doubts About
Suspected Russian Bounties,” New York Times, July 3, 2020.
184 Sarah E. Garding, Analyst in European Affairs, contributed to this section. Also see CRS In Focus IF10771, Defense
Prim er: Inform ation Operations, by Catherine A. T heohary; and CRS Report R45142, Inform ation Warfare: Issues for
Congress, by Catherine A. T heohary.
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Election Interference,” below). Many states have grappled for years with Russian (or, in Cold War
times, Soviet) influence operations designed to interfere in their domestic politics.185 Some
observers contend Russia views influence operations, including disinformation and propaganda,
as an important tool in foreign policy and as part of Russia’s broader competition with its
perceived rivals.186 Some assert that Russian authorities believe Russia itself is the target of
domestic meddling by democratic foreign powers and hence seeks to interfere with political
processes in those countries.187 The goals of Russian influence operations may include
undermining social cohesion, sowing distrust in democracy and Western institutions, and boosting
political parties and politicians who support closer ties with Russia or promote policies that align
with Russian interests.188
Influence operations often are produced or disseminated by Russian news sources and on social
media.189 Russian government-funded television and online news outlets RT and Sputnik are
considered to be among the key vectors aimed at foreign audiences and have a local-language
presence in dozens of countries.190 Russia also relies on private actors, such as the Internet
Research Agency, to conduct influence operations.191
At the same time, observers have noted that increasingly prevalent “homegrown” disinformation
campaigns sometimes can promote narratives that serve Russia’s interest or propagate Russian
narratives or disinformation.192 In some cases, it may be difficult to trace the origins of narratives;

185 See, for example, U.S. Department of State, Active Measures: A Report on the Substance and Process of Anti-U.S.
Disinform ation and Propaganda Cam paigns, August 1986; and T homas Rid, Active Measures: The Secret History of
Disinform ation and Political Warfare (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2020).
186 Michael Connell and Sarah Vogler, “Russia’s Approach to Cyber Warfare,” CNA, March 2017; Roland Heickero,
Em erging Cyber Threats and Russian Views on Inform ation Warfare and Inform ation Operations, Swedish Defense
Research Agency, March 2020; and Ofer Fridm an, “ ‘Information War’ as the Russian Conceptualization of Strategic
Communications,” RUSI Journal, vol. 165, no. 1 (2020), pp. 44-53.
187 Clint Watts, “Russia’s Active Measures Architecture: T ask and Purpose,” Alliance for Securing Democracy, May
22, 2018; and T racey German, “ Harnessing Protest Potential: Russian Strategic Culture and the Colored Revolutions,”
Contem porary Security Policy, vol. 41, no. 4 (2020), pp. 541-563.
188 See, for example, Alina Polyakova and Spencer P. Boyer, The Future of Political Warfare: Russia, the West, and
the Com ing Age of Global Digital Com petition , Brookings Institution, March 2018; T odd C. Helmus et al., Russian
Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe , RAND Corporation, April 2018; Erik
Brattberg and T im Maurer, Russian Election Interference: Europe’s Counter to Fake News and Cyber Attacks,
Carnegie Endowment, May 2018; Luke Harding and Jason Burke, “ Leaked Documents Reveal Russian Effort to Exert
Influence in Africa,” Guardian, June 11, 2019; and Michael Weiss and Pierre Vaux, “ Russia Is Using Undercover
Racists to Exploit Africa’s Anti-racist Political Revolt,” Daily Beast, September 8, 2020.
189 U.S. Department of State, Pillars of Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem , August 2020. On
pertinent U.S. regulations, see CRS In Focus IF11759, Foreign Governm ent-Sponsored Broadcast Program ming, by
Dana A. Scherer.
190 Jim Rutenberg, “ RT, Sputnik, and Russia’s New T heory of War,” New York Times Magazine, September 13, 2017;
Elizabeth Flock, “After a Week of Russian Propaganda, I Was Questioning Everything,” PBS Newshour, May 2, 2018;
Robert W. Orttung and Elizabeth Nelson, “ Russia Today’s Strategy and Effectiveness on YouT ube,” Post-Soviet
Affairs vol. 35, no. 2 (2019), pp. 77-92; Gordon Ramsay and Sam Robertshaw, Weaponising News: RT, Sputnik, and
Targeted Disinform ation, King’s College London, 2019; and Mona Elswah and Philip N. Howard, “ ‘Anything T hat
Causes Chaos’: T he Organizational Behavior of Russia Today (RT),” Journal of Communication 70 (2020), pp. 623-
645.
191 Adrian Chen, “T he Agency,” New York Times Magazine, June 2, 2015; Neil MacFarquhar, “ Inside the Russian T roll
Factory: Zombies and a Breakneck Pace,” New York Tim es, February 18, 2018; Nicholas T hompson, “ How Russian
T rolls Used Meme Warfare to Divide Americans,” Wired, December 17, 2018; Mary Ilyushina, “Russia’s ‘T roll
Factory’ Is Alive and Well in Africa,” CNN, November 1, 2019; and Davey Alba, “How Russia’s T roll Farm Is
Changing T actics Before the Fall Election,” New York Times, March 29, 2020.
192 Matt Apuzzo and Adam Satariano, “Russia Is T argeting Europe’s Elections. So Are Far -Right Copycats,” New York
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untangle the interplay between Russian-backed and homegrown disinformation; and identify
actors involved in amplifying these narratives through social media, blogs, and messaging
services.
Russian influence operations often appear during electoral cycles in targeted countries, but they
also occur on an ongoing basis. For example, various Russian media accounts attributed the 2019
fire at France’s Notre Dame Cathedral to an arson attack by Islamists, the Yel ow Vest protesters,
Ukraine, and the French government itself (French officials said the fire accidental y broke out
during construction).193 Another frequently cited example is a 2016 report, promoted by Russian
media, that a 13-year-old Russian-German girl had been raped by migrants in Germany. Before
being proven untrue, the story provoked demonstrations in Germany against migrants and
German Chancel or Angela Merkel’s migration policies.194
U.S. government and media reports have linked Russia to influence operations related to the
COVID-19 pandemic. Goals of such operations appear to include undermining confidence in
Western vaccines and, possibly, boosting the profile of Russia’s own vaccine, Sputnik V.195
Cyberespionage and Cyberattacks
Russia maintains a robust cyber capability, with units spread across multiple security and
intel igence agencies.196 GRU units and officers have been identified as responsible for numerous
operations, including interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election (see “U.S. Election
Interference,” below). The SVR and the FSB also have cyber capabilities, although reporting
suggests these agencies general y operate more clandestinely than the GRU.197 Russia reportedly
also uses civilian hackers, al owing them to conduct their own self-interested cyber activities in
addition to supporting Russian government operations.198

Tim es, May 12, 2019; Seva Gunitsky, “ Democracies Can’t Blam e Putin for T heir Disinformation Problem,” Foreign
Policy, April 21, 2020; Matthew Rosenberg and Julian E. Barnes, “ A Bible Burning, a Russian News Agency and a
Story T oo Good to Check Out,” New York Times, August 12, 2020; and Jessica Brandt and Amber Frankland, Leaks,
Lies, and Altered Tape: Russia’s Maturing Inform ation Manipulation Playbook, Alliance for Securing Democracy,
October 14, 2020.
193 EU East Stratcom T ask Force, “Building Blocks of Disinformation: Case of Notre Dame,” April 18, 2019.
194 Adam T aylor, “An Alleged Rape Sparked T ensions Between Russia and Germany. Now Police Say It Was
Fabricated,” Washington Post, January 29, 2016; and Ben Nimmo and Nika Aleksejeva, “Lisa 2.0: How Pro -Kremlin
Media in Germany Have Been Using a New Fake to Justify an Old One,” Digital Forensic Research Lab, Atlantic
Council, March 11, 2017.
195 Zach Dorfman, “How Countries Amplify COVID Disinformation,” Axios, February 17, 2021; Bret Schafer et al.,
“Influence-enza: How Russia, China, and Iran Have Shaped and Manipulat ed Coronavirus Vaccine Narratives,”
Alliance for Securing Democracy, March 6, 2021; and Michael R. Gordon and Dustin Volz, “ Russian Disinformation
Campaign Aims to Undermine Confidence in Pfizer, Other Covid-19 Vaccines, U.S. Officials Say,” Wall Street
Journal, March 7, 2021.
196 For more, see CRS In Focus IF11718, Russian Cyber Units, by Andrew S. Bowen; Andy Greenberg, Sandworm: A
New Era of Cyberwar and the Hunt for the Kremlin’s Most Dangerous Hackers (New York: Doubleday, 2019),
hereinafter, Greenberg, Sandworm ; and Bilyana Lilly and Joe Cheravitch, “ T he Past, Present, and Future of Russia’s
Cyber Strategy and Forces,” in 12th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, eds. T . Jančárková et al. (T allinn:
NAT O Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2020).
197 CRS Report R46616, Russian Military Intelligence: Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew S. Bowen;
and Mike Eckel, “T he Return of Cozy Bear: Russian Hackers in the Crosshairs of Western Intelligence Agencies—
Again,” RFE/RL, July 18, 2020.
198 Andrew E. Kramer, “How Russia Recruited Elite Hackers for Its Cyberwar,” New York Times, December 29, 2016;
U.S. Department of Justice, “U.S. Charges Russian FSB Officers and T heir Criminal Conspirators for Hacking Yahoo
and Millions of Email Accounts,” press release, March 15, 2017; and Liliya Yapparova, “T he FSB’s Personal
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Russia uses cyber operations to conduct espionage and influence operations and for other
purposes. In the United States, Russian cyber operations reportedly have targeted a wide range of
critical infrastructure networks, government entities, and nongovernmental organizations, as wel
as political parties, figures, and organizations.199 In addition to the United States, national targets
of prominent attacks have included Estonia,200 France,201 Georgia,202 Germany,203 Ukraine,204 and
the UK.205 Other operations have occurred in countries such as Bulgaria, Montenegro, and
Norway.206
Cyber operations targeting government institutions, political parties, politicians, international
organizations, and think tanks often are designed to access and retrieve private information (e.g.,
email communications, campaign documents), which then can be used, possibly in conjunction
with false information, in influence campaigns to discredit or undermine political targets.
Political y motivated cyber operations also can seek to restrict access to government-related
computer networks or to alter information within those networks.
Additional prominent cyber operations attributed to Russia include the following:
 a 2017 malware attack, commonly known as NotPetya, which infected computers
global y and caused an estimated $10 bil ion in damage;207
 a multiyear operation uncovered in 2018 that inserted malware into hundreds of
thousands of home and office routers and network devices worldwide;208
 cyberattacks on the opening ceremony of the 2018 PyeongChang Winter
Olympics in South Korea;209

Hackers,” Meduza, December 12, 2019.
199 See, for example, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), “Russian Government Cyber Activity
T argeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” March 15, 2018; and CISA, “ Russian State-Sponsored
Advanced Persistent T hreat Actor Compromises U.S. Government T argets,” October 22, 2020.
200 Joshua Davis, “Hackers T ake Down the Most Wired Country in Europe,” Wired, August 21, 2007.
201 Rick Noack, “Cyberattack on French Presidential Front-Runner Bears Russian ‘Fingerprints,’ Research Group
Says,” Washington Post, April 25, 2017; and Kim Willsher and Jon Henley, “Emmanuel Macron’s Campaign Hacked
on Eve of French Election,” Guardian, May 6, 2017.
202 Andy Greenberg, “ T he U.S. Blames Russia’s GRU for Sweeping Cyberattacks in Georgia,” Wired, February 20,
2020.
203 Der Spiegel, “T he Breach from the East,” March 5, 2018; and Katrin Bennhold, “ Merkel Is ‘Outraged’ by Russian
Hack but Struggling to Respond,” New York Tim es, May 13, 2020.
204 Margaret Coker and Paul Sonne, “Ukraine: Cyberwar’s Hottest Front,” Wall Street Journal, November 9, 2015;
Kim Zetter, “ Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid,” Wired, March 3, 2016; and Laurens
Cerulus, “How Ukraine Became a T est Bed for Cyberweaponry,” Politico, February 14, 2019.
205 David D. Kirkpatrick, “British Cybersecurity Chief Warns of Russian Hacking,” New York Times, November 14,
2017; and Kevin Collier, “It Looks Like Russian Hackers Are Still at It in 2019,” BuzzFeed News, January 23, 2019.
206 Georgi Gotev, “ At EU Summit, Borissov Deplores ‘T errible’ Russian Cyberattacks on Bulgaria,” Euractiv, October
18, 2018; Chris Bing, “APT 28 Targeted Montenegro’s Government Before It Joined NAT O, Researchers Say,”
Cyberscoop, June 6, 2017; Eduard Kovacs and Maja Zivanovic, “ Russia’s Fancy Bear Hacks Its Way into
Montenegro,” Balkan Insight, March 5, 2018; Doug G. Ware, “Norway Says Russians Hacked Defense, Security
Agencies,” UPI, February 3, 2017; and BBC News, “Norway Blames Russia for Cyber-Attack on Parliament,” October
13, 2020.
207 Andy Greenberg, “T he Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History,” Wired, August 22,
2018.
208 CISA, “ Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors T argeting Network Infrastructure Devices,” April 16, 2018; and
CISA, “Cyber Actors T arget Home and Office Routers and Networked Devices Worldwide,” May 25, 2018.
209 Andy Greenberg, “ T he Untold Story of the 2018 Olympics Cyberattack, the Most Deceptive Hack in History ,”
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 a 2018 hacking campaign against investigations by the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the UK into the nerve agent attack against
Sergei Skripal and his daughter;210
 hacking attempts against World Anti-Doping Agency officials from 2014 to 2018
and again in 2019;211
 attempts in 2020 to steal COVID-19 vaccine research in Canada, the UK, and the
United States;212 and
 a broad cyberespionage campaign, commonly referred to as Solarwinds, that
gained access starting in 2020 to numerous U.S. business and government
networks.213
U.S. Election Interference214
2016 U.S. Presidential Election215
On January 6, 2017, the Office of the Director of National Intel igence released a declassified
intel igence community (IC) assessment of Russian activities and intentions related to the 2016
U.S. presidential election. The report stated that the Central Intel igence Agency, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Security Agency had “high confidence” that
President Putin “ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election” to
“undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate [Hil ary] Clinton, and harm her
electability and potential presidency.”216 The report also contended that the Russian government

Wired, October 17, 2019; and T ariq Panja, “ After Doping Scandal, Russia Hacked the Olympics, U.S. and Britain
Say,” New York Tim es, October 20, 2020.
210 Ellen Nakashima, Michael Birnbaum, and William Booth, “U.S. and Its Allies T arget Russian Cyber Spies with
Indictments, Public Shaming,” Washington Post, October 4, 2018.
211 U.S. Department of Justice, “U.S. Charges Russian GRU Officers with International Hacking and Related Influence
and Disinformation Operations,” press release, October 4, 2018; and Nicole Perlroth and T ariq Panja, “Microsoft Says
Russians Hacked Antidoping Agency Computers,” New York Tim es, October 28, 2019.
212 National Cyber Security Centre, “Advisory: APT 29 T argets COVID-19 Vaccine Development,” July 16, 2020; and
National Security Agency, “ NSA T eams with NCSC, CSE, DHS CISA to Expose Russian Intelligence Services
T argeting COVID-19 Researchers,” press release, July 16, 2020.
213 CRS Insight IN11559, SolarWinds Attack—No Easy Fix, by Chris Jaikaran; Ellen Nakashima and Craig T imberg,
“Russian Government Hackers Are Behind a Broad Espionage Campaign T hat Has Compromised U.S. Agencies,
Including T reasury and Commerce,” Washington Post, December 14, 2020; and CISA, “ Advanced Persistent T hreat
Compromise of Government Agencies, Critical Infrastructure, and Private Sector Organizations,” December 17, 2020.
214 On U.S. campaign finance and election security policy, see CRS Report R41542, The State of Campaign Finance
Policy: Recent Developm ents and Issues for Congress, by R. Sam Garrett ; and CRS Report R46146, Cam paign and
Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developm ents for Congress, coordinated by R. Sam Garrett .
215 T his section draws on CRS Insight IN10635, Russia and the U.S. Presidential Election, by Catherine A. T heohary
and Cory Welt, available to congressional clients on request. For comprehensive redacted investigations of Russian
activities discussed in this section, see U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on
Russian Active Measures, Together with Minority Views, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Rept. 115-1110 (Washington, DC:
GPO, 2019); U.S. Department of Justice, Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential
Election, vol. 1, Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III, March 2019; and U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Cam paigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election , Together with Additional
Views, 5 vols., 116th Cong., 2nd sess., S.Rept. 116-290 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2020), hereinafter cited as Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Cam paigns.
216 Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S.
Elections, January 6, 2017 (hereinafter, ODNI, Assessing Russian Activities).
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“aspired to help President-elect Trump’s election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary
Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to him.”
Al egations of Russian interference first appeared around June 2016.217 As the U.S. intel igence
community later stated, the Russian government il icitly collected and authorized the release of
emails and documents of the Democratic National Committee and emails of Clinton’s campaign
chairperson, John Podesta. The majority of released emails were disclosed by WikiLeaks, which
al egedly received emails from Russian intel igence-connected sources. Other emails and
materials were released by online personas al egedly linked to Russian intel igence.218 These
operations were al eged to be part of broader collection efforts against the Democratic Party.219
Collection efforts also included Republican targets. However, then-FBI Director James Comey
stated in a 2017 hearing that Russian hackers breached and exfiltrated data from “old domains” of
the Republican National Committee (RNC) and investigators found no evidence that the current
RNC or the Trump campaign were “successfully hacked.”220 No emails connected to either the
RNC or the Trump campaign were released. The 2017 IC assessment stated that although Russia
pursued Republican-affiliated targets, it “did not conduct a comparable disclosure campaign.”221
A second element of Russia’s election interference was the targeting of state election systems.
The IC assessment asserted that “Russian intel igence accessed elements of multiple state or local
electoral boards.”222 In 2017, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials testified before
the Senate Select Committee on Intel igence that “election-related networks, including websites,
in 21 states were potential y targeted by Russian government cyber actors,” including “a smal
number [that] were successful y compromised.”223 Eventual y, the Department of Justice, DHS,
and the Senate Select Committee on Intel igence concluded that Russia had conducted
reconnaissance operations against al 50 states’ election networks before the 2016 election.224
Although some state-level voter registration systems appear to have been breached, the IC

217 Ellen Nakashima, “ Russian Government Hackers Penetrated DNC, Stole Opposition Research on T rump,”
Washington Post, June 14, 2016. Also see Greenberg, Sandworm , pp. 115-122; Ben Buchanan, The Hacker and the
State: Cyber Attacks and the New Norm al of Geopolitics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2020), pp. 211 -239;
and David Shimer, Rigged: Am erica, Russia, and One Hundred Years of Electoral Interference (New York: Knopf,
2020).
218 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities, vol. 5 of Russian Active
Measures Cam paigns, pp. 172-173, 183-199, 207-215. Also see T homas Rid, “ How Russia Pulled Off the Biggest
Election Hack in U.S. History,” Esquire, October 20, 2016; and United States v. Netyksho et al., No. 18-cr-215, July
13, 2018.
219 Other targets included other Clinton campaign staffers and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee . On
early reports, see SecureWorks Counter T hreat Unit Intelligence, “Threat Group -4127 Targets Hillary Clinton
Presidential Campaign,” June 16, 2016; and Joseph Menn, Dustin Volz, and Mark Hosenball, “ Exclusive: FBI Probes
Hacking of Democratic Congressional Group—Sources,” Reuters, July 29, 2016.
220 Elias Groll, “ Russian Hacking Campaign Hit s Republicans, T oo,” Foreign Policy, August 12, 2016; and testimony
of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director James Comey, in U.S. Congress, Senate Select Intelligence
Committee, Russian Intelligence Activities, hearings, 115th Cong., 1st sess., January 10, 2017. T ranscript available at
http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-5017431.
221 ODNI, Assessing Russian Activities, p. 3.
222 ODNI, Assessing Russian Activities, p. 3. For details, see Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Efforts
Against Election Infrastructure, with Additional Views, vol. 1 of Russian Active Measures Cam paigns.
223 T estimony of Jeanette Manfra and Dr. Samuel Liles, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in U.S.
Congress, Senate Select Intelligence Committee, Addressing Threats to Election Infrastructure, hearings, 115th Cong.,
1st sess., June 21, 2017.
224 David E. Sanger and Catie Edmondson, “Russia T argeted Election Systems in All 50 States, Report Finds,” New
York Tim es, July 25, 2019.
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assessment said there was no evidence of tampering with vote tal ies. No cases of access to voting
tabulation systems have been reported.
A third element of the election interference campaign was social media-based propaganda. The IC
assessment noted that the Russian government engaged in international influence efforts through
state-run media and social media “trolls” for the purposes of promoting Trump and denigrating
Clinton.225 Subsequent media, corporate, congressional, and Department of Justice investigations
have stated that Russia’s influence operations, which extended past the presidential election,
included social media campaigns that were issue-based and appeared “to focus on amplifying
divisive social and political messages across the ideological spectrum—touching on topics from
LGBT matters to race issues to immigration to gun rights.”226 Investigations also have concluded
that Russian operations included efforts to organize political demonstrations in the United States,
some of which al egedly were held.227
2018 U.S. Midterm and 2020 Presidential Elections
In advance of the 2018 U.S. midterm elections, the IC reported that Russia (as wel as other
foreign actors) “continue[d] to try to influence public sentiment and voter perceptions … by
spreading false information about political processes and candidates, lying about their own
interference activities, disseminating propaganda on social media, and through other tactics.”228
The IC did not identify “any compromise of [U.S.] election infrastructure that would have
prevented voting, changed vote counts, or disrupted the ability to tal y votes.”229
In the run-up to the 2020 U.S. presidential elections, reporting indicated Russia was continuing its
election interference, primarily through influence operations.230 In September 2020, FBI Director
Christopher Wray, supported by DHS and IC assessments, said Russia had “very active efforts” to
interfere in the 2020 elections.231 Subsequently, then-Director of the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency Christopher Krebs and various election infrastructure bodies
issued a joint statement asserting there was no evidence that foreign interference had penetrated,
altered, or interfered with voting systems and “the November 3rd election was the most secure in
American history.”232

225 ODNI, Assessing Russian Activities, p. 2. For details, see Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Russia’s Use of
Social Media, with Additional Views, vol. 2 of Russian Active Measures Cam paigns.
226 Alex Stamos, “An Update on Information Operations on Facebook,” Facebook Newsroom, September 6, 2017. Also
see United States v. Internet Research Agency et al., No. 18-cr-32, February 16, 2018; United States v. Khusyaynova,
No. 18-mj-464, September 28, 2018; and Renee Diresta and Shelby Grossman, “ Potemkin Pages and Personas:
Assessing GRU Online Operations, 2014 -2019,” Stanford Internet Observatory Cyber Policy Center, 2019.
227 Ben Collins et al., “ Exclusive: Russians Appear to Use Facebook to Push T rump Rallies in 17 U.S. Cities,” Daily
Beast, September 20, 2017.
228 ODNI, “Joint Statement on Election Day Preparations,” November 5, 2018 .
229 ODNI, “DNI Coats Statement on the Intelligence Community’s Response to Executive Order 13848 on Imposing
Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election,” December 21, 2018 .
230 Andy Greenberg, “Russia’s Fancy Bear Hackers Are Hitting U.S. Campaign T argets Again,” Wired, September 10,
2020; and Raphael Satter, Christopher Bing, and Joel Schectman, “ Russian Hackers T argeted California, Indiana
Democratic Parties,” Reuters, October 30, 2020.
231 ODNI, “Statement by NCSC Director William Evanina: Election T hreat Update for the American Public,” August
7, 2020; DHS, “Russia Likely to Continue Seeking to Undermine Faith in U.S. Electoral Process,” September 3, 2020;
and Kyle Cheney, “ Wray Says Russia Engaged in ‘Very Active Efforts’ to Interfere in Election, Damage Biden,”
Politico, September 17, 2020.
232 CISA, “ Joint Statement from Elections Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council and the Election
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In March 2021, the Office of the Director of National Intel igence released a declassified IC
assessment of foreign threats to the 2020 U.S. elections. The assessment stated the IC had high
confidence that President Putin “authorized, and a range of Russian government organizations
conducted, influence operations” to interfere with U.S. elections. The assessment also stated that
Russia used proxies to “launder influence narratives” of “misleading or unsubstantiated
al egations” to undermine public confidence in the elections and exacerbate sociopolitical
divisions.233
Energy and Arms Sales
Energy exports, primarily oil and natural gas, are a pil ar of Russian foreign policy. Energy
resources are central to the Russian economy, help fund military modernization, and give Russia
leverage over energy-importing countries. Russia’s arms exports, behind only the United States in
monetary value, also are an important source of hard currency and fulfil key foreign policy
objectives.
Energy234
Russia is a leading producer, consumer, and exporter of energy, especial y oil and natural gas (see
Table 1). The Russian government uses the country’s vast energy resources to acquire foreign
currency, secure government revenues, maintain domestic subsidies, and exert geopolitical
influence.
Table 1. Selected World Rankings of Russia’s Energy Portfolio, 2019

Reserves
Production
Consumption
Exports
Oil
6th
3rd
5th
2nd
Natural Gas
1st
2nd
2nd
1st
Coal
2nd
6th
6th
3rd
Electric Generation
NA
4th
4th
14th
Sources: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2020; CIA World Handbook, 2020.
Note: NA = not applicable.
Russia’s largest oil and gas companies are state-owned enterprises. Russia’s main natural gas
company is Gazprom, which is majority owned by the Russian government. Gazprom is Russia’s
largest company, the largest natural gas company in the world by revenue, and the world’s largest
exporter of natural gas. Gazprom is responsible for about two-thirds of Russia’s natural gas
production.235 Russia’s largest oil company, Rosneft, is 40% owned by the Russian government,

Infrastructure Sector Coordinating Executive Committees,” November 12, 2020.
233 T he assessment responds to a report ing requirement in the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA;
P.L. 116-92, §5304). ODNI, Foreign Threats to the 2020 U.S. Federal Elections, March 10, 2021, pp. i, 2-3.
234 T his section draws on CRS Report R42405, European Energy Security: Options for EU Natural Gas
Diversification, coordinated by Michael Ratner; and CRS Report R46518, Russia: Dom estic Politics and Econom y, by
Cory Welt and Rebecca M. Nelson.
235 Gazpromexport, “Our Activity,” at http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/about/activity/.
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which effectively controls the company. Rosneft is responsible for about 35% of Russian oil
production.236
Russia enjoys considerable market power in the export of natural gas.237 Many observers believe
Moscow uses this power to achieve foreign policy aims, especial y in Europe, the destination for
most of Russia’s natural gas exports. Since at least 2006, the EU and European countries have
weighed the implications of Europe’s heavy reliance on Russian natural gas imports. The main
impetus for concern were two temporary disruptions in Russian natural gas supplies via Ukraine
in 2006 and 2009.238 Subsequently, the EU and European states began to more seriously assess
the need to diversify their energy sources away from Russia.
To maintain its leverage and position as Europe’s dominant gas supplier, Russia has sought to
develop multiple pipeline routes that can reduce dependence on transit states such as Ukraine and
satisfy regional markets. With the financial support of European energy companies, Russia is
seeking to complete the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which would increase the amount of Russian
natural gas exported directly to Germany and on to other European countries.239 Successive U.S.
Administrations and many Members of Congress have opposed Nord Stream 2, reflecting
concerns about European dependence on Russian energy and the threat Russia poses to Ukraine.
The late 2019 passage of U.S. sanctions legislation targeting Nord Stream 2 delayed pipeline
construction for a year, and in January 2021 the Trump Administration imposed related sanctions
on a Russian pipe-laying vessel and its owner.240 Whether the pipeline wil be completed and
certified remains unclear.
Russia also has constructed new gas pipelines to Turkey and China.241 In addition to supplying
natural gas to Turkey, the TurkStream pipeline delivers Russian gas to some southeastern
European markets through a combination of new and existing infrastructure; additional
connectors are under construction. Many analysts view the TurkStream pipeline as an additional
means for Russia to bypass Ukraine and other transit states and as a counter to the Southern Gas
Corridor, a pipeline system that has begun to transport natural gas to Europe from Azerbaijan.
Another natural gas pipeline, the Power of Siberia, began operations at the end of 2019 and is the
first pipeline to bring Russian gas directly to China.
Russia’s involvement in global energy markets goes beyond its role as an energy supplier. Russia
has engaged in agreements with members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries and other countries to adjust global oil production. Russia also is a founding member of

236 British oil company BP and a subsidiary of the Qatar Investment Authority each own about 20% of Rosneft.
Russia’s next-largest oil companies, the privately owned Lukoil and Surgutneftegaz, are responsible for about 14% and
11%, respectively, of Russian oil production. RBC, “ Oil Production in Russia Dropped to Almost a T en -Year Low” (in
Russian), January 2, 2021, at https://www.rbc.ru/economics/02/01/2021/5ff01e859a794777a8796392.
237 Natural gas is more a regional commodity than oil, since natural gas requires expensive infrastructure for transport.
Oil is a global market in which Russia does not have the same type of leverage it has with natural gas exports.
238 Jonathan Stern, The Russian-Ukrainian Gas Crisis of January 2006, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, January
16, 2006; Simon Pirani, Jonathan Stern, and Katja Yafimava, The Russo-Ukrainian Gas Dispute of January 2009: A
Com prehensive Assessm ent, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, February 2009; and Kirsten Westphal, Russian Gas,
Ukrainian Pipelines, and European Supply Security: Lessons of the 2009 Controversies, SWP, September 2009.
239 CRS In Focus IF11138, Russia’s Nord Stream 2 Pipeline: Continued Uncertainty, by Paul Belkin, Michael Ratner,
and Cory Welt .
240 22 U.S.C. §9526 note; and U.S. Department of State, “Sanctions on Russian Entity and a Vessel Engaging in the
Construction of Nord Stream 2,” January 19, 2021.
241 CRS In Focus IF11177, TurkStream: Russia’s Newest Gas Pipeline to Europe, by Sarah E. Garding et al.; and CRS
In Focus IF11514, Power of Siberia: A Natural Gas Pipeline Brings Russia and China Closer, by Michael Ratner and
Heather L. Greenley.
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the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, a cartel-like organization of natural gas producing
countries.242 Russian companies also participate in and pursue energy investment projects around
the world. Russian energy companies and their subsidiaries have significant ownership stakes in
European energy infrastructure, including pipelines, distribution, and storage facilities.243 Russia
also is a major exporter of nuclear power reactors, fuel, and related services and a key developer
of next-generation nuclear technology.244
Defense Industry and Arms Sales
Arms sales and the defense industry play an important role in Russian domestic and foreign
policy. In 2012, President Putin stated, “Effective military and technical cooperation is a potent
instrument of promoting our national interests, political as wel as economic.”245 Domestical y,
Russia’s defense industry comprises over 1,400 firms and employs several mil ion workers,
making it a key political constituency.246 In foreign policy, arms sales are a policy tool to advance
Russia’s interests, including developing defense relationships and enhancing Russia’s regional
and global influence. In recent years, Russia has been one of the top five arms exporters in dollar-
value terms (often behind only the United States), averaging $13-$15 bil ion in reported annual
sales, according to official statistics.247
Over the last decade, Russia has consolidated its defense industry into a few large holding
companies, with most incorporated into a state-controlled corporation, Rostec, run by longtime
Putin colleague Sergei Chemezov. Russia conducts foreign arms sales through Rosoboronexport,
a state-control ed intermediary and subsidiary of Rostec; these sales are overseen by the Federal
Service for Military-Technical Cooperation.248
Russia has an advanced defense industry capable of producing firearms, aircraft, tanks and
armored vehicles, artil ery, air defense, missiles, and ships. Russia’s military modernization
program has benefitted the defense industry, al owing it to upgrade, design, and test numerous
improvements and new systems.249 Many of these systems are combat tested, including in Syria.

242 See CRS Insight IN11286, Low Oil Prices: Prospects for Global Oil Market Balance, by Phillip Brown; and CRS In
Focus IF10939, Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF): Cartel Lite? , by Michael Ratner.
243 See, for example, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, European Natural Gas Infrastructure: T he Role of
Gazprom in European Natural Gas Supplies, 2014.
244 Economist, “Russia Leads the World at Nuclear-Reactor Exports,” August 7, 2018; and Ben Aris, “Russia’s Nuclear
Power Exports Are Booming,” bne IntelliNews, May 8, 2019.
245 President of Russia, “Meeting of the Commission on Military-T echnical Cooperation with Foreign States,” July 2,
2012.
246 Pavel Luzin, Russia’s Defense Industry: Between Political Significance and Economic Inefficiency, Foreign Policy
Research Institute, 2020, p. 3.
247 In 2020, state-owned arms exporter Rosoboronexport stated it had sold $180 billion worth of arms to foreign
customers over the last 20 years. It announced sales of $15 billion in 2019 and $13 billion in 2020. T ASS, “Russia’s
Portfolio of Arms Orders Exceeds $55 Bln as of Early 2020,” July 22, 2020; T ASS, “ Russia’s Rosoboronexport to
Deliver Armaments Worth $13 Bln in 2020,” August 23, 2020; and T ASS, “Russia’s State Arms Exporter Delivers
Military Hardware Worth $180 Bln over 20 Years,” November 2, 2020.
248 Selected firms can export military-related products directly but still are overseen by the Federal Service for Military-
T echnical Cooperation. Mathieu Boulegue, “ Russia’s Shifting Defense Establishment,” National Interest, July 24,
2018; and Pavel Luzin, “ T he Inner Workings of Russia’s Military Industrial Behemoth,” Riddle, March 27, 2019.
249 Richard Connolly and Cecilie Sendstad, “Russian Rearmament: An Assessment of Defense-Industrial
Performance,” Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 65, no. 3 (2018), pp. 143-160.
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Russia has sold arms to more than 120 countries since 2000, according to official sources.250 A
majority of recent Russian arms exports have gone to five countries: Algeria, China, Egypt, India,
and Vietnam. China and India account for over half of Russia’s arms exports. Sales to China and
India have included S-300 and S-400 air-defense systems (the latter to China), Su-30MKI and Su-
35S fighters, Kilo-class submarines (to China), and Talwar-class frigates (to India).251 In contrast
to the U.S. Total Package Approach to arms sales, which ensures foreign military sales customers
have access to comprehensive training, technical, and support expertise, Russia traditional y does
not provide these services in its arms sales packages.
Many Russian arms sales are upgraded versions of Soviet-era or early Russian systems. Many
systems were under development for decades and in recent years received the necessary financial
and technological support for completion. For more advanced systems, Russia traditional y has
prioritized sel ing “second-best” systems for fear of reverse engineering and technology transfer,
keeping its most advanced weaponry for the Russian military.252 Increased competition and
pressure for local production have made these second-best systems less attractive in recent years.
As countries such as India and China have developed their own defense industries, Russia has had
to offer more advanced and frontline systems (including systems stil under development). Russia
also is pursuing possible joint development and technology licensing strategies, including with
both India and China.253 In some regions, especial y in the Middle East and North Africa, Russia
continues to aggressively market and sel arms, including some of its latest designs.254
Russia’s defense industry suffers from numerous structural, financial, and technological
constraints that have affected its ability to develop and deploy new and advanced systems.255
Russia’s increasing isolation from Western technology and financing in the wake of its invasion
of Ukraine severely affected its defense industry and highlighted its lack of a modern and
precision manufacturing base. In addition, Russia’s domestic arms purchases are set to decrease
over the next decade, diminishing revenue sources and exacerbating outstanding debts.256 As a
result, the defense industry increasingly relies on foreign arms sales for revenue and to support
faltering firms and production lines.257

250 T ASS, “Russia’s State Arms Exporter Delivers Military Hardware Worth $180 Bln over 20 Years,” November 2,
2020.
251 SIPRI, Arms Transfers Database, 2021.
252 Siemon T . Wezeman, “China, Russia and the Shifting Landscape of Arms Sales,” SIPRI, July 5, 2017.
253 Kofman, “Emperors League”; and Amie Ferris-Rotman, “Russia, India Agree to More Military Cooperation,”
Washington Post, September 4, 2019.
254 Weapons systems and equipment offered include air-defense systems, tanks, fighters, patrol and missile ships,
drones, and helicopters. T ASS, “ Rosoboronexport Signs Contracts with African States Worth $1.5 Billion,” February
21, 2020; and T ASS, “Russia’s Military Exports to Middle East and North Africa Hit $6 Billion,” February 21, 2020.
255 In 2012, Russia established an Advanced Research Foundation to fund and develop breakthrough technologies. T or
Bukkvoll, T omas Malmlof, and Konstantin Makienko, “The Defence Industry as a Locomotive for T echnological
Renewal in Russia: Are the Conditions in Place?,” Post-Com m unist Economies, vol. 29, no. 2 (2017), pp. 232-249; and
Maria Shagina and Mathieu Boulegue, “ Russia Wants Its Civil and Military Sectors to Cooperate. So Far, Not So
Much,” Defense One, July 9, 2020.
256 Andrey Frolov, “Defence T echnologies and Industrial Base,” in Defence Industries in Russia and China: Players
and Strategies, eds. Richard Bitzinger and Nicu Popescu (EUISS, 2017), pp. 13 -16; Andrey Biryukov and Evgenia
Pismennaya, “Putin’s Huge Military Buildup Leaves Industry with Debt Hangover,” Bloomberg, July 16, 2019; Gustav
Gressel, “T he Sanctions Straightjacket on Russia’s Defense Sector,” European Council on Foreign Relations, February
13, 2020; and Pavel Luzin, “ Russia’s Arms Manufacturers Are a Financial Black Hole,” Riddle, January 30, 2020.
257 Russia previously offered credit to countries such as Armenia and Venezuela to purchase arms, but the defense
industry’s precarious financial situation suggests loans are less likely to be offered in the future. Matthew Bodner,
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Although global demand for Russian arms sales appears to remain high, U.S. sanctions targeting
significant transactions with the Russian defense and intel igence sectors may impact some major
sales. The United States has imposed sanctions on Chinese and Turkish defense agencies and
officials for procuring Russian S-400 missile systems (and, in China’s case, Su-35S combat
aircraft).258 In December 2020, State Department officials stated that “bil ions of dollars in
announced or expected Russian arms transactions … have quietly been abandoned as a result of
our diplomatic outreach.”259
U.S.-Russia Relations
Since Vladimir Putin’s return to the Russian presidency in 2012 (after serving as prime minister
since 2008), successive U.S. Administrations and Congress have focused increasingly on
countering aggressive Russian actions abroad and addressing Russia’s worsening human rights
abuses. Many U.S. officials and observers have decried what they see as Russia’s lack of respect
for fundamental international norms and have warned about the threats Russia may pose to the
security and interests of the United States and its al ies and partners.
Official U.S. responses to malign Russian activities have included the imposition of a wide array
of sanctions for human rights abuses, the invasion of Ukraine, election interference, malicious
cyber activities, use of a chemical weapon, weapons proliferation, il icit trade with North Korea,
and support to the governments of Syria and Venezuela, among other activities.260 U.S.
Administrations also have responded to election interference, cyberattacks, and other clandestine
Russian activities with indictments and public exposure. The United States has expressed support
for the territorial integrity of Ukraine and Russia’s other neighbors, and it has provided security
assistance, including lethal weaponry, to Ukraine and Georgia, both subject to Russian invasion
and territorial occupation. The United States has led NATO in developing a new military posture
in Central and Eastern Europe intended to reassure al ies and deter further Russian aggression.
Despite tensions and the general y poor state of bilateral relations, U.S. and Russian authorities
have stated the importance of continued engagement on certain issues of common interest. Many
past efforts to engage with Russia have met with failure or limited success, leading some
observers to countenance against further efforts.261 Others argue that issues of mutual interest
al ow for limited reengagement.262

“Influence or Profit? Russia’s Defense Industry Is at a Crossroads,” Defense News, July 22, 2019.
258 U.S. Department of State, “ Sanctions Under Section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries T hrough
Sanctions Act of 2017 (CAAT SA),” September 20, 2018; and U.S. Department of State, “ CAAT SA Section 231
“Imposition of Sanctions on T urkish P residency of Defense Industries,” December 14, 2020.
259 U.S. Department of State, “ Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation Dr. Christopher Ford
and Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Matthew Palmer on the Imposition of Sanctions on T urkey Under
CAAT SA 231,” December 14, 2020.
260 For more, see CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia, coordinated by Cory Welt ; and CRS In Focus
IF10779, U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview, by Dianne E. Rennack and Cory Welt .
261 Mikhail Zygar, “T he Russian Reset T hat Never Was,” Foreign Policy, December 9, 2016; Nina Arshankuni,
Angelina Flood, and Natasha Yefimova-T rilling, “ Why the ‘Reset’ Didn’t Last,” Russia Matters, March 8, 2019; Nicu
Popescu, “Why Attempts to Reset Relations with Russia Fail,” European Council on Foreign Relations, February 3,
2021; and Carl Bildt, “Why the West’s Attempts to Reset Relations with Russia Have Failed Again and Again,”
Washington Post, February 18, 2021.
262 Emma Ashford, “How Reflexive Hostility to Russia Harms U.S. Interests,” Foreign Affairs, April 20, 2018; Dmitry
T renin, “Russia-U.S.: No Reset, Just Guardrails,” Carnegie Moscow Center, July 8, 2020; and Ralph Clem, “Risky
Encounters with Russia: T ime to T alk About Real Deconfliction,” War on the Rocks, February 18, 2021.
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Historical Overview
For almost 30 years, the United States and Russia have struggled to develop a constructive
bilateral relationship.263 In the early 1990s, a spirit of U.S.-Russia “strategic partnership” and
hopes for Russia’s integration with the West were gradual y overtaken by increasing tension and
mutual recrimination, largely as a consequence of disagreements over Russian efforts to
reestablish a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet region, U.S. promotion of NATO enlargement,
and NATO’s military intervention in the former Yugoslavia.264
Particularly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, then-President George W. Bush and
President Putin sought to restore U.S.-Russia relations. The United States aimed to reshape its
relationship with Russia on the basis of cooperation against terrorism and the economic
integration of Russia with the West. Tensions arose around a number of issues, however,
including the Iraq War; so-cal ed color revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan; Russian
energy and security pressure on its neighbors; and U.S. and NATO plans to deploy missile
defenses in Europe. Cooperation continued in some areas, but the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict
caused bilateral ties to deteriorate further.265
Upon entering office in 2009, President Barack Obama sought to “reset” relations with Russia’s
then-president, Dmitry Medvedev. The United States and Russia cooperated in a number of areas,
including nuclear arms control, Afghanistan, the Iran nuclear agreement, sanctions on North
Korea, and the removal of chemical weapons from Syria. Despite such cooperation, tensions
increased with the U.S. arrest of 10 long-term undercover Russian spies in 2010.266 Tensions
further increased with the NATO-led military intervention in Libya that resulted in the toppling
and kil ing of Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi in 2011. Russian authorities claimed the
intervention was evidence the United States and its al ies were wil ing to pursue regime change
under the guise of protecting civilians.267
U.S.-Russia relations worsened with Russia’s disputed 2011 parliamentary elections and Putin’s
2012 return to the presidency. After the U.S. government criticized the conduct of the 2011
elections, Putin accused the State Department of interfering in Russia’s internal affairs and,
ultimately, seeking to promote regime change.268 Relations continued to decline with the passage
in the United States of the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, which
established sanctions in response to certain Russian human rights abuses.269 Relations

263 See, for example, Angela E. Stent, The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century,
updated ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015).
264 James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy Toward Russia After the Cold War
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003).
265 T homas Ambrosio, Challenging America’s Global Preeminence: Russia’s Quest for Multipolarity (London and
New York: Routledge, 2005); Peter Baker, “The Seduction of George W. Bush,” Foreign Policy, November 6, 2013;
and Ronald D. Asmus, A Little War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 2010).
266 FBI, “Operation Ghost Stories: Inside the Russian Spy Case,” October 31, 2011 ; and Gordon Corera, Russians
Am ong Us: Sleeper Cells, Ghost Stories, and the Hunt for Putin’s Spies (New York: Harper Collins, 2020).
267 Ellen Barry, “Putin Criticizes West for Libya Incursion,” New York Times, April 26, 2011; Stephen Blank and Carol
R. Saivetz, “Playing to Lose? Russia and the ‘Arab Spring,’” Problems of Post-Communism vol. 59, no. 1 (2012), pp.
3-14; and Samuel Charap, “ Russia, Syria and the Doctrine of Intervention,” Survival vol. 55, no. 1 (2013), pp. 35-41.
268 David M. Herszenhorn and Ellen Barry, “ Putin Contends Clinton Incited Unrest over Vote,” New York Times,
December 8, 2011.
269 T he act was enacted as T itle IV of the Russia and Moldova Jackson -Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of
Law Accountability Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-208). For more, see CRS Report R46518, Russia: Dom estic Politics and
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deteriorated further after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, 2015 intervention in Syria, and
interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
U.S. Policy During the Trump Administration
During the Trump Administration, U.S. relations with Russia were conducted under the shadow
of Russia’s 2016 election interference and the U.S. Department of Justice Special Counsel
investigation that followed (see “U.S. Election Interference,” above). Nonetheless, President
Trump followed the U.S. Presidents before him in cal ing for improved relations with Moscow.
The Trump Administration asserted that its policies to counter Russian malign activities would
remain strong.
In January 2017, the White House cal ed an initial phone cal between President Trump and
President Putin “a significant start to improving the relationship between the United States and
Russia that is in need of repair.” 270 President Trump and President Putin held periodic bilateral
meetings, including in July 2018 in Helsinki, Finland, where many observers believed President
Trump publicly equivocated between the IC’s conclusion of Russian election interference and
Putin’s denial of the same.271 President Trump also cal ed for including Russia in a reconstituted
Group of Eight (G8).272
At the same time, President Trump claimed he was “tougher on Russia” than past
Administrations.273 Observers and Members of Congress expressed concern that President Trump
would remove sanctions on Russia, but the Trump Administration did not seek to waive existing
sanctions.274 On the contrary, in part due to congressional pressure, the Trump Administration
expanded sanctions on Russia for a variety of malign activities. The Trump Administration also
increased funding to bolster the security of European al ies via the European Deterrence Initiative
(see “Countering Russian Aggression,” below), provided lethal weaponry to Ukraine and
Georgia, discouraged global Russian arms sales, and sought to halt the construction of Russia’s
Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline to Europe (see “Energy and Arms Sales,” above).275
Some observers argue that a gap persisted between the relatively “tough” policies of the Trump
Administration and the more accommodating rhetoric and signaling by President Trump, or that
the Trump Administration could have used a fuller range of tools, including more extensive

Econom y, by Cory Welt and Rebecca M. Nelson.
270 White House, “Readout of the President’s Call with Russian President Vladimir Putin,” January 28, 2017.
271 White House, “ Remarks by President T rump and President Putin of the Russian Federation in Joint Press
Conference,” July 16, 2018; and CRS Insight IN10933, The Trum p-Putin Summit, by Cory Welt .
272 After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia was removed from the Group of Eight (G8), which returned to its
original status as the G7, a group of seven major advanced industrial democracies. Allie Malloy and Nicole Gaouette,
“T rump Says Russia Should Be Reinstated in Group of Leading Industrialized Nations,” CNN, June 8, 2018; and Ryan
Heath, “G7 Members Reject T rump’s Bid to Bring Russia in from the Cold,” Politico, June 2, 2020.
273 Dan Merica, “T rump Declares ‘Nobody Has Been T ougher on Russia’ in Meeting with Baltic Leaders,” CNN, April
3, 2018; and White House, “Remarks by President T rump in Press Briefing,” September 4, 2020. Also see Everett
Rosenfeld, “It’s ‘Crazy T alk’ to Say the U.S. Isn’t T ough on Russia: Mike Pompeo,” CNBC, May 11, 2019.
274 Peter Nicholas, Paul Beckett, and Gerald F. Seib, “T rump Open to Shift on Russia Sanctions, ‘One China’ Policy,”
Wall Street Journal, January 13, 2017; Karen DeYoung and David Filipov, “ T rump Says It Is ‘Very Early’ to Discuss
Lifting Sanctions on Russia,” January 27, 2017; and Lynn Berry, “Day After Putin Call, GOP Warns T rump on Lifting
Sanctions,” Associated Press, January 29, 2017.
275 White House, “ President Donald J. T rump Is Protecting Our Elections and Standing Up to Russia’s Malign
Activities,” July 17, 2018; and Alina Polyakova and Filippos Letsas, “ On the Record: T he U.S. Administration’s
Actions on Russia,” Brookings Institution, December 31, 2019.
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sanctions, in response to Russian malign activities.276 Some Members of Congress debated the
pace and scope of Administration efforts to implement congressional y authorized sanctions and
other policies intended to counter Russian malign activities, especial y as provided for in the
Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA).277
During the Trump Administration, U.S. cabinet members and senior military and diplomatic
officials conducted meetings and dialogues with Russian counterparts on a range of issues. Areas
of dialogue included Syria (see “Deconfliction in Syria,” below), Afghanistan, North Korea, Iran,
Venezuela, energy, counterterrorism, and strategic security (see “Arms Control,” below).278
With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, observers noted frequent communications
between President Trump and President Putin. Discussions reportedly focused on oil supply and
price issues and on the pandemic.279 In April 2020, the Russian government delivered a shipment
of ventilators and personal protection equipment to the United States that turned controversial as
questions arose about the nature of the transaction, regulatory procedures, and safety and
compatibility issues. The United States reciprocated with a donation of ventilators to Russia.280
U.S. Policy During the Biden Administration
In the first months of the Biden Administration, U.S. officials said the Administration would
adopt a firm response to a range of Russian malign activities in coordination with U.S. al ies and
partners, while seeking cooperation in areas the Administration deems to be in the U.S. interest,
such as nuclear arms control.281 In March 2021, the Administration released an Interim National
Security Strategic Guidance, which stated that Russia is “determined to enhance its global
influence and play a disruptive role on the world stage.” However, the interim guidance referred

276 Scott Horsley, “Is T rump the T oughest Ever on Russia?” NPR, July 20, 2018; Michael McFaul, “Sorry, But T rump
Is Not ‘T ough on Russia,’” Washington Post, January 16, 2019; and Noah Weiland, “5 T imes the T rump
Administration Has Been T ougher T han T rump on Russia,” New York Times, January 21, 2019.
277 T itle II of the Countering America’s Adversaries T hrough Sanctions Act (CAAT SA; P.L. 115-44). Olivia Beavers,
“Senate Dems Call for Probe into Why T rump Has Not Issued Russia Sanctions,” Hill, May 18, 2018; and William
Ford, “T he Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Conflicting Views on the Role of Sanctions in America’s Strategy
T oward Russia,” Lawfare, December 10, 2019;
278 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Readout of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dunford’s Meeting with Russian Chief
of the General Staff Gen. Gerasimov,” March 4, 2019; U.S. Department of State, “ Deputy Secretary Sullivan’s
Participation in Second U.S.-Russia High-Level Counterterrorism Dialogue with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister
Syromolotov,” September 9, 2019; and U.S. Department of State, “ U.S.-Russia Strategic Security Dialogue,” January
16, 2020.
279 Official readouts reported that the two presidents also discussed arms control and strategic stability, space
cooperation, and the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II. Mike Eckel, “ A T rump -Putin ‘Reset’? Flurry of
Communication Points to Behind-the-Scenes Diplomacy,” RFE/RL, April 23, 2020; White House, “ Joint Statement by
President Donald J. T rump and President Vladimir Putin of Russia Commemorating the 75 th Anniversary of the
Meeting on the Elbe,” April 25, 2020; and Javier Blas and Bloomberg, “ T rump’s Oil Deal: T he Inside Story of How
the Saudi-Russia Price War Ended,” Fortune, April 14, 2020.
280 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Purchase of Needed Supplies from Russia,” April 1, 2020; Mike Eckel, “T he
Strange Story of a Russian Ventilator Shipment to the U.S. Just Got Stranger,” RFE/RL, May 13, 2020; U.S. Embassy
and Consulates in Russia, “Delivery of U.S. Ventilators to Russia,” May 21, 2020; Reuters, “Russia Gets More U.S.
Ventilators as Coronavirus Cases Climb,” June 4, 2020; and Christopher Miller, “ FEMA T hrew Out the Faulty
Ventilators Russia Gave the U.S. Without Ever Using T hem,” BuzzFeed News, October 19, 2020.
281 See, for example, U.S. Department of State, “On the Extension of the New ST ART T reaty with the Russian
Federation,” February 3, 2021.
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to China, not Russia, as “the only competitor potential y capable of [mounting] a sustained
chal enge to a stable and open international system.”282
In April 2021, President Biden declared a formal national emergency in response to “harmful
foreign activities” of the Russian government that “constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat
to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.” The Administration
also stated that the United States “desires a relationship with Russia that is stable and predictable.
We do not think that we need to continue on a negative trajectory.”283
On President Biden’s first full day in office, the White House confirmed the Administration
would agree to a five-year extension of the New START nuclear arms treaty with Russia without
further negotiations (see “Arms Control,” below).284
At the same time, President Biden directed the IC to provide a “full assessment” of four issues in
U.S.-Russia relations:
 the SolarWinds cyber breach of U.S. government agencies and private companies
identified in late 2020;285
 Russian interference in the 2020 U.S. presidential election (see “2018 U.S.
Midterm and 2020 Presidential Elections,” above);
 the August 2020 nerve agent attack against Russian opposition figure Alexei
Navalny (see below); and
 al eged Russian payments, or “bounties,” to Taliban-related forces for attacks on
U.S. and al ied forces (see “Targeted Overseas Attacks,” above).
On January 26, 2021, President Biden held a telephone cal with President Putin. According to the
White House, the two leaders addressed the issues above, as wel as U.S. support for the
sovereignty of Ukraine. President Biden “made clear that the United States wil act firmly in
defense of its national interests in response to actions by Russia that harm us or our al ies.”286 In
addition to extending New START, the presidents agreed “to explore strategic stability
discussions on a range of arms control and emerging security issues” and “to maintain transparent
and consistent communication going forward.”
The Russian readout of the phone cal addressed additional issues, including the potential for
cooperation on the COVID-19 pandemic and trade and economic affairs. It stated that President
Biden and President Putin discussed the U.S. withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty (see “Arms
Control,” below), the preservation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the Iran nuclear
deal), and a Russian proposal to convene a summit for permanent members of the U.N. Security

282 White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021.
283 White House, “Fact Sheet: Imposing Costs for Harmful Foreign Activities by the Russian Government,” April 15,
2021 (hereinafter, White House, “Imposing Costs for Harmful Foreign Activities); and Executive Order of April 15,
2021, “Blocking Property with Respect to Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the Government of the Russian
Federation,” at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russian_harmful_for_act_eo.pdf.
284 John Hudson, “ Biden Administration to Seek Five-Year Extension on Key Nuclear Arms T reaty in First Foray with
Russia,” Washington Post, January 21, 2021; and U.S. Department of State, “ On the Extension of the New ST ART
T reaty with the Russian Federation,” February 3, 2021.
285 CRS Insight IN11559, SolarWinds Attack—No Easy Fix, by Chris Jaikaran; and CRS In Focus IF11718, Russian
Cyber Units, by Andrew S. Bowen.
286 White House, “ Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Call with President Vladimir Putin of Russia,” January 26,
2021.
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Council.287 Russia’s presidential spokesperson also said, “The presidents took note of a rather
large number of serious disagreements and emphasized the need to maintain dialogue.”288
On March 2, 2021, the Biden Administration said Russian government agents were responsible
for the nerve agent attack on Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny.289 The Department of
State cal ed the attack an “attempted assassination” and determined Russia had used a chemical
weapon in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.290 The White House stated that the IC
“assesses with ‘high confidence’ that officers” of Russia’s FSB were responsible for the attack.291
The Administration announced sanctions in response, as wel as for Navalny’s subsequent arrest
and imprisonment, in coordination with the EU. Secretary of State Blinken said the United States,
together with the EU and others, seeks “to send a clear signal that Russia’s use of chemical
weapons and abuse of human rights have severe consequences.”292
In April 2021, the Biden Administration imposed new sanctions on Russia or Russian persons for
2020 U.S. election interference, the so-cal ed SolarWinds cyberattack, and other harmful foreign
activities. With regard to the al eged Russian “bounties” to the Taliban, the Administration said it
is responding to the reports via nonpublic channels, given the sensitivity of the matter.293
The Biden Administration has cal ed Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline a “bad deal.”294 On
February 22, 2021, the Administration identified a Russian pipe-laying vessel and its owner, both
previously subject to sanctions related to construction of the pipeline, as also subject to sanctions
under the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act of 2019, as amended.295 In addition, the
Administration provided Congress a list of more than 15 entities that had suspended their work
related to Nord Stream 2.296 The State Department indicated an evaluation of other potential
sanctions designations would be ongoing in consultation with European partners. Some Members
of Congress urged the Administration to impose additional sanctions to prevent Russia from
completing construction of the pipeline.297

287 President of Russia, “T elephone Conversation with U.S. President Joseph Biden,” January 26, 2021.
288 David Brennan, “Russia Gives Frosty Review of First Joe Biden -Vladimir Putin Call,” Newsweek, January 27, 2021.
289 CRS Insight IN11596, Russia: Poisoning of Alexei Navalny and U.S. Policy, by Cory Welt.
290 U.S. Department of State, “ Imposing Sanctions on Russia for the Poisoning and Imprisonment of Aleksey Navalny,”
March 2, 2021.
291 White House, “ Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki,” March 2, 2021.
292 U.S. Department of State, “ Imposing Sanctions on Russia for the Poisoning and Imprisonment of Aleksey Navalny,”
March 2, 2021.
293 White House, “Imposing Costs for Harmful Foreign Activities”; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury
Sanctions Russia with Sweeping New Sanctions Authority,” April 15, 20 21; and U.S. Department of the T reasury,
“T reasury Escalates Sanctions Against the Russian Government’s Attempts to Influence U.S. Elections,” April 15,
2021.
294 White House, “Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki,” February 16, 2021.
295 22 U.S.C. §9526 note.
296 U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing,” February 22, 2021.
297 Dan De Luce, “ Lawmakers Urge Biden Administration to Update Congress on Sanctions Against Russian Gas
Pipeline,” NBC News, February 17, 2021; RFE/RL, “Biden Administration’s Additional Sanctions over Nord Stream 2
‘Inadequate,’ Republicans Say,” February 20, 2021; and Brett Forrest, “ U.S. Report Allows Russian Pipeline Project to
Proceed, for Now,” Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2021.
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Congressional Action in the 116th Congress
During the 116th Congress (2019-2020), legislative action and oversight related to Russia focused
on assessing and countering the chal enges and threats Russia poses to the United States and U.S.
al ies and partners. Congressional hearings addressed U.S.-Russia relations, countering Russia in
Europe, Russian foreign and security policy and tools, human rights issues, regional conflicts, and
arms control.
The 116th Congress approved legislation establishing sanctions on Russian persons for
participating in or facilitating the subsea construction of Russia’s Nord Stream 2 and other natural
gas export pipelines, as wel as for participating in the crackdown against opposition and
protesters in Belarus and for being officials of the Russia-Belarus “Union State” (a supranational
institution).298 Congress also passed legislation requiring the President to impose sanctions on
persons in Turkey for acquiring a Russian S-400 air defense system, pursuant to CRIEEA.299 In
addition, Congress approved legislation to help reduce European energy dependence on Russia
and Russian influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.300
During the 116th Congress, Russia-related resolutions agreed to in the House or Senate
 condemned continued Russian aggression against Ukraine and efforts to
weaponize energy exports to Europe (S.Res. 74, H.Res. 672);
 expressed the sense of Congress that the activities of Yevgeniy Prigozhin and
affiliated entities (including PMCs) pose a threat to national security interests
(H.Res. 996);
 condemned the poisoning of Alexei Navalny and the detention of political
prisoners in Russia (H.Res. 1145, H.Res. 958);
 cal ed for accountability and justice for the 2015 murder of opposition figure
Boris Nemtsov (H.Res. 156, S.Res. 81);
 cal ed for the release from Russian prison of U.S. citizens Paul Whelan and
Trevor Reed (H.Res. 552, H.Res. 1115); and
 opposed the inclusion of Russia in future G7 summits (H.Res. 546).
Congress also enacted legislation requiring the executive branch to submit to Congress reports or
assessments on Russian-linked threat finance activities (e.g., financing of transnational threats,
money laundering, or sanctions evasion), corruption, and Putin’s assets; election-related cyber
threats; influence operations and campaigns targeting the United States or foreign elections;
Russian military and security developments, defense spending, strategic intentions, and Arctic
military activities; support for violent extremists abroad; malign influence in Belarus, Venezuela,
and the Eastern Mediterranean; and arms control issues.301

298 Sanctions provisions are in the Protect ing Europe’s Energy Security Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. §9526 note, as amended
by P.L. 116-283, §1242) and the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2020 ( P.L. 116-260,
Division FF, T itle III, Subtitle C).
299 P.L. 116-283, §1241.
300 See the European Energy Security and Diversification Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. §§9561 et seq.) and the Eastern
Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. §2373 note).
301 Reporting requirements are in the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92); the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283); the Further
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94); and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260).
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As in past years, in FY2021 foreign aid appropriations legislation, Congress maintained
restrictions on foreign assistance to Russia’s central government, although funds continued to be
made available “to support democracy programs … including to promote Internet freedom.”
Congress also continued restrictions on defense appropriations.302
Also as in past years, the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) restricted funds
from being used for bilateral military-to-military cooperation with Russia until the executive
branch certifies that Russia “has ceased its occupation of Ukrainian territory and its aggressive
activities that threaten” Ukraine and NATO members and “is abiding by the terms of and taking
steps in support of the Minsk Protocols regarding a ceasefire in eastern Ukraine.”303
Selected Issues in U.S.-Russia Relations
Countering Russian Aggression
In addition to using sanctions, the United States has sought to counter Russian aggression via an
enhanced military presence in Europe, as wel as increased security aid and other foreign
assistance to countries in Europe and Central Asia.
The United States is a key architect of and contributor to NATO’s enhanced deterrence initiatives
(see “NATO,” above), and it has sought to bolster U.S. force posture in Europe in response to
Russian actions. The FY2019 NDAA states that “ it is the policy of the United States to pursue, in
full coordination with [NATO], an integrated approach to strengthening the defense of al ies and
partners in Europe as part of a broader, long-term strategy backed by al elements of United States
national power to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russian aggression.”304
The Department of Defense’s European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) seeks to “enhance the U.S.
deterrence posture, increase the readiness and responsiveness of U.S. forces in Europe, support
the collective defense and security of NATO al ies, and bolster the security and capacity of U.S.
al ies and partners.”305 EDI began as the European Reassurance Initiative in 2014, as an effort to
reassure U.S. al ies in Europe of the continued U.S. commitment to their security in the wake of
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The enhanced U.S. military presence in Central and Eastern Europe primarily consists of
increased rotational deployments of air, ground, and naval assets and a significant increase in
military exercises. The United States currently has a rotational military presence in Poland of
approximately 4,500 personnel, including those involved in Operation Atlantic Resolve and
NATO Missile Defense efforts, and forces assigned to one of four NATO Enhanced Forward
Presence Battle Groups. In 2020, the United States and Poland concluded an Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement to support a larger U.S. military presence.306 The United States also has

302 P.L. 116-260, Division C, §8102(a), and Division K, §7047.
303 P.L. 116-283, §1231; P.L. 114-328, §1232.
304 P.L. 115-232, §1248. Also see P.L. 115-91, §1233.
305 U.S. European Command, “ FY2020 European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) Fact Sheet .” Also see CRS In Focus
IF10946, The European Deterrence Initiative: A Budgetary Overview, by Paul Belkin and Hibbah Kaileh.
306 CRS In Focus IF11280, U.S. Military Presence in Poland, by Andrew Feickert, Kathleen J. McInnis, and Derek E.
Mix; and U.S. Department of State, “ U.S.-Poland Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement,” August 15, 2020.
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increased its military presence in Norway, with U.S. Marines conducting year-round cold weather
training exercises and pre-positioning equipment for use in the event of a crisis.307
EDI began in FY2015 with $985 mil ion in funding. Between FY2016 and FY2019, Congress
authorized significant annual increases in EDI funding, as requested by the Administration.
Funding for the effort peaked at $6.5 bil ion in FY2019 and was $5.9 bil ion in FY2020. The
Trump Administration requested $4.5 bil ion for FY2021. Among other funds, EDI includes
assistance to Ukraine and other European al ies and partners to help strengthen their capacity for
self-defense and improve interoperability with U.S. forces.
Since FY2017, Congress also has appropriated more than $1.3 bil ion in designated funding to
assist countries in Europe and Central Asia “to counter Russian influence and aggression.”308
Most appropriations have been designated for the Countering Russian Influence Fund (CRIF), a
funding directive by which the Department of State provides bilateral and regional aid that is in
addition to country-specific and regional non-CRIF al ocations.309 CRIF funds have been
al ocated for security aid, as wel as for governance, civil society, and economic assistance.
U.S. Policy Toward Russia’s Conflicts310
Successive U.S. Administrations and Members of Congress on a bipartisan basis have condemned
Russia’s occupation of territory in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. The United States supports
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of these states within their international y recognized
borders. CRIEEA states that the United States “does not recognize territorial changes effected by
force, including the il egal invasions and occupations of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea,
Eastern Ukraine, and Transnistria.”311
Ukraine
After Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, the United States, in coordination with the EU and
others, promised to impose increasing costs on Russia until it “abides by its international
obligations and returns its military forces to their original bases and respects Ukraine’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity.”312 The United States imposed sanctions on Russia and
suspended discussions on trade and investment and military-to-military contacts.313
In July 2018, then-Secretary of State Pompeo issued the “Crimea Declaration,” which “reaffirms
as policy [the United States’] refusal to recognize the Kremlin’s claims of sovereignty over
territory seized by force in contravention of international law. In concert with al ies, partners, and

307 Shawn Snow, “T he Corps Plans to Boost Number of Marines in Norway,” Marine Corps Times, June 12, 2018; and
Stars and Stripes, “ 1,000 U.S. Marines Arrive in Norway for Cold-Weather T raining,” January 8, 2021.
308 P.L. 115-31, §7070(d).
309 Prior to creating the Countering Russian Influence Fund (CRIF) in the Co nsolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L.
115-31, §7070(d)), Congress designated some appropriations for countering Russian influence in the Further
Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 114-254, T itle II). T he Countering Russian
Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA, P.L. 115-44, T itle II, §254) formally authorized the CRIF.
310 For more, see CRS Report R45008, Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy, by Cory Welt;
CRS Report R45307, Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy, by Cory Welt ; CRS In Focus IF10894, Moldova: An
Overview, by Cory Welt ; and CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia, coordinated by Cory Welt .
311 P.L. 115-44, T itle II, §253.
312 White House, “Fact Sheet: Ukraine-Related Sanctions,” March 17, 2014.
313 T estimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Eric Rubin, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Ukraine, hearings, 114th Cong., 1st sess., March 6, 2014.
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the international community, the United States rejects Russia’s attempted annexation of Crimea
and pledges to maintain this policy until Ukraine’s territorial integrity is restored.”314 In addition,
CRIEEA states that it is the policy of the United States “to never recognize the il egal annexation
of Crimea by the Government of the Russian Federation or the separation of any portion of
Ukrainian territory through the use of military force.”315
With regard to Russian-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine, the U.S. government has supported
Ukraine’s efforts to pursue a diplomatic solution to the conflict and has cal ed on Russia to fulfil
its commitments under the Minsk agreements. In April 2021, President Biden spoke with
President Putin and “voiced [U.S.] concerns over the sudden Russian military build-up in
occupied Crimea and on Ukraine’s borders, and cal ed on Russia to de-escalate tensions.”316
U.S. officials have cal ed attention to, and imposed sanctions for, Russia’s human rights abuses in
occupied regions of Ukraine. The United States supports Ukraine against Russia’s efforts to
tighten control over the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov. The United States also has supported
Ukraine against Russian efforts to reduce Ukraine’s role as a transit state for natural gas exports
to Europe, including by imposing sanctions related to the construction of Russia’s Nord Stream 2
pipeline.
From 2017 to 2019, U.S. policy on the Ukraine conflict was directed mainly through the Office of
the U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations. The U.S. Department of State
established this position in 2017 to advance “U.S. efforts to achieve the objectives set out in the
Minsk agreements.”317 Ambassador Kurt Volker resigned from the position prior to the start of the
2019 U.S. presidential impeachment inquiry in the House of Representatives; a successor has not
been appointed.
Since FY2015, foreign operations appropriations have prohibited foreign assistance to
governments that take “affirmative steps” to support Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
Appropriations also have restricted funds from implementing policies and actions that would
recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea or other territory in Ukraine or would provide
assistance to Crimea or “other territory in Ukraine under the control of Russian-backed
separatists,” if such assistance includes the participation of Russian government officials or
Russian-controlled entities.318
Georgia and Moldova
The United States cal s on Russia to comply with the terms of the cease-fire agreement that ended
its 2008 war against Georgia, including withdrawal of its forces to prewar positions, and reverse
its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. U.S. officials have criticized
Russian efforts at hardening and extending the boundary lines of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

314 T he Crimea Declaration explicitly links U.S. policy to the Welles Declaration of 1940, which marked the start of a
U.S. policy not to recognize the Soviet Union ’s annexation of the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). U.S.
Department of State, “Crimea Declaration,” July 25, 2018; and U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian,
“Press Release Issued by the Department of State on July 23, 1940.”
315 P.L. 115-44, T itle II, §257.
316 White House, “ Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Call with President Vladimir Putin of Russia,” April 13,
2021.
317 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary T illerson Appoints Ambassador Kurt Volker Special Representative for
Ukraine Negotiations,” July 7, 2017.
318 P.L. 116-260, §7047(b).
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The U.S. government has expressed support for Georgia’s “commitment to dialogue and to a
peaceful resolution to the conflict.”319
Since FY2017, foreign operations appropriations prohibit foreign assistance to governments that
recognize the independence of Abkhazia or South Ossetia and restrict funds from supporting
Russia’s occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.320
In Moldova, the United States “supports the OSCE-led 5+2 negotiations to find a comprehensive
settlement that wil provide a special status for the separatist region of Transnistria within a
territorial y whole and sovereign Moldova.”321
Deconfliction in Syria322
Efforts to de-escalate conflict and deconflict military operations in Syria were a central area of
U.S.-Russia dialogue during the Trump Administration. In 2017, the United States and Russia
renewed a senior-level military dialogue that largely had been suspended since Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine. In 2017, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joe Dunford held two
initial meetings with his Russian counterpart, General Valery Gerasimov, mainly to discuss the
“deconfliction of Russian and coalition operations in Syria.”323
Also in 2017, the United States and Russia worked with Jordan to establish a de-escalation
agreement in the southwestern part of Syria. According to then-Secretary of State Rex Til erson,
the agreement was the “first indication of the U.S. and Russia being able to work together in
Syria.”324 The southwest de-escalation area was recaptured by Syrian military forces in 2018;
Russian officials stated the area was intended to be temporary and the Syrian army had a
legitimate right to fight “terrorists.”325
Paral el U.S. and Russian ground operations in eastern Syria to defeat the Islamic State led to
expanded deconfliction efforts.326 These efforts “dramatical y accelerated ISIS’s losses on the
battlefield,” according to a November 2017 joint statement by President Trump and President
Putin. The statement confirmed the intention of the United States and Russia to maintain
deconfliction efforts and “open military channels of communication” until ISIS was defeated.327

319 U.S. Department of State, “United States Welcomes Georgia Peace Initiative,” April 4, 201 8.
320 P.L. 116-260, §7047(c).
321 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Moldova,” January 7, 2020.
322 Carla E. Humud, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, and Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
Affairs, contributed to this section.
323 U.S. Department of Defense, “Dunford to Discuss Deconfliction with Russian Counterpart in Helsinki,” June 7,
2018. Also see Michael R. Gordon, “ Joint Chiefs Chairman to Meet with Russian Counterpart in Azerbaijan,” New
York Tim es, February 15, 2017.
324 White House, “Press Briefing by Secretary of State T illerson and Secretary of T reasury Mnuchin on the President’s
Meetings at the G20,” July 7, 2017.
325 Ellen Francis, “ Syrian Army Makes Advances in Southwest Offensive,” Reuters, June 28, 2018.
326 Robert E. Hamilton, Russian and American De-Confliction Efforts in Syria: What’s the Endgame in the Civil War? ,
Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 2018; and Andrew S. Weiss and Nicole Ng, Collision Avoidance: The Lessons
of U.S. and Russian Operations in Syria, Carnegie Endowment, March 2019.
327 Near the start of Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015, Russia and the United States also had established initial air
safety protocols t o deconflict air operations. U.S. Department of Defense, “ U.S., Russia Sign Memorandum on Air
Safety in Syria,” October 20, 2015; and U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement by the President of the United
States and the President of the Russian Federation,” November 11, 2017.
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The United States frequently accused Russian forces of breaching air and ground deconfliction
arrangements, and U.S. and Russian forces occasional y entered into direct confrontation.328 In
one exceptional clash in 2018, U.S.-led coalition forces in Syria defended a team of U.S. Special
Forces and local partner forces against an attack on their outpost by pro-Asad fighters who were
joined by members of a Russian PMC. Dozens of Russian fighters reportedly were kil ed in the
attack.329 Testifying about the clash, then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis stated, “The Russian
high command in Syria assured us it was not their people, and my direction to the Chairman was
the force then was to be annihilated. And it was.”330
Incidents also occurred after the 2019 drawdown and redistribution of U.S. forces in Syria. U.S.
military officials noted that Russia continued to violate established deconfliction protocols and
that Russian ground and air incursions into areas in which U.S. forces operated occurred on a
“regular but often sporadic basis.”331 In August 2020, seven U.S. service members were injured
after a Russian vehicle collided with a U.S. patrol in northeastern Syria.332
As of late 2020, Russia continued to conduct operations against the Islamic State in government-
held areas of Syria. Russian and Syrian airstrikes along transportation routes also posed risks to
humanitarian and stabilization activities by U.S. aid partners in Syria.333
Diplomatic Reductions334
In the last five years, U.S. and Russian diplomatic missions were reduced substantial y in size
through a series of tit-for-tat reductions. In December 2016, the Obama Administration imposed
sanctions on Russian persons for election-related malicious cyber activity. The Administration
also declared 35 Russian diplomatic personnel personae non grata in response to what Obama
Administration officials characterized as increased harassment of U.S. diplomatic personnel in
Russia. The White House maintained that those declared personae non grata were intel igence
operatives acting in a manner inconsistent with their diplomatic status.335 The Administration also
announced it would deny Russian officials access to two Russian government-owned compounds,

328 Eric Schmitt, “In Syria’s Skies, Close Calls with Russian Warplanes,” New York Times, December 8, 2017; and Eric
Schmitt, “ Russians Pressure U.S. Forces in Northeast Syria,” New York Times, February 14, 2020.
329 T homas Gibbons-Neff, “How a 4-Hour Battle Between Russian Mercenaries and U.S. Commandos Unfolded in
Syria,” New York Tim es, May 24, 2018.
330 T estimony of Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services,
Departm ent of Defense Budget Posture, hearings, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., April 26, 2018. T ranscript available at
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/18-04-26-department-of-defense-budget-posture.
331 Offices of Inspector General of the Department of Defense, Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International
Development, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, April 1,
2020-June 30, 2020, August 4, 2020, p. 51.
332 U.S. Department of Defense, “Statement on Russian Forces’ Breach of Deconfliction Arrangement in Syria,”
August 27, 2020; and Dan Lamothe, “U.S. T roops Injured in Altercation with Russian Military Patrol in Syria,”
Washington Post, August 27, 2020.
333 Offices of Inspector General of the Department of Defense, Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International
Development, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, October 1,
2020-December 31, 2020, February 9, 2021.
334 Cory R. Gill, Analyst in Foreign Affairs, contributed to this section.
335 White House, “ Fact Sheet: Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment ,” December
29, 2016; and White House, “Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity
and Harassment,” December 29, 2016.
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located in Maryland and New York, which President Obama said Russia was using for
intel igence-related purposes.
During the Trump Administration, Russia responded to the Obama Administration’s 2016
expulsions only after the passage of new U.S. sanctions legislation in August 2017. The Russian
government ordered the United States to reduce its total diplomatic and technical personnel in
Russia to no more than 455, which it said was the size of Russia’s diplomatic presence in the
United States.336 It also took control of U.S. storage and resort facilities in Moscow. In response,
the Trump Administration announced Russia would be required to close its consulate general in
San Francisco, a chancery annex in Washington, DC, and a consular annex in New York City.337
In 2018, in response to a nerve agent attack in the UK (see “Targeted Overseas Attacks,” above),
the United States expel ed 48 Russian officials serving at the Russian Embassy, required the
Russian government to close its consulate general in Seattle, and arranged to expel 12 officials
from the Russian Mission to the United Nations. The White House noted that those being
expel ed were intel igence officers accredited as diplomats.338 In response, Russia expel ed 60
U.S. diplomats and ordered the closure of the U.S. consulate general in St. Petersburg.
Subsequently, the Russian government reportedly refused to provide visas to U.S. diplomatic
personnel. In 2019, then-Ambassador-designate to Russia John Sullivan noted the total number of
U.S. personnel in Russia was “substantial y below 400,” due to visa restrictions.339 In March
2020, the State Department temporarily suspended operations at the U.S. consulate general in
Vladivostok, citing COVID-19 health concerns.340 In December 2020, State Department officials
said staffing problems contributed to a decision to close the consulate general in Vladivostok,
where operations remain suspended, and to suspend operations at the other remaining U.S.
consulate general in Russia, located in Yekaterinburg.341 In April 2021, the State Department said
the consulate general in Yekaterinburg would remain open, although visa and U.S. citizen
services would be suspended.342
Also in April 2021, the Biden Administration announced it was expel ing from the United States
10 Russian diplomatic personnel, including representatives of Russian intel igence services, as
part of its response to Russia’s harmful foreign activities.343

336 Russian officials said this would mean a reduction of around 755 mission personnel (including Russian nationals).
Neil MacFarquhar, “Russia Seizes 2 U.S. Properties and Orders Embassy to Cut Staff,” New York Times, July 28, 2017;
and Andrew Roth, “Putin Orders Cut of 755 Personnel at U.S. Missions,” Washington Post, July 30, 2017.
337 U.S. Department of State, “Achieving Parity in Diplomatic Missions,” August 31, 2017; and Mark Lander and
Gardiner Harris, “In Retaliation, U.S. Orders Russia to Close Consulate in San Francisco,” New York Times, August 31,
2017.
338 White House, “ Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on the Expulsion of Russian Intelligence
Officers,” March 26, 2018.
339 T estimony of Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Nom inations, hearings, 116th Cong., 1st sess., October 31, 2019. T ranscript available at https://plus.cq.com/doc/
congressionaltranscripts-5759976?0.
340 U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Russia, “ T emporary Suspension of Operations at the U.S. Consulate General in
Vladivostok,” March 18, 2020.
341 Mike Eckel, “ Interview: Russia Blocking Visas for U.S. Diplomatic Staff, Forcing Closure of Consulates, U.S.
Ambassador Says,” RFE/RL, December 23, 2020; and Carol Morello, “ How Bad Are U.S. Relations with Russia? Just
T ry Getting a Visa for a Repairman,” Washington Post, December 25, 2020.
342 U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Russia, “Statement from U.S. Ambassador John J. Sullivan,” April 1, 2021.
343 White House, “Imposing Costs for Harmful Foreign Activities.”
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Detention of U.S. Citizens in Russia
Successive U.S. Administrations have broached the plight of U.S. citizens imprisoned in Russia. In 2018 and 2019,
Russia arrested at least three U.S. citizens on what U.S. officials and many observers consider to be trumped-up
charges, possibly to effect an exchange for Russian nationals imprisoned in the United States. These cases include
the December 2018 detention of former U.S. Marine Paul Whelan, who in June 2020 was sentenced to 16 years
imprisonment, al egedly for espionage; the August 2019 arrest of former U.S. Marine Trevor Reed, who in July
2020 was sentenced to 9 years imprisonment, al egedly for assaulting police officers; and the February 2019
detention of private equity firm founder Michael Calvey, who was released from house arrest in November 2020
but is undergoing trial proceedings for al eged embezzlement. In addition, the State Department’s travel advisory
for Russia reports that Russian authorities “arbitrarily enforce the law against U.S. citizen religious workers and
open questionable criminal investigations against U.S. citizens engaged in religious activity.”
Sources: U.S. Department of State, “The Conviction of U.S. Citizen Paul Whelan in Russia,” June 15, 2020; Ivan
Nechepurenko and Andrew Higgins, “Russian Court Sentences American, Paul Whelan, to 16 Years on Spy
Charges,” New York Times, June 15, 2020; RFE/RL, “Former U.S. Marine Trevor Reed Handed Nine-Year Prison
Sentence by Moscow Court,” July 30, 2020; U.S. Department of State, “Russia Travel Advisory,” August 6, 2020;
and RFE/RL, “As His Trial Resumes, U.S. Investor Says He Wants to Continue Working in Russia,” February 17,
2021.
Arms Control344
During the Cold War, arms control negotiations and treaties played a key role in the relationship
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Arms control negotiations were often one of the
few channels for formal communication. Talks provided the United States and the Soviet Union
with a forum to air security concerns and raise questions about plans and programs. They also led
to two major arms control treaties: the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and
the 1991 Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START). During the 1990s, as the relationship
between the United States and Russia improved, arms control did not play as central a role in
fostering cooperation. Nonetheless, the two countries negotiated three follow-on nuclear arms
control treaties, of which two ultimately entered into force: the 2002 Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty and the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).
In 2019, the Trump Administration withdrew from the INF Treaty after assessing that Russia was
in violation of the Treaty and would not return into compliance. The United States first
determined that Russia had developed an intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile in
2014. Russian authorities denied Russia had violated the treaty and responded to the U.S.
withdrawal by suspending Russia’s participation. They also announced Russia would not deploy
INF-range missiles unless the United States did so but would respond in kind to U.S.
deployments. NATO officials have stated that NATO has no intention of deploying new land-
based nuclear missiles in Europe.345 Many analysts criticized the U.S. withdrawal for
undermining a treaty that had supported security and stability in Europe over the last 30 years,
claiming the withdrawal could further undermine NATO cohesion.346 Other analysts argued the

344 Amy F. Woolf, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy, contributed to this section. For more, see CRS Report
R43832, Russian Com pliance with the Interm ediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Amy F. Woolf; CRS In Focus IF11051, U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty: What’s Next? , by Amy F.
Woolf, CRS Insight IN11520, Status of U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arm s Control Talks, by Amy F. Woolf; and CRS Report
R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Lim its and Key Provisions, by Amy F. Woolf.
345 NAT O, “NAT O and the INF T reaty,” updated on August 2, 2019.
346 Ulrich Kuhn, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Europe in a Post -INF World,” Nonproliferation Review, vol. 26,
no. 1-2 (2019), pp.155-166; Steven Pifer, “ The T rump Administration Is Preparing a Major Mistake on the INF
T reaty,” Brookings Institution, October 29, 2019; and T om Countryman and Kingston Reif, “Intermediate-Range
Missiles Are the Wrong Weapon for T oday’s Security Challenges,” War on the Rocks, August 13, 2019.
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INF treaty was outdated and unduly limited U.S. military posture toward not only Russia but also
China.347
The New START Treaty was set to expire on February 5, 2021. In 2020, Trump Administration
officials held several meetings with Russian counterparts to discuss New START extension and a
framework for a future treaty but did not reach an agreement. On January 21, 2021, the Biden
Administration announced it would seek a five-year extension of the treaty, which occurred on
February 3, 2021. The State Department noted the extension was a first step that would provide
“the stability and predictability [needed] to enhance and expand discussions with Russia and
China” on further nuclear arms reductions.348 In April 2021, President Biden and President Putin
discussed their “intent to pursue a strategic stability dialogue on a range of arms control and
emerging security issues, building on the extension of the New START Treaty.”349
In 2020, the Trump Administration withdrew from another arms control treaty, the Treaty on
Open Skies.350 The United States, Canada, and European states (including Russia) signed the
treaty in 1992, and it entered into force in 2002. Parties to the treaty agreed to permit unarmed
observation aircraft to fly over their territories to observe military forces and activities. Prior to
withdrawal, U.S. officials had raised questions about Russian compliance. According to the U.S.
State Department, Russia restricted access for Open Skies flights over Moscow, the Russian
enclave of Kaliningrad, and along Russia’s border with Georgia, adjacent to the Russian-occupied
regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.351 After the U.S. withdrawal, Russia announced plans to
withdraw from the treaty.
Outlook
The 117th Congress is continuing to play an active role in shaping U.S. policy toward Russia
through the consideration of legislative initiatives and resolutions and through oversight assessing
the chal enges Russia presents to the United States and U.S. al ies and partners. Potential
questions that Members of Congress may consider in seeking to understand and respond to
Russian foreign policy actions and malign activities include the following:
 Who besides Putin are the key foreign policy decisionmakers in Russia? Are
there ways, through coercion or potential cooperation, to encourage a less
aggressive Russian foreign policy that is more in line with U.S. interests?
 How can sanctions and other policy tools be made more effective in getting
Russia to change its policies with regard to Ukraine, malicious cyber operations,
human rights abuses (including the persecution of Alexei Navalny), and other
activities? To what extent do sanctions complicate the Administration’s efforts to
cooperate with U.S. al ies and partners, or with Russia, on certain issues?

347 Chris Miller, “T he INF T reaty Is Dead, and Russia Is the Biggest Loser,” Foreign Policy, August 2, 2019; Luis
Simon and Alexander Lanoszka, “T he Post-INF European Missile Balance: T hinking About NAT O’s Deterrence
Strategy,” Texas National Security Review, vol. 3, no. 3 (2020), pp. 13-30; and T homas G. Mahnken, “ Countering
Missiles with Missiles: U.S. Military Posture After the INF T reaty,” War on the Rocks, July 16, 2019.
348 See @StateDeptSpok, T witter, February 3, 2021. Also see footnote 284.
349 White House, “ Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Call with President Vladimir Putin of Russia,” April 13,
2021.
350 CRS Insight IN10502, The Open Skies Treaty: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
351 U.S. Department of State, 2019 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and
Disarm am ent Agreem ents and Com m itments (Com pliance Report), April 2019.
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 What further steps could, or should, be taken to reassure al ies against Russian
aggression?
 Should the United States consider further nuclear arms reductions with Russia? If
so, should these reductions cover a wider range of weapons and countries?
 What areas of policy cooperation between the United States and Russia exist
today or might be possible to explore?
 Can the United States do more to deter Russian influence operations and cyber
operations? What types of Russia-led disinformation efforts, influence
operations, and cyberattacks pose the greatest threat to the United States and its
al ies and partners?
 Do Russia and China have common strategic and geopolitical objectives,
especial y vis-à-vis the United States and the West? To what extent does their
cooperation pose a threat to U.S. interests?
 What are the prospects for halting completion of Russia’s Nord Stream 2 natural
gas pipeline to Germany? What are the consequences for U.S. policy if the
pipeline is completed?
 Can and should the United States do more to promote the resolution of conflicts
in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova and the withdrawal of Russian forces? How
might the U.S. role evolve in conflict settlement efforts between Azerbaijan and
Armenia over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh?
 To what extent do Russian military, economic, and diplomatic activities
worldwide, including in the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa, pose
chal enges to U.S. interests?
 Are there common characteristics among victims of al eged Russian state-
sponsored attacks abroad? Are there countries that are particularly vulnerable to
targeted acts of violence?
 What is known about the role of il icit financial schemes in supporting Russian
malign activities abroad?

Author Information

Andrew S. Bowen
Cory Welt
Analyst in Russian and European Affairs
Specialist in Russian and European Affairs

Acknowledgments
Portions of this report benefited from contributions by CRS colleagues or draw on other CRS products, as
cited in the text. Amber Wilhelm, Hannah Fischer, and Jamie Hutchinson helped create the graphics in this
report.
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Disclaimer
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
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