Federal Crop Insurance: A Primer

Federal Crop Insurance: A Primer

Federal Crop Insurance: A Primer
February 18, 2021
The federal crop insurance program (FCIP) offers farmers the opportunity to purchase
insurance coverage against financial losses caused by a wide variety of perils, including
Stephanie Rosch
certain adverse growing and market conditions. The federal government subsidizes the
Analyst in Agriculture
premiums that farmers pay for these insurance policies to encourage farmer
Policy
participation. Farmers can choose among many types of policies and policy options to

customize the coverage to their farm businesses’ specific needs. Private-sector

companies sel and service the policies; the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
plays critical roles in subsidizing, regulating, and reinsuring the policies.
The FCIP was created in 1938 as part of the agricultural policy response to the Great Depression. The FCIP is
permanently authorized under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (P.L. 75-430) and the Federal Crop
Insurance Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-365). The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC)—the agency that finances
FCIP operations—is funded with mandatory appropriations of “such sums as necessary.” The Congressional
Budget Office projects that net spending for the FCIP wil be almost $40 bil ion for FY2021-FY2025 and more
than $80 bil ion for FY2021-FY2030—including expenditures to subsidize farmers’ policy premiums,
compensate for private insurance providers’ administrative and operating expenses, and reinsure losses from
policies sold.
The FCIP plays a prominent role in helping producers manage financial risk. In crop year 2019, the program sold
more than 2 mil ion policies and insured crops and livestock valued at more than $116 bil ion, equivalent to about
28% of the value of U.S. agricultural production. More than 90% of planted acres for corn, soybeans, and cotton
and more than 85% of wheat planted acres were insured through the FCIP. In al , the FCIP provided coverage for
124 commodities and offered 19 types of insurance policies. Sixteen companies sold crop insurance to farmers
through the program, and farmers enrolled a record high 379.9 mil ion acres in 2019.
The FCIP is a central component of the federal farm safety net, which is a collection of programs that provide risk
protection and financial support to U.S. farmers in times of low farm prices and natural disasters. For 2014-2018,
the FCIP accounted for the largest share (52%) of payments to farmers from farm safety net programs. The FCIP
also supports conservation policy goals through conservation compliance requirements and contributes to the
stability of agricultural credit markets.
Congress may be interested in understanding how FCIP implementation affects which farmers purchase crop
insurance and the types of insurance they purchase, as wel as the associated costs to the U.S. taxpayer for
providing that coverage. Congress may also be interested in ways to expand coverage options, improve the
program’s efficiency and actuarial performance, provide outreach to farmers who have not previously participated
in the program, and in evaluating the program against its policy objectives for the agricultural sector.
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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
Authorities and Appropriations.......................................................................................... 3
Statutory and Discretionary Authorities......................................................................... 3
Appropriations, Outlays, and Budget Baseline ............................................................... 3
How Federal Crop Insurance Works ................................................................................... 4
Types of Commodities Covered ................................................................................... 5
Time Period Covered ................................................................................................. 5
Policies and Coverage Options .................................................................................... 6
Covered Production Practices ...................................................................................... 7
Crop Ownership and Covered Units ............................................................................. 8
Who Buys Crop Insurance .......................................................................................... 9
Why Farmers Purchase Crop Insurance ....................................................................... 11
Scope of the Current Program ......................................................................................... 13
Covered Crops, Livestock, and Livestock Products ....................................................... 13
Covered Locations ................................................................................................... 15
Policies Purchased ................................................................................................... 17
Federal Crop Insurance Program Structure and Operations .................................................. 18
Pricing Crop Insurance Policies ................................................................................. 19
The Role of Projected Market Prices ..................................................................... 20
The Role of Yields and Actual Production History ................................................... 20
Establishing an Actual Production History.............................................................. 21
Yield Risk ......................................................................................................... 21
Loss Ratio .............................................................................................................. 22
Premium Subsidies .................................................................................................. 22
Creating New Policies and Pilot Programs................................................................... 24
Reinsurance Agreements........................................................................................... 24
Marketing Crop Insurance Policies to Farmers ........................................................ 25
Approved Insurance Provider Compensation .......................................................... 25
Reinsurance....................................................................................................... 26
Approved Insurance Provider Qualifications........................................................... 27
Market Competition Among Approved Insurance Providers and Agent
Compensation ................................................................................................. 27
Waste, Fraud, and Abuse........................................................................................... 28
Costs of the FCIP .................................................................................................... 29
The Role of the FCIP in Agricultural Policy ...................................................................... 32
The FCIP and the Farm Safety Net ............................................................................. 32
The FCIP and Conservation Requirements................................................................... 34
The FCIP and Farm Credit ........................................................................................ 35
The FCIP and Trade ................................................................................................. 36
Rationale for Publicly Supported Crop Insurance ............................................................... 37
Costs and Benefits of the FCIP .................................................................................. 38
Issues for Congress ....................................................................................................... 39

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Figures
Figure 1. Federal Crop Insurance Program: Policies Sold and Insured Acres............................. 2
Figure 2. All Farms and Farms Purchasing FCIP Policies, by Annual Sales ............................ 10
Figure 3. All Farms and Farms Purchasing FCIP Policies, by Acres Operated ......................... 11
Figure 4. Annual FCIP Total Premium, Premium Subsidies, and Liabilities ............................ 13
Figure 5. Policies Sold and Liabilities Insured in 2019, by Commodity Type .......................... 14
Figure 6. 2019 FCIP Liabilities by State ........................................................................... 16
Figure 7. 2019 FCIP Premium Subsidies by State............................................................... 17
Figure 8. Key Entities Involved in FCIP Implementation ..................................................... 19
Figure 9. FCIP Net Payments to Farmers and Approved Insurance Providers .......................... 30
Figure 10. Contributions to FCIP Net Payments ................................................................. 31

Tables
Table 1. CBO Baseline for the Federal Crop Insurance Program ............................................. 4
Table 2. Major Crops, Livestock, and Livestock Products Insured in 2019 ............................. 14
Table 3. FCIP Policies Purchased in 2019 ......................................................................... 18
Table 4. Crop Insurance Premium Subsidies ...................................................................... 23
Table 5. 2020 Compensation Subsidies for Approved Insurance Providers ............................. 26
Table 6. Farm Safety Net Program Outlays Since 2014 ....................................................... 33
Table 7. Program Classifications under WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture ............................. 36

Table A-1. Selected Legislation Affecting the Development of the Federal Crop Insurance
Program .................................................................................................................... 43
Table A-2. USDA Agencies Administering FCIP Since 1938................................................ 44

Appendixes
Appendix. A Brief History of Crop Insurance .................................................................... 42

Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 44

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Introduction
The federal crop insurance program (FCIP) provides insurance coverage for the production of
most U.S. agricultural commodities against financial losses caused by adverse growing and
market conditions. This insurance coverage helps stabilize farm business incomes, which can help
farmers to repay debt, reduce farm bankruptcies, and thus avoid disruptions to food, livestock
feed, and other markets for agriculture commodities, including export markets. The FCIP supplies
insurance coverage that is not otherwise available from the private sector and is a central
component of the federal farm safety net, a collection of programs that provide risk protection
and financial support to farmers in times of low farm prices and natural disasters. Farmers can
choose from a variety of insurance coverage options to customize the coverage to the specific
needs of their farm businesses. The federal government subsidizes the policy premiums to
encourage participation.
The FCIP was established in 1938 as part of the agricultural policy response to the Great
Depression. Congress established the FCIP following several unsuccessful attempts by private
industry to market similar products.1 Prior to 1938, the private sector was unable to fund losses
stemming from agricultural weather risks, as these losses simultaneously affected numerous
farmers over a broad area.2 Initial y, the FCIP had no private sector involvement and covered only
wheat, but after a few years, Congress expanded the program to include other commodities. In
response to a period of high disaster support payments in the 1970s and low crop insurance
participation, Congress enacted the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-365). This law
expanded the commodities covered and geographic scope of the program, introduced premium
subsidies, and al owed private-sector companies to sel and service policies. Since the 1980s,
Congress has made numerous changes to the program that expanded crop insurance coverage
options, increased premium subsidies, and aligned the FCIP with other U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) programs and agricultural policy goals (for more background on the history
of the FCIP, see the discussion in the Appendix).
For FY2010-FY2019, the FCIP paid out nearly $85 bil ion for losses to insured agriculture
producers and more than $14 bil ion in reinsurance payments to private-sector insurance
companies.3 These losses affected farmers and ranchers in al 50 states who produced a wide
variety of insurable crops, livestock, and animal products. FCIP payments helped mitigate the
negative financial impacts to farmers and insurance companies from abnormal drought
conditions, record flooding, extended periods of price declines for market commodities, and other
adverse outcomes.
The FCIP plays a prominent role in helping agricultural producers manage financial risk. In crop
year 2019, the FCIP provided coverage for 124 commodities and offered 19 types of insurance
policies.4 Sixteen Approved Insurance Providers (AIPs) sold crop insurance through the program,

1 Randall A. Kramer, “Federal Crop Insurance 1938-1982,” Agricultural History, vol. 57, no. 2 (April 1983), pp. 181-
200.
2 Mario J. Miranda and Joseph W. Glauber, “Systemic Risk, Reinsurance, and the Failure of Crop Insurance Markets,”
Am erican Journal of Agricultural Econom ics, vol. 79, no. 1 (February 1997), pp. 206-215.
3 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using data from the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation/Risk
Management Agency’s Financial Statements for FY2010-FY2019. Outlays for indemnity payments were partially
offset by premiums paid by farmer policyholders. Premium subsidies are not available on a fiscal year basis. For
additional information about costs of premium subsidies and farmer paid premiums, see “ Costs of the FCIP .”
4 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Office of Inspector General, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation/Risk
Management Agency’s Financial Statements for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019 , Audit Report 05401-0011-11, November
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Federal Crop Insurance: A Primer

and farmers enrolled a record high of 379.9 mil ion acres (Figure 1).5 The AIPs sold more than 2
mil ion policies, insuring more than $116 bil ion in value, which was equivalent to about 28% of
value of U.S. agricultural production in 2019.6 The majority of policies were purchased by
producers of corn, soybeans, wheat, and cotton—the principal crops grown in the United States.
In crop year 2019, farmers insured more than 90% of planted acres for corn, soybeans, and cotton
and more than 85% of planted acres for wheat through the FCIP.7
Figure 1. Federal Crop Insurance Program: Policies Sold and Insured Acres
1989-2019 crop years

Source: Figure created by CRS using data from U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Risk Management
Agency (RMA), “Summary of Business.”
Private-sector AIPs sel and service FCIP policies, while USDA plays critical roles in subsidizing,
regulating, and reinsuring the policies. The principal USDA entities that fund and administer the
FCIP are the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) and the Risk Management Agency
(RMA). Congress determines the types of coverage that the FCIP can insure, the rules that USDA
and AIPs must follow in implementing the program, and the funding available for program
operations.
This report provides an overview of the FCIP and of how farmers use federal crop insurance
policies to manage financial risk. It discusses legal authorities and annual appropriations for the
program, key milestones in the program’s history, and how the FCIP relates to the broader U.S.
agricultural policy framework. The report also reviews the rationale for providing crop insurance
by the public sector and outlines several issues Congress may consider related to program
expansion, reform, and oversight.

2019.
5 For a list of Approved Insurance Providers (AIPs), see USDA, Risk Management Agency (RMA), “Insurance
Provider List,” at https://public.rma.usda.gov/AipListing/InsuranceProviders.
6 USDA’s Economic Research Service (ERS) estimates the value of U.S. agricultural production in 2019 was $414
billion. USDA, ERS, “Farm Income and Wealth Statistics: Value Added Years by State,” at https://data.ers.usda.gov/
reports.aspx?ID=17830.
7 CRS calculations based on USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) records for planted acres and
USDA’s RMA records for insured acres.
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Authorities and Appropriations
Statutory and Discretionary Authorities
The FCIP is permanently authorized under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (P.L. 75-430,
52 Stat. 72) and the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-365, 7 U.S.C. §1501 et seq).
These statutory authorities define the FCIP’s purpose and general parameters, including the
powers of the FCIC;8 FCIC funding and management requirements; specific types of insurance
coverage that the FCIC can make available to agricultural producers;9 schedules and eligibility
requirements for subsidies; provisions for pilot programs; and other provisions. Within these
statutory requirements, USDA’s RMA, as approved by the FCIC Board, has discretion to
determine where policies are offered,10 what coverage is offered, and what paperwork is required.
RMA can also set paperwork submission deadlines, negotiate the terms by which private
insurance companies can participate in the program, and determine other aspects of the program.
Since 2008, Congress has made changes to the crop insurance program in successive farm bil s,11
as wel as in annual and supplemental appropriations legislation. These changes have expanded
the types of agricultural commodities and risks that can be insured, clarified how crop insurance
interacts with commodity support and conservation programs, and directed research toward
emerging priority risk management topics (e.g., greenhouse production, local foods, and
subsurface and limited irrigation practices).
Appropriations, Outlays, and Budget Baseline
The FCIP has permanent, indefinite funding authority provided under the Federal Crop Insurance
Act of 1980. Annual funding for the FCIP comes from both mandatory and discretionary
appropriations.12 The financial assistance offered through FCIC is funded with mandatory
appropriations of “such sums as necessary” (7 U.S.C. §1516). The majority of funding for RMA
salaries and expenses to administer the crop insurance program is discretionary and is provided
through the annual appropriations process. RMA can also use up to $7 mil ion in mandatory
funding from FCIC to pay costs associated with program operations.13
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that the FCIP wil cost almost $40 bil ion for
the 5-year period FY2021-FY2025 and more than $80 bil ion for the 10-year period FY2021-

8 T he Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) is a government-owned corporation that finances the federal crop
insurance program’s (FCIP’s) operations, analogous to the Commodity Credit Corporation’s role in financing USDA’s
farm revenue support and conservation programs. T he FCIC is managed by a Boa rd of Directors that includes certain
statutorily mandated members, including the USDA Under Secretary that oversees the FCIP, the USDA Chief
Economist, farmers, and representatives of the AIPs. See the section “ Federal Crop Insurance Program Structure and
Operations” for details on the FCIC.
9 Agricultural producers eligible for crop insurance coverage include farmers, ranchers, and producers of other typ es of
eligible agricultural products (e.g., honey, aquaculture, forage crops).
10 While crop insurance is available nationwide, the availability of specific types of crop insurance policies and
coverage options varies by county. See the section “ Policies and Coverage Options” for more details.
11 See CRS Report RS22131, What Is the Farm Bill?, by Renée Johnson and Jim Monke.
12 Discretionary spending authority is established annually by Congress through the appropriations process. Mandatory
spending is composed of budget outlays controlled by laws other than appropriations acts, including federal spending
on entitlement programs. For more information, see CRS Report R44641, Trends in Mandatory Spending: In Brief, by
D. Andrew Austin.
13 7 U.S.C. §1516(b)(2)(C).
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FY2030 (see Table 1).14 The average cost of the program is projected to be nearly $8 bil ion per
year for FY2021-FY2025 and to remain at around that level in FY2026-FY2030. This baseline
represents the expected budgetary cost of the FCIP under current statutory authorities. The
budgetary impacts of any legislative proposals to change aspects of the program would be
measured as changes from this baseline (until the next CBO baseline has been released).
Table 1. CBO Baseline for the Federal Crop Insurance Program
$ bil ion
Total
Annual Average
Total
Annual Average
Category
FY2021-FY2025
FY2021-FY2025
FY2021-FY2030
FY2021-FY2030
Budget Authority
$39.9
$8.0
$81.9
$8.2
Outlays
$38.8
$7.8
$80.4
$8.0
Source: CRS calculations using Congressional Budget Office (CBO), USDA’s mandatory farm program outlay
projections, March 6, 2020.
Notes: CBO projects annual budgetary authority and outlays for the federal crop insurance program (FCIP) for
each fiscal year for a 10-year budget window. Budgetary authority are funds required to meet new obligations
incurred in that fiscal year. Outlays are funds expended in the fiscal year. FCIP budgetary authority and outlays
for any given fiscal year may not be equal because outlays tend to fol ow crop year and/or reinsurance year
timing instead of aligning with fiscal year schedules.
Projections for the budgetary cost of the FCIP depend in part on projections of future commodity
prices. Higher commodity prices in the future would increase the expected value of insured crops,
thereby increasing the expected value of insured liability and premium subsidies relative to what
liabilities and premium subsidies would cost with lower commodity prices.15 To put these CBO
projections in context, federal outlays for the FCIP averaged $7.7 bil ion per year from FY2010 to
FY2019.16
How Federal Crop Insurance Works
Federal crop insurance policies can provide coverage for agricultural commodities against losses
due to unavoidable natural events and market price declines. Covered perils or “causes of loss”
include adverse weather conditions (e.g., hail, frost, drought, flooding); failure of irrigation water
supply (if caused by an insured peril during the period of insurance coverage); fire (due to natural
causes); plant diseases (provided the farmer followed guidance on proper application of disease
control measures); and insect and wildlife damage (provided the farmer followed guidance on
proper application of pest and wildlife control measures). Certain policies also insure against
losses from market price declines.
Because a loss from any of a variety of covered causes can trigger an indemnity payment, federal
crop insurance is often referred to as “multiperil crop insurance.” Other types of crop insurance
available from the private sector insure against a single type of risk, such as hail damage or losses
due to freezing temperatures.

14 Congressional Budget Office (CBO), USDA’s mandatory farm program outlay projections, March 6, 2020.
15 Premium subsidies are funds provided by USDA on behalf of farmer policyholders to defray a portion of the
premium costs of the policies sold. See “ Premium Subsidies” for more details.
16 Compiled by CRS from USDA, Office of Inspector General, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation/Risk Management
Agency’s Financial Statements for Fiscal Years 2010-2019. T his average includes expenditures on premium subsidies,
administrative and operating payments to AIPs, and underwriting costs.
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Federal Crop Insurance: A Primer

Farmers purchase federal crop insurance from an insurance company approved to sel federal
crop insurance, or an AIP. When a farmer incurs a loss from any of the covered causes, the farmer
submits a claim to the insurer. If the insurer determines that the claim is valid, then the insurer
makes an indemnity payment to the farmer. Depending on how the policy is reinsured, the AIP
may also collect a reinsurance payment from USDA or a third-party reinsurer.
Types of Commodities Covered
Federal crop insurance covers the production of agricultural commodities only. Insurable
commodities vary by location and can include annual crops, perennial crops, forage crops,
livestock, and animal products. Federal crop insurance can be purchased separately for different
commodities or bundled so that a single policy insures the entire farm’s production (i.e., Whole-
Farm Revenue Protection). Farm buildings, equipment, vehicles, on-farm inventories, and farm
operating liability or work-related injury cannot be insured through the FCIP but may be covered
through private-sector insurance products.
Depending on the type of commodity, federal crop insurance can be used to insure the market
value of the commodity (e.g., market price of a bushel of corn); the replacement value of the
commodity (e.g., the cost to replant an orange tree); or the marginal value of producing a
commodity (e.g., the market price of a gal on of milk less the cost to produce a gal on of milk).
For annual crops such as corn and tomatoes, federal crop insurance covers only the market value
of annual production. For perennial crops such as certain fruit and nut trees, growers can choose
to insure the replacement value of the tree itself, the market value of the annual fruit or nut
harvest, or both. For livestock and animal products, agricultural producers can choose to insure
the market values of the animals (e.g., cattle, clams), the operating margin17 of raising the
animals, or the market value of specific animal products (e.g., milk, honey).
Time Period Covered
Federal crop insurance covers the following three categories of agricultural commodities for
specific time periods.
 Annual Crops. Federal crop insurance insures the commodities for the period
between the planting and harvesting of crops.18 After the crop is harvested,
farmers seeking to insure their harvested commodities must seek coverage
outside of the FCIP, such as through privately provided property coverage.
Farmers must have their crops planted and harvested by specific dates in order to
be eligible for crop insurance indemnities.19 However, in the event that farmers
are unable to complete planting by the required date, some policies al ow for the
producer to choose between reduced coverage or “prevented planting” payments.
Prevented planting payments provide smal er indemnities when weather
conditions prevent farmers from planting their crops before the cutoff dates.20

17 Operating margin is defined here as the difference between the market price of the animals and the operating costs
incurred to raise the animals.
18 T he relevant calendar dates for crop insurance vary by type of policy, year, crop, and location. For the specific dates
for each type of policy by year, crop, and location, see USDA, RMA, “Actuarial Information Browser,” at
https://webapp.rma.usda.gov/apps/actuarialinformationbrowser/.
19 CRS Report R45193, Federal Crop Insurance: Program Overview for the 115th Congress, by Isabel Rosa.
20 CRS Report R46180, Federal Crop Insurance: Record Prevent Plant (PPL) Acres and Payments in 2019 , by Randy
Schnepf.
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 Perennial Tree Crops. Federal crop insurance coverage for the trees is for a
single crop year, not the full life span of the tree.
 Livestock and Animal Products. Federal crop insurance can be purchased by
the month, by the quarter, or annual y, depending on the life cycle of the animal
or animal product involved.
Federal crop insurance policies renew automatical y for the next year, and each year thereafter,
unless canceled by the farmer or the AIP. Just as with new policies, farmers purchasing renewed
federal crop insurance coverage must pay their share of the annual premium every year for which
they purchase coverage.
Policies and Coverage Options
Farmers can choose between a variety of options to tailor their crop insurance coverage to suit
their particular farm management goals and production practices. Farmers growing certain annual
crops can choose from various types of coverage under federal crop insurance. For example,
policy types are available to insure a farm’s average crop yield, its crop revenue, the county’s
average crop yield, or the county’s average crop revenue. Insurance coverage for revenue is more
expensive to purchase than yield coverage because revenue policies also insure against an
additional risk (i.e., lower revenue from a decline in the market price), while yield policies do not.
Insurance coverage for the farm is more expensive to purchase than coverage for the county
because the risk of crop losses to any one farm is greater than the risk of crop losses for the
county as a whole. Coverage can be even more specific by insuring al of a farm’s fields in the
same county, the same township, or in some cases, insuring a specific field (described below
under “Crop Ownership and Covered Units”).
Selected Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP) Policies
FCIP offered 26 different insurance policies for crop year 2019. Selected policy types included the fol owing:

Yield-Based Policies. Actual Production History (APH) and Yield Protection (YP) policies insure farmers
against yield losses for a specific crop. Farmers select the percentages of average yield and projected price to
insure. For APH policies, the price is established annual y by the Risk Management Agency (RMA). For YP
policies, the price is based on futures market prices.

Revenue-Based Policies. Revenue Protection (RP) and Revenue Protection with Harvest Price Exclusion
(RP-HPE) insure farmers against revenue losses for a specific crop. Farmers select the percentage of the
revenue guarantee to insure. The revenue guarantee is based on the farmers’ APH and either the projected
price or the harvest price. Futures market prices are used to determine the projected price and the harvest
price. For RP policies, the revenue guarantee uses the higher of the projected price or the harvest price. For
RP-HPE policies, the revenue guarantee uses the projected price only.

Area-Based Policies. Area Yield Protection (AYP), Area Revenue Protection (ARP), and Area Revenue
Protection with Harvest Price Exclusion (ARP-HPE) insure farmers against losses for county yields or county
revenues for a specific crop. Farmers select the percentage of the county’s yield or the county’s revenue
guarantee to insure.

Rainfall Index (RI). RI insures farmers and ranchers against rainfal losses in target geographic areas.
Producers select the percentage of an index of rainfal to insure. The rainfal index is based on weather data
col ected and maintained by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Climate Prediction
Center.

Whole-Farm Revenue Protection (WFRP). WFRP insures farmers against revenue losses for al
insurable crops and livestock produced. Farmers select the percentage of their historic average revenue to
insure. Historic average revenue is based on farmers’ Schedule F tax forms and current-year expected farm
revenues from insurable crops and livestock.

Dairy Revenue Protection (Dairy-RP). Dairy-RP insures farmers against revenue losses on quarterly
milk production. Farmers select the quarter(s) of the year to insure, the milk category or components used
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to establish the value of milk production, and the percentage of quarterly milk production to insure. Prices
for milk categories or components are based on monthly average prices announced by USDA’s Agricultural
Marketing Service. Yields for milk categories or components are based on USDA’s National Agricultural
Statistics Service Milk Production report.
Source: USDA, RMA, “Insurance Plans,” at https://www.rma.usda.gov/Policy-and-Procedure/Insurance-Plans.
For al insured commodities, except for certain livestock and animal products, farmers must select
the level of federal crop insurance coverage they want to purchase. The coverage level is the
percentage of commodity value that is covered 21—referred to as the liability—and the
corresponding loss that a farmer must incur before an indemnity payment wil be made—
comparable to a deductible for home or auto insurance. For example, a revenue policy with 75%
coverage level would insure revenue losses greater than 25% of the liability but provide no
coverage for losses amounting to less than 25% of the liability. Lower coverage levels provide
indemnity payments only in the event of larger losses, that is, losses that exceed the lower
coverage level. Higher coverage levels are more expensive to purchase than lower coverage
levels because farms are more likely to incur smal losses than large losses.22
The minimum coverage possible is catastrophic, or CAT, coverage.23 CAT coverage makes
indemnity payments only when farmers lose 50% or more of their expected yields. CAT coverage
is available nationwide, but only for crops insured on an acreage basis (e.g., annual crops, forage
crops).
The highest available coverage level varies by crop, location, and policy type but is always less
than 100%. Farmers cannot insure the full value of their crops under federal crop insurance. This
ensures that producers can never earn more money from collecting crop insurance than from
harvesting and sel ing their crops; this is to reduce the potential for moral hazard. For the most
commonly purchased federal crop insurance policies, farmers may purchase coverage levels
ranging from a minimum of 50% to a maximum of 85%, in increments of 5%.24
Covered Production Practices
For al insured crops, farmers are required to follow USDA’s guidance on good farm
management practices while planting, growing, and harvesting their crops in order to reduce the
risk of operator-caused crop losses. Good farming practices are the production methods and
practices used to produce a crop such that it is likely to make normal progress toward maturity
and produce yields on par with average historical yields for the farm operation. USDA’s
requirements for good farming practices can vary by crop and location and can include actions
taken before planting (e.g., choosing appropriate plant varieties for the area, preparing a field
properly before planting); during the growth period (e.g., properly watering and weeding crops);
and during crop harvest (e.g., harvesting in ways that minimize crop damage). Failure to adhere

21 For some policies, farmers can choose the amount of revenue loss covered. For other policies, farmers can choose
coverage for the amount of yield and price loss separately.
22 In general, policies that provide coverage for more types of losses and/or higher levels of coverage will be more
expensive to purchase than policies that cover fewer sources of loss or lower levels of coverage.
23 Catastrophic (CAT ) coverage is offered without a premium charge to the producer but carries a signup fee of $655
per crop per county. CAT coverage was first added in 1994 when crop insurance was temporarily mandatory for
participation in other farm programs. CAT coverage represented a low-cost option for the producer to meet the
insurance purchase requirement. See the Appe ndix for additional background on the history of crop insurance.
24 Some policies allow for maximum coverage levels above 85%.
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to good farm management practices, as determined by USDA, can disqualify the farmer from
receiving federal crop insurance indemnity payments.
In addition, certain farm production practices can also influence the risk of crop losses. For
example, farmers who irrigate their crops have lower risks of crop loss due to drought than
farmers who do not irrigate. USDA accounts for these types of differences in loss risk by pricing
policies differently for irrigated crops, organic crops, follow-on crops, til age practices, and other
production practices that affect the risk of crop yield loss.25
Crop Ownership and Covered Units
Farmers may own the land they farm, pay cash to rent the land they farm, and/or rent the land
they farm for a share of the crop produced on the land (i.e., crop-share). Under each of these
arrangements, farmers accept at least some of the financial risk associated with producing the
crop and therefore would be eligible to purchase crop insurance coverage for their portion of the
risk. Landlords who rent their land on a cash rent basis do not share in the financial risk of
producing the crop and therefore are not eligible to purchase crop insurance for the rented acres.
However, landlords who rent their land for a share of the crop produced, thereby accepting some
of the financial risk of producing the crop, would be eligible to purchase crop insurance on the
rented acres.26
Federal crop insurance al ows for differences in land and crop ownership through five types of
insured units:27 basic, optional, enterprise, multicounty enterprise, and whole farm.
 Basic units are al the insurable land in the county that is either owned or cash
rented and planted to one crop.28 Farmers can also insure as a basic unit land that
is rented based on crop-share, but farmers cannot combine multiple crop-share
agreements into a single basic unit. For example, consider a farmer who plants
corn on four fields: one field the farmer owns, one field the farmer cash rents,
one field that is farmed under a crop-share rental agreement with Landlord A, and
another field that is farmed under a second crop-share rental agreement with
Landlord B. If the farmer wants to insure these fields using only basic units, then
the farmer would need to use three basic units in total. The farmer can combine
the corn planted on the field that he owns and the field that he cash rents under a
single basic unit, but he must use separate basic units to insure each of the fields
under crop-share agreement reflects the differences in crop-share ownership.
Basic units are available nationwide to al farms with insurable crops and impose
no minimum or maximum acreage requirements.
 Optional units subdivide a basic unit by geographic boundaries and al ow
farmers to tailor their crop insurance coverage for differences in growing
conditions within the basic unit. If a basic unit includes land in multiple sections

25 For background on how USDA prices crop insurance policies, see “ Pricing Crop Insurance Policies.”
26 Landlords cannot purchase coverage on a tenant’s share of the crop (and vice versa) without written approval from
the other party. See USDA, RMA, “ Final Agency Determination: FAD-122,” at https://legacy.rma.usda.gov/regs/533/
2010/fad-122.html.
27 In addition to the five unit -level coverage plans shown here, area plan coverage (yield or revenue) is available for
basic, enterprise, or multicounty enterprise units.
28 County boundaries can affect the calculation of yield risk and therefore how premiums get priced for an insured unit.
See discussion below under “ Yield Risk.”
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of a county,29 the farmer can insure the land in each section under a separate
optional unit. Farmers can also use optional units to insure irrigated acreage
separately from nonirrigated land. Optional units have no minimum or maximum
acreage requirements and can be established wherever counties can be
subdivided into distinct geographic areas. 30
 Enterprise units include al the insurable acreage for a crop in a county,
regardless of whether the land is owned or rented. To qualify for an enterprise
unit, a farmer must have a minimum number of acres (either 20 acres or 20% of
the total insurable acres, whichever is the smal er amount) in each of two or more
different geographic areas within the county.
 Multicounty enterprise units are enterprise units that include al the insurable
acreage in two contiguous counties. Multicounty enterprise units have the same
minimum acreage requirements as enterprise units, plus limits on total insurable
acres in the second county. These limits prevent farmers from pooling land in two
counties in a single multicounty enterprise unit when the acres could be insured
under separate enterprise units for each county.
 Whole farm units must include al crops grown and al land insured for the
farm, regardless of county boundaries. Whole farm units are available nationwide
and impose no minimum or maximum acreage requirements.
In general, farmers select the unit or combination of units to insure that suit their particular crop
insurance goals. Whole farm units can be used to cover multiple crops planted in multiple
counties in a single unit. The other unit types are crop and location specific, such that a farmer
could use one unit type for corn and a different unit type for soybeans planted in the same county.
Enterprise and multi-enterprise units al ow farmers to cover their crops with fewer insurance
policies than they would need to purchase using basic units. Because enterprise and multi-
enterprise units pool acreage from multiple basic or optional units, enterprise and multi-enterprise
units also have lower risks of average crop losses compared with basic units and therefore cost
less to insure than the equivalent acreage covered under basic units.
As a general rule, the smal er and more specific the insured unit, the more costly wil be the
insurance premium. By the same logic, the greater the number of fields pooled together under the
insured unit, the lower the premium rate. Optional units, which may subdivide coverage into the
smal est geographic area, usual y have the highest premium rates. Whole farm policies usual y
have the lowest premium rates because they pool risk from the largest geographic area and across
multiple crops.
Who Buys Crop Insurance
While over 85% of cropland planted to corn, soybeans, wheat, or cotton is insured by the FCIP,31
not al farmers planting insurable crops choose to purchase crop insurance. According to the 2017
Census of Agriculture, 380,236 farms enrolled cropland, pasture, and/or rangeland in the FCIP in
2017. These farms constituted approximately 19% of al farms and approximately 26% of al

29 A section is a demarcation of land under the Public Land Survey System. Sections are one square mile areas
containing 640 acres.
30 Geographic areas can be county sections, section equivalents, areas farmed under separate Farm Service Agency
farm numbers, or areas that otherwise qualify for different optional units.
31 CRS calculations using data from various NASS Acreage reports and RMA Summary of Business data.
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farms with cropland acreage in 2017.32 However, the Census of Agriculture counts farms that
enrolled land in the FCIP, which may not include some farms that insured crops, livestock, or
animal products on a non-acreage basis. In 2017, the FCIP sold more than 19,000 policies that
provided coverage on a non-acreage basis.33
While crop insurance coverage can be purchased by any size operation, the average crop farm
insured under an FCIP policy usual y has larger annual sales (Figure 2) and operates more acres
(Figure 3) than the average crop farm. This pattern may reflect underlying differences in crop
risk across different farm production scales.34 This pattern could also reflect other factors
associated with farm size, such as region of the country, mix of crops grown, production practices
used, risk management practices employed, and other farm characteristics.
Figure 2. All Farms and Farms Purchasing FCIP Policies, by Annual Sales
2017 data

Source: Figure created by CRS using data from USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), 2017
Census of Agriculture.

32 T he data suggest that many small farm operations—as defined by USDA’s Census criteria of having at least $1,000
in sales during the year—do not purchase crop insurance. CRS calculations using data from USDA, NASS, 2017
Census of Agriculture.
33 RMA Summary of Business data.
34 Keith H. Coble and Brian Williams, “Are Large Farms Less Risky to Insure than Small Farms?,” Choices, vol. 33,
no. 4 (2018), pp. 1-5.
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Figure 3. All Farms and Farms Purchasing FCIP Policies, by Acres Operated
2017 data

Source: Figure created by CRS using data from USDA, NASS, 2017 Census of Agriculture.
Certain types of farms may also be less likely to purchase crop insurance than other types of
farms. For example, certified organic farms have historical y tended to insure a smal er
percentage of their acreage and crop value on average than farms producing with conventional
techniques.35 Some possible reasons for the lower take-up rates among organic producers could
include policies that may not be wel suited to the specific needs of these growers, difficulties in
pricing insurance policies for crops that command premium pricing in markets, lack of insurance
agents who understand organic farming practices, and difficulties in filing and processing claims
related to disputes over requirements for good farming practices for organic producers.36
Why Farmers Purchase Crop Insurance
Farmers may purchase crop insurance for a variety of reasons. The available studies commonly
list four reasons why farmers purchase crop insurance:37 (1) as a tool for managing farm financial
risk; (2) as a means of being able to access farm credit; (3) as a complement to other farm yield

35 Mike Morris, Eric Belasco, and Jeff Schahczenski, Is Organic Farming Risky? Improving Crop Insurance for
Organic Farm s, National Center for Appropriate T echnology, October 2019, at https://attra.ncat.org/product/is-
organic-farming-risky/ (hereinafter Morris, Belasco, and Schahczenski, Is Organic Farm ing Risky?, 2019).
36 Morris, Belasco, and Schahczenski, Is Organic Farming Risky?, 2019.
37 See, for example, Bruce J. Sherrick et al., “ Factors Influencing Farmers’ Crop Insurance Decisions,” American
Journal of Agricultural Econom ics, vol. 86, no. 1 (2004), pp. 103-114 (hereinafter Sherrick et al., “ Factors Influencing
Farmers’ Crop Insurance,” 2004); Jennifer Ifft, T odd H. Kuethe, and Mitchell Morehart, “Farm Debt Use by Farms
with Crop Insurance,” Choices, vol. 28, no. 3 (2013) (hereinafter Ifft, Kuethe, and Morehart, “ Farm Debt Use,” 2013);
and Bruce A. Babcock, “ Using Cumulative Prospect T heory to Explain Anomalous Crop Insurance Coverage
Choice,” Am erican Journal of Agricultural Econom ics, vol. 97, no. 5 (2015), pp. 1371-1384 (hereinafter Babcock,
“Cumulative Prospect T heory,” 2015).
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and revenue risk management strategies; and (4) as a financial investment with an expected
positive rate of return.
1. Risk Management. Crop insurance is a tool that can help farmers manage farm
financial risk. Farm revenues can vary significantly from year to year due to
market price movements and changes in crop yields. Crop insurance payments
may help smooth farm revenues in the advent of poor yields or lower market
prices.
2. Lending Requirement. Farm lenders sometimes require farmers to purchase
crop insurance as a condition for obtaining a loan.38 Farming can be a capital-
intensive business, and lenders may require farmers to purchase crop insurance to
reduce the risk that farmers would be unable to repay their loans after poor
harvests or during a period of low market prices.39
3. Risk Diversification. Purchasing crop insurance may be part of a diversified
farm risk management strategy. Farmers have many options for managing crop
revenue risk, including using forward contracts to lock in market prices,40
purchasing futures and options contracts on commodity stock exchanges to hedge
against adverse price movements,41 self-insuring using their own savings, and
other risk management strategies.42 Farmers can also invest in a variety of
different production practices that affect crop yield risk and thereby crop revenue
risk. Farmers may seek to use crop insurance in conjunction with these yield and
revenue risk management strategies to manage farm financial risk at lower total
cost than would be available without crop insurance.43
4. Positive Return. Some farmers may view crop insurance as a financial
investment with an expected positive rate of return.44 Federal crop insurance is
designed such that the average indemnity payment is approximately equal to the
total premium collected. Because of premium subsidies, farmers do not pay the
full amount of the total premium—they pay the cost of the total premium less the
value of premium subsidies provided by USDA. If there were no premium
subsidies and farmers were responsible for paying the full cost of the premium,
then the expected rate of return from purchasing insurance would be zero. The
federal government pays a substantial portion of crop insurance premiums as a
means of encouraging farmers to purchase policies. Because of premium
subsidies, farmers are likely to recoup more in indemnity payments over time

38 Ifft, Kuethe, and Morehart, “Farm Debt Use,” 2013.
39 David Oppedahl, AgLetter: August 2017, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, no. 1977, at
https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/agletter/2015-2019/august-2017.
40 A forward contract is an agreement between a farmer and a buyer under which the farmer agrees to deliver a set
quantity of a commodity to the buyer at a future date in return for a specified price.
41 A futures contract is an agreement that obliges a buyer to buy or a seller to sell a set quantity of a standardized
commodity (e.g., number 2 yellow corn) traded on a commodity exchange at a future date . An options contract is an
agreement that can give a buyer the right (but not the obligation) to buy or a seller the right (but not the obligation) to
sell a standardized commodity traded on a commodity exchange at a future date.
42 Joy Harwood et al., Managing Risk in Farming: Concepts, Research, and Analysis, USDA, ERS, Agricultural
Economic Report no. 774, March 1999.
43 Sherrick et al., “Factors Influencing Farmers’ Crop Insurance,” 2004.
44 Babcock, “Cumulative Prospect T heory,” 2015.
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than they pay in premiums, generating a net positive financial return from
purchasing crop insurance.
Scope of the Current Program
The scope of the program in any year depends on the policies that farmers choose to purchase that
year. In recent years, the number of policies sold has remained relatively constant, and the total
acreage insured has increased (see Figure 1). Annual liabilities, total premium, and premium
subsidies have increased since 2016 but remain below the record high levels in the early 2010s
(see Figure 4).45 Trends in commodity prices, which were relatively higher in 2008-2014
compared with the 2009-2019 period, affect insured liabilities, total premium, and premium
subsidies.
Figure 4. Annual FCIP Total Premium, Premium Subsidies, and Liabilities

Source: Figure created by CRS using data from USDA, RMA, “Summary of Business.”
Covered Crops, Livestock, and Livestock Products
In 2019, the majority of policies sold were for row crops, including grains, oilseeds, pulses, and
other commodity crops covered by commodity support programs (see Figure 5). Specialty crops
(e.g., fruits, vegetables, and nuts), forage crops, and policies insuring livestock and animal
products accounted for less than 10% of al policies sold. In terms of insured liabilities, however,
row crops accounted for 76%, specialty crops accounted for 14%, and the other commodities
accounted for 10% of total liabilities.

45 Additional background on premium subsidies is available in “ Premium Subsidies.”
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Figure 5. Policies Sold and Liabilities Insured in 2019, by Commodity Type

Source: Figure created by CRS using data from USDA, RMA, “Summary of Business.”
Notes: Row crops include grains, oilseeds, pulses, and other commodities covered under Title I Commodity
Support Programs. Specialty crops include fruits, vegetables, nuts, nursery, and other crops. Forage crops include
hay, alfalfa, and other commodities grown specifical y as livestock forage. Livestock and animal products include
cattle, bees, swine, lamb, and dairy production. Other includes Whole-Farm Revenue Protection.
Corn, soybeans, and wheat accounted for the largest share of policies sold and insured liabilities
among insured commodities (see Table 2). Forage crops, however, accounted for the largest share
of total insured acres. Milk accounted for the largest share of insured liabilities for livestock and
animal products and had the fourth largest liabilities of any insured commodity. Almonds, grapes,
nursery, and apples had the largest share of insured liabilities for specialty crops.
Table 2. Major Crops, Livestock, and Livestock Products Insured in 2019
determined based on insured liabilities
Share of Total
Share of Total
Share of Total
Commodity Type
Commodity
Policies Sold
Insured Acres
Insured Liabilities
Row Crops
Corn
26%
23%
38%
Soybeans
24%
19%
21%
Wheat
14%
10%
6%
Cotton
4%
4%
5%
Forage Crops
Al Forage Crops
2%
38%
3%
Specialty Crops
Almonds
< 1%
< 1%
2%
Grapes
< 1%
< 1%
1%
Nursery
< 1%
N/A
1%
Apples
< 1%
< 1%
1%
Livestock and
Milk
< 1%
N/A
5%
Animal Products
Bees
< 1%
N/A
< 1%
Cattle
< 1%
N/A
< 1%
Swine
< 1%
N/A
< 1%
Source: CRS calculations using data from USDA, RMA, “Summary of Business.”
Notes: N/A = not applicable. Cattle includes dairy, feeder, and fed cattle. Table lists only the top four crops for
each commodity type. Due to omitted insured crops, the columns do not sum to 100%.
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For row crops, the pattern of crop insurance purchases largely aligns with crop planting patterns.
Corn, soybeans, wheat, and cotton were the top four row crops by planted area in 2019.46 For
specialty crops, the pattern of crop insurance purchases largely aligns with production value. In
2019, the top four specialty crops by production value were almonds, grapes, apples, and
strawberries.47 The pattern of crop insurance purchases for livestock and animal products do not
reflect commodity rankings based on the 2019 value of production. The top four livestock and
animal products in 2019 by value of production were cattle, milk, chickens, and hogs.48 The FCIP
has never offered coverage for chickens. Additional y, even though cattle producers insured a
smal share of their animals, they purchased insurance coverage for cattle forage equivalent to
approximately 14% of the value of 2019 U.S. hay production.49
Covered Locations
Agricultural producers purchased crop insurance policies in al 50 states in 2019. The five states
with the largest insured liabilities were Iowa, Il inois, California, Minnesota, and Nebraska (see
Figure 6). These states were among the top 10 agricultural producing states for 2019,50 and
insured liabilities reflect the extent of agricultural production in those states.

46 T he top 10 row crops by 2019 planted acres were corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, sorghum, oats, barley, rice, canola,
and rye. See USDA, NASS, Crop Production: 2019 Sum mary, January 2020, at https://www.nass.usda.gov/
Publications/T odays_Reports/reports/cropan20.pdf.
47 According to USDA NASS records, the top 10 specialty crops by 2019 value of production were almonds, grapes,
apples, strawberries, lettuce, pistachios, oranges, tomatoes, walnuts, and onions. Statistics on the 2019 value of
production for nursery crops are not available.
48 According to USDA NASS records, the top 10 livestock and animal products by 2019 value of production were
cattle (including calves), milk, chickens, hogs, turkeys, catfish, trout, mink, wool, and moha ir. Statistics on the 2019
value of apiculture or honey production are not available.
49 CRS calculations based on data from USDA’s RMA and NASS.
50 According to USDA’s ERS, the top 10 agricultural producing states in terms of 2019 cash receipts were (in
descending order) California, Iowa, Nebraska, T exas, Minnesota, Illinois, Kansas, Wisconsin, North Carolina, and
Indiana. See USDA, ERS, “ FAQs,” at https://www.ers.usda.gov/faqs/.
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Figure 6. 2019 FCIP Liabilities by State

Source: Figure created by CRS using data from USDA, RMA, “Summary of Business” and Esri Data and Maps
2019.
In 2019, the five states in which producers received the most premium subsidies were Texas,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas, and Il inois (see Figure 7). The total amount of the
premium subsidies received by farmers in a state depends on the number of policies sold and the
subsidy received per policy. Premium subsidies are calculated as a fixed proportion of the total
premium for each policy. For high-valued crops, such as cotton, rice, and many specialty crops,
premium rates per acre are much higher than for lower-valued crops, such as corn and wheat.
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Figure 7. 2019 FCIP Premium Subsidies by State

Source: Figure created by CRS using data from USDA, RMA, “Summary of Business” and Esri Data and Maps
2019.
Premium subsidies may also be higher in certain states due to differences in yield risk for crop
production in those states.51 In areas where crop production is more risky, total premiums are
more expensive than for less risky areas.52 This means that the premium subsidy must also be
higher to cover the same proportion of the total premium.
Policies Purchased
The types of policies purchased reflect the type of commodities insured under the FCIP. Revenue
Protection was the most frequently purchased policy type in 2019 (Table 3), accounting for
almost 70% of policies purchased, 53% of acres insured, and 65% of the total liabilities insured
for the program. Actual Production History (APH) and Yield Protection, two types of yield
insurance policies, were the second and third most frequently purchased in terms of liabilities
insured. Revenue Protection (RP), APH, and Yield Protection policies are the most commonly
selected policies for most row and specialty crops.
Area-based policies—including Rainfal Index, Area Revenue Protection, and Margin
Protection—accounted for a smal share of liabilities insured, although Rainfal Index covered
37% of total acres insured under the program. Whole-Farm Revenue Protection also accounted
for a very smal share of total number of policies sold and the total liabilities insured.

51 Additional background on yield risk is available in “ Yield Risk”.
52 Yield risk is one of multiple factors that impact total premiums. Additional background on how premium rates are
calculated is available in “ Pricing Crop Insurance Policies”.
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Table 3. FCIP Policies Purchased in 2019
Share of Total
Share of Total
Share of Total
Policy Type
Policies Sold
Acres Insured
Liabilities Insured
Revenue Protection
69%
53%
65%
Actual Production History
9%
3%
12%
Yield Protection
14%
6%
6%
Dairy Revenue Protection
< 1%
N/A
5%
Rainfal Index
2%
37%
2%
Whole-Farm Revenue Protection
< 1%
N/A
2%
Al Other Policies
5%
1%
8%
Total
100%
100%
100%
Source: CRS calculations using data from USDA, RMA, “Summary of Business” database.
Note: Policies ordered by share of liabilities insured. N/A = not applicable.
Federal Crop Insurance Program Structure and
Operations
The FCIP operates as a public-private partnership. Authorized private-sector insurance
companies, cal ed AIPs, sel and service crop insurance policies (Figure 8). USDA regulates the
policies offered and their pricing and subsidizes the costs that farmers pay to purchase the
policies.
Two entities within USDA are responsible for operating the FCIP. The FCIC, a corporation
wholly owned by the federal government,53 administers payments to AIPs to cover the federal
subsidy of policy premiums, reinsurance costs, and direct costs incurred in delivering and
servicing the policies. RMA administers the FCIP; determines crop insurance policy terms; sets
premium rates, underwriting provisions, and loss adjustment standards; and regulates AIPs.

53 T he federal government owns a variety of corporations, including the U.S. Postal Service and Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation. For a discussion of the issues related to government -owned corporations, see archived CRS
Report RL30365, Federal Government Corporations: An Overview, June 8, 2011 (available to congressional clients
upon request).
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Figure 8. Key Entities Involved in FCIP Implementation

Source: CRS.
Notes: The federal crop insurance program (FCIP) is implemented as a public-private partnership. Farmer
policyholders work with insurance agents to purchase crop insurance policies sold by private sector insurers,
known as Approved Insurance Providers (AIPs). When farmers file claims on the insurance policies, AIPs hire
loss adjustors to determine the extent of losses incurred by the farmers. USDA provides reinsurance to AIPs for
a portion of the losses from crop insurance policies sold. AIPs may purchase additional reinsurance from third-
party reinsurers. USDA also regulates the policies sold by AIPs, subsidizes farmer premiums, and subsidizes AIPs
for the cost of sel ing and servicing crop insurance policies.
Pricing Crop Insurance Policies
Crop insurance policies, like other types of commercial y available insurance, are priced
according to their actuarial ratings. Any premium subsidies are then applied to the price
determined by the actuarial rating. Actuarial rates are an estimate of losses likely to be incurred in
the future based on losses that were incurred in the past. Crop insurance policies are priced with
the goal of being actuarial y fair, meaning that the total value of premiums paid over many years
should be approximately equal to the total value of indemnity payments paid over that same time
period. To make an evaluation of the risk of loss associated with a policy, USDA sets the
premium rates for policies based on projections of market prices, crop yields, and yield and price
risks.
Unlike some other private-sector insurance products, premiums for crop insurance are not
“expense loaded.”54 USDA incurs costs from running the programing, including costs for
compensating AIPs for sel ing and servicing policies and for reinsuring against losses from
policies sold. These costs are specified under the terms of the Standard Reinsurance Agreement
(SRA) and Livestock Price Reinsurance Agreement (LPRA), (see “Reinsurance Agreements”).
Neither AIP compensation nor costs associated with reinsuring AIPs factor into the calculation of
premium rates. Crop insurance premiums are calculated to cover only the liability associated with
crop loss payments.

54 Expense loading is a practice used by commercial insurers that increases premium rates to cover the insurers’
administrative and operating expenses (e.g., taxes, agent commissions, reinsurance costs), as well as a profit margin.
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The Role of Projected Market Prices
An agricultural producer selects and signs a crop insurance policy at the start of the growing
season. Each policy must establish the insured value for the crop at the time of signing, which is
before USDA, producers, or AIPs know what the market price of the crop wil be at harvest. To
value each commodity, USDA uses what is referred to as a “projected price.”
For crops that are traded on commodity exchanges, USDA uses futures contract prices to set the
projected price and estimate the commodity’s price risk for revenue insurance coverage. Futures
markets trade contracts for different delivery points in the future (e.g., delivery in November,
delivery in March). USDA uses the prices quoted before the start of planting for the futures
contract date closest to the end of the crop’s harvest period. For example, the projected price for
corn insurance policies is the average price over the month of February for the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange’s December corn futures contract.55 For crops that are not traded on
commodity exchanges, USDA uses other data sources, such as contract prices, to calculate the
insured value of the crop, that is, the policy’s liability.
The futures market prices are national prices; as such, they may differ from the prices farmers
receive when they sel their crops to local buyers. This difference is known as “basis” and
represents an additional crop marketing risk for producers since the basis amount cannot be
insured with federal crop insurance.
Crop insurance premiums are sensitive to futures contract prices. Higher prices of harvest-time
futures contracts before planting wil increase the value of the insured crop at the time the policy
is purchased and therefore the crop insurance premium charged to insure the crop.
The Role of Yields and Actual Production History
While projected prices are common to al farmers insuring the same crop, expected yields are set
individual y for each insured unit. A farmer with multiple insured units wil have a separate
expected yield for each insured unit, so that the farmer’s crop insurance guarantee wil reflect the
expected yields and yield risk of the unit given the crop, location, and production practices used.
The expected yield for an insured unit is referred to as the actual production history (APH). The
APH is used in conjunction with the projected price to establish the insured value covered under
the policy. Higher APH yields increase the value of the insured crop and therefore the crop
insurance premium charged for the policy.
For crop insurance policies that cover production losses, such as Yield Protection or APH
policies, a farmer’s APH is also used to calculate the insurance guarantee that triggers indemnity
payments. For example, if a farmer’s APH were 100 bushels per acre and the farmer purchases
75% coverage under an APH or Yield Protection policy, then the guarantee would be 75 bushels
per acre. Any harvest of less than 100 bushels per acre could be considered a loss from the
farmer’s point of view, but only harvests of less than 75 bushels per acre would qualify for
indemnity payments.

55 Corn planting in the United States usually begins each year in March or April, and harvesting usually finishes in
November or December. T hus, the December futures contract is an indicator of what corn prices will be at harvest.
Since crop insurance contracts must be purchased before planting begins, USDA uses the price of the December corn
futures contract in February as a forecast of what harvest prices are likely to be for the purposes of calculating crop
insurance premiums.
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Establishing an Actual Production History
USDA uses farm production records, such as sales receipts or storage records, to establish an
APH for each insured unit. Farms can submit up to 10 years of records documenting actual yields.
If farmers do not have at least four years of records available, USDA substitutes a county-specific
transition, or “T-yield,” for the missing years. T-yields are based on the 10-year average yield for
the whole county. Farmers without such records are assigned 65% of the T-yield as their APH
yield. Farmers with fewer than four years of records can receive between 80% and 100% of the T-
yield for the missing years depending on how many years they provide.
The APH is calculated as an average of al the years of records provided, which means that the
calculation can be strongly influenced by years with very poor harvest yields. Farmers in certain
counties can purchase the ability to exclude records for some years from their APH calculations.
The APH yield exclusion option al ows farmers to exclude records from years when the county
had severe yield losses (i.e., less than 50% of the county average trend yield over 10 years).
Farmers may not exclude years for which they experienced a severe loss, but the county overal
did not experience a loss of equal severity. This requirement reduces the potential for moral
hazard within the FCIP. For policies with yield exclusion options, USDA stil incorporates the
excluded years in its assessment of yield risk for the insured unit. Excluding any years from the
assessment of yield risk could compromise the actuarial soundness of the underlying insurance
policy.
Premiums for yield exclusion options are more expensive than premiums without this option.
Excluding years with severe losses from the APH calculation increases the insured value of the
crop and thus the premium required for the policy.
How the Yield Exclusion Option Impacts Farmers’ Indemnity Payments
By excluding years of severe county yield losses, a farmer can insure a higher Actual Production History (APH)
value for the farmer’s unit and therefore receive larger indemnity payments in the event of losses or receive
indemnities when a lower APH might not trigger a loss. For example, consider a farmer who has an APH of 100
bushels per acre, purchases a Yield Protection policy with 75% coverage, and harvests 65 bushels per acre. The
Yield Protection policy would provide indemnity payments on 0.75x100-65=10 bushels per acre. If that same
farmer had also purchased a yield exclusion option that al owed him to increase his APH to 110 bushels per acre,
the indemnity payments would be 0.75x110–65=17.5 bushels per acre, or 7.5 bushels per acre more than without
the yield exclusion option.
The yield exclusion option al ows farmers to col ect indemnity payments for losses that are less severe than would
be required without the yield exclusion option. Continuing the example of the farmer with an APH of 100 bushels
per acre who purchases a Yield Protection policy with 75% coverage, suppose this farmer were to harvest 79
bushels per acre instead of 65 bushels per acre. The threshold harvest yield to col ect an indemnity would be
0.75x100=75 bushels per acre. Because 79 bushels per acre is greater than 75 bushels per acre, the policy would
provide no indemnity for this loss. If, however, the farmer were to purchase the yield exclusion option and
increase the APH to 110 bushels per acre, the threshold harvest yield to col ect an indemnity would be
0.75x110=82.5 bushels per acre. In this circumstance, the farmer would receive indemnity payments on 3.5
bushels per acre, which would not have been made without the yield exclusion option.
Yield Risk
Yield risk is the likelihood of realizing crop yields above or below typical yields for a given farm.
Yield risk can vary by crop, location of the farm (i.e., the agroclimatic setting that encompasses
soil type, weather, and other physical attributes of the production setting), production practice
used, and type of farm or county outcome insured. For this reason, USDA prices yield risk
separately for each insured unit. In general, estimating yield risk for an insured unit requires
many years of data, and some farmers may not have such records available.
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Since USDA is required to make crop insurance available to al eligible producers, regardless of
the years of records they have available, RMA uses a variety of farm-specific and county-specific
factors to estimate yield risk for each insured unit.56 RMA sets premium rates using a crop-
specific “base rate” that reflects the average yield risk for a specific county, unit type, and
production practice. Then USDA adjusts premium rates from base rates as needed to reflect
actuarial y fair pricing for the yield risk estimated for each insured unit.
On average, crop insurance premiums are more expensive in areas where growing conditions are
less favorable.
Loss Ratio
A loss ratio is a measure of the financial performance of an insurance policy or portfolio of
policies. For FCIP policies, loss ratio is defined as the amount of indemnities paid divided by the
amount of premiums collected for policies sold in a given year. The loss ratio includes neither the
costs paid to AIPs for sel ing and servicing crop insurance policies nor the costs of reinsuring
AIPs against losses from policies sold.
A loss ratio of 1.0 indicates that the crop insurance indemnities paid equal the premiums collected
for that year. A loss ratio greater than 1.0 indicates that indemnities exceeded premiums, and a
loss ratio less than 1.0 indicates that premiums exceeded indemnities. USDA calculates the loss
ratio for the program as a whole, as wel as separately by crop, state, county, policy type, and
coverage level.
USDA is statutorily required to operate the program in ways that “improve the actuarial
soundness of federal multiperil crop insurance coverage.” 57 USDA assesses the actuarial
performance of the crop insurance program based on the loss ratio. Statute requires USDA to
operate the program “to achieve an overal projected loss ratio of not greater than 1.0.”58 CBO
records show overal program loss ratios have been less than 1.0 for most of the last 10 crop
years, meaning that premiums have more than covered indemnities. In March 2020, CBO
projected an overal FCIP loss ratio of 0.9 for crop marketing years 2020-2030.59
Premium Subsidies
USDA provides subsidies to AIPs on behalf of farmer policyholders to defray a portion of the
premium costs.60 The subsidy rates for most acreage policies are set by statute and vary based on
the coverage level and unit type the producer selects (Table 4). The government pays 100% of the
premium rate for CAT policies, with decreasing amounts of subsidy provided for higher levels of
coverage. For example, the government pays 59% of the premium cost for a farmer insuring a
basic or optional unit at the 70% coverage level.
The amount of the subsidy provided is larger for enterprise and whole farm units compared with
basic or optional units. Beginning and veteran farmers and ranchers are entitled to a 10% subsidy

56 Keith Coble et al., A Comprehensive Review of the RMA APH and COMBO Rating Methodology: Final Report,
prepared for USDA RMA, March 15, 2010, p. 15.
57 7 U.S.C. §1506(n)(1).
58 7 U.S.C. §1506(n)(2).
59 CBO, USDA mandatory farm program outlay projections, March 6, 2020.
60 T he Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA) refers to these subsidies as “risk subsidies,” as distinct from other
subsidies paid to AIPs.
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rate above the amount listed in Table 4 when insuring enterprise, area yield, area revenue, or
whole farm units.61
FCIP participants also pay administrative fees for the policies they purchase. For CAT coverage,
the administrative fee is $655 per crop per county. Because CAT premiums are 100% subsidized,
the administrative fee is the only cost to the farmer for the policy. For policies with higher
coverage levels, the administrative fee is $30 per crop per county, which must be paid in addition
to the cost of the farmer-paid premium.
Table 4. Crop Insurance Premium Subsidies
government-paid portion of premium as a percent of total premium

Coverage Level
Unit Type
CAT
50%
55%
60%
65%
70%
75%
80%
85%

Subsidy rate (%)
Basic or Optional
100
67
64
64
59
59
55
48
38
Enterprise or Multicounty
n/a
80
80
80
80
80
77
68
53
enterprise
Area plan (yield)
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
59
59
55
55
Area plan (revenue)
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
59
55
55
49
Whole farm
n/a
80
80
80
80
80
80
71
56
Source: CRS using 7 U.S.C. §1508(e).
Notes: N/A= not applicable; CAT = catastrophic. Table provides subsidy rates. Farmer deductibles (not shown
on the table) are calculated as 100% minus the coverage level percentage shown. A basic unit covers land in one
county with the same tenants and landlords. An optional unit is a basic unit divided into smal units by township
section. An enterprise unit covers al land of a single crop in a county for a producer, regardless of tenant and
landlord arrangements. A multicounty enterprise unit covers al land of a single crop in two counties for a
producer, regardless of tenant and landlord arrangements. Area plan (yield or revenue) coverage insures county
losses instead of farm-specific losses and can be applied to basic, enterprise, or multicounty enterprise units. A
whole farm unit covers more than one crop. For CAT coverage, a loss beyond 50% is indemnified at 55% of the
expected price. CAT coverage is not available for al types of policies. For coverage levels other than CAT,
losses are indemnified at more than 55% of the expected price (as selected by the purchaser) within the
minimum and maximum range specified by USDA’s Risk Management Agency (RMA). The whole farm subsidy
shown is for farms insuring three or more commodities; for less than three commodities, whole farm coverage is
not offered at 80% or 85%. Premium subsidies for beginning and veteran farmers purchasing area yield, area
revenue, enterprise, or whole farm coverage are increased by 10% over the rates shown in the table.
Although the government-paid premium subsidies are paid to AIPs on behalf of farmer
policyholders, the policyholders are the ultimate beneficiaries—both in terms of risk reduction
and lower cost of coverage. Because crop insurance policies are actuarial y fair, indemnities paid
over time average out to be close to the value of total premium. As such in the long run, farmer
policyholders collect indemnities that are approximately equal to the value of total premiums.
Over time, the value of the premium subsidies accrues to farmers as excess indemnities received
after accounting for the farmer-paid share of the premium.

61 For FCIP purposes, a beginning farmer or rancher is an individual who has not actively operated and managed a farm
or ranch with an insurable interest in a crop or livestock as an owner -operator, landlord, tenant, or sharecropper for
more than five years. T his includes an insurable interest as an individual or as a substantial beneficial interest holder
(10% or more) in another person who has an insurable interest in any crop or livestock. Crop years when the beginning
farmer/rancher was under the age of 18, enrolled in post -secondary studies (not to exceed five crop years), or on active
duty in the U.S. military may be excluded from consideration of the five crop years.
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By providing the subsidies to AIPs on behalf of farmer policyholders, in lieu of providing the
subsidy payments to farmers directly, USDA may be reducing the total cost required for
distributing the subsidy payments. Mil ions of crop insurance policies are sold every year (see
Figure 1), but fewer than 20 AIPs service al of these policies. An open question is whether
providing premium subsidies to AIPs instead of directly to farmers may result in farmers selecting
higher coverage levels than they would if they were required to pay the entire premium upfront
and receive the premium subsidy from USDA afterward.62
Creating New Policies and Pilot Programs
USDA has broad authority to insure or reinsure producers of agricultural commodities for losses
due to “drought, flood, or other natural disaster (as determined by the Secretary).”63 The FCIC
Board of Directors must approve any new crop insurance policies. These can include new policies
submitted by RMA or submissions from nongovernment actors, including AIPs, colleges,
universities, cooperatives, trade associations, or any person.64 Policies, provisions of policies, or
premium rates submitted by the private sector are often referred to as 508(h) submissions.65
USDA wil reimburse the costs of preparing 508(h) submissions if the FCIC Board of Directors
adopts the proposal. USDA can also reimburse for the costs of preparing “concept proposals” for
future 508(h) submissions that a private-sector actor intends to develop.66 External experts review
concept proposals and full 508(h) submissions prior to consideration for adoption by the FCIC
Board of Directors. USDA estimates that reimbursements for 508(h) submissions wil cost $12
mil ion per fiscal year for FY2021-FY2025.67
By statute, when considering new 508(h) proposals, the FCIC Board of Directors must consider
the interests of agricultural producers and the potential for “significant adverse impact on the crop
insurance delivery system.”68 The 508(h) proposal must also provide coverage that is likely to be
“viable and marketable,” address “a clear and identifiable flaw or problem in an existing policy,”
or provide coverage for a commodity that either could not be covered or had low participation
under the existing coverage.69
Reinsurance Agreements
AIPs sel and service crop insurance policies under two agreements with USDA: the Standard
Reinsurance Agreement (SRA) and the Livestock Price Reinsurance Agreement (LRPA). The

62 See, for example, Babcock, “Cumulative Prospect T heory,” 2015; Xiaodong Du, Hongli Feng, and David A.
Hennessy, “ Rationality of Choices in Subsidized Crop Insurance Markets,” Am erican Journal of Agricultural
Econom ics, vol. 99, no. 3 (June 2016), pp. 732-756; Tobias Dalhaus, Barry J. Barnett, and Robert Finger, “ Behavioral
Weather Insurance: Applying Cumulative Prospect T heory to Agricultural Insurance Design Under Narrow Framing,”
PLOS ONE, vol. 15, no. 5 (May 2020).
63 7 U.S.C. §1508(a)(1).
64 7 U.S.C. §1508(h).
65 508(h) submissions are authorized under 7 U.S.C. §1508(h).
66 7 U.S.C. §1522.
67 T he FY2021 President’s Budget for USDA included a proposal to eliminate reimbursements for 508(h) proposals,
which is expected to provide savings of $12 million per fiscal year. See USDA, 2021 USDA Explanatory Notes—Risk
Managem ent Agency, at https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fpac-rma-fy2021-explanatory-notes.pdf.
T his proposal was not adopted by the 116 th Congress.
68 7 U.S.C. §1508(h)(3)(a).
69 7 U.S.C. §1508(h)(3)(a).
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SRA covers the majority of FCIP crop insurance policies offered, while the LPRA covers
livestock insurance policies.70 The SRA and LPRA are annual agreements that must be signed
before the start of each reinsurance year, which begins on July 1 of each calendar year.
These agreements specify expense reimbursements and risk-sharing arrangements by the federal
government, including the terms under which FCIC provides subsidies and reinsurance (i.e.,
insurance for insurance companies) on eligible crop insurance contracts sold or reinsured by
insurance companies. The agreements also define AIP eligibility criteria, limitations on insurance
agent compensation, data reporting and privacy requirements, and other terms and conditions of
participating in the FCIP.
The terms of the SRA and the LPRA are fixed and do not change for each new annual agreement.
The 2008 farm bil (P.L. 110-246) al ows USDA to renegotiate the SRA and LPRA once every
five years starting with the 2011 reinsurance year.71 The last time USDA renegotiated either
agreement was for the 2011 reinsurance year.
Congress does not directly approve any new agreements between USDA and AIPs. However,
Congress may be interested in the SRA in its oversight capacity, particularly with respect to any
terms that could affect farmer participation, policy coverage, or industry interest in sel ing crop
insurance to farmers (e.g., compensation provided to AIPs and insurance agents, requirements for
new policy marketing outreach to farmers).
Marketing Crop Insurance Policies to Farmers
Under the SRA and LPRA, an AIP is required to offer and market al insurance plans for any
crops in any state in which the AIP operates, provided that RMA actuarial data are available for
that state. AIPs must also accept and approve applications from al eligible farmers. AIPs are
prohibited from providing a rebate (e.g., money, goods, or other benefits) to farmers in exchange
for purchasing a crop insurance policy.
In addition to marketing efforts undertaken by AIPs, USDA also works with private partner
organizations to provide risk management training and education about crop insurance options to
farmers and ranchers. Training is targeted toward limited resource, social y disadvantaged, and
other farmers and ranchers traditional y underserved by the FCIP. USDA also targets producers in
specific states in which FCIP participation has been low historical y, including Alaska,
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawai , Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
Approved Insurance Provider Compensation
Under the SRA, USDA does not reimburse AIPs according to actual expenses incurred for sel ing
and servicing crop insurance policies. Instead, AIPs receive three types of subsidies depending on
the policies sold: a Catastrophic Loss Adjustment Expense (CAT LAE) subsidy, an
Administrative and Operating (A&O) subsidy, and a SnapBack subsidy. The CAT LAE subsidy
compensates AIPs for offering and servicing CAT coverage. A&O subsidies compensate AIPs for
offering and servicing al other types of coverage.72 SnapBack subsidies are extra compensation

70 For more background on the Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA) and the Livestock Price Reinsurance
Agreement (LRPA), see USDA, RMA, “ Reinsurance Agreements,” at https://www.rma.usda.gov/pubs/ra.
71 Requirements for renegotiating the SRA are codified in 7 U.S.C. §1508(k)(8).
72 Coverage that is not CAT coverage is commonly referred to as “buy -up” coverage.
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provided for offering and servicing certain policies in states with high loss ratios (i.e., loss ratios
of 1.2 or greater).73
CAT LAE, A&O, and SnapBack subsidies are calculated in proportion to the total premiums for
the policies sold (see Table 5). The amount each AIP earns from these three subsidies depends on
the volume, types, and locations of policies underwritten by the AIP. The SRA specifies that the
total amount of A&O subsidies provided to al AIPs is subject to a minimum (cup) and a
maximum (cap).74 The cup is designed to guarantee that AIPs as a group wil earn a minimum
amount of A&O subsidies for participating in the program. The cap is designed to guarantee that
USDA wil not have to pay more than a set amount in total A&O subsidies in any reinsurance
year. Since 2015, the cup and cap have been fixed at $1.02 bil ion and $1.28 bil ion, respectively.
Table 5. 2020 Compensation Subsidies for Approved Insurance Providers
Value of Subsidy
Subsidy Type
Applicable Policies
(Percent of Total Premium)
Notes
CAT LAE
CAT
6%
—
A&O
Al except for CAT
12.0%-22.2%
Value of subsidy depends on the
type of insurance policy sold
SnapBack
Al except for CAT and
1.15%
Only available in states with loss
area coverage
ratios of 1.2 or greater
Source: CRS using USDA, RMA, 2020 Standard Reinsurance Agreement, Section III.
Notes: An approved insurance provider (AIP) wil receive either a Catastrophic Loss Adjustment Expense (CAT
LAE) subsidy or an Administrative and Operating (A&O) subsidy, depending on the specific policies sold.
However, in locations where SnapBack is available, AIPs receive SnapBack subsidies in addition to either the
CAT LAE or A&O subsidy.
Reinsurance
USDA provides reinsurance to AIPs against a portion of the losses from sel ing and servicing
crop insurance policies.75 USDA determines the amount of reinsurance coverage based on AIPs’
“net book of premium,” which is the total premium for al eligible policies sold less the value of
A&O subsidies and fees. The SRA and LPRA also permit AIPs to purchase reinsurance from third
parties on the portion of net book premium not reinsured by USDA. Any portion of the risk from
the net book of premium retained by AIPs (i.e., not reinsured by USDA or a third party) can
provide incentives for AIPs to properly adjust claims and not award excess indemnities as a
means of growing their crop insurance businesses.
AIPs can choose which policies they want to retain risk for and which policies they want USDA
to reinsure.76 Additional y, AIPs can assign the reinsured policies to different USDA reinsurance

73 For more information about subsidies for AIPs, see CRS Report R45291, Federal Crop Insurance: Delivery
Subsidies in Brief, by Isabel Rosa.
74 Congress mandated a reduction in AIP subsidy rates in the 2008 farm bill but did not require USDA to negotiate a
cup or cap on subsidy rates. For additional back ground on the origin of the cup and cap on AIP subsidies, see archived
CRS Report R40966, Renegotiation of the Standard Reinsurance Agreem ent (SRA) for Federal Crop Insurance ,
available to congressional clients on request.
75 T his reinsurance is also referred to as “shared underwriting risk.”
76 Under this arrangement, AIPs generally transfer the highest -risk policies to USDA for reinsurance. See discussion in
CRS Report R40532, Federal Crop Insurance: Background, coordinated by Randy Schnepf.
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fund types, al owing AIPs to further limit their exposure to losses from offering crop insurance
policies in locations with higher yield risk.
Under the SRA, AIPs must cede 6.5% of the net gain or loss from their total crop insurance
business nationwide—referred to as the net book quota share—to USDA. In most years, AIPs
have earned gains on their crop insurance portfolios; ceding a portion of the gains to USDA has
helped offset part of costs to USDA for operating the program. The LPRA does not include a net
book quota share provision.
USDA does not purchase third-party reinsurance for the portion of the AIPs’ net book of premium
ceded to USDA. USDA is able to reinsure al policies ceded from AIPs because FCIC has the
ability to borrow from the U.S. Treasury to cover such losses.
Approved Insurance Provider Qualifications
AIPs must reapply for approval each reinsurance year. Applications are due April 1 for the
subsequent reinsurance year, which begins July 1. An AIP must be a licensed U.S. property and
casualty insurance company.77 Section II of the SRA describes the required qualifications for
AIPs.78 AIPs must have the financial and operational resources available to successful y
administer the program and maintain a satisfactory performance history over five reinsurance
years, as per RMA requirements, and be able to achieve minimum financial ratio
standards.79 AIPs must also have the ability to absorb a defined level of losses, or Maximum
Possible Underwriting Loss.80 Throughout the year, RMA monitors AIPs’ operational and
financial performances, ratings provided by A.M. Best,81 and regulatory compliance with
applicable state laws and regulations. Additional y, USDA conducts performance reviews for each
AIP approximately once every three years, unless more frequent reviews are warranted.82 New
AIP applicants must demonstrate to RMA their capacity to service policies—including sales,
underwriting, claims, processing systems, accounting, and compliance—prior to being approved
as an AIP.
Market Competition Among Approved Insurance Providers and Agent
Compensation
AIPs must compete with each other for the opportunity to underwrite farmers’ crop insurance
policies. Unlike a typical private-sector insurance product, AIPs cannot compete by offering
different premium pricing. USDA sets premium prices, and al AIPs must offer the same premium
rates to any given farmer. AIPs do not have direct relationships with their farmer customers.
Farmers work with an insurance agent, who may in turn contract with multiple AIPs.83 Insurance
agents can play a key role in determining which AIPs underwrite the policies for the farmers that

77 Property insurance provides coverage for personal property and belongings, including homes, buildings, vehicles,
and other types of personal property or belongings. Casualty insurance provides liability coverage for accidental injury
to another person or damage to another person’s property or belongings.
78 T he required qualifications are set out in 7 C.F.R. §400, Subpart L.
79 T he requirements for demonstration a satisfactory performance history are specified in SRA, Section II (a)(9), and
the financial ratio standards required to qualify as an AIP are codified in 7 C.F.R. §400.162.
80 7 C.F.R. §400.164.
81 A.M. Best is a credit rating agency that provides creditworthiness assessments of insurance companies.
82 USDA, RMA, COM-17-004, Informational Memorandum, August 17, 2017, at https://legacy.rma.usda.gov/bulletins/
info/2017/com-17-004.pdf.
83 CRS Report R45291, Federal Crop Insurance: Delivery Subsidies in Brief, by Isabel Rosa.
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the agents represent.84 Therefore, instead of competing based on price, AIPs compete based on (1)
the service they provide to the insurance agents, and (2) the compensation they provide to
insurance agents.85
The compensation that AIPs provide to agents can affect the types of policies that agents choose
to recommend to their farmer clients, the incentive agents have to provide outreach to farmers
who may have been previously underserved by the FCIP, and the incentive agents have to become
familiar with new FCIP product offerings, such as insurance options for organic producers and
other new offerings. For example, some stakeholders have suggested that one reason for low
uptake of whole farm revenue protection policies is due to limited promotion of the policies by
insurance agents.86
The SRA limits the amount AIPs are al owed to pay agents to not more than 80% of A&O and
CAT LAE by state. However, an AIP may pay compensation up to 100% of A&O and CAT LAE
by state if certain conditions are met.87 There is no limitation on how much any given agent may
receive so long as it is within the maximum amount al owable per state.88 In addition to the limits
imposed by the SRA, USDA has provided guidance to limit the use of fringe benefits and other
types of compensation, including acquisitions, commissions, profit sharing payments, bonuses,
consulting fees, loans, advance and deferred payments, health or other types of insurance
coverage, trips or entertainment valued in excess of $600, and advertising and promotion
payments.89
Waste, Fraud, and Abuse
USDA and AIPs share responsibility for safeguarding the FCIP against waste, fraud, and abuse.
AIPs are responsible for properly adjusting claims and complying with al SRA and USDA
procedures under penalty of forfeiting their A&O and CAT LAE subsidies.90 AIPs have a duty to
report suspected instances of misrepresentation, fraud, waste, or abuse to USDA, and the FCIP
Spot Check List Handbook specifies requirements for AIP review of anomalous losses.91

84 Matthew Ginder et al., “ Factors Affecting Crop Insurance Purchase Decisions by Farmers in Northern
Illinois,” Agricultural Finance Review, vol. 69, no. 1 (May 2009).
85 Bruce Babcock, Cutting the Fat – It Won’t Kill Crop Insurance, prepared for the Environmental Working Group,
December 2015, at https://static.ewg.org/reports/2015/cutting-the-fat/CuttingT heFat.pdf?_ga=
2.260327501.1702212085.1532617233-677630425.1531861799.
86 National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition, “ Much Needed Improvement t o Whole-Farm Revenue Protection,” June
21, 2019, at https://sustainableagriculture.net/blog/whole-farm-revenue-protection-improvements/.
87 For example, an AIP can pay agents in excess of 80% of A&O and CAT LAE subsidies by state if the AIP received
payments for an underwriting gain for certain funds reinsured t hrough the FCIP. For additional information on limits to
agent compensation, see the 2021 Standard Reinsurance Agreement Section III (a)(4)(C), available at
https://www.rma.usda.gov/-/media/RMA/Regulations/Appendix-2021/21sra.ashx?la=en.
88 RMA, “Frequently Asked Questions: Agent Compensation—Schemes or Devices,” at https://www.rma.usda.gov/
help/faq/agentcomp.html.
89 USDA, RMA, “Guidance Regarding SRA Section III(a)(4) – Agent Compensation,” Bulletin MGR-10-011, at
https://legacy.rma.usda.gov/bulletins/managers/2010/mgr-10-011.1.pdf. See also USDA, RMA, Inform ation
Mem orandum No. IS-11-006, July 22, 2011, at https://legacy.rma.usda.gov/bulletins/info/2011/is-11-006.pdf.
90 SRA, Section IV (h)(8).
91 USDA, RMA, Spot Check List Handbook: 2020 and Succeeding Crop Years, at https://rma.usda.gov/-/media/RMA/
Handbooks/Program-Administration—14000/Spot -Check-List/2020-14070-Spot -Check-List.ashx.
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RMA’s compliance division is responsible for assessing and investigating program vulnerability,
fraud, waste, and abuse, as wel as recommending changes to RMA leadership in policies, loss
adjustment, and farm-service-related procedures, agreements, and contract services.92
Costs of the FCIP
USDA reports costs for the FCIP on a fiscal year basis and in terms of net payments to farmers
and AIPs. Net payments to AIPs consist of subsidies for program delivery (i.e., A&O, CAT LAE,
and Snapback subsidies) plus reinsurance gains less AIP reinsurance losses. Net payments to
farmers consist of indemnity payments made less premiums paid by farmers. On average, over
time, indemnity payments are likely to be approximately equal to the value of premium subsidies
plus farmer paid premiums. However, indemnity payments in any fiscal year may not reflect the
value of premium subsidies paid by USDA on behalf of farmer policyholders in that year. USDA
reports premium subsidies paid by crop year, and Figure 4 shows premium subsidy costs for crop
years 2000-2019. Because USDA does not report premium subsidies on a fiscal year basis, the
rest of this section discusses costs of the FCIP in terms of net payments made to farmers—
including indemnity payments made to farmers and premiums paid by farmers—and net
payments made to AIPs—including subsidies for program delivery and reinsurance gains and
losses.
USDA expended $7.3 bil ion on FCIP net payments to farmers and AIPs in FY2019 (see Figure
9). This amount exceeded total net payments for the previous fiscal year but was close to the
average net payments for FY2010-FY2019.93 Farmers and AIPs each received positive net
payments in FY2019, consistent with FCIP expenditures for most of the previous decade.

92 USDA, RMA, “About the Risk Management Agency,” fact sheet, August 2016, at https://www.rma.usda.gov/en/
Fact -Sheets/National-Fact-Sheets/About-the-Risk-Management-Agency.
93 CRS calculates the average net payments to farmers and AIPs for FY2010 -FY2019 at $7.7 billion.
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Federal Crop Insurance: A Primer

Figure 9. FCIP Net Payments to Farmers and Approved Insurance Providers
by fiscal year

Source: CRS calculations using data from USDA, Office of Inspector General, Federal Crop Insurance
Corporation/Risk Management Agency’s Financial Statements, audit reports, FY2010-FY2019.
Net payments to farmers are positive when indemnities exceed farmer-paid premiums. Net
payments to AIPs are positive when subsidies for program delivery (i.e., A&O, CAT LAE, and
Snapback subsidies) and AIP underwriting gains on policies sold exceed underwriting losses.94
For FY2010-FY2019, there were only two instances where farmers or AIPs did not earn positive
net payments for the fiscal year. Farmers received negative net payments in FY2010, a year when
low yields were offset by higher prices, thus limiting indemnities on revenue plans. AIPs received
negative net payments in FY2012, a year of historic drought, below -average yields, and large
indemnity payments.
In FY2019, farmers paid nearly $4 bil ion in premiums and received nearly $8 bil ion in
indemnity payments (see Figure 10). AIPs received $3.2 bil ion in federal outlays, approximately
half of which was for sel ing and servicing polices (i.e., delivery expenses), and half was for
underwriting gains from policies reinsured by USDA.95

94 Subsidies for program delivery and underwriting gains and losses are explained in the “ Approved Insurance Provider
Compensation” and “ Reinsurance.”
95 AIPs’ role in selling and servicing policies is explained in “ Federal Crop Insurance Program Structure and
Operations.”
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Federal Crop Insurance: A Primer

Figure 10. Contributions to FCIP Net Payments
by fiscal year

Source: CRS using data from USDA, Office of Inspector General, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation/Risk
Management Agency’s Financial Statements, audit reports, FY2015-FY2019.
Notes: Amounts not adjusted for inflation. Net payments to farmers (corresponding to net payments shown in
Figure 9) are the difference between indemnities paid to farmers and premiums col ected from farmers for each
fiscal year. Net payments to Approved Insurance Providers (AIPs) (corresponding to net payments shown in
Figure 9) are the sum of program delivery costs paid to AIPs and reinsurance payments to AIPs for each fiscal
year. Premiums col ected from farmer policyholders do not reflect premium subsidies paid by USDA on
policyholders’ behalf. Premium subsidies are not available on a fiscal year basis but can be seen on a crop year
basis in Figure 4. Premium subsidies have the effect of reducing the amount of premiums col ected from farmers
relative to the amounts that would be col ected without premium subsidies. Over time, the indemnities paid to
farmers average to be approximately equal to the sum of premiums col ected from farmers and premium
subsidies.
Although FCIP costs vary from year to year depending on policies purchased and losses incurred,
premiums collected from farmers and subsidies paid to AIPs for program delivery costs tend to be
less variable than other cost components (see Figure 10). Farmers often renew coverage from
year to year and therefore pay a similar amount for premiums over time. Subsidies for AIP
delivery expenses tend to be stable over time because of the cup and cap imposed on certain
delivery expenses in the SRA.96 Indemnity payments and underwriting gains can vary
considerably from year to year based on weather and market conditions. Additional y, Congress
provided a supplemental “top-up” to the indemnity payments for prevented planting in FY2019,
which further increased indemnity payments compared with previous years.97
In a 2017 report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified potential cost savings
for the program through reducing AIPs’ target rates of return and portions of premiums retained.98
The CBO also identified several potential cost-saving strategies including limiting premium
subsidies to area-based plans; changing how losses are calculated by eliminating the yield

96 T he Standard Reinsurance Agreement is explained in “ Reinsurance Agreements.”
97 For details, see CRS Report R46180, Federal Crop Insurance: Record Prevent Plant (PPL) Acres and Payments in
2019, by Randy Schnepf.
98 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Crop Insurance: Opportunities Exist to Improve Program Delivery and
Reduce Cost, GAO-17-501, July 26, 2017, at https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-501.
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exclusion and the use of the harvest price in determining the insurance guarantee; removing the
harvest price option as the default revenue plan option; and lowering the expected rate of return
for AIPs reflected in the SRA.99 Proposals from other stakeholders include eliminating certain
types of revenue coverage,100 capping premium subsidies,101 and changing prevented planting
rules that discourage farmers from replanting.102
The Role of the FCIP in Agricultural Policy
The FCIP and the Farm Safety Net
The FCIP is a central component of the farm safety net, a collection of programs that provide risk
protection and financial support to U.S. farmers in times of low farm prices and natural disasters.
The three main components of the safety net are (1) permanently authorized federal crop
insurance, (2) farm commodity price and income support programs authorized under the 2018
farm bil for crop years 2019-2023,103 and (3) permanently authorized agricultural disaster
assistance programs.104 Additional support may be provided through ad hoc disaster assistance,
emergency loans, and USDA discretionary assistance.105
For 2014-2018, the FCIP and commodity support programs provided the largest share of outlays
from farm safety net programs, with the FCIP and commodity programs providing similar levels
of support. Since 2018, however, FCIP outlays have exceeded (or are projected to exceed)
commodity support payments. Additional y, ad hoc payments for trade and market disruptions
related to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, including forgivable loans
provided through the Smal Business Administration’s Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), have
exceeded al other categories of farm safety net spending (Table 6) for 2019-2020.

99 CBO, Options to Reduce the Budgetary Costs of the Federal Crop Insurance Program , December 2017.
100 Joseph W. Glauber, Reform Our Crop Insurance Program to Reduce the Burden on Taxpayers, American Enterprise
Institute, November 8, 2017, at https://www.aei.org/articles/reform-our-crop-insurance-program-to-reduce-the-burden-
on-taxpayers/.
101 Scott Faber, Top 5 Reasons to Reform Crop Insurance, Environmental Working Group, June 27, 2018, at
https://www.ewg.org/agmag/2018/06/top-5-reasons-reform-crop-insurance (hereinafter Faber, Top 5 Reasons, 2018).
102 Claire O’Connor and Lara Bryant, Covering Crops: How Federal Crop Insurance Program Reforms Can Reduce
Costs, Em power Farm ers, and Protect Natural Resources, National Resources Defense Council, Issue Paper no. I7 -11-
A, December 2017, at https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/federal-crop-insurance-program-reforms-ip.pdf
(hereinafter O’Connor and Bryant, Covering Crops, 2017).
103 CRS Report R43758, Farm Safety Net Programs: Background and Issues, coordinated by Randy Schnepf.
104 CRS Report RS21212, Agricultural Disaster Assistance, by Megan Stubbs.
105 For example, see CRS Report R45310, Farm Policy: USDA’s 2018 Trade Aid Package, by Randy Schnepf et al.;
CRS Report R45865, Farm Policy: USDA’s 2019 Trade Aid Package, by Randy Schnepf; CRS In Focus IF11539,
Wildfires and Hurricanes Indem nity Program (WHIP), by Megan Stubbs; and CRS Report R46347, COVID-19, U.S.
Agriculture, and USDA’s Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP), by Randy Schnepf and Jim Monke.
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Table 6. Farm Safety Net Program Outlays Since 2014
annual average in $ bil ion for five years from 2014 to 2018 and two years from 2019 to 2020
Permanent
and
Trade and
Supplemental
COVID-
Total Farm
Commodity
Disaster
related
Safety Net
Years
FCIPa
Supportb
Programsc
Supportd
Support
2014-2018
6.2
6.2
1.8
1.0
15.2
2019-2020
6.6
4.8
2.0
23.8
37.2
Sources: CRS calculations using data from USDA, ERS, Farm Incomes and Wealth Statistics: U.S. and State Farm
Income and Wealth Statistics, updated as of February 5, 2021; and USDA, RMA, “Summary of Business” database,
downloaded on February 5, 2021.
Notes: To the extent possible, the data are on a calendar year basis and reflect the timing of the payments. FCIP
data are by crop year. Data for 2020 for commodity support, permanent and supplemental disaster programs,
and trade and COVID-related support are forecast. Descriptions of and authorities for commodity, permanent
disaster, supplemental disaster, trade, and COVID-19-related support programs are available in CRS Report
R46577, U.S. Farm Support: Outlook for Compliance with WTO Commitments, 2018 to 2020, by Randy Schnepf.
a. FCIP outlays include premium subsidies and indemnity payments to farmers in excess of total premiums paid
(i.e., excess losses).
b. Commodity support includes payments under the Agricultural Risk Coverage, Price Loss Coverage, and
marketing assistance loan programs, the Dairy Margin Protection Program and Dairy Margin Coverage
programs, cotton ginning cost share program in 2016 and 2018, and other miscel aneous commodity-
specific programs.
c. Permanent and supplemental disaster payments include the Livestock Forage Disaster Program, Livestock
Indemnity Program, Tree Assistance Program, and Emergency Assistance for Livestock, Honeybees, and
Farm-Raised Fish Program, as wel as supplemental and emergency payments made under programs such as
the Wildfire and Hurricane Indemnity Program (WHIP) and WHIP+.
d. Ad hoc support for trade and COVID-19-related market disruptions includes payments under the 2018
Market Facilitation Program (MFP) of $8.6 bil ion; the 2019 MFP of $14.5 bil ion; portions of the two 2020
Coronavirus Food Assistance Programs (CFAP-1 and CFAP-2), valued at $16 bil ion and $14 bil ion,
respectively; and portions of the $7.3 bil ion in forgivable loans under the PPP.
Most farmers and ranchers are eligible for at least one of the aforementioned federal programs.
Some commodities are supported by a single program; others can receive support through a
combination of programs. Within the farm safety net, federal crop insurance covers the widest
variety of U.S. agricultural production. In addition to the FCIP, certain row crops (e.g., corn,
soybeans, wheat) are eligible for multiple farm commodity support programs, including
Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC), Price Loss Coverage (PLC), and marketing loans.106 Sugar
and dairy have their own support programs in addition to coverage through the FCIP. Specialty
crop and livestock producers have coverage through the FCIP and may receive support from
permanent disaster programs.
Some farm support programs are designed to provide benefits that do not overlap with FCIP
benefits. For example, ARC and PLC provide support for market price declines in ways that
differ from how crop insurance Revenue Protection (RP) policies insure against market price
losses.107 The Dairy Margin Coverage program provides support for changes in market prices and

106 Agriculture Risk Coverage, Price Loss Coverage, and marketing loans are the principal farm -bill-authorized revenue
support programs for U.S. grain, oilseed, and pulse producers. For additional information about these programs, see
CRS Report R46561, U.S. Farm Policy: Revenue Support Program Outlays, 2014 -2020, by Randy Schnepf.
107 CRS Report R45730, Farm Commodity Provisions in the 2018 Farm Bill (P.L. 115 -334), by Randy Schnepf.
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feed input costs, while Dairy Revenue Protection under crop insurance insures against changes in
dairy revenue.
USDA administers the Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program, which provides benefits
similar to FCIP CAT coverage but is available only for crops and/or locations that cannot be
insured through the FCIP. USDA also administers four permanently authorized disaster programs
for livestock and trees: the Livestock Forage Disaster Program (LFP), the Livestock Indemnity
Program (LIP), the Tree Assistance Program (TAP), and Emergency Assistance for Livestock,
Honeybees, and Farm-Raised Fish Program (ELAP). LIP and ELAP provide compensation for
animal losses that cannot be insured under FCIP policies. LFP provides compensation for grazing
losses, which is similar to the coverage provided by pasture, rangeland, and forage (PRF)
coverage under the FCIP. However, PRF coverage makes payments based on acres affected by
adverse weather conditions, whereas LFP makes payments based on the head of livestock affected
by adverse weather conditions. TAP makes payments for replacement or rehabilitation of trees,
bushes, and vines damaged by natural disasters, which can overlap with indemnity payments
from FCIP tree coverage policies.108
Most farm safety net programs are provided free of charge or for a nominal participation fee. The
FCIP is one of the few farm safety net programs that requires farmers to pay a significant
contribution toward the cost of coverage provided under the program. The FCIP is also the only
farm safety net program implemented as a public-private partnership. USDA program agencies
deliver al other farm safety net programs.
The FCIP and Conservation Requirements
The FCIP incentivizes farmers to conserve wetlands and highly erodible lands through
conservation compliance requirements. Conservation compliance requires that producers agree to
maintain a minimum level of conservation on highly erodible land and to not convert wetlands to
crop production.109 The 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) returned crop insurance premium subsidies
to the list of USDA program benefits that could be lost if a producer is determined to be out of
compliance with the conservation compliance provisions.110 USDA’s Economic Research Service
concluded in 2017 that the inclusion of crop insurance premium subsidies to the list of potential
lost program benefits significantly increased the incentive to comply with conservation
compliance requirements for many farms.111
The 2014 farm bil also amended and expanded the sodsaver provision in the 2008 farm bil (P.L.
110-246).112 Under sodsaver, approved yield guarantees and crop insurance premium subsidies
are lowered by 50 percentage points for production of annual crops on native sod113 during the

108 T he FY2021 President’s Budget included a proposal to prevent producers from claiming duplicate benefits under the
T ree Assistance Program and the FCIP. W hite House, Office of Management and Budget, President’s Budget FY 2021:
Budget Appendix, pp. 61-185, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/agr_fy21.pdf. T his proposal
was not adopted by the 116th Congress.
109 For more information on conservation requirements, see CRS Report R42459, Conservation Compliance and U.S.
Farm Policy, by Megan Stubbs.
110 P.L. 113-79, §2611. See Appendix for history of the FCIP and conservation compliance requirements.
111 Roger Claassen et al., Conservation Compliance: How Farmer Incentives Are Changing in the Crop Insurance Era ,
USDA, ERS, Economic Research Report no. ERR-234, July 2017.
112 Referred to in statue as “Crop Production on Native Sod.” 7 U.S.C. §1508(o).
113 Native sod is land that has never been tilled or for which there is no history of prior tilling for crop production.
Native sod and native grasslands can provide habitat for numerous species, including birds, breeding waterfowl , and
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first four years of planting. The 2018 farm bil extended the sodsaver penalties to apply to any
insurable crop, including perennial crops. The sodsaver provision applies to native sod in six
states—Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Nebraska. These states
included some of the areas with the highest rates of conversion of native sod to cropland during
2008-2016.114
In addition to incentivizing conservation of wetlands and highly erodible lands, Congress and
USDA have made changes to certain FCIP procedures that previously could have deterred
farmers from planting cover crops, a practice that could improve soil quality and help reduce soil
erosion. The 2018 farm bil introduced new provisions to qualify certain voluntary uses of cover
crops as a type of good farming practice,115 thereby al owing land planted with cover crops to
maintain eligibility for crop insurance. USDA also adjusted certain cutoff dates that applied to
prevented planting acres in 2019 and 2020 because the original dates could have deterred farmers
from applying cover crops to their prevented planting acreage.
The FCIP also supports state conservation efforts in Iowa and Kansas as part of a collaboration
with their state departments of agriculture. USDA is conducting a multiyear demonstration
project, started in 2017, that aims to increase use of cover crops in Iowa by providing crop
insurance premium discounts for farmers who plant cover crops. For certain counties in Kansas,
USDA introduced a limited irrigation policy option for corn and soybeans that al ows producers
to voluntarily reduce irrigation applications while maintaining insurance coverage and FCIP
records on historical yields and irrigation water usage.
The FCIP and Farm Credit
Several types of lenders make farm loans, including commercial banks, Farm Credit System
(FCS) institutions, USDA’s FSA, life insurance companies, individuals, and other types of
lenders.116 The extent of loans offered and terms of credit available from each of these sources
can depend on the creditworthiness of farmer borrowers. In general, purchasing federal crop
insurance improves the likelihood repayment in the event of a poor harvest or low market prices.
Some lenders may require a farmer to purchase crop insurance to obtain a loan.
FSA is the primary federal lender to farmers. By statute, farmers are required to purchase at least
CAT coverage as a condition for FSA operating, ownership, and emergency loans in areas where
crop insurance is available.117 The requirement applies to loans that FSA makes directly and loans
guaranteed by FSA. Farmers can use FSA loans to purchase crop insurance coverage and can be
disqualified from FSA direct loans for violations of the Federal Crop Insurance Act (e.g., crop
insurance fraud).
FCS institutions are borrower-owned and funded by the private sector but operate under a federal
charter with a statutory mandate to serve only agriculture-related borrowers. By statute, FCS

pollinators.
114 T yler J. Lark et al., “ Cropland expansion in the United States produces marginal yields at high costs to wildlife,”
Nature Com m unications, vol. 11, no. 4295 (September 2020).
115 P.L. 115-334, §11107.
116 For a description of these lenders, see CRS Report RS21977, Agricultural Credit: Institutions and Issues, by Jim
Monke.
117 7 U.S.C. §2008f.
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institutions are al owed to sel crop insurance to their members,118 although they cannot require
members to take out loans in order to purchase crop insurance.
The FCIP and Trade
As a signatory member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United States has committed
to abide by WTO rules and disciplines—including those that govern domestic farm policy and its
effects on international markets. Under the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture, agricultural
support programs must be classified and reported based on their potential to distort markets (i.e.,
to alter the supply and market price of a commodity) from the equilibrium that would otherwise
exist in the absence of the program’s influence.119 The WTO uses a traffic light analogy to group
programs into four boxes (red, amber, blue, and green) and imposes spending limits for national
spending on programs classified in certain boxes. At one extreme, red box programs are
prohibited due to their trade distortionary effects. At the other extreme, green box programs are
considered minimal y or nontrade distorting and are not subject to spending limits. Amber box
programs are considered trade distorting and subject to different spending limits depending on
whether they are classified as product-specific (PS) or nonproduct-specific (NPS). Exceeding
amber box spending limits could constitute a violation of WTO rules, which if successfully
chal enged by another WTO member under the WTO dispute settlement process, could require
elimination, alteration, or amendment by Congress of the program(s) to bring amber box
spending into compliance.
Table 7. Program Classifications under WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture
Production
Annual Spending
Box
Trade Distorting
Limiting
Prohibited
Limit for the U.S.
Green
None or Minimal
No
No
None
Blue
Not Minimal
Yes
No
None
Amber
Not Minimal
No
No
$19.1 bil ion
Red
Not Minimal
No
Yes
$0
Source: CRS using the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, as previously described in CRS Report R45305,
Agriculture in the WTO: Rules and Limits on U.S. Domestic Support, by Randy Schnepf.
Notes: Amber box spending limit includes aggregate spending on a country’s product-specific and nonproduct-
specific programs. Outlays for nonproduct-specific amber box programs may be exempt from counting against
the amber box limit if the outlays amount to less than 5% of the value of total U.S. agricultural output. Outlays
for product-specific amber box programs may be exempt from counting against the amber box limit if the
outlays amount to less than 5% of the commodity’s production value. WTO rules prohibit spending on red box
programs.
Insurance underwriting costs and A&O expenses are notified to the WTO as green box outlays,
whereas premium subsidies are notified to the WTO as amber box outlays. However, USDA has
discretion in how it classifies and reports amber box FCIP premium subsidies to the WTO. From
1995 to 2011, USDA classified FCIP premium subsidies as NPS amber box outlays such that the
total value of premium subsidies was perennial y exempted from counting against the amber box
spending limit under the NPS de minimis exemption.120 Since 2012, USDA has classified FCIP

118 12 U.S.C. §618.8040.
119 CRS Report R45305, Agriculture in the WTO: Rules and Limits on U.S. Domestic Support, by Randy Schnepf.
120 Nonproduct-specific outlays may be exempt from counting against the amber box limit if they are less than 5% of
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premium subsidies as PS amber box outlays. Under this change in notification, USDA evaluates
premium subsidies at the individual commodity level. If total farm support for a commodity
(including revenue support, premium subsidies, and any other program support) amounts to less
than 5% of the commodity’s value of production, it may be exempted from counting against the
amber box spending limit.121 On a crop-specific basis, most crop insurance subsidies are exempt
from the tal y because they do not exceed the 5% threshold. For example, U.S. crop insurance
subsidies in 2014 totaled more than $6.4 bil ion, but 70% of those subsidies were exempt from
the amber box tal y on a product-specific basis.122 However, in years where substantial additional
farm support payments have been made, such as in 2019 and 2020 (see Table 6), there is a greater
likelihood that premium subsidies coupled with the other support payments may exceed the 5%
PS de minimis threshold, thus counting against the U.S. amber box spending limit. The United
States has not notified the WTO of its domestic support spending for 2018, 2019, or 2020, so it
remains to be seen how it wil classify spending in recent years and whether those totals wil
exceed the amber box limit.
Rationale for Publicly Supported Crop Insurance
The federal government conducts a wide variety of insurance activities beyond agriculture,123
some of which paral el coverage currently, or previously, offered by private insurers. Private
insurers have a long history of sel ing insurance coverage for a single type of losses (e.g., damage
from hail) without intervention or support from the federal government. Although the private
sector previously experimented with offering multiperil124 crop insurance from about 1899 to the
early 1920s,125 the FCIP is the only supplier of multiperil crop insurance in the U.S. today. While
the FCIP offered multiperil crop insurance without premium subsidies prior to 1980, history has
shown that farmers have been unwil ing to purchase unsubsidized multiperil crop insurance.126
Like al insurance products, crop insurance is susceptible to problems of adverse selection and
moral hazard. Adverse selection arises when insured farmers have more information about their
own risk of loss than the insurers offering the policies. Without information to distinguish high-
and low-risk farmers, insurers tend to offer products at prices that appeal more to high-risk
farmers than to low-risk farmers. Moral hazard in the insurance industry refers to the general
tendency of an insured party to take on greater risk once insured. Congress and USDA work to
mitigate problems of adverse selection and moral hazard through policy design and premium
rating procedures.

the value of total U.S. agricultural output.
121 Product-specific (PS) amber box subsidies for any commodity are included in the tally of total amber box support if
the value of the subsidies exceeds 5% of the commodity’s production value. Subsidies of less than 5% are considered to
be PS de minimus exempt and are excluded from the amber box tally.
122 Vincent H. Smith, Joseph W. Glauber, and Barry K. Goodwin, Time to Reform the US Federal Agricultural
Insurance Program , American Enterprise Institute, October 2017, at http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/
T ime-to-Reform-the-US-Federal-Agricultural-Insurance-Program.pdf.
123 A 2005 GAO report detailed 95 different federal insurance activities and noted that “no generally accepted
definition of federal insurance exists” (GAO, Catalogue of Federal Insurance Activities, GAO-05-265R, March 4,
2005, p. 2, at http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/93046.pdf).
124 FCIP policies are referred to as multiperil policies because they insure against mult iple types of losses. Multiperil
insurance is distinct from other private-sector crop insurance products that insure against a single type of loss.
125 Randall A. Kramer, “Federal Crop Insurance 1938-1982,” Agricultural History, vol. 57, no. 2 (April 1983), pp. 181-
200.
126 Joseph W. Glauber, “Crop Insurance Reconsidered,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 86, no. 5
(December 2004), pp. 1179-1195.
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Costs and Benefits of the FCIP
The FCIP imposes costs and provides benefits to producers, AIPs, and the public. These costs and
benefits include direct costs and benefits, as wel as indirect costs incurred and benefits received
from the FCIP, such as ancil ary effects on risk management decisions, credit markets, and the
environment.
Costs incurred include the following:
 Costs to Producers. Producers incur direct costs for their share of premiums.
 Costs to AIPs. AIPs incur direct costs for underwriting losses not otherwise
reinsured by USDA or third-party reinsurers.
 Costs to the Public. The public incurs costs for FCIP outlays, including
subsidies paid to farmers and AIPs, as wel as the costs to USDA for running the
program. In addition to the direct costs associated with the FCIP, some
researchers have suggested that the FCIP imposes indirect costs on the public
including rent seeking,127 encouraging production on land prone to flooding and
on marginal land subject to large yield variability,128 excess production of
agricultural commodities, 129 and environmental impacts from excess
production.130 Other researchers have found limited impacts of the FCIP on
planted acres, crop selection, and environmental pollution.131 There is also
potential for the FCIP to “crowd out” private-sector insurance and financial risk
management securities, such as catastrophic bonds and weather derivatives.132
Crowding out occurs when government intervention in a market deters actions
from private-sector participants. If crowding out were to occur, it would impose
indirect costs on the public.
Benefits provided include the following:
 Benefits to Producers. Producers receive direct benefits from premium subsidies
and indemnity payments for excess losses. These direct benefits accrue mostly to
larger-scale operations.133 Producers can also receive indirect benefits, including

127 Vincent H. Smith, “T he US federal crop insurance program: a case study in rent seeking,” Agricultural Finance
Review, vol. 80, no. 3 (December 2019).
128 Ron Wirtz, Crop insurance: Helping farmers, but not without consequences, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,
at https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2018/crop-insurance-helping-farmers-but-not-without-consequences.
129 C. Edwin Young, Monte L. Vandeveer, and Randall D. Schnepf, “Production and Price Impacts of US Crop
Insurance Programs,” Am erican Journal of Agricultural Econom ics, vol. 83, no. 5 (December 2001), pp. 1196-1203;
and Barry K. Goodwin and Vincent H. Smith, “ What Harm Is Done by Subsidizing Crop Insurance?,” Am erican
Journal of Agricultural Econom ics, vol. 95 no. 2 (January 2013), pp. 489-497.
130 JunJie Wu, “Crop Insurance, Acreage Decisions, and Nonpoint -Source Pollution,” American Journal of Agricultural
Econom ics, vol. 81, no. 2 (May 1999), pp. 305-320.
131 Jeremy G. Weber, Nigel Key, and Erik O’Donoghue, “Does Federal Crop Insurance Make Environmental
Externalities from Agriculture Worse?,” Journal of the Association of Environm ental and Resource Econom ists, vol. 3,
no. 3 (September 2016), pp. 707-742; and Roger Claassen, Christian Langpap, and JunJie Wu, “ Impacts of Federal
Crop Insurance on Land Use and Environmental Quality,” Am erican Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 99, no. 3
(April 2017), pp. 592-613.
132 Joshua D. Woodard et al., “ A Spatial Econometric Analysis of Loss Experience in the US Crop Insurance Program,”
Journal of Risk and Insurance, vol. 79, no. 1 (March 2012), pp. 261-286.
133 Daren Bakst, What You Should Know About Who Receives Farm Subsidies, T he Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder
no. 3306, April 16, 2018, at https://www.heritage.org/agriculture/report/what -you-should-know-about-who-receives-
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reduced farm revenue risk, reduced total expenditure on farm risk management,
access to farm credit from lenders who require crop insurance as a condition for
approving farm operating loans, and/or lower cost farm loans. These indirect
benefits vary in value across farm operations.
 Benefits to AIPs. AIPs receive benefits for any A&O, CAT LAE, and SnapBack
subsidies that exceed costs incurred to sel and service policies, as wel as
underwriting gains from reinsurance. AIPs also receive benefits from developing
and marketing private add-on coverage to federal crop insurance.134
 Benefits to the Public. The public does not receive direct benefits from the FCIP.
However, the public may benefit from indirect effects of the FCIP that help to
stabilize farm businesses, agricultural production, and commodity prices. As the
farm lender of last resort, USDA incurs costs from operating farm loan programs.
To the extent that the FCIP facilitates commercial lending to agriculture, the
public may indirectly benefit from reduced USDA outlays for farm lending
programs. Additional y, the public may also indirectly benefit from reduced
spending on ad hoc farm disaster program payments.135
Issues for Congress
Over the last three farm bil s, Congress has acted to expand the FCIP to cover more commodities
and more types of risks. Although current crop insurance market penetration for row crops has
been high historical y, opportunities exist to expand coverage, especial y for specialty crops,
livestock, and animal products. Additional y, farmers have shown limited interest in policies
designed to appeal to organic producers and to highly diversified fruit and vegetable producers.
Congress may consider investigating issues that have made FCIP coverage less appealing to
producers of these commodities.
Numerous stakeholders have proposed reducing the cost of the FCIP. For example, the FY2021
President’s Budget recommended several proposals, including capping underwriting gains for
AIPs, reducing premium subsidies for producers, and introducing premium subsidy eligibility
criteria based on the producer’s adjusted gross income.136 The GAO and CBO also have identified
a number of changes to the program that Congress could consider to lower FCIP costs to the
government. Although al of these proposals have the potential to impact which farmers choose to
purchase crop insurance, proposals that reduce federal costs by targeting payments to AIPs are
less likely to change producers’ incentives to purchase crop insurance than proposals that target
premium subsidies or coverage options.
Additional y, Congress may also be interested in how the SRA affects the cost effectiveness of the
FCIP and the baseline spending levels that determine funding for the next farm bil . The
distribution of risk sharing between AIPs and USDA has been an issue of perennial concern for

farm-subsidies.
134 Selected examples include CLIFF, Excess Moisture, MPowerD, Variable Interval Product, Increased Coverage
Election (ICE), Price-Flex, and Supplemental Replant Coverage.
135 Keith H. Coble and Barry J. Barnett, “Why Do We Subsidize Crop Insurance?,” American Journal of Agricultural
Econom ics, vol. 95, no. 2 (January 2013), pp. 498-504.
136 White House, Office of Management and Budget, President’s Budget FY 2021: Budget Appendix, pp. 61-185, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/agr_fy21.pdf. T hese proposals were not adopted by the 116 th
Congress.
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some policymakers. Congress may be interested in requiring greater transparency of the actual
cost of federal underwriting and the extent that it is shared with AIPs.
Three topic areas, in particular, may be of interest for Congress in performing oversight of FCIP
operations.
 Research has suggested that the program could be vulnerable to waste, fraud, and
abuse by using certain unit types in areas where farmers insured a higher
proportion of acres at high coverage levels and in times of unfavorable economic
and/or adverse weather conditions.137 Congress may consider whether RMA’s
waste, fraud, and abuse detection procedures need to be strengthened to counter
any such vulnerability.
 Social y disadvantaged farmers may be less likely to purchase crop insurance
than nonsocial y disadvantaged farmers, primarily due to the size of their
operations and commodities grown.138 The 2018 farm bil requires USDA to
make recommendations on ways to increase crop insurance participation among
underserved producers as part of the regular review of FCIP insurance plans and
policies.139 Congress may seek to understand the steps that USDA is taking to
prepare their recommendations, including any efforts that USDA and AIPs are
undertaking to solicit input directly from underserved producers.
 The number of AIPs participating in the FCIP has decreased over time, largely
due to consolidation in the insurance industry. Congress may wish to inquire into
the drivers of this consolidation, as wel as any implications it may be having on
AIPs’ outreach to producers in underserved areas and on their wil ingness to
market new types of crop insurance coverage.
Additional y, Congress may be interested in reassessing the role of the FCIP in agricultural policy
more broadly. Numerous environmental stakeholders have issued proposals to enhance the
FCIP’s role in promoting conservation by incentivizing the use of cover crops and other practices
to improve soil health.140 Congress may consider the potential environmental benefits of these
proposals and what their effects might be on the actuarial soundness of the program. Congress
may also consider the interplay, and possible overlap, among the benefits that various producer
groups have received from crop insurance, as wel as from ad hoc payments to producers since
2018 for trade-related damages through USDA’s Market Facilitation Program and for market
disruptions related to COVID-19 through USDA’s Coronavirus Food Assistance Program. A
substantial portion of these ad hoc payments were targeted at commodities that have high crop
insurance penetration rates.141 One of the reasons Congress introduced crop insurance premium
subsidies in 1980 was to increase participation in the FCIP and reduce the need for future ad hoc

137 Sungkwol Park et al., “Contract elements, growing conditions, and anomalous claims behaviour in US crop
insurance,” The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice, vol. 45, no. 1 (August 2019), pp. 157-183.
138 For examples of how farm size and commodity specialization can impact crop insurance purchases by socially
disadvantaged farmers and ranchers, see GAO, Agricultural Lending: Inform ation on Credit and Outreach to Socially
Disadvantaged Farm ers and Ranchers is Lim ited , GAO-19-539, July 2019, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/
700218.pdf.
139 7 U.S.C. §1508(a)(7)(C).
140 See, for example, O’Connor and Bryant, Covering Crops, 2017; and Faber, Top 5 Reasons, 2018.
141 See CRS Report R46577, U.S. Farm Support: Outlook for Compliance with WTO Commitments, 2018 to 2020, by
Randy Schnepf for a discussion of USDA’s Market Facilitation Program and Coronavirus Food Assistance Program
payments for different agricultural commodities.
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disaster spending.142 Congress may consider whether the crop insurance program could be
adapted to provide post-harvest production loss and price risk protection tools and whether such
adaptations could further its policy objectives for the agricultural sector.143

142 See Appendix for details about the history of premium subsidies in the FCIP.
143 T he FY2021 President’s Budget for USDA included a proposal to commission the National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine to present recommendations on the effectiveness of current farm support programs. See
USDA, 2021 USDA Explanatory Notes—Risk Managem ent Agency, at https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/fpac-rma-fy2021-explanatory-notes.pdf. T his proposal was not adopted by the 116th Congress.
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Appendix. A Brief History of Crop Insurance
The federal crop insurance program (FCIP) was created in 1938 as part of the agricultural policy
response to the Great Depression.144 The program initial y had no private sector involvement and
covered only wheat, but after a few years, the program was expanded to include cotton, flax, and
other commodities (see Table A-1). Because of consistently high loss ratios in certain areas and
for the program as a whole, Congress enacted legislation to restrict the geographic scope of the
program in 1947.
In response to a period of high disaster support payments in the 1970s and low crop insurance
participation, Congress enacted the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-365). This law
expanded the commodities covered and geographic scope of the program, introduced premium
subsidies, and al owed private-sector companies to sel and service policies. By passing this law
and providing incentives for farmers to expand their use of crop insurance, policymakers
reportedly hoped to reduce the demand for future disaster assistance payments.145 However, the
1980s were characterized by low farmer participation rates, high program loss ratios, and large
outlays for disaster programs.146 Additional y, Approved Insurance Providers (AIPs) accrued net
underwriting gains over this period, raising concerns about how reinsurance risks were shared
between the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and AIPs.147
In 1994, Congress enacted the Federal Crop Insurance Reform and Department of Agricultural
Reauthorization Act (P.L. 103-354), which increased premium subsidies, created catastrophic
(CAT) coverage, authorized prevented planting coverage, and required farmers to purchase crop
insurance as a condition for receiving commodity support payments. Farmers responded to these
changes by purchasing a record number of policies and expanding acreage insured under the
program (see Figure 1). Congress removed the crop insurance purchase requirement for receiving
commodity support payments in the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996
(P.L. 104-127). This act also al owed for the creation of USDA’s Risk Management Agency,
which has administered the FCIP since 1996 (see Table A-2) and required USDA to cease sel ing
crop insurance policies directly to farmers in areas where AIP coverage was available.
The Agriculture Risk Protection Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-224) further expanded the FCIP by
authorizing sales of crop revenue insurance and insurance for livestock. The legislation increased
premium subsidies to their current levels for basic and optional units and introduced the 508(h)
mechanism for the private sector to propose and develop new types of crop insurance coverage.

144 Randall A. Kramer, “Federal Crop Insurance 1938-1982,” Agricultural History, vol. 57, no. 2 (April 1983), pp. 181-
200.
145 Kramer, 1983, pp. 181-200.
146 Bruce L. Gardner, “Crop Insurance in US Farm Policy,” in Economics of Agricultural Crop Insurance: Theory and
Evidence, eds. Darrell L. Hueth and William H. Furtan (New York, NY: Springer Science+Business Media, 1994), pp.
17-44.
147 See discussion in Joseph W. Glauber, “Crop Insurance Reconsidered,” American Journal of Agricultural
Econom ics, vol. 86, no. 5 (December 2004), pp. 1179-1195. Although there have been changes in how reinsurance
risks are shared between USDA and the AIPs since the 1980’s, some stakeholders still consider this issue to be of
concern in the modern FCIP. See, for example, Joseph W. Glauber, “ Crop Insurance and Private Sector Delivery:
Reassessing the Public-Private Partnership,” T axpayers for Common Sense, December 2016; Barry Barnett et al.,
“Public and Private Roles in Agricultural Risk T ransfer,” AGree, March 2016; and Vincent Smit h et al., “T ime to
Reform the US Federal Agricultural Insurance Program,” American Enterprise Institute, October 2017. For additional
background, see CRS Report R45291, Federal Crop Insurance: Delivery Subsidies in Brief, by Isabel Rosa.
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One of these new policy types was revenue coverage, which has proved to be a popular option;
within a decade, revenue coverage accounted for the largest share of al policies sold.148
The 2008, 2014, and 2018 farm bil s continued to expand crop insurance coverage options
available (see Table A-1). The 2008 farm bil introduced enterprise and whole farm units and
increased subsidies for area-based coverage. The 2014 farm bil authorized shal ow loss coverage
and yield exclusion options. The 2018 farm bil introduced multicounty enterprise units. In
addition to expanding the coverage options available, the 2008 farm bil authorized USDA to
renegotiate the Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA) for the 2011 reinsurance year beginning
in July 2010. Since 2011, each annual SRA has included limits on certain subsidies paid to
AIPs.149
The 2014 farm bil restored conservation compliance as an eligibility requirement for producers
to receive crop insurance premium subsidies, a requirement that had previously been in effect
from 1985 to 1996.
Table A-1. Selected Legislation Affecting the Development of the Federal Crop
Insurance Program
Year
Legislation
Major Changes to FCIP
1938
Agricultural Adjustment Act of
Established the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC).
1938
Authorized insurance for wheat.
1941
55 Stat. 255
Authorized insurance for cotton.
1944
Agricultural Appropriation Act of Prohibited FCIC from issuing any policies.
1944
1944
58 Stat. 918
Reauthorized FCIC to issue policies for wheat, cotton, and flax.
Established experimental program to insure other major
commodities in geographical y limited areas.
1947
61 Stat. 718
Restricted FCIC policies for al crops to limited areas to improve
actuarial performance.
1980
Federal Crop Insurance Act of
Authorized FCIC to issue policies for al commodities and
1980
geographic areas. Subsidized 30% of insurance premiums. Al owed
private companies to sel FCIC policies.
1985
Food Security Act of 1985
Introduced conservation compliance requirements for crop
insurance purchases.
1994
Federal Crop Insurance Reform
Increased premium subsidies and introduced catastrophic coverage.
and Department of Agriculture
Required crop insurance purchases for eligibility for commodity
Reauthorization Act
support. Authorized prevented planting coverage.
1996
Federal Agriculture Improvement
Removed requirement linking commodity support and conservation
and Reform Act of 1996
compliance to crop insurance purchases. Created USDA’s Risk
Management Agency. Disal owed sales of crop insurance through
USDA county offices unless approved insurance provider coverage
is unavailable.
2000
Agriculture Risk Protection Act
Increased premium subsidies to present levels. Granted authority
of 2000
for revenue coverage and insurance for livestock. Authorized
creation of 508(h) pilot programs.

148 Joseph W. Glauber, “T he Growth of the Federal Crop Insurance Program, 1990–2011,” American Journal of
Agricultural Econom ics, vol. 95, no. 2 (January 2013), pp. 482-488.
149 For background on limits to AIP subsidies imposed in the Standard Reinsurance Agreement, see “ Approved
Insurance Provider Compensation.”
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Year
Legislation
Major Changes to FCIP
2008
Food, Conservation, and Energy
Introduced enterprise and whole farm units. Increase subsidies for
Act of 2008
area coverage plans. Authorized renegotiation of the Standard
Reinsurance Agreement for the 2011 reinsurance year.
2014
Agricultural Act of 2014
Introduced area-based shal ow loss coverage and yield exclusion
options. Relinked conservation compliance requirements.
2018
Agricultural Improvement Act of
Introduced multicounty enterprise coverage.
2018
Sources: CRS using Randal A. Kramer, “Federal Crop Insurance 1938-1982,” Agricultural History, vol. 57, no. 2
(April 1983), pp. 181-200, for legislation enacted prior to 1983; Joseph W. Glauber, “Crop Insurance
Reconsidered,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 86, no. 5 (December 2004), pp. 1179-1195 and
Joseph W. Glauber, “The Growth of the Federal Crop Insurance Program, 1990-2011,” American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, vol. 95, no. 2 (January 2013) for legislation enacted prior to 2014; and USDA, Office of
Inspector General, Annual Federal Crop Insurance Corporation/Risk Management Agency’s Financial Statements for
Fiscal Years 2019 and 2018, Audit Report 05401-0011-11, November 2019, for legislation enacted after 2014.
Notes: See CRS Report R42459, Conservation Compliance and U.S. Farm Policy, by Megan Stubbs for a history of
conservation compliance requirements in USDA programs.
Table A-2. USDA Agencies Administering FCIP Since 1938
Period
USDA Agency Administering FCIP
1938-1942
Agricultural Adjustment Administration
1942-1945
Agricultural Adjustment Agency
1945-1953
Production and Marketing Administration
1953-1961
Commodity Stabilization Service
1961-1994
Agricultural Conservation and Stabilization Service
1994-1996
Consolidated Farm Service Agency
1996-Present
Risk Management Agency
Source: CRS using National Archives guides to records for the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) and
the Farm Service Agency (FSA).
Note: In 1996, the Consolidated FSA became the FSA as per the Secretary of Agriculture’s Notice (61 Federal
Register 1109, January 16, 1996).

Author Information

Stephanie Rosch

Analyst in Agriculture Policy

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Federal Crop Insurance: A Primer

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