U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan:
February 4, 2021
Frequently Asked Questions
Clayton Thomas,
In 2021, a year that will mark the twentieth anniversary of the entry of U.S. troops into
Coordinator
Afghanistan, U.S. forces there are at the lowest level since 2001 due to the Trump
Analyst in Middle Eastern
Administration’s reduction of U.S. forces to 2,500 and its conditional commitment to the Affairs
Taliban to withdraw fully by April 2021. Members of Congress have expressed a range

of views about the drawdown and are likely to continue to closely scrutinize the
Cory R. Gill
drawdown’s impact on a range of U.S. policy interests.
Analyst in Foreign Affairs

The mission of U.S. forces in Afghanistan has evolved considerably since 2001, when
Tyler F. Hacker
the United States initiated military action against Al Qaeda and the Taliban government
Analyst in Defense
that protected the group in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks. Changes in
Logistics
security conditions in the country and in U.S. policy have prompted changes to

international force levels, with a gradual increase over the course of the George W. Bush
Heidi M. Peters
Administration due to growing Taliban strength (over 30,000 U.S. troops by 2008); an
Analyst in U.S. Defense
Obama Administration troop “surge” to blunt Taliban momentum that peaked in 2011
Acquisition Policy
with nearly 100,000 U.S. troops and ended on schedule in 2014 (around 10,000 U.S.

forces by 2015); and a smaller increase in U.S. troops under the Trump Administration

(to around 15,000 U.S. forces in 2018) to buttress Afghan forces before withdrawals in
line with a U.S. commitment to the Taliban to remove all U.S. and international forces by the end of April 2021.
U.S. commanders state that the reduction of U.S. troops to 2,500 will not result in any major changes to the two
complementary U.S. missions in Afghanistan, namely counterterrorism and training, advising, and assisting
Afghan forces. However, some have implied that the troop level order by President Trump might result in
adjustments to U.S. operations and limits to U.S. options. It may also affect partner country forces (which now
outnumber U.S. forces) and their ability to continue their training mission. The February 2020 U.S.-Taliban
agreement also commits the United States to withdrawing from Afghanistan all “private security contractors,”
which have played an important role in U.S. operations. The drawdown also has implications for U.S. physical
assets in the country, as military officials assess how to redeploy, transfer, or dispose of that materiel, and the
considerable U.S. diplomatic presence at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.
The drawdown came at a politically sensitive time in Afghanistan, with Taliban and Afghan government
representatives engaged in direct negotiations even as the conflict continues unabated. Many Afghans appear to
view the U.S. troop drawdown warily, given fears that the drawdown could lead to a Taliban military resurgence,
though some Afghan officials have downplayed the effect that U.S. withdrawals have on their own forces’
capabilities. The Taliban have welcomed the drawdown and implied that they may reengage in attacks on
international forces (from which the group has reportedly refrained since early 2020) if forces are not withdrawn
by the April 2021 date in the U.S.-Taliban agreement. U.S. officials speak often of a “conditional” withdrawal, but
have given conflicting accounts of whether the U.S. withdrawal is contingent upon, or otherwise related to, the
Taliban’s talks with the Afghan government or the outcome of such talks. Fragile intra-Afghan talks may go on
for some time as Afghans negotiate contentious issues including a ceasefire and the future of the Afghan state.
Experts have laid out a number of approaches that the Biden Administration, which is reportedly conducting a
review of the U.S.-Taliban agreement and broader U.S. Afghanistan policy, might take in light of the U.S. troop
drawdown. These include withdrawing all U.S. forces by April 2021 as scheduled, pausing or reversing the
withdrawal pending certain Taliban actions, and indefinitely supporting Afghan forces. This report will be updated
to reflect related developments or new considerations. For background on Afghanistan and the U.S. presence
there, see CRS Report R45122, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief, by Clayton Thomas.
Congressional Research Service

link to page 4 link to page 4 link to page 6 link to page 7 link to page 8 link to page 8 link to page 10 link to page 11 link to page 12 link to page 13 link to page 13 link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 19 link to page 20 link to page 20 link to page 25 link to page 26 link to page 26 link to page 28 link to page 30 U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

Contents
Background: When and why did the United States deploy military forces to
Afghanistan? What are the current missions of U.S. forces? ................................................. 1
When and why did the most recent drawdown begin? .............................................................. 3
How might the drawdown affect the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan? ............................ 4
What is the status of other international forces in Afghanistan and how have U.S.
partners reacted to the U.S drawdown and commitment to withdrawal? ............................... 5
How have Afghans, including the Taliban, reacted to the drawdown? ..................................... 7
How might the drawdown affect Afghan forces and the Afghan government? ........................ 8
How is the drawdown related to ongoing intra-Afghan talks? .................................................. 9
How have Members of Congress reacted to the withdrawal commitment and
subsequent drawdown? ........................................................................................................ 10
What is the status of U.S. contractors in Afghanistan? ........................................................... 12
What will happen to DOD materiel and other physical assets in the country? ....................... 13
What is the future of the U.S. diplomatic presence in Afghanistan? ....................................... 14
What are the security implications for the U.S. Embassy and diplomatic personnel? ............ 16
How do the drawdown and withdrawal commitment compare to possible historical
analogues? ............................................................................................................................ 17
What views has President Biden expressed about U.S. policy in Afghanistan? ..................... 22
What policies/actions might the Biden Administration pursue in light of the
drawdown? ........................................................................................................................... 23
What questions might Congress consider when debating U.S. policy in Afghanistan? .......... 25

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 27

Congressional Research Service

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

Background: When and why did the United States deploy military
forces to Afghanistan? What are the current missions of U.S. forces?
U.S. military forces have been in Afghanistan since 2001, making it one of the longest continuous
military conflicts in which the United States has fought. U.S. forces were originally focused
primarily on counterterrorism, but the U.S. military mission evolved to include supporting and
defending the new Afghan government and training its nascent military forces.
On September 11, 2001, operatives of the international terrorist organization Al Qaeda (AQ)
conducted a series of terrorist attacks in the United States that killed nearly 3,000 people. Al
Qaeda, which had previously struck U.S. targets both in the United States and abroad, and its
leader Osama bin Laden, were based in Afghanistan, a legacy of the group’s roots in the anti-
Soviet insurgency of the 1980s. Afghanistan in 2001 was ruled by the Taliban, a fundamentalist
Sunni Islamist group that originated in the country’s majority ethnic Pashtun south and east and
emerged out of Afghanistan’s post-Soviet civil war to take over most of the country by 1996. The
Taliban offered sanctuary to Bin Laden and his followers after they were expelled from Sudan in
1996. The Taliban and Al Qaeda established what was later described as a mutually beneficial
“alliance” whereby Al Qaeda provided financial and armed support to the Taliban in exchange for
freedom of movement in Afghanistan. Over 10,000 AQ fighters may have trained at AQ camps in
Afghanistan.1
In a nationwide address before a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, President
George W. Bush demanded that the Taliban hand over AQ leaders, permanently close terrorist
training camps, and give the U.S. access to such camps, adding that the Taliban “must hand over
the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.”2 Taliban leaders refused, citing Bin Laden’s status
as their guest.3
Pursuant to an authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) enacted on September 18, 2001
(P.L. 107-40), U.S. military action began on October 7, 2001, with airstrikes on Taliban targets
throughout the country and close air support to anti-Taliban forces in northern Afghanistan.
Limited numbers of U.S. Army Special Forces and some conventional ground forces began
deploying in Afghanistan less than two weeks later.4 By November 13, the Taliban evacuated
Kabul, which was soon retaken by those Afghan forces (known as the Northern Alliance). As
U.S.-backed Afghan forces drew closer to the southern city of Kandahar, birthplace of the Taliban
movement and home of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, Taliban leaders reportedly
offered terms of surrender, including an amnesty for Taliban fighters who would lay down their
arms. U.S. officials rejected such an amnesty and while many Taliban fighters and leaders were
killed or captured by U.S. or Afghan forces, others (including Mullah Omar) sought shelter in
remote or rural parts of Afghanistan or escaped to Pakistan.
In December 2001, Afghan delegates convened in Germany by the United Nations selected
Hamid Karzai to serve as head of an interim national government, marking the beginning of post-
Taliban governance. The creation of the new Afghan government also represented the beginning

1 “The 9/11 Commission Report,” July 2004, pp. 66-67.
2 “Text: President Bush Addresses the Nation,” Washington Post, September 20, 2001.
3 Steve Coll, Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Penguin Press, 2018),
pp. 69.
4 For more on the first year of U.S. operations in Afghanistan, see Walter L. Perry and David Kassing, “Toppling the
Taliban: Air-Ground Operations in Afghanistan, October 2001-June 2002,” RAND Corporation, 2015.
Congressional Research Service

1

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

of a major new mission set for U.S. forces and their international partners: helping defend and
develop that government and its nascent military. Karzai attended the January 2002 State of the
Union address where President Bush previewed this expanded mission, saying that the United
States and Afghanistan were “allies against terror” and that “we will be partners in rebuilding that
country.”5 Congress supported the Bush Administration in this approach, authorizing and
appropriating funds for more expansive U.S. military and civilian assistance missions (e.g. via the
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act, 2002 P.L. 107-327). U.S. officials declared an end to major
combat operations in Afghanistan on May 1, 2003, though then-Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld said that “pockets of resistance in certain parts of the country remain.”6
By 2005, scattered Taliban forces had already begun to regroup in the Pashtun heartland of
eastern and southern Afghanistan, as well as across the border in Pakistan, where many observers
suspected that Pakistan’s security and intelligence services were tolerating, if not actively support
them.7 The Taliban described continuing U.S. and coalition military operations in Afghanistan as
a military occupation and characterized their Afghan government adversaries as puppets of
foreign powers.8 In response to growing Taliban activity, the United States gradually increased
forces to around 30,000 by the end of the George W. Bush Administration. Under the Obama
Administration, the United States and its partners further increased international force levels,
which peaked at over 130,000 (of which around 100,000 were U.S. troops) in 2010-11, but set a
goal to end combat operations by the end of 2014.
Though that “surge” was arguably successful in weakening Taliban advances, by 2010 the Obama
Administration came to assess that the conflict had no military solution.9 Preliminary U.S.-
Taliban negotiations were constrained by U.S. policy to require the inclusion of the Afghan
government, with which the Taliban refused to meet, in any settlement.10 As international force
levels were reduced in advance of the scheduled 2014 transition, NATO began gradually
transferring security duties to Afghan forces starting in 2011. Afghan forces assumed full
responsibility for security nationwide at the end of 2014 with the end of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) and the start of the noncombat Resolute Support Mission (RSM) that
began on January 1, 2015.
In addition to training, advising, and assisting Afghan forces as part of RSM, U.S. troops in
Afghanistan also conduct counterterrorism operations; these two “complementary missions”
comprise Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. The legal framework for U.S. operations in Afghanistan
remains the 2001 AUMF, over which there is considerable debate in Congress. In the FY2021
Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-260), Congress made available just over $3 billion in
support for Afghan forces (the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, ASFF), down over a billion
from the amount appropriated in FY2020, in addition to billions in Overseas Contingency
Operations funding for U.S. military operations. Since FY2001, the United States has spent over

5 “President Delivers State of the Union Address,” White House (archived), January 29, 2002.
6 “Rumsfeld: Major combat over in Afghanistan,” CNN, May 1, 2003.
7 See, for example, Matt Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan
Insurgents,” Crisis States Research Centre, June 2010.
8 See Matthew Calvin, “The Use of English-Language Internet Propaganda by the Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan,
2007-2010,” Electronic Theses and Dissertations, June 2011, available at https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/108;
Thomas Ruttig, “How Tribal are the Taliban?” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2010.
9 Rod Nordland, “Troop ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan Ends with Mixed Results,” New York Times, September 21, 2012.
10 Evan MacAskill and Simon Tisdall, “White House shifts Afghanistan strategy towards talks with Taliban,”
Guardian, July 19, 2010.
Congressional Research Service

2

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

$141 billion for reconstruction efforts and related activities (including military assistance), and
over $720 billion to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan.11
As the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan has fallen to a number not seen since 2001, some
have reflected on the circumstances under which U.S. forces entered the country and the
subsequent evolution of U.S. policy. Some maintain that the United States and its international
partners have achieved significant and meaningful gains in Afghanistan, namely fostering a
democratic U.S. ally and counterterrorism partner in a difficult region.12 Others disagree, seeing
the expansion of U.S. mission sets (and investment of personnel and resources) after 2001 as an
error. In a December 2020 visit to Afghanistan, former Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher
Miller (who previously served in Afghanistan as early as 2001) said
I always felt it was a huge strategic error by expanding the war. I thought the war was for
special operations, small footprint. And I just personally thought, if we were smart
strategically, Afghanistan would always have a special operations force... I think we would
have had a different outcome if we had maintained what we were doing then.13
When and why did the most recent drawdown begin?
When President Donald Trump came into office in January 2017, approximately 11,000 U.S.
troops were reportedly in Afghanistan, with U.S. force levels having declined from their 2009-
2011 high point of approximately 100,000 U.S. troops.14 In June 2017, President Trump delegated
to then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis the authority to set force levels, reportedly limited to
around 3,500 additional troops; Secretary Mattis signed orders to deploy them in September
2017.15 Those additional forces (all of which were dedicated to NATO-led RSM) arrived in
Afghanistan within months, putting the total number of U.S. troops in the country at 14,000-
15,000 by the end of 2017.16
By mid-2018, President Trump was reportedly frustrated with the lack of military progress
against the Taliban, and he ordered formal and direct U.S.-Taliban talks without Afghan
government participation for the first time. As those talks developed under Special Representative
for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad, President Trump continued to express
frustration with the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan and a desire to withdraw U.S. forces,
saying in August 2019 that he wanted to do so “as quickly as we can.”17 U.S. force levels began

11 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the U.S. Congress,” October 30,
2020. Both of these figures appear to be in nominal dollar terms.
12 For a wide range of views on the U.S. project in Afghanistan, see CRS Report R46197, The Washington Post’s
“Afghanistan Papers” and U.S. Policy: Main Points and Possible Questions for Congress, by Clayton Thomas.
13 Patrick Tucker, “Acting SecDef Miller Visits Troops in Afghanistan,” DefenseOne, December 22, 2020.
14 While the level was publicly reported at 8,400, media outlets reported in August 2017 that the figure was actually
around 11,000 on any given day due to units rotating in and out of theater. See Gordon Lubold and Nancy Youssef,
“U.S. Has More Troops in Afghanistan Than Publicly Disclosed,” Wall Street Journal, August 22, 2017. See also CRS
Report R44116, Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq: 2007-2018, by Heidi M.
Peters and Sofia Plagakis.
15 Tara Copp, “Mattis signs orders to send about 3,500 more US troops to Afghanistan,” Military Times, Sept. 11, 2017.
16 Dan Lamothe, “Trump added troops in Afghanistan. But NATO is still short of meeting its goal,” Washington Post,
November 9, 2017; Greg Jaffe and Missy Ryan, “Up to 1,000 more U.S. troops could be headed to Afghanistan this
spring,” Washington Post, January 21, 2018. As of September 30, 2017, the total number of active duty and reserve
forces in Afghanistan was 15,298. Defense Manpower Data Center, Military and Civilian Personnel by Service/Agency
by State/Country Quarterly Report, September 2017.
17 Kevin Baron, “Trump Says US Troops Shouldn’t be ‘Policemen’ in Afghanistan. So Why Are They There?”
DefenseOne, July 22, 2019; “Trump Wants to Get Out Of Afghanistan ‘As Quickly As He Can,’” Tolo News, August 1,
Congressional Research Service

3

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

to descend in 2019: at an October 9, 2019, news conference, General Austin S. Miller, the top
U.S. commander in Afghanistan, said that the number of U.S. forces had been gradually reduced
by 2,000 over the past year, to between 12,000 and 13,000.18
In February 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed a formal agreement in which the
United States committed to withdrawing all of its troops, contractors, and nondiplomatic civilian
personnel from Afghanistan, with a drawdown in military forces to 8,600 by mid-July 2020 and a
complete withdrawal by the end of April 2021. In return, the Taliban committed to prevent any
groups, including Al Qaeda, from threatening the United States or its allies by not allowing those
groups to reside, train, or fundraise in Afghanistan. The U.S. withdrawal commitment was not
conditioned explicitly on progress in intra-Afghan talks, but U.S. officials have suggested that
U.S. forces would not be obliged to withdrawal if talks collapsed.
Throughout 2020, although U.S. officials stated that the Taliban were not in full compliance with
the agreement, U.S. force levels continued to drop, reaching 8,600 a month ahead of the mid-July
2020 deadline in the U.S.-Taliban accord.19 Confusion about the United States’ future military
posture grew in October 2020 due to contradictory visions expressed by senior Administration
officials, including President Trump’s tweet that, “We should have the small remaining number of
our BRAVE Men and Women serving in Afghanistan home by Christmas!”20
On November 17, 2020, then-Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller announced, “we
will implement President Trump's orders to continue our repositioning of forces from”
Afghanistan, and that 2,500 U.S. forces would remain in Afghanistan by January 15, 2021. Acting
Secretary Miller characterized the drawdown (announced alongside a similar reduction of U.S.
forces from Iraq) as “consistent with our established plans and strategic objectives,” and said it
“does not equate to a change in U.S. policy or objectives.”21 On January 15, 2021, Acting
Secretary Miller confirmed that the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan had reached 2,500.22
The Biden Administration reportedly is conducting a review of the U.S.-Taliban agreement and
broader U.S. Afghanistan policy, and might take action to endorse or amend the U.S. troop
drawdown (see below).23
How might the drawdown affect the U.S. military mission in
Afghanistan?
In general, U.S. officials insist that the reduction of troops to 2,500 will not result in any major
changes to the two complementary U.S. missions in Afghanistan: counterterrorism and training,
advising, and assisting Afghan forces. However, some officials have implied that the troop level

2019.
18 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Mujib Mashal, “U.S. Is Quietly Reducing Its Troop Force in Afghanistan,” New York
Times, October 21, 2019.
19 Kylie Atwood and Ryan Browne, “US troop drawdown in Afghanistan running ahead of schedule,” CNN, April 30,
2020; “Taliban not living up to its commitments, U.S. Defense Secretary says,” Reuters, May 5, 2020; Robert Burns,
“US General: Taliban Not Yet Met Conditions for US Withdrawal,” Associated Press, June 10, 2020.
20 “U.S. troops in Afghanistan should be ‘home by Christmas’: Trump,” Reuters, October 7, 2020.
21 “Acting Secretary Miller Announces Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq,” Department of Defense, Nov. 17, 2020.
22 “Statement by Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller on Force Levels in Afghanistan,” Department of Defense
January 15, 2021.
23 “Biden Administration to review Taliban deal,” Al Jazeera, January 23, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

4

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

order by President Trump was not ideal from their perspective and might result in some
adjustments to U.S. operations and limits to U.S. options.
In a mid-December 2020 interview, General Kenneth F. McKenzie, Commander of U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM), said of the 2,500-troop level, “We believe that is a practical way
forward. Might not be where you want to be. But I think it is a practical way forward, I think is
something that’s very defensible.”24 Later that month, he said a U.S. troop level of 2,500 “gives
us the ability to do [counterterrorism] operations when we need to do it. It gives us the ability to
protect ourselves, and it gives us the ability to reach out with focused advise and assist to our
Afghan partners where they need it.”25 However, he conceded, “We will not be as robust as we
were in the past. That’s a fact and we recognize that.”
Limitations may also manifest themselves geographically; one media account described former
Acting Secretary Miller as saying that the United States will be able to provide training at the
corps level in the north but perhaps not in the south. Miller did say that the United States would
maintain “the ability to project to what we refer to as ‘points of need,’ which are lower than the
corps level.”26
The drawdown of U.S. forces to 2,500 may have limited effects on the training mission. The
steady drawdown of U.S. forces since the post-2017 high of approximately 15,000 already has
reduced the number of U.S. trainers working with Afghan partners, especially at lower levels of
the Afghan military. Moreover, U.S. commanders have limited face-to-face advising to mission-
essential circumstances since the beginning of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic early in 2020.27 U.S. forces have assessed that COVID-19-mandated remote training
activities, held via email, videoconferencing, text messaging, and other platforms, are still
effective, if less so than in-person training.28
Additionally, Acting Secretary Miller implied that U.S. air support, which many view as critical
for sustaining the Afghan military, will remain a part of the U.S. presence: “Our competitive
advantage as the United States military is our control of the air and I think we can do a lot in this
regard, even if we don’t have a large physical presence on the ground.”29 How the now-reduced
U.S. presence and projected U.S. withdrawal might impact Afghan forces and their battle against
the Taliban is explored below.
What is the status of other international forces in Afghanistan and
how have U.S. partners reacted to the U.S drawdown and
commitment to withdrawal?
International troops from U.S. allies have been deployed alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan
since 2001 under the command of two successive NATO-led training missions: the International

24 “General Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr. Defense One Interview with Katie Bo Williams,” U.S. Central Command,
December 10, 2020.
25 “Gen McKenzie and Luis Martinez On The Record Interview,” U.S. Central Command, December 22, 2020.
26 Katie Bo Williams, “Milley Meets with Taliban in Fragile Peace Negotiations,” Defense One, December 17, 2020.
27 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the U.S. Congress,” October 30,
2020, pg. 78.
28 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the U.S. Congress,” January 30,
2021, p. 57.
29 Tucker, op. cit.
Congressional Research Service

5

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

Security Assistance Force (ISAF, 2003-2014) and Resolute Support Mission (RSM, 2015-
present). According to a recent NATO factsheet, RSM forces provide training, advice, and
assistance to develop the capabilities of Afghan military forces (particularly the air force and
special forces) as well as the civilian institutions that oversee them.30
NATO partners drew down their forces in Afghanistan in 2020 alongside the U.S. drawdown, but
the exact figure has often been unclear in recent months: a NATO table breaking down troop
contributions by country dated June 2020 shows 15,937 troops, including 8,000 U.S. personnel.31
After the United States, the largest troop-contributing nations as of June 2020 were Germany
(1,300), the United Kingdom (950), Italy (895), Georgia (860), and Romania (738). On
November 23, 2020, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that there were “less than 11,000
troops in the train and advice mission.”32
In the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement, the United States committed to withdrawing all
allied and coalition partner forces, in addition to its own. No U.S. partners have separately
confirmed an intention to draw down their own forces in line with the U.S. to reach full
withdrawal by April 2021, per the U.S-Taliban agreement. British Defense Minister Ben Wallace
said that he “expected” that if the United States drew down its troops “at some stage,” the United
Kingdom would do so as well.33 German officials have expressed concern about the pacing of the
U.S. drawdown and conditionality attached to U.S. withdrawal commitment to the Taliban, with
Foreign Minister Heiko Maas warning that a “rash exit” from Afghanistan would create
additional hurdles for the fragile intra-Afghan negotiations.34 Maas and other German officials
have stated their belief that the condition for a military withdrawal should be progress in those
negotiations.
NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg has also voiced caution, saying that while there are risks to
staying, “if we leave, we risk Afghanistan once again becoming a safe haven for international
terrorists, and the loss of the gains made with such sacrifice.”35 Stoltenberg also emphasized the
importance of intra-alliance coordination:
We need to assess whether the conditions for leaving are met, together. We need to make
these decisions together. And as we have said many times in NATO: we went into
Afghanistan together, we should make decisions on adjustments of a presence there
together, and when the time is right we should leave together, but then in a coordinated and
orderly way.36
U.S. officials often cite the higher number of total NATO and other partner country forces in
Afghanistan to argue that current missions can continue with reduced U.S. troop presence.
However, a full U.S. withdrawal would likely disrupt partner country forces’ abilities to continue
their training mission in several ways. First, any deterioration in security conditions resulting
from the U.S. drawdown could spur international partners to withdraw as well; German Defense

30 “NATO-Afghanistan Relations,” NATO, December 2020. Available at
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/2012-backgrounder-afghanistan-e.pdf.
31 “Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures,” August 2020. Available at
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/6/pdf/2020-06-RSM-Placemat.pdf.
32 “Adapting NATO for 2030 and Beyond,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), November 23, 2020.
33 “UK will likely follow the U.S. in cutting Afghanistan troops, minister says,” Reuters, November 19, 2020.
34 Nina Werkhauser and Sandra Petersmann, “German government opposes Donald Trump’s Afghan troop
withdrawal,” Deutsche Welle, November 19, 2020.
35 Online press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, NATO, December 1, 2020.
36 Interview with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, NATO, November 22, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

6

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer said after the U.S. drawdown announcement that
“however things develop, our soldiers’ safety is the top priority.”37
Also, the United States provides allies with key logistical support, without which other
international forces may find operating more difficult. A German defense ministry spokesperson
said after the U.S. drawdown was announced, “We are of course trying to find out…what this
means in concrete terms for capabilities on the ground because …[the United States] has a
significant role to play in capabilities that are necessary to sustain” the German troop presence.38
Secretary Stoltenberg said in November 2020 that NATO military officials have confirmed with
U.S. counterparts that “they will maintain enablers as the support, especially aviation support
helicopter, support fixed wing and rotary wing support to the NATO missions” as the United
States draws down to 2,500 troops. He added that the alliance would assess at its February 2021
defense ministerial meeting whether the conditions have been met for a full withdrawal by April
as envisioned in the U.S.-Taliban agreement.39
How have Afghans, including the Taliban, reacted to the
drawdown?
Press reports suggest many Afghans view the U.S. troop drawdown warily, given fears that the
drawdown could lead to a Taliban military resurgence, though Afghan officials generally maintain
that Afghan forces will be able to defend themselves regardless of U.S. troop levels.
Pro-government Afghans and those who have benefitted from the socio-political reforms of the
past two decades, particularly women and Afghans in urban areas, have reacted to the U.S.
drawdown and commitment to withdrawal with anxiety and concern that the drawdown portends
a Taliban return to power that will curtail their rights and freedoms.40 For their part, Afghan
government officials have generally downplayed the effect that U.S. withdrawals have on their
own forces’ capabilities.41 In the days after the most recent U.S. drawdown announcement,
Afghan Defense Minister Asadullah Khalid said that he did not “see any clear indication that the
U.S. or NATO forces will fully withdraw [from] the country,” and stated that only 4% of
operations require U.S. air support.42 Other Afghan officials are less sanguine, suggesting that a
U.S. force level reduction to 2,500 will have a disruptive impact on the Afghan military and its
ability to keep the Taliban at bay in key parts of the country.43
For their part, the Taliban, who attribute the war to the presence of international forces, have
welcomed the U.S. drawdown announcement, with one representative describing it as a “good

37 Werkhauser and Petersmann, op. cit.
38 Hans von der Burchard, “Germany expresses ‘serious concern’ over US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan,”
Politico, November 18, 2020.
39 “Adapting NATO for 2030 and Beyond,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), November 23, 2020.
40 Sune Engel Rasmussen and Ehsanullah Amiri, “Afghanistan Braces for the Worst as U.S. Troop Withdrawal
Accelerates,” Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2020; Diaa Hadid and Tom Bowman, “People in the Afghan capital
Kabul are uneasy about U.S. troop drawdown,” NPR, December 16, 2020.
41 See “Afghan President Says Possible U.S. Troop Withdrawal Won’t Affect Security,” RFE/RL, December 21, 2018;
Rebecca Blumenstein and Mujib Mashal, “Afghanistan is Ready for Major U.S. Troop Reduction, Ghani Says,” New
York Times, January 23, 2020.
42 Anthony Capaccio and Jonathan Stearns, “NATO Chief Warns Trump’s Afghanistan Troop Cuts Risk Terrorism,”
Bloomberg, November 17, 2020.
43 Phillip Walter Wellman, “Premature US exit could embolden terrorists, Afghans say,” Stars and Stripes, November
17, 2020; Thomas Gibbons-Neff, et al., “U.S. Troops Are Packing Up, Ready or Not,” New York Times, Nov. 17, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

7

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

step.”44 A Taliban spokesman stated in February 2021 that the group has “a legal right to free its
homeland from the presence of occupying forces with every lawful means necessary” and that “if
some discard the Doha accord … history has proven that the Afghan Mujahid nation can valiantly
defend its values, soil, homeland and rights.”45
How might the drawdown affect Afghan forces and the Afghan
government?
The drawdown could affect the Afghan government and its ongoing fight against the Taliban in
two separate but interrelated ways, each of which is difficult to quantify. Most directly, the
drawdown, by reducing the number of U.S. personnel available to train, advise, and accompany
Afghan forces, could negatively impact those forces’ capabilities. Additionally, the U.S.
drawdown, as a step toward the full withdrawal of U.S. forces, could accelerate long-standing
centrifugal forces in the fragile Afghan state if powerbrokers increasingly take matters into their
own hands.
In terms of how the U.S. drawdown may affect Afghan forces’ capabilities, much depends on the
extent to which the NATO-led training mission can continue without interruption. As noted
above, U.S. military officials maintain that training activities can continue (pointing to the larger
NATO presence), though SIGAR reports that trainers will be working at the ministry and corps
levels, citing statements from General Miller.46 Many of the U.S. forces deployed to Afghanistan
(including the Army’s Security Force Assistance Brigades) as part of the Trump Administration’s
increase in force levels provided support at the battalion (or kandak) level; it appears unlikely a
reduced U.S. force would maintain that kind of lower level tactical support. Some also have
warned that a complete U.S. withdrawal could damage the morale of Afghan forces, which is
reportedly already fragile.47
Some U.S. policy tools might counter any potentially detrimental consequence of the drawdown
or eventual withdrawal on Afghan forces. Continued provision of U.S. air support (discussed
above) to Afghan forces until or after withdrawal may have an outsized positive influence on
Afghan forces in the field.48 It arguably may counterbalance the tactical impact of any reduction
in U.S. training for Afghan forces after the drawdown. Continued U.S. financial support also may
be instrumental in keeping Afghan forces in the field against the Taliban. In January 2018,
President Ghani said, “[W]e will not be able to support our army for six months without U.S.
[financial] support.”49 Still, a full U.S. military withdrawal could affect the level and types of
security assistance the United States may provide to Afghanistan.
Beyond the immediate effects on U.S. missions in support of Afghan forces, the U.S. military
drawdown may have second- or third- order effects on the Afghan polity, especially when it

44 “Taliban hails US troop drawdown from Afghanistan as ‘good step,’” France 24, November 18, 2020.
45 “Remarks by spokesman of Islamic Emirate concerning statement.by representatives of some countries,” Voice of
Jihad, February 1, 2021. Available at https://alemarahenglish.net/?p=42271.
46 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the U.S. Congress,” January 30,
2021, p. 56.
47 Brian Glyn Williams and Javed Rezayee, “The perils of a US troop drawdown to the Afghan army and tribes,” The
Hill, November 28, 2020; Gibbons-Neff, et al., op. cit.; Kathy Gannon, “US troop withdrawal will be serious blow to
Afghan forces’ morale, generals say,” Associated Press, December 21, 2018.
48 Susannah George, “The Taliban is on the offensive. Keeping the militants at bay: U.S. airstrikes, even as bases close
and troops leave,” Washington Post, November 21, 2020.
49 Anwar Iqbal, “Afghan Army to Collapse in Six Months Without US Help: Ghani,” Dawn, January 18, 2018.
Congressional Research Service

8

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

comes to perceptions of U.S. intentions and of the impact of the U.S. drawdown on Afghan
capabilities, and the resulting calculations that Afghans make. Some Afghans (including those
who remember the complex, multi-sided civil war of the 1990s) have suggested that their
communities (and, often, their associated militias) may pursue more independent courses of
action in the event that the Afghan government is unable to provide security in the context of the
U.S drawdown and withdrawal. For example, in late December 2020, the former governor of
Balkh Province and widely viewed powerbroker Atta Mohamad Noor warned, “If the government
does not pay attention to areas lacking security, then we must take action and we don’t care if
they call us militia,” adding, “If you cannot improve the security situation, then let us do
something.”50
Fractures between the central government and local powerbrokers are likely to break down along
ethnic lines; Noor and others are associated with the Northern Alliance, which comprised mostly
Tajiks and other ethnic minorities from northern Afghanistan and fought the majority-Pashtun
Taliban in the 1990s.51 Some who oppose the Afghan government’s talks with the Taliban have
proposed reestablishing the Northern Alliance under a new name.52 Members of Afghanistan’s
only majority Shia ethnic group, the Hazaras, have long faced Taliban persecution and may also
look to protect their communities via extralegal means; as one Hazara leader said in a recent
media account, “If America leaves, the Hazaras have no choice but to take up weapons.”53
How is the drawdown related to ongoing intra-Afghan talks?
U.S. officials have given conflicting accounts of whether the U.S. withdrawal is contingent upon,
or otherwise related to, the Taliban holding talks with Kabul or the outcome of such talks. In a
February 29 2020, briefing ahead of the U.S.-Taliban agreement signing, one unnamed senior
U.S. official said, “if the political settlement fails, if the talks fail, there is nothing that obliges the
United States to withdraw troops,” while another said, “the withdrawal timeline is related to
counterterrorism, not political outcomes.”54 The deputy U.S. negotiator Molly Phee said on
February 18, 2020, “We will not prejudge the outcome of intra-Afghan negotiations, but we are
prepared to support whatever consensus the Afghans are able to reach about their future political
and governing arrangements.”55
On September 11, 2020, Afghan government and Taliban representatives met in Doha, Qatar, to
begin the first formal intra-Afghan talks to end the war. It remains unclear what kind of security
and political arrangements could satisfy both Kabul and the Taliban to the extent that the latter
abandons its armed struggle. Many Afghans, especially women, who remember Taliban rule and
oppose the group’s policies and beliefs, remain wary.56 Those Afghans doubt the Taliban’s
trustworthiness and express concern that, in the absence of U.S. military pressure, the group will

50 “Atta Noor threatens to ‘take action’ against security situation,” Ariana News, December 24, 2020.
51 Siddhant Kishore, “Rallying old friends: Adapting to an evolving Afghan threatre,” Observer Research Foundation,
January 7, 2021.
52 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Fatima Faizi, “In Proud Corners of Afghanistan, New Calls for Autonomy,” New York
Times, September 28, 2020.
53 Rasmussen and Amiri, op. cit.
54 “Briefing with Senior Administration Officials on Next Steps Toward an Agreement on Bringing Peace to
Afghanistan,” U.S. Department of State, February 29, 2020.
55 Molly Phee, remarks at “Ending Our Endless War in Afghanistan,” United States Institute of Peace, February 18,
2020.
56 Pamela Constable, “The Return of a Taliban Government? Afghanistan Talks Raise Once-Unthinkable Question,”
Washington Post, January 29, 2019.
Congressional Research Service

9

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

have little incentive to either remain in talks or comply with the terms of any agreement reached
with Kabul.57 The Taliban denied involvement in the January 2021 assassination of female
supreme court judges in Kabul and other recent targeted attacks, but the United States and other
nations released a joint statement on January 31, 2020, charging that “the Taliban bears
responsibility for the majority of this targeted violence.”58 Some Afghan officials reportedly
suspect the Taliban of trying to “run out the clock on the withdrawal of American troops,”
remaining in negotiations long enough to secure a full U.S. withdrawal.59
A December 2019 survey reported that a “significant majority” of Afghans were both aware of
(77%) and strongly or somewhat supported (89%) efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with the
Taliban, while opposing the group itself.60 Nearly 80% of respondents in a November 2020
survey said that they were strongly or somewhat optimistic that talks would lead to a “lasting
peace,” though over a quarter expect the Taliban to defeat the Afghan government if talks fail.61
At least some Afghans support “peace at any cost” given the decades of conflict through which
the country has suffered.62
How have Members of Congress reacted to the withdrawal
commitment and subsequent drawdown?
While the congressional reaction to the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement was diverse but
relatively limited, reaction to the Trump Administration’s November 2020 withdrawal
announcement was more extensive.63 Some Members welcomed the announcement or did so with
reservations, while others expressed concerns or opposed it outright. Additionally, Congress
enacted restrictions on the President’s ability to reduce troops in Afghanistan below certain levels
in the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-283); President Trump
waived those restrictions in January 2021.
Members who have expressed support for the drawdown and withdrawal generally contend that
the U.S. military presence cannot bring about an intra-Afghan settlement to end the conflict and
that the ability of that military presence to achieve U.S. interests is limited. Citing those and other
arguments, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith described the drawdown as
“the right policy decision.”64 Other Members welcome the drawdown as a step toward the full
withdrawal of U.S. troops: in a letter to Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller, Senator
Josh Hawley argued that the United States had demonstrated sufficient counterterrorism

57 “Afghans voice fears that the U.S. is undercutting them in deal with the Taliban,” Washington Post, August 17, 2019.
58 Ayaz Gul, “Gunmen Assassinate 2 Female Afghan Judges in Kabul,” VOA, January 17, 2021; “Statement on
Continuation of Assassinations, Kidnapping, and Destruction of Vital Infrastructure,” U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan,
January 31, 2021.
59 Mujib Mashal, “Violent attacks plague Afghanistan as peace talks in Doha slow,” New York Times, September 19,
2020.
60 The Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2019: A Survey of the Afghan People,” released December 3, 2019.
61 “The Afghan People’s Peace Perception Survey: Third Survey,” Institute of War and Peace Studies, November 2020.
Available at https://iwps.org.af/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/English-3th-Peace-Perception-Survey-IWPS-2020.pdf.
62 Susannah George and Sharif Hassan, “Faced with the prospect of formal peace talks, Afghans consider what they’re
willing to concede,” Washington Post, June 7, 2020.
63 “Acting Secretary Miller Announces Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq,” Department of Defense, Nov. 17, 2020.
64 “Smith Statement on Afghanistan Troop Drawdown,” House Armed Services Committee, November 17, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

10

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

capabilities to justify an expeditious full withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan,
characterizing what he called the “broader nation-building mission” as a “mistake.”65
On the other hand, some Members advocate for an eventual U.S. withdrawal, but criticize the
Trump Administration’s motivations, methods, or timing, particularly emphasizing the potential
effects on security conditions and intra-Afghan negotiations. Senator Tim Kaine argued that the
“haphazard nature of President Trump’s decision will harm our national security and jeopardize
countless American [and] Afghan” lives.66 Senator Chris Murphy expressed his support for a
“swift and orderly drawdown of U.S. forces” but contended the decision was made without
sufficient consultation with allies and that the “Afghan government is currently engaged in
sensitive negotiations with the Taliban over the future status of the country’s political and social
order, and we should use our leverage to help them get the best deal possible.”67 House Oversight
and Reform National Security Subcommittee Chairman Steven Lynch argued in a letter to Acting
Secretary Miller and then-Secretary of State Pompeo that drawing down U.S. forces could have
serious consequences for U.S. interests, and requested that they provide documentation of Taliban
compliance with the February 2020 agreement as well as executive branch communications
regarding the drawdown decision.68
Other Members have emphasized the importance of conditionality: Senator Lindsey Graham, for
example, said that a “drawdown to 2,500 counter-terrorism forces may be sufficient but should be
conditions-based, to protect America’s interests.”69 Similarly, in floor remarks, then-Senate
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell praised President Trump’s Afghanistan policy, saying “[t]hat
same successful approach should continue until the conditions for the long-term defeat” of
terrorist groups are achieved.70 He also warned, “A rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Afghanistan now would hurt our allies and delight the people who wish us harm,” comparing a
“premature American exit” to the 2011 withdrawal from Iraq and the “humiliating American
departure from Saigon in 1975.”71
Finally, some Members expressed opposition to the drawdown announcement: Senator Mitt
Romney called on the Trump Administration to reverse what he called a “politically-motivated
decision,” saying that “conditions for withdrawal [from Afghanistan] have not been met.”72
Senator Ben Sasse said, “this weak retreat is not grounded in reality and will make the world a
more dangerous place.”73 House Foreign Affairs Committee Ranking Member Michael McCaul
called on the Trump Administration to “ensure a residual force is maintained for the foreseeable

65 “Hawley Praises President Trump’s Plan to Bring Troops Home from Afghanistan,” Office of Senator Josh Hawley,
November 17, 2020.
66 “Kaine Statement on Trump Decision to Withdraw Troops from Afghanistan and Iraq,” Office of Senator Tim Kaine,
November 17, 2020.
67 “Murphy Statement On Troop Withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq,” Office of Senator Chris Murphy, November
17, 2020.
68 Letter from Chairman Stephen Lynch to Secretary of State Pompeo and Acting Secretary of Defense Miller,
November 17, 2020.
69 “Graham on Afghanistan Drawdown,” Office of Senator Lindsey Graham, November 17, 2020.
70 “Premature Afghanistan Exit Would Jeopardize Trump Administration’s Record of Success,” Office of Majority
Leader Mitch McConnell, November 16, 2020.
71 Ibid.
72 “Romney Statement on Proposed Troop Withdrawals from Afghanistan and Iraq,” Office of Senator Mitt Romney,
November 17, 2020.
73 “Sasse Statement on Retreat from Middle East,” Office of Ben Sasse, November 17, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

11

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

future to protect U.S. national and homeland security interests and to help secure peace in
Afghanistan.”74
Beyond Member statements, Congress also passed legislation containing provisions directly
related to U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan. Section 1215 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283)
prohibits the use of funds to reduce U.S. forces in Afghanistan below the level as of enactment or
2,000 (whichever is lesser) until the Secretary of Defense submits a report that includes, among
other points, an assessment of the effects of U.S. troop reductions on counterterrorism, Afghan
military capabilities, the NATO-led training mission, and other U.S. policy priorities. Section
1215 also allows the President to waive the reporting requirement with the submission of a
written determination that such a waiver is in U.S. national security interests with a “detailed
explanation” of how it furthers those interests. President Trump signed such a waiver on January
13, 2021, arguing that the U.S. drawdown to 2,500 troops was necessary to support Afghan talks
and sufficient to continue the U.S. counterterrorism mission.75
What is the status of U.S. contractors in Afghanistan?
Overseas contingency operations in recent decades have highlighted the role that contractors play
in supporting the U.S. military, both in terms of the number of contractor personnel and the type
of work being performed by these individuals.76 Analysts have highlighted numerous benefits of
using contractors. Some of these benefits include freeing up uniformed personnel to focus on
military-specific activities; providing supplemental expertise in specialized fields, such as
linguistics or weapon systems maintenance; and providing a surge capability to quickly deliver
critical support tailored to specific military needs. Just as the effective use of contractors can
augment military capabilities, the ineffective use of contractors can prevent troops from receiving
what they need when they need it and can lead to wasteful spending. Contractors can also
compromise the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. military and undermine operations, as
many analysts believe occurred during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.77
Since 2008, CENTCOM has published quarterly contractor census reports, which provide
aggregated data–including elements such as mission category and nationality–on contractors
employed through DOD-funded contracts who are physically located within the CENTCOM area
of responsibility (AOR), which includes Afghanistan.78 During the first quarter of FY2021,
CENTCOM reported that 18,214 contractor personnel working for DOD were located in
Afghanistan, down nearly 20% from the previous quarter.79 In Afghanistan as of the first quarter

74 “McCaul Statement on Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs Committee Republicans, November 16, 2020.
75 Letter from President Donald J. Trump, January 13, 2021.
76 For past CRS analysis, see CRS Report R43074, Department of Defense’s Use of Contractors to Support Military
Operations: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress, by Heidi M. Peters.
77 Some observers believe that the fallout from Abu Ghraib and other incidents, such as the shooting of Iraqi civilians
by private security contractors hired by the United States government, have hurt the credibility of the U.S. military and
undermined efforts in Iraq. See also: Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” February 2010, p.
93; Commission on Wartime Contracting In Iraq and Afghanistan, “Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling
Costs, Reducing Risk, Final Report to Congress,” August, 2011, p. 5; U.S. Government Accountability
Office, “Operational Contract Support: Management and Oversight Improvements Needed in Afghanistan,” GAO-12-
290, March 29, 2012, p. 1-2.
78 See CRS Report R44116, Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq: 2007-2018,
by Heidi M. Peters and Sofia Plagakis.
79 See Department of Defense, “Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility,”
January 2021, at https://www.acq.osd.mil/log/ps/.CENTCOM_reports.html/FY21_1Q_5A_Jan2021.pdf.
Congressional Research Service

12

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

of FY2021, about 35% of DOD’s 18,214 reported individual contractors were U.S. citizens.
Approximately 39% were third-country nationals and roughly 26% were local/host-country
nationals (i.e., from Afghanistan).
In Afghanistan, armed and unarmed private security contractors have been employed to provide
services such as protecting fixed locations; guarding traveling convoys; providing security
escorts; and training police and military personnel. The number of private security contractor
employees under contract with DOD in Afghanistan has fluctuated significantly over time,
depending on various factors. As of the first quarter of FY2021, DOD reported contracting 2,920
private security contractors in Afghanistan (down from 4,164 in the previous quarter), with 1,575
specifically categorized as armed private security contractors (compared to 1,813 in the previous
quarter). In the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement, the United States committed to
withdrawing the “private security contractors” of the United States, its allies, and Coalition
partners as part of the military withdrawal.80 It is unclear if contractors in other mission categories
would also be subject to the same withdrawal commitment.
What will happen to DOD materiel and other physical assets in the
country?
As the U.S. military withdraws forces from Afghanistan, DOD plans to redeploy materiel and
physical assets to the United States or to other AORs, transfer materiel to the Afghan government,
or dispose of materiel according to statutory requirements and DOD regulations.81 Joint
redeployment operations—detailed in Joint Publication 3-35 Deployment and Redeployment
Operations—typically begin with “prepare the force” activities. During these activities military
planners determine movement requirements, identify materiel to be removed (or “retrograded”)
from the combat area, and identify materiel for other disposition via reutilization, transfer, sale, or
destruction.82 General Kenneth F. McKenzie, Commander of CENTCOM, stated in September
2020 that logistical efforts to remove or transfer materiel currently in Afghanistan were
underway.83 In December 2020, General McKenzie confirmed that equipment levels would be
further reduced to match decreased troop levels.84

80 See Department of State, “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America,”
February 29, 2020, at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-
Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf.
81 See Department of Defense, “Manual 4160.21, Defense Materiel Disposition: Disposal Guidance and Procedures
Volumes 1-4,” at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodm/416021_vol1.pdf?ver=2019-10-
02-080613-750.
82 See Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-35 Deployment and Redeployment Operations, January 10, 2018, at
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_35.pdf.
83 Department of Defense, “General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. interview with Courtney Kube Sept. 10th 2020,”
September 16, 2020, at https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/Transcripts/Article/2349252/general-kenneth-f-mckenzie-jr-
interview-with-courtney-kube-sept-10th-2020/.
84 Department of Defense, “General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. interview on the record Media Round Table – Dec. 20th,
2020,” December 21, 2020, at https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/Transcripts/Article/2453511/general-kenneth-f-
mckenzie-jr-interview-on-the-record-media-round-table-dec-20t/.
Department of Defense, “Gen McKenzie and Luis Martinez On the Record Interview 22 DEC 20,” December 24, 2020,
at https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/Transcripts/Article/2456788/gen-mckenzie-and-luis-martinez-on-the-record-
interview-22-dec-20/.
Congressional Research Service

13

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) moves equipment and supplies belonging to
redeploying units to the unit’s new location, whether the unit’s home station or another area of
operations. Non-unit redeployed equipment and supplies are typically redistributed according to
plans developed by the Joint Staff, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and the military services
with input from Combatant Commanders.85 This materiel may be redistributed to other U.S.
forces, transferred to the host nation or other foreign nations, or moved to storage and
maintenance facilities belonging to the military services, DLA, or the General Services
Administration. Certain physical assets, such as concrete barriers, may be left in place due to their
low value and high transportation costs. Additionally, DLA may demilitarize and destroy items
deemed unserviceable or whose transportation costs exceed their demilitarization costs.86 As
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley said of some U.S. equipment in a
December 2020 visit to Afghanistan, “It’s more efficient and cost-effective to just destroy it.”87
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency is responsible for monitoring the end use of defense
materiel transferred to the Afghan government in accordance with the transfer agreement, the
Foreign Assistance Act, and the Arms Export Control Act.88 The Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has identified deficiencies in U.S. end use monitoring
efforts, in part “because the security situation in Afghanistan prevents some inventories from
taking place.”89 Further deteriorations in security conditions would likely further constrain the
United States’ ability to account for the use of U.S.-supplied materiel.
Afghanistan’s landlocked location affects the costs and time required to transport materiel out of
the country. While materiel retrograded from Iraq was largely moved through Kuwait’s seaports,
materiel in Afghanistan has in the past been moved by means of multiple routes and modes of
transportation.90 In general, airlifting equipment to nearby seaports for multimodal transport is
typically more expensive than surface transportation and may be limited by the size and
availability of cargo aircraft. Transporting materiel to seaports via ground routes is often less
costly, however, in the case of Afghanistan, such transport requires the cooperation of other
nations, such as Pakistan.
What is the future of the U.S. diplomatic presence in Afghanistan?
As the position of U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan is vacant, the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires
currently serves as the Chief of Mission (COM) in Afghanistan. The Foreign Service Act of 1980
(P.L. 96-465, as amended) provides that each COM has full responsibility for the direction,
coordination, and supervision of all U.S. executive branch employees in the country in question,
with the exception of Voice of America correspondents on official assignment and employees
under the command of a United States area military commander.91 Additionally, National Security

85 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-35 Deployment and Redeployment Operations, Jan. 10, 2018, pp. IV-7.
86 For examples of equipment destroyed in previous drawdowns, see U.S. Government Accountability Office,
Afghanistan Equipment Drawdown: Progress Made, but Improved Controls in Decision Making Could Reduce Risk of
Unnecessary Expenditures, GAO-14-768, September 30, 2014, pp. 27.
87 Williams, Defense One, op. cit.
88 See CRS Report R46337, Transfer of Defense Articles: Sale and Export of U.S.-Made Arms to Foreign Entities, by
Nathan J. Lucas and Michael J. Vassalotti.
89 SIGAR 21-11 Audit Report “Military Equipment Transferred to the Afghan Government: DOD Did Not Conduct
Required Monitoring to Account for Sensitive Articles,” SIGAR, December 2020. See also SIGAR 14-84Audit Report
“Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Weapons Accountability,” SIGAR, July 2014.
90 “Afghanistan Equipment Drawdown,” op. cit., pp. 9-10, 25.
91 See 22 U.S.C. §3927.
Congressional Research Service

14

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

Decision Directive 38 (NSDD-38) establishes a process through which the COM exercises their
authority to determine the size, composition, and mandate of U.S. Government executive branch
agencies at their mission.92 The State Department, through the Chargé d’Affaires (or the U.S.
Ambassador, when this position is not vacant) and with the support of the Assistant Secretary of
State for South and Central Asian Affairs, is responsible for overseeing and coordinating inter-
agency civilian operations and personnel in Afghanistan.93
The number of U.S. personnel under COM authority in Afghanistan appears to have fluctuated
over the past several years, at times roughly correlating with the U.S military footprint there.
While the State Department does not publicly discuss the number of U.S. personnel at overseas
posts for security reasons, public reporting indicates that the number of such personnel assigned
to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul increased from 340 in 2008 to as many as 1,330 in 2012, in the
midst of the so-called civilian surge that corresponded with a major surge in U.S military
personnel in the country.94 Yet as the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan declined during most
of the previous decade, Embassy Kabul underwent an $800 million expansion project and the
number of civilian personnel there increased.95
The State Department has not announced a new initiative to adjust the U.S. civilian footprint in
Afghanistan in connection with the recent military drawdown. However, in 2019 the State
Department ordered a comprehensive review of its overseas presence in Afghanistan shortly after
President Trump indicated his support for cutting the number of U.S. troops from the then-
existing level of 14,000. The State Department reportedly maintained that the results of this
review would allow the United States to maintain a strong diplomatic presence in Afghanistan
“focused on achieving a sustainable peace, supporting a successful presidential election, and
moving the Afghans toward self-reliance.”96 The State Department subsequently began efforts to
reduce the U.S. diplomatic presence in Afghanistan by approximately 50%, with the goal of
completing the cuts by September 2019. The State Department is required to submit quarterly
reports to certain congressional committees on the number of U.S. personnel in Afghanistan
under Chief of Mission authority, including locally employed staff and contractors.97
With respect to the review, the State Department’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) observed
that the right-sizing review was expedited because Embassy Kabul had already been directed to
reduce staff. The OIG further noted that the State Department refrained from reassessing and
adjusting its strategic objectives in the country to align with the staff reductions. It noted, for
example, that “preventing the recurrence of a terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan...
remained [a] stated policy objective even though personnel who advanced [this] objective were
significantly reduced.”98 Others acknowledged that reductions of diplomatic personnel may be
necessary, but stressed their opposition to any cuts that would impede the ability of U.S.
diplomats to report on local events and interact with Afghan stakeholders.99 The State Department

92 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs Manual, “6 FAH-5 H-351.2 NSDD-38 Process.”
93 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs Manual, “2 FAM 113.1 Chief of Mission and Principal Officer.”
94 Lara Jakes, “As U.S. Troops Leave Afghanistan, Diplomats Are Left to Fill Uncertain Mission,” New York Times,
March 22, 2020.
95 Tom Bowman, “U.S. Looking To Reduce Kabul Embassy Staff As Afghanistan Mission Changes,” National Public
Radio, February 14, 2019.
96 Ibid.
97 For example, see Sec. 7019(e) of P.L. 116-260 and pp. 114-115 of H.Rept. 116-444.
98 U.S. Department of State, Office of Inspector General, “Inspector General Statement on the Department of State’s
Major Management and Performance Challenges,” OIG-EX-21-01, November 18, 2020.
99 Kylie Atwood, “US scaling back Afghanistan embassy at crucial moment in peace talks,” CNN, August 1, 2019.
Congressional Research Service

15

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

and others defended the cuts as necessary, arguing that the department needed to focus its limited
resources on confronting Russia and China, and that Afghanistan was a logical place to seek cuts
due to the embassy’s unique status as the largest U.S. overseas post.100
Similar sentiments may accompany efforts by the Biden Administration to further adjust the U.S.
diplomatic presence in Afghanistan. The scope of such efforts also may depend on
implementation of the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement and the course of negotiations
between the Afghan government and Taliban representatives on the future of the Afghan state.
What are the security implications for the U.S. Embassy and
diplomatic personnel?
Under reciprocal treaty obligations, host nations are obligated to provide security for the
diplomatic facilities of sending states.101 However, instances in which host nations have been
unable or not fully committed to fulfilling this responsibility have sometimes left U.S. facilities
vulnerable, especially in extraordinary circumstances. U.S. embassies and other overseas posts
therefore employ a layered approach to security, including not only the measures taken by a host
country, but also additional U.S.-coordinated measures, to include armed Diplomatic Security
Service agents, U.S.-trained and/or contracted local security guards, and U.S. Marine Security
Guard (MSG) detachments. In Afghanistan and elsewhere, these elements, including the MSG
detachments, are under the supervision and control of the COM and the State Department’s
Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) Regional Security Officer at post rather than the U.S.
military.
Some observers note that following the 2012 killing of U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens in
Benghazi, Libya, DS have improved strategic and interagency contingency planning, along with
much closer coordination with military partners.102 Furthermore, Congress has passed laws
intended to enhance the State Department’s capabilities while providing for more robust
congressional oversight in these areas. For example, P.L. 114-323 included provisions that
required the State Department to provide monthly briefings to Congress on diplomatic security
matters, updated the criteria the State Department must employ when developing contingency
plans at overseas posts, and expanded mandatory security training requirements for personnel. As
demonstrated by the U.S. response to the January 2020 siege of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad,
DS can also request support from Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, Crisis
Response units to augment an embassy’s MSG detachment in crisis situations. These units are
tailored to conduct crisis response, contingency operations, theater security cooperation, enabling
operations, and other missions as directed by their assigned combatant command. One such unit
is assigned to CENTCOM, and comprises a rotational contingent of approximately 2,000
Marines, sailors, and support elements.103 Despite these developments, concerns persist regarding
the State Department’s diplomatic security programs. The State OIG regularly cites the protection

100 Jonathan Landay and Phil Stewart, “Exclusive: U.S. accelerates plan to drastically downsize Kabul embassy,”
Reuters, April 25, 2019; Robbie Gramer, “U.S. Eyes Plans to Cut Diplomatic Staff in Afghanistan, Iraq,” Foreign
Policy, April 5, 2019.
101 For example, see the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations at
https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iii-3&chapter=3&lang=en. The United States and
Afghanistan are among the states parties to this treaty.
102 Fred Burton, “Protecting Diplomats Following Soleimani's Death,” Lawfare, January 5, 2020.
103 United States Marine Corps, “Special Purpose MAGTF Crisis Response-Central Command,” at
https://www.imef.marines.mil/Units/SPMAGTF-CR-CC/About/.
Congressional Research Service

16

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

of people and facilities among the most significant management and performance challenges the
State Department faces in its annual reporting on this subject.104
Neither the State Department nor the Department of Defense disclose the number of MSGs or
other security elements serving at each overseas post. However, press reports indicate that as the
State Department has reduced the U.S. diplomatic footprint in Kabul, this has affected the number
of security personnel at the embassy.105 Some observers have raised concerns that security
restrictions affecting the movement of diplomats in Afghanistan prevent them from regularly
leaving embassy grounds to engage with Afghan officials and local stakeholders. They add that in
the past, U.S. diplomats who served in provincial reconstruction teams were able to travel
throughout the country and engage closely with local governments.106 Reductions in the number
of security personnel in Afghanistan may further limit the ability of diplomats to operate in the
field. However, others may view these restrictions as appropriate given acute security risks both
in Kabul and throughout Afghanistan.
How do the drawdown and withdrawal commitment compare to
possible historical analogues?
Policymakers and analysts have compared the U.S. drawdown in, and potential full withdrawal
from, Afghanistan to a number of historical episodes, usually to argue that such U.S. moves
would be detrimental to U.S. interests.
The Collapse Scenario: U.S. Withdrawal from Vietnam and Aftermath
Some, including former Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, have used the 1973 negotiated
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam and the subsequent fall of the South Vietnamese
government to warn that a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan might have a similar result.
In January 1973, after years of talks, negotiators representing the United States, U.S.-backed
South Vietnam, and North Vietnam (as well as the North Vietnamese-backed shadow Provisional
Revolutionary Government, or PRG, in South Vietnam) signed an agreement in Paris, France, to
end the decades-long U.S. involvement in the war. The Paris Peace Accords called for a cease-
fire, the withdrawal of the remaining U.S. troops within 60 days, a prohibition on the provision of
new U.S. military equipment to South Vietnam beyond a replacement basis, a political
reconciliation commission in the south, and a demilitarized zone between the north and the south.
Other than the full withdrawal of U.S. forces (completed by the end of March 1973), few of the
provisions were implemented, as violence continued unabated on both sides. U.S. military aid to
the government of South Vietnam decreased significantly as well, under a congressionally
imposed funding ceiling and other restrictions. In early 1975, in light of what North Vietnamese
leaders perceived as a more ambivalent U.S. attitude toward South Vietnam and reduced U.S.
military assistance, North Vietnam launched a major military offensive against the South. South
Vietnamese forces withdrew from wide swaths of territory with the intention of holding important
coastal areas, but withdrew from these as well in the face of the North Vietnamese advance. North
Vietnamese forces took the capital Saigon on April 29, 1975, and the South Vietnamese

104 See U.S. Department of State, Office of Inspector General, “Inspector General Statement on the Department of
State’s Major Management and Performance Challenges,” OIG-EX-20-02, January 22, 2020.
105 See footnote 98.
106 See footnotes footnote 98 and footnote 99.
Congressional Research Service

17

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

government unconditionally surrendered the next day to the communist PRG (which merged with
North Vietnam in 1976 to form the present-day Socialist Republic of Vietnam).
Some observers charge that the goal of U.S. policy in Afghanistan is to secure a “decent interval”
before the collapse of the government in Kabul as then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger called
the period between a U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and the inevitable fall of the U.S.-supported
government there.107 For their part, U.S. officials have stated that the “strategic stalemate” of
recent years between the Afghan government and Taliban is likely to persist, but only with U.S.
support. In December 2020, General Milley described the stalemate as a situation “where the
government of Afghanistan was never going to militarily defeat the Taliban and the Taliban, as
long as we were supporting the government of Afghanistan, was never going to militarily defeat
the regime.”108 The military defeat of the Afghan government would have potentially dramatic
effects on the security and human rights of the Afghan people (possibly spurring a mass exodus of
refugees, as happened in South Vietnam in 1975),109 and on U.S. security concerns.
The Civil War Scenario: Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan and Aftermath
The Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the subsequent civil war there, has
emerged as a frequently referenced possible historical analogue for the U.S. experience there.
The Soviet Union deployed troops into Afghanistan in December 1979 to buttress the communist
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) government, which was established after a
1978 coup. Growing instability in Afghanistan, including factional fighting within the PDPA and
a nascent grassroots popular uprising against the PDPA’s reform program, led Soviet leaders to
order the initial invasion of about 80,000 Soviet troops, which quickly took control of urban
centers, major lines of communication, and other strategic points. Soviet troops, which numbered
over 100,000 at their peak, partnered with Afghan government forces and various paramilitaries
but generally bore the brunt of fighting against armed opposition groups, collectively known as
the mujahideen. Mujahideen groups, supported by Pakistan, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and
others, led a guerilla campaign against Soviet and Afghan government forces. The Soviet Union
also “sent thousands of technical specialists and political advisors” to Afghanistan to “help
stabilize the government and broaden its base of support,” though these missions were often
undermined by “infighting and lack of coordination among advisers and other Soviet officials.”110
By 1985, newly installed Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had decided to seek a withdrawal
from Afghanistan.111 Increasingly, Soviet attention turned to pressuring squabbling Afghan
leaders to unify and building up the Afghan military, which suffered from high rates of desertion,
attrition, and casualties. U.N.-mediated talks in Geneva between delegations from the

107 James Pinkerton, “Searching for Kissinger’s ‘Decent Interval’ in Afghanistan,” American Conservative, September
4, 2019.
108 “A Conversation with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley,” Brookings Institute, December
2, 2020.
109 “Peace with Honor: What Vietnam Can Teach Us about How To Leave Afghanistan,” Time, May 24, 2019.
110 Artemy Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan (Harvard University Press, 2011),
pp. 33-35.
111 Soviet military losses were substantial (around 13,000 Soviet troops killed and 40,000 wounded over the course of
the decade-long intervention), but experts disagree about the extent to which these casualties motivated the decision to
withdraw. Other reasons cited include international isolation, the economic cost of the war effort, the potential for
political unrest within the Soviet Union, and the greater importance Gorbachev placed on his reform program. See
Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal (Oxford University
Press, 1995).
Congressional Research Service

18

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

governments of Afghanistan (supported by the Soviet Union) and Pakistan (supported by the
U.S.) began in March 1982 and continued fitfully until the signing of the Geneva Accords in April
1988. The Soviet withdrawal began in May 1988, per the Accords, and finished in February 1989.
Mujahideen forces, as a coalition of rival nonstate movements, were excluded from U.N.
negotiations. Various entities among them continued to receive support from the United States,
Pakistan, and other backers after the Soviet withdrawal, as the Afghan government continued to
receive military and financial support from Moscow. With this support, the Afghan government
(led by Najibullah Ahmadzai, commonly known by his first name) defied expectations among
some in the U.S. government that it would collapse after the Soviet military withdrawal and
instead maintained its position for several years.112
In September 1991, as the Soviet Union was engulfed in a major political crisis that would
eventually lead to its dissolution in December 1991, Soviet and U.S. officials announced a final
cutoff in their countries’ support to their respective clients, effective January 1992. With the help
of key defections, mujahideen and other Afghan groups overthrew Najibullah in April 1992. The
country entered into a four-year civil war from which the Taliban would emerge and eventually
take control of most of the country (and later offer sanctuary to Al Qaeda). Upon their entry to
Kabul in September 1996, one of the Taliban’s first acts was to torture and publicly hang
Najibullah, a scenario President Ghani has referenced publicly to warn against a U.S.
withdrawal.113
Other Afghans and officials describe a ruinous civil war as a potential outcome if the United
States withdraws and/or intra-Afghan talks fail.114 National Security Adviser Hamdullah Mohib
said in October 2020 that the threat of civil war was real and even “very likely.”115 Some U.S.
officials also raise the prospect: Afghan commander General Scott Austin said in an October 2020
interview that “what we are trying to do is…keep pushing the situation back into a place where
Afghanistan is not faced with civil war.”116
The Soviet experience in Afghanistan also demonstrates the importance of financial and material
support in buttressing a partner government. In addition to the nearly twenty-year U.S. military
presence, Congress has appropriated over $86 billion for Afghan security since FY2002, largely
through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). The ASFF, which has averaged between
$4 billion and $5 billion in recent years, funds a wide range of activities, including procuring
ammunition, vehicles, spare parts, and facilities for Afghan forces and contracting logistical
support to paying Afghan forces’ salaries. The appropriation of assistance funding is a
congressional prerogative. Some Members have raised concerns that a withdrawal might impair
the United States’ ability to monitor the distribution and effectiveness of U.S. aid, a long-standing
U.S. concern.117

112 See, for example, Special National Intelligence Estimate 37-89, “Afghanistan: The War in Perspective,” Director of
Central Intelligence, November 1989 (approved for release December 16, 2010).
113 “Transcript: Afghanistan’s vision for peace: A conversation with H.E. President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani,”
Atlantic Council, June 11, 2020.
114 Kathy Gannon, “Afghans say preventing next war as vital as ending this one,” Associated Press, October 18, 2020.
115 Lyse Doucet, “Taliban conflict: Afghan fears rise as U.S. ends its longest war,” BBC, October 20, 2020.
116 Ibid.
117 See Senator Reed’s remarks at Senate Armed Service Committee Hearing on U.S. Central Command, February 5,
2019.
Congressional Research Service

19

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

The ISIS Scenario: U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq and aftermath
A more recent possible analogue is the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, which some have said
allowed for the subsequent rise of the Islamic State, warning that a withdrawal from Afghanistan
could similarly empower terrorist groups.
In response to rising U.S. domestic opposition to the U.S. military presence in Iraq (reflected in
increasingly large congressional votes in favor of a U.S. withdrawal), the George W. Bush
Administration negotiated two bilateral agreements with the Iraqi government, including a status
of forces agreement. These accords, signed in November 2008 and approved by the Iraqi
government the next month, required the United States to withdraw combat forces from Iraqi
cities, towns, and localities by June 30, 2009, with all U.S. forces withdrawing from Iraq by the
end of December 2011. President Barack Obama subsequently announced his plans to execute a
drawdown and eventual withdrawal from Iraq in compliance with the status of forces agreement,
setting and achieving his Administration’s goal of withdrawing all U.S. combat forces from Iraq
by the end of August 2010. On September 1, 2010, remaining U.S. forces in Iraq inaugurated
Operation New Dawn—the U.S. mission to continue training and support for Iraqi security
forces.
Given ongoing security challenges posed by the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and other groups,
Obama administration officials expected that the Iraqi government would request a continued
U.S. presence beyond 2011. U.S. and Iraqi differences over the terms of such a continued
presence, and specifically whether or not U.S. forces would be extended legal protections
consistent with the existing status of forces agreement, created an impasse. After consulting with
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki, President Obama announced on October 21, 2011, that all
remaining U.S. forces would be withdrawn by the end of the year. The last convoy of U.S. troops
left Iraq for Kuwait on December 18, 2011; a NATO training mission (NATO Training Mission-
Iraq, or NTM-I) also came to an end at the close of 2011.118
After the withdrawal of international forces in 2011, infighting between Iraqi political elites
(largely along sectarian lines) led to a series of political crises and security conditions worsened
as ISI attacks increased. ISI also infiltrated fighters into neighboring Syria to take part in the
uprising there, and the group proclaimed itself the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also
referred to as ISIS) in April 2013. In June 2014, ISIL fighters launched an offensive that captured
wide swaths of northern Iraq, including Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, as Iraqi forces
abandoned their positions (and, in many cases, their U.S.-supplied equipment). After again
rebranding themselves as the Islamic State (IS) and declaring a caliphate in areas under their
control, IS fighters neared Erbil in August 2014, the seat of the federally recognized Kurdish
Regional Government (KRG), and committed mass atrocities against Iraqi Yazidis in
northwestern Iraq. The United States launched airstrikes at the Iraqi government’s request against
IS targets.
Later, in September 2014, the Iraqi government of new Prime Minister Hayder Al Abadi formally
requested international military intervention and support in a letter to the United Nations Security
Council, and a nearly five year U.S. and coalition campaign against the terrorist group began.
Congress enacted unique train and equip authorities to enable the executive branch to provide
training and equipment to Iraqi security forces and non-state partner forces in Syria.119

118 NATO, “NATO’s assistance to Iraq (Archived)” September 1, 2015.
119 See also CRS In Focus IF10040, DOD Train and Equip Authorities to Counter the Islamic State, by Nina M.
Serafino (archived).
Congressional Research Service

20

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

Additionally (and also in response to a request from the Iraqi government), NATO launched a
new training mission in Iraq in 2015, which continues today.
Some attributed the resurgence of the Islamic State in Iraq to the 2011 U.S. withdrawal, arguing
that U.S. disengagement from Iraq reduced pressure on terrorist groups and enabled an increase in
sectarian tensions by allowing Iran-linked Iraqi politicians to behave provocatively toward Iraqi
Sunnis.120 U.S. officials saw and warned about the growing extremist threat to Iraq, although U.S.
responses were insufficient to prevent military collapse in the face of poor decision making by
Iraqi leaders and the opportunities presented to extremists by the conflict and chaos of
neighboring Syria. Some Members of Congress who opposed the Trump Administration’s
November 2020 Afghanistan drawdown announcement cited the 2011 Iraq withdrawal as a
cautionary example.121 However, some U.S. officials argue that while continued U.S. training
after 2011 could have improved some Iraqi military capabilities, the root of the Islamic State’s
success in Iraq was sectarian antagonism, exacerbated by actors in the Iraqi political system: as
former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq James Jeffrey wrote in 2014, “the common argument that U.S.
troops could have produced different Iraqi political outcomes is hogwash.”122
President Obama appeared to express a related view. When asked in August 2014 about whether
conditions in Iraq gave him pause about the then-planned U.S. pullout of Afghanistan, he said:
I think the real lesson in Afghanistan is that if factions in a country after a long period of
civil war do not find a way to come up with a political accommodation; if they take
maximalist positions and their attitude is, I want 100 percent of what I want and the other
side gets nothing, then the center doesn’t hold…So that’s a real lesson I think for
Afghanistan coming out of Iraq is, if you want this thing to work, then whether it’s different
ethnicities, different religions, different regions, they’ve got to accommodate each other,
otherwise you start tipping back into old patterns of violence. And it doesn’t matter how
many U.S. troops are there.123
In the case of Afghanistan, the regional Islamic State affiliate (Islamic State Khorasan Province,
or ISKP, established in 2015) is still active, though not as much as in recent years, when it had a
measure of territorial control in some parts of the country. Crucially, the Taliban opposes ISKP
and has fought and defeated the group, sometimes in tandem with Afghan forces. The United
States has even provided air support that “helped” Taliban offensives against the Islamic State in
some limited circumstances.124 It therefore seems unlikely that the Taliban exercising a greater
measure of control in Afghanistan (via a political settlement or military conquest) would result in
gains for ISKP. However, in a more unstable and decentralized scenario, where the Taliban
further weaken the Afghan government but are unable to take power themselves, ISKP could
increase its activity.
Whereas any post-U.S. withdrawal increase in Taliban influence would likely have negative
implications for ISKP, Al Qaeda would seem to benefit. Al Qaeda is still assessed to have a
presence in Afghanistan and its decades-long ties with the Taliban appear to remain close: in May
2020, the United Nations reported that senior Taliban leaders “regularly consulted” with their AQ

120 Danielle Pletka, “What Obama Has Wrought in Iraq,” U.S. News and World Report, June 13, 2014.
121 See statements by Senator Mitch McConnell, Senator Ben Sasse, and Representative Adam Kinzinger.
122 James Jeffrey, “Behind the U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 2,
2014.
123 White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on Iraq,” August 9, 2014.
124 “General Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr. Defense One Interview with Katie Bo Williams,” U.S. Central Command,
December 10, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

21

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

counterparts during negotiations with the United States.125 Afghan forces’ killing in October 2020
of a high-ranking AQ operative in Afghanistan’s Ghazni province, where he reportedly was living
and working with Taliban forces, further underscores questions about AQ-Taliban links and
Taliban intentions with regard to Al Qaeda.126
U.S. officials have disagreed on the extent to which the Taliban are fulfilling their
counterterrorism commitments concerning Al Qaeda. On July 1, 2020, then-Secretary Pompeo
said he had seen indications that the Taliban were actively combatting Al Qaeda, while on July
15, 2020, General McKenzie said, “right now, it is simply unclear to me that the Taliban has taken
any positive steps.”127 Other assessments align with General McKenzie’s analysis: the U.S.
Treasury reported in a January 4, 2021, letter that “as of 2020, al-Qaeda is gaining strength in
Afghanistan while continuing to operate with the Taliban under the Taliban’s protection.”128 It is
unclear what verification mechanisms might be in place to ensure Taliban compliance with the
commitment to prevent Al Qaeda from operating in Afghanistan, and to what extent the U.S.
withdrawal might be paused or reversed based on Taliban action with regard to Al Qaeda.
What views has President Biden expressed about U.S. policy in
Afghanistan?
President Biden, when Vice President, reportedly opposed the Obama Administration’s decision
to increase U.S. force levels in 2009.129 He also expressed skepticism about both U.S.
development assistance and troop levels as a candidate during the 2020 primary campaign,
indicating that he may be supportive of withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Some relevant
statements from then-candidate Biden are below:
 “I also think we should not have combat troops in Afghanistan. It’s long overdue.
It should end.” (June 28, 2019)130
 “I would bring American combat troops in Afghanistan home during my first
term. Any residual U.S. military presence in Afghanistan would be focused only
on counterterrorism operations.” (July 30, 2019)131
 “The whole purpose of going to Afghanistan was to not have a counter
insurgency, meaning that we’re going to put that country together. It can not be
put together.” (September 12, 2019)132

125 Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability
and security of Afghanistan, U.N. Document S/2020/415, released May 27, 2020.
126 Jeff Seldin, “US Calls Death of al-Qaida Official a Major Setback for Terror Group,” Voice of America, October
26, 2020.
127 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo with Bret Baier of Fox News Special Report,”
July 1, 2020; Carla Babb, “VOA Exclusive: CENTCOM chief says US can do job in Iraq with fewer forces,” Voice of
America, July 15, 2020.
128 “Memorandum for Department of Defense Lead Inspector General, Department of the Treasury,” January 4, 2021.
Available at https://oig.treasury.gov/sites/oig/files/2021-01/OIG-CA-21-012.pdf.
129 Coll, Directorate S, op. cit., pp. 353-354, 367.
130 “Transcript from Night 2 of the First 2019 June Democratic Debates,” Rev.com, June 28, 2019.
131 “The Presidential Candidates on the War in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 30, 2019.
132 “September Houston Democratic Debate Transcript – Third Debate,” Rev.com, September 12, 2019.
Congressional Research Service

22

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

 “The first thing I would do as president the United States of America is to make
sure that we brought all combat troops home and into a negotiation with the
Taliban. But I would leave behind special forces in small numbers to be able to
deal with the potential threat unless we got a real good negotiation accomplished
to deal with terrorism.” (December 20, 2019)133
 “…with regard Afghanistan…The only thing we should be doing is dealing with
terrorism in that region… there is no possibility of uniting that country, no
possibility at all of making it a whole country. But it is possible to see to it that
they’re not able to launch more attacks from the region on the United States of
America.” (February 7, 2020)134
 “I can think of 10 countries where women and or children and or people are
being persecuted or being hurt. But the idea of us going to be able to use our
armed forces to solve every single internal problem that exists throughout the
world is not within our capacity. The question is, is America’s vital self-interest
at stake or the vital self-interest of one of our allies at stake?” (February 23,
2020)135
Members of the Biden Administration have stated publicly that they will review the U.S.-Taliban
agreement and broader U.S. policy in Afghanistan. In remarks on January 29, 2021, National
Security Advisor Jake Sullivan noted the late April 2021 deadline for U.S. withdrawal, but argued
that it should be conditional on Taliban actions, specifically that they (1) cut ties with terrorist
groups; (2) “meaningfully reduce levels of violence,” and (3) participate in serious negotiations
with the Afghan government.136 Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said on January 28, 2021, that
the Taliban are “not meeting their commitments” with regard to al Qaeda and reducing
violence.137 He further argued that unless they met those commitments, reaching a negotiated
political settlement would remain difficult, but he did not say how the Taliban’s failure to meet to
those conditions or the failure of intra-Afghan negotiations might impact the U.S. troop presence.
What policies/actions might the Biden Administration pursue in
light of the drawdown?
Experts have laid out a number of approaches that the Biden Administration, which is reportedly
conducting a review of the U.S.-Taliban agreement and broader U.S. Afghanistan policy, might
take in light of the U.S. troop drawdown.138 One longtime Afghanistan observer, in surveying the
policy landscape that the new administration confronts in Afghanistan, has said “there are no
good or easy options—only less bad ones.”139
 Withdraw all U.S. troops immediately irrespective of conditions. President
Trump’s nominee for ambassador to Afghanistan wrote in November 2020 to
support an immediate total withdrawal of all U.S. troops. He argued that there is

133 “December Democratic Debate Transcript: Sixth Debate from Los Angeles,” Rev.com, December 20, 2019.
134 “New Hampshire Democratic Debate Transcript,” Rev.com, February 7, 2020.
135 “Transcript: Joe Biden on Face the Nation,” CBS News, February 23, 2020.
136 “Passing the Baton 2021: Securing America’s Future Together,” United States Institute of Peace, January 29, 2021.
137 Lolita Baldor, “Taliban violence raises questions about US troop withdrawal,” Associated Press, January 28, 2021.
138 “Biden Administration to review Taliban deal,” Al Jazeera, January 23, 2021.
139 Steve Coll, “Joe Biden Will Have to Address the War in Afghanistan—Again,” New Yorker, January 20, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

23

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

“little reason to wait for some more perfect moment in the future” given what he
saw as the inevitability that the Taliban will both enter power in some fashion
and reject any kind of U.S. military presence.140 He also dismissed concerns that
a withdrawal would empower Al Qaeda, arguing that an empowered Taliban
would be unlikely to again risk its position by sheltering the group, which is no
longer as much of a threat to the United States as it used to be.

Others, doubting the political viability of raising U.S. troop levels again, argue
that given the choice between 2,500 U.S. forces and zero, the Biden
Administration should take the latter option to avoid being bound to “an
escalating civil war,” even if that means the fall of the Afghan government.141
 Pause withdrawal pending Taliban ceasefire or other conditions. Some have
asserted that an international military presence is necessary to force the Taliban
to make substantive concessions. Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander
James Stavridis argued that the United States should “state clearly that until the
Taliban lives up to a cease-fire agreement for at least 180 days there will be no
further troop withdrawals.”142 Others recommend “enforcement of the
conditionality already contained in the U.S.-Taliban agreement” by extending
troop withdrawal deadlines if counterterrorism or other commitments are not
met.143

Leaders of the congressionally mandated Afghanistan Study Group contend that
“No deal will emerge as long as the Taliban believes the United States is
withdrawing troops imminently, without regard for the Taliban’s behavior.”144
Accordingly, they recommend that the United States “reemphasize to the Taliban
that the full withdrawal of U.S. troops is strictly conditional on progress toward
peace.” They also recommend “affirm[ing] the U.S. commitment to
Afghanistan’s constitutional order and the country’s gains in human rights,
including the rights of women,” though it is unclear whether that should be a
condition of any U.S. withdrawal. In its February 2021 final report, the Group
recommends conditioning further U.S. troop withdrawals on Taliban steps to
“contain terror groups,” a reduction in Taliban violence, and “real progress
toward a compromise political settlement.”145

It is unclear how insisting on such conditionality, and thereby maintaining U.S.
troops beyond May 2021, might impact intra-Afghan talks or Taliban military
action. Some who have written favorably about conditioning the U.S. troop
presence on progress in the intra-Afghan talks concede that the talks are likely to

140 William Ruger and Rajan Menon, “It’s Time to Withdraw from Afghanistan,” Washington Post, Nov. 17, 2020.
141 Carter Malkasian, “Joe Biden is facing a dead end in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, November 23, 2020.
142 James Stavridis, “I Commanded NATO Forces in Afghanistan. Here’s How We Could End This ‘Forever War,’”
Time, December 10, 2020.
143 Scott Worden, “Afghanistan Withdrawal Should Be Based on Conditions, Not Timelines,” United States Institute of
Peace, November 19, 2020.
144 Kelly Ayotte, Joseph Dunford, and Nancy Lindborg, “An abrupt U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan undermines the
fragile peace,” Washington Post, November 25, 2020.
145 “Afghanistan Study Group Final Report,” United States Institute of Peace, February 2021.
Congressional Research Service

24

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

go on past May 2021, after which the presence of international forces “could
prompt the Taliban to walk away from talks and intensify their attacks.”146
 Indefinite U.S. military presence to support Afghan forces. Former
Ambassador to Afghanistan and Pakistan Ryan Crocker said in December 2020
testimony before the House Armed Services Committee that the U.S. troop
withdrawal should be suspended. More broadly, he argued that the lack of U.S.
“strategic patience” undermines U.S. alliances and empowers U.S. adversaries
and that the United States can and must maintain its commitment to Afghanistan:
“The cost for the US in blood and treasure is a small fraction of what it was at the
height of the troop surge. I look at it as a very reasonable insurance premium
against the return of the perpetrators of 9/11.”147 Similarly, one analyst suggests
reframing the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, comparing the U.S. military presence
in Afghanistan to the decades-long U.S. presence in Western Europe and East
Asia and arguing that U.S. personnel in Afghanistan “are no longer prosecuting a
war but advancing a peace.”148
Former U.S. official Lauren Miller argues that having any residual U.S. military
presence remain in Afghanistan is “not a real option,” because the Taliban will
not “abandon its number one demand and the rationale for its insurgency: the
removal of all foreign forces.” Instead, she recommends that the Biden
Administration should try to negotiate an extension of the troop withdrawal
timeline to buy time for deeper analysis of the terrorism threat and whether U.S.
troops are necessary to counter it.149
 Increase U.S. troops. Some argue that 2,500 troops are insufficient to adequately
support the Afghan military and recommend increasing U.S. force levels. One
expert recommends 4,500; former Commander Stavridis suggested 5,000.150
 Focus on regional cooperation. Afghanistan expert Barnett Rubin argued in a
December 2020 piece that the Biden Administration should pair U.S. troop
drawdowns with a comprehensive regional strategy, including China, Russia,
Iran, Pakistan, and India, focused not just on common concerns about security,
but also shared commercial, trade, and infrastructure interests. Doing so, Rubin
argues, is not just critical for ensuring international support without which any
intra-Afghan settlement will fail, but can also “serve as the foundation of a more
ambitious and effective Asia policy.”151
What questions might Congress consider when debating U.S.
policy in Afghanistan?
In hearings, public statements, investigations, and debate over appropriations and authorizations
measures, Members of Congress might consider the following questions as they continue to

146 Robert Malley, “10 Conflict to Watch in 2021,” International Crisis Group, December 30, 2020.
147 Testimony of Ryan Crocker, House Committee on Armed Services Hearing on Afghanistan, November 20, 2020.
148 Elliot Ackerman, “The Afghan War Is Over. Did Anyone Notice?” New York Times, December 17, 2020.
149 Laurel Miller, “The Myth of a Responsible Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, January 22, 2021.
150 Mick Mulroy, “Troop withdrawals shouldn’t come at the expense of everything we’ve fought for,” Middle East
Institute, December 3, 2020; Stavridis, op. cit.
151 Barett Rubin, “There Is Only One Way Out Of Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, December 9, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

25

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

oversee U.S. policy in Afghanistan in light of the U.S. drawdown and in advance of the possible
full U.S. and international withdrawal by April 2021.
U.S. Policy Interests
 Counterterrorism. What is the nature of the threat posed by terrorist groups in
Afghanistan? How does it compare to the threat posed by terrorist groups
elsewhere, or by other U.S. adversaries? Which components of the U.S. military
presence and of U.S. assistance programs are most effective in countering
terrorism, and which components are least effective? What affect might a military
withdrawal have on U.S. counterterrorism efforts and how, if at all, can the
United States continue those efforts without a military presence on the ground in
Afghanistan?
 Human Rights. To what extent should support for democracy and human rights
(including the rights of women and girls) drive U.S. policy in Afghanistan? How
might a U.S. withdrawal impact human rights in Afghanistan, and how can the
United States incentivize or otherwise back protections for human rights? What
compromises by the Afghan government, if any, should the United States support
in a possible political settlement?
 Supporting the Afghan government. How important is the Afghan government
to U.S. policy interests as a U.S. ally? As a counterterrorism partner? As a
democracy in a difficult region? Without a U.S. and foreign military presence,
how might intra-Afghan political and security relationships change? In the event
of a full U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan, how likely are the Taliban to
establish control over the country by force? What, if anything, could the United
States do to forestall such an outcome short of direct military intervention?
Congressional Levers
 Development assistance. For what purposes, and at what levels, should the
United States provide development assistance in Afghanistan? To what extent, if
any, should challenges in distributing and monitoring assistance in Afghanistan
influence Congress’s willingness to appropriate aid? How might a full U.S.
military withdrawal affect State Department and USAID operations and
programs?
 Military assistance. How effective has U.S. assistance been in developing
Afghan forces’ military capabilities? For how long, and at what cost, should the
United States be prepared to provide financial and materiel assistance to Afghan
forces against the Taliban?
 Conditionality. To what extent do conditions on U.S. assistance lead to
outcomes more favorable to U.S. policy? To what extent, if at all, does U.S.
assistance represent leverage over the Afghan government, the Taliban, or other
actors?
 Legal framework. Are current legal authorities overly broad, restrictive, or
appropriate for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan? How does the 2001
AUMF reflect current congressional thinking about the proper mission of U.S.
military forces in Afghanistan?
Congressional Research Service

26

U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

Author Information

Clayton Thomas, Coordinator
Tyler F. Hacker
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
Analyst in Defense Logistics

Cory R. Gill
Heidi M. Peters
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
Analyst in U.S. Defense Acquisition Policy

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R46670 · VERSION 1 · NEW
27