U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) Shipping and Shipbuilding Support Programs

U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) Shipping and Shipbuilding Support Programs

U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD)
January 8, 2021
Shipping and Shipbuilding Support Programs
Ben Goldman
The U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) is one of the 11 operating administrations of the
Analyst in Transportation
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). Its mission is to develop the merchant maritime
Policy
industry of the United States. U.S. maritime policy, largely set out by the Merchant Marine Acts

of 1920 and 1936 and with some roots in even older legislation, is codified in Subtitle V of
Chapter 46 of the U.S. Code. As currently articulated, it is the policy of the United States to

“encourage and aid the development and maintenance of a merchant marine” that meets the
objectives below, which MARAD helps to achieve via the following programs and activities:
 Carry domestic waterborne commerce and a substantial part of the waterborne export and import
foreign commerce of the United States . International shipping is dominated by companies using foreign-
owned or foreign-registered vessels taking advantage of comparatively lower operating costs. The MARAD
Maritime Security Program (MSP) supports U.S.-flagged ships engaged in international commerce by
providing annual subsidies to defray the operating costs of up to 60 vessels. Originally scheduled to expire
at the end of 2025, authorization for MSP was extended through 2035 by the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2020 (P.L. 116-92). Similar programs were established to
support tankers and cable-laying ships, either in that same law or in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L.
116-283). MARAD does not subsidize the operations of vessels in purely domestic shipping, since that
industry is closed to foreign competition by the Jones Act, but MARAD oversees the Marine Highway
Program, which supports short-sea shipping and inland waterway port upgrades.
 Serve as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency. MARAD owns and
maintains approximately 100 vessels in the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), including a subset
called the Ready Reserve Force that is intended to mobilize within days , to supplement the U.S. Navy’s
Military Sealift Command. The advanced age of many NDRF vessels presents rising maintenance costs, as
well as problems crewing vessels built to outdated specifications. The type of ships in the NDRF may not
always align with the military’s needs, and the ability of the military to wage war may be less dependent on
oceangoing vessels than it was when the NDRF was established in the aftermath of World War II, but
NDRF vessels have supported overseas operations as recently as 2014 in West Africa and the Middle East.
 Be owned and operated as vessels of the United States by citizens of the United States. MSP operating
subsidies offset competitive disadvantages facing ship owners who register their vessels in the United
States. Previous iterations of the program committed to a steady subsidy over 20 years. Subsidy amounts
have been subject to the annual appropriations process since 1996, but this has not dampened interest in the
program. Congress has considered bills that would subsidize additional ships of specific types, such as
tankers and submarine cable-layers. The FY2020 NDAA established a two-vessel Cable Security Program
similar to MSP.
 Use vessels constructed in the United States and manned with trained and efficient citizen personnel.
The Maritime Guaranteed Loan program, also known as Title XI, may issue or guarantee loans for ship
construction in domestic shipyards at favorable borrowing costs. To maintain the existence of a pool of
trained personnel, MARAD provides financial support for the federal U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and
six state maritime academies . A shortage of mariners could threaten the capability to mobilize reserve fleets
in times of war, but a shortage of shipboard positions would make it difficult to employ the necessary
number of mariners during peacetime. MARAD is in the process of procuring new training ships for the
state academies, whose current ships are insufficient to meet current training needs.
 Be supplemented by efficient facilities for building and repairing vessels. In 1993, eligibility for Title
XI loans was expanded to include modernization of shipyards, and a discretionary grant program distributes
funds to small shipyards.
MARAD supports other aspects of the maritime freight industry such as port infrastructure and ship disposal. The Port
Infrastructure Development (PID) grant program, established in 2009, has distributed millions of dollars to landside port
improvements in recent years, but may be duplicative with other DOT grant programs. MARAD’s ship disposal program is
responsible for retiring a backlog of aging NDRF vessels and preparing the experimental nuclear-powered cargo ship
Savannah for safe disposal or conversion into a museum ship.
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Contents
Background.................................................................................................................... 1
Shipbuilding Assistance ................................................................................................... 3
Maritime Guaranteed Loan Program (“Title XI” Loans) .................................................. 3
Assistance to Smal Shipyards ..................................................................................... 5
Capital Construction Funds ......................................................................................... 5
Operating Assistance ....................................................................................................... 6
Maritime Security Fleet .............................................................................................. 6
National Defense Reserve Fleet ................................................................................... 9
Cargo Preference ....................................................................................................... 9
Other Support Programs ................................................................................................. 10
Merchant Marine Training ........................................................................................ 10
Port Infrastructure Development Grants ...................................................................... 13
Marine Highways .................................................................................................... 13
Ship Disposal.......................................................................................................... 14
The Nuclear Ship Savannah ...................................................................................... 15

Figures
Figure 1. MARAD Funding by Program and Full-Time Equivalent Employment,
FY2015-FY2020 .......................................................................................................... 2
Figure 2. Authorized Maritime Security Program Stipend per Vessel, FY1996-FY2035.............. 7
Figure 3. America’s Marine Highway Routes .................................................................... 14
Figure 4. Obsolete NDRF Vessels Removed for Disposal, FY2007-FY2019........................... 15

Tables
Table 1. National Maritime Policy Objectives and Corresponding MARAD Programs ............... 1

Table A-1. Title XI Funding, Applications Approved, Loan Guarantee Amounts
Approved, and Guaranteed Loan Amounts Outstanding, FY2000-FY2020 .......................... 16
Table A-2. Assistance to Smal Shipyards Authorizations and Appropriations, FY2006-
2020......................................................................................................................... 17
Table A-3. MARAD Funding by Program and Full-Time Equivalent Employment,
FY2015-FY2020 ........................................................................................................ 18

Appendixes
Appendix. Additional Data ............................................................................................. 16

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Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 18

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Background
The U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) is one of the 11 operating administrations of the
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). Its mission is to develop the merchant maritime
industry of the United States.1 Created in 1950 within the Commerce Department, MARAD did
not join DOT until 1981.2 It differs from most other modal agencies within DOT in that its
mission explicitly encompasses support of a domestic industry, rather than purely safety
enforcement or grantmaking.
U.S. maritime policy, largely set out by the Merchant Marine Acts of 1920 and 1936 and with
some roots in even older legislation, is codified in Subtitle V of Chapter 46 of the U.S. Code. As
currently articulated, it is the policy of the United States to “encourage and aid the development
and maintenance of a merchant marine” that meets stated objectives (Table 1). MARAD’s
principal role is to perform various functions that, in the determination of Congress, support
achievement of those objectives.
Table 1. National Maritime Policy Objectives and Corresponding MARAD Programs
Objectives (“A merchant marine that is ...”)
MARAD support
(1) sufficient to carry the waterborne domestic
Maritime, Tanker, and Cable Security Programs
commerce and a substantial part of the waterborne
subsidize U.S.-flagged ships engaged in oceangoing
export and import foreign commerce of the United
commerce; Marine Highway Program funds short-sea
States and to provide shipping service essential for
shipping and inland waterway port upgrades
maintaining the flow of the waterborne domestic and
foreign commerce at al times;
(2) capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in
Maintenance of the National Defense Reserve Fleet,
time of war or national emergency;
including the Ready Reserve Force, to supplement the
U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command
(3) owned and operated as vessels of the United States
Maritime Security Program offsets competitive
by citizens of the United States;
disadvantages facing ship owners engaged in
international trade who register their vessels in the
United States
(4) composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most
Title XI loans for ship construction; grants to the U.S.
suitable types of vessels constructed in the United
Merchant Marine Academy and state maritime
States and manned with a trained and efficient citizen
academies
personnel; and
(5) supplemented by efficient facilities for building and
Title XI loans for shipyard modernization; grants to
repairing vessels.
smal shipyards; management of tax-exempt Capital
Construction Funds
Sources: Objectives from 46 U.S.C. §50101; MARAD programs compiled by CRS.
Note: To fly the U.S. flag, a vessel must satisfy certain ownership and operational requirements.
The promotional maritime statutes of the United States primarily address national security and
defense, not economic need or efficiency. Furthermore, while some of MARAD’s support—such
as for deep-sea shipping in international trade—is connected to its military auxiliary role, not al
aspects of the merchant marine are of military value. MARAD’s support for other types of
maritime activities, such as coastwise and Great Lakes shipping and barge transport on inland
waterways, is primarily in the service of its other goals.

1 49 U.S.C. §109(a).
2 P.L. 97-31.
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Some of the federal government’s most prominent maritime activities are not MARAD
responsibilities. It does not administer the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund, which supports
maintenance and deepening of harbors and channels, or the Inland Waterways Trust Fund, which
funds locks and channels on inland waterways; both of these activities fal within the jurisdiction
of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.3 Nor does MARAD enforce the Jones Act, the law
requiring that vessels transporting cargo from one U.S. point to another U.S. point be U.S.-built
and owned and crewed by U.S. citizens; the Jones Act fal s within the jurisdiction of the U.S.
Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), with MARAD’s role limited to
verifying whether Jones Act-qualified vessels are available when CBP receives a request to waive
Jones Act requirements.4
MARAD’s budget has increased in recent years, but this can be largely attributed to the cost of
replacing training ships for the state maritime academies and to the appropriation of funds for
Port Infrastructure Development grants (see Figure 1). Even taking these increases into account,
MARAD activities constitute little more than 1% of the overal DOT budget.
Figure 1. MARAD Funding by Program and Full-Time Equivalent Employment,
FY2015-FY2020
in mil ions of nominal dol ars (left axis) and ful -time equivalents (FTE, right axis)

Source: U.S. DOT, MARAD Budget Estimates, FY2016-FY2021; congress.gov.
Notes: FY2020 funding reflects amounts appropriated as of February 2020 and does not include any COVID-19
emergency relief appropriations. FY2021 funding reflects amounts appropriated as of December 2020.
* Prior to FY2019, State Maritime Academy Operations were funded out of Operations and Training. The
shaded portion in FY2018 corresponds to funds appropriated for the purchase of new training ships.
** Includes the Cable Security Fleet, Assistance to Smal Shipyards, Ship Disposal, and Maritime Guaranteed Loan
(Title XI) programs.
MARAD employs just under 800 full-time equivalents (FTEs), roughly two-thirds of which are
directly funded by MARAD, including approximately 300 at the United States Merchant Marine

3 CRS Report R43222, Harbor Maintenance Finance and Funding, by John Frittelli; CRS Report R43101, Inland
Waterways: Financing and Management Options in Federal Studies, by John Frittelli.
4 T he Jones Act refers to Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (P.L. 66-261). See CRS Report R45725,
Shipping Under the Jones Act: Legislative and Regulatory Background , by John Frittelli.
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Academy. Funding for the remaining FTEs is reimbursable by other agencies, notably the
Department of Defense (DOD), which reimburses funding for the approximately 250 FTEs
attached to the Ready Reserve Force of the National Defense Reserve Fleet. The size of
MARAD’s workforce has fluctuated only slightly year over year even as the agency’s funding
has increased. Much of that increase can be attributed to shipbuilding contracts at private
shipyards and infrastructure grants to port authorities, execution of which may not require new
MARAD staff.
Shipbuilding Assistance
Maritime Guaranteed Loan Program (“Title XI” Loans)
The Maritime Guaranteed Loan Program provides federal loan guarantees to vessel operators to
construct vessels in U.S. shipyards, and to modernize those shipyards. It was created by the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936, and is more commonly referred to by the specific section of the
law creating it—Title XI. However, the program as currently configured dates to 1993, when it
was reformed to comply with requirements of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990.5
The comparatively high cost of building ships in the United States relative to other countries
discourages commercial operators from ordering vessels from U.S. shipyards, except when they
are required to use U.S.-built vessels to engage in domestic trade. U.S. shipyards enjoy few
economies of scale in building containerships and tankers due to the low volume of construction.
Also, oceangoing vessels built in U.S. shipyards tend to be significantly smal er than similar
vessels built abroad, as only a modest amount of domestic cargo is shipped by sea. Together,
China, South Korea, and Japan account for over 90% of al ship production in terms of cargo-
carrying capacity.6 In general, shipbuilding is highly subsidized, as governments consider it an
important source of employment not only in shipyards, but also in supplier industries such as
steelmaking.7
Under Title XI, MARAD offers loan guarantees intended to make domestic shipbuilding more
attractive to vessel buyers. These guarantees permit both vessel buyers and shipyards to obtain
financing on more favorable terms than would otherwise be made available by a commercial
lender, offsetting the comparatively high costs of shipbuilding in the United States. A single
guarantee may support the construction of more than one vessel. In return, MARAD collects a
one-time fee equal to between 0.5% and 1.0% of the principal outstanding balance. Given the
costs associated with shipbuilding, these fees can reach into the mil ions of dollars, and can be
financed alongside the loan itself.
A wave of loan defaults during the 1980s prompted a reorganization of the program with a greater
emphasis on creditworthiness. Congress appropriated new funds to underwrite guarantee subsidy
costs during the 1990s. MARAD approved $1.4 bil ion in loan guarantees in 1998, the peak year.
In 2001, a company that received $1.2 bil ion in loan guarantees to build two U.S.-flagged cruise
ships went bankrupt, sending the loans into default. The economic downturn that followed the

5 For more information about federal credit programs, see CRS Report R44193, Federal Credit Programs: Comparing
Fair Value and the Federal Credit Reform Act (FCRA) , by Raj Gnanarajah.
6 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Shipbuilding Market Developments: Q2 2018.”
7 United Nations Conference on T rade and Development (UNCT AD), Review of Maritime Transport 2019, October 30,
2019, p. 30, at https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2019_en.pdf.
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September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks was accompanied by additional loan defaults, and MARAD
struggled to recover assets to offset payouts to creditors.
Since then, MARAD’s credit assistance has been far more limited. Over the past decade,
MARAD has approved seven Title XI loan guarantees for a total amount of $1.9 bil ion,
supporting the construction of 19 vessels. MARAD has received few applications to build certain
types of vessels most needed by the military, such as ships with truck ramps or onboard cranes
able to unload cargo at underdeveloped or damaged ports. Of the vessels financed in the past
decade, eight have been barges or combination tug-barges and five have been supply ships for
offshore oil dril ing platforms. In the past, several large loans have gone to building such
platforms themselves.
As of June 2020, MARAD had $35.4 mil ion available for subsidy costs associated with Title XI,
enough to guarantee approximately $432 mil ion in loans.8 Congress does not appropriate new
funding for subsidies every year, though these funds do remain available for multiple years if
unused. Its most recent appropriation was $27 mil ion for FY2018. Absent congressional
appropriations, the fees collected by MARAD from borrowers can be enough to al ow the agency
to guarantee additional loans.
As of December 2020, MARAD’s portfolio contained 18 guaranteed loans worth a total of $2.5
bil ion, the newest approved in FY2020 and the oldest approved in FY2000. Six more
applications for a total of $487 mil ion in loan guarantees remained pending (see Table A-1). A
$331 mil ion loan guarantee that was approved in March 2020 was the first to be issued since
FY2016, and was the first to be issued under new rules that specify that the Federal Financing
Bank replace commercial banks as the sole buyer of debt guaranteed under Title XI.9
Reform Proposals
Congress commissioned an audit of the program in 2003 after a series of defaults. MARAD is not
a private-sector lender and is therefore not expected to turn a profit in pursuing its policy goal of
strengthening the U.S. shipbuilding and merchant shipping industries, but it does have a
secondary policy goal of responsible stewardship of taxpayer dollars. Auditors found that
between 1993 and 2002, MARAD had underestimated the number of defaults and overestimated
its ability to recover value from loans in default, and that it had not fully complied with
regulations governing the program.10 A follow-up audit conducted in 2009-2010 by the DOT
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) found that MARAD had not yet fully implemented
procedures for improving oversight of borrowers pursuant to recommendations of previous
audits.11 OIG initiated a new audit of the Title XI program in December 2018, as required by the

8 MARAD bases its guarantee capacity estimate on assumptions about the duration of its loans, likelihood of loan
losses, interest rates, upfront fees charged to borrowers, and the availability of financing from the Federal Financing
Bank. See MARAD, “Subsidy Availability & History,” at https://www.maritime.dot.gov/grants-finances/title-xi/
subsidy-availability-history.
9 Jorge Romero and Darrell L. Conner, Major Changes in Title XI, the Federal Ship Financing Program , K&L Gates,
May 15, 2020, at https://www.klgates.com/major-changes-in-title-xi-the-federal-ship-financing-program-5-15-2020.
10 Government Accountability Office, GAO-03-657, Maritime Administration: Weaknesses Identified in Management
of the Title XI Loan Guarantee Program , June 2003, at https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-657.
11 Department of T ransportation Office of the Inspector General, “ T itle XI Loan Guarantee Program: Act ions Are
Needed to Fully Address OIG’s Recommendations,” December 7, 2010, at https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/
29793.
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John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2019 (P.L. 115-232).12 The
results of the 2018 audit have not yet been published.
In its FY2021 budget request, the Trump Administration proposed the elimination of the Title XI
program, and the transfer of the existing loan portfolio to the National Surface Transportation and
Innovative Finance Bureau (also cal ed the Build America Bureau) in DOT.13 Congress did not
take these actions in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260).
Assistance to Small Shipyards
The FY2006 NDAA14 authorized MARAD to make matching grants to eligible shipyard facilities
with fewer than 1,200 production employees for capital and related improvements. Grant funds
may also be used for maritime training programs in communities whose economies are related to
or dependent upon the maritime industry.15 The FY2006 NDAA original y authorized MARAD to
make such grants during FY2006-2010, but the FY2009 NDAA16 codified the program
permanently within Title 46 of the United States Code and extended authority through FY2013.
Authority to make grants lapsed for a year before being reauthorized in the Coble Act of 201517
for FY2015-FY2017. Grants were authorized again in the FY2018 NDAA18 for FY2018-FY2020,
and for an additional year by the FY2021 NDAA.19
From the program’s first year of authorization in 2006 until 2017 (with the exception of 2014,
when funding for the program was not authorized by statute), Congress authorized $30 mil ion
per year, of which $5 mil ion would be set aside for training programs and the remaining $25
mil ion would be for capital improvements and related expenses. The FY2018 NDAA increased
the total authorized level to $35 mil ion and removed the set-aside requirement. However, the
program has no dedicated funding source and is therefore contingent upon the annual
appropriations process. When the program has received an appropriation, it has usual y been at a
level below what Congress authorized, around $10 mil ion-$20 mil ion per year (see Table A-2).
A notable exception occurred in 2009, when the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (P.L.
111-5), passed in response to the 2008 financial crisis, appropriated $100 mil ion for smal
shipyard grants. This infusion effectively back-funded the program at close to its authorized
levels, but no funding was appropriated between FY2012 and FY2015. As a result, while
Congress has authorized a cumulative total of $435 mil ion over the life of the program, only
$228 mil ion has been appropriated for it (not adjusting for inflation).
Capital Construction Funds
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 (P.L. 74-835) created the Capital Construction Fund (CCF)
program, which al ows vessel owners to deposit a portion of their shipping profits, taxed at 0%,
into CCF accounts and withdraw them later to finance the construction, reconstruction, or

12 Letter from Barry J. DeWeese, Assistant Inspector General for T ransport ation Audits, to Mark H. Buzby, Maritime
Administrator, December 13, 2018, available at https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/36951.
13 MARAD Budget Estimates for Fiscal Year 2021, p. 79, at https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2020-
03/MARAD%20FY%202021%20Budget%20Estimate.pdf .
14 P.L. 109-163, §3506.
15 46 U.S.C. §54101.
16 P.L. 110-417.
17 P.L. 113-281.
18 P.L. 115-91.
19 P.L. 116-283.
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acquisition of vessels built or rebuilt in a U.S. shipyard. About 180 companies have established
CCFs. MARAD promulgates the rules and regulations related to the CCF program and verifies
eligibility and compliance among fund holders. MARAD shares responsibility for the program
with the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, which has jurisdiction over
commercial fishing vessels.
Operating Assistance
Maritime Security Fleet
The Maritime Security Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-239) established the Maritime Security Program
(MSP) to subsidize operations of the privately owned, U.S.-flagged fleet engaged in international
“liner” transport.20 MSP replaced the Operating Differential Subsidy (ODS) program, which was
created in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 and was one of the functions MARAD inherited from
an earlier agency.
The purpose of the MSP is to establish and sustain a fleet of active ships that are privately owned,
commercial y viable, and militarily useful to meet national defense and other emergency sealift
requirements. The ships must be crewed by U.S. citizens, but there is no requirement that they be
built in the United States. In return for agreeing to register ships under the U.S. flag and to make
them available upon request by the Secretary of Defense during times of war or national
emergency, carriers receive fixed annual retainer payments. As of February 2020, 60 ships from
16 operators were enrolled in the MSP. Danish shipping giant Maersk owns several of the
operators. The MARAD FY2021 budget request estimates that the MSP fleet employs
approximately 2,400 merchant mariners.
The MSP was initial y enacted as a $1 bil ion, 10-year program for a fleet not to exceed 47 ships.
The NDAA for FY2004 (P.L. 108-136) codified the program, increased the size of the fleet to 60
ships beginning in FY2006, and reauthorized it for an additional 10 years. Halfway through the
life of that authorization, the NDAA for FY2011 (P.L. 111-383) authorized $1.9 bil ion for the
program for a further 10 years, extending authority to FY2025. Subsequent NDAAs altered
annual funding levels but not the size of the fleet.
Bil s introduced in the House and Senate in 2019 each proposed extending authority for the
program through 2035, with new funding levels taking effect beginning in FY2022.21 The Senate
bil 22 would have frozen funding at $5.2 mil ion per vessel, slightly above FY2021 levels. The
House bil 23 proposed increasing the per-vessel subsidy from $5.3 mil ion in FY2022-2025 to
$5.8 mil ion through FY2028, then to $6.3 mil ion through FY2031 and $6.8 mil ion through
FY2035. Either bil would have avoided a decrease in authorized funding contained in earlier
legislation. Eventual y, the issue was addressed in the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92), which
retained the stepped-up funding levels from the House proposal (see Figure 2 below).
Subsequently, the FY2021 NDAA authorized a one-year increase to $8.2 mil ion per vessel for

20 “Liner” service generally refers to regularly scheduled shipping performed by container ships and roll-on/roll-off
ships with ramps for transporting vehicles.
21 Prior to the FY2020 NDAA, MSP funding had been set at $5.2 million per vessel for FY2021 before decreasing to
$3.7 million per vessel for FY2022-2025.
22 S. 1790 (116th Congress).
23 H.R. 2500 (116th Congress).
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FY2021, but Congress had already appropriated the previously authorized sum of $314 mil ion
before the NDAA was enacted.
Figure 2. Authorized Maritime Security Program Stipend per Vessel, FY1996-FY2035
in mil ions of nominal dol ars

Source: P.L. 104-239, P.L. 108-136, P.L. 111-383, P.L. 112-239, P.L. 114-92, P.L. 114-113, P.L. 115-232, S. 1719,
P.L. 116-92.
Notes: From FY1996 to FY2005, stipends were capped at 47 vessels. The cap was increased to 60 vessels
beginning in FY2006. Bil numbers refer to 116th Congress.
The House bil would also have created two new programs similar to MSP—one for tankers and
one for ships capable of laying and repairing submerged cables—on the grounds that a lack of
U.S.-flagged vessels of these types represented a threat to national security not currently
addressed by MSP. Each fleet was to consist of at most 10 ships, each subsidized at $6 mil ion per
year. These provisions were not incorporated into the FY2020 NDAA in their entirety, but
Congress did authorize a pared-down Cable Security Program (two ships, each subsidized at $5
mil ion per year) through FY2035.24 Congress then created a similar ten-vessel Tanker Security
Program subsidized at $6 mil ion per vessel per year in the FY2021 NDAA.
One of the main differences between MSP and its predecessor ODS is that MARAD previously
committed to 20-year contracts with vessel operators. These contracts were not subject to the
annual appropriations process. The promise of 20 years of profitable service for a given vessel
was intended to enable the operator to obtain more favorable terms when financing construction
in a U.S. shipyard, a requirement of the program. MSP subsidies, though they are paid out over
10-year agreements, are subject to the annual appropriations process, and at the time of its
introduction this prompted some observers to worry that a less “bankable” program would result
in increased cost or reduced availability of financing (the shift from ODS to MSP followed a
period in which the Title XI loan program was suspended). MARAD has been able to fil al
available slots with qualified ships, though this may be due to the cumulative effects of multiple
MARAD programs, not necessarily MSP alone.
One issue facing the MSP (and one that faced the ODS before it) is that the types and sizes of
vessels for which there is greatest commercial demand are not always the types and sizes that the
military requires. In the earlier days of the ODS program, this was not a significant problem,
because many cargo ships could use onboard cranes to self-load and -unload. Changes in the

24 P.L. 116-92, §3521(a).
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industry, as a result of containerization and other factors, have meant that most general cargo
ships move freight in containers between ports with considerable dockside infrastructure such as
cranes and rail yards, whereas the military may place strategic value on being able to load and
unload cargo at places other than large container ports. For example, in countries with poor land
infrastructure, the most efficient way to deliver military cargo may be to drive fully loaded trucks
off the vessel, but commercial demand for the types of roll-on/roll-off vessels the military desires
is limited. It may be difficult to justify operating subsidies to container vessels as militarily
necessary when most commercial vessels are of limited military utility.
A related program, the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), al ows U.S.-flagged
commercial ships to devote a portion of their capacity to military cargo. MARAD created VISA
in 1995 in partnership with the U.S. Transportation Command, the military command tasked with
transporting personnel and cargo for DOD. Specifical y, VISA is designed for the movement of
ammunition and sustainment cargo. In peacetime, DOD wil give priority consideration to VISA
participants when booking military cargo on ships. As of February 2020, there were 101 ships
enrolled in the VISA program. There is no stipend provided by MARAD for these ships, but they
do receive cargo preference (discussed later in this report).
GAO Audit
A 2018 Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit identified a widening differential in
operating costs between U.S.-flagged ships in international trade and foreign-flagged vessels and
decreasing volume of government cargo, which is reserved for U.S.-flagged ships.25 GAO
suggested three potential modifications to the MSP:
1. Competitive bidding. Rather than each vessel receiving the same stipend, vessel
operators could bid for slots in the program, possibly reducing stipends below
current levels for some vessels.
2. Competition for replacement slots. Rather than opening al slots to
competition, MARAD could open a slot to competition only when an operator
wishes to replace one existing MSP vessel with another.
3. Variable stipend. Rather than granting each vessel the same stipend, MARAD
could adjust the per-vessel stipend by vessel type to more closely reflect the costs
and utility of operating a given vessel.
A GAO survey of vessel operators indicated that any changes to the MSP could undermine
operators’ confidence in predictable revenues.
GAO also considered two alternatives to replacing the MSP as currently configured: replacing
MSP vessels with a fully government-owned fleet of ships, or simply expanding the VISA
program and contracting for or chartering additional capacity if needed. Each alternative could in
theory preserve U.S.-registered sealift capacity, but may not serve MARAD’s goals of promoting
the domestic merchant marine industry. Under government ownership, the vessels may be
underused for prolonged periods, making it difficult to maintain mariners’ skil s and increase
their experience. If MARAD were to contract for ships only when needed, it is possible that ship
owners would choose to register their vessels under foreign flags for economic reasons, leaving
insufficient U.S.-flagged vessel capacity when required in an emergency.

25 GAO-18-478, “Maritime Security: DOT Needs to Expeditiously Finalize the Required National Maritime Strategy
for Sustaining U.S.-Flag Fleet,” August 2018. GAO also noted that Congress directed MARAD to produce a national
maritime strategy by February 2015; this strategy was three years past due at the time of the audit, and was not
published until July 2020.
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U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) Shipping and Shipbuilding Support Programs

National Defense Reserve Fleet
MARAD manages and maintains a fleet of approximately 100 inactive, government-owned
vessels in the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), including 46 ships in the Ready Reserve
Force (RRF). Unlike the MSP, these ships do not engage in any peacetime commercial activity.
While the NDRF traces its origins to the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946, passed in the
aftermath of World War II, the RRF originated from a Memorandum of Agreement signed in 1976
in the aftermath of the Vietnam War.
The RRF provides a ready source of “surge” shipping to support rapid deployment of U.S.
military forces. RRF ships are kept in a state of readiness to sail on five (in select cases, ten) days’
notice. Al NDRF activities, including the RRF, are funded from appropriations transferred to
MARAD from the Navy’s National Defense Sealift Fund in accordance with a 1997
Memorandum of Agreement between MARAD and DOD. In FY2020, $352 mil ion was
transferred for RRF activities.26
Vessel age and the availability of mariners could hamper the ability of MARAD to reach its
sealift goals. During a no-notice dril conducted in 2019, 60% of RRF vessels were deemed ready,
and not al of those were able to leave port.27 In a 2019 hearing before two House subcommittees,
former MARAD Administrator Mark Buzby testified that the average age of an RRF vessel was
44 years, and that the correspondingly high cost of maintaining and repairing such old vessels
was a chal enge to the effectiveness of the program.28
Cargo Preference
Another way federal policy supports the domestic merchant marine industry is by requiring
certain percentages of “government impel ed” cargo to be carried on U.S.-owned, -flagged, and -
crewed vessels. This includes al military cargo, at least half of al export cargo financed through
the Export-Import Bank, and half of food aid and other civilian agency aid cargo.29 Private
carriers bid to carry this “preference cargo.”30 Carriers that can provide U.S.-flagged service to
the final port of discharge are given priority over U.S.-flagged carriers that would transfer cargo
to a foreign-flagged feeder vessel to reach the final port. MARAD is responsible for ensuring that
federal agencies comply with these shipping requirements. About 85 U.S.-flagged ships carry
preference cargoes, including the 60 ships enrolled in the MSP. Commercial cargoes alone are not
sufficient to sustain any of the U.S.-flagged ships engaged in international transport; al rely on
some combination of preference cargoes and MSP operating subsidies.
The FY2009 Duncan Hunter NDAA specified that preference requirements also apply to cargo
that is imported into the United States if the federal government “provides financing in any way
with federal funds for the account of any persons unless otherwise exempted.”31 At least 50% of
such cargo must be shipped in U.S.-flagged vessels.

26 P.L. 116-93, §8109.
27 Ben Werner, “T est of Ready Reserve Force Exposes Need for Newer Ships, More People,” USNI News, January 16,
2020, at https://news.usni.org/2020/01/16/test-of-ready-reserve-force-exposes-need-for-newer-ships-more-people.
28 House hearing 36-297; see also CRS Insight IN11416, Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Sealift Fleet, by
John Frittelli.
29 P.L. 83-664.
30 See CRS Report R44254, Cargo Preferences for U.S.-Flag Shipping, by John Frittelli.
31 P.L. 110-417, §3511; 46 U.S.C. §55305(b).
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The FY2009 NDAA directed MARAD to issue new regulations and guidance to govern the
administration of cargo preference by other federal agencies, but it has not yet done so. The
agency submitted a draft notice of proposed rulemaking for Office of Management and Budget
approval in December 2011, but the process has not moved forward. MARAD has not indicated
when it might restart the regulatory development process.32 Absent this guidance, different
agencies within DOT have sometimes made their own determinations as to when and how to
apply cargo preference requirements. The Federal Highway Administration has interpreted the
law to apply cargo preference requirements to federal y supported highway projects carried out by
state departments of transportation and other agencies.33 MARAD has applied cargo preference
requirements to imported components for ships constructed with federal loan guarantees.34
Recent legislation has sought to extend cargo preference requirements to commercial cargoes not
paid for by the federal government. A bil introduced in 2017 would have required that a certain
percentage of crude oil or natural gas exports be moved on U.S.-flagged vessels, but it was not
enacted.35 House and Senate companion bil s introduced in 2018 and in 2019 would require al
exports of liquefied natural gas to be transported by vessels built (or refurbished) and registered
in the United States, but these have not been enacted either, despite bipartisan sponsorship.36
Attempts to require commercial cargo to be moved on U.S.-flagged ships have faced strong
pushback from importers and exporters seeking to maximize flexibility and minimize costs in
their shipping options.37 A 2015 GAO audit validated some of these concerns when it found that
cargo preference requirements can increase the cost of delivering exported food aid by an
estimated 23%.38
Other Support Programs
Merchant Marine Training
Consistent with the policy goal of having a U.S.-flagged merchant fleet crewed by “trained and
efficient citizen personnel,”39 Congress supports the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and six state
maritime academies. Funds for academy activities—as wel as the procurement, upkeep, and
replacement of classroom ships—are provided in MARAD’s budget.

32 U.S. Congress, House Committee on T ransportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
T ransportation, The State of the U.S.-Flag Maritim e Industry, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., January 17, 2018, p. 10.
33 FHWA, “Cargo Preference Act and Federal-aid Projects,” Letter from Chief Counsel, December 8, 2015, at
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/construction/cqit/cargo/151208.cfm.
34 80 Federal Register 22611, April 22, 2015. Comments filed by U.S. shipbuilders and domestic ocean carriers in
response to the proposed policy clarification asserted that the requirement would severely disrupt shipbuilding supply
chains. For additional background, see CRS Report R44831, Revitalizing Coastal Shipping for Dom estic Com m erce, by
John Frittelli.
35 H.R. 1240 (115th Congress).
36 H.R. 5893 and S. 2916 (115th Congress), H.R. 3829 and S. 2167 (116th Congress).
37 J. Michael Cavanaugh, History Doesn’t Bode Well for New Commercial Cargo Preference Bill, Holland & Knight,
March 21, 2017, at https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2017/03/history-doesnt -bode-well-for-new-
commercial-cargo.
38 Government Accountability Office, “International Food Assistance: Cargo Preference Increased Food Aid Shipping
Costs; Benefits Remain Unclear,” October 19, 2017, p. 3, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/687836.pdf; see also CRS
Report R45422, U.S. International Food Assistance: An Overview, by Alyssa R. Casey.
39 46 U.S.C. §50101.
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United States Merchant Marine Academy
The U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA), located at Kings Point, NY, is an accredited
institution of higher education and one of the nation’s Federal Service Academies, a group that
also includes the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard academies. Besides distributing funds,
MARAD has authority to direct the academy superintendent appointed by the Secretary of
Transportation, as wel as other oversight duties.
In exchange for education provided free of charge for tuition, room, and board, graduates can
choose either to work five years on U.S. merchant ships along with serving for eight years as an
officer in any military reserve unit, or to serve five years on active duty in the armed forces.
About one-fourth of graduates choose the latter option. In FY2021, Congress appropriated $86
mil ion for the USMMA, which graduates approximately 230 Coast Guard-credentialed merchant
mariners each year.
The USMMA was the first federal service academy to admit women, but today it graduates the
fewest. Despite a provision in the 2009 NDAA requiring USMMA to be a sexual assault-free
environment, in 2014-2015 it reported the highest rate of sexual assault and harassment of any of
the federal service academies.40 A 2018 OIG audit mandated by the 2017 NDAA found that the
USMMA Sexual Assault Prevention and Response program did not align with guidelines issued
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and issued 10 recommendations for further
action, al of which MARAD concurred with. By law, the MARAD Office of Civil Rights must
maintain an open line of communication with USMMA cadets, outside the usual chain of
command, for sexual harassment and assault claims.
State Merchant Marine Academies
Six state maritime academies also receive federal assistance from MARAD:
1. California Maritime Academy in Val ejo, CA;
2. Great Lakes Maritime Academy in Traverse City, MI;
3. Maine Maritime Academy in Castine, ME;
4. Massachusetts Maritime Academy in Buzzards Bay, MA;
5. State University of New York (SUNY) Maritime College in The Bronx, NY; and
6. Texas A&M Maritime Academy in Galveston, TX.
The six academies collectively graduated 922 merchant mariners in FY2019. Unlike graduates of
USMMA, graduates of state maritime academies are not automatical y commissioned as officers
in the armed forces or reserves, but they do receive the necessary training to obtain a Coast Guard
credential for crewing merchant vessels.
State maritime academy funding was previously distributed from MARAD’s general Operations
and Training account. The Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (P.L. 116-6)
created a new Treasury account for state maritime academy funding. MARAD received $345
mil ion in FY2019, $342 mil ion in FY2020, and $433 mil ion in FY2021 to fund state maritime
academy program activities, including at least $300 mil ion each year for the procurement of new
training ships as described below.

40 Lisa Rein, “Merchant Marine midshipmen endure rough waters as sexual misconduct roils their ranks,” Washington
Post, July 18, 2016, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/08/11/merchant-marine-academy-
under-fire-for-sexual-assault-allegations/.
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Training Ships
MARAD’s support for state maritime academies includes the use of six ships from the NDRF
used for training purposes. The oldest ship stil in use, the TS Empire State VI, was built in 1962,
and the youngest, the TS State of Maine, was built in 1990. Al six were original y cargo or
research vessels and were converted to training ships between 1989 and 2003. One training ship,
the TS General Rudder, has capacity for only 50 cadets, which meets approximately 20% of the
training capacity requirement of the academy that uses it. MARAD maintains a seventh training
ship, transferred from NASA in 2012, as a backup.
Congress appropriated a total of $11 mil ion in FY2016-FY2017 to design a new National
Security Multi-Mission Vessel (NSMV) to replace the oldest of these ships. The NSMV design,
which incorporates the capacity needs of each state maritime academy, would accommodate 600
cadets and would be equipped with on-board educational facilities. It would also include a
helicopter landing pad and the capacity to berth 1,000 people as part of humanitarian or
emergency relief missions.
Congress has subsequently appropriated $300 mil ion annual y in FY2018-FY2020 to construct
new NSMVs. In May 2019, MARAD contracted with TOTE Services to serve as the vessel
construction manager on the project,41 and in April 2020 Phil y Shipyard Inc. was selected to
construct the vessels.42 According to MARAD’s acquisition strategy, the first ship would be
delivered in 2023, with additional ships delivered at 12-month intervals. The initial order was for
two vessels using funds appropriated through FY2019, with an option to construct up to three
more pending the availability of funds for a total possible contract value of approximately $1.5
bil ion. The Administration requested a $95 mil ion decrease in appropriations for the NSMV
program for FY2020, which would have necessitated a new design for future vessels. Congress
did not adopt these cuts and fully funded a third NSMV, followed by a fourth in FY2021.
Mariner Shortage
In an audit conducted in 2018 and updated in 2020, GAO found that maritime industry
stakeholders and government officials shared concerns about a lack of qualified U.S.-citizen
mariners.43 The audit cited a 2017 report from the MARAD Maritime Workforce Working Group
that estimated a shortage of over 1,800 mariners in the event of a drawn-out military effort,
though it also admitted uncertainty in the count of available mariners. Some older NDRF ships
are steam powered, unlike much of the commercial fleet. This could mean that even if a full
complement of mariners were available in time of war, the mariners may not be capable of
mobilizing MARAD’s entire reserve fleet. However, the number of available shipboard positions
during peacetime may be insufficient to provide employment for al graduates if class sizes at
maritime academies were to be enlarged as a result of increased funding.

41 T OT E Services, “T ote Services Awarded MARAD Contract to Develop National Security Multi-Mission Vessel,”
press release, May 21, 2019, at http://www.toteservices.com/blog/2019/05/21/tote-services-awarded-marad-contract -to-
develop-national-security-multi-mission-vessel/.
42 Philly Shipyard, “Philly Shipyard Wins Major T raining Ships Contract,” press release, April 8, 2020, at
http://www.phillyshipyard.com/s.cfm/2-38_94/Philly-Shipyard-Wins-Major-Training-Ships-Contract .
43 Government Accountability Office, “National Maritime Strategy: DOT Is T aking Steps to Obtain Interagency Input
and Finalize Strategy,” January 15, 2020, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/703892.pdf.
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Port Infrastructure Development Grants
Section 3512 of the NDAA for FY201044 created a new program for Port Infrastructure
Development (PID) Grants overseen by MARAD. Port infrastructure projects are traditional y
funded by private industry and local port authorities, not by the federal government, but
supporters argued that additional federal support was justified given the importance of maritime
freight.45 Congress did not specify a funding level for this program, instead authorizing “such
sums as may be necessary” to carry out the goals of the program. After several years without any
funding, the program has received a total of $748 mil ion across three separate annual
appropriations beginning in FY2019. The first project selections, totaling over $280 mil ion in
awarded funds, were announced in February 2020.46
The PID Grant program al ows ports to compete for funds that would be otherwise unavailable or
more difficult to obtain under other discretionary grant programs such as the Infrastructure for
Rebuilding America (INFRA) program. INFRA, created by the Fixing America’s Surface
Transportation Act of 2015 (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94), is primarily focused on highway freight
movement, with a limited amount of funds available for rail or landside port projects, capped in
the aggregate by statute. The program receives funding from the Highway Trust Fund and is not
subject to annual appropriations, but it (along with the rest of the FAST Act) is slated to expire at
the end of FY2020. Some Members have proposed raising the cap on non-highway funding from
INFRA, if not removing the cap altogether, if the program is reauthorized.
Port projects are also eligible for the Better Utilizing Investments to Leverage Development
(BUILD) grant program, managed by the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, but must
compete with highway, rail, and transit projects for grant funds. Citing eligibility under INFRA
and BUILD, the Administration requested no additional funding for PID grants in its FY2021
budget request, but Congress has continued to appropriate new funding.
Marine Highways
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140) directed MARAD to create a
program that would encourage “short sea transportation.” Short sea transportation involves
loading freight—usual y in intermodal containers or truck trailers—onto vessels for part of their
journeys, taking advantage of increased fuel economy and potential y bypassing congested
roadways. A primary goal of the new program was to reduce landside congestion at ports by
designating a network of “marine highways.” The Marine Highway system currently includes 25
routes that offer relief to landside corridors suffering from traffic congestion, excessive air
emissions, or other environmental chal enges (Figure 3). Each route is designated by the
Secretary of Transportation.
Congress appropriated $10.8 mil ion for the America’s Marine Highway program for FY2021. A
total of $31 mil ion in federal funds has been awarded to 30 projects since 2007, but the program
has not always received an annual appropriation.47

44 P.L. 111-84.
45 “America’s Marine Highways Grants Proposed,” Marine Link, July 14, 2009, at https://www.marinelink.com/news/
americas-highways331213.
46 MARAD, “Maritime Administration Announces More than $280 Million in Grants for Nation’s Ports,” press release,
February 14, 2020, at https://www.maritime.dot.gov/newsroom/press-releases/maritime-administration-announces-
more-280-million-grants-nations-ports.
47 T he volume of domestic waterborne freight has held steady at around 500 billion ton -miles per year since 2008 (the
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U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) Shipping and Shipbuilding Support Programs

Many of these corridors have failed to support commercial intermodal service, which either has
been withdrawn or continues only with subsidies to barge operators. One factor working against
MARAD’s effectiveness in this area may be that the condition of locks and dams—a potential
impediment to freight flow on inland waterways—is outside MARAD’s jurisdiction. Another
limiting factor may be that even congested roads can permit faster travel speeds than uncongested
waterways over most distances.
Figure 3. America’s Marine Highway Routes

Source: MARAD, at https://www.maritime.dot.gov/grants/marine-highways/marine-highway.
Ship Disposal
MARAD is the disposal agency for federally owned merchant vessels of 1,500 gross tons48 or
greater as required by the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949.49 Ships in
the NDRF that are no longer militarily useful are retained at MARAD-operated anchorages and
downgraded to non-retention status. These vessels may then be used as a source of components
and equipment for operational vessels. When they no longer have logistical support value, the
Ship Disposal Program arranges for their responsible disposal (“shipbreaking”), on a worst-first
basis, selecting from among bids submitted by domestic ship recycling facilities approved by
MARAD. During FY2019, MARAD arranged the disposal of five non-retention vessels from the

first full year of the America’s Marine Highways program), representing about 10% of all domestic freight ton -miles.
T his follows a decades-long decline, especially in the volume of coastwise traffic. Over 20% of domestic ton -miles
moved by water in the 1980s.
48 Gross tonnage is a function of a ship’s interior volume capacity, not its weight or mass. Merchant ships can be
measured in terms of gross or net tonnage (carrying capacity), lightweight (actual weight of the ship empty),
deadweight (combined weight of the crew, cargo, and supplies a ship carries), or displacement (weight of water
displaced at different loads).
49 40 U.S.C. §548.
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U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) Shipping and Shipbuilding Support Programs

NDRF and other federal fleets. MARAD has disposed of 159 such vessels since FY2007 (Figure
4).
Figure 4. Obsolete NDRF Vessels Removed for Disposal, FY2007-FY2019

Source: MARAD FY2021 Budget Estimates.
Commercial shipbreaking is similar to shipbuilding in that a smal number of foreign countries—
in this case, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India—tend to dominate the market. MARAD is limited to
the use of domestic recyclers by a provision of the NDAA for FY 2009.50 The few MARAD-
qualified shipbreakers are concentrated along the Gulf Coast in Texas and Louisiana.51
The Nuclear Ship Savannah
MARAD also uses funds from the Ship Disposal Program to decommission the nuclear ship
Savannah, which it owns. Savannah was the world’s first nuclear-powered merchant ship,
launched in 1959 as a joint project between MARAD, then-parent agency the Department of
Commerce, and the Atomic Energy Commission, to demonstrate the feasibility of nuclear
propulsion for peacetime purposes. Savannah served as a passenger-cargo liner from its maiden
voyage in 1962 through 1965, then transported cargo exclusively until 1971. No further nuclear
cargo ships were ever built in the United States; the cost of maintaining a nuclear reactor and the
ship’s comparatively smal cargo capacity prevented it from being economical y viable.
Worldwide, only three other nuclear cargo ships have ever been built.
Since leaving active service, Savannah spent time as a museum ship in South Carolina from 1981
to 1994, during which time it was added to the National Register of Historic Places (in 1982) and
designated a National Historic Landmark (in 1991). Since 2008, Savannah has been docked at the
Canton Marine Terminal in Baltimore harbor, except for a brief period spent in dry dock in
Philadelphia in late 2019 and early 2020. Decommissioning must be completed by December
2031, at which point MARAD may explore options to preserve or dispose of it. Of the $4.2
mil ion appropriated for the Ship Disposal Program in FY2021, some portion is likely to be set
aside for upkeep of Savannah.

50 P.L. 110-47, §3502.
51 MARAD, Report to Congress: Maritime Administration Vessel Disposal Program , March 2016, pp. 6-8, at
https://www.maritime.dot.gov/sites/marad.dot.gov/files/docs/about-us/foia/4186/march-2016-report -2.pdf.
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Appendix. Additional Data
Table A-1. Title XI Funding, Applications Approved, Loan Guarantee Amounts
Approved, and Guaranteed Loan Amounts Outstanding, FY2000-FY2020
al figures are in mil ions of dol ars except Applications Approved
Appropriated
Applications
Loan Amounts
Loan Amounts
Year
Funding
Approved
Approved
Outstanding
FY2000
6
13
892
209
FY2001
30
12
730
185
FY2002
33
8
225
0
FY2003
25
4
519
338
FY2004
0
1
12
0
FY2005
0
1
140
0
FY2006
5
0
0
0
FY2007
0
0
0
0
FY2008
5
0
0
0
FY2009
0
2
307
307
FY2010
5
1
23
0
FY2011
5
3
798
346
FY2012
(35)
0
0
0
FY2013
0
0
0
0
FY2014
35
1
325
325
FY2015
0
1
12
12
FY2016
5
1
397
397
FY2017
0
0
0
0
FY2018
27
0
0
0
FY2019
0
0
0
0
FY2020
0
1
331
331
Total
146
49
4,710
2,451
Source: MARAD; compiled by CRS.
Notes: Includes appropriations to the financing (subsidy costs) account only, not the program (administrative
costs), account. Loan Amounts Approved includes al guaranteed loans outstanding and retired due to repayment
or default. Loan Amounts Outstanding refers to original commitment and does not reflect any partial repayment.
Dol ar amounts are not adjusted for inflation. Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding.
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Table A-2. Assistance to Small Shipyards
Authorizations and Appropriations, FY2006-2020
in mil ions of nominal dol ars
Year
Authorized Funding
Appropriated Funding
2006
30
—
2007
30
—
2008
30
10
2009
30
118
2010
30
15
2011
30
10
2012
30
—
2013
30
—
2014
n/a
—
2015
30
—
2016
30
5
2017
30
10
2018
35
20
2019
35
20
2020
35
20
2021
20
20
Total
455
248
Source: Compiled by CRS using information from congress.gov.
Notes: The Smal Shipyards program received $100 mil ion from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) and $17.5 mil ion from the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-8).
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Table A-3. MARAD Funding by Program and Full-Time Equivalent Employment,
FY2015-FY2020
in mil ions of nominal dol ars and FTEs
Program
FY2015
FY2016
FY2017 FY2018
FY2019 FY2020
FY2021
Operations and Training
148.1
171.2
175.6
513.6
149.4
152.6
155.6
State Maritime Academy
—
—
—
[300.0]
345.2
342.3
432.7
Operations
Maritime Security Program
186.0
210.0
300.0
300.0
300.0
300.0
314.0
Cable Security Program
—
—
—
—
—
—
10.0
Port Infrastructure
—
—
—
—
292.7
225.0
230.0
Development
Ship Disposal
4.0
5.0
34.0
116.0
5.0
5.0
4.2
Assistance to Smal Shipyards
—
5.0
10.0
20.0
20.0
20.0
20.0
Maritime Guaranteed Loans
3.1
8.1
3.0
30.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
(Title XI)
Total Funding
341.2
399.3
522.6
979.6
1,115.3
1,047.9
1,169.5
Ful -time equivalent
770
754
732
724
733
785
n/a
employment
Source: MARAD and congress.gov; compiled by CRS.
Notes: FY2018 State Maritime Academy Operations were funded out of Operations and Training. Title XI
funding includes the program (administrative costs) and financing (subsidy costs) accounts. Figures do not include
COVID-19 emergency relief funds from the CARES Act, which provided an additional $3.1 mil ion for
Operations and Training and $1 mil ion for State Maritime Academy Operations in FY2020.

Author Information

Ben Goldman

Analyst in Transportation Policy

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
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