Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues for Congress

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues for Congress

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of
May 21, 2021
Forced Labor: Overview and Issues for
Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs,
Congress
Coordinator
Analyst in International
The International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates that as of 2016, nearly 25 million adults
Trade and Finance
and children worked in forced labor, also known as labor traffickin g. Section 307 of the Tariff

Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. §1307) prohibits U.S. imports of any product that was mined, produced,
Christopher A. Casey
or manufactured wholly or in part by forced labor, including forced or indentured child labor.
Analyst in International
Trade and Finance
Amid concerns in recent decades over the statute’s lack of use and increasing interest in

combatting human trafficking, Congress amended Section 307 in 2015 to make it easier to block
the entry of products of forced labor by removing the “consumptive demand” exception. This
Katarina C. O'Regan
Analyst in Foreign Policy
exception had permitted imports of goods that were not domestically produced in such quantities

as to meet U.S. consumption needs. Since 2016, enforcement of Section 307 has increased in
frequency and scope, and to date U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has issued nearly 30

“withhold release orders” (WROs), which bar entry of certain goods made by forced labor. While
WROs were typically limited to specific manufacturers and producers, CBP recently has issued broader in dustry- and
countrywide orders. WROs are one of several congressionally mandated forced labor and anti-human trafficking measures. In
addition, various international conventions and guidelines address forced labor and supply chains, including those produced
by the United Nations and the International Labor Organization (ILO), which have informed and worked in tandem with U.S.
approaches.
Stakeholders welcomed congressional action to repeal the consumptive demand exception as a critical step toward improving
utilization of Section 307. Enforcement of the provision has faced challenges, however, and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), research institutes, and the media have documented a number of U.S. companies and global brands implicated,
directly or indirectly, by forced labor in their supply chains. The U.S. Department of Labor tracks more than 60 categories of
goods produced with forced labor from more than 40 countries. While identifying high-risk sectors and countries in which
forced labor occurs is not inherently difficult, tracing such practices to specific facilities can be very challenging, particularly
given complex global supply chains, widespread subcontracting, and problems with effective third-party auditing.
Some Members of Congress have expressed interest in ensuring CBP actively applies Section 307. Some observers view
recent enforcement actions as inadequate in eliminating U.S. imports of forced labor, and recommend greater clarity and
guidance in CBP decisions and requirements, as well as allocation of greater resources. Other stakeholders emphasize the
need to shift the burden of mitigating risk to manufacturers and importers, through due diligence measures and transparency
in supplier relationships. Some advocate for greater use of broader enforcement actions against an entire industry, region or
country, rather than targeting individual companies. In particular, some Members and stakeholders seek a regional
enforcement approach to address forced labor practices in China, given deepening concerns over the widespread use of state-
sponsored forced labor of Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and China’s central role in
global manufacturing. On the other hand, some industry groups caution about the spillover effects and compliance costs of
broader enforcement, which could disrupt legitimate supply chains, burden companies, and further harm vulnerable workers.
Practical challenges in enforcement, such as limited resources and tracing difficulties in supply chains are also key private
sector concerns.
The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (H.R. 1155/S. 65) would create a rebuttable presumption provision that all goods
produced or manufactured in Xinjiang are made with forced labor, and thus prohibited under Section 307. This and other bils
also aim to improve disclosure and transparency of companies. In January 2020, Congress used passage of the U.S.-Mexico-
Canada Agreement (P.L. 116-113) to bolster broader enforcement efforts related to Section 307 and interagency
coordination.
This report provides background and analysis on Section 307 and CBP processes, trends regarding its use, and key issues for
Congress regarding Section 307 enforcement and U.S. trade policy.
Congressional Research Service

link to page 4 link to page 6 link to page 6 link to page 7 link to page 11 link to page 13 link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 18 link to page 21 link to page 21 link to page 22 link to page 24 link to page 25 link to page 25 link to page 26 link to page 28 link to page 28 link to page 28 link to page 29 link to page 29 link to page 30 link to page 32 link to page 33 link to page 34 link to page 34 link to page 35 link to page 9 link to page 11 link to page 12 link to page 17 link to page 23 link to page 35 Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
Section 307: Origins, Development, and Trends ................................................................... 3
Origins..................................................................................................................... 3
Trends and Development: 1930-2020............................................................................ 4
Section 307 Application ................................................................................................... 8
Responsibilities of Importers ..................................................................................... 10
CBP Resources........................................................................................................ 12
Trends: U.S. Trade and Forced Labor ............................................................................... 13
Forced Labor in Xinjiang .......................................................................................... 15
Other U.S. Forced Labor and Anti-Labor Trafficking Measures ............................................ 18
Department of Homeland Security ............................................................................. 18
Departments of Labor and State ................................................................................. 19
Free Trade Agreements and Other Trade Programs........................................................ 21
Intergovernmental Forced Labor and Anti-Trafficking Measures .......................................... 22
International Labor Organization................................................................................ 22
Other U.N. Initiatives ............................................................................................... 23
Issues for Congress ....................................................................................................... 25
Section 307 Enforcement .......................................................................................... 25
Changes to Section 307 Processes to Enhance Enforcement ...................................... 25
Feasibility of Industry- or Region-wide Enforcement Approaches and Related
Challenges...................................................................................................... 26
Section 307 as a Tool for Mitigating Forced Labor Practices in China......................... 27
Impact of Enforcement on Workers and Companies ................................................. 29
Role of Multinationals and Supply Chain Due Diligence .......................................... 30
U.S. Trade Policy and Forced Labor Provisions ............................................................ 31
U.S. Trade Policy Tools to Complement and Enhance Section 307 Objectives ............. 31
Role of International Trade Rules with Respect to Forced Labor Issues....................... 32

Figures
Figure 1. Withhold Release Orders (WROs): Issued and In Force ........................................... 6
Figure 2. WROs by Country ............................................................................................. 8
Figure 3. Application of Section 307 .................................................................................. 9
Figure 4. Countries with Production by Forced Labor and/or Forced Child Labor ................... 14

Tables
Table 1. Goods and Countries Identified by DOL for Child Labor or Forced Labor.................. 20

Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 32

Congressional Research Service

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

Introduction
The International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates that as of 2016, nearly 25 mil ion adults
and children worked in forced labor, also known as labor trafficking, including 16 mil ion put to
work by the private sector.1 The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) tracks at least 63 categories of
goods produced with forced labor, some exported as finished goods or inputs, from more than 40
countries.2 U.S. customs law has prohibited importing goods produced by certain categories of
labor since the late nineteenth century.3 Today, Section 307 of that Tariff Act of 1930, as amended
(19 U.S.C. §1307), prohibits the importation of goods made by forced labor.4 It provides:
All goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholy or
in part in any foreign country by convict labor or/and forced labor or/and indentured labor
under penal sanctions shall not be entitled to entry at any of the ports of the United States,
and the importation thereof is hereby prohibited, and the Secretary of the Treasury is
authorized and directed to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary for the
enforcement of this provision.5
Enforcement of this prohibition by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has been uneven
and has faced chal enges, and forced labor in global supply chains has persisted. Over the past
several decades, some Members of Congress have expressed concerns with CBP’s enforcement
of Section 307, and Congress has enacted legislation to remove exceptions and expand CBP’s
enforcement capacity.6 Most notably, Congress removed the so-cal ed “consumptive demand”
provision in 2015, which had al owed the importation of goods made with forced labor if such
goods were not made in the United States in sufficient quantities to meet domestic demand.7
Since 2016, CBP has increased the use of Section 307. In the past five years, CBP has issued
nearly 30 “withhold release orders” (WROs), which bar the entry of certain goods suspected of
being produced with forced labor. Between 2000 and 2015, CBP had issued zero. In the past,
WROs were typical y limited to specific manufacturers and producers. Recently, however, CBP
has also issued broader industry and countrywide orders, which may cover an entire product line
from a country or region.
Even with the recent change, some Members have continued to express concerns with Section
307 enforcement.8 Some labor groups and government agencies recommend improving
transparency in CBP decisions and petition requirements, such as clarifying evidentiary standards
and improving CBP’s collaboration with other anti-trafficking initiatives.9 Some

1 ILO, Ending Forced Labour by 2030: A Review of Policies and Programmes, December 2018.
2 Based on DOL’s 2020 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; reported figures do not include
countries and goods produced by child labor. While some goods listed are produced with both child labor and forced
labor, DOL notes that this does not necessarily mean that the goods were produced with forced child labor.
3 See, e.g., the T ariff Act of 1890 §51, 26 Stat. 567, 624 (October 1, 1890).
4 P.L. 71-361 (March 13, 1930), §307; 46 Stat. 590, 689, codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §1307 .
5 Ibid.
6 See, e.g., P.L. 114-125 (February 24, 2016) §910(a); 130 Stat. 122, 239; P.L. 105-61 (October 10, 1997) §634, 111
Stat. 1272.
7 P.L. 114-125 (February 24, 2016) §910(a); 130 Stat. 122, 239.
8 U.S. Congress, House Ways and Means Committee, Enforcing the Ban on Imports Produced by Forced Labor in
Xinjiang, hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., September 17, 2020.
9 For example, T estimony by Cathy Feingold, International Director, AFL-CIO, U.S. Congress, House Ways and
Means Committee, Enforcing the Ban on Im ports Produced by Forced Labor in Xinjiang , hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd
Congressional Research Service
1

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) argue that manufacturers and purchasers should bear
more of the burden of preventing the use of forced labor through greater supply chain due
diligence and accountability.10 While identifying high-risk sectors and countries in which forced
labor occurs is not inherently difficult—and is the subject of annual reports by DOL11—tracing
forced labor practices to a specific factory or farm is often difficult, particularly given complex
global supply chains, widespread subcontracting often involving migrant or temporary workers,
and chal enges in effective third-party auditing. To this end, some stakeholders seek greater use of
enforcement actions against an entire industry, region or country, rather than targeting individual
companies.12 Others caution about the potential spil over effects and the compliance costs of
broader enforcement actions, which could disrupt legitimate supply chains, burden companies,
and further harm vulnerable workers.13 Some industry groups emphasize practical chal enges in
enforcement and complex supply chains as complicating factors, for example, the lack of tracing
technologies that ensure complete accuracy of the origin of key inputs at risk for forced labor.14
Some Members have advocated a regional enforcement approach to address forced labor
practices in China, given deepening concerns over reports of widespread state-sponsored forced
labor of Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, both in facilities in
Xinjiang, as wel as in other parts of China.15 The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (H.R.
1155/S. 65) includes a rebuttable presumption provision that al goods produced or manufactured
in Xinjiang are made with forced labor, and thus prohibited under Section 307. In addition, H.R.
1155 would require publicly traded companies to disclose certain activities related to Xinjiang,
including whether they knowingly engaged with any entity for which CBP has issued a WRO.
Other bil s also mandate disclosure and transparency of firms, such as H.R. 2072. Amid growing
congressional pressure, throughout 2020, CBP issued several new orders to ban imports of certain
products from Xinjiang, culminating in its first region-wide ban on Xinjiang cotton and tomato
products in January 2021.16
There was legislative activity on forced labor and trade issues in the 116th Congress. For instance,
in January 2020, Congress used passage of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement Implementation

sess., September 17, 2020; International Labor Rights Forum (ILRF), Com batting Forced Labor and Enforcing
Workers’ Rights Using the Tariff Act, Briefing Paper, February 2020; and U.S. GAO, Forced Labor – Better
Com m unication Could Im prove Trade Enforcem ent Efforts Related to Seafood , GAO-20-441, June 2020.
10 ILRF, Combatting Forced Labor and Enforcing Workers’ Rights Using the Tariff Act, February 2020. T he latter
terms refer to systematic efforts to determine what types of labor are used in the manufacture of a given product or
supply chain in order to preclude and/or eliminate the use of forced labor.
11 Available at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods.
12 See, e.g., the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (H.R. 1155); Olivia Enos, Responding to the Crisis in Xinjiang,
T he Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No. 3416, June 7, 2019.
13 COAC, Report of the Intelligent Enforcement Subcommittee Forced Labor Working Group , July 15, 2020.
14 In particular, for highly fungible commodities, such as cotton; cotton from Xinjiang, China for example, can be and
is often co-mingled with similar cotton fibers from other sources, including from the United States. T estimony by
Stephen Lamar, President and CEO, American Apparel & Footwear Associatio n, U.S. Congress, House Ways and
Means Committee, Enforcing the Ban on Im ports Produced by Forced Labor in Xinjiang , hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd
sess., September 17, 2020.
15 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “ Xinjiang: CECC Commissioners Seek Import Restrictions on
Forced Labor Made Goods,” Press release, November 5, 2019.
16 U.S. CBP, “ CBP Issues Region-Wide Withhold Release Order on Products Made by Slave Labor in Xinjiang,” Press
release, January 13, 2021.
Congressional Research Service
2

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

Act (P.L. 116-113) to bolster broader enforcement efforts related to Section 307 and expand
interagency coordination.17
This report provides background and analysis on Section 307 and CBP processes, trends
regarding its use, and issues for Congress. It also contextualizes the debate over Section 307
enforcement, with other U.S. and international forced labor and anti-trafficking tools.
Section 307: Origins, Development, and Trends
Origins
U.S. prohibitions on the import of goods made with forced or penal labor were not initial y
enacted as a humanitarian measure, but to protect domestic free labor. In the 1880s, following the
end of formal slavery in the United States, U.S. manufacturers and labor activists became
increasingly concerned with competition from the expansion of penal labor domestical y and
abroad.18 In 1890, Congress prohibited the import of “al goods, wares, articles and merchandise
manufactured wholly or in part in any foreign country by convict labor.”19 The purpose of the
measure, the Chair of the House Committee on Ways and Means explained, was to prevent the
admission of “convict-made products of the world to free competition with our free labor.”20
In Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930,21 Congress expanded this prohibition to include any (not
just manufactured) products of “convict labor or/and forced labor or/and indentured labor under
penal sanctions”—see Text Box for definitions. Although the amendment’s sponsor brought up
humanitarian concerns as a rationale for the expansion of the prohibition,22 the overriding
legislative concern expressed by the final text of Section 307 was with protecting domestic
producers and workers, while also ensuring that Americans retained access to products commonly
produced with forced labor that were unavailable in the United States.23 While debating the

17 P.L. 116-113 (January 29, 2020) §§741-744, 134 Stat. 11, 88-90, codified at 19 U.S.C. §§4681-4684.
18 On the growth of penal labor in the United States following the end of slavery, see Alex Lichtenstein, Twice the
Work of Free Labor: The Political Econom y of Convict Labor (London: Verso, 1996). On concern with imports of
goods made with penal labor, see, e.g., U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, report to accompany H.R. 9051,
50th Cong., 1st sess., S.Rept. 50-232 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1888), pp. 345, 540, 795; U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Ways and Means, Revision of the Tariff, hearings, 51st Cong., 1st sess., Misc.Doc. 51-176 (Washington,
DC: GPO, 1890), p. 584. Penal labor still exists in the United States and U.S. firms have at times found themselves in
breach of foreign laws prohibiting the import of goods made by prison labor. See for instance, James Hagerty,
“Berkshire Unit Finds It Broke Canada T rade Laws Over Prison Labor,” Wall Street Journal, January 12, 2012.
19 T he T ariff Act of 1890 §51, 26 Stat. 567, 624 (October 1, 1890).
20 House debate, Congressional Record, vol. 21, part 6 (May 7, 1890), p. 584.
21 P.L. 71-361 (March 13, 1930), §307; 46 Stat. 590, 689. The amendment that became Section 307 was introduced, in
part, to give effect to the Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, 25 September 1926, 60 LNT S 253,
Department of State T reaty Series No. 778 , 46 Stat. (pt. 2) 2183, which had been recen tly ratified in 1929. See, Senate
debate, Congressional Record, vol. 71, part 4 (October 14, 1929), p. 4496.
22 See, e.g., Senate debate, Congressional Record, vol. 71, part 4 (October 14, 1929), p. 4496: Sen. Blaine. “I
understand that we might suffer some economic loss, but we can not [sic] afford any economic gain at the sacrifice of
the degeneracy and death of the natives amounting to millions of men and women….”
23 See, e.g., ibid., p. 4494: Sen. Reed. “I think we are agreed that American labor ought to be protected from the
competition of convict-made goods or slave-made goods…but we are legislating for the benefit of Americans here.
Will it benefit Americans to exclude from importation into this country products which we do not make and can not
make, such as tea and coffee and rubber?” See also McKinney v. U.S. Dept. of T reasury, 9 C.I.T . 315, 320 (1985):
“Congress intended to protect domestic workers and producers from unfair competition. But this concern as well as any
desire to improve foreign labor conditions were clearly subordinate in section 307, as enacted, to co ncern for the
Congressional Research Service
3

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

amendment, Senator David A. Reed rhetorical y asked, “Wil it help Americans for us in our zeal
to abolish forced labor in foreign climes, to deny al Americans the use of such articles as coffee,
tea, and rubber?”24 In its final form, Section 307 exempted from prohibition any goods that were
not domestical y produced in such quantities as to meet U.S. consumptive demands.25
Selected U.S. Government Definitions of Forced Labor/Labor Trafficking
Tariff Act of 1930/19 U.S.C. §1307: “Al work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of
any penalty for its nonperformance and for which the worker does not offer himself voluntarily.”
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000/22 U.S.C. §7102: “The recruitment, harboring, transportation,
provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the
purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.” (Note, part of a broader
definition of severe forms of trafficking against persons, which also includes sex trafficking.)
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000/18 U.S.C. §1589: “Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or
services of a person-(1) by threats of serious harm to, or physical restraint against, that person or another person;
(2) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if the person did not
perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint; or
(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process.”
Trends and Development: 1930-2020
In the decades following its entry into law, Section 307 was used sparingly.26 Between 1930 and
the mid-1980s, the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) identified between 60 and 75
instances in which parties requested, or the U.S. Customs Service (CBP’s precursor) considered
the application of Section 307.27 Only eight of those instances resulted in a good’s exclusion from
importation.28 During that time, investigations varied in scale and scope, according to the USITC,
“because of the varying amount and degree of reliability of the information available relating to
the imports [of goods al egedly made with forced labor].”29 Additional y, the USITC reported that
the Customs Service was lenient in its application of Section 307, “[al owing on an ad hoc basis]
the importation of prison goods where the size of the shipment was smal , where the prisoners
were working voluntarily and were compensated, or where importers promised not to enter
subsequent shipments.”30
In the 1980s, following the emergence of modern international human and worker rights politics
in the 1970s,31 increasing Cold War tensions,32 and growing public awareness of the role of forced

American consumer’s access to merchandise not produced domestically in quantities sufficient to satisfy consumer
demand.”
24 Senate debate, Congressional Record, vol. 71, part 4 (October 14, 1929), p. 4494.
25 P.L. 71-361 (March 13, 1930), §307, 46 Stat. at 690.
26 U.S. International T rade Commission, International Practices and Agreements Concerning Compulsory Labor and
U.S. Im ports of Goods Manufactured by Convict, Forced, or I ndentured Labor (“ USIT C Report”), U.S. IT C Pub. 1630
(December 1984), pp. v-vi.
27 USIT C Report, p. vi.
28 USIT C Report, pp. B-3 – B-6.
29 USIT C Report, p. vi.
30 USIT C Report, p. vi, 6.
31 See Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), pp. 120-175; Daniel Sargent,
A Superpower Transform ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 220 -229; Carol J. Pier, “ Workers’ Rights
Provisions in Fast T rack Authority, 1974-2007,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 13, no. 1 (Winter 2006), pp.
78-81; T he T rade Act of 1974 required that the President to “ bring trade agreements heretofore entered into…into
conformity with…international fair labor standards.” P.L. 93-619 (January 2, 1975) §121, 88 Stat. 1978, 1986.
32 See, e.g., Robert G. Kaiser, “U.S.-Soviet Relations: Goodbye to Détente,” Foreign Affairs (1980); Dimitri K. Simes,
Congressional Research Service
4

link to page 9 Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

labor in the Soviet Union and China,33 some Members of Congress expressed interest in using
Section 307 to restrict imports for foreign policy and human rights purposes.34 Moreover,
Congress had become increasingly interested in incorporating worker rights protection clauses
into U.S. trade legislation and trade programs, such as adding worker rights criteria into U.S.
trade preference programs, including on forced labor and the worst forms of child labor.35 Against
this background, Congress began to express its concern with the lack of enforcement of Section
307,36 and a USITC report prepared in response to that concern identified several problems with
the Customs Service’s enforcement, specifical y that it was opaque, inconsistent, and lacked clear
evidentiary standards.37
By the early 1990s, perhaps owing to additional congressional pressure, enforcement of Section
307 had become more common, and CBP issued several WROs per year, primarily on
merchandise from China. However, the reinvigoration was short lived and use of Section 307
declined in the late 1990s; between 2000 and 2015, CBP did not issue a single WRO (Figure 1).
Some observers attributed the decline in enforcement, in part, to the strictures of the consumptive
demand provision, which was included in 1930 to ensure Americans did not lose access to
commodities like “coffee, tea, and rubber” that then were produced entirely abroad, often with
forced labor.38 In 2005, for example, cocoa produced with forced child labor was al owed entry
because no domestic cocoa production industry existed sufficient to meet domestic demand.39

“T he Death of Détente,” International Security 5, no. 1 (Summer 1980), pp. 3-25.
33 See, e.g., Aleksander Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago (New York: Harper and Row, 1974); David Satter, “T he
System of Forced Labor in Russia,” Wall Street Journal, June 24, 1982, p. 28; “C.I.A. Says 4 Million in Soviet are
Doing Penal Labor,” New York Times, November 7, 1982, p. 3; John Maclean, “Soviet Refugee Describes Forced
Labor on Pipeline,” Chicago Tribune, December 27, 1982, p. 1.
34 USIT C Report, p. vii; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, Subcommittee on International T rade,
Enforcem ent of U.S. Prohibitions on the Im portation of Goods Produced by Convict Labor, hearing, 99th Cong., 1st
sess, July 9, 1985, S. Hrg. 99-357 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985) (“ Forced Labor Hearing”); Helsinki Commission,
Im plem entation of the Helsinki Accords, Soviet Forced Labor Practices, hearing, 99th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington,
DC: GPO, 1985); Kenneth B. Noble, “U.S. Asked to Ban Soviet Items Made by Forced Labor,” New York Times,
October 8, 1983, p. 1. For example, in 1983 Comm issioner of Customs, William von Raab, recommended using
Section 307 to block certain imports from the Soviet Union; others in the Reagan Administration worried such actions
might further cool U.S.-Soviet relations. Ultimately, no action was taken. Clyde, H. Farnsworth, “ Reagan Delays
Decision on Soviet Import Ban,” New York Times, May 17, 1984, p. 12; “U.S. T rade United Reports on Prison -Good
Imports,” New York Times, December 20, 1984, p. 23; Forced Labor Hearing, p. 11. In 1988, concerned that “delay in
enforcing the law [was bringing] into question the commitment of the United States to protest the inhumane treatment
of prisoners in the Soviet Gulag,” Congress urged the President to increase enforcement of Section 307 “without delay”
with respect to goods imported from the Soviet Union. P.L. 100-418 (August 23, 1988), 102 Stat. 1313, 1314.
35 See, e.g., T rade and T ariff Act of 1984, P.L. 98-573 (October 30, 1984) §503, 98 Stat. 2948. See also Carol J. Pier,
“Workers’ Rights Provisions in Fast T rack Authority, 1974-2007.”
36 See P.L. 100-418.
37 USIT C Report, p. vii.
38 See, e.g., Int’l Labor Rights Fund v. United States, 29 C.I.T . 1050, 1055 (2005); U.S. Congress, Senate, A Bill to
Am end the Tariff Act of 1930 to Elim inate the Consum ptive Dem and Exception Relating to the Im portation of Goods
Made with Forced Labor, S.1157, 110th Cong., 1st sess., introduced in Senate April 19, 2007; Marc Ellenbogen, “ Can
the T ariff Act Combat Endemic Child Labor Abuses—T he Case of Cote d’Ivoire,” Texas Law Review 82 (2004), pp.
1131, 1136, 1139; Senate debate, Congressional Record, vol. 71, part 4 (October 14, 1929), p. 4494.
39 Int’l Labor Rights Fund v. United States, 29 C.I.T . at 1055.
Congressional Research Service
5

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

Figure 1. Withhold Release Orders (WROs): Issued and In Force

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
Note: *2021 through Jan. 30. CBP may rescind WROs. However, as the figure indicates, such rescissions are
rare.
Although enforcement of the prohibition declined around the turn of the mil ennium, Congress
continued to be interested in mitigating forced labor and child labor. In 1998, Congress forbade
the Customs Service from using funds to al ow the importation of goods produced with forced
labor.40 In 2000, Congress amended Section 307 to include “forced or indentured child labor” in
its definition of forced labor.41 Congress also continued to insist that U.S. trade agreements
include worker rights provisions that reflected core international y recognized rights.42 Moreover,
Congress passed significant legislation related to human trafficking, notably the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-386) and subsequent reauthorizations.43
Despite this legislative activity, according to the Court of International Trade in 2005, Section
307’s consumptive demand provision continued to “subordinate[] human rights concerns to the
availability of the goods at issue by means of domestic production.”44 In 2015, perhaps reflecting
a congressional commitment to anti-trafficking measures and concern over global labor
conditions, Congress eliminated the consumptive demand provision of Section 307, as part of the
Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act (TFTEA, P.L. 114-125).45 In addition, TFTEA also
required CBP to submit to the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means
Committee an annual report on CBP’s enforcement activities with respect to Section 307.46 CBP

40 T reasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1998, P.L. 105-61 (October 10, 1997) §634, 111 Stat. 1272.
41 T rade and Development Act of 2000, P.L. 106-200, (May 18, 2000) §411, 114 Stat. 251. Codified at 19 U.S.C.
§1307.
42 See, e.g., North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, opened for signature Sept. 8, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1994); T rade Act of 2002, P.L. 107-210 (August 6, 2002) §2102(a)(6, 7, 9), (b)(11, 17), (c);
116 Stat. 933, 994, 1002-1003. See also Kimberly Ann Elliott, Preferences for Workers? Worker Rights and the U.S.
Generalized System of Preferences, Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 28, 1998; Carol J. Pier,
“Workers’ Rights Provisions in Fast T rack Authority, 1974-2007.”
43 Victims of T rafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 , P.L. 106-386 (October 28, 2000), 108 Stat. 1902.
44 Int’l Labor Rights Fund v. United States, 29 C.I.T . at 1057.
45 T rade Facilitation and T rade Enforcement Act of 2015 (“TFTEA”), P.L. 114-125 (February 24, 2016) §910(a); 130
Stat. 122, 239. Codified at 19 U.S.C. §4453.
46 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
6

link to page 11 link to page 18 Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

expected that the changes to Section 307 would “enhance [its] ability to prevent products made
with forced labor from being imported into the United States.”47
In 2017, Congress legislated a new approach to Section 307 enforcement for North Korean goods
specifical y. Section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017
(CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) creates a presumption that goods mined, produced, or manufactured by
North Korean nationals have been produced by forced labor and are thus prohibited from
importation under Section 307.48 The presumption can be rebutted only if the CBP Commissioner
finds by clear and convincing evidence that such goods were not produced by forced labor.49
In the years after TFTEA eliminated the consumptive demand provision, enforcement of Section
307 increased in frequency and scope. Since 2016, CBP has issued 28 WROs through the date of
this report. Although traditional y WROs were issued against specific goods from specific
producers or manufactured in specific facilities, since 2016 CBP has issued four geographical y
bounded orders, such as the WROs banning cotton from Turkmenistan and tobacco from Malawi.
In 2020, WROs targeted Chinese-manufactured hair products, garments and apparel, cotton, and
computer parts; Malaysian disposable gloves and palm oil; and seafood harvested by two
specified Taiwan-flagged fishing vessels and a Vanuatu-flagged fishing vessel.
The majority of WROs issued by CBP since 1990 have targeted Chinese goods. Many were
issued between 1991 and 1993, but the number declined after the United States and China
negotiated agreements relating to goods made with prison labor, notably a 1992 Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU)50 and a 1994 Statement of Cooperation. These agreements provided for
the exchange of information and requests for inspections, although many observers and officials
have considered China’s compliance with the MOU to have been inconsistent.51 Like some U.S.
industry groups, representatives of Chinese trade associations have argued that U.S. efforts are
hypocritical due to the use of U.S. prison labor in U.S. manufacturing.52
Since 2016, China has again become a focus of Section 307 cases. Sixteen WROs have been
issued against products from China, with a total of 34 in force, as of January 2021 (Figure 2).
The recent increase reflects, in part, al egations of systematic state-sponsored forced labor of
Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang (see “Forced Labor in Xinjiang”).

47 U.S. CBP, “Forced Labor,” available at https://www.cbp.gov/trade/programs-administration/forced-labor.
48 Countering America’s Adversaries T hrough Sanctions Act (“CAAT SA”), P.L. 115-44 (August 2, 2017) §302A,
codified at 22 U.S.C. §9241a.
49 Ibid.; U.S. CBP, “ Countering America’s Adversaries T hrough Sanctions Act: T itle III Section 321 Frequently Asked
Questions,” March 6, 2018.
50 China-United States, Memorandum of Understanding on Prohibiting Import and Export Trade in Prison Labor
Products, August 7, 1992, 3 I.L.M. 1071 (1992).
51 John Dotson and T eresa Vanfleet, Prison Labor Exports from China and Implications for U.S. Policy, U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, July 9, 2014; U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. China Trade,
Im plem entation of the 1992 Prison Labor Mem orandum of Understanding , GAO/GGD-95-106, April 1995, p. 2; U.S.
Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Im plem entation of Prison Labor Agreem ents with China ,
hearings, 105th Cong., 1st sess., May 21, 1997, S. Hrg. 105-253 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1997).
52 T estimony by Shengfu Wu, China National Forest Products Industry Association, Marketing Department Director, in
U.S. International T rade Commission, Multilayered Wood Flooring from China, Investigation Nos. 701-TA-476 and
731-T A-1179 (Preliminary), November 12, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
7

link to page 28
Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

Figure 2. WROs by Country

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
Section 307 Application
Under the current regulations implementing Section 307, any person who “has reason to believe
that any class of merchandise that is being, or is likely to be, imported into the United States is
being produced, whether by mining, manufacture, or other means, in any foreign locality with the
use of convict labor, forced labor, or indentured labor under penal sanctions, including forced
child labor or indentured child labor under penal sanctions” may communicate that belief to
CBP.53 Persons outside of CBP may report such reasonable beliefs by submitting a statement
accompanied by a detailed description of the merchandise and al pertinent facts they have
available to any port director, to the Commissioner, or online.54 Additional y, port directors and
other principal Customs officers are required to report any such reasonable beliefs they have
about possible product-forced labor linkages to the CBP Commissioner.55 CBP has not published
precise guidance on the information that should be contained in such reports, leading to some
criticism about the process (see “Section 307 Enforcement”).
Upon receipt of a report, the Commissioner must initiate an investigation as “warranted by the
circumstances of the case.”56 Because the amount and the reliability of information submitted to
CBP can vary, the scale, scope, and timing of the investigation are left to the Commissioner’s
discretion. If the Commissioner finds “that information available reasonably but not conclusively
indicate” that imported merchandise may be the product of forced labor, he or she is required to
issue a WRO to port directors, instructing them to withhold the release of the merchandise at
issue pending further instructions.57

53 19 C.F.R. §12.42.
54 19 C.F.R. §12.42(b).
55 19 C.F.R. §12.42(a).
56 19 C.F.R. §12.42(d).
57 19 C.F.R. §12.42(e).
Congressional Research Service
8

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

An importer has three months to contest a
Figure 3. Application of Section 307
WRO.58 To succeed in contesting a WRO, an
importer must demonstrate that they have
made “every reasonable effort to determine
the source of the merchandise and of every
component thereof and to ascertain the
character of labor used in the production of
the merchandise and each of its components”
(see below).59 If the importer successfully
contests the WRO, the merchandise may be
released into the United States. If the importer
does not successfully contest the WRO and
does not remove the merchandise at issue
from the United States, or reexport it, within
60 days, CBP is authorized to seize and

destroy it.60 Beyond publishing the date,
Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
merchandise type, manufacturer, and status of
a WRO, CBP does not general y publish information about specific detentions, reexportations,
exclusions, or seizures.
Following the issuance of a WRO, if the Commissioner finds that the covered merchandise is
conclusively subject to Section 307, the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security,61 wil publish such a finding in the Customs Bulletin and the
Federal Register.62 The publication of a finding authorizes CBP to seize the unreleased
merchandise and commence forfeiture proceedings.63 On October 20, 2020, CBP found, after
obtaining conclusive evidence that the imported goods were made with forced labor.64 The
finding authorized CBP to seize (rather than just withhold release) and commence forfeiture
proceedings on imports of stevia produced or manufactured in China by the Inner Mongolia
Hengzheng Group Baoanzhao Agriculture, Industry, and Trade Co., Ltd.65 On March 29, 2021,
CBP issued another finding authorizing CBP to seize certain disposable gloves manufactured by
Top Glove Corporation Bhd. in Malaysia.66 These were CBP’s first two findings since 1996.

58 19 C.F.R. §12.43(a).
59 19 C.F.R. §12.43(a-b).
60 19 C.F.R. §12.44(a-b). In addition to forfeiture, persons who transport certain goods made with penal labor may be
subject to criminal penalties. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§1761 -1762.
61 See “Merchandise Produced by Convict, Forced, or Indentured Labor; Conforming Amendment and T echnical
Corrections,” 82 Federal Register 26582, June 8, 2017.
62 19 C.F.R. §12.42(f).
63 19 C.F.R. §12.44(b).
64 U.S. CBP, “ Notice of Finding T hat Certain Stevia Extracts and Derivatives Produced in the People’s Republic of
China With the Use of Convict, Forced or Indentured Labor Are Being, or Are Likely T o Be, Imported Into the United
States,” 85 Federal Register 66574, October 20, 2020.
65 Ibid.
66 U.S. CBP, “Notice of Finding T hat Certain Disposable Gloves Produced in Malaysia With the Use of Convict,
Forced or Indentured Labor Are Being, or Are Likely T o Be, Imported Into the United States,” 86 Federal Register
16380, March 29, 2021.
Congressional Research Service
9

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

Responsibilities of Importers
U.S. companies importing goods into the United States have a general obligation to exercise
“reasonable care” and to take necessary and appropriate steps to ensure that imported goods
comply with U.S. laws and regulations, including those related to forced labor (see Text Box). As
per the Customs Modernization Act (Mod Act),67 the importer of record is responsible for
exercising reasonable care to enter, classify, and determine the value of imports, and to provide
any other information necessary to enable CBP to properly assess duties, col ect accurate
statistics, and determine whether other applicable legal requirements have been met.
As such, CBP advises that importers must exercise reasonable care over their supply chains and
understand where and how their products are manufactured or produced.68 Companies,
particularly those operating in industries and geographies at higher risk of forced labor, are
general y advised by CBP to address forced labor risks through supply chain due diligence (see
Text Box), maintaining a comprehensive social compliance system, obtaining U.S. import
certifications of origin, and including forced labor prohibition provisions in contract terms.69 CBP
and other agencies (including DOL), as wel as certain NGOs, offer support and resources for
advising on best practices and reporting on forced labor issues.70 In response to a WRO, an
importer may contend that the good was not produced by forced labor for example, by submitting
a certificate of origin signed by the foreign sel er, and a statement (e.g., third-party audit)
demonstrating the goods were not produced with forced labor.
Exercising Reasonable Care Over Supply Chains
U.S. importers have a general obligation to exercise “reasonable care” in importing into the United States, which
includes the responsibility to take reliable measures to ensure imported goods are not produced whol y or in part
with forced labor. To promote importers’ compliance with CBP laws and regulations related to forced labor, CBP
guidance includes scoping questions that prompt importers to71

Establish reliable procedures to ensure goods are not being imported in violation of 19 U.S.C. §1307 and 19
C.F.R. §§12.42-12.44;

Know how goods are made, by whom, where, and under what labor conditions;

Review CBP’s “Forced Labor” web page, which includes a list of active withhold release orders and findings,
as wel as forced labor fact sheets;

Review the Department of Labor’s List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor;

Obtain a “ruling” from CBP regarding admissibility of imported goods under 19 U.S.C. §1307;

Establish a procedure of conducting periodic internal audits to check for forced labor in the supply chain;

Establish a reliable procedure for third-parties to conduct periodic, unannounced audits of supply chain;

Review the ILO’s “Indicators of Forced Labour”;

67 P.L. 103-182, Title VI, 107 Stat. 2057.
68 U.S. CBP, “Forced Labor Frequently Asked Questions,” https://www.cbp.gov/trade/programs-administration/forced-
labor/frequently-asked-questions.
69 Clare Connellan et al., US Customs & Border Protection Enforces Forced Labor Prohibition in First Action Against
Vessel, White & Case, April 2019; and T eresa Polino, David Salkeld, and Arent Fox, “ US Announces New Strategy to
Combat Forced Labor in US Imports,” JD Supra, February 12, 2020.
70 For example, see, U.S. CBP , Responsible Business Practices on Forced Labor Risk in the Global Supply Chain ,
August 2018; and U.S. DOL, “ Comply Chain: Business T ools for Labor Compliance in Global Supply Chains,”
https://www.dol.gov/general/apps/ilab-comply-chain.
71 U.S. CBP, What Every Member of the Trade Community Should Know: Reasonable Care, An Informed Compliance
Publication, September 2017.
Congressional Research Service
10

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues


Vet new suppliers/vendors for forced labor risks through questionnaires or other means;

Include terms in contracts with suppliers that prohibit use of forced labor, a time frame to take corrective
action if forced labor is identified, and consequences if corrective action is not taken ;

Put in place a comprehensive and transparent social compliance system;

Develop a reliable program or procedure to maintain and produce any required customs entry
documentation and supporting information.
The importer of record may face liability for noncompliance with Section 307. For example, in its
first civil enforcement action since the passage of TFTEA, in August 2020, CBP fined Pure Circle
U.S.A. Inc. $575,000 after an investigation found evidence of past imports of stevia made with
prison labor in China.72 Additional y, the Tariff Act of 1930 permits CBP to impose civil penalties
for any person who “by fraud, gross negligence, or negligence” introduces or attempts to
introduce any merchandise into the United States by means of false information or material
omissions.73 Such penalties can extend to persons beyond the importer of record.74 A person or
corporation that “benefits, financial y or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a
venture which has engaged in the providing or obtaining of [forced labor],” when that person or
corporation knew, or recklessly disregarded, how the labor was obtained may face further
criminal and civil penalties under anti-trafficking laws.75 While traditional y such prosecutions
have focused on importers, the Trump Administration indicated it is seeking to enforce these
provisions more broadly, including in potential actions against company and corporate officials.76
Multinationals and Supply Chain Due Diligence
Reports by NGOs, research institutes, and media have documented a number of U.S. companies and international
brands implicated, directly or indirectly, in forced labor in their supply chains.77 Certain multinational companies
have developed codes of conduct, social audits, risk management and due diligence measures to prevent and
mitigate their exposure, often through col aborative efforts with civil society, government, and international
organizations,78 and in response to various national legislation on labor-related disclosure requirements.79 Many

72 U.S. CBP, “ CBP Collects $575,000 from Pure Circle U.S.A. for Stevia Imports Made with Forced Labor ,” August
13, 2020. CBP has not identified the legal basis under which it levied the penalty, but it is possible that it was imposed
under 19 U.S.C. §1592. Current CBP regulations indicate that violations of Section 307 are subject to forfeiture
proceedings, see 19 C.FR. §12.44, so it may be that CBP relied on Section 1592 to levy t he civil penalty.
73 19 U.S.C. §1592(a).
74 United States v. T rek Leather, Inc., 767 F.3d 1288, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
75 18 U.S.C. §1589; Laura Ezell, “Human T rafficking in Multinational Supply Chains: A Corporate Director’s
Fiduciary Duty to Monitor and Eliminate Human T rafficking Violations,” Vanderbilt Law Review 69, no. 2 (March
2016); Stefan Schumann, “Corporate Criminal Liability on Human T rafficking,” The Palgrave International Handbook
of Hum an Trafficking (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).
76 In November 2019, Kenneth Kennedy, head of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Forced Labor
Program stated that the agency is “ under extraordinary pressure from Congress and the White House to enforce [forced
labor] laws,” and the Department of Justice is “willing to prosecute retailers…online marketplaces and so on.” Arthur
Friedman, “Jail T ime Awaits Retailers T rading in Forced-Labor Goods,” Sourcing Journal, November 11, 2019.
77 For example, see Peter Whoriskey and Rachel Siegel, “ Cocoa’s child laborers,” Washington Post, June 5, 2019;
Vicky Xiuzhong Xu et al., Uyghurs for Sale: ‘Re-education’, Forced Labour and Surveillance Beyond X injiang,
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Policy Brief Report No. 26/2020, March 2020.
78 For example, OECD, Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, 2018 and Update of the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2011; Principles of Fair Labor and Responsible Sourcing , Fair Labor
Association, https://www.fairlabor.org/our-work/principles. Per the OECD, “ risk-based due diligence refers to the steps
companies should take to identify and address actual or potential risks in order to pre vent or mitigate adverse impacts
associated with their activities or sourcing decisions.”
79 Nicola Phillips, Genevieve Lebaron, and Sara Wallin, Mapping and Measuring the Effectiveness of Labour-related
Congressional Research Service
11

link to page 28 Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

U.S. companies have issued public commitments to eliminate forced labor in their supply chains and emphasize a
zero tolerance approach. Recent reports by KnowTheChain, a nongovernmental partnership, benchmarks such
efforts of global companies in three sectors at relatively high risk for forced labor (information and
communications technology, food and beverage, and apparel and footwear), and finds companies have made
advancements, but there remains significant room for improvement.80 In general, companies tend to be more
advanced in developing supply chain commitments and monitoring the labor conditions of their first-tier
suppliers.81 While overal efforts have made important strides in certain sectors, some critics argue that broader
accountability and transparency measures are needed to reinforce Section 307 enforcement.
To this end, some bil s introduced during the 116th Congress and 117th Congress aim to improve disclosure and
transparency of companies (for more, see “Section 307 Enforcement”). There have been similar legislative efforts
in the past, but no bil passed successful y at the federal level. Section 1502 of Title XV of the Dodd -Frank Wal
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203) requires publicly-traded companies to report if and
where they purchased “conflict minerals” mined in or sourced from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
or adjoining countries, and engage in due diligence reporting.82 While Section 1502 was intended to prevent
companies from directly or indirectly financing armed groups in the DRC, the due diligence frameworks that firms
use to comply general y also cover child labor and/or other forced labor, which has been widely documented in
the DRC and some other countries.83
In recent years, there have also been state government efforts to address forced labor. The California
Transparency in Supply Chains Act, which took effect in 2012, requires large retailers and manufacturers to
disclose on their websites “efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from [their] direct supply chain for
tangible goods offered for sale.”84 Disclosures are required in five areas: verification, audits, certification, internal
accountability, and training. These laws do not mandate that companies take specific actions, however.
CBP Resources
Prior to 2016, CBP handled forced labor issues through an informal internal forced labor task
force, which sporadical y pulled approximately 8-12 staff from other divisions on a temporary
basis.85 The informal structure and lack of permanent staff may have contributed to the previously
mentioned difficulties in enforcing Section 307.
The passage of TFTEA in 2016 and elimination of the “consumptive demand” exception perhaps
signaled continued congressional interest in human trafficking, forced labor, and trade
enforcement more general y. Subsequently, CBP created the Trade Enforcement Task Force,
which was to focus on “issues related to enforcement of antidumping and countervailing duty
laws, and interdiction of imported products using forced labor.”86 In 2018, CBP transformed the

Disclosure Requirem ents for Global Supply Chains, Working Paper No. 32, ILO, June 2018.
80 KnowT heChain is a partnership between Humanity United, the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre,
Sustainalytics, and Verité. See KnowT heChain, Forced Labor Action Com pared: Findings From Three Sectors, 2017;
KnowT heChain, Three Sectors, Three Years Later: Progress and Gaps in the Fight Against Forced Labor, April 2019.
81 KnowT heChain, 2017, p. 5.
82 “Conflict minerals” generally include columbite-tantalite (coltan), cassiterite, gold, wolframite, or their derivatives.
83 See CRS Report R42618, Conflict Minerals in Central Africa: U.S. and International Responses, by Nicolas Cook.
Regarding Section 1502, compliance costs, practicalities of compliance (e.g., supply chain tracking challenges and
business confidentiality), effectiveness of reporting, and impact on the ground were extensively debated. T he section’s
provisions have also been subject to litigation. T he quality of Section 1502 due diligence reporting varies, ac cording to
the Responsible Sourcing Network (RSN). See RSN, Mining the Disclosures 2019: An Investor Guide to Conflict
Minerals and Cobalt Reporting in Year Six, December 6, 2019.
84 Cal. Civ. Code, §1714.43. T he law applies to any company doing business in California with annual worldwide gross
receipts of greater than $100 million.
85 Based on email correspondence between CRS and CBP staff.
86 U.S. CBP, “CBP Creates T rade Enforcement T ask Force,” Press release, May 2, 2016.
Congressional Research Service
12

link to page 21 Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

informal task force into the formal Forced Labor Division, located within the Office of Trade.87
CBP has increased the division’s resources, expanding its expenditures from $1 mil ion in
FY2018 to $1.4 mil ion in FY2019—this accounts for less than 1% of the Office of Trade’s
budget.88 According to CBP, as of mid-2020, 13 full-time positions were al ocated to the Forced
Labor Division.89 Other offices within CBP also contribute to the agency’s investigative work and
enforcement efforts, including the review of forced labor al egations and the verification of
import trends, on an as-needed basis.90 (See “Department of Homeland Security.”)
According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), CBP’s Forced Labor Division
has not completely assessed and documented its workforce needs, and staff shortages perpetuate
chal enges in effectively enforcing Section 307.91 According to CBP officials, the division has
suspended ongoing investigations due to staff shortages, and does not have enough resources to
reassess the effectiveness of existing WROs, among other issues. GAO recommended that CBP:
(1) perform a needs assessment to identify potential gaps in its Forced Labor Division workforce;
(2) issue guidance or take other steps to improve the completeness, consistency, and accuracy of
summary data on active, suspended, and inactive investigations; and (3) set targets for
performance indicators related to Section 307 enforcement. CBP’s FY2021 budget justification
requests funding for an additional 50 positions for overal Trade Agreement, Remedies and
Enforcement Personnel. The new personnel are expected to “strengthen [Office of Trade]
enforcement efforts around key trade issues such as … forced labor.”92
Trends: U.S. Trade and Forced Labor
While data on rates of forced labor are imprecise due to a range of factors, such as lack of data
collection capacities in many countries and the structure of some industries, the ILO has
estimated that in 2016, 24.9 mil ion people were engaged in forced labor, 16 mil ion of these in
the private sector.93 Global y, domestic work and construction are the leading sectors, accounting
for more than 40% of forced labor used by the private sector, followed by manufacturing (15%),
and agriculture and fishing (11%).94
Sizing up the volume of trade flows tied to forced labor is difficult, in part due to the complexity
of supply chains, the magnitude of global trade flows, and tracing chal enges. There is limited
aggregate data on global and domestic consumption patterns with respect to goods made with
forced labor, though sectoral case studies by country or region can offer some insights on major
exporting sectors. U.S. data are limited, as CBP does not disclose the value of shipments
produced by forced labor that are imported, detained, or seized pursuant to a WRO. WROs have
also typical y applied to specific companies, for which data can be proprietary or undisclosed in
records at the buyer and shipment level. The Forced Labor Program in Homeland Security

87 Paul Koscak, “CBP T akes Aim at Forced Labor,” https://www.cbp.gov/frontline/cbp-takes-aim-forced-labor.
88 U.S. GAO, Forced Labor Imports: DHS Increased Resources and Enforcement Efforts, but Needs to Improve
Workforce Planning and Monitoring, GAO-21-106, October 27, 2020, p. 15.
89 Based on email correspondence between CRS and CBP staff.
90 For more detail, see U.S. GAO, October 2020, pp. 13, 47.
91 U.S. GAO, October 2020.
92 Department of Homeland Security, U.S. CBP, Budget Overview, FY 2021, p. CBP -OS-58.
93 ILO, Ending Forced Labour by 2030: A Review of Policies and Programmes, 2018. For information on obstacles to
measuring labor trafficking, see ILO, Measurem ent of Forced Labor, October 2018, pp. 12-14.
94 ILO, Ending Forced Labour by 2030, 2018, p. 33.
Congressional Research Service
13

link to page 17
Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

Investigations (HSI)95 reported that it seized $1.4 mil ion worth of products produced with forced
labor, domestical y and international y, in FY2018.96
Reports produced by the International Labor Affairs Bureau (ILAB) of DOL provide broad
insights on high-risk countries and sectors for forced labor. The 2020 List of Goods Produced by
Child Labor or Forced Labor specifies 63 distinct categories of goods in 41 countries with
production by forced labor (see Figure 4).97 Twenty-six of these countries are specifical y cited
for forced child labor in ILAB’s latest List of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child
Labor.98 Considering listed countries collectively, the highest incidence of forced labor is in the
bricks, cotton, garments, cattle, fish, gold, and sugarcane sectors. China (17 goods), Burma (13),
India (8), and North Korea (7) are the top countries in terms of the most categories of goods
subject to forced labor production.
Figure 4. Countries with Production by Forced Labor and/or Forced Child Labor

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, 2020 List of Goods Produced by Child
Labor or Forced Labor and 2019 List of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor.
Notes: * Categories overlap and some countries with forced child labor also have incidence of non-child forced
labor; in its categorization, ILAB does not definitively distinguish countries as exclusively one or the other.
Several factors limit insights into precise estimates of U.S. imports affected by forced labor.
ILAB reports on countries and goods found to have a “significant incidence” of forced labor, but
notes that the listing of any particular good and country cannot be generalized to al production of

95 An investigative arm of ICE.
96 Department of Homeland Security, ICE, Forced Labor and Forced Child Labor: Fiscal Year 2018 Report to
Congress, May 24, 2019. Note, ICE did not report comparative figures in its FY2019 report.
97 Figures do not include countries/goods produced by child labor. ILAB considers evidence of child labor and forced
labor separately to determine whether either or both were used in production. While some goods are listed as produced
with both child labor and forced labor, ILAB notes this does not necessarily imply production with forced child labor.
98 T he latest complete list is for 2019; see https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-products. In
October 2020, DOL made an initial determination to add Cambodia to the list, bringing the t otal to 26 countries. See
“Notice of Initial Determination Revising the List of Products Requiring Federal Contractor Certification as to Forced
or Indentured Child Labor,” 85 Federal Register 62325, October 2, 2020.
Congressional Research Service
14

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

that good in the country.99 ILAB also does not distinguish between goods produced for domestic
consumption and for export, nor does it indicate the relative weight of the forced labor good as a
share of the country’s exports of the good. In the past, some commentators have urged that the
child labor and forced labor list correspond with specific product codes under the U.S.
Harmonized Tariff Schedule, to improve specificity, analysis, and interagency consultation.100 In
addition, the list focuses on raw goods and materials.
A growing priority of ILAB is addressing the impact of forced labor on global supply chains. An
estimated 70% of global trade involves global supply chains, with production taking place across
multiple countries.101 As a result, trade in services, raw materials, parts and components often
repeatedly cross borders, confounding the chal enge of identifying and tracing forced labor in
supply chains, beyond the “first-tier,” which is comprised of a company’s direct suppliers.
Congress has attempted to address such issues by mandating the expansion of DOL’s list of
goods produced by forced or child labor to include goods made with inputs produced by forced or
child labor.102 The 2020 DOL list highlights supply chains with documented forced labor risks,
including those involving cobalt, a key input for lithium ion batteries; cocoa, an input to
chocolate products; and palm oil, an input to consumer products, such as soap.
Forced Labor in Xinjiang
Nine of the 17 Chinese goods in ILAB’s 2020 list relate to forced labor production in Xinjiang.
At least ten WROs issued recently against China have centered on concerns of forced labor in
Xinjiang—a growing target of trade enforcement actions (see Text Box). Since 2017, according
to various reports, authorities in Xinjiang have implemented mass detentions of ethnic Uyghurs
and other Turkic Muslims in political “re-education” centers, some of which include assignment
to factory work within the facilities.103 In addition, Chinese factories, within and outside the
Xinjiang region, are reportedly using Uyghur forced labor or employing former detainees under
coercive conditions. According to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), at least 27
factories in nine Chinese provinces have used transferred labor since 2017; those factories claim
to be part of the supply chain of more than 80 global brands.104
In one case that received significant media attention, CBP officials seized almost 13 tons of
imported human hair products at the Port of New York/Newark.105 In September 2020, CBP

99 U.S. DOL, ILAB, 2020 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor, pp. 80-81.
100 U.S. DOL, “Notice of Procedural Guidelines for the Development and Maintenance of the List of Goods From
Countries Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Request for Information,” 72 Federal Register 73374, December
27, 2007.
101 OECD, “ T he trade policy implications of global value chains,” https://www.oecd.org/trade/topics/global-value-
chains-and-trade/.
102 Per the Frederick Douglass T rafficking Victims Prevention and Protection Reauthorization Act of 2018, 22 U.S.C.
§7112(b)(2)(C)). Also, see U.S. DOL, 2020 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor, p. 42.
103 For more information and analysis on developments in Xinjiang and treatment of Uyghurs, see CRS In Focus
IF10281, Uyghurs in China, by T homas Lum and Michael A. Weber; Congressional-Executive Commission on China,
Global Supply Chains, Forced Labor, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonom ous Region , Staff Research Report, March
2020; and Adrian Zenz, Beyond the Cam ps: Beijing’s Grand Schem e of Forced Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social
Control in Xinjiang, SocArXiv Papers, July 12, 2019.
104 Vicky Xiuzhong Xu et al., Uyghurs for Sale: ‘Re-education’, Forced Labour and Surveillance Beyond Xinjiang,
Policy Brief Report No. 26/2020, ASPI, March 2020.
105 U.S. CBP, “CBP Detains Chinese Shipment of Suspected Forced Labor Products Made with Human Hair,” Press
release, July 1, 2020.
Congressional Research Service
15

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

issued five WROs to ban imports of certain cotton, apparel, computer parts, and other products
from Xinjiang, including al products from a specified facility.106 Subsequently on November 30,
2020, CBP issued a WRO banning the import of al cotton and cotton products produced by the
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corporation (XPCC) and its affiliates—a major
producer—as wel as any products made in whole or in part with that cotton, such as apparel,
garments, and textiles.107 These actions stopped short of a region-wide WRO, which was
reportedly under consideration at the time.108 In January 2021, CBP went a step further and issued
a region-wide WRO on cotton, tomatoes and downstream products from Xinjiang (see below).109
Other Reporting and Trade-Related Enforcement Actions
The increase in WROs has coincided with heightened response across the executive branch to the Chinese
government’s repressive activities in Xinjiang. Recent annual State Department reports reference state-sponsored
forced labor of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang.110 In addition, between October 2019 and June 2020, Commerce
added 37 Chinese companies to the Bureau of Industry and Security’s (BIS) Entity List, which restricts exports of
certain items to listed entities due to U.S. national security priorities.111 The BIS actions relate less directly to
forced labor practices and more broadly target the Chinese government’s surveil ance and control of information,
communications, and movement in Xinjiang. Commerce added another 11 entities in July 2020, reflecting China’s
“campaign of repression, mass arbitrary detention, forced labor, involuntary col ection of biometric data, and
genetic analyses targeted at Muslim minority groups” from Xinjiang.112
Xinjiang commodities and products are used as inputs in finished goods in China and neighboring
countries, putting entire regional supply chains at risk of exposure to forced labor production. In
July 2020, the Departments of State, Commerce, the Treasury, and Homeland Security issued a
joint Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory. The advisory recommended that businesses with
operations in Xinjiang “be aware of the reputational, economic, and legal risks of involvement
with entities that engage in human rights abuses, including but not limited to forced labor in the
manufacture of goods intended for domestic and international distribution.”113
U.S. experts have identified high-risk sectors to include agricultural products (e.g., tomatoes),
cotton, textiles, apparel and footwear, electronics, food products, mining, chemicals, and medical
equipment.114 There has been a particular focus and congressional concern regarding textile and

106 “U.S. CBP, “ DHS Cracks Down on Goods Produced by China’s State-Sponsored Forced Labor,” Press release,
September 14, 2020.
107 While the actions fell short of a region-wide ban of cotton, acting Deputy Homeland Security Secretary Ken
Cuccinelli stated that given XPCC is “so massive” and deeply embedded in the region’s economy, “even though it
appears that it’s a single company, from our perspective it is equivalent to a regional WRO.” U.S. CBP, “ CBP Issues
Detention Order on Cotton Products Made by Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Using Prison Labor ,” Press
release, December 2, 2020; Gavin Bade, “ DHS blocks cotton imports from major Chinese firm over forced labor,”
Politico Pro, December 2, 2020.
108 Doug Palmer, “ CBP could take action against Xinjiang cotton products,” Politico, September 8, 2020; and Ben Fox,
“US halts imports from China’s Uighur region for forced labor,” Washington Post, September 14, 2020.
109 U.S. CBP, “ CBP Issues Region-Wide Withhold Release Order on Products Made by Slave Labor in Xinjiang,”
Press release, January 13, 2021.
110 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2020, pp. 153-157.
111 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Commerce Department Adds Eleven Chinese Entities Implicated in Human Rights
Abuses in Xinjiang to the Entity List,” Press release, July 20, 2020.
112 Ibid.
113 U.S. Departments of State, the T reasury, Commerce, and Homeland Security, Xinjiang Supply Chain Business
Advisory: Risks and Considerations for Businesses with Supply Chain Exposure to Entities Engaged in Forced Labor
and other Hum an Rights Abuses in Xinjiang , July 1, 2020, p. v1.
114 Amy Lehr, Addressing Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region , Center for Strategic and International
Congressional Research Service
16

link to page 28 Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

apparel supply chains, as China is the world’s largest producer of yarn, textiles, and apparel, and
a top producer of cotton; Xinjiang cotton accounts for more than 80% of China’s cotton and a
fifth of global supply.115 One U.S. expert characterizes these supply chains as “complex and often
difficult to trace due to potential roles of middlemen and commodities traders and the practice of
blending cotton and yarn at certain stages.”116 Because China is a major yarn and textile exporter,
textile and apparel from third countries are considered highly likely to be affected by forced labor.
U.S. companies are primarily linked to forced labor through purchases that include Xinjiang
inputs, rather than through direct shipments and relationships with factories—though there have
been such cases.117 One estimate suggests that of 13 bil ion units of cotton garments imported into
the United States in 2019, at least 2 bil ion were made, in part, in Xinjiang.118
These conditions have led a number of stakeholders and some Members to advocate for CBP to
issue a regional WRO, at least with regard to al cotton, yarn, fabric and finished apparel from
Xinjiang (see “Section 307 Enforcement”). In addition, a coalition of labor unions and NGOs has
urged apparel brands and retailers to “take a stand” and withdraw from Xinjiang, concluding that
“the only way brands can ensure they are not profiting from the exploitation is by exiting the
region and ending relationships with suppliers propping up this Chinese government system.”119
Industry groups representing brands and retailers have emphasized zero tolerance for forced labor
and ongoing collective efforts to address due diligence chal enges.120 On January 13, 2021, CBP
issued its first region-wide WRO against Xinjiang blocking al U.S. imports of cotton products
and tomato products.121 The order applies to “cotton and tomatoes grown in that region and to al
products made in whole or in part using this cotton or these tomatoes, regardless of where the
downstream products are produced.”122 The agency cited several forced labor indicators in its
investigation, including debt bondage, restriction of movement, isolation, intimidation and
threats, withholding of wages, and abusive living and working conditions.

Studies, July 2020, pp. 2-3; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Global Supply Chains, Forced Labor, and
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonom ous Region , Staff Research Report, March 2020, p. 6; and U.S. Departments of State,
T reasury, Commerce, and Homeland Security, Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory, July 1, 2020, p. 16.
115 Amy Lehr, Addressing Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region , Center for Strategic and International
Studies, July 2020.
116 Ibid., p. 4.
117 Amy Lehr and Mariefaye Bechrakis, Connecting the Dots in Xinjiang: Forced Labor, Forced Assimilation, and
Western Supply Chains, Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2019, pp. 9 -10.
118 T estimony by Scott Nova, Executive Director, Worker Rights Consortium, in U.S. Congress, House Ways and
Means Committee, Enforcing the Ban on Im ports Produced by Forced Labor in Xinjiang , hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd
sess., September 17, 2020.
119 Worker Rights Consortium, “ 180+ Orgs Demand Apparel Brands End Complicity in Uyghur Forced Labour,” Press
release, July 23, 2020.
120 “Joint statement from NRF, AAFA, FDRA, RILA and USFIA on Supply Chains and Xinjiang,” July 23, 2020.
121 U.S. CBP, “ CBP Issues Region-Wide Withhold Release Order on Products Made by Slave Labor in Xinjiang,”
Press release, January 13, 2021.
122 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
17

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

Other U.S. Forced Labor and Anti-Labor Trafficking
Measures
Numerous U.S. government measures may inform the issuance of WROs under Section 307 and
seek to address labor trafficking more broadly.123 For example, the October 2020 National Action
Plan to Combat Human Trafficking establishes, in principle, the need to “Build capacity to
prohibit goods produced with forced labor from entering United States markets.” The plan’s
priority actions include the publication by CBP of “an accessible explanation of its Withhold
Release Order and Findings process” and seeking the inclusion in future trade agreements
commitments “to prohibit the importation of goods produced with forced labor.”124
Department of Homeland Security
Within DHS, various offices engage with international forced labor issues. The DHS Center for
Countering Human Trafficking, which is led by ICE, was established in September 2020, and wil
reportedly inform CBP forced labor actions as part of its mandate to support “federal criminal
investigations, victim assistance efforts, intel igence analysis, and outreach and training activities
related to human trafficking.”125 The Forced Labor Program of HSI Global Trade Investigations
(GTI) division conducts criminal investigations of al egations of forced labor related to goods
imported into the United States, as wel as domestic forced labor.126 The program works with
other government entities and civil society organizations to share and gather information about
forced labor.127 The CBP Office of Trade’s Regulatory Audit Office has partnered with CBP’s
Forced Labor Division to conduct forced labor surveys of selected imports. Established by
TFTEA, the Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee (COAC), composed of
members from the private sector, advises the Secretaries of Treasury and Homeland Security “on
al matters involving the commercial operations” of CBP (see Text Box).128 While much of
COAC’s work on labor trafficking and imports is centered in its Forced Labor Working Group, its
Trusted Trader Working Group reported on CBP plans to implement forced labor provisions into
the Custom Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT), a voluntary public-private partnership
designed to strengthen international supply chains and U.S. border security.129 CBP also
reportedly chairs an Interagency Working Group on Forced Labor.130

123 For a fuller list of government entities involved in anti-trafficking efforts, see U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Strategy to Com bat Hum an Trafficking, the Im portation of Goods Produced with Forc ed Labor, and Child
Sexual Exploitation, January 2020, and the President’s Interagency T ask Force, Report on U.S. Governm ent Efforts to
Com bat Trafficking in Persons, October 2020.
124 White House, The National Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking , October 19, 2020, p. 18.
125 U.S. DHS, “DHS Launches New Center for Countering Human T rafficking,” Press release, October 20, 2020, and
CRS correspondence with CBP, October 30, 2020.
126 U.S. ICE Homeland Security Investigations, Forced Labor Program , July 2018.
127 In 2019, GT I announced a partnership with an anti-trafficking NGO, Liberty Shared. According to ICE, “ By using
its unique authorities, and by partnering with organizations like Liberty Shared with information about corporate supply
chains and financial flows, HSI seeks to gather information that will lead to successful prosecutions and significant
steps being made in eliminating forced labor.” U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “ ICE HSI Global T rade
Investigations Division Partners with Liberty Shared to Combat Forced Labor,” Press release, July 31, 2019.
128 P.L. 114-125 §109, 130 Stat. 122, 136, codified at 19 U.S.C. §4316.

129 COAC, Secure Trade Lanes Subcommittee: Trusted Trader Working Group, July 15, 2020.
130 GAO, Forced Labor, June 2020, pp. 32-33.
Congressional Research Service
18

link to page 23 Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

In May 2020, President Trump established a new interagency Forced Labor Enforcement Task
Force, chaired by the Secretary of Homeland Security, as required by the United States-Mexico-
Canada Agreement Implementation Act (P.L. 116-113), to monitor U.S. enforcement of Section
307.131 The act directed the task force to meet quarterly “regarding active Withhold and Release
Orders, ongoing investigations, petitions received, and enforcement priorities, and other relevant
issues with respect to enforcing the [Section 307] prohibition.”132 The task force is also required
to establish timelines for CBP response to Section 307 petitions, and submit a biannual report to
Congress detailing DHS enforcement activities related to forced labor, among other issues.133
Recommendations by the Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee
A July 2020 report by COAC’s Forced Labor Working Group identified recommendations for CBP, such as134

Recognize WRO Remediation, such as taking into account when importers are “making genuine efforts
to conduct due diligence and active remediation,” and consider “utilizing grace periods during which CBP
provides alerts and/or guidance to al ow the problem to be sustainably resolved before issuing a WRO.”

Enhance Collaboration Between Industry & U.S. Government to identify known forced labor risks
and address highest risks.

Adjust WRO Process to take into consideration engaging U.S. government entities that may provide
services to those affected by CBP actions.

Promote International Labor Organization (ILO) Standards, including the ILO Declaration on the
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, Convention 29, and the 2014 Protocol on Forced Labor.

Assist Importers to gain deeper knowledge of complex supply chains.
Departments of Labor and State
Other agencies have core responsibilities in monitoring and reporting on forced labor trends, and
such findings may inform Section 307 processes. As discussed, DOL’s ILAB reports identify
goods and countries implicated in forced labor, including: Findings on the Worst Forms of Child
Labor (prepared in accordance with the Trade and Development Act of 2000, P.L. 106-200); List
of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor (required by the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, P.L. 109-164)—see Table 1; and List of Countries and
Goods Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor (pursuant to Executive Order 13126).135
These reports have traditional y been used to increase awareness rather than inform CBP actions,
though CBP officials have stated that they may consult ILAB as part of the WRO process.136 In
addition, DOL, as wel as the State Department, partners with foreign governments and funds
technical assistance and projects aimed at preventing and abating forced labor.137

131 T ask force activities relate to U.S. enforcement of Section 307 broadly and are not limited to USMCA parties,
though there are specific duties on enforcement and reporting regarding forced labor in Mexico per §744. P.L. 116-113
(January 29, 2020) §741(a); E.O. 13923, “ Establishment of the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force Under Section
741 of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Implementation Act ,” 85 Federal Register 30587, May 20, 2020.
132 P.L. 116-113 §741(b), 134 Stat. 11, 88, codified at 19 U.S.C. §4681.
133 P.L. 116-113 §742(c), 134 Stat. 11, 88, codified at 19 U.S.C. §4682.
134 Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee, Report of the Intelligent Enforcement Subcommittee Forced
Labor Working Grp, July 15, 2020, pp. 10-11.
135 E.O. 13126, “Prohibition of Acquisition of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor,” 64 Federal
Register 32383, June 16, 1999.
136 GAO, Forced Labor, June 2020, pp. 32-33.
137 See https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/projects.
Congressional Research Service
19

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

Table 1. Goods and Countries Identified by DOL for Child Labor or Forced Labor

2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2016
2018
2020
Number of
122
128
130
134
134
136
139
148
155
Goods
Number of
58
70
71
74
73
74
75
76
77
Countries
Source: U.S. Department of Labor annual Lists of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor.
Notes: Year refers to calendar year covered, not necessarily the year of report publication.
The State Department publishes an annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report (pursuant to the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, P.L. 106-386), which classifies countries according to
the effectiveness of their efforts to address human trafficking.138 The reports include country
profiles and often provide information about industries suspected of using forced labor. The State
Department’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices also provide information,
occasional y describing incidents in which goods made with forced labor were reportedly
imported into the United States. CBP officials have stated that they may consult these
resources.139
Sector-Specific Policy Tools and Legislation
Other anti-labor-trafficking programs, policies, and agreements exist for particular industries. For example,
seafood imports may be subject to regulations for il egal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, an il icit
practice that may encompass forced labor.140 A June 2020 report from the U.S. GAO identified numerous statutes
that prohibit il egal y harvested seafood, including the Magnuson-Fishery Conversation and Management Act of
1976 and the Lacey Act of 1900.141
In another example, representatives of the cocoa industry signed a congressional y led protocol in 2001 aimed at
ending forced child labor in the cocoa industry in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, known as the Harkin-Engel Protocol,
after former Senator Tom Harkin and former Representative Eliot Engel.142 The United States has implemented
subsequent studies, implementation plans, and technical assistance projects, with the support of the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID), DOL, the ILO, and the State Department.143 The protocol also has been
repeatedly amended and extended, but in recent years, rates of child labor in the cocoa sector reported ly have
risen.144 Some Members have urged the use of Section 307 in response to the incomplete implementation of the
Harkin-Engel Protocol, including missed deadlines and goals in the 2010 fol ow up framework. For example, in July
2019 Senators Sherrod Brown and Ron Wyden cal ed for DHS to take more “aggressive action” and invoke
Section 307 to prohibit imports of cocoa products produced by forced child labor from Côte d’Ivoire.145 After a

138 For more, see CRS Report R44953, The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report: Scope, Aid Restrictions,
and Methodology, by Michael A. Weber, Katarina C. O'Regan, and Liana W. Rosen .
139 GAO, Forced Labor, June 2020, pp. 20-23.
140 Ibid., pp. 5-9.
141 Ibid., p. 11.
142 Chocolate Manufacturers Association, Protocol for the Growing and Processing of Cocoa Beans and Their
Derivative Products in a Manner that Com plies with ILO Convention 182 Concerning the Prohibition and Im m ediate
Action for the Elim ination of the Worst Form s of Child Labor, September 19, 2001.
143 E.g., see DOL, Framework of Action to Support Implementation of the Harkin-Engel Protocol, September 11, 2010.
144 Ange Aboa and Aaron Ross, “Child labour still prevalent in West Africa cocoa sector despite industry efforts:
report,” Reuters, April 9, 2020.
145 “Wyden, Brown Call on Department of Homeland Security to Fully Enforce the Law, Crack Down on Imported
Cocoa Produced With Child Labor,” Press release, July 19, 2019.
Congressional Research Service
20

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

Washington Post investigation of labor conditions in June 2019, CBP reportedly opened a Section 307 investigation
of Ivoirian cocoa.146 Another petition was filed in February 2020, but there has been no action to date.147
Free Trade Agreements and Other Trade Programs
The U.S. government also uses other trade policy tools to promote international y recognized
worker rights abroad and constrain forced labor practices. Starting with the 1994 North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), free trade agreements (FTAs) and trade programs have
expanded coverage of such issues, in part because multilateral trade rules under the World Trade
Organization (WTO) do not cover labor issues, with one exception al owing for restrictions on
imports produced by prison labor.148 Consistent with negotiating objectives set by Congress in
trade promotion authority (TPA), recent U.S. FTAs commit countries to adopt, maintain and
enforce laws on core labor rights and principles of the ILO, including the elimination of forced
labor (see below).149 These commitments are enforceable under FTA dispute settlement
provisions. In a 2012 FTA labor dispute with the Dominican Republic (DR), for instance, DOL
confirmed al egations of violations of laws related to forced labor in the sugar industry, and has
conducted periodic reviews of the DR government’s progress toward remedying U.S. concerns.150
The 2020 U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which replaced NAFTA, goes further than
other U.S. FTAs and reflects Section 307 in committing the parties to prohibit imports from other
countries of goods produced by forced labor through “measures [a party] considers appropriate,”
and to establish cooperation for identifying such goods.151 As discussed, Congress also used the
opportunity of USMCA passage to bolster broader U.S. enforcement efforts related to Section
307 within implementing legislation.
Most of the countries with forced labor concerns are not U.S. FTA partners, but may be affected
by other trade policies. For instance, eligibility criteria for U.S. trade preference programs, such
as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the African Growth and Opportunity Act
(AGOA), which offer duty-free entry to certain U.S. imports from beneficiary developing
countries, include taking steps to maintain worker rights, including with respect to forced labor.
The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has reviewed certain beneficiary countries’ compliance
with such criteria, and in some cases has suspended benefits over forced labor concerns.152

146 Peter Whoriskey and Rachel Siegel, “ Cocoa’s child laborers,” Washington Post, June 5, 2019; “ U.S. report: Much
of the world’s chocolate supply relies on more than 1 million child workers,” Washington Post, October 19, 2020.
147 “Cal and IRAdvocates Challenge Importation of Cocoa Produced with Forced Child Labor,” February 2020,
https://corpaccountabilitylab.org/calblog/2020/2/14/cal-and-iradvocates-challenge-importation-of-cocoa-produced-
with-forced-child-labor.
148 Article XX(e), General Exceptions clause of the General Agreement on T ariffs and T rade (GAT T ) states that:
“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of ar bitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures: …(e) relating to the products of prison labour.”
149 For more information on T PA, see CRS Report R43491, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Frequently Asked
Questions, by Ian F. Fergusson and Christopher M. Davis.
150 U.S. DOL, Office of T rade and Labor Affairs, Public Report of Review of U.S. Submission 2011-03 (Dominican
Republic), September 2013.
151 USMCA art. 23.6, November 30, 2018, available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-
states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-between.
152 For example, see UST R, “ President T rump T erminates T rade Preference Program Eligibility for Mauritania,” Press
release, November 2, 2018. T he UST R may self-initiate a GSP review, or interested parties may request one. CRS
Congressional Research Service
21

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

Intergovernmental Forced Labor and Anti-
Trafficking Measures
Numerous international conventions and guidelines address forced labor in the contexts of core
international y recognized worker rights, human trafficking, and supply chains, including those
created by the United Nations and ILO. These efforts have informed and worked in tandem with
U.S. approaches; U.S. agencies often collaborate with ILO programs and are a key source of
funding.153 Other international organizations, including the World Bank and Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), have addressed forced labor through various
guidelines. See Text Box (below) for an example of U.S. and global efforts to mitigate forced
labor in the cotton sector in Central Asia.
International Labor Organization
Two of the ILO’s “fundamental” conventions, which have arguably become binding norms of
international law, directly pertain to forced or compulsory labor. The Forced Labour Convention,
1930 (No. 29) prohibits al forms of forced labor, while The Abolition of Forced Labour
Convention, 1957 (No. 105) concerns forced labor imposed by state authorities (e.g., as a means
of political coercion).154 These conventions are among the ILO’s most highly ratified
instruments155—the United States has only ratified No. 105 and not No. 29, due to conflicts in
U.S. law and practice related to the use of prison labor.156 Amid concerns over gaps in
implementation, a Protocol to Convention No. 29 was adopted in 2014 to “bring ILO standards
against forced labour into the modern era.”157 Other measures also address forced labor, including
the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182).158 The 1998 Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work commits ILO members to respect and promote four

Report RL33663, Generalized System of Preferences (GSP): Overview and Issues for Congress, by Vivian C. Jones,
and CRS Report R43173, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): Background and Reauthorization , by Brock
R. Williams.
153 ILO, The United States: ILO Cooperation, October 2019.
154 ILO, General Survey concerning the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), and the Abolition of Forced Labour
Convention, 1957 (No. 105), 2007.
155 As of December 2020, 178 member states have ratified No. 29 (nine countries have not, including the United
States); 176 have ratified No. 105 (eleven have not).
156 In its review of potential conflicts of conventions with U.S. federal and state laws, the U.S. T ripartite Advisory
Panel on International Labor Standards determined that No. 29 cannot be ratified without amending U.S. law and
practice relating to prison labor. Namely, “the trend of states to subcontract the operation of prison facilities to the
private sector in the United States conflicted with the requirements of Convention 29 relating to circumstances under
which the private sector may profit from prison labor.” United States Council for International Business, U.S.
Ratification of ILO Core Labor Standards, April 2007, p. 8. Other studies have documented forced labor and labor
trafficking practices in U.S. agriculture, domestic work, hospitality, restaurants, and construction sectors; see for
example, Colleen Owens et al., Understanding the Organization, Operation, and Victim ization Process of Labor
Trafficking in the United States, Urban Institute and Northeastern University, October 2014.
157 It provides guidance on effective measures regarding prevention, protection and remedies toward elimination of
forced labor. As of December 2020, 47 countries have ratified the 2014 Protocol; the protocol is accompanied by a
nonbinding Recommendation No. 203. See ILO, ILO Standards on Forced Labor: The New Protocol and
Recom m endation at a Glance, 2016.
158 Worst forms of child labor include “all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and
trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory
recruitment of children for use in armed conflict.”
Congressional Research Service
22

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

core labor rights categories, including “elimination of al forms of forced or compulsory labour,”
whether or not they have ratified conventions.159
The ILO has a supervisory and reporting system to monitor the application of ratified
conventions. In addition, through technical assistance (e.g., research, capacity building, and field-
based projects) the ILO helps countries address problems in developing and implementing
legislation and undertaking other actions to meet their obligations. Through ILO representation
and complaint procedures, industrial associations of workers/employers and member states,
respectively, can raise concerns over a country’s noncompliance with conventions; some
submissions have related to forced labor and a few resulted in investigations.160 In one instance,
in 2000 the ILO took unprecedented steps to compel Burma to take action after it failed to
implement the recommendations of an investigation that found “widespread and systematic”
forced labor.161 The ILO has relatively limited means for enforcing recommendations.162
Other U.N. Initiatives
In 2000, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime and its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons. The
Protocol committed ratifying states to criminalize human trafficking and to attempt to implement
measures including “economic initiatives” to prevent it.163 The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime
is responsible for overseeing implementation of the protocol and has published numerous issue
papers and strategy documents relating to forced labor.164
The U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights includes the operational principle
that “States should enforce laws that are aimed at, or have the effect of, requiring business
enterprises to respect human rights.”165 U.N. Sustainable Development Goal 8, Decent Work and
Economic Growth, includes target 8.7 “to eradicate forced labor, end modern slavery and human
trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labor.” Al iance

159 See https://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang—en/index.htm.
160 About 9% of representations (out of 238 total), 15% of complaints (out of 34), and more than a third of those
complaints resulting in investigations (out of 14) involved conventions Nos. 29 or 105, according to CRS calculations.
See https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-standards/lang—en/index.htm.
161 A Commission of Inquiry is the ILO’s highest -level investigative procedure and convenes when a country is
accused of persistent and serious violations, and failing to address them. If a country refuses to meet a Commission’s
recommendations, the ILO Governing Body can take action under article 3 3 of the ILO Constitution and recommend
“action as it may deem wise and expedient to secure compliance therewit h.” Article 33 was invoked for the first time
with respect to Burma. For more detail on measures taken, see “ ILO Governing Body opens the way for unprecedented
action against forced labour in Myanmar,” November 17, 2000.
162 Kimberly Ann Elliott, The ILO and Enforcement of Core Labor Standards, Policy Briefs Number 00-6, Institute for
International Economics, July 2000; and Miriam Hartlapp, Labour law supervision and enforcem ent by EU an d ILO: Is
there one international im plem entation style? Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Session in Uppsala, 13 -18 April 2004.
163 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons Especially Wom en and Children, supplem enting the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crim e, November 2000, Article 9.
164 See, for example, the discussion of forced labor in UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in the Fishing Industry
– Focus On: Trafficking in Persons, Smuggling of Migrants, Illicit Drugs Trafficking, 2011, and U.N. Global Initiative
to Fight Human T rafficking, Vienna Forum Workshop: Supply Managem ent, Elim inating the Risks of Forced Labour
and Trafficking, February 2008.
165 U.N. OHCHR, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 2011, p. 9.
Congressional Research Service
23

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

8.7, a partnership focused on achieving the target, has published reports relating to forced labor
and international trade, and includes a Supply Chain Action Group, chaired by the ILO.166
Forced Labor in Cotton Production: Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan
Reports of state-sponsored labor trafficking in cotton harvests in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have prompted
responses from intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, and the U.S. government. Cotton has been identified in
DOL’s List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor for both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan since the first list
was published in 2009, and has been referenced in recent annual State Department TIP reports. In 2013, the
International Labor Rights Forum (ILRF) and Cotton Campaign submitted a Section 307 petition seeking to
exclude cotton yarn and fabric imports from Uzbekistan.167 CBP did not ultimately issue a WRO.168 In 2013, CBP
did reportedly stop a shipment of Uzbek yarn due to al egations of forced labor.169 In 2016, ILRF and the Cotton
Campaign submitted a petition to ban cotton imports from Turkmenistan.170 CBP requested that ILRF provide
more information before ultimately issuing an industry-wide WRO against Turkmen cotton in May 2018.171
In 2016, human rights groups reported that the World Bank had funded numerous agricultural projects in
Uzbekistan that had been linked to child and forced labor.172 In 2017, third-party monitoring by the ILO reported
that Uzbekistan had “phased-out organized child labor,” and that no child or forced labor had been identified to
World Bank-supported agriculture, water, and education projects, though “forced labor [remained] a risk for
some categories of people.”173 A February 2020 ILO report stated that “systematic forced labor did not occur
during the 2019 cotton harvest,” but that approximately 102,000 workers were subjected to some form of forced
labor coercion, a 40% decline from the previous year.174 Current views on forced labor in Uzbekistan vary. Some
observers have held Uzbekistan up as a model for addressing forced labor and suggest that further prohibitions on
Uzbek cotton wil impede economic growth and other reforms, but some human rights groups remain concerned
that progress has been insufficient and advocate for additional prohibitions.175 DOL removed Uzbek cotton from
its forced child labor list in 2019, but reinstated the sector in its 2020 list for forced labor.176

166 Alliance 8.7, 2nd Global Workshop of the Supply Chains Action Group Outcome Report, May 2019.
167 Letter from Brian Campbell, director of ILRF’s Policy and Legal Program, and Matthew Fischer-Daly, Cotton
Campaign coordinator, to CBP Commissioner T homas Winkowski, May 15, 2013.
168 CBP reportedly declined to provide information on decision -making on Uzbek cotton, in response to a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) request filed by ILRF, citing “ ongoing law enforcement investigations.” See ILRF,
Combatting Forced Labor and Enforcing Workers’ Rights Using the Tariff Act, Briefing Paper, February 2020, p. 5.
T he issue of economic pressures on and by importers of Uzbek cotton arose in Europe as well. A 2013 report by the
European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights contended that “T he cessation of business relationships with the
Uzbek cotton industry therefore remains the only adequate measure [to address forced labor],” but found that global
cotton traders ceased to engage on anti-labor trafficking efforts when media attention lessened. See ECCHR, Forced
Labor of Children and Adults in Uzbekistan. How Effective is the OECD Com plaint Mechanism ? May 2013.
169 Cotton Campaign, “T ruthfully ‘Why was a Container with 22 T ons of Uzbek Yarn Detained in the United States?’”
January 3, 2014.
170 Letter from Ruslan Myatiev, Alternative T urkmenistan News director, Matthew Fischer -Daly, Cotton Campaign
coordinator, and Brian Campbell, Cotton Campaign legal adviser, to CBP commissioner Kerlikowske, April 6, 2016.
171 ILRF, Combatting Forced Labor and Enforcing Workers’ Rights Using the Tariff Act, February 2020, p. 4.
172 Human Rights Watch and the Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights, “We Can’t Refuse to Pick Cotton”: Forced
and Child Labor Linked to World Bank Group Investm ents in Uzbekistan , June 27, 2017.
173 ILO, Third-Party Monitoring of Measures Against Child Labor and Forced Labor During the 2016 Cotton Harvest
in Uzbekistan, February 1, 2017, pp. 2-3.
174 ILO, Third-Party Monitoring of Child Labor and Forced Labor During the 2019 Cotton Harvest in Uzbe kistan,
February 5, 2020, p. 4.
175 See for example, Komala Ramachandra, Forced Labor Persists in Uzbekistan’s Cotton Fields, Human Rights
Watch, June 25, 2020; Kenneth Rapoza, “ As China Faces U.S. Forced Labor Sanctions, Uzbekistan Becomes a
Model,” Forbes, September 24, 2020; and Esfandyar Batmanghelidj and Oybek Shaykhov, “T he Boycott on Uzbek
Cotton Needs to End,” Foreign Policy, March 28, 2020.
176 U.S. DOL, “ Notice of Final Determination T o Remove Uzbek Cotton From the List of Products Requiring Federal
Contractor Certification as to Forced or Indentured Child Labor Pursuant to Executive Order 13126 ,” 84 Federal
Register 11123, March 25, 2019.
Congressional Research Service
24

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

Issues for Congress
Stakeholders and many Members of Congress welcomed congressional action to repeal the
consumptive demand exception in 2015 as a critical step toward improving utilization of Section
307.177 Stil , some observers view recent enforcement actions as inadequate and seek new
approaches, while others caution against the potential adverse impacts of broader enforcement on
U.S. and foreign workers and companies. Congress has engaged on these issues through its
oversight of Section 307 implementation and lawmaking responsibilities. Committees and
commissions have held numerous hearings on forced labor in China and proposed related
legislation. Congress may consider several questions related to its oversight of Section 307 and in
examining ongoing chal enges, such as regarding CBP processes, transparency, and resources.
Other considerations include prospects for greater regional or industry-wide enforcement actions,
including Section 307 as a tool for mitigating forced labor in Xinjiang, and impacts on workers
and companies. Congress may also consider how U.S. trade policy tools and international trade
rules may complement and enhance Section 307 objectives. These issues may receive renewed
focus in the Biden Administration. As part of its “worker-centric” trade policy priorities, the
Biden Administration has pledged to “engage with al ies to achieve commitments to fight forced
labor and exploitative labor conditions, and increase transparency and accountability in global
supply chains.”178
Section 307 Enforcement
Changes to Section 307 Processes to Enhance Enforcement
Since the statute’s inception, CBP has had broad discretion in administering Section 307.179 The
varying amount and reliability of evidence in a case, as wel as limited resources, have presented
ongoing chal enges.180 A 1984 report by the USITC noted that regulations implementing Section
307 did not “provide specific guidance with respect to evidentiary standards, investigative
procedures and schedules, criteria for initiating investigations, and rules for making final
determinations.”181 The report also expressed concerns about the consistency of enforcement.182
Al of these are stil ongoing issues identified by various stakeholders. NGOs and labor groups,
which have filed numerous petitions, have expressed concern regarding the lack of official
guidance from CBP on what kind of information makes an al egation credible.183 In particular,
stakeholders view the lack of guidance on the evidentiary standards required for CBP to consider
an al egation to be credible as a factor that has hampered enforcement.184 They also cite a lack of

177 Senate debate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 162, no. 25 (February 11, 2016), p. S836; Human Rights
First, “President Signs Bill to Close Loophole on Import of Goods Made with Forced Labor ,” February 24, 2016.
178 In addition, it pledged in particular to “hold China accountable, including for the extensive human rights abuses
perpetrated by its state-sanct ioned forced labor program.” UST R, 2021 Trade Policy Agenda and 2020 Annual Report,
p. 2, 4.
179 USIT C Report, p. 4.
180 USIT C Report, p. vi.
181 USIT C Report p. vii, 7.
182 USIT C Report pp. vi-viii.
183 U.S. GAO, Forced Labor – Better Communication Could Improve Trade Enforcement Efforts Related to Seafood,
GAO-20-441, June 2020; ILRF, February 2020.
184 ILRF, February 2020, p. 4.
Congressional Research Service
25

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

transparency regarding the justification and timelines required for CBP action or inaction and an
unwil ingness to publicize the status of ongoing cases.185 For example, while CBP took action
against Turkmenistan cotton in 2016, it deferred action in 2013 on cotton from Uzbekistan, at a
time when forced labor was widely documented in the country, raising possible questions about
the consistency of CBP’s evaluation process. Industry has likewise expressed confusion about
how CBP evaluates evidence that a good is not subject to a WRO.186
A July 2020 GAO report recommended that CBP improve communications about the types of
information that help the agency initiate and investigate cases, which would in turn improve
enforcement.187 The Trump Administration’s 2020 National Action Plan to Combat Human
Trafficking also cal ed for increased clarity on the WRO process.188 Some advocates argue that
Congress could consider exercising its oversight to ensure CBP acts expeditiously and
transparently upon information concerning forced labor imports and clarifies its internal
processes for interested stakeholders.189
Feasibility of Industry- or Region-wide Enforcement Approaches and Related
Challenges
Some observers attribute the relatively limited number of enforcement actions to CBP’s
customary practice of targeting individual producers, rather than an industry across an entire
country or region within a country.190 While the U.S. government and various other stakeholders
are able to identify countries in which forced labor occurs on a regular basis, tracing forced labor
practices to a specific factory, farm, or fishing vessel can be chal enging, given complex global
supply chains and the widespread use of informal subcontracting, often involving migrant or
temporary workers. Traceability can be particularly difficult for agricultural commodities, such as
cocoa and cotton. The few industry and countrywide WROs issued by CBP have been welcome
developments to some observers, and there is growing bipartisan support for this approach to
Xinjiang, China (see below). Some labor groups however, have questioned resulting enforcement
outcomes, citing the absence of reports of CBP blocking cotton-made goods from Turkmenistan.
One group concluded that, “lack of any action following the issuance of the Turkmenistan WRO
has no doubt meant that a substantial amount of goods [are] imported from third countries
containing Turkmen cotton.”191
Others support enforcement involving targeted entities, and caution that broader WROs are
difficult to enforce and may disrupt supply chains and deter legitimate business with suppliers
that are not using forced labor.192 In this view, practical chal enges in enforcement and

185 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
186 Complaint, Vitus Nutrition LLC v. United States, Court of International T rade, Case 1:21 -cv-00165, filed April 15,
2021.
187 GAO, Forced Labor, June 2020.
188 White House, The National Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking , October 19, 2020, p. 18.
189 T estimony by Cathy Feingold, International Director, AFL-CIO, U.S. Congress, House Ways and Means
Committee, Enforcing the Ban on Im ports Produced by Forced Labor in Xinjiang , hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd sess.,
September 17, 2020.
190 ILRF, February 2020, pp. 5-7.
191 T estimony by Cathy Feingold, International Director, AFL-CIO, September 17, 2020.
192 T estimony by Stephen Lamar, President and CEO, American Apparel & Footwear Association , U.S. Congress,
House Ways and Means Committee, Enforcing the Ban on Im ports Produced by Forced Labor in Xinjiang , hearing,
116th Cong., 2nd sess., September 17, 2020; and U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “ U.S. Chamber Letter on H.R. 6210, the
‘Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act,’ H.R. 6270, the ‘Uyghur Forced Labor Disclosure Act of 2020,’” September 22,
Congressional Research Service
26

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

complexities in global supply chains are complicating factors. According to the head of the
American Apparel and Footwear Association (AAFA), “we simply do not have the capability or
capacity to implement, comply with, or enforce a blanket WRO.”193 In particular, while new
technologies have advanced more reliable traceability in global apparel supply chains, AAFA
asserted that, “there is no technology yet developed that al ows us to trace the origin of cotton
with reasonable, let alone complete, accuracy.”194 In the context of a region-wide WRO against
Xinjiang products, he argued this “creates enormous compliance and enforcement chal enges for
both CBP and the industry that have yet to be solved.” In support of a targeted approach, apparel
and retail industry representatives have stated that “clearly defined [WROs] on specific and
actionable intel igence greatly supplement our own considerable enforcement activity.”195 At the
same time, they committed to working with CBP to make sure enforcement of the recent region-
wide cotton ban is “smart, transparent, targeted, and effective.”196 Others claim there is capacity
to determine origins of inputs, but brands and retailers “choose not to know,” absent
consequences for failing to control and track sourcing.197
Broader enforcement approaches, as wel as maintaining CBP’s current standard practice, would
likely hinge on greater resources. CBP officials have confirmed that staff shortages have led the
agency to drop Section 307 cases, limited investigations of violations under the Countering
America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 related to imports of North Korean goods,
and affected its ability to proactively monitor and review existing cases.198 Many experts agree
that more enforcement resources wil be necessary if CBP issues more industry-wide or regional
WROs. Congress could appropriate funds if lack of capacity hinders new WRO issuance and
enforcement.
Section 307 as a Tool for Mitigating Forced Labor Practices in China
Some Members of Congress are particularly interested in ensuring the effective use of Section
307 to address forced labor practices in China, and some have proposed related legislation. China
has emerged as a key focus of congressional concerns due to growing public documentation of
the scope and scale of China’s repression of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, China’s central role in
global manufacturing, and its ranking as the country with the most forced labor goods identified
by DOL. As discussed, because Xinjiang is a key supplier in several sectors across China and
regional y, entire supply chains have become at risk of exposure to forced labor production. This
has prompted some Members and various stakeholders to urge more concerted action to enforce
Section 307, including adopting the same approach taken to ban North Korean imports.199

2020.
193 T estimony by Stephen Lamar, President and CEO, American Apparel & Footwear Association , September 17, 2020.
194 Ibid.
195 United States Fashion Industry, “Joint Statement from AAFA, NRF, RILA, USFIA in Response to Administration’s
Enforcement Actions to Prohibit XPCC Cotton,” Press release, December 2, 2020.
196 “Joint Statement from AAFA, NRF, RILA, USFIA in Response to Ban on All Cotton Imports From XUAR,”
January 13, 2021.
197 T estimony by Scott Nova, Executive Director, Worker Rights Consortium, in U.S. Congress, House Ways and
Means Committee, Enforcing the Ban on Im ports Produced by Forced Labor in Xinjiang , hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd
sess., September 17, 2020.
198 U.S. GAO, Forced Labor Imports: DHS Increased Resources and Enforcement Efforts, but Needs to Improve
Workforce Planning and Monitoring, GAO-21-106, October 27, 2020, p. 17.
199 For example, Republican Study Committee, The RSC National Security Strategy: Strengthening America &
Countering Global Threats, June 2020, p. 21.
Congressional Research Service
27

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

Committees and commissions recently held numerous hearings on human rights abuses and
forced labor in Xinjiang, including in the 116th Congress.200 In September 2020, the House Ways
and Means Committee held a hearing on “Enforcing the Ban on Imports Produced by Forced
Labor in Xinjiang.” The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (H.R. 1155) creates a rebuttable
presumption of denial of imports of items produced, wholly or in part, in Xinjiang or by certain
Xinjiang-related entities,201 pursuant to Section 307, in addition to other provisions.202 The
presumption would be rebutted only if CBP finds by clear and convincing evidence that such
goods were not produced by forced labor. In addition, the bil would require publicly-traded
companies to disclose in filings to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) certain
activities related to Xinjiang, including whether they knowingly engaged with any entity for
which CBP has issued a WRO. Other proposed legislation also would mandate transparency of
companies and industries possibly benefiting from forced labor production (see below).203
If CBP were to issue more industry-wide WROs, or if al goods from Xinjiang were presumed as
prohibited (per H.R. 1155/S. 65), some experts expect companies may face chal enges in
diversifying supply chains and securing sufficient inputs due to China’s “outsized role” in global
supply chains.204 Additional y, industry representatives have expressed concern that it would be
difficult to know with complete certainty that a product was fully in compliance, given the
opacity of supply chains in China—CBP’s enforcement of, and U.S. industries compliance with,
the recent region-wide action to ban Xinjiang cotton wil provide an il ustrative case study. As
such, some industry representatives have asked that any potential legislation or regulations
provide more clarity about their scope, such as activities and entities targeted or covered, more
certainty as to how any prohibitions wil be enforced, and more time before becoming effective to
ensure compliance.205
Congress may consider potential implementation chal enges related to CBP processes and
resources, implications for those supply chains that may reposition out of compliance or in
mitigating risk, as wel as prospective impacts on workers and companies (see below). Congress
may also consider the role of other anti-trafficking tools including State Department reporting and
U.S. diplomatic outreach to other countries related to oppression in Xinjiang, in conjunction with
Section 307.206 For example, Congress might urge the Administration to formalize channels for
sharing information with CBP compiled from foreign government services on forced labor in the
region.

200 See for example, U.S. Congress, House Ways and Means Committee, Enforcing the Ban on Imports Produced by
Forced Labor in Xinjiang, hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., September 17, 2020; and Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, Forced Labor, Mass Internm ent, and Social Control in Xinjiang , hearing, October 17, 2019.
201 Namely, “persons working with the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region governmen t for purposes of the ‘poverty
alleviation’ program or the ‘pairing-assistance’ program which subsidizes the establishment of manufacturing
facilities” in Xinjiang (H.R. 1155 §4(a)).
202 S. 65 is the companion bill.
203 In addition, the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-145) states that U.S. entities operating in
Xinjiang should take steps to “ensure that their supply chains are not compromised by forced labor.” Some versions of
the UIGHUR Act of 2019 (S. 178/H.R. 1025) would have required a report on human rights abuses, including
assessments of forced labor and “a description of foreign companies and industries benefiting from such labor” (S. 178,
§8(b)(4)).
204 Amy Lehr, Addressing Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region , Center for Strategic and International
Studies, July 2020, pp. 9-10.
205 Based on CRS discussions with various sources. Also, see Ana Swanson, “ Nike and Coca-Cola Lobby Against
Xinjiang Forced Labor Bill,” New York Tim es, November 29, 2020.
206 For example, “Uzbekistan Resists as U.S. Seeks to Rally Central Asians Against China,” Reuters, February 3, 2020.
Congressional Research Service
28

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

In the case of Xinjiang, many experts agree that Section 307 is an important tool, but perhaps not
sufficient to bring about policy changes in China given the scale and severity of the human rights
crisis, which goes beyond forced labor to include mass arbitrary detention, mass surveil ance, and
other abuses.207
Impact of Enforcement on Workers and Companies
Some observers argue that strict enforcement of import bans on goods made by forced labor may
be ineffective at reducing forced labor practices and labor trafficking, leave workers in a more
vulnerable position, and unnecessarily break constructive business relationships. In its July 2020
white paper, the private sector advisory committee COAC stated that “Importers, civil society,
international institutions, industry groups, multi-stakeholder initiatives, and others general y al
agree that importers and buyers should use their leverage, such that it may exist, to support
remediation of an issue rather than ‘cutting and running.’”208 COAC contended that the severing
of business between importers and suppliers due to forced labor, risks removing leverage that
importers may have to improve labor practices.
Others argue that in exceptional circumstances of systemic, state-sponsored forced labor, as in
Xinjiang—in which there is little chance that such practices wil be easily remediated, given their
deliberate and widespread nature—al parts of the supply chain remain at risk of complicity in
forced labor. In such cases, they argue economic pressure arising from withdrawal may be the
primary means of supporting vulnerable workers (see below).209 Representatives of brands and
retailers have argued that industry’s economic leverage can be limited, and that systemic
problems in Xinjiang are far bigger than one industry can handle.210 They emphasize only
sustained government-to-government pressure and multi-stakeholder engagement can solve the
pervasive risks of forced labor in the region.
Others have used the passage of TFTEA to elevate what they see as ongoing unfair competition
for American workers from U.S. prison labor. In 2016, the then-president and CEO of the AAFA
argued that stricter enforcement of Section 307 increases the hypocrisy of U.S. prison labor and
advocated that such labor also be prohibited.211

207 In January 2021, under the T rump Administration, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declared that the Chinese
government has committed “ crimes against humanity” and “ genocide against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and
other et hnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.” T he Biden Administration is reviewing the designation. See
U.S. Department of State, “ Determination of the Secretary of State on Atrocities in Xinjiang,” Press statement, January
19, 2021; and Patricia Zengerle and Michelle Nichols, “ U.S. reviewing China genocide ruling to make sure it sticks,”
Reuters, January 27, 2021. Stakeholders have generally advocated for the use of numerous policies concurrently to
create change in China. One report suggested that nat ional governments employ diplomatic leverage, potentially in
relation to the 2022 Olympic Games scheduled to be held in Beijing, in addition to trade policy, for example. Amy
Lehr Addressing Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonom ous Zone – Toward a Shared Agenda, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, July 2020, p. 9. For more information on policy options for promoting human rights
in China, see CRS Report R45956, Hum an Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 116th Congress, by T homas
Lum and Michael A. Weber.
208 COAC, Report of the Intelligent Enforcement Subcommittee Forced Labor Working Group , July 15, 2020, p. 8.
209 See expert remarks during “ Using T rade T ools to Combat Forced Labor: T he Roles of Government, Business, and
Civil Society,” Washington International T rade Association event, October 15, 2020.
210 “Joint statement from NRF, AAFA, FDRA, RILA and USFIA on reports of forced labor in Xinjiang,” March 10,
2020; and T estimony by Stephen Lamar, President and CEO, AAFA, U.S. Congress, House Ways and Means
Committee, Enforcing the Ban on Im ports Produced by Forced Labor in Xinjiang , hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd sess.,
September 17, 2020.
211 Rick Helfenbein, “Prisoners Compete for a Share of ‘Made in USA,’” The Hill, May 15, 2016.
Congressional Research Service
29

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

A report by the nongovernmental Human Trafficking Legal Center cal ed WROs “a powerful
trade enforcement tool,” but suggested that in some cases, foreign manufacturers have gone out of
business due to forced labor enforcement, jeopardizing the economic security of vulnerable
workers.212 The AFL-CIO has suggested that Congress consider amending Section 307 to provide
a basis for remedies to forced laborers who suffer negative consequences when WROs are issued,
and use civil fines on importers as a means of compensating such victims.213 In considering
further legislation related to Section 307, Congress may consider the potential benefits and
likelihood of remediation, and the potential contributing factors, such as demand from other
countries for the products at issue in such cases, as wel as the potential for the goods to be
reexported and reach other markets, which could conceivably have a lessened impact on
addressing the existence of forced labor.
Role of Multinationals and Supply Chain Due Diligence
The debate over strengthening Section 307 enforcement has brought attention to U.S. importers’
compliance and transparency in supplier relationships. While many companies have publicly
committed to zero tolerance for forced labor and have robust systems in place to manage risks,
various reports have documented problematic supply chains. Some labor groups advocate for
more stringent requirements by CBP in Section 307 petitions, such as requiring importers in
higher-risk industries to disclose their suppliers and document steps taken to eliminate forced
labor from supply chains.214 Some experts contend that if CBP puts in place broader regional or
industry-wide import bans, the agency wil need a dedicated strategy to incentivize or require
companies to trace their supply chains, or prioritize targeting those companies not making serious
efforts, including those directly sourcing from Xinjiang.215
In the 117th Congress, as noted above, some bil s aim to improve disclosure and transparency of
companies doing business in the region, such as H.R. 2072. Other past proposed legislation
targeted practices more broadly, such as the Business Supply Chain Transparency on Trafficking
and Slavery Act of 2020 (H.R. 6279; 116th Congress) and Slave-Free Business Certification Act
of 2020 (S. 4241; 116th Congress). H.R. 6279, for instance, would have amended the Securities
Exchange Act to require that companies disclose in annual SEC reports measures taken to address
conditions of forced labor, slavery, human trafficking, and worst forms of child labor.
There is intensive debate about the objectives and impact of transparency mandates. Key factors
debated include compliance costs, practicalities of compliance (e.g., supply chain data tracking
chal enges and business confidentiality), effectiveness of reporting, and impact on the ground.216
In a review of assessments of U.S. and EU policies, one 2016 study concluded that in general

212 T he Human T rafficking Legal Center, Importing Freedom: Using the U.S. Tariff Act to Combat Forced Labor in
Supply Chains, June 2020. Others have suggested that wide-ranging WROs can impact entire sectors or economies and
contribute to economic instability that is counter-productive to improving human rights. Corporate Accountability Lab,
Using the Master’s Tools to Dismantle the Master’s House: 307 Petitions as a Human Rights Tool, August 31, 2020.
213 T estimony by Cathy Feingold, International Director, AFL-CIO, in U.S. Congress, House Ways and Means
Committee, Enforcing the Ban on Im ports Produced by Forced Labor in Xinjiang , hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd sess.,
September 17, 2020.
214 ILRF, February 2020.
215 T estimony by Amy Lehr, Director and Senior Fellow, Human Rights Initiative, CSIS, in U.S. Congress, House
Ways and Means Committee, Enforcing the Ban on Im ports Produced by Forced Labor in Xinjiang , hearing, 116th
Cong., 2nd sess., September 17, 2020.
216 For example, for debate over Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, see CRS Report R42618, Conflict Minerals in
Central Africa: U.S. and International Responses, by Nicolas Cook.
Congressional Research Service
30

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

they can be expensive for companies, especial y smal er companies, to implement; they have not
led the bulk of companies to report; and sufficient information is not provided to facilitate
effective monitoring.217 Companies can also face chal enges in conducting effective due diligence
in practice. In the case of Xinjiang, there is broad consensus that reliable and accurate verification
and auditing of factories and farms is not possible, amid reports of auditors being detained or
harassed; pervasive surveil ance and government interference; and the inability to conduct candid
interviews of workers.218 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce expressed opposition to the Uyghur
Forced Labor Disclosure Act of 2020 (H.R. 6270), claiming that “past attempts to utilize
domestic U.S. securities law to combat human rights abuses provide a cautionary tale”—a
reference to the Dodd-Frank Act provision on conflict minerals (Section 1502).219 Congress may
consider whether disclosure requirements in proposed legislation, as wel as any prospective CBP
requirements may improve enforcement of Section 307.
U.S. Trade Policy and Forced Labor Provisions
U.S. Trade Policy Tools to Complement and Enhance Section 307 Objectives
The treatment of forced labor concerns in U.S. trade policy and FTAs has been of long-standing
congressional interest and has evolved in recent years to complement Section 307 more directly.
The most recent U.S. FTA, the USMCA, reflects the intent of the provision in its labor chapter,
which some observers and Members of Congress view as a template for future agreements.220 As
evidenced in the USMCA debate and passage, Congress may continue to use the implementation
of FTAs to bolster U.S. enforcement efforts related to forced labor. Some Members have
emphasized the importance of linking trade negotiations and forced labor issues, citing the U.S.
phase-one trade deal with China as a missed opportunity to require the Chinese government to
commit to address widespread reports of forced labor production in Xinjiang.221
With the current TPA expiring in July 2021, the potential reauthorization process and debate
could provide Congress an opportunity to revisit U.S. trade negotiating objectives with respect to
forced labor. Some Members have indicated that improving enforcement of Section 307 and
oversight of TFTEA implementation could be part of a reauthorization debate, citing issues with
CBP reporting requirements, transparency, and responsiveness to congressional requests.222
Regarding negotiating objectives, U.S. FTAs reflect TPA’s emphasis on upholding the ILO
Declaration and do not commit the parties to enforce the core ILO conventions themselves. Labor

217 Susan Ariel Aaronson and Ethan Wham, Can Transparency in Supply Chains Advance Labor Rights? Mapping of
Existing Efforts, IIEP-WP-2016-6, George Washington University, April 2016.
218 As a result, several major auditing firms have suspended labor-audit or inspection services in the region.
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Global Supply Chains, Forced Labor, and the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonom ous Region, Staff Research Report, March 2020; and Eva Xiao, “ Auditors to Stop Inspecting Factories in
China’s Xinjiang Despite Forced-Labor Concerns,” Wall Street Journal, September 21, 2020.
219 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “ U.S. Chamber Letter on H.R. 6210, the ‘Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act,’ H.R.
6270, the ‘Uyghur Forced Labor Disclosure Act of 2020,’” September 22, 2020.
220 For example, see Speaker of the House, “ T ranscript of Speaker Pelosi Press Conference Announcing New USMCA
Agreement ,” Press release, December 10, 2019.
221 U.S. Congress, House Ways and Means Committee, Enforcing the Ban on Imports Produced by Forced Labor in
Xinjiang, hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., September 17, 2020; House debate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol.
166, no. 164 (September 22, 2020), p. H4663. For information on the U.S. -China trade deal, see CRS Insight IN11208,
U.S. Signs Phase One Trade Deal with China , by Karen M. Sutter.
222 For example, see Rep. Kind remarks in U.S. Congress, House Ways and Means Committee, Enforcing the Ban on
Im ports Produced by Forced Labor in Xinjiang , hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., September 17, 2020
Congressional Research Service
31

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

groups argue that doing so would strengthen labor chapter commitments, but this seems unlikely,
since the United States has not ratified most of those conventions due to conflicts with U.S. law
and practice.223 Because most countries with forced labor concerns are not FTA partners,
engagement through trade preference programs and trade capacity building may continue to be an
avenue for remedying concerns.
Role of International Trade Rules w ith Respect to Forced Labor Issues
While U.S. trade agreements and programs are tools for mitigating the import of forced labor
goods, many observers maintain that more effective global coordination on trade-related labor
issues may hinge on developing multilateral trade rules.224 However, WTO members omitted
labor provisions from the global trade agenda in the 1990s amid intense debate and a view that
the ILO is the lead international organization for addressing labor issues, and these issues have
not gained new traction as part of recent efforts to advance new WTO rules and reforms.225 Given
the WTO’s current deference to the ILO, Congress might consider assessing the ILO’s role, as
wel as how to enhance U.S. support for ILO work in forced labor and trade issues. Congress
could also encourage the Administration to elevate forced labor as part of trade discussions
among senior officials in other international fora, such as the G7/G20, as wel as the OECD Trade
Committee, to report on measures other member nations are taking to prohibit trade of goods
produced by forced labor.

Author Information

Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, Coordinator
Katarina C. O'Regan
Analyst in International Trade and Finance
Analyst in Foreign Policy

Christopher A. Casey

Analyst in International Trade and Finance

223 AFL-CIO, NAFTA at 20, March 2014; and United Stat es Council for International Business, U.S. Ratification of
ILO Core Labor Standards, April 2007.
224 For example, see T estimony by T hea M. Lee, President of the Economic Policy Institute, in U.S. Congress, Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Multilateral Econom ic Institutions and U.S. Foreign Policy, hearing, 115th Cong., 2nd
sess., November 27, 2018.
225 WT O, “Labour standards: consensus, coherence and controversy,” https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/
tif_e/bey5_e.htm.
Congressional Research Service
32

Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and Issues

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R46631 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED
33