Addressing COVID-19 Pandemic Impacts on Civil Aviation Operations

Addressing COVID-19 Pandemic Impacts on Civil Aviation Operations

Addressing COVID-19 Pandemic Impacts on
August 17, 2020
Civil Aviation Operations
Bart Elias
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a large impact on civil aviation, particularly commercial
Specialist in Aviation Policy
passenger airline operations. The combination of travel restrictions; state and local mandates to

stay at home, shelter-in-place, and self-quarantine after travel from certain areas; and public
concerns over the risk of contracting COVID-19 from travel-related activities has resulted in a

significant decrease in air travel demand since March 2020. Passenger air travel is not expected
to return to 2019 levels until 2023 at the earliest.
The COVID-19 outbreak is the first major global pandemic having widespread impact on passenger jet air travel, and the
federal government lacked a comprehensive plan for responding to communicable disease outbreaks across the aviation
system despite considerable efforts to study the risks and develop airport-specific response plans. Initial federal response to
the COVID-19 outbreak focused on international travel restrictions from countries experiencing outbreaks starting in late
January 2020 with restrictions on travelers from China. Restrictions were later expanded to include travelers from Iran,
Europe, and later from Brazil. Additionally, the Department of State had issued a global health advisory, urging U.S. citizens
to avoid all international travel. The European Union also imposed restrictions on travelers from the United States which
remains in effect even through restrictions on travel to Europe from certain other countries have been eased.
The United States has not limited domestic air travel. Nevertheless, domestic travel has been impacted significantly by state
and local restrictions and public trepidation about COVID-19 transmission within the aviation system and at popular travel
destinations. As a result passenger activity at U.S. airports since March 2020 is down about 75% compared to 2019 levels.
In July 2020, the Department of Transportation, in coordination with other federal agencies, developed a framework for
responding to the public health risks of COVID-19 in the aviation sector. The framework emphasizes the implementation of
voluntary mitigation measures and shared responsibilities, but some in the aviation industry and in Congress have advocated
for specific federal mandates for certain measures, such as requiring face masks while traveling in the aviation system,
something the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommends but does not require. A number of voluntary
measures have been implemented at airports, aboard aircraft, and at air traffic control facilities to mitigate COVID-19
transmission, including signage and other public education efforts; social distancing cues; shields and barriers at ticketing
counters, TSA checkpoints, and gates; stepped-up cleaning and disinfection of high-touch surfaces; increased airflow and
filtration; and protocols to identify and isolate ill passengers and aviation workers. Additional precautions, such as pre-board
health screenings and temperature checks are being debated but remain controversial. While actions taken have resulted in
some recovery in air travel demand, airline ridership remains well below historical levels and will likely remain low until
COVID-19 is well contained and flyers have sustained confidence in effective contagious disease mitig ation measures
implemented for air travel.
In response to the significant downtown in air travel, U.S. airlines have received federal aid including loan guarantees and
payroll assistance grants authorized through provisions in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act
(P.L. 116-136) which was enacted on March 27, 2020. Workforce protections implemented as a condition of accepting these
funds are set to expire at the end of September 2020, prompting airlines to plan for and announce large-scale airline
furloughs, layoffs, and early retirement offers. Airlines have already taken steps to idle large portions of their fleets and
accelerate plans to retire aging and outmoded aircraft in an effort to downsize amid growing financial debt. These actions are
anticipated to result in both near-term and long-lasting impacts on the industry and could severely hamper airlines’ ability to
attract and hire qualified pilots and mechanics in the future and to acquire new aircraft to meet passenger demand,
particularly if there is a surge in travel demand once COVID-19 is effectively contained. The Transportation Security
Administration, which has historically struggled with high screener turnover, may face similar challenges to appropriately
reduce screener staffing levels to reflect suppressed passenger levels in the near-term while having the ability to attract, hire,
and train screeners to adequately staff checkpoints to meet future airline passenger demand.
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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
Historical Overview ........................................................................................................ 2
The 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Outbreak ..................................... 2
The 2014 Ebola Outbreak ........................................................................................... 3
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) .................................................................. 4
Research, Planning, and Preparedness........................................................................... 4
U.S. Civil Aviation Response to COVID-19 ........................................................................ 5
International Travel Restrictions .................................................................................. 5
Domestic Air Travel ................................................................................................... 6
COVID-19 Response Framework for U.S. Civil Aviation................................................. 6
Measures to Protect Flyers and Aviation Workers ................................................................. 7
Masks and Facial Coverings ........................................................................................ 7
Social Distancing....................................................................................................... 8
Airliner Cabin Air Filtration ........................................................................................ 8
Procedures for Responding to Il Travelers .................................................................... 9
Sanitation and Decontamination of Aircraft ................................................................. 10
TSA Screening Checkpoints ...................................................................................... 10
Airport Infrastructure Improvements .......................................................................... 11
FAA Air Traffic Facilities.......................................................................................... 12
Economic Relief for Airlines........................................................................................... 12
Changes to Airline Fleets................................................................................................ 13
Aviation Workforce Chal enges ....................................................................................... 14
Safety-Critical Airline Jobs ....................................................................................... 14
Implications for the Future Aviation Workforce ............................................................ 15
Security Screener Staffing......................................................................................... 15

Figures
Figure 1. Daily Passengers Passing Through TSA Screening Checkpoints ................................ 2

Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 16

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Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a large impact on civil aviation, particularly commercial
passenger airline operations. While the pandemic and the response to the pandemic continues to
evolve,1 the aviation industry and related federal agencies face a broad array of chal enges to keep
airline employees and passengers safe, mitigate the spread of the disease, and respond to dramatic
shifts in demand for air travel.
The combination of travel restrictions; state and local mandates to stay at home, shelter in place,
and self-quarantine after travel from certain areas; and public concerns over the risk of
contracting COVID-19 from travel-related activities has had a significant impact on air travel
demand since March 2020. Throughout March 2020, the number of passengers passing through
TSA checkpoints throughout the United States dropped precipitously (see Figure 1). At its lowest
point in mid-April, passenger volume experienced a drop of more than 95% compared to one year
ago. Passenger numbers hovered at or below about 100,000 daily passengers throughout much of
April 2020, compared to more than 2 mil ion daily passengers during comparable days in 2019.
As states in the Northeast began to ease COVID-19 restrictions, passenger numbers increased to
about 700,000 per day by the end of July 2020, stil showing a significant decline from past
summer passenger volumes of about 2.6 mil ion daily passengers. Potential resurgences in
COVID-19 cases could further suppress airline ridership in the coming months.
It is likely that passenger airline travel wil not return to pre-March 2020 levels until a highly
effective prophylactic treatment or a vaccine to protect against COVID-19 can be developed and
made widely available, a prospect that most infectious disease experts expect wil take at least 12
to 18 months based on historical experience with vaccine development, testing, and approvals
processes.2 An International Air Transport Association survey found that a majority of individuals
indicated that they would hold off 6 to 12 months following COVID-19 containment before
returning to air travel.3 Therefore, air travel demand wil not likely recover substantial y until late
2021 or 2022 at the earliest, and passenger demand is not expected to reach 2019 levels
international y until 2023 or later.4 Airlines have cautioned that once demand for air travel
recovers, it wil take years for operations to be restored to pre-pandemic levels.5 If a spike in
demand for air travel ensues following an end to the global pandemic, the airline industry may be
hard-pressed to quickly rebuild their workforces, particularly in safety-critical occupations, and to
marshal sufficient aircraft and equipment to expand capacity.

1For a general overview of the U.S. response to COVID-19 see CRS Report R46219, Overview of U.S. Domestic
Response to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), coordinated by Sarah A. Lister and Kavya Sekar.
2 “Can a Vaccine for Covid-19 Be Developed in Record T ime?, A Discussion Moderated by Siddhartha Mukherjee,”
New York Tim es Magazine, June 9, 2020, at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/09/magazine/covid-
vaccine.html; “ Vaccine Development, Testing, and Regulation,” The History of Vaccines, T he College of Physicians of
Philadelphia, at https://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/articles/vaccine-development -testing-and-regulation.
3 International Air T ransport Association (IATA), Air Passenger Market Analysis, May 2020, at https://www.iata.org/
en/iata-repository/publications/economic-reports/air-passenger-monthly-analysis—may-2020/.
4 Ibid.
5 Airlines for America, Tracking the Impacts of COVID-19, at https://www.airlines.org/dataset/impact-of-covid19-data-
updates/#.
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Figure 1. Daily Passengers Passing Through TSA Screening Checkpoints
March-July 2020 vs. 2019

Source: Transportation Security Administration.
Notes: Dates provided are for 2020. Data for 2019 are matched to corresponding weekday of the 2020 date.
Historical Overview
The COVID-19 outbreak represents the first major global pandemic in the age of passenger jet air
transportation which began in the late 1950s, wel after the notorious 1918 influenza pandemic.6
While smal er-scale flu pandemics in 1957 and 19587 and between 1968 and 19708 were each
responsible for more than one mil ion deaths worldwide and more than 100,000 in the United
States, they appear to have had little impact on commercial air travel in part because air travel,
especial y international air travel, was not as widely used as it is today.
The 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Outbreak
In 2003, the global airline industry, stil recovering from a considerable downturn in air travel
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in September 2001, was significantly but briefly impacted by

6 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1918 Pandemic (H1N1 virus), at https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-
resources/1918-pandemic-h1n1.html. For a complete list of past pandemics see https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-
resources/basics/past-pandemics.html.
7 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1957-1958 Pandemic (H2N2 virus), at https://www.cdc.gov/flu/
pandemic-resources/1957-1958-pandemic.html.
8 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1968 Pandemic (H3N2 virus), at https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-
resources/1968-pandemic.html.
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the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), caused by a novel coronavirus
(SARS-CoV-1) believed to have originated in the Guangdong province of China. While fewer
than 10,000 cases and fewer than 1,000 deaths worldwide were attributed to SARS in 2003, the
outbreak triggered widespread concerns over potential spread from international travel. Although
the outbreak was quickly contained, it was estimated that annual total air travel in 2003 declined
by 8% among air carriers in the Asia-Pacific region and by about 3.7% among U.S. air carriers.
Airlines worldwide lost an estimated $7 bil ion of revenue, including $1 bil ion among U.S.
airlines.9 The SARS outbreak, coupled with an intense focus on homeland security preparedness
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, prompted considerable federal and industry attention to
communicable disease transmission through the commercial air transport system.
In September 2007, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine sponsored a
workshop bringing together federal agency officials and aviation industry leaders to collaborate
on plans for addressing pandemic outbreaks.10 Discussion revealed that while the U.S.
government had developed a strategic plan to prevent pandemic events originating overseas from
spreading to the United States and to contain disease spread domestical y while limiting
economic impacts, these goals presented conflicting chal enges for the aviation industry. Experts
noted that minimizing the spread of disease through air travel would involve collaborative efforts
to carry out risk-based screening at airports, impose in-flight measures to protect passengers and
crew, and to support medical response and effective cleaning and disinfecting of aircraft and
airport facilities. At the same time, it was recognized that airlines and airports could face
considerable chal enges to preserve air service, maintain critical transportation infrastructure, and
address workforce absenteeism and attrition during a pandemic event. Suggested next steps
centered on additional research, planning, communication, and coordination to prepare for
pandemics. Most other recent contagious diseases outbreaks, including the 2009 H1N1 influenza
pandemic, had little impact on air travel.
The 2014 Ebola Outbreak
Response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa focused on preventing disease spread to the
United States through air travel using risk-based health screening, targeted measures to isolate
and quarantine suspected cases, and contact tracing to identify and monitor exposed individuals.11
Travelers who had originated in West African nations impacted by the disease underwent
enhanced health screenings including questionnaires and temperature checks at U.S. airports of
entry. To facilitate these checks, U.S.-bound passengers originating from impacted West African
countries were required to enter the United States through one of five designated airports.
Another key component of the response to the Ebola outbreak involved providing advisory
materials to educate air travelers, particularly those traveling to or from the impacted region.
There were no direct flights between the United States and the affected countries, but many

9 T eresa Cederholm, “Must -know: SARS’ impact on the airline industry,” Market Realist, October 21, 2014, at
https://marketrealist.com/2014/10/must-know-sars-impact -airline-industry/; Sherisse Pham, “ SARS cost global airlines
$7 billion. T he coronavirus outbreak will likely be much worse,” CNN Business, February 5, 2020, at
https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/05/business/coronavirus-airline-cost/index.html.
10 T he National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Interagency-Aviation Industry Collaboration on
Planning for Pandem ic Outbreaks: Sum m ary of a Workshop (Katherine F. T urnbull, Rapporteur), Conference
Proceedings 41, 2008, National Academies Press, at https://www.nap.edu/catalog/23266/interagency-aviation-industry-
collaboration-on-planning-for-pandemic-outbreaks.
11 Nicole J. Cohen, MD; Clive M. Brown, MBBS; & Francisco Alvarado-Ramy, MD, et al., T ravel and Border Health
Measures to Prevent the International Spread of Ebola, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Supplem ent, July 8,
2016, 65(3), pp. 57-67, at https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/su/su6503a9.htm.
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flights were cancel ed as other countries, particularly European nations, imposed travel
restrictions. During the outbreak, FAA acknowledged its broad authority to restrict access to U.S.
airspace, but cautioned that decisions made on a public health basis would involve coordination
with other federal agencies including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, and the Department of
Transportation (DOT).12
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS)
The 2012 outbreak of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), which was mostly contained
to the Arabian Peninsula, had minimal impact on air travel. A local outbreak of MERS in South
Korea in 2015 was traced to a traveler who had returned from the Arabian Peninsula, but there
have only been a couple documented cases of MERS in the United States. While no travel
restrictions or special precautions have been put in place in response to MERS, the CDC
continues to monitor reports of il travelers returning from the Arabian Peninsula. The current
COVID-19 pandemic poses potential chal enges for monitoring MERS as the symptoms of the
two diseases are similar.13 MERS is caused by a different coronavirus than the virus responsible
for COVID-19, and about 3 to 4 out of every 10 individuals who have contracted MERS have
died as a result.14
Research, Planning, and Preparedness
In 2015, citing these global communicable disease threats, the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) advised that a formal national aviation preparedness plan to respond to
communicable disease outbreaks would aid in developing a coordinated response, including
appropriate employee training, distribution of protective equipment and supplies, and sanitation
and disinfection practices.15 However, as of June 2020, GAO reported that the federal government
stil had not developed such a plan, despite international obligations to do so.16 Specifical y, the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the specialized agency of the United Nations
for civil aviation matters, expects countries to develop an aviation-related plan to respond to any
communicable disease posing a serious public health risk.17 The U.S. approach to addressing
communicable disease risks instead has relied primarily on individual airport plans focused

12 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), “FAA Statement on Ebola,” press release, Oct. 23, 2014, at
https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=17375; CRS Report R43809, Preventing the
Introduction and Spread of Ebola in the United States: Frequently Asked Questions, coordinated by Sarah A. Lister.
13 Ali Pormohammad, Saied Ghorbani, et al., “ Comparison of confirmed COVID‐19 with SARS and MERS cases ‐
Clinical characteristics, laboratory findings, radiographic signs and outcomes: A systematic review and meta‐analysis,”
Reviews in Medical Virology, 30(4), July 2020, e2112.
14 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Information About Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), Revised
December 2015, at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/mers/downloads/factsheet -mers_en.pdf.
15 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Air Travel and Communicable Diseases: Comprehensive Federal Plan
Needed for U.S. Aviation System ’s Preparedness, GAO-16-127, December 16, 2015, at https://www.gao.gov/products/
GAO-16-127.
16 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Air Travel and Communicable Diseases: Status of Research Efforts and
Action Still Needed to Develop Federal Preparedness Plan , GAO-20-655T , June 23, 2020, at https://www.gao.gov/
products/GAO-20-655T .
17 See International Civil Aviation Organization, Guidelines for States Concerning the Management of Communicable
Disease Posing a Serious Public Health Risk, at https://www.icao.int/safety/aviation-medicine/guidelines/
AvInfluenza_guidelines.pdf.
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primarily on handling il travelers entering the United States from overseas rather than on system-
wide measures.
In March 2018, the Transportation Research Board of the National Academies sponsored an
Airport Cooperative Research Program workshop exploring airport roles in reducing the
transmission of communicable diseases.18 The workshop focused on collaborative efforts between
airports and public health service agencies to
 develop, test, evaluate, and revise communicable disease response plans;
 effectively communicate with travelers, airport personnel, and the public at large,
including communications through print and broadcast media and social media
platforms;
 design and utilize airport infrastructure in a manner that reduces the risk of
disease spread;
 engage with various stakeholders at the international, federal, state, and local
level to mitigate communicable disease outbreaks before they occur; and
 manage and coordinate preparedness and response to contagious disease
outbreaks.
These airport-specific frameworks, along with airline initiatives to address mitigation measures
onboard aircraft, have served as the initial means for responding to the COVID-19 pandemic in
the U.S. civil aviation system.
U.S. Civil Aviation Response to COVID-19
International Travel Restrictions
On January 31, 2020, President Trump issued restrictions banning foreign travelers who were in
China within14 days prior to traveling to the United States. On February 29, 2020, a similar
restriction was imposed on travelers from Iran, and on March 11, 2020, restrictions were imposed
on travelers from the 26 countries in the Schengen area of the European Union (EU). On March
14, 2020, the European restrictions were expanded to include travelers from the United Kingdom
and Ireland. On May 24, 2020, President Trump imposed similar restrictions on travelers entering
the United States from Brazil. These restrictions have al remained in effect. On March 31, 2020,
the Department of State issued a global level 4 health advisory, urging U.S. citizens to avoid al
international travel. That advisory was lifted in early August 2020, but many popular destinations
for American travelers have remained off limits because of restrictions on U.S.-based passengers
imposed by other nations.19
In early July, European Union member countries agreed to begin easing travel restrictions,
al owing residents of some countries outside the EU, including Canada, to travel to and from
Europe for non-essential reasons. The EU member countries kept restrictions on residents of the
United States in place, but indicated that they would review the restrictions every two weeks and

18 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Airport Roles in Reducing Transmission of
Com m unicable Diseases, Washington, DC: T he National Academies Press, 2019, at https://www.nap.edu/catalog/
25367/airport-roles-in-reducing-transmission-of-communicable-diseases.
19 T ariro Mzezewa, “ T he U.S. Lifted Its Advisory Against T raveling Abroad. What Does T hat Mean?,” New York
Tim es, August 6, 2020, at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/06/travel/USA-T ravel-State-Department-warnings.html.
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make determinations based on current epidemiologic data. U.S. citizens also face restrictions,
including outright bans, quarantine, and COVID-19 testing requirements imposed by many other
destinations including Canada, the Bahamas, Australia, and most countries in Asia.20
As the pandemic continues, additional restrictions on international travel to and from the United
States may be imposed depending on local conditions in various countries. Since these
restrictions may be unpredictable, flyers may cancel or hold off on international travel plans
altogether, even if restrictions are eased, potential y suppressing the number of passengers flying
overseas. Therefore, impacts on airline passenger demand for international travel may last for
some time even after restrictions are eased or lifted.
Domestic Air Travel
The United States has not limited domestic air travel. Nonetheless, domestic travel has been
affected by state and local restrictions such as quarantine orders imposed by some states,
territories, and the District of Columbia as wel as many municipalities. Many of these restrictions
require individuals arriving from certain areas to self-isolate for up to 14 days, although there are
various exceptions for essential travel purposes such as emergency response, maintaining critical
infrastructure, and medical treatment. In general, tourism is discouraged if not outright forbidden
by many of these orders. For example, Hawai , a popular tourist destination, imposed a
mandatory 14-day self-quarantine for passengers arriving from other states on March 26. On
April 1, Hawai ’s self-quarantine requirement was expanded to include interisland travel within
the state. As a consequence, passenger air travel to Hawai in 2020 is down 95% compared to
2019 levels.21 Other states have also imposed broadly applicable stay-at-home or shelter-in-place
orders which may also restrict travelers from engaging in activities at their travel destinations.
Additional y, the CDC has advised that travel increases the risk of COVID-19 disease
transmission.22 The CDC cautions that while most viruses do not spread easily on flights because
of how air circulates and is filtered on airplanes, social distancing is difficult on crowded flights,
and individuals may be seated closer to others than the recommended 6 feet of distance,
sometimes for several hours. Moreover, CDC notes that air travel involves spending time in
airport terminals and at security checkpoints which may involve close contact with other
individuals and frequently touched surfaces, thus increasing the risk of exposure to the virus that
causes COVID-19. Addressing the risks, many businesses have cancel ed non-essential travel for
their employees, and many individuals have decided to avoid air travel during the pandemic.
COVID-19 Response Framework for U.S. Civil Aviation
In July 2020, the Departments of Transportation, Homeland Security, and Health and Human
Services jointly published a framework for mitigating the public health risks of COVID-19 in the
aviation sector. That document, titled Runway to Recovery, outlines a national strategy for
restoring the air transportation system. It emphasized greater consistency in public health
mitigation measures implemented by airports and airlines and the shared responsibilities for

20 Geoff Whitmore, “August 2020 Update on Coronavirus T ravel Restrictions,” August 6, 2020, Forbes, at
https://www.forbes.com/sites/geoffwhitmore/2020/08/06/august-2020-update-on-coronavirus-travel-restrictions/
#429e54ae290d.
21 Airlines for America, Tracking the Impacts of COVID-19, at https://www.airlines.org/dataset/impact-of-covid19-
data-updates/#.
22 See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Considerations for Travelers – Coronavirus in the US, at
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/travel-in-the-us.html.
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implementing these measures, as wel as effective coordination and communication.23 The
framework identifies a number of measures for airports and airlines that are recommended but not
mandated, including
 requiring masks or face coverings throughout the air transportation environment;
 promoting social distancing;
 enhancing cleaning and disinfecting;
 conducting health assessments of passengers and workers;
 collecting passenger information to facilitate contact tracing;
 minimizing the touching of shared objects, documents, and surfaces;
 reporting daily on public health risk mitigation efforts;
 enhancing exposure reduction initiatives at security checkpoints;
 educating and communicating with passengers and employees; and
 using new technologies to support mitigation measures.
The framework also highlights aviation as a key driver of economic recovery because of its key
role in efficiently and safely transporting people and goods. It emphasizes that innovation,
creative solutions, flexibility, and rapid deployment of new technologies are needed to respond to
and recover from the COVID-19 public health emergency.
Measures to Protect Flyers and Aviation Workers
A number of voluntary measures have been implemented at airports, aboard aircraft, and at air
traffic control facilities to mitigate COVID-19 transmission, including signage and other public
education efforts; social distancing cues; shields and barriers at ticketing counters, TSA
checkpoints, and gates; stepped-up cleaning and disinfection of high-touch surfaces; increased
airflow and filtration; airline requirements that passengers wear masks aboard aircraft; and
protocols to identify and isolate il passengers and aviation workers.
The CDC is authorized to conduct public health measures related to interstate travel including at
U.S. airports using non-invasive procedures to detect the presence of communicable diseases.24
This could include measures such as pre-board health questionnaires and temperature checks. As
part of these measures, the CDC has the authority to require traveling individuals to provide
contact information to aid in contact tracing efforts.
Masks and Facial Coverings
The CDC recommends, but does not require, masks or cloth face coverings at al times while
traveling in the passenger air transportation system, including at airports and on board aircraft.
Many airlines, including al major U.S. air carriers have imposed requirements for passengers to
wear masks or facial coverings while on board aircraft. Exceptions are made for individuals with
medical conditions or disabilities that would make compliance chal enging or could interfere with
the individual’s ability to remove the mask if needed, for example to access supplemental oxygen

23 U.S. Department of T ransportation, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Runway to Recovery: The United States Fram ework for Airlines and Airports to Mitigate the Public
Health Risks of Coronavirus, July 2020, at https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2020-07/
Runway_to_Recovery_07022020.pdf.
24 See 42 C.F.R. §70.10.
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in the case of cabin depressurization. The Health and Economic Recovery Omnibus Emergency
Solutions Act (HEROES) Act (H.R. 6800), passed by the House on May 15, 2020, would
mandate al U.S. passenger airlines to require passengers and cabin crew to wear a mask or face
covering whenever they are onboard aircraft. The legislation would require flight crews to wear
masks whenever they are on board aircraft and outside the flight deck. It would direct FAA to
study the safety implications of al owing pilots to wear masks on board the flight deck, a practice
that could prove chal enging because pilots must be able to quickly access and don oxygen masks
in the event of a rapid depressurization or smoke in the cockpit.
Social Distancing
Social distancing cues, such as floor markings and signs, have been implemented at several
airports, but effective social distancing is difficult to implement in crowded airport terminals.
Social distancing is even more difficult on air carrier aircraft w here seats are closely spaced.
Legislation intended to promote airline passenger safety (S. 4293 and H.R. 7741) would prohibit
airlines from fil ing middle seats of airplanes during the COVID-19 emergency. Airlines argue
that such restrictions are not economical y viable. In 2019, the break-even load factor (the percent
of seats that must be fil ed with paying travelers to cover operational costs) was 75.9%, but
requiring middle seats to remain unfil ed would effectively cap load factors at about 66% for
typical aircraft economy class configurations.
Airliner Cabin Air Filtration
Airlines have stated that the highly efficient particulate air filters instal ed on almost al passenger
jets operated by major air carriers can effectively capture most viruses, reducing the chances of
infection from circulating air.25 Moreover, increasing the rate at which cabin air is replaced with
fresh air can further mitigate risks, rendering airline cabin air cleaner than air in most buildings,
according to airlines and aircraft manufacturers. Public health research found that respiratory
disease spread by droplets would likely be limited inside an aircraft cabin among seated
passengers to one row in front or behind an infected individual, suggesting that filtration systems
are relatively effective at trapping viruses even though their primary purpose is to rid the air of
harmful chemicals.26 Nonetheless, further transmission may occur if an infected passenger visits
the lavatory during flight, or comes in contact with other passengers and crew during boarding
and deplaning.
Researchers are looking into additional measures to help mitigate contagious disease spread in
aircraft cabins including ultraviolet lights, self-cleaning lavatories, and redesigned ventilation
systems.27 However, it is not likely that these changes would be implemented anytime soon and
there has been no indication so far that FAA wil seek to require any of these design changes on
current or future aircraft.

25 International Air T ransport Association, Briefing Paper: Cabin Air Quality – Risk of Communicable Diseases
Transm ission, IAT A Corporate Communications, January 2018 , at https://www.iata.org/contentassets/
f1163430bba94512a583eb6d6b24aa56/cabin-air-quality.pdf.
26 Michael Laris, “ Scientists Know Ways T o Help Stop Viruses from Spreading on Airplanes. T hey’re too Late for This
Pandemic,” Washington Post, April 29, 2020, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/
scientists-think-they-know-ways-to-combat -viruses-on-airplanes-theyre-too-late-for-this-pandemic/2020/04/20/
83279318-76ab-11ea-87da-77a8136c1a6d_story.html; Karen Bull, “ Cabin Air Filtration: Helping to Protect Occupants
from Infectious Diseases,” Travel Medicine and Infectious Disease, 6(3), May 2008, pp. 142, 144.
27 Ibid.
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Procedures for Responding to Ill Travelers
CDC regulations require airlines to report onboard deaths and il nesses.28 CDC guidelines
stipulate that reportable conditions would include a fever of 100.4 degrees Fahrenheit or higher
and other specified symptoms of a communicable disease. In practice, this information would be
relayed to the CDC by FAA air traffic controllers or sometimes by airline operations center
dispatchers for domestic flights. Airlines already have wel established procedures that follow
CDC requirements and recommended practices for identifying, isolating, and documenting il
travelers.
The CDC maintains 20 quarantine stations throughout the country, including 16 located at major
international airports of entry. These serve as a primary means for identifying, isolating, and
tracking passengers with contagious diseases upon arrival at airports of entry.29 When il
passengers are identified, CDC can implement contact tracing protocols to identify and notify
other passengers who may have come in contact with the il individual. The CDC has the legal
authority to deny foreign visitors that are il entry into the United States, detain and quarantine
individuals that may have certain communicable diseases, including COVID-19, or order such
individuals to be hospitalized or to self-quarantine and isolate for a certain period of time.
However, detection, quarantine, and contact tracing practices have played a limited role in
fighting the spread of COVID-19 through international air travel mainly because the international
travel restrictions and advisories along with travelers’ reluctance to fly, especial y on long-haul
flights, have reduced international passenger traffic so significantly.
The CDC has also, at times, relied on public health do-not-board and lookout lists to identify
passengers with highly infectious diseases that should be denied aircraft boarding.30 The CDC
shares this information with the TSA, which incorporates these identities into its Secure Flight
system, the principal tool used to check airline passenger information for suspected terrorists and
other individuals that pose a threat to civil aviation. The CDC has used this approach to prevent
commercial travel by individuals known to be infected with tuberculosis and measles, but has not
used this as a screening tool during the current COVID-19 pandemic. The large numbers of
infections and new daily cases would pose significant chal enges to utilizing the public health do-
not-board list or a similar tool to prevent COVID-19 transmission through airline travel.
Moreover, such a tool may only be partial y effective if individuals who are asymptomatic or
mildly symptomatic but undiagnosed can transmit the disease.
There has been considerable policy discussion surrounding pre-board enhanced health screenings,
including asking questions about common COVID-19 symptoms and conducting temperature
checks. CDC recommends temperature checks and health assessments for certain other situations,
for example, prior to admitting employees arriving for shift work at critical infrastructure
facilities, including transportation facilities such as airports and aircraft maintenance facilities.31
However, proposals to screen airline passengers have been more controversial, as questions

28 See 42 C.F.R. §§70.4, 70.11, 71.21.
29 See https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/quarantine-stations-us.html.
30 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Federal Air T ravel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes—United
States, June 2007-May 2008,” Mortality and Morbidity Weekly Report, September 19, 2008, 57(37), pp. 1009-1012, at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5737a1.htm.
31 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Implementing Safety Practices for Critical Infrastructure Workers Who
May Have Had Exposure to a Person with Suspected or Confirm ed COVID-19, Interim Guidance, Updated April 20,
2020, at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/critical-workers/implementing-safety-practices.html.
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remain over who would conduct the screening and how effective the measures would be at
detecting il travelers and preventing the spread of COVID-19.
Airlines have advocated for temperature checks and have suggested that TSA would be best
equipped and staffed to carry out pre-board screening measures.32 However, on May 15, 2020,
House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Bennie Thompson issued a statement
questioning TSA’s authority to perform temperature checks of passengers as wel as raising
questions about the additional health and safety risks to frontline TSA screeners if they were
required to perform these checks.33 Nonetheless, airlines have continued to push for temperature
checks at screening checkpoints, arguing that TSA is in the best position to ensure that procedures
are standardized and consistent across airports, and vowing to refund tickets if passengers are
turned away because of an elevated temperature.34
Sanitation and Decontamination of Aircraft
Airlines have stepped up cleaning and disinfection of aircraft between flights and overnight. The
HEROES Act (H.R. 6800) would require that aircraft cabins and cockpits be cleaned, disinfected,
and sanitized after each flight in accordance with CDC guidance. Thorough disinfection of
aircraft interiors between flights, however, could run counter to airline scheduling strategies of
minimizing the time aircraft spend at the gate. Thorough cleaning and disinfecting is also more
labor intensive than routine cleaning and requires airlines to hire or contract larger numbers of
cleaning personnel, who must be trained in properly sanitizing and disinfecting aircraft cabins.
For these reasons, some airlines have reportedly started to scale-back back cleaning. For example,
it was reported in August 2020 that Southwest Airlines had stopped wiping down arm rests, seat
belts, and seats between each flight while continuing to disinfect tray tables and lavatories before
new passengers board.35 Southwest indicates that its practices remain compliant with CDC
guidance.36
TSA Screening Checkpoints
The CARES Act provided TSA $100 mil ion in additional operational funds to pay for stepped up
cleaning and sanitization at checkpoint and in other airport common areas. TSA has stepped up
cleaning and disinfecting of checkpoints focusing on high-touch areas and objects such as the
plastic bins used to load personal items for security inspection. TSA now instructs passengers to
store smal personal items such as wal ets, keys, and cel phones inside carry-on bags rather than
placing them loose in the plastic bins. TSA has also eased its restrictions on liquids and gels,

32 Airlines for America, “ Major U.S. Airlines Pledge to Refund T ickets for Passengers Who Are Denied Access if
Federal Authorities Begin Checking T emperatures at Airports,” June 25, 2020, at https://www.airlines.org/news/major-
u-s-airlines-pledge-to-refund-tickets-for-passengers-who-are-denied-access-if-federal-authorities-begin-checking-
temperatures-at-airports/
33 Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, “T hompson Statement on Reports T SA to Check
Passenger T emperatures,” May 15, 2020, at https://homeland.house.gov/news/press-releases/thompson-statement-on-
reports-tsa-to-check-passenger-temperatures.
34 Airlines for America, “ Major U.S. Airlines Pledge to Refund T ickets for Passengers Who Are Denied Access if
Federal Authorities Begin Checking T emperatures at Airports,” June 25, 2020, at https://www.airlines.org/news/major-
u-s-airlines-pledge-to-refund-tickets-for-passengers-who-are-denied-access-if-federal-authorities-begin-checking-
temperatures-at-airports/.
35 Mary Schlangenstein, “Southwest Pulls Back on Jet Cleanup to Save T ime Between Flights,” Bloomberg Business,
August 3, 2020, at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-03/southwest -air-pulls-back-on-jet-cabin-
cleaning-between-flights.
36 See https://www.southwest.com/Coronavirus/.
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al owing passengers to bring up to 12 ounces of liquid hand sanitizer through screening
checkpoints.
At airport security checkpoints, TSA screeners are required to wear masks, but passengers are
not. Passengers may voluntarily wear masks, but could be asked to briefly remove them in order
for document checkers to visual y match them to their identification. TSA has erected barrier
shields to separate document checkers from travelers and has made procedural changes to
minimize contact between document checkers and the public by having travelers scan their own
documents.
While social distancing cues, such as markers on the floor, have been instal ed at some airports to
promote social distancing in security lines, long term solutions to reconfigure security checkpoint
queuing areas may be needed. Adding additional space for social distancing could greatly
exacerbate existing problems regarding space al ocation for screening checkpoints and queues.
Airport Infrastructure Improvements
On June 4, 2020, President Trump signed an executive order37 that, among other things, directed
the Department of Transportation to expedite the delivery of transportation infrastructure projects,
including airport infrastructure projects. On July 6, 2020, DOT announced airport safety and
infrastructure grant awards totaling almost $800 mil ion, including roughly $690 mil ion in
Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grants and an additional $104 mil ion in CARES Act grants
that boost federal contributions to 100% of project costs eliminating the caps on federal shares for
FY2020 projects.38 On July 28, 2020 an additional $242 mil ion in AIP grants and $31 mil ion in
CARES Act funds were awarded.39
These funds are intended primarily for infrastructure projects that wil improve the safety and
efficiency of flight operations. However, the pandemic has created new infrastructure needs,
mostly inside airport terminals. For example design changes may be needed at ticketing areas,
security checkpoints, waiting areas, restrooms, and inter- and intra-terminal transportation
systems to better accommodate social distancing and facilitate more frequent cleaning and
disinfecting of high-traffic areas.
Such design changes may need to identify and focus on remediation of key areas of potential
disease transmission. In restrooms, for example, modifications could include expanded use of
touchless plumbing fixtures, entryways without doors, and other modifications that would limit
user contact with fomites, the surfaces and objects where viruses may linger. A more chal enging
proposition would be to increase the number of restrooms, or create partitions to close portions of
restrooms on a rolling basis to al ow for more thorough cleaning and disinfecting throughout the
day. Similar approaches may be conceived to cordon off waiting areas for cleaning and
disinfection, but this poses chal enges at busy airports where seating is limited and gate down
time is minimal.

37 Executive Order 13927, “Accelerating the Nation’s Economic Recovery From the COVID-19 Emergency by
Expediting Infrastructure Investments and Other Activities,” 85 Federal Register 35165-35170, June 4, 2020.
38 U.S. Department of T ransportation, U.S. Transportation Secretary Elaine L. Chao Announces Nearly $800 Million in
Grants to 347 Airports in 46 States and 4 Territories, July 6, 2020, at https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/us-
transportation-secretary-elaine-l-chao-announces-nearly-800-million-grants-347.
39 U.S. Department of T ransportation, U.S. Transportation Secretary Elaine L. Chao Announces Over $273 Million in
Grants to 184 Airports in 41 States, 6 Territories, July 28, 2020, at https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/us-
transportation-secretary-elaine-l-chao-announces-over-273-million-grants-184.
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Historical y, the federal role in airport terminal projects has been limited mainly to al owing
publicly owned airports to fund terminal improvements with tax-favored municipal bonds.
Terminal infrastructure needs were addressed in the context of aviation security following the
9/11 terrorist attacks. Notably, the Aviation Security Capital Fund was established in 2004 and
provides $250 mil ion annual y to airports for security-related infrastructure improvements such
as the instal ation of in-line baggage screening conveyors and equipment.40 A similar approach to
provide long-term federal funding for airport improvements intended to mitigate contagious
disease transmission has not been included in formal legislative proposals offered thus far.
FAA Air Traffic Facilities
Controllers and other personnel at many air traffic facilities have become infected with the novel
coronavirus, potential y leaving some facilities with less than their normal staffing at certain
times. At the same time, however, a significant reduction in the number of flights has lessened the
demand for air traffic control services.
In April 2020, FAA shortened the operating hours at about 100 air traffic control towers in
response to the significant reduction in flights during evening and nighttime hours. On July 6,
2020, FAA published a safety alert providing instructions for pilots conducting operations at
airports where the tower may be closed or in airspace that is uncontrolled due to staffing
shortages or unplanned facility shutdowns due to COVID-19.41
The alert largely builds upon existing regulations and procedures for operating in uncontrolled
airspace and at airports without an operating control tower. Operators are advised to ensure that
the aircraft’s traffic alerting and collision avoidance systems are in working order and pilots are
instructed to review procedures in the event that they are unable to visual y identify the runway or
land due to poor weather or other factors. In some cases, certain minimum descent altitudes and
more precise approach procedures that require air traffic control weather reporting and flight
monitoring may not be available, slightly increasing the chances that a flight may be unable to
land at its intended destination in poor weather. Similarly, some high density operations, such as
closely spaced approaches to paral el runways, are not authorized when those operations are not
monitored by air traffic control raising the possibility of flight delays during busy periods at FAA
facilities significantly impacted by COVID-19.
Economic Relief for Airlines
The CARES Act made up to $25 bil ion available in the form of loans to industries related to
passenger air travel and an additional $4 bil ion to cargo airlines. The Secretary of the Treasury
may require that borrowers issue the government warrants or non-voting shares of company stock
in return for the federal assistance. In addition, the law provided up to $32 bil ion to airlines that
agree not to reduce employees’ wages and benefits and not to involuntarily furlough or terminate
workers through September 30, 2020. The act also stipulated that airlines must maintain a certain

40 See 49 U.S.C. §44923.
41 Federal Aviation Administration, Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO): Continuation of Air Carrier and Other
Operations in Term inal Airspace when an Air Traffic Control (ATC) Facility with Responsibility for That Controlled
Airspace Closes Unexpectedly, SAFO 20012, July 6, 2020, at https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/
airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/all_safos/media/2020/SAFO20012.pdf.
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level of service to airports where scheduled service existed prior to the pandemic, preventing
airlines from completely eliminating service, particularly to smal er communities.42
The CARES Act also suspended payments of passenger ticket taxes, cargo waybil fees, and
airline fuel taxes through the end of calendar year 2020. These taxes and fees fund the Airport and
Airway Trust Fund (AATF) which pays for civil aviation programs including federal grants for
airport projects, FAA facilities and equipment, and part of FAA’s budget for air traffic operations.
The AATF had a cash balance of roughly $18 bil ion at the beginning of the COVID-19
pandemic.43 However, annual revenues that have ranged between roughly $14 bil ion and $16
bil ion in recent years wil largely be forgone in calendar year 2020 due to a combination of
reduced passenger travel and the temporary suspension of aviation taxes and fees.
Despite the economic relief measures implemented under the CARES Act, the airline industry
anticipates that the economic impacts of the COVID-19 public health crisis wil last for several
years. Airlines for America, a trade organization representing several major U.S. air carriers,
expects that passenger volumes may not return to 2019 levels until 2023.
Changes to Airline Fleets
With passenger demand significantly reduced, available airline seat capacity has continued to
exceed demand despite the temporary grounding or retirement of many aircraft. In mid-May
2020, about 52% of the U.S. air carrier fleet, or over 3,100 planes, had been idled, compared to
only about 5% of the fleet at the end of February 2020.44 By the end of July 2020, the number of
idle aircraft had been reduced somewhat as passenger volumes increased, but about 1 in every 3
aircraft in the U.S. air carrier fleet stil remained idle. On average, passenger flights were less
than half full throughout June and July 2020. During the same period in 2019, close to 90% of
available seats were fil ed.
Moreover, the fleet impact of COVID-19 has been quite uneven. Use of large aircraft that fly
mostly on long-haul international routes has been significantly curtailed as a result of
international flight restrictions. In some cases, smal er aircraft operating short-haul flights, often
operated by regional partners of major airlines, have been idled as passengers have opted to drive
instead of fly, leading carriers to cancel flights.
Many airlines have opted to accelerate the complete retirement of older, less efficient aircraft, and
in some cases to streamline fleets by reducing the numbers of different aircraft types. American
Airlines announced that it is retiring about 80 aircraft, including al its Airbus A330-300s, Boeing
757s and Boeing 767s, as wel as its Embraer E190 and Bombardier CRJ200 regional jets.45 Delta
Airlines accelerated its planned retirement of the McDonnel Douglas MD88 and MD90 aircraft
and has also retired its fleet of 18 Boeing 777 widebody jets, accelerating plans to simplify and
modernize its widebody fleet.46 Whereas Delta is shifting toward greater reliance on Airbus

42 For additional details see CRS Report R46329, Treasury and Federal Reserve Financial Assistance in Title IV of the
CARES Act (P.L. 116-136), coordinated by Andrew P. Scott .
43 See Federal Aviation Administration, Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF) Fact Sheet, at https://www.faa.gov/
about/budget/aatf/media/AAT F_Fact_Sheet.pdf.
44 Airlines for America, Tracking the Impacts of COVID-19, at https://www.airlines.org/dataset/impact-of-covid19-
data-updates/#.
45 American Airlines, “A Fond Farewell to Five Fantastic Fleets,” April 30, 2020, at http://news.aa.com/news/news-
details/2020/A-fond-farewell-to-five-fantastic-fleets-FLT-04/default.aspx.
46 Delta Airlines, “ Delta’s 777 aircraft to retire by end of 2020, simplifying widebody fleet amid COVID-19,” May 14,
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aircraft, Alaska Airlines announced plans to retire its Airbus A320 fleet in order to accelerate
plans to return to a mainline fleet comprised of Boeing 737s.47 In addition, a large number of 50-
seat regional jets, mostly operated by regional partners to the major airlines, wil be phased out in
the coming months.48
Airlines have also cancel ed or deferred orders for new aircraft in the expectation that it may take
several years for passenger traffic to return to pre-pandemic levels. This has been particularly
significant for the Boeing Company; Boeing has a considerable order book for its 737 MAX,
which has remained grounded pending an FAA certification review following deadly crashes in
2018 and 2019, but many airlines have now cancel ed or reduced their orders for the aircraft or
sought to defer deliveries.49 Without orders in the pipeline, manufacturers are slowing
production.50 Moreover, airlines and aircraft leasing companies may face future chal enges raising
capital to acquire jets to meet a potential rise in air traffic demand once the pandemic abates.
Aviation Workforce Challenges
Safety-Critical Airline Jobs
The reduction in the number of flights and shrinkage of airline fleets are likely to have
considerable impacts on the aviation workforce. Many safety-critical aviation workers, including
pilots and flight attendants, must be qualified to operate specific aircraft types, and aircraft
mechanics and technicians are trained to service particular aircraft, engines, or electronic systems.
Not only are airlines likely to need fewer workers over the next few years, but they wil need to
align the skil s and qualifications of their workforces with the changing composition of their
fleets.
Labor agreements in the airline industry pose a considerable chal enge to carrying out orderly
changes in fleet composition and workforce staffing because they are built on principles of
seniority. The most senior airline captains typical y fly the largest aircraft, which are most
frequently used on transatlantic and transpacific flights. International travel restrictions imposed
in response to the pandemic have significantly curtailed these flights in particular. Under most
labor agreements, captains no longer needed to fly these routes because of reduced demand could
displace captains flying domestic routes, who might, in turn, displace first officers. This shuffling
of pilots is likely to trigger significant training needs to ensure that pilots meet FAA requirements
to operate the aircraft they are assigned to. Similar shuffling based on seniority wil create the
need to retrain flight attendants as wel . Early retirements, furloughs, and layoffs would likely add
to these training needs at airlines as personnel are reassigned to different aircraft to fil vacancies
and adjust to fleet changes.

2020, at https://news.delta.com/deltas-777-aircraft-retire-end-2020-simplifying-widebody-fleet-amid-covid-19.
47 Edward Russell, “U.S. Airlines May Have to Retire 1,000 Jets. T hese Are the Ones that Could End Up in the
Boneyard,” The Points Guy, June 5, 2020, at https://thepointsguy.com/news/us-airlines-fleet-retirements-cowen-
analyst/.
48 Ibid.
49 Dominic Gates, “Boeing Has Lost More T han 800 Orders for the 737 MAX T his Year,” Seattle Times, July 14, 2020,
at https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-has-lost-more-than-800-orders-for-the-737-max-
this-year/.
50 Peggy Hollinger, “How Coronavirus Brought Aerospace Down to Earth,” Financial Times, April 20, 2020, at
https://www.ft.com/content/3fe8a876-7d7c-11ea-8fdb-7ec06edeef84.
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In addition, both pilots and flight attendants must maintain currency and proficiency as a
condition of operating revenue flights. This is typical y accomplished through recurrent training
and observation flights conducted in simulators or onboard aircraft. FAA has temporarily waived
some of these training and currency requirements during the COVID-19 pandemic. Many of those
blanket waivers for air carriers were initial y set to expire at the end of May 2020, but have been
extended multiple times. Most of the waivers are now set to expire in October and November
2020. Further extending them could raise flight safety concerns.
Significant airline furloughs and layoffs may occur in the fal of 2020, when airlines’ obligations
under the CARES Act to maintain employment end. In July 2020, United Airlines sent notices
mandated under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act of 1988 (P.L.
100-379) to about 36,000 employees, including 2,250 pilots and 15,000 flight attendants, warning
of potential furloughs in October 2020. It has been reported that Delta similarly has given
advance notice of potential furloughs to about 2,500 pilots.51 Delta is also negotiating terms for
voluntary early retirements but anticipates there wil not be enough retirements to achieve its
workforce-reduction goals. The HEROES Act (H.R. 6800) would extend CARES Act job
protections until the payroll support funds accepted by the respective airlines are completely
exhausted.
Large-scale furloughs and layoffs could pose an obstacle to increasing service should demand for
air travel increase faster than airlines anticipate. Employees furloughed for extended periods
could see their currency and proficiency requirements expire and might need to be retrained after
recal before they could work aboard revenue flights.
Implications for the Future Aviation Workforce
The airline industry was concerned about maintaining an adequate supply of pilots, aircraft
mechanics, and technicians before the COVID-19 pandemic.52 While the reduction in flights has
eliminated immediate concerns about labor shortage, in the long term the pandemic could
undermine airlines’ ability to attract highly skil ed workers. This is particularly an issue with
respect to pilots, who frequently must make substantial personal investments to obtain the
training and flight hours necessary to be hired by a commercial air carrier.
Airlines had also projected future shortages of mechanics prior to the COVID-19 pandemic,
suggesting that industry practices of outsourcing heavy aircraft maintenance to overseas facilities
could further expand if the supply of certified aircraft mechanics in the United States dwindles.
The aviation maintenance field has faced continuing recruitment and retention chal enges because
the technical skil s required are readily transferrable to other industries providing higher wages
and better working conditions. Furloughs and layoffs attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic
could make aviation maintenance work a less attractive alternative for younger workers.
Security Screener Staffing
The pandemic could also significantly impact TSA’s ability to attract and retain screening
personnel. Even before the pandemic, TSA struggled with high attrition rates among its

51 Alison Sider, “ Delta Warns Pilots of Possible Furloughs,” Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2020, at
https://www.wsj.com/articles/delta-warns-pilots-of-possible-furloughs-11593226550.
52 Brianne Eby and Paul Lewis, Aviation Workforce Challenges in the United States and the United Kingdom, March
2019, Eno Center for T ransportation, at https://www.enotrans.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/3.26-US-UK-Aviation-
Workforce_final.pdf.
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screeners.53 Concerns about workplace safety and possible COVID-19 exposure at work along
with enduring uncertainty about job security due to decreased travel demand could influence
future attrition rates.
Like the airlines, TSA may face considerable training chal enges if it furloughs or lays off large
numbers of screeners and later recal s them or has to replace them with new hires as travel
demand picks back up. For TSA, the prospect that individuals wil not return as screeners once let
go appears greater than for other aviation sector jobs because screener pay is comparatively
lower. The DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) found in 2019 that TSA pay at some airports
was as much as 31% below local per capita income and that workers at nearby retail stores and
sandwich shops earned as much as or more than entry-level screeners.54 Of screeners who left
TSA during FY2017, the DHS OIG found, about 24% were employed for less than six months.
The cost of hiring and training those screeners who spent less than six months working for TSA
was about $16 mil ion.
In July 2020, TSA announced voluntary early retirement offers available to certain eligible
employees. However, this approach might have limited impact on the TSA screener workforce.55
For one, individuals must have at least 20 years of federal service to qualify, but TSA has existed
for only 18 years, so only individuals who have held other federal positions qualify. Additional y,
the offers would not be available to screeners at certain airports where TSA provides retention
incentives to curb attrition. Final y, the early retirements reportedly would not include any
separation incentives. It remains unclear whether the early retirement offer wil be sufficient to
bring the size of TSA’s screener workforce into line with air travel demand. TSA has not
announced additional plans for reducing its screener workforce.

Author Information

Bart Elias

Specialist in Aviation Policy

53 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Testimony of Acting Inspector General John V. Kelly
Before the Subcom m ittee on Transportation and Maritim e Security, Com m ittee on Hom eland Security, U.S. House of
Representatives, “The TSA Workforce Crisis: A Homeland Security Risk, May 21, 2019, at https://homeland.house.gov/
download/testimony-john-kelly.
54 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, TSA Needs to Improve Efforts to Retain, Hire, and
Train Its Transportation Security Officers, OIG-19-35, March 28, 2019, at https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
assets/2019-04/OIG-19-35-Mar19.pdf.
55 Eric Katz, “DHS Staffing Shakeups Continue Amid Early Retirement and Reassignment Offers,” Government
Executive, July 8, 2020, at https://www.govexec.com/pay-benefits/2020/07/dhs-staffing-shakeups-continue-amid-early-
retirement -and-reassignment-offers/166737/.
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Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
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copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
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