COVID-19: Department of Justice Enforcement Against Scams

COVID-19: Department of Justice Enforcement Against Scams

COVID-19: Department of Justice Enforcement July 20, 2020
Against Scams
Kristin Finklea
Criminals and other malicious actors often seek to capitalize on world events for their gain.
Specialist in Domestic
Currently, some are leveraging the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and relying
Security
on heightened public interest in it to take advantage of individuals and organizations. These

schemes range from criminals claiming to be from a charitable organization or government
agency and tricking individuals into providing money or personally identifiable information (PII)

to fraudsters selling bogus or counterfeit treatments for COVID-19 or protective equipment and
medical devices, that may or may not be delivered after victims submit payment. Further, scammers have tried to use stolen
PII to gain access to and steal unemployment benefits and economic impact payments provided pursuant to the Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act; P.L. 116-136).
On March 16, 2020, Attorney General William Barr issued a memorandum to U.S. Attorney’s Offices regarding the
Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) COVID-19 related enforcement priorities. The memorandum stated that “[e]very U.S.
Attorney’s Office is thus hereby directed to prioritize the detection, investigation, and prosecution of all criminal conduct
related to the current pandemic.” With the proliferation of COVID-19-related scams, federal law enforcement has established
several specific mechanisms to coordinate efforts. For instance, the Attorney General requested that each U.S. Attorney’s
Office establish a Coronavirus Coordinator to serve as a legal counsel for the federal judicial district on COVID-19-related
matters, prosecute or aid in the prosecution of COVID-19-related cases, and conduct public awareness and outreach activities
regarding COVID-19 issues. Investigative agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also lead and
participate in task forces and working groups specifically targeting COVID-19-related scams.
DOJ has also conducted outreach to federal agencies charged with administering funding related to the CARES Act to help
prevent and detect scams. In addition, DOJ has directed the public to report potential COVID-19 scams to the National
Center for Disaster Fraud (NCDF), and the FBI points potential victims to several reporting systems, including the NCDF
and the Internet Crime Complaint Center, and to reporting directly to the FBI through its tip line or local field offices.
In addition to establishing new efforts to counter COVID-19-related fraud, DOJ can leverage its existing tools to target
scammers. Officials have noted that this fraud is often cyber enabled. Federal law enforcement has the principal role in
investigating and attributing cyber incidents to specific perpetrators, and this responsibility has been established within the
broader framework of federal cyber incident response. DOJ leads these efforts through the FBI and the National Cyber
Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF). However, federal agencies involved in countering cyber threats and those related to
COVID-19 are not limited to agencies within DOJ. Other federal law enforcement, such as the U.S. Secret Service,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations, and Customs and Border Protection have been
working to investigate COVID-19 related scams, and entities such as the Federal Trade Commission, Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency, and the Department of the Treasury and the Department of Health and Human Services,
among others, have been promoting public awareness about prominent scams.
Efforts from DOJ and other entities to counter COVID-19-related fraud involve both prevention (e.g., awareness campaigns)
and response (e.g., investigations) activities. As policymakers examine the federal government’s efforts to stop these scams,
they may question the potential effects of agencies’ investments in prevention activities and law enforcement response on
reducing the prevalence and impacts of pandemic-related fraud. Relatedly, they may look to how the agencies themselves are
evaluating the effects of the resources they have placed toward countering these scams.
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Contents
COVID-19 Scams ........................................................................................................... 2
Scamming Victims Out of Money Directly .................................................................... 2
Leveraging Stolen Personal Information........................................................................ 3
Department of Justice Response ........................................................................................ 5
DOJ’s Role in Countering Cybercrime .......................................................................... 6
FBI Cyber Investigations ....................................................................................... 7
A Broad Federal Response................................................................................................ 9

Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 10

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COVID-19: Department of Justice Enforcement Against Scams

riminals and other malicious actors often seek to capitalize on world events for their gain.
Some criminals are leveraging heightened interest in the Coronavirus Disease 2019
C (COVID-19) pandemic to take advantage of individuals and organizations.1 Officials have
cautioned about a host of scams and other criminal activity relating to the pandemic. These range
from criminals claiming to be from a charitable organization or government agency and tricking
individuals into providing money or personal y identifiable information (PII) to fraudsters sel ing
bogus or counterfeit treatments for COVID-19 or personal protective equipment (PPE) and
medical devices that may or may not be delivered after victims submit payment.2 The Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) noted that “as of May 28, 2020, the Internet Crime Complaint
Center (IC3) received nearly the same amount of complaints in 2020 (about 320,000) as they had
for the entirety of 2019 (about 400,000). Approximately 75% of these complaints are frauds and
swindles.”3 In addition, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) received more than 134,100
complaints (approximately 69,600 of which were specific to fraud) related to the COVID-19
pandemic, including the loss of over $87 mil ion to fraud, in the first six and a half months of
2020.4
On March 16, 2020, Attorney General Wil iam Barr issued a memorandum to U.S. Attorney’s
Offices regarding the Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) COVID-19-related enforcement priorities.
The memorandum stated that “[e]very U.S. Attorney’s Office is thus hereby directed to prioritize
the detection, investigation, and prosecution of al criminal conduct related to the current
pandemic.”5 Less than one week later, DOJ announced its first enforcement action against
COVID-19 fraudsters. In doing so, the department al eged that the website
“coronavirusmedicalkit.com” was claiming to provide consumers with access to World Health
Organization (WHO) coronavirus vaccine kits if they provided their credit card information to
pay for shipping.6
This report provides a brief overview of the types of scams criminals may use to steal money and
PII from individuals and businesses. The report also discusses federal law enforcement’s role—
specifical y, DOJ’s role—in investigating and prosecuting these scams. Congress, in examining
DOJ’s priorities going forward, may look to the resources DOJ has placed toward countering
fraud more broadly, and toward specific nefarious activity capitalizing on the COVID-19
pandemic.

1 See, for example, Department of Justice (DOJ), Combatting COVID-19 Fraud, at https://www.justice.gov/
coronavirus/combattingfraud. For more information on COVID-19, see the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
Coronavirus (COVID-19), at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.html.
2 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Internet Crime Complaint Center, FBI Sees Rise in Fraud Schemes Related to
the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandem ic, Alert Number I-032020-PSA, March 20, 2020.
3 FBI testimony before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, COVID-19 Fraud: Law Enforcement’s
Response to Those Exploiting the Pandem ic, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., June 9, 2020.
4 Federal T rade Commission (FT C), FTC COVID-19 and Stimulus Reports, January 1, 2020 – July 16, 2020, accessed
July 19, 2020.
5 Department of Justice (DOJ), Memorandum for All United States Attorneys: COVID-19-Department of Justice
Priorities, March 16, 2020.
6 Department of Justice (DOJ), “Federal Court Issues T emporary Restraining Order Against Website Offering
Fraudulent Coronavirus Vaccine,” press release, March 22, 2020. Notably, there are currently no approved vaccines to
protect against COVID-19.
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COVID-19 Scams
General y, fraud is a profit-driven crime. Fraudsters may attempt to scam victims—individuals
and organizations, including government programs—out of money directly or steal victims’
personal information to profit in other ways. COVID-19-related fraud is no different.7 While this
section presents examples of COVID-19-related scams, it is not meant to be representative of the
full spectrum of scams and tools criminals are utilizing to take advantage of the pandemic.
Scamming Victims Out of Money Directly
Fraudsters have used a number of scams to prey on public interest in the COVID-19 pandemic.
People seek up-to-date information about the disease, attempt to purchase PPE such as masks,
want to learn about or purchase preventive treatments or potential cures, and try to support front
line workers and charities that deliver much-needed resources. The following are examples of
how fraudsters take advantage of the pandemic.
 Swindlers have tried to sel counterfeit drugs and medical equipment or have
pretended to sel PPE such as masks that are never delivered, scamming buyers
out of money and potential y endangering lives. For example, DOJ arrested two
individuals who tried to scam victims out of more than $4 mil ion by falsely
representing the legitimacy of their company and purporting to sel boxes of PPE;
the boxes were empty, and law enforcement disrupted the scheme before victims
lost their money.8
 DOJ filed a civil forfeiture complaint against several PayPal accounts associated
with fraudulent websites. These websites were run by individuals in China
purporting to sel masks; some victims never received anything, and others
received alternate, nonmedical items such as toys or jewelry.9
 Law enforcement and consumer protection agencies have warned against
scammers masquerading as charitable organizations addressing the pandemic.10
The FBI has reported that “law enforcement has seen an increase in social media
scams and telephone cal s fraudulently seeking donations for il egitimate or non-
existent charitable organizations requesting victims’ bank account information.”11
The FBI has also worked with private sector internet domain providers and
registrars to disrupt fraudsters, including taking down malicious websites such as
one pretending to collect donations for American Red Cross COVID-19 relief
efforts.12

7 T he Department of Justice is also countering price gouging and hoarding of goods related to the pandemic, but these
are beyond the scope of this report.
8 Department of Justice (DOJ), “T wo Individuals Arrested for Conspiring to Defraud Purported Purchasers of Personal
Protective Equipment,” press release, April 27, 2020.
9 Department of Justice (DOJ), “U.S. Files Civil Forfeiture Complaint in COVID-19 Fraud Case,” press release, June
10, 2020.
10 See, for example, Federal T rade Commission (FT C), Make Your Coronavirus Donations Count, May 5, 2020.
11 Department of Justice (DOJ), Coronavirus Response: Combatting COVID-19 Fraud, at https://www.justice.gov/
coronavirus/combattingfraud.
12 Department of Justice (DOJ), “Department of Justice Announces Disruption of Hundreds of Online COVID-19
Related Scams,” press release, April 22, 2020.
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Leveraging Stolen Personal Information
Criminals who steal victims’ PII can use it to gain access to victims’ existing accounts or establish
new accounts that can be used for profit. For instance, scammers have tried to use stolen PII to
redirect unemployment benefits and economic impact payments (EIP) provided pursuant to the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act; P.L. 116-136). The Identity
Theft Resource Center (ITRC) reports an uptick in queries related to COVID-19 fraud and that
traffic to the center was 850% higher in March 2020 than in March 2019.13 Fraudsters may use a
number of tactics, including phone cal s or email phishing14 schemes in which they pretend to be
a representative of a legitimate organization, to try and steal PII that they can then leverage to
their advantage. The following are examples of how fraudsters have used interest in the pandemic
to steal PII.
 Hackers have preyed upon public interest in mapping the spread of COVID-19.
In one scheme, they sold a malware15 infection kit to fraudsters who used an
interactive map of COVID-19 cases produced by Johns Hopkins University to
infect computers with malware. This malware was designed to steal passwords
such that when unsuspecting users clicked on the map for information, their
devices would become infected.16 It is believed that hackers used the AZORult
malware, “one of the most commonly bought and sold stealers in Russian
[cybercrime] forums.”17
 Thieves have used stolen PII to set up fraudulent accounts on the IRS website,
and those who previously stole victims’ PII and filed taxes using a stolen identity
may also be able to receive the EIPs al ocated to those individuals as part of the
CARES Act.18
 DOJ has indicted individuals for attempting to defraud the government by filing
false loan applications in attempts to receive forgivable Paycheck Protection
Program (PPP) loans pursuant to the CARES Act. Some tried to swindle the
government out of mil ions of dollars in loan money by falsifying business
information.19

13 Identity T heft Resource Center (IT RC), COVID-19 Resources, at https://www.idtheftcenter.org/covid-19-resources/.
T he IT RC is a nonprofit resource center focused primarily on supporting identity theft victims in the United States. See
also Nathaniel Popper, “‘Pure Hell for Victims’ as Stimulus Programs Draw a Flood of Scammers, ” The New York
Tim es, April 24, 2020.
14 Phishing is “an attempt by an individual or group to solicit personal information from unsuspecting users by
employing social engineering techniques.” See U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, at https://us-
cert.cisa.gov/report -phishing.
15 T he term malware refers to “ A program that is inserted into a system, usually covertly, with the intent of
compromising the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the victim’s data, applications, or operating system or of
otherwise annoying or disrupting the victim.” National Institute of Standards and T echnology (NIST ), “ Malware,”
Computer Security Resources Center Glossary.
16 “Live Coronavirus Map Used to Spread Malware,” Krebs On Security, March 12, 2020.
17 Alexander Eremin, Kaspersky, AZORult++: Rewriting History, March 22, 2019.
18 Nathaniel Popper, “ ‘Pure Hell for Victims’ as Stimulus Programs Draw a Flood of Scammers,” The New York Times,
April 24, 2020. T he IRS has issued warnings to taxpayers cautioning about potential fraud. See, for example, Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), “ IRS Issues Warning about Coronavirus-Related Scams; Watch Out for Schemes T ied to
Economic Impact Payments,” press release, April 2, 2020.
19 See, for example, Department of Justice (DOJ), “Massachusetts Man Charged with COVID-Relief Fraud,” press
release, June 22, 2020.
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 Fraudsters have taken advantage of the surge in unemployment claims and have
used stolen PII to receive unemployment benefits. For example, the Secret
Service issued an alert noting that a “wel -organized Nigerian crime ring is
exploiting the COVID-19 crisis by committing large-scale fraud against multiple
state unemployment insurance programs, with potential losses in the hundreds of
mil ions of dollars.”20 These criminals are reportedly using stolen PII to apply for
state unemployment benefits and then relying on money mules, intermediaries
often recruited through online romance scams, to receive the il icit money and
forward it to them.21
 Law enforcement has received reports of scammers offering COVID-19 testing
services in order to get Medicare beneficiary information, which they can then
use to submit fraudulent medical claims for reimbursement—related or unrelated
to COVID-19.22
While the pandemic may have presented new opportunities for criminals to leverage, fraudsters
stil rely upon a number of tried-and-true tools to scam victims or gain access to information,
accounts, and resources. For instance, they continue to make robocal s, phish for information
through emails and social media, instal malware on unsuspecting users’ devices, and exploit
technology vulnerabilities. These scams general y seem to have a cyber component in that they
are carried out or facilitated by the internet and evolving technology. In addition, criminals
leverage both the surface web and dark web to facilitate these schemes.
Fraudsters on the Dark Web23
The layers of the internet go far beyond the surface content that many can easily access in their typical searches.
The other content is that of the deep web, content that has not been indexed by traditional search engines such as
Google. The furthest corners of the deep web, segments known as the dark web, contain content that has been
intentional y concealed. The dark web may be used for legitimate purposes as wel as to conceal criminal or
otherwise malicious activities.
Fraudsters taking advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic have leveraged dark web marketplaces as an additional
venue through which to sel legal or il egal, legitimate or counterfeit, and plentiful or scarce products and
information. For instance, personal protective equipment such as N95 masks, gowns, and gloves have been found
for sale on these marketplaces. In addition, there are reports that unapproved preventive drugs or cures such as
the drug chloroquine24 have been listed on these marketplaces. Even blood al eged to have belonged to recovered
coronavirus patients was found for sale.25
However, it is unclear the extent to which scammers rely on the dark web instead of the surface web to sel
pandemic-related goods and services and to carry out scams. For instance, the sale of some goods on the dark
web may be limited by the “availability of similar goods on the surface web and the wider customer base not being
traditional dark web users.”26 Reduced product supply on the surface web, though, could correlate with
customers seeking these goods on the dark web.

20 “U.S. Secret Service: ‘Massive Fraud’ Against State Unemployment Insurance Programs,” Krebs On Security, May
16, 2020.
21 Ibid. See also Mike Baker, “Feds Suspect Vast Fraud Network Is T argeting U.S. Unemployment Systems,” The New
York Tim es, May 17, 2020.
22 Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Justice Enforcement Actions Related to COVID-19, March 24, 2020.
23 For more information on the dark web, see CRS Report R44101, Dark Web.
24 For more information about chloroquine and related drugs, see CRS Insight IN11347, Treatment of COVID-19:
Hydroxychloroquine and Chloroquine.
25 Sooraj Shah, “Dark web scammers exploit Covid-19 fear and doubt,” BBC News, May 19, 2020.
26 EUROPOL, Catching the Virus: Cybercrime, Disinformation and the COVID-19 Pandemic, April 3, 2020, p. 10.
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Department of Justice Response
With the proliferation of COVID-19 related scams, DOJ has established several specific
mechanisms to coordinate efforts to combat them. For instance, DOJ has directed the public to
report COVID-19-related scams to the National Center for Disaster Fraud (NCDF), within DOJ’s
Criminal Division. The NCDF’s mission is to “improve and further the detection, prevention,
investigation, and prosecution of fraud related to natural and man-made disasters, and to advocate
for the victims of such fraud.”27 The FBI points potential victims to several reporting systems,
including the NCDF and the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), and to reporting directly to
the bureau through its tip line or local FBI field offices.28 Federal law enforcement therefore has a
number of pathways to receive information about COVID-19-related scams. As Congress
examines federal law enforcement’s response to the pandemic, policymakers may look to these
different pathways to see if they are sufficient to ensure that the full spectrum of reports are being
received and that there are means to establish clear jurisdiction over particular crimes.
Reporting COVID-19 Scams
There is no central repository where individuals and organizations report complaints of fraud, COVID-19-related
or otherwise. However, there are a number of reporting systems for the public to report suspected incidents of
fraud, and those systems may share information to help law enforcement consolidate and deconflict public
complaints about such incidents, including those related to COVID-19. Examples of federal entities to which
victims may report include the fol owing.

National Center for Disaster Fraud (NCDF). The NCDF is a repository for the public to report
complaints of disaster-related fraud to DOJ.29 It was created in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and continues
to serve as a resource for reporting fraud related to natural and man-made disasters.

Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3). The IC3 is a mechanism for the public to report al types of
Internet-related crime to the FBI.30 Original y established as the Internet Fraud Complaint Center in 2000, it
was renamed in 2003 to reflect the nature of the internet- and cyber-related crimes reported to the center.
In addition to providing information to law enforcement, the IC3 also shares alerts with industry partners and
the public.

Consumer Sentinel. The FTC’s Consumer Sentinel is a mechanism for the public to report a range of
consumer complaints to the commission, which in turn shares these complaints with law enforcement.31 The
Sentinel network provides law enforcement with tips on complaints, including frauds involving consumer
product scams, credit and telemarketing scams, and identity theft.

FBI’s tip line. The FBI’s system accepts tips on potential terrorist activity and reports of federal crimes such
as fraud—including COVID-19-related fraud.32 However, cal ers are directed to report internet-based fraud
to the IC3. (In addition to the FBI, other federal, state, and local law enforcement entities have their own tip
lines where individuals can report scams.33)

27 Ibid. See also Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Justice Coronavirus Response, at
https://www.justice.gov/coronavirus/DOJresponse. T he NCDF, when appropriate, shares information with the FT C’s
Sentinel Database, which contains consumer complaints across a variety of categories (collecting complaints from at
least 35 databases across the country) and is available to law enforcement.
28 See https://www.fbi.gov/coronavirus.
29 For more information, see https://www.justice.gov/disaster-fraud.
30 For more information, see https://www.ic3.gov/about/default.aspx.
31 For more information, see https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/consumer-sentinel-network.
32 For more information, see https://www.fbi.gov/tips.
33 For example, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) directs the
public to report COVID-19 related fraud to a special DHS email tip line, COVID19FRAUD@DHS.gov, est ablished for
these types of reports.
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In addition to providing mechanisms for the public to report information about COVID-19-related
scams, DOJ has established several coordinated efforts to counter criminal activity associated
with the pandemic. For example,
 the Attorney General requested that each U.S. Attorney’s Office establish a
Coronavirus Coordinator to serve as a legal counsel for the federal judicial
district on COVID-19-related matters, prosecute or aid in the prosecution of
COVID-19-related cases, and conduct public awareness and outreach activities
regarding COVID-1934;
 the FBI has formed—along with DOJ’s Fraud Section and the Smal Business
Administration’s Inspector General—a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP)
Working Group to counter fraud against the program. The FBI reported that the
working group had identified over $42 mil ion in potential fraud and recovered
over $900,000 as of early June 202035; and
 DOJ’s Criminal Division has “engaged in outreach to agencies tasked with
implementing and overseeing CARES Act funds to design programs to detect and
deter fraudulent conduct in the first instance. They are also coordinating with
investigative agencies to identify key indicia of COVID-19/CARES Act related
fraud schemes and to make sure information about emerging patterns and
practices of fraudsters are shared across the relevant law enforcement
community.”36
In addition to establishing new efforts to counter COVID-19-related fraud, DOJ can leverage its
existing tools to target scammers. As officials have noted, fraud related to COVID-19 is often
cyber-enabled in some form37; the section below focuses on DOJ’s role in countering cybercrime,
including fraud.
DOJ’s Role in Countering Cybercrime
Federal law enforcement has the principal role in investigating and attributing cyber incidents to
specific perpetrators, and this responsibility has been established within the broader framework of
federal cyber incident response. In a 2016 Presidential Policy Directive, the Obama
Administration outlined how the government responds to significant cyber incidents—those that
are “likely to result in demonstrable harm to the national security interests, foreign relations, or
economy of the United States or to the public confidence, civil liberties, or public health and
safety of the American people.”38 Responding to cyber incidents involves (1) threat response, (2)
asset response, and (3) intel igence support. DOJ, through the FBI and National Cyber

34 Department of Justice (DOJ), Coordinated Nationwide Response to Detect, Deter, and Punish Crime Relating to the
National Em ergency Caused by COVID-19, March 19, 2020.
35 FBI testimony before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, COVID-19 Fraud: Law Enforcement’s
Response to Those Exploiting the Pandem ic, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., June 9, 2020.
36 DOJ testimony before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, COVID-19 Fraud: Law Enforcement’s
Response to Those Exploiting the Pandem ic, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., June 9, 2020.
37 See U.S. Secret Service testimony before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, COVID-19 Fraud:
Law Enforcement’s Response to Those Exploiting the Pandemic, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., June 9, 2020.
38 T he White House, Presidential Policy Directive—United States Cyber Incident Coordination, PPD-41, July 26,
2016. Of note, it is unclear whether any of the cyber incidents discussed in this CRS report may be considered a
“significant cyber incident.” Further, there have been no official indications that the T rump Administration has changed
this approach to cyber incident response.
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Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF), is the designated lead on threat response.39 Threat
response involves
conducting appropriate law enforcement and national security investigative activity at the
affected entity’s site; collecting evidence and gathering intelligence; providing attribution;
linking related incidents; identifying additional affected entities; identifying threat pursuit
and disruption opportunities; developing and executing courses of action to mitigate the
immediate threat; and facilitating information sharing and operational coordination with
asset response.40
Defining a Cyber Incident
A principal issue in understanding how the federal government responds to a cyber incident is the definition of a
cyber incident. A host of terms are used in discussing malicious activity with a cyber, online, or technological
component. These range from cyber attack and cyberwarfare to cybercrime, cyber espionage, and cyber
terrorism. A key distinction between these malicious incidents is the actor’s motivation. For instance, a criminal
may be profit motivated, while a terrorist may be political y motivated. However, “the speed and anonymity of
cyber attacks makes distinguishing among the actions of terrorists, criminals, and nation states difficult, a task
which often occurs only after the fact, if at al .”41
Cyber incident, therefore, is an umbrel a term encompassing a range of malicious activity carried out by diverse
actors with varying motivations and capabilities—al of whom exploit cyberspace.42 The federal government has
defined a cyber incident as “an event occurring on or conducted through a computer network that actual y or
imminently jeopardizes the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of computers, information or communications
systems or networks, physical or virtual infrastructure control ed by computers or information systems, or
information resident thereon.”43
As such, an incident could capture an array of activities carried out by malicious actors ranging from hacktivists
and criminals to nation states and terrorists. Notably, the federal government has not developed official def initions
for specific subsets of cyber incidents—such as cybercrime—that distinguish them from other subsets.44
FBI Cyber Investigations
The FBI pursues cybercrime cases ranging from computer hacking and intel ectual property rights
violations to child exploitation, fraud, and identity theft. Its top priorities involve combating

39 For more information on the FBI’s cyber investigations, see https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber/. Information on
the NCIJT F is available at https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber/national-cyber-investigative-joint-task-force. See also
CRS Report R44926, Justice Departm ent’s Role in Cyber Incident Response. T he Department of Homeland Security,
through the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, is the lead on asset response. T he Office
of the Director of National Intelligence, through the Cyber T hreat Intelligence Integration Center, is the lead on
intelligence support.
40 T he White House, Presidential Policy Directive—United States Cyber Incident Coordination, PPD-41, July 26,
2016.
41 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, February 2003, p. viii.
42 T he National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-54/HSPD-23)
defines cyberspace as “ the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, and includes the Internet,
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers in critical industries.” In
other words, cyberspace is the “ virtual environment of information and interactions between people. ” National Security
Agency, Statement for the Record, Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, Commander, Joint Functional Component
Command for Network Warfare, Before the House Armed Services Committee, T errorism, Unconventional T hreats,
and Capabilities Subcommittee, May 5, 2009.
43 T he White House, Presidential Policy Directive—United States Cyber Incident Coordination, PPD-41, July 26,
2016. T he PPD noted that this definition could include vulnerabilities in information systems, system security
procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could ultimately be exploited by a threat actor.
44 For a policy discussion on issues defining different types of cyber incidents (such as a definition of cybercrime), see
CRS Report R42547, Cybercrim e: Conceptual Issues for Congress and U.S. Law Enforcem ent.
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computer and network intrusions and investigating ransomware. The FBI’s cyber priorities focus
on “high-level intrusions by state-sponsored hackers, global organized crime syndicates, and
other technical y sophisticated and dangerous actors.”45 It is unclear which portion of COVID-19
related scams might fal under these priorities.
The FBI leads a variety of law enforcement task forces and partnerships focused on cyber threat
response.
 National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF). The NCIJTF was
established by National Security Presidential Directive-54/Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-23 in January 2008. As established, the NCIJTF’s mission
is to “serve as a multi-agency national focal point for coordinating, integrating,
and sharing pertinent information related to cyber threat investigations.”46 Led by
the FBI, the NCIJTF coordinates over 20 U.S. agencies including law
enforcement, intel igence, and the military. It also collaborates with the private
sector and international partners.
 Cyber Task Forces (CTFs). There is a CTF at each FBI field office. These CTFs
focus on local cybersecurity threats, respond to incidents, and maintain
relationships with companies and institutions. They also support the national
effort to combat cybercrime by participating in national virtual teams on certain
cyber issues and providing cyber subject matter experts or surge capability
outside of their field office jurisdiction, when needed.47
 Cyber Action Teams (CATs). In 2006, the FBI established CATs of agents and
computer scientists that can be rapidly deployed around the country or the world
to assist in computer-intrusion investigations. CAT members have expertise in
various computer languages, forensic investigations, and analysis of malware.48
 Cyber Assistant Legal Attachés (ALATs). In addition to domestic field offices
pursuing international leads in investigations, the FBI has positioned cyber
ALATs in some foreign countries. These ALATs work with law enforcement in
host countries to share information, collaborate on investigations, and enhance
relationships with partner agencies. They focus on “identifying, disrupting, and
dismantling cyber threat actors and organizations.”49
 Private Sector Partnerships. In addition to the IC3, the FBI has established
several initiatives to interface with the private sector and general public regarding
cyber incidents. Through these initiatives, the FBI collects and shares
information, builds partnerships, and enhances awareness. For instance, the
National Cyber-Forensics and Training Al iance (NCFTA) is a nonprofit

45 Statement of FBI Director Christopher Wray before the U.S. Congress, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee, Worldwide Threats, 116th Cong., 1st sess., November 5, 2019.
46 T he White House, National Security Presidential Directive-54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-23, January
8, 2008.
47 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cyber Task Forces: Building Alliances to Improve the Nation’s
Cybersecurity.
48 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), The Cyber Action Team: Rapidly Responding to Major Computer Intrusions,
March 4, 2015.
49 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Cyber Security Awareness Month: FBI Deploys Cyber Experts to
Work Directly With Foreign Partners, October 26, 2016. ALAT s have been placed in London, England; T he Hague,
Netherlands; T allinn, Estonia; Kyiv, Ukraine; and Ottawa, Canada, among other locations.
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COVID-19: Department of Justice Enforcement Against Scams

information-sharing organization that brings together subject matter experts from
law enforcement, the private sector, and academia to target cybercrime; it
produces unclassified intel igence assessments and develops strategies to mitigate
cyber threats.50 In addition, InfraGard is a collaboration between the FBI and
private sector partners such as business executives, entrepreneurs, computer
professionals, academia, the military, law enforcement, and other government
officials; the program facilitates information sharing with the goal of protecting
U.S. critical infrastructure.51
A Broad Federal Response
Federal agencies involved in countering COVID-19-related scams are not limited to those within
DOJ. DOJ investigates and prosecutes fraud and provides consumer awareness, but federal efforts
to counter these scams include agencies in other departments as wel . For instance, within the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Homeland Security Investigations (ICE HSI) launched Operation Stolen Promise to bring
together the agency’s “expertise in global trade investigations, financial fraud and cyber
investigations with robust private and public partnerships to disrupt and dismantle this criminal
activity [COVID-19 related fraud] and strengthen global supply-chain security.”52 In addition,
ICE HSI works with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to prevent smugglers from
bringing “fraudulent, mislabeled, and unauthorized COVID-19 related products, such as
purported anti-viral products, [PPE], and test kits” into the United States.53 Further, the U.S.
Secret Service and its electronic and financial crimes task forces investigate cyber-enabled
financial crimes related to the pandemic. The Secret Service, like other federal law enforcement
agencies, is also working on task forces specifical y designed to counter pandemic-related fraud
and conducting outreach with industry partners.54
In addition to investigating and prosecuting fraudsters exploiting the pandemic, federal agencies
enhance public awareness of potential scams.55 The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency and FTC, for instance, provide tips to organizations and individuals on avoiding a range
of pandemic-related scams. Other agencies provide awareness on industry-specific scams. For
example, the Department of Health and Human Services provides awareness on testing,
treatment, and Medicare-related scams; the Treasury Department’s Inspector General warns about
tax-related fraud; and the Social Security Administration warns about scams related to Social
Security benefits.
Efforts from DOJ and other entities to counter COVID-19-related fraud involve both prevention
(e.g., awareness campaigns) and response (e.g., investigations) activities. As policymakers
examine the federal government’s efforts to stop these scams, they may question the potential
effects of agencies’ investments in both prevention and response activities on reducing the

50 For more information on the NCFT A, see https://www.ncfta.net/.
51 For more information on InfraGard, see https://www.infragard.org.
52 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), “ICE HSI launches Operation Stolen Promise,” press release,
April 15, 2020.
53 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), “ICE HSI El Paso investigating COVID-19 related fraud, such as
unauthorized test kits, face masks, diluted cleaning solutions, anti-viral products,” press release, May 7, 2020.
54 See U.S. Secret Service testimony before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, COVID-19 Fraud:
Law Enforcement’s Response to Those Exploiting the Pandemic, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., June 9, 2020.
55 For more information on agencies providing information about scams and fraud, see https://www.usa.gov/
coronavirus.
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prevalence and impacts of pandemic-related fraud. Relatedly, they may look to how the agencies
themselves are evaluating the effects of the resources they have placed toward countering these
scams.

Author Information

Kristin Finklea

Specialist in Domestic Security

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