Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress

Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress

Emerging Military Technologies:
February 22, 2024
Background and Issues for Congress
Kelley M. Sayler
Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing emerging
Analyst in Advanced
military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with U.S. competitors. The
Technology and Global
U.S. military has long relied upon technological superiority to ensure its dominance in conflict
Security
and to underwrite U.S. national security. In recent years, however, technology has both rapidly

evolved and rapidly proliferated—largely as a result of advances in the commercial sector. As
former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel observed, this development has threatened to erode the

United States’ traditional sources of military advantage. The Department of Defense (DOD) has
undertaken a number of initiatives to arrest this trend. For example, in 2014, DOD announced the Third Offset Strategy, an
effort to exploit emerging technologies for military and security purposes as well as associated strategies, tactics, and
concepts of operation. In support of this strategy, DOD established a number of organizations focused on defense innovation,
including the Defense Innovation Unit and the Defense Wargaming Alignment Group.
More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy echoed the underpinnings of the Third Offset Strategy, noting that U.S.
national security will likely be
affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war…. New technologies
include advanced computing, “big data” analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, directed energy,
hypersonics, and biotechnology—the very technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars
of the future.
Similarly, the 2022 National Defense Strategy notes that artificial intelligence, quantum science, autonomy, biotechnology,
and space technologies have the potential to change warfighting. The United States is the leader in developing many of these
technologies. However, China and Russia—key strategic competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced
military technologies. As these technologies are integrated into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, they could
hold significant implications for the future of international security writ large, and will have to be a significant focus for
Congress, both in terms of funding and program oversight.
This report provides an overview of selected emerging military technologies in the United States, China, and Russia:
• artificial intelligence,
• lethal autonomous weapons,
• hypersonic weapons,
• directed energy weapons,
• biotechnology, and
• quantum technology.
It also discusses relevant initiatives within international institutions to monitor or regulate these technologies, considers the
potential implications of emerging military technologies for warfighting, and outlines associated issues for Congress. These
issues include the level and stability of funding for emerging technologies, the management structure for emerging
technologies, the challenges associated with recruiting and retaining technology workers, the acquisitions process for rapidly
evolving and dual-use technologies, the protection of emerging technologies from theft and expropriation, and the
governance and regulation of emerging technologies. Such issues could hold implications for congressional authorization,
appropriation, oversight, and treaty-making.

Congressional Research Service

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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Artificial Intelligence (AI) ............................................................................................................... 2
United States ............................................................................................................................. 4
China ......................................................................................................................................... 5
Russia ........................................................................................................................................ 6
International Institutions ........................................................................................................... 7
Potential Questions for Congress .............................................................................................. 8
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) ............................................................................... 9
United States ........................................................................................................................... 10
China ........................................................................................................................................ 11
Russia ....................................................................................................................................... 11
International Institutions .......................................................................................................... 11
Potential Questions for Congress ............................................................................................ 12
Hypersonic Weapons ..................................................................................................................... 12
United States ........................................................................................................................... 13
China ....................................................................................................................................... 14
Russia ...................................................................................................................................... 15
International Institutions ......................................................................................................... 16
Potential Questions for Congress ............................................................................................ 17
Directed Energy (DE) Weapons .................................................................................................... 17
United States ........................................................................................................................... 18
China ....................................................................................................................................... 19
Russia ...................................................................................................................................... 20
International Institutions ......................................................................................................... 20
Potential Questions for Congress ............................................................................................ 20
Biotechnology ............................................................................................................................... 21
United States ........................................................................................................................... 22
China ....................................................................................................................................... 24
Russia ...................................................................................................................................... 25
International Institutions ......................................................................................................... 25
Potential Questions for Congress ............................................................................................ 26
Quantum Technology .................................................................................................................... 26
United States ........................................................................................................................... 27
China ....................................................................................................................................... 29
Russia ...................................................................................................................................... 29
International Institutions ......................................................................................................... 30
Potential Questions for Congress ............................................................................................ 30
Potential Implications of Emerging Technologies for Warfighting ............................................... 30
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 32
Funding Considerations .......................................................................................................... 32
Management ............................................................................................................................ 33
Personnel ................................................................................................................................. 34
Acquisition .............................................................................................................................. 35
Intellectual Property .......................................................................................................... 36
Supply Chain Security ...................................................................................................... 36
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Technology Protection............................................................................................................. 37
Governance and Regulation .................................................................................................... 37
Oversight ................................................................................................................................. 39

Figures
Figure 1. AI Failure in Image Recognition ...................................................................................... 3
Figure 2. Selected Reporting Structure of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering (R&E) ........................................................................................ 34

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 39

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Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing emerging
military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with U.S. competitors. The
U.S. military has long relied upon technological superiority to ensure its dominance in conflict
and to underwrite U.S. national security. In recent years, however, technology has both rapidly
evolved and rapidly proliferated—largely as a result of advances in the commercial sector. As
former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has observed, this development has threatened to erode
the United States’ traditional sources of military advantage.1 The Department of Defense (DOD)
has undertaken a number of initiatives in recent years in an effort to arrest this trend. For
example, in 2014, DOD announced the Third Offset Strategy, an effort to exploit emerging
technologies for military and security purposes as well as associated strategies, tactics, and
concepts of operation.2 In support of this strategy, DOD established a number of organizations
focused on defense innovation, including the Defense Innovation Unit and the Defense
Wargaming Alignment Group.
More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy has echoed the underpinnings of the Third
Offset Strategy, noting that U.S. national security will likely be
affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war…. New
technologies include advanced computing, “big data” analytics, artificial intelligence,
autonomy, robotics, directed energy, hypersonics, and biotechnology—the very
technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.3
Similarly, the 2022 National Defense Strategy notes that artificial intelligence, quantum science,
autonomy, biotechnology, and space technologies have the potential to change warfighting.4
Although the United States is the leader in developing many of these technologies, China and
Russia—key strategic competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced military
technologies. As they are integrated into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, these
technologies could hold significant implications for congressional considerations and the future
of international security writ large.
This report provides an overview of selected emerging military technologies in the United States,
China, and Russia:
• artificial intelligence,
• lethal autonomous weapons,
• hypersonic weapons,
• directed energy weapons,
• biotechnology,

1 Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, “Defense Innovation Days
Opening Keynote,” September 3, 2014, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/605602/.
2 The Third Offset Strategy is a strategy for maintaining U.S. military superiority. It succeeds the First and Second
Offsets—nuclear weapons and the precision-guided munitions regime, respectively. Remarks as prepared for delivery
by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, “National Defense University Convocation,” August 5, 2014, at
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/605598/.
3 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America,” 2018, p.
3, at https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
4 Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America, October 2022, p. 19, at
https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-
MDR.PDF.
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Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress

• and quantum technology.
It also discusses relevant initiatives within international institutions to monitor or regulate these
technologies, considers the potential implications of emerging military technologies, and outlines
associated issues for Congress. Such issues could hold implications for congressional
authorization, appropriation, oversight, and treaty-making.
Artificial Intelligence (AI)5
Although the U.S. government has no official definition of artificial intelligence, policymakers
generally use the term AI to refer to a computer system capable of human-level cognition. AI is
further divided into three categories: narrow AI, general AI, and artificial superintelligence.
Narrow AI systems can perform only the specific task that they were trained to perform, while
general AI systems would be capable of performing a broad range of tasks, including those for
which they were not specifically trained. Artificial superintelligence refers to a system “that
greatly exceeds the cognitive performance of humans in virtually all domains of interest.”6
General AI systems and artificial superintelligence do not yet—and may never—exist.7
Narrow AI is currently being incorporated into a number of military applications by both the
United States and its competitors. Such applications include but are not limited to intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance;8 logistics; cyber operations; command and control; and semi-
autonomous and autonomous vehicles. These technologies are intended in part to augment or
replace human operators, freeing them to perform more complex and cognitively demanding
work. In addition, AI-enabled systems could (1) react significantly faster than systems that rely on
operator input; (2) cope with an exponential increase in the amount of data available for analysis;
and (3) enable new concepts of operations, such as swarming (i.e., cooperative behavior in which
unmanned vehicles autonomously coordinate to achieve a task) that could confer a warfighting
advantage by overwhelming adversary defensive systems.
Narrow AI, however, could introduce a number of challenges. For example, such systems may be
subject to algorithmic bias as a result of their training data or models. Researchers have
repeatedly discovered instances of racial bias in AI facial recognition programs due to the lack of
diversity in the images on which the systems were trained, while some natural language
processing programs have developed gender bias.9 Such biases could hold significant
implications for AI applications in a military context. For example, incorporating undetected
biases into systems with lethal effects could lead to cases of mistaken identity and the unintended
killing of civilians or noncombatants.

5 For more information about artificial intelligence, see CRS Report R45178, Artificial Intelligence and National
Security, by Kelley M. Sayler.
6 Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press,
2014).
7 For a discussion of narrow versus general artificial intelligence, as well as a range of expert opinions about the future
of general artificial intelligence, see Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford, United
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014).
8 For a discussion of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, see CRS Report R46389, Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance Design for Great Power Competition, by Nishawn S. Smagh.
9 Brian Barrett, “Lawmakers Can’t Ignore Facial Recognition’s Bias Anymore,” Wired, July 26, 2018, at
https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-facial-recognition-congress-bias-law-enforcement/; and Will Knight, “How to
Fix Silicon Valley’s Sexist Algorithms,” MIT Technology Review, November 23, 2016, at
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602950/how-to-fix-silicon-valleys-sexist-algorithms/.
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Similarly, narrow AI algorithms can produce unpredictable and unconventional results that could
lead to unexpected failures if incorporated into military systems. In a commonly cited
demonstration of this phenomenon (illustrated in Figure 1), researchers combined a picture that
an AI system correctly identified as a panda with random distortion that the computer labeled
“nematode.” The difference in the combined image is imperceptible to the human eye, but it
resulted in the AI system labeling the image as a gibbon with 99.3% confidence. Such
vulnerabilities could be exploited intentionally by adversaries to disrupt AI-reliant or -assisted
target identification, selection, and engagement. This could, in turn, raise ethical concerns—or,
potentially, lead to violations of the law of armed conflict—if it results in the system selecting
and engaging a target or class of targets that was not approved by a human operator.
Figure 1. AI Failure in Image Recognition

Source: Andrew Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms, Issues Questions, and Recommended Studies, Center for Naval
Analyses, January 2017, p. 61.
Finally, recent news reports and analyses have highlighted the role of AI in enabling increasingly
realistic photo, audio, and video digital forgeries, popularly known as “deep fakes.” Adversaries
could deploy this AI capability as part of their information operations in a “gray zone” conflict.10
Deep fake technology could be used against the United States and its allies to generate false news
reports, influence public discourse, erode public trust, and attempt blackmail of government
officials. For this reason, some analysts argue that social media platforms—in addition to
deploying deep fake detection tools—may need to expand the means of labeling and
authenticating content.11 Doing so might require that users identify the time and location at which
the content originated or properly label content that has been edited. Other analysts have
expressed concern that regulating deep fake technology could impose an undue burden on social
media platforms or lead to unconstitutional restrictions on free speech and artistic expression.12
These analysts have suggested that existing law is sufficient for managing the malicious use of
deep fakes and that the focus should be instead on the need to educate the public about deep fakes
and minimize incentives for creators of malicious deep fakes.

10 “Gray zone” conflicts are those that occur below the threshold of formally declared war. For more information about
information operations, see CRS In Focus IF10771, Defense Primer: Operations in the Information Environment, by
Catherine A. Theohary.
11 Some social media platforms such as Twitter have established rules for labeling and removing certain types of
synthetic or manipulated media. See Yoel Roth and Ashita Achuthan, “Building rules in public: Our approach to
synthetic & manipulated media,” Twitter, February 4, 2020, at https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/
new-approach-to-synthetic-and-manipulated-media.html.
12 Jessica Ice, “Defamatory Political Deepfakes and the First Amendment,” Case Western Reserve Law Review, 2019,
at https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol70/iss2/12.
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United States
DOD’s unclassified investments in AI have grown from just over $600 million in FY2016 to
approximately $1.8 billion in FY2024, with the department maintaining over 685 active AI
projects.13 Pursuant to the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 115-232),
DOD established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC, pronounced “jake”) to coordinate
DOD projects of over $15 million; the JAIC was granted acquisition authority by Section 808 of
the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283).14 The JAIC has undertaken a number of National Mission
Initiatives for AI, including predictive maintenance,15 humanitarian aid and disaster relief,
warfighter health, and business process transformation. In addition, the JAIC maintains the Joint
Common Foundation, a “secure cloud-based AI development and experimentation environment”
intended to support the testing and fielding of department-wide AI capabilities.16 In December
2021, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks directed the establishment of the Chief Digital
and Artificial Intelligence Office, which is to “serve as the successor organization to the JAIC,
reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.”17
The FY2019 NDAA also directed DOD to publish a strategic roadmap for AI development and
fielding, as well as to develop guidance on “appropriate ethical, legal, and other policies for the
Department governing the development and use of artificial intelligence enabled systems and
technologies in operational situations.”18 In support of this mandate, the Defense Innovation
Board (DIB), an independent federal advisory committee to the Secretary of Defense, drafted
recommendations for the ethical use of artificial intelligence.19 Based on these recommendations,
DOD then adopted five ethical principles for AI based on the DIB’s recommendations:
responsibility, equitability, traceability, reliability, and governability.20 On May 26, 2021, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks issued a memorandum providing guidance on the
implementation of Responsible Artificial Intelligence (RAI), in keeping with the ethical

13 The amount listed as the FY2024 investment reflects DOD’s FY2024 unclassified budget request for AI. DOD’s
actual investments in AI in FY2024 may be higher; based on historical precedent, they are unlikely to be lower. Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, United States Department of Defense Fiscal
Year 2024 Budget Request, March 2023, p. 15, at
hhttps://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2024/FY2024_Budget_Request.pdf; and
Government Accountability Office, Artificial Intelligence: Status of Developing and Acquiring Capabilities for
Weapon Systems, February 2022, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104765.pdf.
14 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §1051; and P.L. 116-283, Section 2, Division A, Title VIII, §808.
15 Predictive maintenance uses AI “to predict the failure of critical parts, automate diagnostics, and plan maintenance
based on data and equipment condition.” Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense
Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” February 12, 2019, p. 11, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/
1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-STRATEGY.PDF.
16 Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, “Joint Common Foundation,” at https://www.ai.mil/jcf.html.
17 Department of Defense, “Establishment of the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer,” December 8, 2021,
at https://media.defense.gov/2021/Dec/08/2002906075/-1/-1/1/MEMORANDUM-ON-ESTABLISHMENT-OF-THE-
CHIEF-DIGITAL-AND-ARTIFICIAL-INTELLIGENCE-OFFICER.PDF.
18 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §238.
19 For a discussion of DOD’s rationale for developing principles for ethical AI, as well as DOD’s existing ethical
commitments related to AI, see Defense Innovation Board, “AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use of
Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense,” October 31, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/
2002204458/-1/-1/0/DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_PRIMARY_DOCUMENT.PDF.
20 For definitions of these principles, see Department of Defense, “DOD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial
Intelligence,” February 24, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2091996/dod-
adopts-ethical-principles-for-artificial-intelligence/.
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principles.21 DOD then released an RAI strategy and implementation pathway in June 2022.22
Section 1544 of the FY2024 NDAA (P.L. 118-31) directs DOD to assess whether a given AI
technology operationalizes the RAI principles, “to report and remediate any artificial intelligence
technology that is determined not to be in compliance with the [RAI] framework,” and to
discontinue the use of noncompliant technology “until effective remediation is achievable.” E.O.
14110, Executive Order (E.O.) on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of
Artificial Intelligence, additionally provides guidance on standards for AI safety and security.23
Finally, Section 1051 of the FY2019 NDAA established a National Security Commission on
Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) to conduct a comprehensive assessment of militarily relevant AI
technologies and to provide recommendations for strengthening U.S. competitiveness. The
commission’s final report to Congress was delivered in March 2021 and generally offers
recommendations along five key lines of effort: (1) investing in research and development, (2)
applying AI to national security missions, (3) training and recruiting AI talent, (4) protecting and
building upon U.S. technology advantages, and (5) marshalling global AI cooperation.24 A
number of NSCAI’s recommendations have been passed into law.25 In addition, Section 247 of
the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) directs the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional
defense committees annual status reports on the department’s intent to implement NSCAI
recommendations, as well as any associated timelines for implementation.26
China
China is widely viewed as the United States’ closest competitor in the international AI market.27
China’s 2017 “Next Generation AI Development Plan” describes AI as a “strategic technology”

21 RAI is to focus on RAI governance, warfighter trust, AI product and acquisition lifecycle, requirements validation,
responsible AI ecosystem, and AI workforce. For additional information about RAI, see Kathleen H. Hicks,
“Implementing Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Department of Defense,” May 26, 2021, at
https://media.defense.gov/2021/May/27/2002730593/-1/-1/0/IMPLEMENTING-RESPONSIBLE-ARTIFICIAL-
INTELLIGENCE-IN-THE-DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE.PDF.
22 Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation
Pathway, June 2022, at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jun/22/2003022604/-1/-1/0/Department-of-Defense-
Responsible-Artificial-Intelligence-Strategy-and-Implementation-Pathway.PDF. The Defense Innovation Unit (DIU)
has additionally issued Responsible AI Guidelines in Practice: Lessons Learned from the DIU Portfolio to
operationalize DOD’s Ethical Principles for AI within DIU’s commercial prototyping and acquisitions programs. Jared
Dunnmon et al., Responsible AI Guidelines in Practice: Lessons Learned from the DIU Portfolio, November 14, 2021,
at https://assets.ctfassets.net/3nanhbfkr0pc/acoo1Fj5uungnGNPJ3QWy/3a1dafd64f22efcf8f27380aafae9789/
2021_RAI_Report-v3.pdf.
23 For additional information, see CRS Report R47843, Highlights of the 2023 Executive Order on Artificial
Intelligence for Congress, by Laurie Harris and Chris Jaikaran; and CRS Insight IN12286, The AI Executive Order and
Its Potential Implications for DOD, by Alexandra G. Neenan and Kelley M. Sayler.
24 National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, Final Report, March 2021, at https://www.nscai.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf. Pursuant to Section 238 of the FY2019 NDAA, RAND
Corporation, a federally funded research and development center, additionally conducted a review of DOD’s posture
for AI. See Danielle C. Tarraf et al., The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence: Assessment and
Recommendations, RAND Corporation, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4229.html.
25 See, for example, Section 216 (“Improvements relating to Steering Committee on Emerging Technology and
National Security Threats”), Section 228 (“Executive Education on Emerging Technologies for Senior Civilian and
Military Leaders”), Section 903 (“Enhanced role for the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering on
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council”), Section 909 (“Digital Talent Recruiting Officer”), and Section 1118
(“Occupational series for digital career fields”) of the FY2022 NDAA.
26 This requirement is to expire on December 27, 2023.
27 See, for example, Kai-Fu Lee, AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order (Boston, MA:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 2018).
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that has become a “focus of international competition.”28 Recent Chinese achievements in the
field demonstrate China’s potential to realize its goals for AI development. In particular, China
has pursued language and facial recognition technologies, many of which it plans to integrate into
the country’s domestic surveillance network. Such technologies could be used to counter
espionage and aid military targeting. In addition to developing various types of air, land, sea, and
undersea autonomous military vehicles, China is actively pursuing swarm technologies, which
could be used to overwhelm adversary missile defense interceptors. Moreover, open-source
publications indicate that China is developing a suite of AI tools for cyber operations.29
China’s management of its AI ecosystem stands in stark contrast to that of the United States.30 In
general, few boundaries exist between Chinese commercial companies, university research
laboratories, the military, and the central government. China’s National Intelligence Law, for
example, requires companies and individuals to “support, assist, and cooperate with national
intelligence work.”31 As a result, the Chinese government has a direct means of guiding military
AI development priorities and accessing technology developed for civilian purposes.
Russia
Russian president Vladimir Putin has stated that “whoever becomes the leader in [AI] will
become the ruler of the world.”32 At present, however, Russian AI development lags significantly
behind that of the United States and China. As part of Russia’s effort to close this gap, Russia has
released a national strategy that outlines 5- and 10-year benchmarks for improving the country’s
AI expertise, educational programs, datasets, infrastructure, and legal regulatory system.33 Russia
has indicated it will continue to pursue its 2008 defense modernization agenda, which called for
robotizing 30% of the country’s military equipment by 2025.34
The Russian military has been researching a number of AI applications, with a heavy emphasis on
semiautonomous and autonomous military vehicles. Russia has also reportedly built a combat
module for unmanned ground vehicles that may be capable of autonomous target identification—
and, potentially, target engagement—and it plans to develop a suite of AI-enabled autonomous
systems.35 In addition, the Russian military plans to incorporate AI into unmanned aerial, naval,
and undersea vehicles and is reportedly developing swarming capabilities.36 These technologies

28 China State Council, “A Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” p. 2.
29 Elsa Kania, Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power,
Center for a New American Security, November 28, 2017, p. 27.
30 Ibid., p. 6.
31 Arjun Kharpal, “Huawei says it would never hand data to China’s government. Experts say it wouldn’t have a
choice,” CNBC, March 5, 2019.
32 “‘Whoever leads in AI will rule the world’: Putin to Russian children on Knowledge Day,” RT.com, September 1,
2017, at https://www.rt.com/news/401731-ai-rule-world-putin/.
33 Office of the President of the Russian Federation, “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the
Development of Artificial Intelligence in the Russian Federation” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology,
Trans.), October 10, 2019, at https://cset.georgetown.edu/research/decree-of-the-president-of-the-russian-federation-on-
the-development-of-artificial-intelligence-in-the-russian-federation/.
34 Tom Simonite, “For Superpowers, Artificial Intelligence Fuels New Global Arms Race,” Wired, August 8, 2017.
35 Tristan Greene, “Russia is Developing AI Missiles to Dominate the New Arms Race,” The Next Web, July 27, 2017,
at https://thenextweb.com/artificial-intelligence/2017/07/27/russia-is-developing-ai-missiles-to-dominate-the-new-
arms-race/; and Kyle Mizokami, “Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot,” Popular Mechanics, July 19,
2017, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/news/a27393/kalashnikov-to-make-ai-directed-
machine-guns/.
36 Samuel Bendett, “Red Robots Rising: Behind the Rapid Development of Russian Unmanned Military Systems,” The
Strategy Bridge, December 12, 2017.
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could reduce both cost and manpower requirements, potentially enabling Russia to field more
systems with fewer personnel. Russia is also exploring innovative uses of AI for remote sensing
and electronic warfare, which could in turn reduce an adversary’s ability to effectively
communicate and navigate on the battlefield.37 Finally, Russia has made extensive use of AI
technologies for domestic propaganda and surveillance, as well as for information operations
directed against the United States and U.S. allies.38
Despite Russia’s aspirations, analysts argue that it may be difficult for Russia to make significant
progress in AI development. For example, some analysts note that Russian academics have
produced few research papers on AI—ranking 22nd in AI-related publications globally39—and that
the Russian technology industry has yet to produce AI applications on par with those produced by
the United States and China.40 Other analysts counter that such factors may be irrelevant, arguing
that while Russia has never been a leader in internet technology, it has managed to become a
notably disruptive force in cyberspace.41 Russia may also be able to draw upon its growing
technological cooperation with China.42
International Institutions
A number of international institutions have examined issues surrounding AI, including the Group
of Seven (G7), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which developed the first intergovernmental
set of principles for AI.43 These principles are intended to “promote AI that is innovative and
trustworthy and that respects human rights and democratic values.”44 The United States is one of
42 countries—including the OECD’s 36 member countries, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Peru, and Romania—to have adopted the OECD AI Principles. These principles serve as the
foundation for the Group of Twenty’s (G20’s) June 2019 Ministerial Statement on human-

37 Jill Dougherty and Molly Jay, “Russia Tries to Get Smart about Artificial Intelligence”; The Wilson Quarterly,
Spring 2018; and Margarita Konaev and Samuel Bendett, “Russian AI-Enabled Combat: Coming to a City Near You?,”
War on the Rocks, July 31, 2019, at https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/russian-ai-enabled-combat-coming-to-a-city-
near-you/.
38 Alina Polyakova, “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare,” Brookings Institution,
November 15, 2018, at https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-
warfare/; and Chris Meserole and Alina Polyakova, “Disinformation Wars,” Foreign Policy, May 25, 2018, at
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/25/disinformation-wars/.
39 Margarita Konaev et al., Headline or Trend Line? Evaluating Chinese-Russian Collaboration in AI, Center for
Security and Emerging Technology, August 2021, p. 9.
40 Leon Bershidsky, “Take Elon Musk Seriously on the Russian AI Threat,” Bloomberg, September 5, 2017, at
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-09-05/take-elon-musk-seriously-on-the-russian-ai-threat; and Alina
Polyakova, “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare,” Brookings Institution, November 15,
2018, at https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/.
41 Gregory C. Allen, “Putin and Musk Are Right: Whoever Masters AI Will Run the World,” CNN, September 5, 2017.
42 Samuel Bendett and Elsa Kania, A New Sino-Russian High-tech Partnership, Australian Strategic Policy Institute,
October 29, 2019, at https://www.aspi.org.au/report/new-sino-russian-high-tech-partnership. Some analysts have
cautioned, however, that “the extent and scope of Chinese-Russian collaboration in AI may be overstated by both
Chinese and Russian sources as well as U.S. observers.” Margarita Konaev et al., Headline or Trend Line? Evaluating
Chinese-Russian Collaboration in AI, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, August 2021, p. 9.
43 In May 2020, the United States joined the G7’s Global Partnership on AI, which is “to guide the responsible adoption
of AI based on shared principles of ‘human rights, inclusion, diversity, innovation and economic growth.’” Matt
O’Brien, “US joins G7 artificial intelligence group to counter China,” Associated Press, May 28, 2020.
44 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “OECD Principles on AI,” June 2019, at
https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/ai/principles/.
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centered AI.45 In addition, the OECD established the AI Policy Observatory in 2019 to develop
policy options that will “help countries encourage, nurture, and monitor the responsible
development of trustworthy AI systems for the benefit of society.”
Similarly, in October 2021, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) released its first AI
strategy.46 According to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, the strategy is to “set
standards for responsible use of artificial intelligence, in accordance with international law,
outline how [NATO] will accelerate the adoption of artificial intelligence in what [it does], set out
how [NATO] will protect this technology, and address the threats posed by the use of artificial
intelligence by adversaries.”47 NATO has additionally established AI test centers and a data and
AI review board to “ensure the ‘operationalization’ of the AI strategy.”48
Finally, in September 2021, the United States announced that it had formed a trilateral security
partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom.49 This partnership, known as AUKUS,
includes defense cooperation on artificial intelligence and autonomy, as well as hypersonic
weapons, quantum technologies, and other advanced capabilities.50
Potential Questions for Congress
• What measures is DOD taking to implement its ethical principles for artificial
intelligence? Are such measures sufficient to ensure DOD’s adherence to the
principles?
• How is DOD testing and evaluating AI systems to ensure that they have not been
exploited by adversaries?
• Do DOD and the intelligence community have adequate information about the
state of foreign military AI applications and the ways in which such applications
may be used to harm U.S. national security?
• How has the establishment of the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office
affected DOD’s ability to adopt AI applications?
• How should national security considerations with regard to deep fakes be
balanced with free speech protections, artistic expression, and beneficial uses of
the underlying technologies? What efforts, if any, should the U.S. government
undertake to ensure that the public is educated about deep fakes?

45 “G20 Ministerial Statement on Trade and Digital Economy,” June 9, 2019, at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/
000486596.pdf.
46 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Summary of the NATO Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” October 22, 2021, at
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_187617.htm?mc_cid=8f2b5c99db&mc_eid=5a3e8d2b43.
47 Vivienne Machi, “NATO ups the ante on disruptive tech, artificial intelligence,” C4ISRNET, November 3, 2021, at
https://www.c4isrnet.com/digital-show-dailies/feindef/2021/11/03/nato-ups-the-ante-on-disruptive-tech-artificial-
intelligence/.
48 Ibid. For additional information, see NATO, “NATO’s Data and Artificial Intelligence Review Board,” October 17,
2022, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_208374.htm; and NATO, “DIANA Network: Test Centers,”
July 20, 2023, at https://www.diana.nato.int/resources/site1/general/maps/diana-test-centres-en_v5.pdf.
49 The White House, “Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS,” September 15, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/.
50 The White House, “Fact Sheet: Implementation of the Australia – United Kingdom – United States Partnership
(AUKUS),” April 5, 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-
implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/. For additional information about
AUKUS and advanced capability development, see CRS Report R47599, AUKUS Pillar 2: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Patrick Parrish and Luke A. Nicastro.
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Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS)51
Although there is no internationally agreed definition of lethal autonomous weapon systems,
Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.09 defines LAWS as a class of weapon systems
capable of both independently identifying a target and employing an onboard weapon to engage
and destroy the target without manual human control. This concept of autonomy is also known as
“human out of the loop” or “full autonomy.” The directive contrasts LAWS with human-
supervised, or “human on the loop,” autonomous weapon systems, in which operators have the
ability to monitor and halt a weapon’s target engagement. Another category is semi-autonomous,
or “human in the loop,” weapon systems that “only engage individual targets or specific target
groups that have been selected by a human operator.”52
LAWS would require computer algorithms and sensor suites to classify an object as hostile, make
an engagement decision, and guide a weapon to the target. Although these systems are not yet in
widespread development,53 it is believed they would enable military operations in
communications-degraded or -denied environments where traditional systems may not be able to
operate. Some analysts have noted that LAWS could additionally “allow weapons to strike
military objectives more accurately and with less risk of collateral damage” or civilian
casualties.54
Others, including approximately 30 countries and 165 nongovernmental organizations, have
called for a preemptive ban on LAWS due to ethical concerns such as a perceived lack of
accountability for use and a perceived inability to comply with the proportionality and distinction
requirements of the law of armed conflict. Some analysts have also raised concerns about the
potential operational risks posed by lethal autonomous weapons.55 These risks could arise from
“hacking, enemy behavioral manipulation, unexpected interactions with the environment, or
simple malfunctions or software errors.”56 Although such risks could be present in automated
systems, they could be heightened in autonomous systems, in which the human operator would be

51 For additional information about LAWS, see CRS Report R44466, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: Issues for
Congress, by Nathan J. Lucas.
52 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated January 25, 2023, at
https://www.esd.whs.mil/portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf.
53 Some analysts have argued that certain loitering munitions such as the Israeli Harpy meet the United States’
definition of LAWS. See, for example, Defense Innovation Board, AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use
of Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense - Supporting Document, October 2019, p. 12, at
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/2002204459/-1/-1/0/
DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_SUPPORTING_DOCUMENT.PDF. In addition, while a United Nations report concluded that
Turkey’s deployment of the STM Kargu-2 constitutes the first use of a lethal autonomous weapon system in combat,
the U.N. described the Kargu-2 as being “programmed to attack targets” [emphasis added]. For this reason, it is
unlikely that the Kargu-2 meets the U.S. definition of LAWS. United Nations Security Council, “Letter dated 8 March
2021 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of
the Security Council,” March 8, 2021, p. 17, at https://undocs.org/S/2021/229.
54 U.S. Government, “Humanitarian Benefits of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons,”
March 28, 2018, at https://ogc.osd.mil/Portals/99/Law%20of%20War/Practice%20Documents/
US%20Working%20Paper%20-
%20Humanitarian%20benefits%20of%20emerging%20technologies%20in%20the%20area%20of%20LAWS%20-
%20CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.4_E.pdf?ver=O0lg6BIxsFt57nrOuz3xHA%3D%3D.
55 See, for example, Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,” Center for a New American Security,
February 2016, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-
risk.pdf.
56 Ibid.
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unable to physically intervene to terminate engagements—potentially resulting in wider-scale or
more numerous instances of fratricide, civilian casualties, or other unintended consequences.57
United States
The United States is not known to currently have LAWS in its inventory; however, there is no
prohibition on the development, fielding, or employment of LAWS. DODD 3000.09 establishes
DOD guidelines for the future development and fielding of LAWS to ensure that they comply
with “the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of
engagement.”58 This directive includes a requirement that LAWS be designed to “allow
commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of
force.”59 “Human judgment over the use of force” does not require manual human “control” of
the weapon system, as is often reported, but instead requires broader human involvement in
decisions about how, when, where, and why the weapon will be employed.
In addition, DODD 3000.09 requires that the software and hardware of all systems, including
lethal autonomous weapons, be tested and evaluated to ensure they
[f]unction as anticipated in realistic operational environments against adaptive adversaries;
complete engagements in a timeframe consistent with commander and operator intentions
and, if unable to do so, terminate engagements or seek additional human operator input
before continuing the engagement; and are sufficiently robust to minimize failures that
could lead to unintended engagements or to loss of control of the system to unauthorized
parties.
Any changes to a system’s operating state—for example, due to machine learning—would require
the system to be retested and reevaluated to ensure that it has retained its safety features and
ability to operate as intended. In addition to the standard weapons review process, a secondary
senior-level review is required for covered autonomous and semi-autonomous systems. This
review requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]), the Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), and the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(USD[R&E]) to approve the system before formal development. USD(P), VCJCS, and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD[A&S]) must then approve the
system before fielding. In the event of “urgent military need,” this senior-level review may be
waived by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. DODD 3000.09 additionally establishes the
Autonomous Weapon System Working Group—composed of representatives of USD(P);
USD(R&E); USD(A&S); DOD General Counsel; the Chief Digital and AI Officer; the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation; and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—to support and
advise the senior-level review process.60
Per Section 251 of the FY2024 (P.L. 118-31), the Secretary of Defense is to notify the defense
committees of any changes to DODD 3000.09 within 30 days. The Secretary is directed to
provide a description of the modification and an explanation of the reasons for the modification.

57 Ibid.
58 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated January 25, 2023, at
https://www.esd.whs.mil/portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf. For an explanation of this directive,
see CRS In Focus IF11150, Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, by Kelley M. Sayler.
59Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated January 25, 2023, at
https://www.esd.whs.mil/portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf.
60 Ibid.
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China
According to former U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, some Chinese weapons
manufacturers, such as Ziyan, have advertised their weapons as having the ability to select and
engage targets autonomously.61 It is unclear whether these claims are accurate; however, China
has no prohibition on the development of LAWS, which it has characterized as weapons that
exhibit—at a minimum—five attributes:
The first is lethality, which means sufficient pay load (charge) and for means [sic] to be
lethal. The second is autonomy, which means absence of human intervention and control
during the entire process of executing a task. Thirdly, impossibility for termination,
meaning that once started there is no way to terminate the device. Fourthly, indiscriminate
effect, meaning that the device will execute the task of killing and maiming regardless of
conditions, scenarios and targets. Fifthly evolution, meaning that through interaction with
the environment the device can learn autonomously, expand its functions and capabilities
in a way exceeding human expectations.62
Russia
Russia has proposed the following definition of LAWS: “unmanned technical means other than
ordnance that are intended for carrying out combat and support missions without any involvement
of the operator” beyond the decision of whether and how to deploy the system.63 Russia has noted
that LAWS could “ensure the increased accuracy of weapon guidance on military targets, while
contributing to lower rate of unintentional strikes against civilians and civilian targets.”64
Although Russia has not publicly stated that it is developing LAWS, Russian weapons
manufacturer Kalashnikov has reportedly built a combat module for unmanned ground vehicles
capable of autonomous target identification and, potentially, target engagement.65
International Institutions
Since 2014, the United States has participated in international discussions of LAWS under the
auspices of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (U.N. CCW). The
U.N. CCW has considered proposals by states parties to issue political declarations about LAWS,
as well as proposals to regulate or ban them. At the U.N. CCW, the United States and Russia have
opposed a preemptive ban on LAWS, while China has supported a ban on the use—but not
development—of LAWS, which it defines as weapon systems that are inherently indiscriminate
and thus in violation of the law of war.66 The United States has instead proposed the development

61 Patrick Tucker, “SecDef: China is Exporting Killer Robots to the Mideast,” Defense One, November 5, 2019.
62 U.N. CCW, “China: Position Paper,” April 11, 2018, p. 1, at https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/
(httpAssets)/E42AE83BDB3525D0C125826C0040B262/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.7.pdf.
63 U.N. CCW, “Russian Federation: Potential opportunities and limitations of military uses of lethal autonomous
weapons systems,” 2019, at https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/
(httpAssets)/B7C992A51A9FC8BFC12583BB00637BB9/$file/CCW.GGE.1.2019.WP.1_R+E.pdf.
64 Ibid.
65 Kyle Mizokami, “Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot,” Popular Mechanics, July 19, 2017.
66 For additional information about U.N. CCW discussions on LAWS, see CRS In Focus IF11294, International
Discussions Concerning Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, by Kelley M. Sayler.
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of a nonbinding Code of Conduct, which “would help States promote responsible behavior and
compliance with international law.”67
The United States has additionally issued the “Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use
of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy,” which notes that “military use of AI must be in
compliance with applicable international law” and occur within a “responsible human chain of
command and control.”68 To date, 50 states have endorsed the declaration.69
Potential Questions for Congress
• To what extent are potential U.S. adversaries developing LAWS? How, if at all,
should this affect U.S. LAWS research and development?
• What role should the United States play in U.N. CCW discussions of LAWS?
Should the United States support the status quo or advocate regulation of or a ban
on LAWS?
• If the United States chooses to develop LAWS, are current weapons review
processes and legal standards for their employment in conflict sufficient?
Hypersonic Weapons70
A number of countries, including the United States, Russia, and China, are developing hypersonic
weapons—those that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound. In contrast
to ballistic missiles, which also travel at hypersonic speeds, hypersonic weapons do not follow a
parabolic ballistic trajectory and can maneuver en route to their destination, making defense
against them difficult.
There are two categories of hypersonic weapons:
• Hypersonic glide vehicles are launched from a rocket before gliding to a
target.71
• Hypersonic cruise missiles are powered by high-speed engines throughout the
duration of their flight.
Analysts disagree about the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. Some have identified
two factors that could hold significant implications for strategic stability: (1) the weapon’s short
time-of-flight, which, in turn, compresses the timeline for response, and (2) its unpredictable

67 U.S. Delegation to the U.N. CCW, “Opening Statement, as delivered by Joshua Dorosin,” December 2, 2021, at
https://geneva.usmission.gov/2021/12/03/convention-on-ccw-group-of-governmental-experts-on-emerging-
technologies-in-the-area-of-laws/.
68 Department of State, “Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy,”
November 9, 2023, at https://www.state.gov/political-declaration-on-responsible-military-use-of-artificial-intelligence-
and-autonomy-2/.
69 For a list of endorsing states, see https://www.state.gov/political-declaration-on-responsible-military-use-of-artificial-
intelligence-and-autonomy/.
70 For additional information about hypersonic weapons, see CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler; and CRS In Focus IF11459, Defense Primer: Hypersonic Boost-Glide
Weapons, by Kelley M. Sayler and Amy F. Woolf.
71 When hypersonic glide vehicles are mated with their rocket booster, the resulting weapon system is often referred to
as a hypersonic boost-glide weapon.
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flight path, which could generate uncertainty about the weapon’s intended target and therefore
heighten the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in the event of a conflict.72
Other analysts have argued that the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons are minimal
because U.S. competitors such as China and Russia already possess the ability to strike the United
States with intercontinental ballistic missiles, which, when launched in salvos, could overwhelm
U.S. missile defenses.73 Furthermore, these analysts argue that in the case of hypersonic weapons,
traditional principles of deterrence hold: “it is really a stretch to try to imagine any regime in the
world that would be so suicidal that it would even think threating to use—not to mention to
actually use—hypersonic weapons against the United States ... would end well.”74
United States
The Pentagon requested $4.7 billion in FY2023 for hypersonic weapons and $225.5 million for
hypersonic defense programs.75 The Pentagon declined to provide a breakout of funding for
hypersonic-related research in FY2024, but requested $11 billion for long-range fires—a category
that includes hypersonic weapons.76 DOD is currently developing hypersonic weapons under the
Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program, which is intended to provide the U.S. military with
the ability to strike hardened or time-sensitive targets with conventional warheads, as well as
through several Air Force, Army, and DARPA programs.77 Analysts who support these
development efforts argue that hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence, as well as provide
the U.S. military with an ability to defeat capabilities such as mobile missile launchers and
advanced air and missile defense systems that form the foundation of U.S. competitors’ anti-
access/area denial strategies.78 Others have argued that hypersonic weapons confer little to no
additional warfighting advantage and note that the U.S. military has yet to identify any mission
requirements or concepts of operation for hypersonic weapons.79

72 See, for example, Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of
Weapons, RAND Corporation, 2017, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html.
73 David Axe, “How the U.S. Is Quietly Winning the Hypersonic Arms Race,” The Daily Beast, January 16, 2019,
at https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-is-quietly-winning-the-hypersonic-arms-race. See also Mark B.
Schneider, “Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles,” p. 14.
74 Jyri Raitasalo, “Hypersonic Weapons are No Game-Changer,” The National Interest, January 5, 2019, at
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-game-changer-40632.
75 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: United
States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, April 2022, p. 4-6, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/
Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. For additional information
about hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus IF11623, Hypersonic Missile Defense: Issues for Congress, by
Kelley M. Sayler.
76 CRS correspondence with DOD Comptroller on October 12, 2023; November 27, 2023; and January 4, 2024.
77 In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would lead the development of a common glide vehicle
for use across the services. The services coordinate efforts on a Common Hypersonic Glide Body Board of Directors
with rotating chairmanship. Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Army Ramps Up Funding for Laser Shield, Hypersonic Sword,”
Breaking Defense, February 28, 2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/army-ramps-up-funding-for-laser-
shield-hypersonic-sword/. For a full history of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, see CRS Report R41464,
Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
78 Roger Zakheim and Tom Karako, “China’s Hypersonic Missile Advances and U.S. Defense Responses,” remarks at
the Hudson Institute, March 19, 2019. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army
Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 580.
79 See, for example, Valerie Insinna, “Air Force’s top civilian hints at changes to hypersonic weapons programs,”
Defense News, September 22, 2021, at https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/09/22/air-forces-top-civilian-hints-at-
changes-to-hypersonic-weapons-programs/.
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The United States is unlikely to field an operational hypersonic weapon before FY2025; however,
in contrast to Russia and China, the United States is not known to be developing hypersonic
weapons for potential use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, the United States is seeking to
develop hypersonic weapons that can attack targets with greater accuracy, which could be more
technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed—and less accurate—Russian and Chinese
systems.
Section 237 of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263) directs the Secretary of Defense to both assess
DOD’s capacity to test and evaluate hypersonic capabilities and “[identify] test facilities outside
the Department of Defense that have potential to be used to expand [DOD] capacity ... including
test facilities of other departments and agencies of the Federal Government, academia, and
commercial test facilities.” Section 218 of the FY2024 NDAA (P.L. 118-31) directs the Secretary
to update this assessment at least once every two years. It additionally directs the Secretary to
conduct a study to evaluate at least two possible locations in the United States that “have potential
to be used as additional corridors for long-distance hypersonic system testing” and to submit to
the congressional defense committees an annual report on DOD funding and investments in
hypersonic capabilities.
China
According to Tong Zhao, a fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, “most
experts argue that the most important reason to prioritize hypersonic technology development [in
China] is the necessity to counter specific security threats from increasingly sophisticated U.S.
military technology” such as U.S. regional missile defenses.80 China’s pursuit of hypersonic
weapons, like Russia’s, reflects a concern that U.S. hypersonic weapons could enable the United
States to conduct a preemptive, decapitating strike on China’s nuclear arsenal and supporting
infrastructure. U.S. missile defense deployments could then limit China’s ability to conduct a
retaliatory strike against the United States.81
China has developed the DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which, according to a
2014 report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, could carry a nuclear
hypersonic glide vehicle.82 General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, then-commander of U.S. Northern
Command, seemed to confirm this assessment in February 2020, when he testified that “China is
testing a [nuclear-capable] intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle … which is designed
to fly at high speeds and low altitudes, complicating our ability to provide precise warning.”83
Reports indicate that China may have tested a nuclear-capable HGV84—launched by a Long
March rocket—in August 2021.85 In contrast to the ballistic missiles that China has previously

80 Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the
Security Dilemma,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/
07/23/conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-
dilemma-pub-76894.
81 Ibid.; and Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide,” August 15, 2017, Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, at https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide.
82 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2014 Annual Report, p. 292, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/annual_reports/Complete%20Report.PDF.
83 General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, “Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” February, 13, 2020,
at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/OShaughnessy_02-13-20.pdf.
84 It is not clear if this nuclear-capable HGV is the same model as that referenced by General O’Shaughnessy.
85 Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “China tests new space capability with hypersonic missile,” October 16,
2021, at https://www.ft.com/content/ba0a3cde-719b-4040-93cb-a486e1f843fb. China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
(continued...)
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used to launch HGVs, the Long March, a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS),
launches the HGV into orbit before the HGV de-orbits to its target. This could provide China with
a space-based global strike capability and further reduce the amount of target warning time prior
to a strike.86
China has additionally tested the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle at least nine times since 2014.
U.S. defense officials have reportedly identified the range of the DF-ZF as approximately 1,200
miles and have stated that the missile may be capable of performing evasive maneuvers during
flight.87 Although unconfirmed by intelligence agencies, some analysts believe the DF-ZF could
have become operational as early as 2020.88 In addition, in August 2018 China successfully tested
Starry Sky-2, a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle prototype.89 Some reports indicate that the
Starry Sky-2 could be operational by 2025.90 U.S. officials have declined to comment on the
program.91
Russia
Although Russia has conducted research on hypersonic weapons technology since the 1980s, it
accelerated its efforts in response to U.S. missile defense deployments in both the United States
and Europe, and in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in
2002.92 Detailing Russia’s concerns, President Putin stated in 2018 that “the US is permitting
constant, uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-ballistic missiles, improving their quality,
and creating new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, eventually this will result in
the complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that all of our missiles could
simply be intercepted.”93 Russia thus seeks hypersonic weapons, which can maneuver as they

Zhao Lijian has stated that “this was a routine test of [a] space vehicle,” rather than a test of a nuclear-capable HGV.
Zhao Lijian, “Remarks at Regular Press Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,
October 18, 2021, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1915130.shtml.
86 Greg Hadley, “Kendall: China Has Potential to Strike Earth From Space,” Air Force Magazine, September 20, 2021,
at https://www.airforcemag.com/global-strikes-space-china-frank-kendall/.
87 “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” The Economist, April 6, 2019, at
https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-faster-than-mach-5-are-
coming; and Franz-Stefan Gady, “China Tests New Weapon Capable of Breaching US Missile Defense Systems,” The
Diplomat, April 28, 2016, at https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-tests-new-weapon-capable-of-breaching-u-s-
missile-defense-systems/.
88 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2015 Annual Report, p. 20, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.PDF.
89 Jessie Yeung, “China claims to have successfully tested its first hypersonic aircraft,” CNN, August 7, 2018, at
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/china/china-hypersonic-aircraft-intl/index.html. See also U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission 2018 Annual Report, p. 220, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/
2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf.
90 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report 2015, p. 20.
91 Bill Gertz, “China Reveals Test of New Hypersonic Missile,” The Washington Free Beacon, August 10, 2018, at
https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinas-reveals-test-new-hypersonic-missile/.
92 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons: A Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic
Arms Control, February 2019, at https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/hypersonic-weapons-a-challenge-
and-opportunity-for-strategic-arms-control/.
93 Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/56957.
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approach their targets, as an assured means of penetrating U.S. missile defenses and restoring its
sense of strategic stability.94
Russia is pursuing two nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons: the Avangard and the 3M22 Tsirkon
(or Zircon).95 Avangard is a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from an ICBM, giving it
“effectively ‘unlimited’ range.”96 Reports indicate that Avangard is currently deployed on the SS-
19 Stiletto ICBM, though Russia plans to eventually launch the vehicle from the Sarmat ICBM.
Sarmat reportedly entered combat duty in September 2023.97 Tsirkon has a range of between
approximately 250 and 600 miles and can be fired from the vertical launch systems mounted on
cruisers Admiral Nakhimov and Pyotr Veliky, Project 20380 corvettes, Project 22350 frigates, and
Project 885 Yasen-class submarines, among other platforms.98 Russian news sources assert that
Tsirkon was successfully launched from a Project 22350 frigate in January, October, and
December 2020 and May 2022, and from a Project 885 Yasen-class submarine in October 2021.99
Russia reportedly deployed Tsirkon on the Project 22350 frigate Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet
Union Gorshkov in January 2023.100
International Institutions
No international treaty or agreement is dedicated to overseeing the development of hypersonic
weapons. Although the New START Treaty—a strategic offensive arms treaty between the United
States and Russia—does not specifically limit hypersonic weapons, it does limit ICBMs, which
could be used to launch hypersonic glide vehicles.101 Because Russia has deployed its Avangard
hypersonic glide vehicle on an SS-19 ICBM, it has agreed that missiles equipped with Avangard
count under New START. Furthermore, Article V of the treaty states that “when a Party believes
that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the

94 In this instance, “strategic stability” refers to a “bilateral nuclear relationship of mutual vulnerability.” See Tong
Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Security
Dilemma,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/
conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemma-
pub-76894.
95 Although it is frequently characterized as a “hypersonic weapon”—including by U.S. defense officials, a third
weapon, the Kinzhal, is a maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile. See, for example, CSIS Missile Defense Project,
“Kh-47M2 Kinzhal,” Updated March 19, 2022, at https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kinzhal/.
96 Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” Aviation Week, January 14-27, 2019, p. 20.
97 Al Jazeera, “Russia puts advanced Sarmat nuclear missile system on ‘combat duty,’” September 2, 2023, at
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/2/russia-puts-advanced-sarmat-nuclear-missile-system-on-combat-
duty#:~:text=Russia%20test%2Dfired%20the%20Sarmat,in%20Russia's%20far%20east%20region. Sarmat could
reportedly accommodate at least three Avangard vehicles. See Malcolm Claus, “Russia unveils new strategic delivery
systems,” Jane’s (subscription required), at https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR.
98 “Russia makes over 10 test launches of Tsirkon seaborne hypersonic missile,” TASS, December 21, 2018, at
http://tass.com/defense/1037426. See also Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power
Aspirations, Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 79, at https://www.dia.mil/portals/27/documents/news/
military%20power%20publications/russia%20military%20power%20report%202017.pdf.
99 “TASS: Russia Conducts First Ship-Based Hypersonic Missile Test,” Reuters, February 27, 2020, at
https://www.voanews.com/europe/tass-russia-conducts-first-ship-based-hypersonic-missile-test; and Samuel Cranny-
Evans, “Russia conducts first submarine test launches of Tsirkon hypersonic missile,” Jane’s (subscription required),
October 4, 2021.
100 Guy Faulconbridge, “Putin deploys new Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles to Atlantic,” Reuters, January 4, 2023, at
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-sends-off-frigate-armed-with-new-hypersonic-cruise-missile-2023-01-04/.
101 For example, Russia’s Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle is reportedly launched by an intercontinental ballistic
missile. See Rachel S. Cohen, “Hypersonic Weapons: Strategic Asset or Tactical Tool?,” Air Force Magazine, May 7,
2019, at https://www.airforcemag.com/hypersonic-weapons-strategic-asset-or-tactical-tool/.
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question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative
Commission (BCC).” Accordingly, some legal experts hold that it would be possible to negotiate
provisions that would count additional types of hypersonic weapons under the New START
limits.102 However, because New START is due to expire in 2026, this may be a short-term
solution.103 In addition, the treaty would not cover hypersonic weapons developed in countries
other than the United States and Russia.104
Finally, some analysts have noted that if any parties to the Outer Space Treaty were to launch a
nuclear-armed HGV on a fractional orbital bombardment system, they would likely be in
violation of Article IV of the treaty, which prohibits the placement of “any objects carrying
nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction” into orbit.105
Potential Questions for Congress
• What mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons
the most cost-effective means of executing these potential missions?
• Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how
should Congress evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or
the balance of funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling
technologies, and supporting test infrastructure?
• How, if at all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability? Is
there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START,
negotiating new multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking
transparency and confidence-building activities?
Directed Energy (DE) Weapons106
DOD defines directed energy (DE) weapons as those using concentrated electromagnetic energy,
rather than kinetic energy, to “incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy equipment,
facilities, and/or personnel.”107 DE weapons could be used by ground forces in short-range air
defense (SHORAD), counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS), or counter-rocket, artillery,
and mortar (C-RAM) missions.108 DE weapons could offer low costs per shot and—assuming

102 James Acton notes: “during [New START] negotiations, Russia argued that boost-glide weapons might constitute ‘a
new kind of strategic offensive arm,’ in which case they would trigger bilateral discussions about whether and how
they would be regulated by the treaty—a position [then] rejected by the United States.” James M. Acton, Silver Bullet?:
Asking the Right Questions about Conventional Prompt Global Strike, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2013, p. 139, at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf.
103 CRS Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, by Amy F. Woolf.
104 In addition to China, countries with hypersonic weapons development programs include Australia, India, France,
Germany, South Korea, North Korea, and Japan. For additional information, see CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic
Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler.
105 Jeffrey Lewis, “China’s Orbital Bombardment System Is Big, Bad News—but Not a Breakthrough,” Foreign
Policy, October 18, 2021, at https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/18/hypersonic-china-missile-nuclear-fobs/.
106 For additional information about directed energy weapons, see CRS Report R46925, Department of Defense
Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kelley M. Sayler.
107 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, Joint Publication 3-85, May 22, 2020, GL-6.
108 For more information about the role of DE weapons in C-UAS missions, see CRS In Focus IF11426, Department of
Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems, by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler.
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access to a sufficient power supply109—nearly limitless magazines that, in contrast to existing
conventional systems, could enable an efficient and effective means of defending against missile
salvos or swarms of unmanned systems. Theoretically, DE weapons could also provide options
for boost-phase missile intercept, given their speed-of-light travel time; however, as in the case of
hypersonic missile defense, experts disagree on the affordability, technological feasibility, and
utility of this application.110
High-powered microwave weapons, a subset of DE weapons, could be used as a nonkinetic
means of disabling electronics, communications systems, and improvised explosive devices, or as
a nonlethal “heat ray” system for crowd control.
United States
Although the United States has been researching directed energy since the 1960s, some experts
have observed that “actual directed energy programs … have frequently fallen short of
expectations,” with DOD investing billions of dollars in programs that were ultimately
cancelled.111 Others contend that developments in commercial lasers could be leveraged for
military applications.112 Directed energy weapons programs continue, however, to face questions
about their technological maturity, including questions about the ability to improve beam quality
and control to militarily useful levels and the ability to meet power, cooling, and size
requirements for integration into current platforms.113
The U.S. Navy fielded the first operational U.S. DE weapon, the Laser Weapon System (LaWS),
in 2014 aboard the USS Ponce. LaWS was a 30-kilowatt (-kW) laser prototype that “was capable
of blinding enemy forces as a warning, shooting down drones, disabling boats, or damaging
helicopters.”114 In addition, the Navy installed its 60-kW laser, HELIOS, on the USS Preble in
FY2022 and plans to continue at-sea testing through at least the end of FY2028.115 Similarly, the
Army delivered a platoon of 50-kW Directed Energy Mobile Short-Range Air Defense System
prototypes to the 4th Battalion, 60th Air Defense Artillery Regiment (Fort Sill, Oklahoma) in

109 Although research has been conducted on chemically fueled lasers, most countries are now pursuing solid state
lasers, which are fueled by electrical power. As a result, the cost per shot is equivalent to the cost of the electrical
power required to fire the shot. See Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” National
Defense, July 1, 2015, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-
weapons-will-they-ever-be-ready.
110 See, for example, James N. Miller and Frank A. Rose, “Bad Idea: Space-Based Interceptors and Space-Based
Directed Energy Systems,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 13, 2018, at
https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-space-based-interceptors-and-space-based-directed-energy-systems/; and Justin
Doubleday, “Pentagon punts MDA‘s laser ambitions, shifts funding toward OSD-led ‘laser scaling,’” Inside Defense,
February 19, 2020, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/pentagon-punts-mdas-laser-ambitions-shifts-funding-
toward-osd-led-laser-scaling.
111 Paul Scharre, Preface to “Directed-Energy Weapons: Promise and Prospects,” Center for a New American Security,
April 2015, p. 4.
112 See Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July 1, 2015, at
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-
ready.
113 Ibid.
114 Kyle Mizokami, “The U.S. Army Plans To Field the Most Powerful Laser Weapon Yet,” Popular Mechanics,
August 7, 2019. Kilowatts are units of power. For example, 1 kilowatt is equal to 1,000 watts.
115 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, March 2023, p. 979, at
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/24pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf.
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2023.116 The Air Force is currently conducting field assessments of several counter-UAS DE
systems, including both laser and high-powered microwave systems.117
Overall, DOD requested approximately $1 billion for directed energy weapons programs in
FY2024.118 Many of these programs are intended to support DOD’s Directed Energy Roadmap.
According to OUSD(R&E), DOD’s DE roadmap outlines DOD’s plans to increase power levels
of HEL weapons from around 150 kilowatt (kW), as is currently feasible, to 500 kW class—with
reduced size and weight—by FY2025. DOD seeks “to further reduce size and weight and
increase power to MW [megawatt] levels by FY2026.”119
China
According to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China has been
developing DE weapons since at least the 1980s and has made steady progress in developing
HPM and increasingly powerful HELs.120 China has reportedly developed a 30-kilowatt road-
mobile DE system, LW-30, designed to engage unmanned aerial vehicles and precision-guided
weapons.121 Reports indicate that China is also developing an airborne DE weapon pod and has
used or proposed using DE weapons to interfere with U.S. and allied military aircraft and to
disrupt U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific.122
According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, China is additionally pursuing DE weapons
to disrupt, degrade, or damage satellites and their sensors and possibly already has a limited
capability to employ laser systems against satellite sensors. China likely will field a
ground-based laser weapon that can counter low-orbit space-based sensors by 2020, and
by the mid-to-late 2020s, it may field higher power systems that extend the threat to the
structures of non-optical satellites.123

116 Venetia Gonzales, “Groundbreaking laser prototype systems delivered to 4-60th Air Defense Artillery Regiment,”
U.S. Army, September 21, 2023, at
https://www.army.mil/article/270134/groundbreaking_laser_prototype_systems_delivered_to_4_60th_air_defense_artil
lery_regiment.
117 For a more in-depth discussion of U.S. DE programs, see CRS Report R46925, Department of Defense Directed
Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kelley M. Sayler.
118 CRS conversation with Principal Director for Directed Energy Dr. Frank Peterkin, May 17, 2023. See also
Government Accountability Office, Directed Energy Weapons: DOD Should Focus Transition on Planning, April
2023, p. 1.
119 CRS correspondence with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, September 8,
2022. For reference, although no consensus exists regarding the precise power level that would be needed to neutralize
different target sets, DOD briefing documents suggest that a laser of approximately 100 kW could engage UASs,
rockets, artillery, and mortars, whereas a laser of around 300 kW could additionally engage small boats and cruise
missiles flying in certain profiles (i.e., flying across—rather than at—the laser). Lasers of 1 MW could potentially
neutralize ballistic missiles and hypersonic weapons. Dr. Jim Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon
Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” presentation at IDGA, October 21, 2020; and CRS conversation with
then-Principal Director for Directed Energy Modernization Dr. Jim Trebes, November 17, 2020. Required power levels
could be affected by additional factors such as adversary countermeasures and atmospheric conditions and effects.
120 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), USCC 2017 Annual Report, November 2017, p.
563, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-09/2017_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf.
121 Nikolai Novichkov, “Airshow China 2018: CASIC’s LW-30 laser weapon system breaks cover,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly, November 9, 2018.
122 Andrew Tate, “China aiming to procure airborne laser-based weapon pod,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 8, 2020;
and Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at
https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/.
123 Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, February 2019, p. 20, at https://www.dia.mil/Portals/
27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf.
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Russia
Russia has been conducting DE weapons research since the 1960s, with a particular emphasis on
HELs. Russia has reportedly deployed the Peresvet, a mobile, ground-based HEL, with several
mobile intercontinental ballistic missile units. Although little is publicly known about Peresvet,
including its power level, some analysts assert it is to dazzle satellites and provide point defense
against unmanned aircraft systems.124 Russia’s deputy defense minister Alexei Krivoruchko has
stated that efforts are underway to increase Peresvet’s power level and to deploy it on military
aircraft.125 Reports suggest that Russia may also be developing HPMs as well as additional HELs
capable of performing antisatellite missions.
International Institutions
DE weapons “are not authoritatively defined under international law, nor are they currently on the
agenda of any existing multilateral mechanism.”126 However, certain applications of DE weapons
are prohibited. For example, Protocol I of the CCW “Protocol on Blinding Lasers” prohibits the
employment of “laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of
their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision.”127 Some analysts
have suggested that multilateral agreements should be considered. For example, Congress may
consider prohibitions on nonlethal anti-personnel uses of DE weapons—such as “heat rays” or
lasers intended to cause temporary visual impairment—or on certain military applications of DE
weapons—such as aircraft interference—in peacetime.128 Other analysts have argued that DE
weapons could be considered more humane than conventional weapons because their accuracy
could potentially reduce collateral damage and because they could provide a nonlethal anti-
personnel capability in circumstances in which lethal force might otherwise be used.129
Potential Questions for Congress
• Does the technological maturity of DE weapons warrant current funding levels?
To what extent, if at all, can advances in commercial lasers be leveraged for
military applications?

124 Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, February 2019, p. 23, at https://www.dia.mil/Portals/
27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf; and “Putin hails new
Russian laser weapons,” Associated Press, May 17, 2019, at https://apnews.com/ff03960c48a6440bacc1c2512a7c197a.
125 Bart Hendrickx, “Peresvet: a Russian mobile laser system to dazzle enemy satellites,” The Space Review, June 5,
2020, at https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3967/1.
126 “Directed Energy Weapons: Discussion paper for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),”
Article 36, November 2017.
127 The protocol does not cover the development, procurement, or possession of such weapons, nor does it prohibit the
employment of laser weapons that may cause blindness “as an incidental or collateral effect.” Additional Protocol to
the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to
Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Vienna, October 13, 1995, United Nations, Treaty Series,
vol. 1380, p. 370, at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1995/10/19951013%2001-30%20AM/Ch_XXVI_02_ap.pdf.
For additional information about the protocol and its relationship to DE weapons programs, see Appendix I of CRS
Report R41526, Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
128 Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at
https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/.
129 See, for example, Mark Gunzinger and Chris Dougherty, Changing the Game: The Promise of Directed-Energy
Weapons, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 19, 2021, at https://csbaonline.org/uploads/
documents/CSBA_ChangingTheGame_ereader.pdf.
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• How successful have U.S. field tests of DE weapons been? Are any changes to
operational concepts, rules of engagement, or tactics required to optimize the use
of DE weapons or deconflict the use of DE weapons with other U.S. military
operations?
• In what circumstances and for what purposes should the U.S. military’s use of
DE weapons be permissible? What, if any, regulations, treaties, or other measures
should the United States consider with regard to the use of DE weapons in both
war and peacetime?
Biotechnology
Biotechnology leverages life sciences for technological applications. A number of developments
in biotechnology hold potential implications for the U.S. military and for international security
writ large. As a 2018 Government Accountability Office report notes, the Departments of
Defense, State, and Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
assess that biotechnologies, such as the low-cost gene-editing tool CRISPR,130 have the potential
to
alter genes or create DNA to modify plants, animals, and humans. Such biotechnologies
could be used to enhance [or degrade] the performance of military personnel. The
proliferation of synthetic biology—used to create genetic code that does not exist in
nature—may increase the number of actors that can create chemical and biological
weapons.131
Similarly, the U.S. intelligence community’s 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment cited genome
editing as a potential weapon of mass destruction.132
In addition, biotechnology could be used to create adaptive camouflage, cloaking devices, or
lighter, stronger, and—potentially—self-healing body and vehicle armor.133 Concerns have been
raised that U.S. competitors may not hold the same ethical standards in the research and
application of biotechnologies, particularly regarding biological weapons, genome editing, or
more invasive forms of human performance modification.134

130 For a general overview of CRISPR, see CRS Report R44824, Advanced Gene Editing: CRISPR-Cas9, by Marcy E.
Gallo et al.
131 Government Accountability Office, National Security: Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States as
Identified by Federal Agencies, December 2018, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf.
132 James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”
delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 9, 2016.
133 Patrick Tucker, “The US Army Is Making Synthetic Biology a Priority,” Defense One, July 1, 2019; and “Army
scientists explore synthetic biology potential,” U.S. Army, June 24, 2019, at https://www.army.mil/article/223495/
army_scientists_explore_synthetic_biology_potential.
134 James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”
delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 9, 2016; and Daniel R. Coats, “Statement for
the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” delivered before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed Services, March 6, 2018. Although the U.S. military has long used certain drugs such as caffeine,
modafinil, dextroamphetamine, and various sleep aids to enhance soldier performance, it bans other performance-
enhancing drugs and techniques such as anabolic steroids and blood doping. See Paul Scharre and Lauren Fish, Human
Performance Enhancement, Center for a New American Security, November 7, 2018, at https://www.cnas.org/
publications/reports/human-performance-enhancement-1.
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United States
Overall, DOD requested $1.3 billion for biotechnology efforts in FY2023; the department did not
provide a topline breakout of its request for biotechnology in FY2024.135 Unclassified U.S.
biotechnology programs with military applications center primarily on improving “readiness,
resilience, and recovery.” DARPA, for example, has a number of biotechnology programs
devoted to battlefield medicine, diagnostics, and prognostics. It is also exploring options for
mitigating the effects of traumatic brain injury, treating neuropsychiatric illnesses such as
depression and post-traumatic stress, and protecting against infectious diseases and bio-
engineered threats to the U.S. food supply. In addition, DARPA’s Safe Genes program seeks “to
[protect] service members from accidental or intentional misuse of genome editing
technologies.”136
DOD is also exploring “advanced development and operational testing of biomanufacturing
capabilities to provide alternative sources for critical supply chain materials” and other “products
needed for non-medical supply chain resiliency,” and is to invest $1 billion in bioindustrial
domestic manufacturing infrastructure over five years.137 Similarly, DOD has announced the
establishment of a Tri-Service Biotechnology for a Resilient Supply Chain program, which is to
include “more than $270 million investment over five years … to support the advanced
development of bio-based materials for defense supply chains, such as fuels, fire-resistant
composites, polymers and resins, and protective materials.”138 In addition, Section 215 of the
FY2023 NDAA directs the Secretary of Defense, subject to the availability of appropriations, to
provide support for the development of a network of bioindustrial manufacturing facilities.139 In
support of these efforts, DOD released its Biomanufacturing Strategy in March 2023.140

135 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: United
States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, April 2022, p. 4-7, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.
pdf.
136 See Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Our Research: Biological Technologies Office,” at
https://www.darpa.mil/our-research?tFilter=&oFilter=1.
137 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: United
States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, April 2022, p. 4-7, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/
Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf; and The White House,
“FACT SHEET: The United States Announces New Investments and Resources to Advance President Biden’s National
Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Initiative,” September 14, 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/statements-releases/2022/09/14/fact-sheet-the-united-states-announces-new-investments-and-resources-to-
advance-president-bidens-national-biotechnology-and-biomanufacturing-initiative/.
138 The White House, “FACT SHEET: The United States Announces New Investments and Resources to Advance
President Biden’s National Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Initiative,” September 14, 2022, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/09/14/fact-sheet-the-united-states-announces-
new-investments-and-resources-to-advance-president-bidens-national-biotechnology-and-biomanufacturing-initiative/.
139 P.L. 117-263, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §215. DOD’s FY2024 budget request notes that, following a $300
million congressional add in support of Section 215, the BioMADE Manufacturing Innovation Institute—a DOD-
sponsored public-private partnership headquartered at the University of Minnesota in St. Paul—is to initiate the
development of the network. DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Defense-Wide Justification Book Volume 3 of 5 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation,
March 2023, p. 296, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2024/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/OS
D_PB2024.pdf.
140 Department of Defense, Biomanufacturing Strategy, March 21, 2023, at
https://media.defense.gov/2023/Mar/22/2003184301/-1/-1/1/BIOMANUFACTURING-STRATEGY.PDF.
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Some reports suggest that the United States is also researching or has previously researched
biotechnology and neuroscience applications to increase soldier lethality, including applications
to make soldiers “stronger, smarter, [and] more capable, and … give them more endurance than
other humans.”141 Some groups have expressed ethical concerns about this research; although the
United States had a series of presidential bioethics commissions between 1974 and 2017, there is
no current national framework for examining ethical concerns.142
Although there does not appear to be a DOD-specific biotechnology research strategy, the Biden
Administration released the National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan for
Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health
Security—as well as an associated National Security Memorandum on Countering Biological
Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security (NSM-15)—
in October 2022.143 These documents outline “how the U.S. Government will manage its
activities to more effectively assess, prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from biological
threats, coordinating its biodefense efforts with those of [state, local, tribal, and territorial]
entities, international partners, industry, academia, nongovernmental entities, and the private
sector.”144 The Administration notes that, while it is currently “implementing key actions in the
Strategy with existing funding,” full implementation “will require the support of Congress to
provide additional resources, including the President’s $88 billion request over five years for
pandemic preparedness and biodefense.”145
Congress has expressed an interest in conducting oversight of the military applications of
emerging biotechnologies. For example, per Section 263 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92),
DOD is to conduct “a review of the military understanding and relevancy of applications of
emerging biotechnologies to national security requirements of the Department of Defense” and
provide recommendations for future legislative and administrative activities.”146 Section 278 of
the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs DOD to “conduct an assessment and direct comparison

141 Annie Jacobsen, The Pentagon’s Brain: An Uncensored History of DARPA, America’s Top-Secret Military
Research Agency (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2015). See also Michael Joseph Gross, “The Pentagon’s
Push to Program Soldiers’ Brains,” The Atlantic, November 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/
2018/11/the-pentagon-wants-to-weaponize-the-brain-what-could-go-wrong/570841/.
142 For a history of these commissions, see Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, “History of
Bioethics Commissions,” archived January 15, 2017, at https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/history.html.
143 The White House, National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan for Countering Biological Threats,
Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security, October 2022, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Biodefense-Strategy-and-Implementation-Plan-
Final.pdf; and The White House, National Security Memorandum on Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing
Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security, October 18, 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/10/18/national-security-memorandum-on-countering-biological-threats-
enhancing-pandemic-preparedness-and-achieving-global-health-security/. See also Diane Dieuliis, “Biotechnology for
the Battlefield: In Need of a Strategy,” War on the Rocks, November 27, 2018.
144 The White House, National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan for Countering Biological Threats,
Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security, October 2022, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Biodefense-Strategy-and-Implementation-Plan-
Final.pdf.
145 The White House, “Fact Sheet: Biden-⁠Harris Administration Releases Strategy to Strengthen Health Security and
Prepare for Biothreats,” October 18, 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/10/
18/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-releases-strategy-to-strengthen-health-security-and-prepare-for-biothreats/.
This $88 billion request includes funds for the Department of Health and Human Services, the Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Preparedness and Response, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Institutes of
Health, the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International
Development; it does not include funds for DOD.
146 P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §263.
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of capabilities in emerging biotechnologies for national security purposes ... between the
capabilities of the United States and the capabilities of adversaries of the United States.”147
Similarly, Section 1312 of the FY2024 NDAA (P.L. 118-31) directs the Secretary of Defense to
conduct “an analysis to determine if any biotechnology entity, or any subsidiary, parent, affiliate,
or successor of such an entity, should be identified as a Chinese military company or a military-
civil fusion contributor and included on [DOD’s 1260H] list.”148
Finally, Section 1091 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) establishes the National Security
Commission on Emerging Biotechnology, which is to “consider the methods, means, and
investments necessary to advance and secure the development of biotechnology,
biomanufacturing, and associated technologies by the United States to comprehensively address
the national security and defense needs of the United States.” The commission delivered an
interim report to Congress in December 2023 and is to deliver its final report in December
2024.149
China
Motivated by an aging population and growing health care needs, China has been particularly
interested in conducting biotechnology research. Biotechnology is cited as a key strategic priority
within China’s Made in China 2025 initiative and is additionally highlighted within China’s
current five-year development plan.150 In particular, China is aggressively pursuing
biotechnologies for genetic testing and precision medicine. In 2016, Chinese scientists became
the first to use the CRISPR gene-editing tool on humans, and in 2018, a Chinese scientist
produced—perhaps with the approval of the Chinese government—the first “gene-edited
babies.”151 In addition, China maintains one of the world’s largest repositories of genetic
information, the National Genebank, which includes U.S. genetic data. Such information could be
used to develop personalized disease treatment plans or, potentially, precision bioweapons.152
Open-source information about China’s research into specific military applications of
biotechnology is limited; however, China’s policy of military-civil fusion would enable the
Chinese military to readily leverage developments in civilian biotechnology.153 Furthermore,
reports indicate that China’s Central Military Commission “has funded projects on military brain
science, advanced biomimetic systems, biological and biomimetic materials, human performance

147 P.L. 116-283, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §278.
148 For additional information about DOD’s 1260H list, see Section 1260H of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283).
149 See National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology, Interim Report, December 2023, at
https://www.biotech.senate.gov/press-releases/interim-report/.
150 “Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and
Long-Range Objectives for 2035,” Xinhua News Agency, March 12, 2021, Translated by Etcetera Language Group,
Inc., at https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/t0284_14th_Five_Year_Plan_EN.pdf.
151 Amidst international outcry, China later sentenced the scientist to three years in jail and termed his work “extremely
abominable in nature.” Michael Standaert, “'Extremely abominable’: Chinese gene-editing scientist faces law,” Al
Jazeera, November 26, 2018. See also, Elsa Kania, “Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military Is Preparing for a
‘New Domain of Warfare,’” Defense One, August 14, 2019.
152 David J. Lynch, “Biotechnology: the US-China dispute over genetic data,” Financial Times, July 31, 2017. See also
Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “China’s Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New
Revolution in Military Affairs,” The Jamestown Foundation, October 8, 2019, at https://jamestown.org/program/
chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/.
153 Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military Is Preparing for a ‘New Domain of
Warfare,’” Defense One, August 14, 2019, at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/08/chinas-military-pursuing-
biotech/159167/.
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enhancement, and ‘new concept’ biotechnology,” while the Chinese military’s medical
institutions have conducted extensive research on CRISPR gene editing.154
Russia
Although Russia released BIO2020—a whole-of-government strategy for improving the standing
of Russia’s biotechnology sector—in 2012, biotechnology research in Russia continues to lag
behind that of the United States and China.155 BIO2020 identifies Russia’s priority areas for
biotechnology research as biopharmaceutics and biomedicine, industrial biotechnology and
bioenergetics, agricultural and food biotechnology, forest biotechnology, environmental
protection biotechnology, and marine biotechnology.156
Little information is publicly available on how Russia might employ such dual-use technologies
within a military or national security context. However, the accusation that the country attempted
to assassinate a former double agent for the United Kingdom using a Novichok nerve agent—in
violation of the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention—suggests that it may be similarly
unrestrained in weaponizing biological agents, including those derived from synthetic biology.157
Indeed, the Soviet Union is known to have maintained an extensive, long-standing biological
weapons program, Biopreparat, in violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.158
Furthermore, in August 2020, the End-User Review Committee (ERC)—composed of
representatives of the U.S. Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, Energy, and, where
appropriate, Treasury—stated that it has “reasonable cause” to believe that three Russian research
institutes are associated with the Russian biological weapons program.159
International Institutions
Only the weaponization of biotechnology is prohibited under international law.160 Some
international institutions have demonstrated interest in considering broader implications of
biotechnologies. For example, since 1983, ASEAN has maintained a subcommittee on
biotechnology that facilitates coordination of regional biotechnology projects. Similarly, since
1993, the OECD has maintained an Internal Co-ordination Group for Biotechnology that
monitors developments in biotechnology and facilitates coordination among various sectors
involved in biotechnology research (e.g., agriculture, science and technology, environment,
industry). In addition, the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity is charged with

154 Ibid.
155 Russian Federation, “BIO2020: Summary of the State Coordination Program for the Development of Biotechnology
in the Russian Federation,” 2012.
156 Ibid.
157 Mark Urban, “Salisbury attack ‘evidence’ of Russian weapon stockpile,” BBC, March 4, 2019. For a full assessment
of the potential national security threats posed by synthetic biology, see the Committee on Strategies for Identifying
and Addressing Potential Biodefense Vulnerabilities Posed by Synthetic Biology Consensus Report: Biodefense in the
Age of Synthetic Biology, National Academy of Sciences, 2018, at http://nap.edu/24890.
158 Lukas Trakimavičius “Is Russia Violating the Biological Weapons Convention?,” Atlantic Council, May 23, 2018,
at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/is-russia-violating-the-biological-weapons-convention/.
159 The ERC added these research institutes to the Entity List, which identifies entities acting “contrary to the national
security or foreign policy interests of the United States.” Department of Commerce, “Addition of Entities to the Entity
List, and Revision of Entries on the Entity List,” August 27, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/08/
27/2020-18909/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list-and-revision-of-entries-on-the-entity-list.
160 The United States, China, and Russia have ratified the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which is a legally
binding treaty that bans the development and production of biological weapons.
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governing the development and use of genetically modified organisms.161 These entities are not,
however, focused specifically on military applications of biotechnology.
In terms of potential militarization, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention requires review
conferences, which every five years assess both the implementation of the treaty and ongoing
developments in biotechnology. Annual meetings are held between review conferences to
informally consider relevant topics, as well as to address national bilateral and multilateral efforts
to enhance biosecurity. Some analysts have argued that an international framework should be
established to consider the militarization of biotechnologies and discuss potential regulation of or
limits on certain applications.162
Potential Questions for Congress
• Is a DOD biotechnology strategy or organization needed to identify research
priorities and coordinate department-wide research? What, if any, resources or
organizational changes would be required to fully implement a national
biodefense strategy?
• What military applications of biotechnologies are U.S. competitors developing?
Is the U.S. military appropriately balancing the potential warfighting utility of
biotechnologies with ethical considerations?
• What, if any, national and international frameworks are needed to consider the
ethical, moral, and legal implications of military applications of biotechnologies
such as synthetic biology, genome editing, and human performance
modification?
Quantum Technology163
Quantum technology translates the principles of quantum physics into technological
applications.164 In general, quantum technology has not yet reached maturity; however, it could
hold significant implications for the future of military sensing, encryption, and communications.
GAO reports that DOD, State, DHS, and ODNI have assessed that “quantum communications
could enable adversaries to develop secure communications that U.S. personnel would not be able
to intercept or decrypt. Quantum computing may allow adversaries to decrypt [unclassified,
classified, or sensitive] information, which could enable them to target U.S. personnel and
military operations.”165

161 The United States is not a party to this convention or its associated protocols.
162 See, for example, Brett Edwards, “We’ve got to talk: The militarization of biotechnology,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, August 4, 2017, at https://thebulletin.org/2017/08/weve-got-to-talk-the-militarization-of-biotechnology/.
163 See also CRS In Focus IF11836, Defense Primer: Quantum Technology, by Kelley M. Sayler.
164 These principles include superposition—in which “a quantum system can exist in two or more states at once”—and
entanglement—in which “two or more quantum objects in a system can be intrinsically linked such that measurement
of one dictates the possible measurement outcomes for another, regardless of how far apart the two objects are.” Emily
Grumbling and Mark Horowitz, eds., Quantum Computing: Progress and Prospects, National Academy of Sciences,
2019, at https://www.nap.edu/read/25196/chapter/1. For additional information about quantum technology, see CRS
Report R45409, Quantum Information Science: Applications, Global Research and Development, and Policy
Considerations, by Patricia Moloney Figliola.
165 Government Accountability Office, National Security: Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States as
Identified by Federal Agencies, December 2018, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf. Significant advances
in quantum computing will likely be required to break current encryption methods. Indeed, some analysts believe that a
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Quantum technology could have other military applications, such as quantum sensing, which
could theoretically enable significant improvements in submarine detection, rendering the oceans
“transparent.”166 This could, in turn, compromise the survivability of the U.S. sea-based nuclear
deterrent. Quantum sensing could also provide alternative positioning, navigation, and timing
options that could in theory allow militaries to continue to operate at full performance in GPS-
degraded or GPS-denied environments.
Military application of such technologies could be constrained, however, by the fragility of
quantum states, which can be disrupted by minute movements, changes in temperature, or other
environmental factors. As physicist Mikkel Hueck has explained, “if future devices that use
quantum technologies [continue to] require cooling to very cold temperatures, then this will make
them expensive, bulky, and power hungry.”167 As a result, widespread adoption will likely require
significant advances in materials science and fabrication techniques.
United States
According to a Defense Science Board Task Force on Applications of Quantum Technologies
assessment, three applications of quantum technologies demonstrate the most promise for the
U.S. military: quantum sensing, quantum computing, and quantum communications.168 The task
force notes that quantum sensing could “dramatically improve” DOD’s ability to conduct certain
missions, providing precision navigation and timing options in environments in which GPS is
degraded or denied; that quantum computers could “potentially give DOD substantial
computation power” for decryption, signals processing, and AI; and that quantum
communications could improve networking technologies.169 The task force concludes that
“quantum sensing applications are currently poised for mission use whereas quantum computing
and communications are in earlier stages of development…. Quantum radar will not provide
upgraded capability to DOD.”170 Both DARPA and the services fund an array of quantum
technology programs across these and other research areas.
In addition, some analysts believe that an initial quantum computer prototype capable of breaking
current encryption methods could be developed in the 2030 to 2040 timeframe.171 For this reason,
the United States is investing in post-quantum cryptography (also known as quantum-resistant
cryptography). In May 2022, the Biden administration released National Security Memorandum

quantum computer with around 20 million qubits—shorthand for “quantum bits,” or computing units that leverage the
principle of superposition—would be required to break these methods; the most advanced quantum computers today
have around 256 qubits. See Siobhan Roberts, “This new startup has built a record-breaking 256-qubit quantum
computer,” MIT Technology Review, November 17, 2021, at https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/11/17/1040243/
quantum-computer-256-bit-startup/.
166 Michael J. Biercuk and Richard Fontaine, “The Leap into Quantum Technology: A Primer for National Security
Professionals,” War on the Rocks, November 17, 2017, at https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/leap-quantum-
technology-primer-national-security-professionals/.
167 U.S. Army Research Lab Public Affairs, “Army researchers see path to quantum computing at room temperature,”
April 30, 2020, at https://www.army.mil/article/235127/
army_researchers_see_path_to_quantum_computing_at_room_temperature#:~:text=
%E2%80%9CIf%20future%20devices%20that%20use,power%20hungry%2C%E2%80%9D%20Heuck%20said.
168 Defense Science Board, Applications of Quantum Technologies: Executive Summary, October 2019, at
https://dsb.cto.mil/reports.htm.
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid.
171 See, for example, “Quantum computers will break the encryption that protects the internet,” The Economist, October
10, 2018, at https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2018/10/20/quantum-computers-will-break-the-
encryption-that-protects-the-internet.
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on Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to
Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems (NSM-10), which “directs specific actions for agencies to take
as the United States begins the multi-year process of migrating vulnerable computer systems to
quantum-resistant cryptography.”172 NSM-10 notes that the Director of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology and the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) are
developing and expected to publicly release by 2024 technical standards for quantum-resistant
cryptography. In September 2022, NSA issued a cybersecurity advisory stating that it “expects the
transition to [quantum-resistant] algorithms for [national security systems] to be complete by
2035 in line with NSM-10.”173
Per Section 234 of the FY2019 NDAA (P.L. 115-232), the Secretary of Defense—acting through
the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering—is tasked with coordinating
quantum technology programs and providing “for interagency cooperation and collaboration on
quantum information science and technology research and development between the Department
of Defense and other departments and agencies of the United States and appropriate private sector
entities.”174 In addition, Section 220 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) authorizes the Secretary
of each military department to establish Quantum Information Science (QIS) Research Centers
that may “engage with appropriate public and private sector organizations” to advance quantum
research. To date, the Navy has designated the Naval Research Laboratory as its QIS Research
Center, while the Air Force has designated the Air Force Research Laboratory as a QIS Research
Center for both the Air Force and Space Force. The Army does not plan to establish a QIS
Research Center at this time.175
Finally, Section 214 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the services to compile and
annually update a list of technical challenges that quantum computers could potentially address
within the next one to three years.176 It also directs the services to establish programs with small
and medium businesses to provide quantum computing capabilities to government, industry, and
academic researchers working on these challenges. Section 1722 directs DOD to conduct an
assessment of the risks posed by quantum computers, as well as current standards for post-
quantum cryptography. In addition, Section 229 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) directs the
Secretary of Defense to establish activities to “to accelerate the development and deployment of
dual-use quantum capabilities,” while Section 511 expands the grant program for science,
technology, engineering, and math education in the Junior Research Officers’ Training Corps to
include quantum information sciences.

172 The White House, National Security Memorandum on Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing
While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems, May 4, 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/national-security-memorandum-on-promoting-united-states-leadership-in-
quantum-computing-while-mitigating-risks-to-vulnerable-cryptographic-systems/.
173 National Security Agency, “Cybersecurity Advisory: Announcing the Commercial National Security Algorithm
Suite 2.0,” September 7, 2022, at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/07/2003071834/-1/-1/0/
CSA_CNSA_2.0_ALGORITHMS_.PDF.
174 Section 219 of the FY2024 NDAA amended this provision to authorize the Secretary of Defense to “carry out a
program of fellowships in quantum information science and technology research and development for individuals who
have a graduate or postgraduate degree.” Similarly, Section 220 of the FY2024 NDAA (P.L. 118-31) directs the
Secretary of Defense to “to establish public-private talent exchange programs with private-sector entities working on
quantum information sciences and technology research applications.”
175 CRS correspondence with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, April 5,
2021.
176 On behalf of the services, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering identified
these challenges as quantum chemistry, optimization, and machine learning. CRS correspondence with the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, March 25, 2022.
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Finally, Section 231 of the FY2024 NDAA (P.L. 118-31) authorizes the Secretary of Defense to
carry out a pilot program on near-term quantum computing applications.
China
China has increasingly prioritized quantum technology research within its development plans.177
Indeed, President Xi has cited quantum communications and quantum computing as key research
initiatives “prioritized for major breakthroughs by 2030,” an objective that is also cited in the
country’s National Science and Technology Innovation Program.178 China is already a world
leader in quantum technology. In 2016, China launched the world’s first quantum satellite
(Micius) to provide a “global quantum encrypted communications capability.”179 In 2017, China
hosted the first quantum-secured intercontinental videoconference.180 Furthermore, China is
investing heavily in terrestrial quantum communications networks. It completed construction of a
2,000 kilometer (approximately 1,250 miles) Beijing-Shanghai quantum network in 2016 and
plans to expand that network nationwide in the years to come.181 While such advances in quantum
technology have been driven primarily by academia, China has expressed its intent to leverage
them for military applications in the country’s Thirteenth Five-Year S&T Military-Civil Fusion
Special Projects Plan.
Russia
Russian development of quantum technology, as with artificial intelligence, lags significantly
behind that of the United States and China, with some analysts noting that Russia is likely “5 to
10 years behind” in quantum computing.182 In an effort to spur development, Russia announced
plans in December 2019 to invest $790 million in quantum research over the next five years and
adopted a five-year Russian Quantum Technologies Roadmap.183 These initiatives are not

177 For a history of China’s quantum technology research and development initiatives, see Elsa B. Kania and John
Costello, Quantum Hegemony?: China’s Ambitions and the Challenge to U.S. Innovation Leadership, Center for a New
American Security, September 2018, p. 8, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReport-
Quantum-Tech_FINAL.pdf?mtime=20180912133406.
178 Ibid., p. 6.
179 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2019, May 2, 2019, p. 146, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/
2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf. This satellite—as well as the other communications networks
discussed in this section—employ quantum key distribution (QKD), a subset of quantum communications. QKD
enables secure communications that cannot be covertly intercepted during transmission. QKD communications can,
however, be intercepted at the relay stations currently required for long-distance transmissions.
180 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2019, May 2, 2019, p. 101, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/
2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf.
181 Elsa B. Kania and John Costello, Quantum Hegemony?: China’s Ambitions and the Challenge to U.S. Innovation
Leadership, p. 14. This terrestrial network is reportedly connected to Micius, which provides a satellite link “spanning
2,600 km [1,600 miles] between two observatories—one east of Beijing and the other just a few hundred kilometers
from China’s border with Kazakhstan.” See Hamish Johnston, “Quantum cryptography network spans 4600 km in
China,” Physics World, January 7, 2021, at https://physicsworld.com/a/quantum-cryptography-network-spans-4600-
km-in-china/.
182 Quirin Schiermeier, “Russia joins race to make quantum dreams a reality,” Nature, December 17, 2019, at
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03855-z.
183 For comparison, the U.S. National Quantum Initiative Act (P.L. 115-368), signed into law in December 2018,
commits the United States to investing $1.25 billion in quantum research over five years.
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military-specific, however, and limited information is available in open sources about how Russia
might apply them to its military.
International Institutions
No major international institutions have formal initiatives devoted to monitoring or regulating
military or other applications of quantum technology.
Potential Questions for Congress
• Does the maturity of military applications of quantum technology warrant current
funding levels? To what extent, if at all, can advances in commercial quantum
technology be leveraged for military applications?
• Are adequate measures being taken to develop quantum-resistant encryption and
to protect data that has been encrypted using current methods?
• How mature are U.S. competitor efforts to develop military applications of
quantum technologies? To what extent, if at all, could such efforts threaten
advanced U.S. military capabilities such as submarines and fifth-generation
stealth aircraft?
Potential Implications of Emerging Technologies
for Warfighting
The implications of emerging technologies for warfighting and strategic stability are difficult—if
not impossible—to predict, as they will be a function of many factors, including the rate of
technological advancement in both the United States and competitor nations, the manner in which
emerging technologies are integrated into existing military forces and concepts of operation, the
interactions between emerging technologies, and the extent to which national policies and
international law enable or inhibit their development, integration, and use.
Nonetheless, many emerging technologies exhibit characteristics that could potentially affect the
future character of war. For example, developments in technologies such as AI, big data analytics,
and lethal autonomous weapons could diminish or remove the need for a human operator. This
could, in turn, increase combat efficiency and accelerate the pace of combat—potentially with
destabilizing consequences.
Emerging technologies such as low-cost drones could shift the balance between quality—upon
which U.S. military forces have traditionally relied—and quantity, as well as between offense and
defense. For example, swarms of coordinated, unmanned vehicles could overwhelm defensive
systems, providing a greater advantage to the attacker, while directed energy weapons that
provide a low-cost means of neutralizing such attacks, could favor the defender. Thus, emerging
technologies could shift the offense-defense balance multiple times over the coming decades.
Interactions among emerging technologies could also improve existing military capabilities or
enable new capabilities—with unforeseen consequences for warfighting and strategic stability.
For example, an enabling technology like AI could be paired with quantum computing to produce
more powerful methods of machine learning, potentially leading to improvements in image
recognition and target identification and enabling more sophisticated autonomous weapons.
Similarly, AI could be paired with 5G communications technologies to enable virtual training
environments or with biotechnology in a “brain-computer interface” to enhance human cognition
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or control prosthetics or robotic systems.184 Such developments could, in turn, require new
strategies, tactics, and concepts of operation.185
Emerging military technologies—particularly complex systems such as AI and LAWS—could
additionally produce unintended consequences if they fail to perform as anticipated. These
consequences could range from system failure to violations of the law of armed conflict. As
analyst Paul Scharre has noted, “in the most extreme case, an autonomous weapon could continue
engaging inappropriate targets until it exhausts its magazine, potentially over a wide area.”186 This
could, in turn, result in mass fratricide or civilian casualties—a possibility that has led some
analysts to call for a pre-emptive ban on LAWS.
Finally, emerging military technologies could raise an array of ethical considerations. For
example, some analysts have argued that the use of LAWS would be inherently immoral—
regardless of whether the weapon could be used legally—because a human operator would not
make specific target selection and engagement decisions.187 Others have countered that human
operators would continue to exercise “appropriate levels of human judgement over the use of
force” and would remain accountable for ensuring that the deployment of LAWS conforms to the
requirements of the laws of armed conflict.188 Those supporting a pre-emptive ban on LAWS have
additionally appealed to the Martens Clause, which appears in the1899 Hague Convention
preamble and states that weapons usage should conform to the “principles of humanity and the
dictates of the public conscience.”189 These analysts believe that LAWS contravene that
requirement; however, others have noted that the Martens Clause has not been used previously to
ban a weapons system and, furthermore, that the legal status of the Martens Clause is
questionable and instead constitutes “merely a recognition of ‘customary international law’.”190
Similarly, some analysts have raised ethical concerns about applications of biotechnology that
involve human testing or modification as well as the weaponization of biotechnology, which
could potentially be used for targeted genetic attacks.191

184 For additional information about military applications of 5G, see CRS In Focus IF11251, National Security
Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies, by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler.
185 For a discussion of these and other military and security implications—including implications for deterrence, crisis
stability, force posture, and military roles and missions—see Robert O. Work and Shawn Brimley, 20YY: Preparing for
War in the Robotic Age, Center for a New American Century, January 22, 2014, pp. 31-35, at https://www.cnas.org/
publications/reports/20yy-preparing-for-war-in-the-robotic-age.
186 Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,” Center for a New American Security, February 2016,
at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-risk.pdf.
187 See, for example, Bonnie Docherty, Heed the Call: A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots, Human
Rights Watch, August 21, 2018, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-
killer-robots.
188 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at
https://www.esd.whs.
189 See, for example, Bonnie Docherty, Heed the Call: A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots, Human
Rights Watch, August 21, 2018, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-
killer-robots.
190 Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
2018), pp. 263-266.
191 For a more in-depth discussion of ethical considerations related to biotechnology, see CRS Report R44824,
Advanced Gene Editing: CRISPR-Cas9, by Marcy E. Gallo et al. See also Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “China’s
Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New Revolution in Military Affairs,” The
Jamestown Foundation, October 8, 2019, at https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-
military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/.
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Issues for Congress
Congress has previously demonstrated interest in conducting oversight of emerging military
technologies beyond technology-specific activities. In Section 247 of the FY2019 NDAA (P.L.
115-232), Congress specified “a set of classified reports that set forth a direct comparison
between the capabilities of the United States in emerging technology areas and the capabilities of
adversaries of the United States.”192 These areas include hypersonic weapons, AI, quantum
technology, directed energy weapons, and other relevant technologies as determined by the
Secretary of Defense. Similarly, Section 1251 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) directs the
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in coordination with the Director of
the Office of Net Assessment, to “conduct a comparative analysis assessment of the efforts of the
United States Government and the Government of the People’s Republic of China to develop and
deploy” emerging technologies such as directed energy weapons, hypersonic weapons,
biotechnology, and quantum technology. Section 225 of the FY2019 NDAA additionally tasked
the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering with generating procedures for
developing “technologies that are urgently needed to react to a technological development of an
adversary of the United States or to respond to a significant and urgent emerging technology [that
are] not receiving appropriate research funding or attention from the Department of Defense.”
Furthermore, Section 232 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) tasked the Secretary of Defense
with developing “a process to ensure that the policies of the Department of Defense relating to
emerging technology are formulated and updated continuously as such technology is developed
by the Department,”193 while Section 236 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) granted the
Secretary the authority to establish a Steering Committee tasked with developing assessments of
and a strategy for emerging technology and national security threats.
As Congress continues to review the Pentagon’s plans for emerging military technologies during
the annual authorization and appropriations process, it might consider issues surrounding funding
considerations, management, personnel, acquisition, technology protection, governance and
regulation, and oversight.
Funding Considerations
A number of emerging military technologies, including hypersonic weapons and directed energy
weapons, have experienced fluctuations in funding over the years. According to a U.S.
government interagency task force on the defense industrial base, such “fluctuations challenge the
viability of suppliers within the industrial base by diminishing their ability to hire and retain a
skilled workforce, [achieve] production efficiencies, and in some cases, [stay] in business.”194

192 Each report is to include the following elements: “(1) an evaluation of spending by the United States and adversaries
on such technology, (2) an evaluation of the quantity and quality of research on such technology, (3) an evaluation of
the test infrastructure and workforce supporting such technology, (4) an assessment of the technological progress of the
United States and adversaries on such technology, (5) descriptions of timelines for operational deployment of such
technology, [and] (6) an assessment of the intent or willingness of adversaries to use such technology.”
193 Section 232 defines emerging technology as “technology determined to be in an emerging phase of development by
the Secretary of Defense, including quantum computing, technology for the analysis of large and diverse sets of data
(commonly known as ‘big data analytics’), artificial intelligence, autonomous technology, robotics, directed energy,
hypersonics, biotechnology, and such other technology as may be identified by the Secretary.”
194 Interagency Task Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806, Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing
and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States, September 2018, p. 21, at
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND-STRENGTHENING-THE-
MANUFACTURING-AND%20DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE-AND-SUPPLY-CHAIN-RESILIENCY.PDF.
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Other analysts have noted that such fluctuations are often due to unavoidable tradeoffs between
technology investment priorities or to questions about a given technology’s feasibility or
maturity.195
Some analysts have suggested that, given the potential for technological surprise, funding for
overall research and development is inadequate. Summarizing such views, technology expert
Martijn Rasser notes that reducing overall research and development in order to enable “big bets”
or heavy investments in a particular technology or technologies, can be a risky approach because
“we just don’t know where the next breakthroughs will come from.”196
Management
In general, DOD manages each of the aforementioned emerging military technologies separately
due to the distinct expertise required. For example, within the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E])/Chief Technology Officer (CTO), there are
separate principal directors for artificial intelligence and autonomy, hypersonic weapons, directed
energy, biotechnology, and quantum technology—among other technology areas. Development of
each of these technologies is guided by a standalone technology roadmap and, in the case of AI, a
classified strategy. Although the USD(R&E)/CTO has oversight over emerging military
technologies, some analysts have suggested that there is a need for a more holistic approach to
portfolio management that better considers how such technologies might be combined and
integrated.197
Furthermore, prior to May 2022, these principal directors reported to the USD(R&E)/CTO
through a singular Director for Modernization, who was “responsible for managing the capability
analysis and investments for the modernization priorities outlined in the National Defense
Strategy,” including the technologies discussed in this report.198 In May 2022, DOD reorganized
the office of the USD(R&E)/CTO and created separate reporting structures for “enabling
technology”—including the Principal Director for AI and autonomy—and “applied
technology”—including the Principal Directors for directed energy and hypersonic weapons (see
Figure 2). The Directors for Enabling Technology and Applied Technology report to the Deputy
CTO for Critical Technologies. In contrast, the Principal Directors for biotechnology and
quantum science report through the Director of Science and Technology Futures to a different
Deputy CTO—the Deputy CTO for Science and Technology.199 Congress may consider the ways

195 See, for example, Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July
1, 2015, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-
ever-be-ready.
196 See, for example, Will Knight, “Trump Proposes a Cut in Research Spending, but a Boost for AI,” Wired, February
11, 2020, at https://www.wired.com/story/trump-proposes-cut-research-spending-boost-ai/. For more information about
federal R&D funding, including a discussion of DOD R&D funding, see CRS Report R46341, Federal Research and
Development (R&D) Funding: FY2021, coordinated by John F. Sargent Jr.
197 See, for example, Government Accountability Office, Weapon System Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Improve
the Department of Defense’s Portfolio Management, August 2015, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672205.pdf; and
Pete Modigliani, After the divorce: How the Pentagon can position itself for speed, agility, and innovation in the new
era of acquisitions, MITRE, March 2019, at https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-18-03404-3-after-
the-divorce-white-paper.pdf.
198 CRS In Focus IF10834, Defense Primer: Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, by Marcy E.
Gallo.
199 See Department of Defense, “Organizational Improvements to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering,” May 10, 2022, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3026367/
organizational-improvements-to-the-office-of-the-under-secretary-of-defense-for/.
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in which this organizational change affects the oversight and integration of emerging
technologies.
Finally, senior leaders do not always agree on the priorities among emerging military
technologies—both in terms of effort and funding—and such priorities can shift frequently. This
fluctuation has led some analysts to suggest that DOD should adopt a technology strategy “to set
spending priorities that can be sustained over time, outlasting individual leaders.”200
Figure 2. Selected Reporting Structure of the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering (R&E)

Source: CRS image, adapted from https://www.cto.mil/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/
usdre_org_chart_09may2022_distro_a.pdf.
Notes: Chart depicts only the reporting structure for the OUSD(R&E) principal directors associated with the
technologies discussed in this report. For a ful OUSD(R&E) organizational chart, see “Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Organization,” May 9, 2022, at https://www.cto.mil/wp-
content/uploads/2022/05/usdre_org_chart_09may2022_distro_a.pdf.
Personnel
Some reports indicate that DOD and the defense industry have difficulty recruiting and retaining
personnel with expertise in emerging technologies because research funding and salaries
significantly lag behind those of commercial companies.201 Other reports suggest that such
challenges stem from quality-of-life factors, as well as from a belief among many technology
workers that “they can achieve large-scale change faster and better outside the government than
within it.”202 DOD faces additional challenges in training and educating its standing workforce.
Examples of recommendations for addressing this set of challenges include increasing technology
education opportunities at military academies, enhancing partnerships between DOD and research

200 Paul Scharre and Ainikki Riikonen, “The Defense Department Needs a Real Technology Strategy,” Defense One,
April 21, 2020, at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/04/pentagon-needs-technology-strategy/164764/.
201 M.L. Cummings, “Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare,” Chatham House, January 2017, p. 11, at
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-01-26-artificial-intelligence-future-
warfare-cummings-final.pdf.
202 Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs, “The Divide between Silicon Valley and Washington Is a National-Security Threat,”
The Atlantic, December 13, 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/growing-gulf-between-silicon-
valley-and-washington/577963/.
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universities, creating government fellowships and accelerated promotion tracks for technology
workers, and improving the technology literacy of human resource teams.203
Acquisition
DOD may need to continue adjusting its acquisition process to account for rapidly evolving dual-
use technologies such as AI.204 For example, a 2017 internal study of the process found that it
takes an average of 81 months for information technology programs to move from the initial
Analysis of Alternatives, defining the requirements for a system, to an Initial Operational
Capability.205 In contrast, commercial companies typically execute an iterative development
process for software systems (such as those involved in AI capabilities), delivering an initial
product in six to nine months.206 These findings prompted DOD to issue an interim software
acquisition policy intended to “[simplify] the acquisition model to enable continuous integration
and delivery of software capability on timelines relevant to the Warfighter/end user.”207 Similar
efforts may be needed for other emerging military technologies.
Furthermore, the commercial companies that are often at the forefront of innovation in emerging
technologies may be reluctant to partner with DOD due to the complexity of the defense
acquisition process. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study of this issue found that, of
12 U.S. commercial companies who choose not to do business with DOD, all 12 cited the
complexity of the defense acquisition process as a rationale for their decision.208 DOD has created
a number of avenues for rapid acquisitions—including the Strategic Capabilities Office, the
Defense Innovation Unit, and Project Maven—that are intended to streamline cumbersome
processes and accelerate the acquisitions timeline.209 Project Maven, for example, was established
in April 2017; by December, the team was fielding a commercially acquired prototype AI system

203 See Defense Science Board, Applications of Quantum Technologies: Executive Summary; National Security
Commission on Artificial Intelligence, First Quarter Recommendations, March 2020, pp. 21-43, at
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wkPh8Gb5drBrKBg6OhGu5oNaTEERbKss/view; and Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs,
“The Divide between Silicon Valley and Washington.” For example, DOD is establishing a university consortium for
hypersonic research and workforce development, while the Defense Digital Service now offers one- to two-year
assignments for commercial technology workers. Similarly, the National Security Innovation Network seeks to create
models and pathways for recruiting technologists to the U.S. government.
204 Andrew Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms: Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies, Center for Naval
Analysis, January 2017, pp. 190-191. For an overview of recent acquisition reform efforts, see CRS Report R45068,
Acquisition Reform in the FY2016-FY2018 National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs), by Heidi M. Peters.
205 Andrew Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms: Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies, p. 189.
206 Defense Science Board, “Design and Acquisition of Software for Defense Systems,” February 2018, at
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1048883.pdf. See also Defense Innovation Board, Software is Never Done:
Refactoring the Acquisition Code for Competitive Advantage, May 3, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/30/
2002124828/-1/-1/0/
SOFTWAREISNEVERDONE_REFACTORINGTHEACQUISITIONCODEFORCOMPETITIVEADVANTAGE_FIN
AL.SWAP.REPORT.PDF.
207 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, “Software Acquisition Pathway Interim
Policy and Procedures,” January 3, 2020, at https://www.acq.osd.mil/ae/assets/docs/USA002825-
19%20Signed%20Memo%20(Software).pdf.
208 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Acquisitions, DOD is Taking Step to Address Challenges Faced
by Certain Companies, GAO-17-644, July 20, 2017, p. 9. Other rationales cited include unstable budget environment,
lengthy contracting timeline, government-specific contract terms and conditions, and inexperienced DOD contracting
workforce.
209 In certain circumstances, DOD may also use other transaction authorities (OTAs) to accelerate research,
prototyping, and production. For additional information about OTAs, see CRS Report R45521, Department of Defense
Use of Other Transaction Authority: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress, by Heidi M. Peters.
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in combat.210 Although some analysts argue that these are promising developments, critics point
out that the department must replicate such results at scale and implement more comprehensive
acquisitions reform.211
Intellectual Property
Commercial technology companies are often reluctant to partner with DOD due to concerns about
intellectual property and data rights.212 As an official interviewed for a 2017 GAO report on
broader challenges in military acquisitions noted, intellectual property is the “life blood” of
commercial technology companies, yet “DOD is putting increased pressure on companies to grant
unlimited technical data and software rights or government purpose rights rather than limited or
restricted rights.”213 In an effort to manage these concerns, DOD released an instruction that
“establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for the acquisition,
licensing, and management of IP.”214 The instruction additionally establishes a DOD IP Cadre to
advise and assist the acquisition workforce on matters related to IP and calls for the development
of an IP strategy to “identify and manage the full spectrum of IP and related matters” for each
acquisition program.215
Supply Chain Security
A number of recent reports have raised concerns about the security of the U.S. supply chain for
emerging military technologies. For example, one assessment found that China “may have
opportunities to jeopardize the development of hypersonics through industrial espionage,
transfers of technology, or providing unreliable components” due to its potential exposure to low-
level U.S. suppliers.216 Similarly the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence
found that “the United States lacks domestic facilities capable of producing, integrating,
assembling, and testing” the microelectronics needed to enable AI, forcing the U.S. “to rely on
foreign fabrication and complex global supply chains for production.”217 In response to such
concerns, Title XCIX of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283), Creating Helpful Incentives to
Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) for America, authorized an incentive program for building and
equipping semiconductor fabrication facilities in the United States. Congress subsequently
provided funding for the program in the Chips and Science Act (P.L. 117-167).218

210 Marcus Weisgerber, “The Pentagon’s New Artificial Intelligence is Already Hunting Terrorists,” Defense One,
December 21, 2017, at http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/12/pentagons-new-artificial-intelligence-already-
hunting-terrorists/144742/.
211 Andrew Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms: Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies, Center for Naval
Analysis, January 2017, p. 190.
212 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Acquisitions, DOD is Taking Steps to Address Challenges Faced
by Certain Companies.
213 Ibid., p. 20.
214 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, “DOD Instruction 5010.44 Intellectual
Property (IP) Acquisition and Licensing,” October 16, 2019, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/
issuances/dodi/501044p.PDF?ver=2019-10-16-144448-070.
215 Ibid., pp. 8-11.
216 Govini, The 2020 Federal Scorecard: High-Intensity Warfare Edition, p. 67, at https://www.govini.com/wp-content/
uploads/2020/06/Govini-2020-Federal-Scorecard.pdf.
217 National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, First Quarter Recommendations, p. 46.
218 For additional information about these provisions, see CRS Report R47558, Semiconductors and the CHIPS Act:
The Global Context, by Karen M. Sutter, John F. Sargent Jr., and Manpreet Singh.
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Technology Protection
Estimates indicate “that American industry loses more than $600 billion dollars [each year] to
theft and expropriation,” including the theft and expropriation of emerging military technologies
and related intellectual property.219 The United States has a number of programs devoted to
addressing this issue. For example, pursuant to the Foreign Investment Risk Review
Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS) now reviews certain foreign investments, including those involving “emerging
and foundational technologies.” In addition, FIRRMA authorized CFIUS to consider “whether a
covered transaction involves a country of special concern that has a demonstrated or declared
strategic goal of acquiring a type of critical technology or critical infrastructure that would affect
United States leadership in areas related to national security.”220 Similarly, DOD’s Protecting
Critical Technology Task Force helps protect universities, labs, and the U.S. defense industrial
base against the theft of “classified information, controlled unclassified information, and key
data.”221 As part of this effort, the task force intends to institute cybersecurity training programs
for small businesses, enhance DOD’s understanding of supply chain vulnerabilities, and develop a
prioritized list of technologies that are critical to national security—as mandated by Section 1049
of the FY2019 NDAA—among other activities.222 Some analysts have recommended expanding
technology protection efforts to include U.S. allies and partners.223
Governance and Regulation
According to then-Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats, “technology developments …
are likely to outpace regulation, which could create international norms that are contrary to US
interests and increase the likelihood of technology surprise.”224 To address this concern, some
analysts have argued that “the United States should undertake broad, sustained diplomatic
engagement to advance collaboration on emerging technologies, norms, and standards setting.”225

219 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum on the Establishment of the Protecting Critical Technology Task
Force,” October 24, 2018, at https://insidecybersecurity.com/sites/insidecybersecurity.com/files/documents/2018/nov/
cs2018_0459.pdf.
220 The specific technologies that qualify as “emerging and foundational technologies” are to be identified by an
interagency process led by the Department of Commerce. See P.L. 115-232, Title XVII, §1702(c). For more
information on FIRRMA, see CRS In Focus IF10952, CFIUS Reform Under FIRRMA, by James K. Jackson and
Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs. Some entities, including the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, have
argued that the U.S. government should consider additional measures of technology protection, such as “heavier
scrutiny of the potential end use and end user of specific items.” See National Security Commission on Artificial
Intelligence, Interim Report, November 2019, p. 42, at https://drive.google.com/file/d/
153OrxnuGEjsUvlxWsFYauslwNeCEkvUb/view.
221 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum on the Establishment of the Protecting Critical Technology Task
Force.”
222 C. Todd Lopez, “Task Force Curbs Technology Theft to Keep Joint Force Strong,” DOD News, November 26,
2019, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2027555/task-force-curbs-technology-theft-to-keep-
joint-force-strong/.
223 See, for example, Daniel Kliman, Ben FitzGerald, Kristine Lee, and Joshua Fitt, Forging an Alliance Innovation
Base, Center for a New American Security, March 2020, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/
CNAS-Report-Alliance-Innovation-Base-Final.pdf?mtime=20200329174909.
224 Daniel R. Coats, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”
delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 6, 2018.
225 Samuel J. Brannen, Christian S. Haig, Katherine Schmidt, and Kathleen H. Hicks, Twin Pillars: Upholding National
Security and National Innovation in Emerging Technologies Governance, Center for Strategic and International
(continued...)
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Studies, January 2020, at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/
200123_Brannen_TwinPillars_WEB_FINAL.pdf?eljUpAKOjVauOujYfnvuSGDK0xvsQGZF.
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Similarly, Section 9414 of the FY2021 NDAA directs the Director of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology to oversee a study that assesses China’s role in international standards
setting organizations and provides recommendations for mitigating China’s influence and
strengthening U.S. participation in these organizations.
Oversight226
As Congress conducts oversight of emerging military technologies, it may be challenged in its
ability to independently evaluate and assess complex, disparate technical disciplines. In 1972,
Congress established the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to provide expert
“assessments, background papers, technical memoranda, case studies, and workshop
proceedings” that were to inform congressional decisionmaking and legislative activities.227
Congress eliminated funding for OTA in 1995 “amid broader efforts to reduce the size of
government.228 Since then, Congress has continued to debate the need for OTA or a similar
technology assessment organization.229

Author Information

Kelley M. Sayler

Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global
Security

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

226 For a full discussion of issues surrounding congressional oversight of technology, see CRS Report R46327, The
Office of Technology Assessment: History, Authorities, Issues, and Options, by John F. Sargent Jr..
227 Ibid.
228 Ibid.
229 For an overview of OTA/technology assessment-related legislation in the 107th-116th Congresses, see Appendix C in
CRS Report R46327, The Office of Technology Assessment: History, Authorities, Issues, and Options, by John F.
Sargent Jr..
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