{ "id": "R46217", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "R46217", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 616365, "date": "2020-01-30", "retrieved": "2020-02-07T23:07:14.749244", "title": "Indo-Pacific Strategies of U.S. Allies and Partners: Issues for Congress", "summary": "China\u2019s growing confidence in asserting itself regionally and internationally, combined with longstanding concerns about whether the United States has the capacity or commitment to remain the region\u2019s dominant actor, is leading U.S. allies and partners to adjust their strategic posture. This report seeks to outline some of these changes and to outline the perspectives of Indo-Pacific nations seeking to navigate a changing geopolitical environment, including by recasting their conception of the region to draw in new potential counterweights to China such as India, prioritizing new defense acquisitions to bolster indigenous security capacities, and seeking out new, networked security partnerships.\nSeveral Indo-Pacific nations over the past decade have substantially increased defense spending to prepare for new challenges; in some cases they have also sought more extensive roles in shaping the regional security architecture. Some are seeking to develop new intra-Asian security partnerships and strengthen existing strategic relationships. Japan, Australia, and India are among the most active in these regards. \nThe Trump Administration similarly has articulated strategic objectives in an expansive region from East Asia to South Asia and the Indian Ocean, and has increased defense spending. Some actions taken by President Trump, however\u2014including his questioning of alliance relationships, his opposition to multilateral trade agreements, and possibly his moves to retreat from U.S. security commitments elsewhere in the world\u2014have, in the view of many, sent conflicting signals to and undermined confidence in U.S. alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region. Many observers have pointed to the value of U.S. allies and partners in protecting U.S. security and values and questioned the economic elements of the Administration\u2019s Indo-Pacific strategy, arguing that the Administration has not come forward with an adequate replacement to fill the gap in U.S. engagement that was opened when President Trump withdrew from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement.\nDeveloping a better understanding of how the United States\u2019 Indo-Pacific allies and partners are positioning themselves to adapt to this evolving strategic landscape can inform Congress\u2019s oversight of U.S. policies and approaches to the region. It can also aid Congress as it makes funding decisions for U.S. armed forces and foreign assistance or considers strategic aspects of potential trade agreements or other economic initiatives in the region. Within this context Congress may consider a number of questions.\nWhat are U.S. allies and partners\u2019 perceptions of U.S. power and commitment to the Indo-Pacific? How are these perceptions changing? If these perceptions are negative, how are they affecting U.S. interests and what should be done to change them?\nHow are Indo-Pacific countries responding to China\u2019s growing economic influence and military power?\nWhat impact has President Trump had on the United States\u2019 relationship with key allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and what effect, if any, has this had on U.S. interests?\nHow have regional states responded to the Trump Administration\u2019s Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy? Is the strategy calibrated to gain regional support to achieve U.S. interests? Is it well understood in the region, and is its implementation sufficient to convince the region of U.S. commitment? If not, what should change, and in what ways? \nDo new security partnerships in Asia raise policy questions or opportunities in areas such as new arms sales, training, or exercises? \nThis report will compare various nations\u2019 approaches to bolstering their collective security through increased defense spending and evolving security networks and strategic linkages, and identify options for the United States, and for Congress specifically in light of answers to the above questions.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R46217", "sha1": "69acc8d37ad224208de0a606d672be9e0cb022e5", "filename": "files/20200130_R46217_69acc8d37ad224208de0a606d672be9e0cb022e5.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R46217_files&id=/3.png": "files/20200130_R46217_images_92f8e432da8aebf746fd9e2b97df54a1d8b8ea00.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R46217_files&id=/2.png": "files/20200130_R46217_images_bf3a2f00c0f2e05ceae9fc61f82770d4a16828d0.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R46217_files&id=/6.png": "files/20200130_R46217_images_78ff64a24a0dde124a8ae014a475a94980f0127c.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R46217_files&id=/5.png": "files/20200130_R46217_images_9de72a3cefd7a2c92ea81e8bcb13f465e52c5106.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R46217_files&id=/4.png": "files/20200130_R46217_images_63dea3af33a041d9cc54a55b724d79f930f2a673.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R46217_files&id=/0.png": "files/20200130_R46217_images_64209246327b4f2517db358a682158d6aadf808f.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R46217_files&id=/1.png": "files/20200130_R46217_images_81836d58ae0e2b7d81fd0a199d167a411b302b15.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R46217", "sha1": "770a61c4856a9a5aed99d6699f3423b6240ff1c3", "filename": "files/20200130_R46217_770a61c4856a9a5aed99d6699f3423b6240ff1c3.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Asian Affairs", "European Affairs", "Foreign Affairs", "National Defense", "South Asian Affairs" ] }