{ "id": "R46146", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "R46146", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 612359, "date": "2020-01-02", "retrieved": "2020-01-03T14:51:41.205419", "title": "Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress", "summary": "In the United States, state, territorial, and local governments are responsible for most aspects of selecting and securing election systems and equipment. Foreign interference during the 2016 election cycle\u2014and widely reported to be an ongoing threat\u2014has renewed congressional attention to campaign and election security and raised new questions about the nature and extent of the federal government\u2019s role in this policy area. \nThis report provides congressional readers with a resource for understanding campaign and election security policy. This includes discussion of the federal government\u2019s roles; state or territorial responsibilities for election administration and election security; an overview of potentially relevant federal statutes and agencies; and highlights of recent congressional policy debates. The report summarizes related legislation that has advanced beyond introduction during the 116th Congress. It also poses questions for consideration as the House and Senate examine whether or how to pursue legislation, oversight, or appropriations.\nIn the 116th Congress, the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; S. 1790; P.L. 116-92), enacted in December 2019, contains several provisions related to campaign and election security. Most provisions involve providing Congress or federal or state agencies with information about election interference. It also requires the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with several other agencies, to develop a strategy for countering Russian cyberattacks against U.S. elections. In addition, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-93; H.R. 1158), also enacted in December 2019, includes $425 million for payments to states, territories, and the District of Columbia to make general improvements to the administration of federal elections, including upgrades to election technology and security.\nAs of this writing, 116th Congress legislation that has advanced beyond introduction in at least one chamber includes H.R. 1; H.R. 753; H.R. 1158; H.R. 2500; H.R. 2722; H.R. 3351; H.R. 3494; H.R. 3501; H.R. 4617; H.R. 4782; H.R. 4990; S. 482; S. 1060; S. 1321; S. 1328; S. 1589; S. 1790; S. 1846; S. 2065; and S. 2524. Other bills also could have implications for campaign and election security even though they do not specifically reference the topic (e.g., those addressing cybersecurity generally or voter access). Several congressional committees also have held legislative or oversight hearings on the topic.\nFederal statutes\u2014such as the Help America Vote Act (HAVA); Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA); and the Voting Rights Act (VRA)\u2014all contain provisions designed to make campaign finance, elections, or voting more secure. Several federal agencies are directly or indirectly involved in campaign and election security. These include, but are not limited to, the Department of Defense (DOD); Department of Homeland Security (DHS); Department of Justice (DOJ); Election Assistance Commission (EAC); and Federal Election Commission (FEC). \nSecuring federal elections is a complex policy challenge that crosses disciplinary lines. Some of the factors shaping that complexity include divisions of authority between the federal and state (or territorial or local) governments; coordination among federal agencies, and communication with state agencies; funding; changing elections technology; and the different needs of different sectors, such as campaigns, administrators, and vendors. \nThis report does not attempt to resolve ongoing policy debates about what campaign and election security should entail. The report cites other CRS products that contain additional discussion of some of the topics discussed herein. The report does not address constitutional or legal issues.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R46146", "sha1": "671783e454623189ba326eeee99f40dbf1f15ffc", "filename": "files/20200102_R46146_671783e454623189ba326eeee99f40dbf1f15ffc.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R46146", "sha1": "53ac1e6eed847da17a1e6a0b11f0c24d3b5fccce", "filename": "files/20200102_R46146_53ac1e6eed847da17a1e6a0b11f0c24d3b5fccce.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "American Law", "Appropriations", "Constitutional Questions", "Foreign Affairs", "National Defense" ] }