{ "id": "R46105", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "R46105", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 610260, "date": "2019-12-05", "retrieved": "2019-12-13T15:05:35.619646", "title": "Supreme Court Criminal Law Decisions: 2019", "summary": "In 2019, the Supreme Court issued a sizeable number of criminal law decisions, which addressed several topics, including sentencing, pretrial, statutory construction, and ineffective assistance of counsel. This report discusses the following Supreme Court holdings in greater detail:\nRacially Discriminatory Jury Selection: \u201c[T]he trial court at Flowers\u2019 sixth trial committed clear error in concluding that the State\u2019s peremptory strike of [a] black prospective juror ... was not motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.\u201d Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019).\nExecution of the Mentally Incompetent: \u201cFirst, under Ford and Panetti, the Eighth Amendment may permit executing Madison even if he cannot remember committing his crime. Second, under those same decisions, the Eighth Amendment may prohibit executing Madison even though he suffers from dementia, rather than delusions. The sole question on which Madison\u2019s competency depends is whether he can reach a rational understanding\u2019 of why the State wants to execute him.\u201d Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718 (2019).\nExecution of the Intellectually Disabled: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals erred in assessing and denying a death-row inmate\u2019s claim of intellectual disability. Moore v. Texas, 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019).\nHabeas Jurisdiction: Federal courts may not grant state prisoners habeas relief based on Supreme Court precedent established after the completion of state proceedings. Shoop v. Hill, 139 S. Ct. 504 (2019).\nMethod of Execution: A death row inmate challenging the state\u2019s method of execution must show that the state\u2019s method involves a risk of severe pain and that a feasible, readily available alternative method will significantly reduce the risk of pain. \u201c[E]ven if execution by nitrogen hypoxia were a feasible and readily implemented alternative to the State\u2019s chosen method, Mr. Bucklew has still failed to present any evidence suggesting that it would significantly reduce his risk of pain.\u201d Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019).\nViolent Crime Sentencing: \nThe Armed Career Criminal Act\u2019s (ACCA) Section 924(c) residual clause purporting to provide an alternative definition for \u201ccrime of violence\u201d is constitutionally vague. United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).\nConviction under Florida robbery statute qualifies as a crime of violence under ACCA elements clause. Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019).\nUnder the ACCA\u2019s specific crimes clause, the generic crime of \u201cburglary\u201d covers unlawfully entering, or remaining in, a building or structure, including mobile homes, trailers, tents, or vehicles, if they are designed, adapted, or customarily used for overnight accommodations of individuals. United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018).\nUnder the ACCA\u2019s specific crimes clause, the generic burglary definition includes entering with an intent to commit a crime or remaining in a building or structure after forming an intent to commit a crime. Quarles v. United, 139 S. Ct. 1872 (2019). \nExcessive Fines: The Eighth Amendment\u2019s Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause and is therefore binding on the States. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).\nSupervised Release: \nImposing a mandatory term of imprisonment after revoking supervised release, based on finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Haymond had breached the conditions of his supervised release, violated the Sixth Amendment\u2019s jury trial guarantee and the Fifth Amendment\u2019s Due Process beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard for criminal cases. The lower court will decide, at least initially, whether the error was harmless and, if not, the appropriate remedy. United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019).\nA federal supervised release term does not run for a convict held in state pretrial detention if the time in state pretrial detention counts as time served for state conviction purposes. Mont v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1826 (2019). \nMens Rea: Conviction of an alien unlawfully present in the United States for unlawful firearms possession requires proof that the alien knew both that (1) he was in possession of a firearm and (2) he was unlawfully present. Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019).\nNondelegation: Authorizing the Attorney General to issue regulations governing registration requirements under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) for pre-Act offenders as soon as feasible did not violate the nondelegation doctrine. Gundy v. United States, 139 U.S. 2116 (2019).\nDouble Jeopardy: The dual sovereign doctrine of the Fifth Amendment\u2019s Double Jeopardy Clause permits successive state and federal prosecutions for the same misconduct. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019).\nDrunk Driving: A suspect\u2019s loss of consciousness following his probable cause arrest for drunk driving will almost always qualify for the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment\u2019s warrant requirement. Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019) (plurality).\nSection 1983 Litigation: \nProbable cause to arrest precludes a Section 1983 civil liability claim based on alleged First Amendment retaliation unless \u201ca plaintiff presents objective evidence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been.\u201d Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019).\nThe statute of limitations for a Section 1983 cause of action alleging falsification of evidence \u201cbegan to run when criminal proceedings against him terminated in his favor.\u201d McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149 (2019).\nIn assessing a Section 1983 qualified official immunity claim, \u201c[t]he Court of Appeals should have asked whether clearly established law prohibited the officers from stopping and taking down a man in these circumstances. Instead, the Court of Appeals defined the clearly established right at a high level of generality by saying only that the right to be free of excessive force\u2019 was clearly established.\u201d City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500 (2019).\nIneffective Assistance of Counsel: A defense attorney\u2019s failure to honor his client\u2019s request to appeal is presumptively prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel \u201ceven when the defendant has signed an appeal waiver.\u201d Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738 (2019).", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R46105", "sha1": "7f16e720eb6b62031685de1db4c6723339310694", "filename": "files/20191205_R46105_7f16e720eb6b62031685de1db4c6723339310694.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R46105", "sha1": "3d5f2e2287ec26da8b610a7d96b18be95faf9d99", "filename": "files/20191205_R46105_3d5f2e2287ec26da8b610a7d96b18be95faf9d99.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "American Law", "Constitutional Questions" ] }