Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy

Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy

Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and October 5, 2021
U.S. Policy
Cory Welt
Ukraine has been governed by President Volodymyr Zelensky and his Servant of the People
Specialist in Russian and
party since 2019. During Zelensky’s presidency, Ukraine has enacted difficult economic and
European Affairs
governance reforms , albeit with some resistance and delays, and grappled with the social and

economic consequences of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.

Under President Zelensky, Ukraine also has confronted Russia’s ongoing occupation of
Ukraine’s Crimea region and parts of eastern Ukraine. Zelensky has attempted to reinvigorate the conflict resolution process
with regard to Russia-occupied eastern Ukraine and has drawn greater international attention to the situation in Ukraine’s
occupied Crimea region. Russia, however, appears no closer to implementing a permanent ceasefire or to withdrawing its
military forces from Ukraine.
The United States supports Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders and
promotes the implementation of domestic reforms. Since Ukraine’s independence in 1991, and especially after Russia’s 2014
invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory, Ukraine has been a leading recipient of U.S. foreign and military aid in
Europe and Eurasia. From FY2015 to FY2020, State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
bilateral aid allocations to Ukraine were about $418 million a year on average, plus a total of more than $350 million in
humanitarian aid since 2014. For FY2021, State Department and USAID allocations to Ukraine totaled about $464 million.
Since 2014, the United States has provided more than $2.5 billion in security assistance to Ukraine, mainly though the
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative and Foreign Military Financing.
Since 2014, many Members of Congress on a bipartisan basis have condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, promoted
sanctions against Russia, and supported increased aid to Ukraine. Key legislation includes the Support for the Sovereignty,
Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014, as amended (P.L. 113-95; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.); the
Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014, as amended (P.L. 113-272; 22 U.S.C. 8921 et seq.); the Countering Russian Influence
in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017, as amended (P.L. 115-44, Title II, Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions
Act; 22 U.S.C. 9501 et seq.); and the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act of 2019, as amended (P.L. 116-92, Title
LXXV; 22 U.S.C. §9526 note).
Ukraine-related legislative initiatives in the 117th Congress include the Crimea Annexation Non-recognition Act (H.R. 922),
the Ukraine Security Partnership Act of 2021 (S. 814), the Ukraine Religious Freedom Support Act (H.R. 496, S. 1310), and
the Restraining Russian Imperialism Act (H.R. 3144). An amendment to the House-passed version of the FY2022 National
Defense Authorization Act (H.Amdt. 110 to H.R. 4350) would require the President to impose sanctions related to the
planning, construction, or operation of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. A resolution introduced in the Senate (S.Res. 360) would
celebrate the 30th anniversary of Ukraine’s independence and affirm the United States’ “unwavering commitment” to support
the Ukrainian government’s efforts to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
For related information, see CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia; CRS In Focus IF11138, Russia’s Nord Stream 2
Natural Gas Pipeline to Germany; and CRS In Focus IF11862, Uk rainian Armed Forces.
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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
Political Developments .................................................................................................... 1
Reform Chal enges .......................................................................................................... 5
Anti-corruption Efforts ............................................................................................... 8
Justice Sector Reforms ............................................................................................. 10
Combatting Oligarchic Influence ............................................................................... 11
Conflict with Russia ...................................................................................................... 14
Crimea ................................................................................................................... 16
Eastern Ukraine....................................................................................................... 17
Conflict Resolution Process ...................................................................................... 17
Maritime Conflict .................................................................................................... 19
Economy ..................................................................................................................... 21
Trade ..................................................................................................................... 22
Energy ................................................................................................................... 23
Relations with the EU and NATO .................................................................................... 25
U.S.-Ukraine Relations .................................................................................................. 27
Security ................................................................................................................. 29
Reforms ................................................................................................................. 31
Foreign and Military Aid .......................................................................................... 32
Bilateral Trade ........................................................................................................ 36
Role of Congress ..................................................................................................... 36
Sanctions Related to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine ........................................................ 39
Outlook ....................................................................................................................... 40

Figures
Figure 1. 2019 Parliamentary Elections .............................................................................. 3
Figure 2. Parliamentary Factions or Groups......................................................................... 4
Figure 3. Ukraine .......................................................................................................... 14
Figure 4. Southern Ukraine and the Sea of Azov ................................................................ 21

Tables
Table 1. Primary U.S. Assistance to Ukraine, FY2015-FY2022 ............................................ 32

Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 41

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Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy

Introduction
Ukraine has undergone dramatic changes since the country’s 2013-2014 Revolution of Dignity
(also known as the Euromaidan Revolution). Forced to confront a Russian invasion and
occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea region, a Russian-led separatist conflict in eastern Ukraine, and a
tightening of Russian control in the nearby Sea of Azov and Black Sea, Ukraine has developed a
military capable of territorial defense, reversed a decline in economic growth, implemented
reforms, maintained a democratic path, and gained formal independence for the Orthodox Church
of Ukraine.1
Ukraine continues to grapple with serious
Ukraine at a Glance
chal enges. Since 2019, Ukraine has been
Population: 41.6 mil ion (2021 est., excluding more
governed by President Volodymyr Zelensky
than 2 mil ion in Crimea)
and his Servant of the People party. During
Size: Slightly smal er than Texas
Zelensky’s presidency, Ukraine has enacted
Capital: Kyiv
difficult economic and governance reforms,
Ethnicity: 78% Ukrainian, 17% Russian, 0.5% Crimean
albeit with some resistance and delays, and
Tatar (2001 census)
grappled with the social and economic
Languages: Ukrainian (official), Russian (regional
consequences of the Coronavirus Disease
status)
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.
GDP/GDP per capita: $156 bil ion/$3,727 (2020)
Top Exports: cereals, iron and steel, fats and oils, iron
President Zelensky also has attempted to
ores, electrical equipment and parts, industrial
reinvigorate the conflict resolution process
machinery, oil seeds
with regard to Russia-occupied eastern
Leadership: President Volodymyr Zelensky, Prime
Ukraine and has drawn greater international
Minister Denys Shmyhal, Foreign Minister Dmytro
attention to the situation in Ukraine’s
Kuleba, Defense Minister Andri Taran
occupied Crimea region. Russia, however,
Sources: State Statistics Service of Ukraine; and
appears no closer to implementing a
World Bank.
permanent ceasefire or to withdrawing its
military forces from Ukraine.
The United States has long supported Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, democratic trajectory,
and governance reforms. Since 2014, many Members of Congress have condemned Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine, promoted sanctions against Russia for its actions, and supported increased
economic and security aid to Ukraine. In 2019, U.S. relations with Ukraine became a prominent
issue in U.S. domestic affairs, as the House of Representatives agreed to articles of impeachment
related in part to al eged presidential actions regarding Ukraine; the Senate acquitted President
Trump of the charges in 2020.
This report provides an overview of Ukraine’s domestic politics and reform chal enges; Ukraine’s
conflict with Russia; the Ukrainian economy; and Ukraine’s relations with the United States, the
European Union (EU), and NATO.
Political Developments
Ukraine, an independent country since 1991, is one of the largest successors, by territory,
population, and economy, to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, or Soviet Union)

1 In 2019, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople recognized the Orthodox Church of Ukraine as an independent
(autocephalous) church, officially separate from the Russian Orthodox Church. Many Ukrainians viewed this as a
major achievement in the evolution of Ukraine’s national identity.
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(for map, see Figure 3). Historical y, Ukrainians trace their lineage to medieval Kievan Rus, an
early Orthodox Christian state that Russians also consider a core part of their heritage. Most of
Ukraine’s territory was incorporated over time into the USSR’s predecessor, the Russian Empire,
although several western regions of Ukraine were first annexed by the Soviet Union during World
War II. In December 1991, Ukraine’s leaders joined those of neighboring Russia and Belarus to
dissolve the USSR.2
In almost 30 years of Ukraine’s independence, many observers have considered the country to
have a “hybrid” political system, containing both democratic and nondemocratic elements. The
U.S.-based nongovernmental organization (NGO) Freedom House currently assigns Ukraine a
“global freedom” score of 60 out of 100 (“partly free”), one of the highest ratings among the post-
Soviet states that gained their independence after the USSR’s dissolution.3
According to Freedom House, Ukraine’s democratic credentials improved after the ouster of
former President Viktor Yanukovych in 2014, in an event Ukrainians cal the Revolution of
Dignity, also known as the Euromaidan Revolution (see “From Orange Revolution to Revolution
of Dignity” text box, below).
From Orange Revolution to Revolution of Dignity
In 2004, a popular movement known as the Orange Revolution thwarted the efforts of then-President Leonid
Kuchma’s team—with Russian support—to fraudulently elect as Kuchma’s successor then-Prime Minister Viktor
Yanukovych. Infighting and poor governance led to disil usionment with the “Orange government” that fol owed
and eventual y to Yanukovych’s return to power, first as prime minister (2006-2007) and then as president (2010-
2014).
Many observers considered Yanukovych to be a corrupt and authoritarian president who preferred to preserve
power with Russia’s support rather than pursue Western-oriented reforms. In November 2013, protests erupted
over Yanukovych’s decision to postpone concluding an association and free trade agreement with the European
Union. The government suppressed the initial protests, leading to larger protests, violent clashes with police, and
the kil ing of over 100 protestors (whom many Ukrainians refer to as the Heavenly Hundred); almost 20 police
officers also were kil ed.
In February 2014, Yanukovych’s government col apsed. Yanukovych agreed to a deal with the opposition that was
to lead to an early presidential election, but instead he departed for eastern Ukraine amid government defections.
Ukraine’s parliament voted to remove Yanukovych from office, and he left Ukraine for Russia. In 2019,
Yanukovych was found guilty of treason and sentenced in absentia to 13 years in prison.
Sources: Andrew Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (Yale University Press, 2005); Anders Aslund and Michael
McFaul, Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough (Carnegie Endowment, 2006);
Andrew Wilson, Ukraine Crisis: What It Means for the West (Yale University Press, 2014); and RFE/RL, “Ukraine
Sentences Ex-President Yanukovych in Absentia to 13 Years in Prison,” January 24, 2019.
Ukraine has a mixed presidential-parliamentary system, in which the president shares power with
a prime minister appointed by Ukraine’s legislature, the Verkhovna Rada. When the legislature is
dominated by the president’s party, as is currently the case, observers general y consider the
president more powerful than the prime minister (whom the president typical y selects in such
circumstances).

2 Historical surveys of Ukraine include Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, 4th ed. (T oronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2009); Paul Robert Magosci, A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples, 2nd ed. (T oronto: University of
T oronto Press, 2010); and Serhii Plokhy, The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine (New York: Basic Books, 2015).
3 Freedom House ranks all countries in the world by a “global freedom” score, which includes measures of political
rights and civil liberties. Freedom House also ranks post -Communist states by a “ democracy” score that ranges
between 1 (least democratic) and 7 (most democratic). Ukraine’s democracy score is 3.36 (transitional or hybrid
regime). Scores reflect the stat e of affairs at the start of the year. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021; and
Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2021.
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Ukraine’s president is Volodymyr Zelensky, previously a popular actor-comedian and producer.
In April 2019, Zelensky defeated incumbent Petro Poroshenko, 73% to 24%, in a second-round
presidential election.4 Zelensky’s victory appeared to reflect widespread disil usionment with
Ukraine’s political establishment. Many Ukrainians believed Poroshenko had failed to combat
corruption and, general y, had not done enough to restore the country’s economic health after
almost five years of conflict with Russia.5
Zelensky’s appeal stemmed in part from his starring role in a popular television show, Servant of
the People, as a schoolteacher who is unexpectedly elected president of Ukraine after a video of
him delivering an anti-corruption rant goes viral. Zelensky is a bilingual Russian and Ukrainian
speaker, is of Jewish descent, and supports closer relations with the West. He is from Kryvih Rih
(Kryvoi Rog) in Ukraine’s Dnipropetrovsk region, north of Crimea.
In July 2019 snap parliamentary elections, Zelensky’s nascent and political y untested party,
Servant of the People, won 60% of 424 seats, including 43% of the party-list vote and almost
two-thirds of majoritarian seats, making it the first party in independent Ukraine to win an
outright majority of seats in the legislature (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. 2019 Parliamentary Elections

Source: Central Election Commission of Ukraine; and Ukrainska Pravda.
Note: Ukraine’s legislature currently includes 424 seats, as elections to single-mandate seats from 26 districts in
occupied Crimea and the nongovernment-control ed areas of eastern Ukraine have been suspended.
Another four parties received enough party-list votes to enter the legislature. These are the eastern
Ukrainian-based (and Russian-leaning) Opposition Platform–For Life; former Prime Minister
Yulia Tymoshenko’s Fatherland; ex-President Poroshenko’s European Solidarity; and Voice, a
new reform party. Fatherland, European Solidarity, and Voice al are considered to be pro-Western
parties. Since the elections, two additional “parliamentary groups” mainly comprising MPs that
were elected as independent deputies have been established: For the Future (connected to
Ukrainian oligarch Ihor Kolomoysky) and Trust (see Figure 2).

4 In the first round of the March 2019 election, Volodymyr Zelensky won 30% of the vote and Petro Poroshenko came
in second place, with 16%. Poroshenko, a wealthy businessman and member of parliament (MP) who supported the
Euromaidan protests, won 55% of the popular vote in a May 2014 election to succeed Viktor Yanukovych.
5 Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, “The Fight Against Corruption in Ukraine: Public Opinion,” June 1,
2018; and Volodymyr Yermolenko, “ Does Poroshenko Have a Chance at a Second T erm?” Atlantic Council, October
1, 2018.
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Figure 2. Parliamentary Factions or Groups

Source: Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine.
Notes: Ukraine’s legislature currently includes 424 seats, as elections to single-mandate seats from 26 districts
in occupied Crimea and the nongovernment-control ed areas of eastern Ukraine have been suspended. One
other seat currently is vacant.
Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal assumed office in March 2020. Shmyhal previously served as
head of administration in the western Ukrainian region of Ivano-Frankivsk and then as deputy
prime minister and minister for community and territorial development. Prior to working in
government, Shmyhal had worked since 2017 for DTEK, a major energy conglomerate owned by
Rinat Akhmetov, who is widely considered to be Ukraine’s wealthiest individual.
Shmyhal succeeded Zelensky’s first prime minister, Oleksiy Honcharuk, whose government was
in power for six months. In March 2020, Honcharuk submitted his resignation after Zelensky
expressed dissatisfaction with the cabinet. Zelensky praised the outgoing government for being
uncorrupt and hardworking but expressed a lack of confidence in its ability to address mounting
chal enges, including budgetary shortfal s, industrial production declines, and high utility prices.6
Some observers expressed concern about Zelensky’s decision to reshuffle his first government,
which had gained the support of international lenders and donors.7 Some believed that the reform-
minded Honcharuk government was not given sufficient time to achieve results. A related concern
was that the reshuffle could strengthen oligarchic influences.
The centrist and non-ideological platform of Zelensky and Servant of the People may have helped
them achieve victory in 2019. However, two years of partial y implemented or delayed reforms, a
perceived resurgence of oligarchic influence, al eged mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic,
and related economic woes al appear to have contributed to a decline in the government’s
popularity. From May to September 2019, President Zelensky’s approval rating averaged about

6 Kyiv Post, “Zelensky on Cabinet Replacement: ‘T his Government Achieved More than All the Rest, Combined,’”
March 5, 2020.
7 RFE/RL, “Ukraine’s Government Reshuffle Raises Concerns over Reform Agenda,” March 4, 2020; Oleh
Havrylyshyn and Basil Kalymon, “ Ukraine’s New Government Must Act Fast or Face Failure,” Atlantic Council,
March 5, 2020; and T odd Prince, “ Zelenskiy’s Big Move: Will ‘New Brains And New Hearts’ Revive the Same Old
Problems in Ukraine?,” RFE/RL, March 6, 2020.
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70% or higher. By February 2020, Zelensky’s approval rating had declined to about 50%.8 In
more recent polls, the president’s approval ratings declined further, to under 40%.9
Servant of the People has been weakened somewhat by internal divisions. One independent
investigation estimated that about 85 Servant of the People members of parliament (MPs)
represent the interests of one of two wealthy Ukrainian businessmen: Ihor Kolomoysky, with
whom President Zelensky has had ties (see below), and Rinat Akhmetov. These divisions
reportedly have led on occasion to the party’s inability to secure passage of legislation or
approval of cabinet appointments.10
In several regions and cities, other parties and political figures, often local y influential
politicians, dominate. In October 2020 local elections, Servant of the People placed first in few
regional councils and did not win mayoral elections in any of Ukraine’s major cities.11 In al ,
Servant of the People won about 15% of local council seats, behind independent candidates
(16%). Independent candidates also won about 47% of al mayoral elections; Servant of the
People candidates won 16%.12
Reform Challenges
Since Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity, the results of Ukraine’s reform efforts have been
mixed. During Poroshenko’s presidency, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) praised key
reforms, including a reduction of the fiscal deficit, increase in gas prices (retaining subsidies for
lower-income households), and reform of the banking system.13 Observers also noted progress in
public procurement transparency, decentralization, and health care reform.14
At the same time, domestic and international stakeholders criticized the government under
Poroshenko for slowly implementing, failing to complete, or backsliding on key reforms,
particularly with regard to anti-corruption efforts (see “Anti-corruption Efforts,” below).
International partners and donors underlined the importance of further reforms in the energy

8 Kyiv Institute of International Sociology (KIIS), “Assessment of Authorities’ Activities and Reaction to Curr ent
Events: February 2020” (in Ukrainian), February 27, 2020, at https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=
920&page=1&t=1; and Ukrinform, “ Over Half of Ukrainians T rust President – Razumkov Center,” February 24, 2020.
9 See, e.g., KIIS, “Level of T rust in Politicians, Electoral Rating and Attitude to Certain Events: February 2021” (in
Ukrainian), at https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1016&page=5; Center for Insights in Survey Research
(International Republican Institute [IRI]), “Public Opinion Survey of Residents of Ukraine (March 13 -21, 2021),” May
17, 2021; and Ukrinform, “ Zelensky Ahead of Poroshenko in Presidential Rating – KIIS Poll,” May 5, 2021.
10 Observers also consider that the parliamentary group For the Future represents Kolomoysky’s interests and that a few
dozen other MPs represent Akhmetov’s interests. Oleg Sukhov, “Investigative Show Exposes Influence of
Kolomoysky, Akhmetov on Lawmakers,” Kyiv Post, January 14, 2021.
11 Brian Mefford, “Winners and Losers of Ukraine’s Local Elections,” Atlantic Council, November 2, 2020; Orysia
Lutsevych, “Ukraine Local Elections Challenge Zelenskyy’s Plans,” Chatham House, November 3, 2020; and Vita
Dumanska and Iryna Fedoriv, “Ukraine’s Local Elections: A Reality Check for Decentralization and Electoral
Reforms,” Kennan Institute, January 12, 2021.
12 Central Election Commission of Ukraine.
13 International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Ukraine Receives IMF Support but Must Accelerate Reforms,” IMF Country
Focus, April 4, 2017.
14 See, e.g., Rowland Manthorpe, “From the Fires of Revolution, Ukraine Is Reinventing Government,” Wired, August
20, 2018; Maryna Rabinovych, Anthony Levitas, and Andreas Umland, Revisiting Decentralization After Maidan:
Achievem ents and Challenges of Ukraine’s Local Governance Reform , Kennan Institute, July 16, 2018; and Melinda
Haring, “Finally Some Good News from Ukraine,” Atlantic Council, June 26, 2018.
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sector (see “Energy,” below), sustainable pension reform, the privatization of state-owned
enterprises, and land sales (a moratorium existed on land sales from 2001 until 2021).15
In 2016, the IMF warned that stal ed reforms could lead to a halt in loan disbursements to
Ukraine. The IMF eventual y issued two more disbursements under a four-year loan package
(2015-2019) but did not release any more funds from that package after April 2017.16 The IMF
approved a new short-term loan package in December 2018.
After taking power in 2019, Zelensky and the Servant of the People government unveiled an
ambitious reform program. In its first several months, the new parliament passed or considered
legislation to, among other aims, advance anti-corruption and judicial reforms; accelerate
decentralization efforts; introduce fiscal, trade, and pro-business reforms; and pave the way for
the privatization of state assets and the establishment of a land market.17 In December 2019, the
IMF commended Ukraine for “impressive progress ... in advancing reforms and continuing with
sound economic policies,” and it announced an agreement for a new $5.5 bil ion three-year loan
package conditional on the passage of legislation on land sales and on safeguarding the
restructuring of the banking sector.18
Nonetheless, observers expressed concerns about various aspects of the Zelensky government’s
initial reform efforts. Some maintained the rapid pace of lawmaking led to substantive and
procedural deficiencies in the legislation. Others raised concerns about implementation of new
laws, especial y with regard to reforms facing resistance by wealthy businesspeople, corrupt
actors, or the public.19 In addition, some observers expressed disapproval of what they considered
the government’s pursuit of political y motivated cases against ex-President Poroshenko.20
The March 2020 government reshuffle raised concerns about the government’s commitment to
reform, but some IMF-backed reform measures soon fol owed as the COVID-19 pandemic began
to impact Ukraine. First, the parliament dismissed two newly appointed controversial ministers of
health and finance who were regarded as obstacles to reform. Second, to reach an agreement with
the IMF, and to receive greater COVID-19-related funding, Ukraine’s parliament approved
legislation to prevent the return of nationalized banks to their former owners (see “Combatting
Oligarchic Influence” below).21 The parliament also passed a major piece of land reform

15 See, e.g., IMF, “Reforming Ukraine’s Pension System,” in Ukraine: Selected Issues, March 7, 2017, pp. 19-37;
World Bank, Ukraine Special Focus Note: Reform ing Land Markets for Agricultural Growth , October 3, 2017; and
World Bank Group, Reducing Market Distortions for a More Prosperous Ukraine: Proposals for Market Regulation,
Com petition Policy, and Institutional Reform , March 2019.
16 IMF, “Statement by the Managing Director on Ukraine,” press release, February 10, 2016; and Natalia Zinets,
“Ukraine Goes Back to the Future as IMF Programme Stutters,” Reuters, August 1, 2018.
17 Kyiv Post, “Quick Wins, Big Promises: Zelensky’s Agenda for Parliament, Government,” September 6, 2019;
T etyana T yshchuk, “ iMoRe: Quarterly Review, Quarter III, 2019: Calm Before the Storm?” Vox Ukraine, December
12, 2019; and Kseniia Alekankina, “T urbo-Mode of the Ukrainian Government: Reforms in the 4th Quarter of 2019,”
Vox Ukraine, January 29, 2020.
18 IMF, “Statement by t he IMF Managing Director on Ukraine,” December 7, 2019; and IMF, “Statement by the IMF
Managing Director on Ukraine,” March 26, 2020.
19 Hromadske International, “Looking Back at Ukraine’s 2019: A New Government at the Center of Attention,”
December 23, 2019; Roman Olearchyk, “ Ukraine Sows Seeds of Suspicion with Land Sale Plans,” Financial Tim es,
January 19, 2020; Ilona Sologoub, “Ukraine’s T op Five 2020 Reform Priorities,” Atlantic Council, January 21, 2020;
and Anders Aslund, “Zelenskyy Must Not Miss His Chance to Change Ukraine,” Atlantic Council, February 6, 2020.
20 Andrew E. Kramer, “Ukraine Is T hreatening to Arrest Its Former President,” New York Times, February 28, 2020;
and RFE/RL, “ Ukraine’s Ex-President Calls on President ‘T o Stop Persecuting Opposition,’ Before Questioning,”
February 28, 2020.
21 Roman Olearchyk, “Ukraine Approves Law to Safeguard Banking Clean -Up,” Financial Times, May 13, 2020.
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legislation that the IMF supported, enabling Ukrainian nationals to buy and sel land of up to 100
hectares (about 250 acres) as of July 2021.22
Reform efforts slowed during the rest of 2020, at least in part due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Observers expressed concerns about potential backsliding in anti-corruption and judicial reforms
and the government’s seeming lack of wil or ability to overcome resistance to reforms by
oligarchic and other corrupt actors, including within the judiciary.23 In 2020, many observers
noted what appeared to be increasingly overt resistance to anti-corruption reforms by members of
the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) and the High Council of Justice (HCJ), the judiciary’s
self-governing body. Observers also expressed concern about the summer 2020 resignation of the
head of the National Bank of Ukraine, Ukraine’s central bank, who said the bank, which had been
praised for its independence, had become subject to political pressure.24
Near the end of 2020, President Zelensky signaled the start of a new reform drive. In November
2020, he announced plans to launch investigations against those who al egedly “acted il egal y on
behalf of vested interests of wel -known influential financial groups and foreign powers to
destroy [Ukraine’s] anti-corruption agencies.”25 In 2021, President Zelensky and other officials
pledged to renew comprehensive reforms, including anti-corruption and justice sector reforms,
industrial privatization, and security sector reform.26 The government also launched a new effort
to counter the influence of Ukraine’s so-cal ed oligarchs (see “Combatting Oligarchic Influence”
below). Cabinet reshuffles led to the replacement of three ministers—of economy, infrastructure,
and health—deemed to be underperforming and, in July 2021, the resignation after seven years in
office of Ukraine’s powerful but unpopular minister of internal affairs, Arsen Avakov.27

22 In 2024, Ukrainian entities will be able to buy and sell up to 10,000 hectares (about 25,000 acres). Hromadske
International, “Ukrainian Parliament Passes Land Market Law,” March 31, 2020; and RFE/RL, “Ukraine Allows
Farmland Sales for First T ime Since Independence,” July 2, 2021.
23 Serhiy Verlanov, “Ukraine Will Never Reform Until Oligarchs Lose Power,” Atlantic Council, November 9, 2020;
Atlantic Council, Washington Post, “ Ukraine’s Anti-Corruption Push Is Stalled. Biden Can Help Get It Going Again,”
November 19, 2020; and Daryna Krasnolutska and Volodymyr Verbyany, “ Ukraine’s Leader Is Being Broken by the
System He Vowed to Crush,” Bloomberg News, December 17, 2020.
24 Anders Aslund, “Central Bank Chief’s Political Ouster Discredits Ukraine,” Atlantic Council, July 10, 2020; and
David L. Stern and Robyn Dixon, “ Ukraine’s Bank Chief Quit and Received a Coffin as a Warning. It’s a Scandal that
T hreatens the Country’s Economic Health,” Washington Post, July 11, 2020.
25 Volodymyr Zelensky, “Ukraine Courts Cannot Be Allowed to T hrow Out Anti-corruption Gains,” Financial Times,
November 1, 2020.
26 Oleksiy Sorokin, “Zelensky Urges Unity, Calls on Governing Party to Complete Ref orms,” Kyiv Post, March 13,
2021; and Interfax-Ukraine, “ Minister Predicts Adoption of Amendments to Constitution in T erms of Decentralization
in 2021,” April 5, 2021.
27 Oleg Varfolomeyev, “President Zelenskyy Reshuffles Government, Drops Powerful Interior Minister,” Jamestown
Foundation, July 20, 2021.
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COVID-19 Pandemic in Ukraine
As of the start of October 2021, Ukraine has had more than 2.4 mil ion confirmed cases of COVID-19 and almost
57,000 deaths attributed to the virus (excluding data from Russia-occupied regions). This puts Ukraine among the
world’s top 20 countries with the highest number of COVID-19 cases and attributed deaths. In response to the
pandemic, the Ukrainian government adopted measures similar to those in other European countries, including
restricted movement into and within the country, school closures, social distancing, and mask usage. The
Ukrainian government began to ease restrictions in summer 2020 but imposed new restrictive measures in
December 2020 during an initial surge in cases. A second higher and more deadly peak of cases emerged in spring
2021. Ukraine’s vaccination drive has lagged behind that of most other European countries. As of the start of
October 2021, about 13% of the population was ful y vaccinated.
Sources: Ministry of Health of Ukraine and Johns Hopkins University of Medicine Coronavirus Resource Center.
Anti-corruption Efforts
After the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, the Ukrainian government made combating corruption a
central focus of its reform agenda. High levels of corruption reportedly persisted during
Poroshenko’s presidency, however, and many officials resisted anti-corruption measures. Since
2013, Ukraine’s score in the NGO Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index has
improved gradual y; in 2020, it ranked 117 out of 180 countries.28 The United States and other
international stakeholders strongly support Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms.
Since 2014, a major focus of anti-corruption reforms has been the establishment of three related
institutions: the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), an investigative body; the
Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO); and the High Anti-Corruption Court
(HACC).29 A fourth anti-corruption institution, the National Agency on Corruption Prevention
(NACP), oversees a system of public disclosure and verification of government officials’ assets
and incomes.30
Various obstacles have impeded the functioning of these anti-corruption institutions. As discussed
in the sections below, they have met resistance reportedly from within the judiciary and from
oligarchic forces, as wel as from some government officials who may seek to retain political
control over these potential y powerful institutions.
National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine
The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) has encountered repeated resistance
from within Ukraine’s government, reportedly due to the agency’s investigative mandate and
independence. In 2019, Ukraine’s Constitutional Court (CCU)—–which includes some judges
suspected of seeking to impede anti-corruption reforms—ruled that the underlying legal basis for
many NABU investigations, related to the crime of il icit enrichment, was unconstitutional. A
new law on il icit enrichment enacted later in 2019 al owed new cases to proceed. 31

28 T ransparency International, “Ukraine,” Corruption Perceptions Index 2020; and T ransparency International Ukraine,
“Ukraine in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2020.”
29 In addition, in May 2021, the Ukrainian government established an Economic Security Bureau as a parallel agency to
NABU to investigate other economic crimes. John Lough and Vladimir Dubrovskiy, Are Ukraine’s Anti-Corruption
Reform s Working?, Chatham House, November 2018; and Oleg Sukhov, “ Gov ernment Creates Economic Security
Bureau,” Kyiv Post, May 12, 2021.
30 Blerta Cela, “ Electronic Asset Declarations for Public Officials – T wo Years After Its Launch. A Panacea Against
Corruption?” UNDP Ukraine, August 25, 2018.
31 T ransparency International, “Constitutional Court Ruling Undermines Anti-corruption Achievements in Ukraine,”
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In 2020, however, the CCU ruled that former President Poroshenko had lacked the constitutional
authority to establish NABU or appoint its director.32 The parliament is considering legislation to
strengthen NABU’s constitutional grounding and preserve its independence, including through
the participation of international experts in hiring NABU’s director.33
National Agency on Corruption Prevention
After the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) was established, asset and income
verifications of public officials moved slowly and eventual y stal ed. Former NACP employees
accused agency officials of corruption and collusion with other government officials. Under
Zelensky, the government restructured NAPC and appointed a new director with the aim of
boosting the NAPC’s integrity and independence.34
In 2020, however, the CCU issued a controversial ruling striking down legislation al owing the
NACP to mandate and enforce asset declarations. Some CCU members and opposition MPs who
initiated the case reportedly were under, or faced, the prospect of NACP-related investigations.35
The government and parliament restored NACP authority to collect and publish asset declarations
but reduced penalties for improper disclosures. In June 2021, the parliament passed legislation
strengthening criminal liability for false declarations.36
High Anti-Corruption Court
After years of delay, Poroshenko agreed in 2018 to establish the High Anti-Corruption Court
(HACC), after the United States, the EU, the IMF, and the World Bank cal ed on the government
to do so in line with international recommendations. Judges were selected via a competitive
process that included the participation of international experts.37
Observers general y view HACC positively, although it too has faced chal enges. The office of
the prosecutor general has removed cases from HACC’s jurisdiction, and the High Council of
Justice (HCJ), the judiciary’s self-governing body, has disciplined a HACC judge for what some
observers consider to be political y motivated purposes. Observers have questioned the
professionalism and integrity of some HACC judges.38

March 1, 2019; Oleksandra Drik, “Why the West Should Be Worried About Ukraine’s Flagging Fight Against Graft,”
Atlantic Council, March 12, 2019; and Ukrinform, “ World Bank W elcomes Signing of Law on Illicit Enrichment in
Ukraine,” November 26, 2019.
32 T etiana Shevchuk, “Pro-Kremlin MPs and Oligarchs Wage Lawfare on Ukraine’s Reform Agenda,” Atlantic
Council, September 1, 2020; and Roman Olearchyk, “Ukraine Anti-corruption Drive in Doubt After Court Ruling,”
Financial Tim es, September 17, 2020.
33 Reuters, “Ukraine Backs Bill to Boost Independence of Anti-Corruption Bureau,” May 21, 2021.
34 Government of Ukraine, “ Government Appoints Oleksandr Novikov as Head of the National Agency on Corruption
Prevention,” January 15, 2020.
35 Roman Olearchyk and Ben Hall, “Zelensky Faces Pivotal Moment in Confrontation with Constitutional Court,”
Financial Tim es, November 2, 2020; and Anton Naychuk, “ T he Constitutional Court Can Be a T hreat: How Zelenskyy
Can Save the Anti-corruption Policy of Ukraine,” New Eastern Europe, January 11, 2021.
36 Anticorruption Action Center (AntAC), et al., “CSO’s Statement on New Law Reinstating Criminal Liability for
False Declarations,” December 5, 2020; and Reuters, “Ukraine Backs Bill to Jail Officials for False Asset
Declarations,” June 29, 2021.
37 Marc Jones, “ IMF Backs Ukraine Anti-corruption Court Plan,” Reuters, July 25, 2018; and Ukrinform, “How Judges
of High Anti-Corruption Court Were Selected,” April 16, 2019.
38 Oleg Sukhov, “Anti-corruption Court Better T han Others, but Still Not Good Enough,” Kyiv Post, April 23, 2021.
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Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office
During Poroshenko’s presidency, NABU and many observers believed the Specialized Anti-
Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) head lacked sufficient political independence, and
concerns emerged that he was hindering the progress of NABU-initiated investigations.39 The
SAPO head resigned in August 2020, three months before his term in office was to expire.40
As of the start of October 2021, the selection process for a new SAPO head was ongoing. Out of
37 candidates, two remained under consideration. Some contend the government has been
seeking to manipulate the selection process, which includes the participation of international
experts, to ensure the appointment of a political y loyal candidate.41
Justice Sector Reforms
Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms are part of broader reforms to the justice sector. These reforms
are intended to reduce corruption and promote professionalism and integrity in the prosecutorial
service and judiciary, including within the CCU and the HCJ, a judicial governing body that has
been “accused of blocking judicial reform and promoting tainted judges.”42
Office of the Prosecutor General
Zelensky’s first prosecutor general embarked on an institutional reform that included a
recertification process for al prosecutors. In March 2020, the EU Advisory Mission in Ukraine
cal ed the reforms “one of the most comprehensive and meaningful reform efforts in the civilian
security sector in years.”43 Of more than 1,300 central prosecutors, more than half were removed
after they declined to be vetted, failed knowledge-based tests, or did not pass interviews designed
as “integrity” checks. Some observers and political opponents have criticized the current
prosecutor general for al egedly limiting the progress of further prosecutorial reforms and
sheltering some government-linked figures from justice.44
High Council of Justice/High Qualifications Commission of Judges
In July 2021, the parliament passed long-awaited legislation to reform the HCJ, including by
establishing an ethics council to oversee appointments to the HCJ, and to reform the High
Qualifications Commission of Judges (HQCJ), a commission that hires and fires judges.45 Both

39 Oleg Sukhov and Olena Goncharova, “Anti-Corruption Prosecutor Alleged to Have Blocked Cases Against Powerful
Suspects,” Kyiv Post, April 6, 2018; Olena Makarenko, “ Ukraine’s Main Anti-Corruption Prosecutor Keeps Office
Despite Gross Violations of Professional Ethics,” Euromaidan Press, July 27, 2018; and Oleg Sukhov, “ Criminal Case
Against Anti-Corruption Prosecutor Kholodnytsky Closed,” Kyiv Post, January 29, 2019.
40 Ukrinform, “ Kholodnytsky Hopes Anti-Corruption Court Will Put End to T op Corruption Cases,” October 29, 2019;
and Matthew Kupfer and Olga Rudenko, “Ukraine’s T op Anti-Corruption Official Under Fire from T argets of His
Investigations,” Kyiv Post, February 20, 2020.
41 Oleg Sukhov, “Selection Panel Accused of Vetoing Best Candidates for Chief Ant i-Graft Prosecutor,” Kyiv Post,
June 26, 2021; and Kateryna Ryzhenko, “Election of SAPO Head at the Finish Line: What to Expect?”, T ransparency
International Ukraine, July 28, 2021.
42 Oleg Sukhov, “Zelensky’s Obstacles on the Way to Rule of Law,” Kyiv Post, September 6, 2019.
43 @EUAM_Ukraine, T witter, March 4, 2020.
44 AntAC, “‘Where Are the Results?’ or T op 5 Failures of Venediktova as a Prosecutor General,” October 14, 2020;
and Oleg Sukhov and Oleksiy Sorokin, “T op Prosecutor’s Priority Appears to Be Image over Achievement,” Kyiv Post,
September 3, 2021.
45 Olena Makarenko, “‘Historical Event’ as Ukraine Finally Adopts All Legislation for Judicial Reform,” Euromaidan
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the ethics council and the HQCJ hiring committee are to include international experts. Under
Zelensky, an initial judicial reform law had been enacted in 2019, but HCJ and CCU decisions
prevented the law from taking effect.46 In September 2021, Ukraine’s Council of Judges (another
judicial body) declined to participate as required by law in the process of appointing members to
the ethics council; the U.S. State Department said this action “threatens to derail the promise of
real judicial reform in Ukraine.”47
Constitutional Court of Ukraine
President Zelensky has initiated measures to reform the CCU, although observers have debated
the legality of his efforts. After the CCU issued the above-mentioned rulings against anti-
corruption institutions in 2020, Zelensky cal ed on parliament to disband the court, reform it, and
repopulate it with new judges. He then suspended the CCU chairman and, in March 2021,
cancel ed the 2013 decrees by which then-President Yanukovych appointed the chairman and
another judge. In July 2021, Ukraine’s Supreme Court overruled Zelensky’s order; the
government has appealed the decision.48
Kyiv District Administrative Court
Zelensky also has said he is seeking to restructure the Kyiv District Administrative Court
(KDAC), which observers consider to be especial y plagued by corruption. In April 2021, the
government introduced a bil to eliminate KDAC and replace it with a new court composed of
new judges.49 The KDAC chairman and other judges have been charged twice for crimes
including obstruction of justice, bribery, and abuse of power. Efforts to arrest or prosecute them
have been unsuccessful for unclear reasons.50
Combatting Oligarchic Influence
In 2021, the Ukrainian government launched a highly publicized effort to combat the influence of
Ukraine’s so-cal ed oligarchs under the slogan of “de-oligarchization.”51 In May 2021, the head
of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) said that 13 Ukrainian citizens
matched the government’s proposed definition of an “oligarch.” This term subsequently was
defined in draft legislation as those individuals who meet three of four criteria: a participant in
political life, someone who has significant media influence, the beneficial owner of a

Press, July 14, 2021; and Olena Halushka and T etiana Shevchuk, “ Ukraine T akes a Big Step T owards Judicial
Reform,” Atlantic Council, July 18, 2021.
46 Olena Halushka and Halyna Chyzhyk, “Is Ukraine’s New Judicial Reform a Step Forward?” Atlantic Council,
October 24, 2019; and Oleg Sukhov, “Constitutional Court Cancels Most of Zelensky’s Judicial Reform,” Kyiv Post,
March 12, 2020.
47 U.S. Department of State, “Judicial Reform in Ukraine,” September 16, 2021.
48 Roman Olearchyk, “Ukraine’s President Ousts T wo Judges for Being T hreats to National Security,” Financial Times,
March 27, 2021; and Natalia Zinets, “Ukraine President to Appeal After Court Bars Him from Firing T op Judge,”
Reuters, July 14, 2021.
49 Oleg Sukhov, “Zelensky Moves to Liquidate Ukraine’s Most Scandalous Court,” Kyiv Post, April 13, 2021.
50 AntAC, “Destroy Vovk’s Influence: How the President Wants to Liquidate the KDAC,” April 14, 2021.
51 President of Ukraine, “ For the First T ime in Many Years, the Number of Oligarchs in Ukraine Has Decreased, and
the Process of De-oligarchization Will Be Continued - Volodymyr Zelenskyy,” May 14, 2021. Also see Roman
Olearchyk, “Zelensky T akes on Ukraine’s Oligarchs in Bid to Court Biden,” Financial Times, March 2, 2021; and
David L. Stern, “Ukraine Wants to Show Biden It’s Serious About Ending ‘Oligarch Era.’ T hat’s Not So Easy,”
Washington Post, March 29, 2021.
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monopolistic company, and the holder of confirmed assets valued at more than one mil ion times
Ukraine’s monthly subsistence minimum (currently around $84 mil ion).52
According to Ukraine’s so-cal ed oligarch law, which the parliament passed in September 2021,
individuals declared to be oligarchs wil have to declare their assets and they wil not be permitted
to finance political parties or participate in privatization auctions. In addition, government
officials wil have to report al interactions with them. The parliament passed the law a day after
one of Zelensky’s closest aides survived a shooting attack that some officials and observers
speculated could be linked to the government’s efforts to reduce oligarchs’ influence.53
The first prominent target of the “de-
Ukrainian “Oligarchs”
oligarchization” policy was Russian-
referenced in report
leaning opposition party leader (and
Rinat Akhmetov: Metals, mining, energy, coal, media. Wealthiest
wealthy businessman and media
person in Ukraine. Owned companies seized by Russian proxies in
mogul) Viktor Medvedchuk. In
Russia-occupied eastern Ukraine.
February 2021, the NSDC imposed
Dmytro Firtash: Energy, chemicals, metals, media. Under U.S.
sanctions on Medvedchuk, as wel as
indictment and subject to Ukrainian sanctions. Resides in Austria,
from where the U.S. government seeks his extradition.
on related individuals and entities,
Ihor Kolomoysky: Finance, energy, air transport, media. Former
for al egedly financing terrorism.
governor of Dnipropetrovsk region. Controls television station
Medvedchuk and others were said to
that used to air Zelensky’s media programs. Under U.S.
benefit from energy trade with the
investigation and subject to U.S. visa sanctions. Connected
separatist regimes of eastern Ukraine
companies and col eagues under Ukrainian investigation. Fourth
(which Ukrainian law defines as
wealthiest person in Ukraine.
terrorists). The sanctioned entities
Viktor Medvedchuk: Energy, media. Co-leader of Russian-leaning
opposition party Opposition Platform-For Life. Friend of Russian
include three television networks
President Vladimir Putin. Subject to Ukrainian and U.S. sanctions
many considered to be sources of
and under Ukrainian indictment.
Russian propaganda and which were
Petro Poroshenko: Confectionaries, agriculture, media. Former
official y owned by one of
president and head of opposition European Solidarity party. Under
Medvedchuk’s colleagues.54
Ukrainian investigations that supporters consider to be political y
Medvedchuk subsequently was
motivated. Sixth wealthiest person in Ukraine.
indicted on separate treason-related
Note: According to Forbes, seven Ukrainians were bil ionaires at
charges in May 2021.
the start of 2021; these include (in addition to Akhmetov,
55
Kolomoysky, and Poroshenko) Viktor Pinchuk, Kostyantyn
Another prominent businessman,
Zhevago, Gennadiy Boholyubov, and Vadim Novinsky.
Ihor Kolomoysky, with whom
President Zelensky has had ties, also has been targeted, although not directly. In 2020, legislation
was enacted to prevent the possible return of PrivatBank, Ukraine’s largest commercial bank, to
Kolomoysky and another previous owner. The National Bank of Ukraine nationalized PrivatBank

52 Oleksiy Sorokin, “Security Council Says Ukraine Has 13 Oligarchs,” Kyiv Post, May 11, 2021; and Interfax-
Ukraine, “Rada Passes at First Reading Bill on De-Oligarchization,” July 1, 2021.
53 Mark Raczkiewycz and Polina Ivanova, “Ukraine Passes Law to Curb P olitical Influence of Oligarchs,” Financial
Tim es, September 23, 2021; and T haisa Semenova, “ An Assassination Attempt Leaves Ukraine’s Authorities
Perplexed,” Kyiv Post, September 23, 2021.
54 Peter Dickinson, “Ukraine Bans Kremlin-Linked T V Channels,” Atlantic Council, February 5, 2021; and Alla
Hurska, “Ukraine’s Sanctions Against Pro-Russian Oligarch Medvedchuk – All About Oil and Coal,” Jamestown
Foundation, February 24, 2021.
55 T odd Prince, “A Powerful Kremlin Ally Faces a T reason T rial in Ukraine. Ukraine’s President Faces a Political T rip
Wire,” RFE/RL, May 14, 2021.
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in 2016 after $5.5 bil ion went missing (its owners were suspected of benefitting from fraudulent
lending).56
In 2021, additional actions potential y seeking to undermine Kolomoysky’s influence have
followed. Authorities indicted three former PrivatBank executives (not including Kolomoysky)
on embezzlement charges.57 Authorities also launched an investigation against a state-owned
electricity company in which Kolomoysky previously exerted influence.58 In addition, Servant of
the People expel ed from its parliamentary faction a leading supporter of Kolomoysky, Oleksandr
Dubinsky.
A third target has been Dmytro Firtash, who reportedly has controlled much of Ukraine’s
domestic gas distribution network, as wel as chemical and metal (titanium) companies. In June
2021, the NSDC imposed sanctions on Firtash, who currently resides in Austria, where he is
fighting extradition to the United States.59
The Ukrainian government’s actions in part align with U.S. actions, including sanctions, against
these individuals. In 2014, the Obama Administration imposed sanctions on Medvedchuk for his
role in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and indicted Firtash on bribery-related charges.60 In January
2021, the Trump Administration imposed sanctions on the Kolomoysky-linked Dubinsky in
connection with “a Russia-linked foreign influence network” that al egedly sought to interfere in
the 2020 U.S. presidential election.61 In March 2021, the Biden Administration imposed sanctions
on Kolomoysky “due to his involvement in significant corruption.”62 The Federal Bureau of
Investigation is investigating Kolomoysky for al eged embezzlement and fraud.63
Some observers have raised concerns about the Ukrainian government’s “de-oligarchization”
policy. They say it is too personalized and selective, does not address core causes of corruption or
oligarchic influence in Ukrainian politics, and potential y runs afoul of free speech
considerations.64

56 Matthias Williams and Natalia Zinets, “Comedian Faces Scrutiny over Oligarch T ies in Ukraine Presidential Race,”
Reuters, April 1, 2019; and Roman Olearchyk, “Ukraine Approves Law to Saf eguard Banking Clean-Up,” Financial
Tim es, May 13, 2020.
57 Ben Aris, “Zelenskiy Steps Up His Assault on the Oligarchs as Ex -Privatbank CEO Names as Fraud Suspect,” bne
Intellinews, February 23, 2021; and Roman Olearchyk, “ Zelensky’s Anti-Corruption Squad Swoops on Ukrainian
Oligarchy,” Financial Times, March 25, 2021.
58 Oleksiy Sorokin, “SBU Search Kolomoysky’s Office in Centrenergo Embezzlement Case,” Kyiv Post, April 23,
2021.
59 Mark Rachkevych, “Firtash Presses All Buttons to Avoid US Extradition on Bribery Charges,” Kyiv Post, February
23, 2021; and T odd Prince, “ Ukraine Slaps Sanctions on Oligarch Wanted by U.S. Ahead of President’s T rip to
Washington,” RFE/RL, June 18, 2021.
60 U.S. Department of the T reasury, “Treasury Designates Four Individuals Involved in Violating Ukrainian
Sovereignty,” March 17, 2014; and U.S. Department of Justice, “Six Defendants Indicted in Alleged Conspiracy to
Bribe Government Officials in India to Mine T itanium Minerals,” press release, April 2, 2014.
61 U.S. Department of the T reasury, “Treasury T akes Further Action Against Russian-linked Actors,” press release,
January 11, 2021.
62 U.S. Department of State, “ Public Designation of Oligarch and Former Ukrainian Public Official Ihor Kolomoyskyy
Due to Involvement in Significant Corruption,” March 5, 2021.
63 U.S. Department of Justice, “ Justice Department Seeks Forfeiture of T hird Commercial Property Purchased with
Funds Misappropriated from PrivatBank in Ukraine,” December 30, 2020; and Andrew E. Kramer, “ U.S. Sanctions
Key Ukrainian Oligarch,” New York Times, March 5, 2021.
64 T aras Kuzio, “Can Zelensky’s T urn to Populism Save Him in the Next Ukrainian Election?” National Interest, June
24, 2021; Andrew Wilson, “ Faltering Fightback: Zelensky’s Piecemeal Campaign Against Ukraine’s Oligarchs,”
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 6, 2021; David Clark, “Will Zelenskyy T arget All Ukrainian Oligarchs
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Figure 3. Ukraine

Sources: Graphic produced by CRS. Map information generated using data from the Department of State, Esri,
and DeLorme.
Conflict with Russia65
Many observers believe that of al the post-Soviet states, Ukraine’s independence has been the
most difficult for Russians to accept. Many Russians traditional y considered much of Ukraine to
be a historical province of Russia and Ukrainians to be close ethnic brethren. In July 2021,
Russian President Vladimir Putin published an essay expanding upon claims he has made before
regarding Ukraine’s ties to Russia and maintaining that Russians and Ukrainians are “one
people.”66
Most Ukrainians can speak Russian, whether as a primary or secondary language. In Ukraine’s
last national census (2001), 17% of the population identified as ethnic Russians, mostly
concentrated in the south (Crimea) and east, where ties to Russia are stronger than in the rest of
the country. In Soviet times, eastern Ukraine became home to a heavy industrial and defense
production sector that retained close economic ties to Russia after independence.
Before 2014, the Russia-Ukraine relationship occasional y suffered turbulence, with disputes over
Ukraine’s ties to NATO and the EU, the status of Russia’s Crimea-based Black Sea Fleet, and the
transit of Russian natural gas via Ukraine to Europe. By the end of 2013, ex-President

Equally?” Atlantic Council, July 10, 2021; and Olena Removska, “Zelenskiy’s ‘De-Oligarchization’ Goal Important,
Path to Success ‘Difficult,’ U.S. Official Says,” RFE/RL, July 24, 2021.
65 Andrew Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European Affairs, contributed to this section.
66 President of Russia, “Article by Vladimir Putin ‘On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,’” July 12, 2021.
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Yanukovych appeared to make a decisive move toward Russia, postponing an association
agreement to establish closer political and economic ties with the EU and agreeing instead to
substantial financial assistance from Moscow. This decision provoked the Euromaidan protests
and, ultimately, led to Yanukovych’s removal from power.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine occurred soon after Yanukovych fled to Russia in February 2014.67
Russian government officials cast the Revolution of Dignity as a Western-backed “coup” that,
among other things, could threaten the security of the ethnic Russian population in Ukraine’s
Crimea region, could eject Russia’s Black Sea Fleet from the region, and even could bring
Ukraine into NATO. The Russian government covertly deployed forces to Crimea and, after
holding what most observers consider to have been an il egal referendum, declared it was
incorporating Crimea (with a population of about 2 mil ion) directly into the Russian Federation
(for a map, see Figure 3).
Moscow then engineered the rise of new separatist movements in eastern Ukraine (the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions, collectively known as the Donbas, with a population of about 6.6 mil ion in
2014). Militants forcibly took power in several cities and towns, announced the establishment of
two separatist entities (the so-cal ed Donetsk People’s Republic, or DPR, and Luhansk People’s
Republic, or LPR), and gradual y expanded their control in the two regions. Ukrainian
government and volunteer forces fought back, restoring state control over a portion of each region
but suffering some major defeats, including in battles in which regular Russian forces reportedly
participated.68 In 2019, one study estimated that about half the pre-conflict population of the
Donetsk and Luhansk regions (or 3.2 mil ion people) were living under the control of Russian
proxies.69
For Russia, the establishment of separatist entities in eastern Ukraine may have served multiple
purposes. The Russian government claimed it was seeking to “protect” relatively pro-Russian
populations in these regions. Many observers believe that Moscow sought to complicate
Ukraine’s domestic development and foreign policy and to increase Russian leverage in potential
negotiations over Ukraine’s future trajectory.70
To date, the conflict has led to more than 10,000 combatant deaths and almost 3,400 civilian
fatalities. Ukraine has registered more than 1.4 mil ion people as internal y displaced persons.71

67 Studies of the conflict in Crimea and eastern Ukraine include Richard Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the
Borderlands (I.B. T auris, 2016); Michael Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crim ea and Eastern
Ukraine (RAND Corporation, 2017); Samuel Charap and T imothy J. Colton, Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and
the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia (Routledge/IISS, 2017); and Lawrence Freedman, Ukraine and the Art of
Strategy (Oxford University Press, 2019).
68 Maj. Michael Cohen, “Ukraine’s Battle at Ilovaisk, August 2014: T he T yranny of Means,” Military Review, June 10,
2016; Maj. Amos C. Fox, “Cyborgs at Little Stalingrad”: A Brief History of the Battles of the Donetsk Airport,
Institute of Land Warfare, May 2019; and Maj. Amos C. Fox, “Battle of Debal’tseve: T he Conventional Line of Effort
in Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine,” Armor (Winter 2017), pp. 45-52.
69 Yuriy Vyshnevskyy, “Demography of ORDLO (Separate Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions),” Delovaya
Stolitsa (Ukraine), n.d., at https://www.dsnews.ua/static/longread/donbas-eng/demography-of-ordlo.html; and
International Crisis Group, Peace in Ukraine (III): The Costs of War in Donbas, September 3, 2020.
70 Charap and Colton, Everyone Loses; and Andrew S. Bowen, “Coercive Diplomacy and the Donbas: Explaining
Russian Strategy in Eastern Ukraine,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 42, no. 3-4 (2019), pp. 312-343.
71 T his count includes the 298 foreign nationals killed in the July 17, 2014, downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (or
MH17), a commercial aircraft en route from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur that was shot down in Ukrainian airspace.
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Conflict -Related Civilian Casualties in
Ukraine,” May 6, 2021; OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 1 August 2020-31 January 2021,
March 11, 2021, p. 7; and U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “ Ukraine – Registration of Internal
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Ukrainian officials state that a few hundred Ukrainians remain in il egal detention in Russia-
controlled areas of eastern Ukraine, occupied Crimea, or Russia.72
The conflict’s intensity has declined since 2015, but sporadic fighting has continued. A July 2020
cease-fire led to a reduced number of cease-fire violations and casualties for several months.73 A
new round of hostilities occurred in March 2021, as Russia amassed troops along its border with
Ukraine and in occupied Crimea. The size and sustained nature of Russian troop deployments
greatly concerned Ukrainian and Western governments.74
Crimea
Since 2014, Russia has significantly increased its military presence in Crimea and suppressed
local dissent. Russia has deployed more than 30,000 armed personnel to Crimea. Russia’s
military forces in Crimea include ground, artil ery, coastal defense, air defense, and fighter
units.75 Additional y, Russia has increased the size and capability of its Black Sea Fleet,
headquartered in Sevastopol.76
The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has documented
“multiple and grave” human rights violations in Crimea and said that minority Crimean Tatars,
who are general y opposed to Russia’s occupation, have been “particularly targeted.”77 Russia
reportedly has relocated more than 200,000 Russian nationals to the occupied region.78 The
Ukrainian government and state-owned companies have pursued claims in international
arbitration courts concerning the violation of their rights in Crimea and in nearby maritime
waters.79
Much of the international community does not recognize Russia’s purported annexation of
Crimea. Many have condemned Russia’s occupation as a violation of international law and of
Russia’s own international commitments. In particular, many consider it to be a violation of the
1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Russia, together with the United States and the United
Kingdom (UK), reaffirmed its commitment “to respect the independence and sovereignty and the
existing borders of Ukraine,” as wel as the “obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force”

Displacement.”
72 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President Zelenskyy of Ukraine Before Bilateral Meeting,”
September 1, 2021.
73 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 1 August 2020 -31 January 2021, March 11, 2021.
74 Andrew E. Kramer, “Fighting Escalates in Eastern Ukraine, Signaling the End to Another Cease-Fire,” New York
Tim es, March 30, 2021; Michael Kofman, “ Russia’s Military Buildup near Ukraine is an Intimidation T actic,” Moscow
Tim es, April 3, 2021; and Isabelle Khurshudyan et al., “ On Ukraine’s Doorstep, Russia Boosts Military and Sends
Message of Regional Clout to Biden,” Washington Post, April 10, 2021.
75 T his includes units equipped with S-400 surface-to-air missiles and Bastion-P coastal defense systems. Patrick
T ucker, “U.S. Intelligence Officials and Satellite Photos Detail Russian Military Buildup on Crimea,” Defense One,
June 12, 2019; and Ukrinform, “ Already 31,500 Russian T roops Deployed in Occupied Crimea,” November 7, 2019.
76 Dmitry Gorenburg, “Is a New Russian Black Sea Fleet Coming? Or Is It Here?,” War on the Rocks, July 31, 2018;
and Igor Delanoe, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet: Toward a Multiregional Force, CNA, June 2019.
77 Crimean T atars made up about 10%-15% of Crimea’s population before the occupation. OHCHR, “Situation of
Human Rights in the T emporarily Occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol (Ukraine),”
September 25, 2017.
78 Alla Hurska, “Demographic T ransformation of Crimea: Forced Migration as Part of Russia’s ‘Hybrid’ Strategy,”
Jamestown Foundation, March 29, 2021.
79 Kateryna Busol, “Can Ukraine’s Appeal to the International Courts Work?” Chatham House, April 3, 2020.
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against Ukraine.80 Since 2014, the U.N. General Assembly has voted several times, most recently
in 2020, to affirm Ukraine’s territorial integrity, condemn the “temporary occupation” of Crimea,
and reaffirm nonrecognition of its annexation.81
Eastern Ukraine
In contrast to its policy toward Crimea, Moscow official y recognizes the areas it controls in
eastern Ukraine as Ukrainian territory. Although the Russian government continues to deny
military involvement in eastern Ukraine, U.S. officials have said that “Russia has 100 percent
command and control of what is happening in the occupied areas there—military forces, political
entities, and direct economic activity.”82 In May 2021, Ukrainian officials estimated that almost
3,000 Russian military forces, mostly in command and control positions, were fighting in eastern
Ukraine, with the total number of Russia-led fighters estimated at more than 35,000.83 In May
2021, Russian officials stated that Russia had granted citizenship to more than 525,000 residents
of Russia-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine.84
Until the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, residents were freely permitted to cross the
approximately 300-mile long “contact line” that divides the government- and Russia-controlled
areas of Donetsk and Luhansk. In 2019, an average of about 1.2 mil ion total crossings occurred
per month via five official crossing points (expanded to seven in November 2020). The pandemic
led to the temporary closure of crossing points. After the crossing points began to reopen,
authorities in the Russia-controlled areas imposed new restrictions, limiting total crossings to
under 100,000 per month.85
Conflict Resolution Process
With respect to eastern Ukraine, Russia and Ukraine formal y participate in a conflict resolution
process structured around a set of measures known as the Minsk agreements (Russia refuses to
engage in a similar conflict resolution process with respect to Crimea, as Russia claims to have
annexed that region). The Minsk agreements were signed in 2014 and 2015 by representatives of
Russia, Ukraine, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)—
members of what is known as the Trilateral Contact Group—together with Russian proxy
authorities in eastern Ukraine (see “Minsk Agreements” text box, below). The agreements are

80 T hese assurances were provided in connection with Ukraine’s assent to the removal of nuclear weapons from its
territory. The official title of the Budapest Memorandum is the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection
with Ukraine’s Accession to the T reaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. United Nations General
Assembly/Security Council (A/49/765, S/1994/1399), December 19, 1994. Also see Steven Pifer, The Trilateral
Process: The United States, Ukraine, Russia and Nuclear Weapons, Brookings, May 2011.
81 U.N. General Assembly Resolutions A/RES/75/29, December 7, 2020; and A/RES/75/192, December 16, 2020.
82 T hen-U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley said, “militants in eastern Ukraine report directly to the
Russian military, which arms them, t rains them, leads them and fights alongside them.” U.S. Department of State,
“Press Briefing with Kurt Volker, Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations,” November 8, 2018; and Remarks
at the U.N. Security Council (S/PV.8270, 16), May 29, 2018, at https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8270.
83 Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the International Organizations in Vienna, “Statement on Russia’s On -going
Aggression Against Ukraine and Illegal Occupation of Crimea,” May 27, 2021.
84 T ASS Russian News Agency, “Nearly 530,000 Donbass Citizens Receive Russian Citizenship in Simplified
Procedure,” May 2, 2021.
85 Dmitry Durnev, “In Ukraine’s Donbas, Coronavirus Is Pushing People on Both Sides Ever Further Apart,”
openDem ocracy, June 30, 2020; Alisa Sopova and Anastasia T aylor-Lind, “ How Seven Years of War and COVID-19
Split Ukraine in T wo,” New Humanitarian, April 6, 2021; and UNHCR, “Checkpoints – People’s Monthly Crossings,”
at https://www.unhcr.org/ua/en/resources/checkpoints-crossings.
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supported by a broader international grouping known as the Normandy Four (or Normandy
Format): France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine.
Minsk Agreements
The Minsk agreements were signed in September 2014 and February 2015. The 2014 agreements included the 12-
point Minsk Protocol, signed days after Russia-led forces defeated Ukrainian government and volunteer forces in a
major battle, and a fol ow-up memorandum outlining measures for a cease-fire and international monitoring
mission. The Minsk Protocol failed to end fighting or prompt a political resolution to the conflict. Leaders from
Ukraine and Russia, as wel as from France and Germany, met again in February 2015, amid another major battle,
to develop a more detailed “package of measures” known as Minsk-2. Although Minsk-2 established a specific
timeline and/or sequencing for several of its measures, the sequencing of some key measures was ambiguous.
Many of the measures in Minsk-2 remain unfulfil ed to date. A summary of Minsk-2 measures is as fol ows:
1. Immediate and comprehensive cease-fire.
2. Withdrawal of heavy weapons from defined security zones.
3. OSCE monitoring and verification of the cease-fire regime and withdrawal of heavy weapons.
4. Dialogue on (1) modalities of local elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation and (2) the future status of
“certain areas” in Donetsk and Luhansk and specification of the areas in eastern Ukraine to which this status
applies.
5. Amnesty via a law forbidding persecution and punishment of persons “in connection with the events” that took
place in certain areas in Donetsk and Luhansk.
6. Release and exchange of al hostages and other il egal y detained people based on a principle of “al for al .”
7. Safe access and delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need, on the basis of an international mechanism.
8. Determining modalities for ful y restoring social and economic links with nongovernment-control ed areas of
eastern Ukraine, including pensions and taxes (and, consequently, functioning of the Ukrainian banking system in
those areas).
9. Restoration of ful Ukrainian control over its border with Russia, beginning from the first day after local
elections and ending after a comprehensive political settlement, fol owing the introduction of a new constitution
and permanent legislation on the special status of certain areas in Donetsk and Luhansk.
10. Withdrawal of al foreign armed groups, weapons, and mercenaries from Ukrainian territory and disarmament
of al il egal groups.
11. Constitutional reform, including on decentralization, and permanent legislation on the special status of certain
areas in Donetsk and Luhansk, in agreement with representatives of nongovernment-control ed areas.
12. Local elections to be held in certain areas in Donetsk and Luhansk, in agreement with representatives of those
districts and in accordance with OSCE standards.
13. Intensification of the work of the Trilateral Contact Group, including through working groups on
implementation of the Minsk agreements.
Sources: “Protocol on the Outcome of Consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group on Joint Steps Aimed at
the Implementation of the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine, P. Poroshenko, and the Initiatives of the
President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin,” September 5, 2014; “Memorandum on the Implementation of the
Provisions of the Protocol […],” September 19, 2014; and “Package of Measures for the Implementation of the
Minsk Agreements,” February 12, 2015.
The U.N. Security Council, which includes Russia as a permanent member, has endorsed the
Minsk agreements. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2202 (2015) endorses and cal s on al
parties to fully implement the package of measures. In 2018, a Security Council “presidential
statement” urged “[the] parties to recommit to the peace process [and] achieve immediate
progress in the implementation of the Minsk agreements.”86

86 U.N. Security Council, “ Condemning Continuous Ceasefire Violations in Eastern Ukraine, Security Council
Presidential Statement Expresses Grave Concern About Severe Impact on Civilians,” SC/13367, June 6, 2018.
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Ukrainian President Zelensky initial y sought to reinvigorate what had been a relatively dormant
conflict resolution process. In 2019, Ukrainian and Russia-led forces implemented one long-
planned confidence-building measure: the withdrawal of armed forces and hardware from three
disengagement areas near populated areas. Several major prisoner exchanges also occurred.87
Although the July 2020 cease-fire was more successful than previous ones, armed hostilities have
continued. In addition, efforts to settle thornier issues, including the withdrawal of Russian forces
and the legal status of Russia-controlled areas, have not been successful.
After Russia’s spring 2021 military buildup along the border with Ukraine and in Crimea,
President Zelensky cal ed for a reconsideration of the Minsk process and the expansion of the
Normandy Format to include the United States and others.88 Ukrainian officials have underlined
the need for a permanent cease-fire and withdrawal of Russian official and unofficial forces, both
on principle and as a necessary condition for establishing a secure environment to hold free and
fair local elections in the Russia-controlled regions of eastern Ukraine.
The Russian government, for its part, continues to deny a substantial military presence in eastern
Ukraine and disavows responsibility for cease-fire violations and the failure to withdraw heavy
weapons. Russia has cal ed on Ukraine, irrespective of the security environment and the presence
of Russian forces, to fulfil certain political measures, including a permanent grant of special
status to the nongovernment-controlled areas and related constitutional reforms.
In eastern Ukraine, an international monitoring mission monitors cease-fire violations and the
presence of heavy weaponry within defined security zones. The OSCE’s Special Monitoring
Mission (SMM) to Ukraine is an unarmed civilian monitoring mission that was established in
2014 after Russia’s occupation of Crimea. The SMM is deployed throughout Ukraine but focuses
on the nongovernment-control ed areas in Donetsk and Luhansk. As of August 2021, the SMM
includes almost 700 international monitors, including 59 from the United States, the SMM’s
largest contributor.89 The SMM issues daily and spot monitoring reports on the security situation
and facilitates the delivery of humanitarian aid.
The OSCE also operated an Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk
(both within Russia) to monitor border crossings to and from eastern Ukraine. In September 2021,
Russian authorities announced that Russia would not support a renewal of this second mission’s
mandate after September 30, 2021.90
Maritime Conflict
Russia has sought to establish greater control over maritime regions adjacent to Crimea and
eastern Ukraine, including in the Sea of Azov, the Black Sea, and the Kerch Strait, which
connects the two seas (see Figure 4). In 2018, Russian President Putin opened a 12-mile-long
bridge over the Kerch Strait linking Russia to occupied Crimea. The bridge was designed to

87 RFE/RL, “Ukraine, Russia-Backed Separatists Hold Another Prisoner Swap,” April 16, 2020; and International Crisis
Group, Peace in Ukraine (II): A New Approach to Disengagem ent, August 3, 2020.
88 Ben Hall, “Ukrainian Leader Calls for Revamp of Peace Process to End Donbas War,” Financial Times, April 26,
2021.
89 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, “Status Report
as of 23 August 2021,” August 30, 2021.
90 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria
Zakharova on the T ermination of OSCE Observer Mission’s Activities at the Gukovo and Donetsk Checkpoints on the
Russia-Ukraine Border,” September 3, 2021; and U.S. Mission to the OSCE, “ Right of Reply to Russia: Russia’s
Objection to Renewal of the OSCE’s Border Observer Mission Mandate,” September 2, 2021 .
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accommodate an existing shipping lane, but it imposed new limits on the size of ships that transit
the strait and enables Russia to prevent passage to and from the Sea of Azov. Russia also
bolstered its maritime forces in the Sea of Azov. Russia interferes with commercial traffic
traveling to and from Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov in Mariupol and Berdyansk, which
export steel, grain, and coal.91
In 2018, Russian forces forcibly prevented Ukrainian naval vessels from passing through the
Kerch Strait to reach Ukrainian shores, il egal y detained 24 crew members for 10 months, and
returned their heavily damaged ships after two more months.92 Ukraine and its international
partners considered the incident to be a major violation of international law and an escalation in
Russia’s efforts to control maritime access to eastern Ukraine.93 In 2019, the U.N.-established
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea issued an order requiring Russia to release the
sailors and ships.94

91 Oksana Grytsenko and Kostyantyn Chernichkin, “Dangerous Waters: As Russia Monopolizes Azov Sea, Mariupol
Feels Heightened Danger,” Kyiv Post, August 3, 2018; Ukrinform, “How Russia Violates Security in Azov -Black Sea
Region,” June 1, 2020; and Ihor Kabanenko, “Russia’s Strategy in the Sea of Azov: T he Kerch Bridge, Artificial
Shipping Delays and Continued Harm to Ukraine,” Jamestown Foundation, January 14, 2021.
92 Dmitry Gorenburg and Michael Kofman, “ Russia and Ukraine Had a Short Naval Battle. Here’s What You Need to
Know,” Washington Post, November 28, 2018; Andrzej Wilk, “T he Russian Attack on Ukrainian Ships in the Black
Sea: T he Military Aspects,” Centre for Eastern Studies (Warsaw), November 28, 2018; and RFE/RL, “Ukrainian Envoy
Says Russian Helicopter Fired On Navy Vessel In Black Sea In 2018 ,” February 13, 2020.
93 A 2003 bilateral agreement between Ukraine and Russia affirms freedom of navigation through the strait for both
countries. Some argue that customary international law as reflected in the United Nations Charter on the Law of the
Sea, or UNCLOS, also does that . See http://www.fao.org/fishery/shared/faolextrans.jsp?xp_FAOLEX=LEX-
FAOC045795, and https://www.iucn.org/theme/marine-and-polar/our-work/international-ocean-governance/unclos.
94 International T ribunal for the Law of the Sea, “T ribunal Prescribes Provisional Measures Ordering the Russian
Federation to Release T hree Ukrainian Naval Vessels and T heir 24 Servicemen,” press release, May 25, 2019.
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Figure 4. Southern Ukraine and the Sea of Azov

Sources: Graphic produced by CRS. Map information generated using data from the Department of State, Esri,
and DeLorme.
Economy
As part of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was responsible for a large share of the country’s
agricultural and industrial production. The Soviet Union’s collapse led to a severe economic
contraction in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states.95 Ukraine’s economy recovered for much of
the 2000s but was hit hard by the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. After returning to growth, the
economy stagnated in 2012-2013 and declined again after Russia’s 2014 invasion; GDP fel by
7% in 2014 and 10% in 2015.
In recent years, Ukraine’s economy has improved, due in part to international assistance,
including IMF loan disbursements worth more than $16 bil ion.96 From 2016 to 2019, Ukraine’s
GDP grew by 2.8% a year on average. During these years, observers noted several positive
trends, including declining inflation, rising incomes, growing retail trade, increased agricultural
exports, and growing international reserves and a strengthening currency, in part due to an
increase of foreign investment in Ukraine’s sovereign bonds.97
In 2020, Ukraine’s GDP declined by an estimated 4% due to the impact of the COVID-19
pandemic. The World Bank stated that the economic impact of the pandemic “appears to be less

95 Ukraine’s gross domestic product (GDP) reportedly dropped by over 60% from 1989 to 1999. Anders Aslund,
Ukraine: What Went Wrong and How to Fix It (Washington, DC: PIIE Press, 2015), p. 5.
96 IMF, “Ukraine: T ransactions with the Fund,” at https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extrans1.aspx?
memberKey1=993&endDate=2021-08-31.
97 Olha Hordienko, “Ukraine’s Economic Outlook for 2020: Modest Growth, Low Inflation, and Possible Devaluation
Return,” UNIAN Information Agency, December 31, 2019; and Anders Aslund, “Ukraine’s Underrated Economy Is
Poised for A Strong 2020,” Atlantic Council, January 6, 2020.
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severe than initial y anticipated,” although it has “exacted a heavy toll in terms of health and
mortality.” The World Bank further states that “accelerating the reform momentum is key to
achieving faster economic growth and poverty reduction in 2022 and 2023.”98 Ukraine’s GDP is
expected to grow 3.5% to 4% in 2021. In August 2021, Ukraine’s international reserves reached
their highest level since 2012.99
Ukraine’s official unemployment rate for 2020 was under 10%. Up to 20% of Ukrainian laborers
work in agriculture, a sector of the economy that accounts for about 10% of GDP.100 Ukraine is
the largest recipient of migrant remittances among European low- and middle-income countries,
according to the World Bank. From 2016 to 2020, remittances were equivalent to about 8% of
Ukraine’s annual GDP. In 2020, the National Bank of Ukraine reported that Poland was the
largest source of Ukrainian remittances, followed by the United States, the United Kingdom,
Russia, and the Czech Republic.101
Trade
In 2020, Ukraine’s largest merchandise trading partner was the EU, which accounted for about
39% of total trade. Individual y, Ukraine’s four largest trading partners were China ($15.4 bil ion,
or 15% of Ukraine’s trade), Germany ($7.4 bil ion, 7%), Poland ($7.4 bil ion, 7%), and Russia
($7.3 bil ion, 7%). The top three destinations for Ukraine’s merchandise exports in 2020 were
China (14%), Poland (7%), and Russia (6%).102
Ukraine’s merchandise trade declined after Russia’s 2014 invasion but it has grown since 2017,
reaching more than $100 bil ion a year since 2018. Ukraine’s main exports include cereals, iron
and steel, sunflower oil, iron ores, electrical equipment and parts, and industrial machinery.
Ukraine is one of the world’s leading grain exporters and the world’s largest exporter of
sunflower oil.
Before 2013, Russia was Ukraine’s largest trading partner. In 2013, Russia began to impose
restrictions on trade in response to Ukraine’s plans to conclude a free trade agreement with the
EU. Further restrictions followed in 2014-2015, and Russia suspended its own free trade
agreement with Ukraine in 2016. Ukraine also introduced trade restrictions against Russia.
Excluding exports from occupied Crimea and Russia-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine, the total
value of Ukraine’s merchandise exports declined by 42% from 2013 to 2016, with the value of
merchandise exports to Russia declining by 76%.103
After a severe decline in foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2014, FDI inflows recovered
somewhat. According to the National Bank of Ukraine, total FDI (stock) was $49.7 bil ion at the
end of 2020. FDI inflows in 2019 were mainly in industry, wholesale and retail trade, financial
and insurance services, and real estate. The top sources of FDI in 2019 were Cyprus, the

98 World Bank, “World Bank in Ukraine.”
99 National Bank of Ukraine, “International Reserves Rose to Nine-Year High of USD 31.6 Billion in August,”
September 7, 2021.
100 State Statistics Service of Ukraine, at http://ukrstat.gov.ua/.
101 World Bank, Migration and Remittances Data; National Bank of Ukraine, at https://bank.gov.ua/; and RFE/RL,
“Remittances to Ukraine: Where Do T hey Come From?” August 23, 2019.
102 T rade data are from the State Customs Service of Ukraine, as presented by T rade Data Monitor.
103 T he total value of Ukraine’s merchandise imports declined by 51% from 2013 to 2015, with the value of
merchandise imports from Russia declining by 78% from 2013 to 2016.
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Netherlands, and Switzerland. FDI inflows declined heavily in 2020 during the COVID-19
pandemic.104
Energy
Ukraine has significant energy resources, although the sector historical y has performed below its
potential, given an environment of low domestic energy prices, subsidies, high consumption, and
corruption.105 Ukraine’s primary energy mix consists of about 32% natural gas, 30% coal, and
21% nuclear. Ukraine produces about two-thirds of its total energy supply, including about two-
thirds of its natural gas and 55% of its coal.106
Prior to Russia’s 2014 invasion, Ukraine depended on Russian imports for more than half its total
consumption of natural gas.107 Observers contend that traditional y Russia used gas price hikes,
debt repayments, and cutoffs as leverage in disputes with various Ukrainian governments.108 After
Russia’s invasion, Ukraine’s gas usage and, consequently, dependence on Russian gas declined,
due to lower industrial production, the halting of gas supplies to Russia-controlled areas of
eastern Ukraine, and higher tariffs.109 In 2016, Ukraine halted direct gas imports from Russia
entirely, replacing them with supplies from Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary (al of which import
gas from Russia).
After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Ukrainian government began to reform its energy sector,
including raising tariffs for households (while retaining subsidies for lower-income consumers).
Ongoing priorities include strengthening the independence of the energy regulator, increasing
competition and transparency in the electricity sector, and facilitating private investment in oil
and natural gas development.110 In 2019, the government fulfil ed a long-standing commitment to
unbundle Ukraine’s state-owned energy company, Naftogaz, into production and transmission
companies.111
Controversy Over Naftogaz Reshuffling

104 National Bank of Ukraine; and Daryna Antoniuk, “Foreign Investment in Ukraine Plummets to $221 Million So Far
in 2020,” Kyiv Post, December 2, 2020.
105 See, e.g., Anders Aslund, Securing Ukraine’s Energy Sector, Atlantic Council, April 2016.
106 Ukraine’s energy mix also includes about 13% oil and 4% hydroelectric and renewables. BP Statistical Review of
World Energy 2021; and OECD, Snapshot of Ukraine’s Energy Sector: Institutions, Governance, and Policy
Fram ework, 2019.
107 Cedigaz, a subscription service statistical database, at http://www.cedigaz.org.
108 In particular, Russia briefly reduced gas exports to Ukraine in 2006 after gas contract negotiations failed and, in
2009, briefly cut them, leading to temporary dips in supplies to some EU countries. For more, see Jonathan Stern, The
Russian-Ukrainian Gas Crisis of January 2006, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, January 16, 2006; and Simon
Pirani, Jonathan Stern, and Katja Yafimava, The Russo-Ukrainian Gas Dispute of January 2009: A Com prehensive
Assessm ent, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, February 2009.
109 Naftogaz annual reports for 2014-2016.
110 Council of the EU, “Joint P ress Statement following the 6th Association Council Meeting between the EU and
Ukraine,” press release, January 28, 2020; T odd Prince, “ After Years of Stalling, Can Ukraine Finally Become Energy
Self-Sufficient?” RFE/RL, September 15, 2019; and Ihor Orel, “ Ukraine’s Plans to Get Off Energy Dependence
Needle,” UNIAN Information Agency, January 22, 2020.
111 T he unbundling was intended to align Ukraine’s energy system with the EU’s “T hird Energy Package,” an effort to
liberalize and increase energy sector competition. Alexander Query, “ Ukraine’s Naftogaz Announces Completion of
Gas System Unbundling,” Kyiv Post, January 2, 2020. For more on EU energy policy, see CRS Report R42405,
European Energy Security: Options for EU Natural Gas Diversification , coordinated by Michael Ratner.
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In April 2021, the Ukrainian government unexpectedly dismissed longtime Naftogaz head Andriy Kobolev an d
replaced him with acting minister of energy Yuriy Vitrenko (a former Naftogaz senior official). The day before,
Naftogaz had reported a loss of $684 mil ion for 2020 (Nafotgaz faulted corporate customers for chronic non -
payments). Observers speculated that the government wanted to instal a more political y compliant official to run
Naftogaz, one of Ukraine’s largest taxpayers. Members of Naftogaz’s supervisory board announced their
resignations in protest but subsequently agreed to remain in their positions for at least one year. In June 2021,
Ukraine’s National Agency on Corruption Prevention ruled that Vitrenko’s appointment was not in compliance
with Ukrainian law; Naftogaz announced it would chal enge the decision.
The United States, the European Union, and other international stakeholders expressed concerns about Kobolev’s
dismissal. In a visit to Kyiv in May 2021, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the dismissal had sent “a bad
signal” about the state of corporate governance in Ukraine but that “the government understands that and
hopeful y wil move forward on corporate governance with Naftogaz [and] other big state-owned enterprises.”
Sources: Alexander Query, “Vitrenko In, Kobolyev Out at Naftogaz,” Kyiv Post, April 30, 2021; U.S. Department
of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Olena Frolyak of ICTV,” May 6, 2021; and Reuters, “Naftogaz
Supervisory Board Head Supports New CEO’s Suspension,” June 16, 2021.
Gas Transit to Europe and the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline
Ukraine is a transit state for Russian natural gas exports to Europe. In recent years, Russia has
sought to reduce the amount of natural gas it transits through Ukraine. Before the 2011 opening of
the first Nord Stream pipeline from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea, most of Russia’s
natural gas exports to Europe transited Ukraine. Since the opening of the first Nord Stream
pipeline, about 40%-50% of these exports have transited Ukraine.112
In December 2019, Gazprom, Naftogaz, and a new Gas Transmission System Operator of
Ukraine (GTSOU) renewed a contract for the transit of Russian natural gas to Europe from 2020
to 2024.113 The contract provided for transit of at least 65 bil ion cubic meters (BCM) in 2020 and
40 BCM a year from 2021 to 2024, a volume equal to about 45% of the 2019 volume. In addition,
Gazprom agreed to accept the ruling of an international arbitration court concerning several trade
disputes with Naftogaz and paid the latter $2.9 bil ion in damages and interest. In 2020, Russia
shipped about 56 BCM to Europe via Ukraine, although Ukraine reportedly received the full
contracted amount of $2.1 bil ion in transit revenues.114
Nord Stream 2 is a second Baltic Sea pipeline system that runs paral el to Nord Stream.115
Pipeline construction was initial y suspended in December 2019, after the passage of U.S.
legislation establishing new sanctions related to the pipeline (see “Sanctions Related to Russia’s
Invasion of Ukraine,” below). Construction resumed at the end of 2020 and reportedly was
completed in September 2021. Additional steps, including certification by German authorities, are
required before the pipeline wil be able to transport gas.116
The Ukrainian government opposes the construction and operation of Nord Stream 2. If Nord
Stream 2 becomes operational, it is expected to divert Russian natural gas flows from existing

112 International Energy Agency, “Facts in Brief: Ukraine, Europe, Oil & Gas,” March 4, 2014; Naftogaz annual
reports; and Gazpromexport, “Gas Supplies to Europe.”
113 Simon Pirani and Jack Sharples, “T he Russia-Ukraine Gas T ransit Deal: Opening a New Chapter,” Oxford Institute
for Energy Studies, February 2020.
114 Naftogaz Group, “Naftogaz Provided Gazprom with Gas T ransit Services Equaling $2.11 Billion in 2020,” press
release, January 19, 2021.
115 For more, see CRS In Focus IF11138, Russia’s Nord Stream 2 Natural Gas Pipeline to Germany, by Paul Belkin,
Michael Ratner, and Cory Welt .
116 America Hernandez, “3 Hurdles Still Facing the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline,” Politico, September 12, 2021.
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routes that transit Ukraine. This wil not necessarily increase Ukraine’s vulnerability to energy
supply cutoffs, as Ukraine stopped importing natural gas directly from Russia in 2016. It could
lead to declines in transit revenues, however, and increase Ukraine’s strategic vulnerability, if
reduced dependence on transit leads Moscow to act more aggressively in Ukraine.
In July 2021, the Ukrainian and Polish governments criticized a U.S.-German joint statement
regarding Nord Stream 2, support for Ukraine, and European energy security (see “U.S.-Ukraine
Relations” below). The statement noted that an apparent decision by the United States and
Germany to forgo efforts to halt Nord Stream 2 had “created a political, military, and energy
threat for Ukraine and Central Europe, while increasing Russia’s potential to destabilize the
security situation in Europe.”117
Relations with the EU and NATO
Since 2014, the Ukrainian government has prioritized closer integration with the EU and NATO.
In 2019, a new constitutional amendment declared the government responsible for implementing
Ukraine’s “strategic course” toward EU and NATO membership.118 Zelensky’s first foreign trip
as president was to Brussels, where he reaffirmed Ukraine’s “strategic course to achieve full-
fledged membership in the EU and NATO.”119
The EU’s main framework for political and economic engagement with Ukraine is an Association
Agreement, which encourages harmonization with EU laws and regulations and includes a Deep
and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).120 According to the EU, the DCFTA “appears to
be having a significant positive impact on trade in goods.”121 In 2017, the EU granted Ukrainian
citizens visa-free entry to the EU’s Schengen area of free movement, which al ows individuals to
travel without passport checks between most European countries. The EU has imposed sanctions
on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine and supported Ukraine against Russia’s maritime
aggression.
The EU is a major provider of foreign aid to Ukraine, totaling more than €13 bil ion (about $14.2
bil ion) in loans and €2 bil ion ($2.2 bil ion) in grants from 2014 to 2019. In addition, EU
member states provided an additional €1.4 bil ion ($1.5 bil ion) in bilateral assistance.122 In 2020,
the EU announced it would provide more than €190 mil ion ($205 mil ion) in emergency support
to Ukraine to address the COVID-19 pandemic. The EU subsequently provided another €1.2
bil ion ($1.3 bil ion) in loans to help “limit the economic fal out” of the pandemic.123

117 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, “ Joint Statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba
and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland Zbigniew Rau on Nord Stream 2 ,” July 21, 2021.
118 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, “ President Signed Amendments to the Constitution on the Strategic Course
of Ukraine for Membership in the EU and NAT O,” February 19, 2019.
119 RFE/RL, “Ukraine’s President Promises NAT O Referendum as Part of Path to West,” June 5, 2019.
120 Parts of the agreement were applied provisionally from 2014, and the free-trade agreement was applied
provisionally in 2016. T he full agreement entered into force in 2017. T he text of the Association Agreement and the
2020 Association Im plem entation Report are available at https://eeas.europa.eu/node/10420_en.
121 European Commission and European External Action Service (EEAS), Joint Staff Working Document: Association
Im plem entation Report on Ukraine, December 12, 2019, p. 16. Also see T ony Barber, “ Ukraine Reaps Benefits of
T rade Deal with EU,” Financial Times, September 11, 2018.
122 EEAS, “Ukraine and the EU,” at https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/1937/ukraine-and-eu_en. Also see
European Council, “EU Relations with Ukraine,” at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eastern-partnership/
ukraine/.
123 European Commission, “T he EU’s Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic in the Eastern Partnership,” April 2020;
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Ukraine also has close relations with NATO, which considers the NATO-Ukraine relationship to
be “one of the most substantial of NATO’s partnerships.”124 In 1994, Ukraine was the first post-
Soviet state (after the Baltic states) to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace. A NATO-Ukraine
Commission was established in 1997. Under ex-President Yanukovych, Ukraine adopted a non-
bloc (i.e., nonaligned) status, rejecting aspirations of NATO membership. After Russia’s 2014
invasion, Ukraine’s parliament rejected this non-bloc status.
In 2016, NATO endorsed a Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) for Ukraine “to implement
security and defense sector reforms according to NATO standards.” The CAP includes several
trust fund projects “to support capability development and sustainable capacity-building in key
areas.”125 In June 2020, Ukraine became one of NATO’s Enhanced Opportunity Partners, a
cooperative status currently granted to six of NATO’s close strategic partners.126 NATO members
provide training to and conduct joint exercises with the Ukrainian armed forces in a multinational
framework (see “Foreign and Military Aid,” below).
Ukraine supports NATO peacekeeping and maritime operations. Ukrainian forces have long
contributed to the NATO-led Kosovo Force. Ukraine contributed to the International Security
Assistance Force and follow-on Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, the counterterrorism
Operation Active Endeavour maritime mission, and the antipiracy Operation Ocean Shield. In
addition, Ukraine has supported NATO’s maritime Sea Guardian operation. Ukraine also
participates in the NATO Response Force, a rapid reaction force.
In recent years, the Ukrainian government has sought to deepen its relations with NATO. In 2017,
Ukraine’s parliament voted to make cooperation with NATO a foreign policy priority.127
Ukraine’s 2020 National Security Strategy includes as a priority the development of a special
partnership with NATO and the pursuit of NATO membership. In 2021, President Zelensky and
other Ukrainian officials cal ed on NATO to grant Ukraine a Membership Action Plan, which they
see as a stepping stone to membership.128
Closer integration with the EU and NATO does not appear to have enabled Ukraine to improve its
near-term prospects for membership in these organizations. According to recent polls, more than
half of Ukrainians support membership in the EU (polls do not include occupied Crimea or
Russia-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine).129 The EU is unlikely to consider Ukraine a candidate
for membership soon, however, given Ukraine’s domestic chal enges, the conflict with Russia,
the EU’s own internal chal enges, and the lack of support for further enlargement among many
EU members.

and European Commission, “Coronavirus: Eight Macro-financial Assistance Programmes Agreed to Support
Enlargement and Neighbourhood Partners,” press release, August 11, 2020.
124 NAT O, “Relations with Ukraine,” updated August 27, 2021.
125 Since 2014, trust fund project areas have included Command, Control, Communications and Computers; Logistics
and Standardization; Cyber Defense; Medical Rehabilitation; Military Career T ransition; and Explosive Ordnance
Disposal and Countering Improvised Explosive Devices. NAT O, “ Relations with Ukraine,” updated August 27, 2021.
126 NAT O’s Enhanced Opportunity Partners are Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, Sweden, and Ukraine. NAT O,
“Partnership Interoperability Initiative,” updated August 24, 2021.
127 Steven Pifer, “Ukraine Overturns Its Non-Bloc Status: What Next with NAT O?” Kyiv Post, December 26, 2014; and
RFE/RL, “ Ukrainian Parliament Makes NAT O Integration a Priority,” June 8, 2017.
128 Dmytro Kuleba, “Why Is Ukraine Still Not in NAT O,” Atlantic Council, February 16, 2021; Roman Olearchyk and
Michael Peel, “Ukraine Pressures NAT O to Speed Path to Membership,” Financial Times, April 6, 2021; and Olga
Stefanishyna, “Ukraine Needs a Clear Path to NAT O Membership,” Foreign Policy, April 12, 2021.
129 Interfax Ukraine, “Most Ukrainians Support Joining EU – Poll,” March 23, 2021; and IRI, “ IRI Poll in Ukraine
Finds Continued Support for European Integration Against Backdrop of COVID-19 Pandemic,” May 17, 2021.
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Ukraine also faces a chal enge to NATO membership. In 2008, NATO members formal y agreed
that Ukraine and Georgia would become members of NATO, but neither state has been granted a
clear path to or timeline for membership.130 Many observers believe NATO wil not move
forward with membership as long as Russia occupies Ukrainian territory and the conflict remains
unresolved. Ukrainians themselves remain divided over NATO membership. Since 2014, about
40%-50% of opinion poll respondents support membership in NATO (compared to about 25%-
30% against); these polls do not include occupied Crimea and Russia-controlled areas of eastern
Ukraine, where support for NATO membership likely would be lower even in the absence of
conflict.131
U.S.-Ukraine Relations
U.S. relations with Ukraine are deep and multifaceted. In 1994, former National Security Adviser
Zbigniew Brzezinski justified U.S. engagement with the newly independent Ukraine by arguing
that a strong Ukraine would not only benefit Ukrainians but also help prevent the rise of a new
Russian empire, bolstering regional and global security. “It cannot be stressed strongly enough
that without Ukraine,” Brzezinski said, “Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine
suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatical y becomes an empire.”132
Less frequently cited are Brzezinki’s 1994 assessment of Ukraine’s fragility and his ensuing
policy prescriptions, which successive U.S. administrations appear to have followed:
American policymakers must face the fact that Ukraine is on the brink of disaster: the
economy is in a free-fall, while Crimea is on the verge of a Russia-abetted ethnic explosion.
Either crisis might be exploited to promote the breakup or the reintegration of Ukraine in
a larger Moscow-dominated framework. It is urgent and essential that the United States
convince the Ukrainian government—through the promise of substantial economic
assistance—to adopt long-delayed and badly needed economic reforms. At the same time,
American political assurances for Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity should
be forthcoming.133
Soon after Brzezinki’s article was published, the United States provided “political assurances” to
Ukraine with the signing of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum (see “Crimea,” above). Twenty
years later, after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, U.S. officials came to express more
emphatical y and frequently U.S. support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within
its international y recognized borders.
In 2019, U.S. relations with Ukraine became a prominent issue in U.S. domestic political affairs.
In September 2019, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced that the House would begin an
impeachment inquiry related in part to al eged presidential actions regarding Ukraine.134 On

130 In the Bucharest Summit Declaration of April 2008, heads of state and government of NAT O member countries
declared that “NAT O welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NAT O. We
agreed today that these countries will become members of NAT O.” NAT O, “ Bucharest Summit Declaration,” April 3,
2008.
131 Gerard T oal, John O’Loughlin, and Kristin M. Bakke, “ Is Ukraine Caught between Europe and Russia? We Asked
Ukrainians T his Important Question,” Washington Post, February 26, 2020; and Center for Insights in Survey Research
(IRI), “Public Opinion Survey of Residents of Ukraine, March 13 -21, 2021,” at https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/
wysiwyg/public_-_03.2021_national_eng-_public.pdf.
132 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “T he Premature Partnership,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (March/April 1994), p. 80. Hereinafter
Brzezinski, “Premature Partnership.”
133 Brzezinski, “Premature Partnership.”
134 Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, “Pelosi Remarks Announcing Impeachment Inquiry,” press release, September
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December 18, 2019, the House of Representatives agreed to H.Res. 755, which impeached
President Trump on charges of abuse of power (Article I) and obstruction of Congress (Article
II).135 The first article of impeachment in part accused the President of
soliciting the Government of Ukraine to publicly announce investigations that would
benefit his reelection, harm the election prospects of a political opponent, and influence the
2020 United States Presidential election to his advantage. President Trump also sought to
pressure the Government of Ukraine to take these steps by conditioning official United
States Government acts of significant value to Ukraine on its public announcement of the
investigations.
President Trump and White House officials acknowledged the President’s interest in Ukrainian
investigations but said those interests were tied to legitimate concerns. White House officials
general y denied that U.S. government acts had been contingent on an announcement of such
investigations.136 Other U.S. officials presented their views during the impeachment inquiry. On
February 5, 2020, the Senate adjudged that President Trump was not guilty as charged in the two
articles of impeachment (for more, see “Foreign and Military Aid,” below).
The Biden Administration has sought to renew close relations with Ukraine. Secretary of State
Antony Blinken visited Ukraine in May 2021, and Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm
represented the administration at the August 2021 Crimea Platform Summit in Kyiv. President
Biden twice spoke by telephone with President Zelensky in April and June 2021 and hosted
President Zelensky at the White House in September 2021 (see text box below).
President Zelensky’s 2021 White House Visit
During Zelensky’s visit to Washington, DC, in August-September 2021, the United States and Ukraine released
Joint Statements on the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Partnership and on Enhancing Bilateral Energy and Climate
Cooperation. Officials signed a new Strategic Defense Framework and a defense research, development, test and
evaluation agreement, as wel as a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at enhancing trade and economic
cooperation. U.S. officials also announced the extension of a U.S.-Ukraine Science and Technology Agreement and
the establishment of a new secure communication line through the National and Nuclear Risk Reduction Center.
According to Biden Administration officials, “in the 30 years since Ukraine achieved independence, [the U.S.-
Ukraine] strategic partnership has never been stronger than it is now.”
Sources: White House, “Joint Statement on the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Partnership,” September 1, 2021; U.S.
Department of Energy, “Joint Statement by and Between the United States Department of Energy and the Ministry
of Energy of Ukraine on Enhancing Bilateral Energy and Climate Cooperation ,” August 31, 2021; U.S. Department
of Defense, “U.S., Ukraine Leaders Discuss Strategic Partnership During Pentagon Meeting,” August 31, 2021;
Export-Import Bank of the United States, “EXIM Signs Memorandum of Understanding with Ukraine’s Ministry of

24, 2019. On October 31, 2019, the House agreed to H.Res. 660, which directed certain committees to continue
ongoing investigations as part of an impeachment inquiry.
135 Also see U.S. House of Representatives, Trial Memorandum of the United States House of
Representatives in the Impeachment Trial of President Donald J. Trump, January 18, 2020. For
additional documents and materials associated with the impeachment process, including related to
Ukraine, see U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, “The Impeachment of
Donald John Trump, Evidentiary Record from the House of Representatives,” at
https://judiciary.house.gov/the-impeachment-of-donald-john-trump/, and “Markup of H.Res. 755,
Articles of Impeachment Against President Donald J. Trump,” at https://docs.house.gov/
Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=110331.
136 See, e.g., White House, Trial Memorandum of President Donald J. Trump, January 20, 2020.
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Economy,” September 1, 2021; and White House, “Background Press Cal by Senior Administration Officials on
the President’s Upcoming Meeting with President Zelenskyy of Ukraine,” September 1, 2021.
Security
U.S. officials have said that U.S. support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is
“unwavering.”137 This applies to both occupied Crimea and Russia-controlled areas in eastern
Ukraine. In 2018, then-Deputy Secretary of State John J. Sullivan said in Kyiv that “Crimea is
Ukraine.... We wil never accept trading one region of Ukraine for another. We wil never make a
deal about Ukraine without Ukraine.”138 In July 2018, then-Secretary of State Pompeo issued the
“Crimea Declaration,” which
reaffirms as policy [the United States ’] refusal to recognize the Kremlin’s claims of
sovereignty over territory seized by force in contravention of international law. In concert
with allies, partners, and the international community, the United States rejects Russia’s
attempted annexation of Crimea and pledges to maintain this policy until Ukraine’s
territorial integrity is restored.139
The Crimea Declaration explicitly links U.S. policy to the Wel es Declaration of 1940, which
marked the start of a U.S. policy not to recognize the Soviet Union’s annexation of the Baltic
states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania).140
The Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA) states that it is
the policy of the United States “to never recognize the il egal annexation of Crimea by the
Government of the Russian Federation or the separation of any portion of Ukrainian territory
through the use of military force” (§257).141 Since FY2015, foreign operations appropriations
have prohibited foreign assistance to governments that take “affirmative steps” to support
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and have restricted funds from implementing policies and actions
that would recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea (P.L. 116-260, §7047(b)).
U.S. officials have cal ed attention to Russia’s human rights abuses in occupied Crimea. These
abuses include “a brutal campaign of repression against Crimean Tatars, ethnic Ukrainians, and
members of other minority ethnic and religious groups in Crimea.”142
The United States supports the efforts of the Trilateral Contact Group and the Normandy Four in
implementing the Minsk agreements (see “Conflict Resolution Process,” above).143 U.S. officials

137 See, e.g., White House, “ Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Call with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of
Ukraine,” April 2, 2021.
138 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Diplomatic Academy,” February 21, 2018.
139 U.S. Department of State, “Crimea Declaration,” July 25, 2018.
140 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Press Release Issued by the Department of State on July 23,
1940,” at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1940v01/d412. Also see U.S. Department of State, “Seventy-
Fifth Anniversary of the Welles Declaration,” July 22, 2015.
141 T itle II of P.L. 115-44, Countering America’s Adversaries T hrough Sanctions Act (CAAT SA). T he Countering
Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA) also states that the United States “ does not recognize
territorial changes effected by force, including the illegal invasions and occupations” of Crimea and eastern Ukrain e, as
well as of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (in Georgia) and T ransnistria (in Moldova) (§253).
142 U.S. Department of State, “Crimea Is Ukraine,” February 25, 2021.
143 From 2017 to 2019, U.S. policy on the Ukraine conflict was directed mainly through the office of a newly-
established U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations. Ambassador Kurt Volker resigned from this position
in September 2019 prior to the start of the presidential impeachment inquiry in the House of Representatives. T he
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criticize Russia for failing to fulfil its commitments under the Minsk agreements and condemn
Russia’s aggressive actions in and around Ukraine.144 In April 2021, President Biden spoke with
President Putin to “[voice] concerns over the sudden Russian military build-up in occupied
Crimea and on Ukraine’s borders, and cal ed on Russia to de-escalate tensions.”145 In addition,
the State Department cal ed on Russia “to cease its harassment of vessels” in the Black Sea
region.146
The United States supports Ukraine against Russian efforts to reduce Ukraine’s role as a transit
state for natural gas exports.147 CRIEEA states that it is U.S. policy to “oppose the Nord Stream 2
pipeline given its detrimental impacts on the EU’s energy security, gas market development in
Central and Eastern Europe, and energy reforms in Ukraine” (§257). On President Trump’s last
full day in office, the Trump Administration imposed sanctions on a Russian-related entity and a
pipelaying vessel for participating the construction of Nord Stream 2. The Biden Administration
imposed a second round of sanctions on that entity and vessel, as wel as on 21 other entities and
vessels.
The Biden Administration appears to have shifted its focus away from working to prevent the
completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline to mitigating the potential negative impacts of an
operational pipeline. This includes by issuing a U.S.-Germany joint statement in July 2021 that
pledges, among other things, to bolster Ukraine’s energy security and to support sanctions in
response to further acts of Russian aggression toward Ukraine.148 In August 2021, Secretary of
State Antony Blinken appointed Amos Hochstein to serve as Senior Advisor for Energy Security,
focusing on the “implementation of measures to reduce the risks posed by the Nord Stream 2
pipeline.”149
U.S. Concerns About Technology Transfer to China: Case of Motor Sich
Since 2018, U.S. officials reportedly have sought to deter Ukraine from approving the sale to Chinese companies
of Motor Sich, a Ukrainian company that is a major producer of airplane and helicopter engines. In 2017, official
documents revealed that a Chinese state-linked company had acquired majority ownership of Motor Sich. A
Ukrainian court froze a percentage of the Chinese-owned shares after the Security Service of Ukraine said the
company was intending to move Motor Sich’s assets abroad. U.S. concerns about the sale relate to the transfer of
sensitive technologies that could boost Chinese domestic military production and cooperation with Russia. U.S.
officials warned Ukraine that the sale could lead China to displace Ukraine as a leading aircraft engine exporter.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has taken further steps to prevent China’s takeover of Motor Sich. In
2020, Ukraine’s Anti-Monopoly Committee rejected proposals to formal y establish joint Chinese-Ukrainian
control over Motor Sich. In February 2021, the Ukrainian government imposed sanctions on the pertinent
Chinese companies and their owners (fol owing a U.S. decision to place one of the companies on the U.S. Military

T rump Administration did not appoint a successor, and neither has the Biden Administration.
144 See, e.g., U.S. Department of State, “ Russia’s Decision to Grant Expedited Citizenship to Residents of Russia-
Controlled Eastern Ukraine,” April 24, 2019; and U.S. Department of State, “ Secretary Antony J. Blinken and
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at a Joint Press Availability ,” May 6, 2021.
145 White House, “Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Call with President Vladimir Putin of Russia,” April 13,
2021.
146 U.S. Department of State, “Russia’s Intention to Restrict Navigation in Parts of the Black Sea,” April 19, 2021.
147 For more, see CRS In Focus IF11138, Russia’s Nord Stream 2 Natural Gas Pipeline to Germany, by Paul Belkin,
Michael Ratner, and Cory Welt .
148 U.S. Department of State, “ Joint Statement of the United States and Germany on Support for Ukraine, European
Energy Security, and our Climate Goals,” July 21, 2021.
149 U.S. Department of State, “Senior Advisor for Energy Security,” August 10, 2021.
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End-User List, restricting certain U.S. exports to that company). In March 2021, Ukrainian authorities said the
government intended to take control of Motor Sich. Chinese investors said they would contest Ukraine’s actions.
Sources: Askold Krushelnycky, “Washington Worries Over Kyiv Defense Ties to China,” Kyiv Post, September
14, 2018; Al a Hurska, “The Battle for Motor Sich,” Center for European Policy Analysis, November 20, 2020; U.S.
Department of Commerce, “Commerce Adds China National Offshore Oil Corporation to the Entity List and
Skyrizon to the Military End-User List,” press release, January 14, 2021; and Brett Forrest and Alan Cul ison,
“Ukraine to Nationalize Defense Firm, Keeping China Out in a Nod to U.S.,” Wal Street Journal, March 16, 2021.
Reforms
The United States promotes domestic reforms in Ukraine. During the Obama Administration,
U.S. officials criticized the Yanukovych government for suppressing the Euromaidan protests.
U.S. officials supported a negotiated resolution to Ukraine’s domestic crisis and the establishment
of an interim government before Yanukovych fled to Russia in 2014.150
During Poroshenko’s presidency, the Obama Administration supported a wide range of
governance and economic reforms in Ukraine, including the establishment of new anti-corruption
institutions.151 In 2015, then-Vice President Biden reportedly told Ukrainian officials the United
States would withhold a $1 bil ion loan guarantee (the third since 2014) if Ukraine’s then-
prosecutor general did not resign.152 U.S. and European officials had criticized the prosecutor
general’s office for hindering corruption investigations (for more on U.S. aid, see “Foreign and
Military Aid,” below).153
Trump Administration officials also expressed support for Ukraine’s domestic reforms. In 2017,
then-Secretary of State Rex Til erson said, “It serves no purpose for Ukraine to fight for its body
in Donbas if it loses its soul to corruption. Anti-corruption institutions must be supported,
resourced, and defended.”154 In 2019, then-U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch
cal ed for the replacement of Ukraine’s anti-corruption prosecutor “to ensure the integrity of
anticorruption institutions.” 155

150 U.S. Department of State, “Statement of Events in Ukraine,” December 10, 2013; and U.S. Department of State,
“Situation in Ukraine,” February 20, 2014.
151 See, in particular, testimony of Victoria Nuland, in U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Policy
in Ukraine: Countering Russia and Driving Reform , hearings, 114th Cong., 1st sess., March 10, 2015; The Econom ic
and Political Future of Ukraine, hearings, 114th Cong., 1st sess., October 8, 2015; and Ukrainian Reform s Two Years
After the Maidan Revolution and the Russian Invasion , hearings, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., March 15, 2016. Also see
White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance to Ukraine Since February 2014,” June 15, 2016.
152 Steve Clemons, “T he Biden Doctrine,” Atlantic, August 22, 2016; Council on Foreign Relations, “Foreign Affairs
Issue Launch with Former Vice President Joe Biden,” January 23, 2018; and Matt Viser and Paul Sonne, “Inside Joe
Biden’s Brawling Efforts to Reform Ukraine – Which Won Him Successes and Enemies,” Washington Post, October
19, 2019.
153 RFE/RL, “U.S. Ambassador Upbraids Ukrainian Prosecutors over Anticorruption Efforts,” September 25, 2015;
Victoria Nuland, in U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, The Econom ic and Political Future of
Ukraine, hearings, 114th Cong., 1st sess., October 8, 2015, at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/download/nuland-
testimony-100815; James Risen, “ Joe Biden, His Son and the Case Against a Ukrainian Oligarch,” New York Tim es,
December 8, 2015; and Daniel McLaughlin, “EU Hails Sacking of Ukraine’s Prosecutor Viktor Shokin,” Irish Times,
March 29, 2016.
154 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks to NAT O-Ukraine Commission,” U.S. Department of State, March 31, 2017.
155 U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, “ Remarks by Ambassador Yovanovitch on the Occasion of the 5 th Anniversary of the
Ukraine Crisis Media Center’s Founding,” March 5, 2019.
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The Biden Administration has stated the United States is a “full partner” in Ukraine’s domestic
reform efforts.156 Visiting Kyiv in May 2021, Secretary Blinken said Ukraine “faces twin
chal enges: aggression from outside coming from Russia, and in effect, aggression from within
coming from corruption, oligarchs, and others who are putting their interests ahead of those of the
Ukrainian people.”157 The State Department has elaborated that “building institutions with
integrity and ensuring accountable governance in both state institutions and in the corporate
sector is the key to Ukraine achieving its Euro-Atlantic aspirations and building a prosperous,
secure, and democratic future.”158
Foreign and Military Aid
Since independence, Ukraine has been a leading recipient of U.S. foreign and military aid in
Europe and Eurasia. In the 1990s (FY1992-FY2000), the U.S. government provided almost
$2.6 bil ion in total aid to Ukraine ($287 mil ion a year, on average).159 In the 2000s (FY2001 to
FY2009), total aid to Ukraine amounted to almost $1.8 bil ion ($199 mil ion a year, on
average).160 In the five years before Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine (FY2010 to FY2014),
State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) bilateral aid
al ocations amounted to about $105 mil ion a year on average.161
After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States began to provide higher levels of annual
assistance to Ukraine across multiple accounts. From FY2015 to FY2020, State Department and
USAID bilateral aid al ocations to Ukraine (including foreign military financing, or FMF) totaled
about $418 mil ion a year on average (see Table 1). For FY2021, State Department and USAID
al ocations to Ukraine totaled about $464 million, including $115 mil ion in FMF.162 The
President’s FY2022 State/USAID request for Ukraine is about $459 mil ion.
Table 1. Primary U.S. Assistance to Ukraine, FY2015-FY2022
(selected account al ocations, in thousands of dol ars)

FY2021
FY2022
FY2015
FY2016
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
(estimate)
(request)
State/USAID
361,872
667,099
454,315
421,817
445,654
447,049
463,556
458,900
of which, FMF
47,000
85,000
99,000
95,000
115,000
115,000
115,000
115,000

156 U.S. Department of State, “ Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at a Joint
Press Availability,” May 6, 2021; and U.S. Department of State, “ Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Ukrainian Prime
Minister Denys Shmyhal Before T heir Meeting,” May 6, 2021.
157 U.S. Department of State, “ Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at a Joint
Press Availability,” May 6, 2021.
158 U.S. Department of State, “The United States and Ukraine: Strategic Partners,” May 5, 2021.
159 Foreign aid totals from FY1992 to FY2000 include all agencies and accounts. See U.S. Department of State, U.S.
Governm ent Assistance to and Cooperative Activities With the New Independent States of the Form er Soviet Union
(submitted pursuant to Section 104 of the FREEDOM Support Act, P.L. 102-511), FY2000 Annual Report (Appendix),
January 2001, at https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/nisasst/index.htm.
160 CRS calculations, based on data available in the U.S. Department of State’s annual U.S. Government Assistance to
and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia reports for FY2001 to FY2009, at https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/
c10250.htm.
161 Since FY2010, the U.S. government has not provided a comprehensive accounting of foreign aid to post -Soviet
states similar to t hat included in the annual Section 104 reports issued through FY2009. From FY2010, State
Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) assistance cited in the text refer to actual funds,
as reported in the State Department’s annual Congressional Budget Justifications.
162 U.S. Department of State, FY2021 estimate data, June 15, 2021.
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FY2021
FY2022
FY2015
FY2016
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
(estimate)
(request)
Ukraine Security
Assistance
Initiative (DOD)

226,530
148,636
195,450
214,800
256,701
275,000
250,000
Sources: Department of State Congressional Budget Justifications and Department of Defense Budget Requests,
except FY2021 (State Department estimate).
Notes: Amounts include development and security assistance provided via regular bilateral programming
accounts. Table does not include humanitarian assistance or security and nonproliferation assistance periodical y
provided via other accounts (inter alia, Cooperative Threat Reduction, Section 333, Europe and Eurasia Regional
FMF, Global Security Contingency Fund). For FY2016, State/USAID amount includes a loan guarantee subsidy
cost of $290 mil ion.
U.S. assistance to Ukraine extends beyond State Department and USAID funding. U.S. security
assistance includes the Department of Defense’s Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI;
P.L. 114-92, §1250), which is intended to support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity
and to help Ukraine defend against further aggression. From FY2016 to FY2021, Congress
appropriated more than $1.3 bil ion for USAI. Ukraine also has received security assistance
through additional DOD and other accounts, including emergency and reprogrammed aid in
2014-2015, the European Deterrence (formerly Reassurance) Initiative, the Global Security
Contingency Fund, Section 333 (Building Partner Capacity), regional FMF, and International
Military Education and Training (IMET). In al , the United States has al ocated more than $2.5
bil ion in security assistance to Ukraine since Russia’s 2014 invasion.163
In addition, the U.S. government has provided more than $351 mil ion in humanitarian assistance
since FY2014 to assist internal y displaced persons (IDPs) and other victims of conflict.164
Nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance administered by the Department of Energy and
the Department of Defense (DOD) has totaled more than $205 mil ion in obligated funds since
FY2014.165 The United States also has provided three $1 bil ion loan guarantees to Ukraine.166
Lethal and Nonlethal Security Assistance
The Obama Administration provided nonlethal security assistance to Ukraine, due to concerns
about potential conflict escalation.167 Such assistance included “body armor, helmets, vehicles,

163 U.S. Department of Defense, “Defense Department Announces $150 Million in Assistance for Ukraine,” June 11,
2021; and U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Securit y Cooperation with Ukraine,” July 2, 2021.
164 See U.S. Department of State, “United States Announces Humanitarian Assistance for Ukraine,” September 2, 2021;
and USAID’s end-fiscal year Ukraine - Complex Emergency Fact Sheet for FY2015 to FY2020, at
https://www.usaid.gov/humanitarian-assistance/ukraine/ukraine-archive.
165 Nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance refers to obligated funds from the Department of Ene rgy Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation and Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction (CT R) accounts, as reported by
USAID and the State Department, at https://foreignassistance.gov/. FY2014 CT R funds include some assistance
provided in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
166 On loan guarantees, see CRS In Focus IF10409, U.S. Foreign Assistance: USAID Loan Guarantees; and USAID,
“USAID Announces U.S. Issuance of $1 Billion Loan Guarantee to the Government of Ukraine,” press release,
September 30, 2016.
167 T estimony of John Kerry, in U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Advancing U.S. Interests in a
Troubled World: The FY2016 Foreign Affairs Budget, hearings, 114th Cong., 1st sess., February 25, 2015; testimony of
Victoria Nuland, in U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Ukraine Under Siege, hearings, 114th Cong., 1st
sess., March 4, 2015; and U.S. Department of State, “Remarks o n T ransatlantic Cooperation and the Crisis in Ukraine,”
March 5, 2015. Also see Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, “ How Aiding the Ukrainian Military Could Push Putin into a
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night and thermal vision devices, heavy engineering equipment, advanced radios, patrol boats,
rations, tents, counter-mortar radars, uniforms, first aid equipment and supplies, and other related
items.”168 Both the Trump and Biden Administrations have provided nonlethal aid and defensive
lethal weaponry to Ukraine.
From 2017 to 2021, security assistance has included
capabilities to enhance the lethality, command and control, and situational awareness of
Ukraine’s forces through the provision of counter-artillery radars, counter-unmanned aerial
systems, secure communications gear, electronic warfare and military medical evacuation
equipment, and training and equipment to improve the operational safety and capacity of
Ukrainian Air Force bases.169
In 2018 and 2019, DOD notified Congress of two Foreign Military Sales to Ukraine for a total of
360 Javelin portable anti-tank missiles, as wel as launchers, associated equipment, and
training.170 According to media reports, these missiles were to be stored away from the
frontline.171 In September 2021, the Biden Administration announced plans to provide “a new $60
mil ion package for additional Javelin anti-armor systems and other defensive lethal and non-
lethal capabilities.”172 U.S. military assistance to Ukraine also has included armed Mark VI patrol
boats and Coast Guard Island-class patrol boats.173
Ukraine Aid and the 2019 U.S. Presidential Impeachment
In August and September 2019, some Members of Congress expressed concern about a reported hold of security
assistance funds to Ukraine that were to expire at the end of the fiscal year (September 30, 2019).a The
Department of Defense had notified Congress of its intent to obligate a total of $250 mil ion in Ukraine Security
Assistance Initiative (USAI) funds in February 2019 and May 2019. The Administration released the USAI funds on
September 12, 2019. In addition, the State Department notified Congress of its intent to obligate $141.5 mil ion in
Foreign Military Financing for Ukraine on September 11, 2019.b
Questions persisted about the hold, especial y after media reports al eged that a whistleblower complaint received
by the Office of the Inspector General of the Intel igence Community in August 2019 was related to presidential
communications regarding Ukraine.c After the Acting Director of National Intel igence (DNI) declined to transmit
the complaint to Congress, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced on September 24, 2019, that the House
would start an impeachment inquiry. The next day, the White House released a memorandum of a July 25, 2019,
telephone conversation between President Trump and President Zelensky; in addition, the Office of the DNI
provided Congress with a declassified version of the whistleblower complaint.
The December 2019 articles of impeachment in part accused President Trump of linking security aid and a head of
state White House meeting to an agreement by the Ukrainian government to announce investigations into two
matters: (1) what President Trump al eged was potential Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential

Regional War,” Washington Post, February 5, 2015.
168 White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance to Ukraine,” November 21, 2014. Also see Lolita C. Baldor and Nedra
Pickler, “U.S. to Send Ukraine Drones, More Aid, But No Lethal Weapons,” Associated Press, March 11, 2015, and
Adriane Elliot, “Security Enterprise Builds Partner Nation’s Defenses,” U.S. Army, July 20, 2016.
169 U.S. Department of Defense, “Defense Department Announces $150 Million in Assistance for Ukraine,” June 11,
2021. Also see U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine,” July 2, 2021.
170 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Ukraine – Javelin Missiles and Command Launch Units,” T ransmittal No.
18-02, March 1, 2018; and Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “ Ukraine – Javelin Missiles and Command Launch
Units,” T ransmittal No. 19-70, October 3, 2019.
171 Mike Eckel and Christopher Miller, “ Next Up for U.S. Weapons Supplies to Ukraine? Possibly Surface-to-Air
Missiles,” RFE/RL, June 11, 2019.
172 U.S. Department of Defense, “ Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III’s Meeting With Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Minister of Defen se Andrii T aran,” August 31, 2021.
173 U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD Announces $250M to Ukraine,” June 11, 2020; and U.S. Department of State,
“Former U.S. Coast Guard Patrol Boats to Serve Again in the Ukrainian Navy,” July 2, 2021.
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election and (2) the role of then-Vice President Joseph Biden in securing the removal from office of Ukraine’s
then-Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin in 2016 (see “Reforms,” above).
President Trump and White House officials said the hold on Ukraine’s security aid had been in place while they
assessed Zelensky’s commitment to combatting corruption and the amount of aid European states were providing
to Ukraine.d In January 2020, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that the withholding of
aid by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was a violation of the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974. The OMB, which in December 2019 stated that the hold had been a legal
“pause in obligations,” said that it “disagree[d] with GAO’s opinion.”e
Sources: a Caitlin Emma and Connor O’Brien, “Trump Holds Up Ukraine Military Aid Meant to Confront Russia,”
Politico, August 28, 2019; U.S. Senator Rob Portman, “Portman, Shaheen Lead Bipartisan Ukraine Caucus
Leadership Letter Urging Trump Administration to Release Military Security Assistance Funds for Ukraine,” press
release, September 3, 2019; and U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “Three House Committees Launch
Wide-Ranging Investigation into Trump-Giuliani Ukraine Scheme,” press release, September 9, 2019.
b Caitlin Emma et al., “Trump Administration Backs Off Hold on Ukraine Military Aid,” Politico, September 12,
2019.
c El en Nakashima et al., “Whistleblower Complaint About President Trump Involves Ukraine, According to Two
People Familiar with the Matter,” Washington Post, September 19, 2019.
d See, for example, White House, “Remarks by Vice President Pence and President Duda of Poland in Joint Press
Conference,” September 2, 2019; White House, “Remarks by President Trump and President Ni nistö of the
Republic of Finland in Joint Press Conference,” October 2, 2019; White House, “Remarks by Vice President Pence
in a Press Gaggle,” October 10, 2019; and New York Times, “Read Mulvaney’s Conflicting Statements on Quid Pro
Quo,” October 17, 2019.
e Office of Management and Budget, “OMB OGC Letter to GAO on Authority to Pause Obligation of Ukraine
Funds,” December 11, 2019; U.S. Government Accountability Office, Office of Management and Budget—
Withholding of Ukraine Security Assistance, B-331564, January 16, 2020; and Andrew Duehren, “Hold on Ukraine Aid
Violated Law, Nonpartisan Watchdog Finds,” Wal Street Journal, January 16, 2020.
Since 2015, U.S. forces from the U.S. Army and National Guard, together with military trainers
from U.S. al ied states, have provided training and mentoring to members of the Ukrainian Armed
Forces as part of a Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine.174
The United States and Ukraine host regular joint military exercises in Ukraine with the
participation of NATO al ies and partners. Sea Breeze, a maritime exercise, has been held
regularly since 1997; in 2021, training objectives included “amphibious warfare, land maneuver
warfare, diving operations, maritime interdiction operations, air defense, special operations
integration, anti-submarine warfare, and search and rescue operations.”175 Another exercise,
Rapid Trident, has been held annual y since 2011. Original y a peacekeeping exercise for NATO
and Partnership for Peace members, Rapid Trident has evolved to “enhance readiness and build
interoperability” among Ukrainian and partner forces. Rapid Trident is the “culminating event of
an ... annual training exercise to prepare Ukrainian Land Force units for the chal enges of real
world situations and deployments.”176
The United States provides cybersecurity assistance to Ukraine. The United States and Ukraine
are planning to hold a fourth Bilateral Cybersecurity Dialogue in Kyiv in October 2021.177 U.S.

174 U.S. Department of Defense, “Pentagon Press Secretary Updates Reporters on DOD Operations,” February 22,
2021.
175 U.S. Navy, “U.S. Sixth Fleet Announces Sea Breeze 2021 Participation,” June 21, 2021; and Robyn Dixon, “T he
U.S.-Ukraine Sea Breeze Naval Exercises, Explained,” Washington Post, July 2, 2021.
176 Spc. Michael Sword, “Secretary of Army Witnesses Rapid T rident 2011 in Ukraine,” U.S. Army, August 5, 2011;
and U.S. Army Europe and Africa, “Exercise Rapid T rident 20 to be Held in September,” September 14, 2020.
177 U.S. Department of State, “The United States and Ukraine Hold T hird Cyber Dialogue,” March 3, 2020; and White
House, “Joint Statement on the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Partnership,” September 1, 2021.
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interagency teams visited Ukraine in 2016 regarding 2015 cyberattacks against Ukrainian power
companies.178
Bilateral Trade
The United States granted Ukraine permanent normal trade relations status in 2006.179 From 2014
to 2016, bilateral trade declined in line with an overal decline in Ukraine’s trade after Russia’s
invasion. U.S.-Ukraine trade began to recover in 2017. In 2020, the United States was Ukraine’s
5th-largest source of merchandise imports and 14th-largest destination for exports.180 The value of
U.S. merchandise exports to Ukraine—mostly motor vehicles, coal, and industrial machinery—
was $1.9 bil ion in 2020. The value of U.S. merchandise imports from Ukraine—primarily iron
and steel—was $1.3 bil ion in 2020.
In 2017, President Trump and then-President Poroshenko agreed to increase the sale of U.S. coal
to Ukraine, stating that it could help replace now-halted supplies of coal from the
nongovernment-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine.181 In 2020, U.S. coal accounted for about
28% of Ukraine’s total coal imports.
Role of Congress
Since 1991, Congress has supported Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and democratic
trajectory.182 Congress supported Ukraine’s democratic transition during the 2004-2005 Orange
Revolution.183 Congress also has agreed to several resolutions to commemorate the 1986
Chernobyl nuclear disaster, which took place in Soviet Ukraine, and to support related U.S. and
international assistance.184 Congress has commemorated the Soviet Ukraine famine of 1932-1933,
most recently in 2018 (H.Res. 931/S.Res. 435).185

178 ICS-CERT , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure,”
February 25, 2016; and Kim Zetter, “ Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid,” Wired,
March 3, 2016.
179 P.L. 109-205. Before 2006, Ukraine was subject to T itle IV of the T rade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618; 19 U.S.C. 2101
et seq.), pursuant to which Russia and other post -Soviet states were denied permanent normal trade relations status. The
T rade Act had originally imposed restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union, due to its nonmarket economy and
prohibitive emigration policies (the latter through Section 402, popularly cited as the Jackson -Vanik amendment). After
the collapse of the Soviet Union, these trade restrictions formally continued to apply to Russia and other post -Soviet
states, even though they received conditional normal trade relations in 1992.
180 Data in this section are from the State Customs Committee of Ukraine and U.S. Census Bureau, as presented in
Global T rade Atlas.
181 Ari Natter, “Ukraine Coal Exports Part of T rump Bid to Counter Russia,” Bloomberg News, July 31, 2017; and
Alessandra Prentice, “How a U.S. Coal Deal Warmed Ukraine’s T ies with T rump,” Reuters, February 19, 2018.
182 See, e.g., H.Con.Res. 120 (1996), S.Res. 205 (2002), and S.Res. 422 (2010).
183 See S.Res. 473 (2004), S.Res. 487 (2004), and H.Con.Res. 16/S.Con.Res. 7 (2005).
184 See H.Res. 440 (1986), H.Con.Res. 167/S.Con.Res. 56 (1996), H.Res. 703 (2006), and S.Res. 153 (2011).
185 Historians attribute the famine, which Ukrainians refer to as the Holodomor, to the coercive policies of Joseph
Stalin’s regime. T he famine killed almost 4 million Ukrainians, according to current estimates. In 1985, Congress
established a Commission on the Ukraine Famine (P.L. 99-180), which held hearings with eyewitnesses, published
findings, and conducted a related oral history project. In 2006, Congress passed legislation authorizing the government
of Ukraine to establish a memorial on federal land to honor the victims of the Ukraine famine ( P.L. 109-340). T he
memorial was established in 2015. Anne Applebaum, Red Fam ine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine (Doubleday, 2017);
Commission on the Ukraine Famine, Investigation of the Ukrainian Fam ine, 1932-1933, April 22, 1988; and Askold
Krushelnycky, “How Washington Holodomor Monument Won the Race Against T ime,” Kyiv Post, February 23, 2020.
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During Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity, Congress supported a peaceful resolution to the
political turmoil. Before ex-President Yanukovych fled to Russia in February 2014, the House and
Senate agreed to resolutions to support Ukrainians’ democratic aspirations, cal for a peaceful
resolution to the standoff between the government and protestors, and raise the prospect of
sanctions “against individuals responsible for ordering or carrying out the violence” (S.Res. 319,
H.Res. 447).
Since 2014, many Members of Congress have condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,
promoted sanctions against Russia, and supported increased aid to Ukraine.186 The Support for the
Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (SSIDES; P.L.
113-95; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.) was enacted in April 2014. SSIDES authorized aid to help
Ukraine pursue reform, provided security assistance to Ukraine and neighboring countries,
directed the U.S. government to assist Ukraine to recover assets linked to corruption, and
established a variety of sanctions (see “Sanctions Related to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,”
below). At this time, Congress also passed legislation authorizing increased funds to boost
programming in Ukraine, Moldova, “and neighboring regions” by U.S. government-funded
broadcasters Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and Voice of America (VOA) (P.L. 113-
96).
The Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (UFSA; P.L. 113-272; 22 U.S.C. 8921 et seq.) was
enacted in December 2014. UFSA stated that it is the policy of the United States “to further assist
the Government of Ukraine in restoring its sovereignty and territorial integrity [and] to deter the
Government of the Russian Federation from further destabilizing and invading Ukraine and other
independent countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.” The act
required or authorized a variety of expanded sanctions; authorized increased aid to Ukraine; and
authorized an expansion of RFE/RL and VOA broadcasting throughout the post-Soviet states.
The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA; P.L. 115-44; U.S.C.
9501 et seq.), with CRIEEA as its Title II, was enacted in August 2017. CRIEEA codified
Ukraine-related executive orders (E.O.s) establishing sanctions on Russia, strengthened sanctions
authorities initiated in Ukraine-related E.O.s and legislation, and established several new
sanctions, including ones related to Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline (see “Sanctions Related to
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” below). It also established congressional review of any action the
President takes to ease or lift a variety of sanctions. Among other measures, the act authorized
$30 mil ion in FY2018-FY2019 to promote energy security in Ukraine and required the State
Department to submit a semiannual report to Congress on U.S. efforts to promote energy security
in Ukraine (§257).
Since 2014, Congress has supported the provision of defensive lethal weapons to Ukraine. UFSA
authorized the President to provide “defense articles ... including anti-tank and anti-armor
weapons [and] crew weapons and ammunition.”187 The FY2016 to FY2021 National Defense
Authorization Acts (NDAA) authorized “appropriate security assistance” to Ukraine, including
“lethal assistance” such as “anti-armor weapon systems, mortars, crew-served weapons and
ammunition, grenade launchers and ammunition,” and (since FY2020) “coastal defense and anti-
ship missile systems.” Since FY2016, defense appropriations have provided military assistance to
Ukraine, to include “lethal weapons of a defensive nature” and (since FY2019) “lethal
assistance.” In 2019, S.Res. 74 affirmed the United States’ “unwavering commitment to ...

186 For House resolutions, see H.Res. 499, H.Res. 726, and H.Res. 758 in 2014, and H.Res. 50, H.Res. 162, and H.Res.
348 in 2015. For Senate resolutions, see S.Res. 378 and S.Res. 520 in 2014, and S.Res. 52 and S.Res. 72 in 2015.
187 From 2014 to 2016, the House and/or Senate repeatedly expressed support f or providing lethal defensive weapons to
Ukraine. See H.Res. 758 (2014), P.L. 113-291 (2015), H.Res. 162 (2015), S.Res. 72 (2015), and H.R. 5094 (2016).
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providing additional lethal and non-lethal security assistance to strengthen Ukraine’s defense
capabilities on land, sea, and in the air in order to improve deterrence against Russian
aggression.”
The FY2021 NDAA required the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State to jointly submit
a report to Congress on the capability and capacity requirements of Ukraine’s military forces, as
wel as a resource plan for U.S. security assistance (§1236).
Some Members of Congress have expressed concern about the emergence of far-right movements
in Ukraine.188 Since FY2017, defense appropriations have prohibited funds from being used “to
provide arms, training, or other assistance to the Azov Battalion” (P.L. 116-260, §9015).
In 2018, Members of the 115th Congress agreed to resolutions condemning Russia’s attack on
Ukrainian naval vessels (S.Res. 709, H.Res. 1162) and cal ing for the cancel ation of Nord Stream
2 and the imposition of sanctions on entities for investing in or supporting the project (H.Res.
1035).
In 2019, during the 116th Congress, the Senate agreed to S.Res. 74 to mark the fifth anniversary of
Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity “by honoring the bravery, determination, and sacrifice of the
people of Ukraine during and since the Revolution, and condemning continued Russian
aggression against Ukraine.”
Also in 2019, Congress passed the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act (PEESA), which
established more sanctions related to the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and other
Russian natural gas pipelines (P.L. 116-92, Title LXXV; 22 U.S.C. §9526 note). In January 2021,
Congress amended PEESA to clarify and expand its pipeline-related sanctions (P.L. 116-283,
§1242).
Other Legislative Initiatives
The Ukraine Cybersecurity Cooperation Act of 2017 (H.R. 1997), which passed the House during
the 115th Congress, cal ed for greater cybersecurity cooperation with and aid to Ukraine.189
In March 2019, the House of Representatives voted 427-1 to pass H.R. 596, the Crimea
Annexation Non-recognition Act, which would assert that it is the policy of the United States not
to recognize Russia’s claim of sovereignty over Crimea, its airspace, or its territorial waters. The
act was re-introduced during the 117th Congress as H.R. 922.
Other bil s and resolutions introduced or re-introduced during the 117th Congress include the
following:
 Ukraine Security Partnership Act of 2021 (S. 814). This act would, among other
measures, appoint a Special Envoy for Ukraine and authorize $300 mil ion a year
for FMF assistance and $50 mil ion a year for other aid from FY2022 through
FY2026.
 The Ukraine Religious Freedom Support Act (H.R. 496, S. 1310). This act
would, among other measures, seek to deny U.S. visas to Russian officials if they
committed particularly severe violations of religious freedom in occupied
Ukrainian territory. The act would require the President to consider such

188 Rep. Ro Khanna, “Rep. Khanna Leads Bipartisan Members in Condemning Anti-Semitism in Europe,” April 25,
2018; and Rep. Max Rose, “ Rose Leads Dozens of House Dems in Asking State Dept: Why Aren’t White Supremacist
Groups Listed as Foreign T errorist Organizations?” October 16, 2019.
189 A related bill, S. 2455, was introduced in the Senate.
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violations for the purposes of making a determination of whether to designate
Russia as a country of particular concern for religious freedom (H.R. 5408, S.
3064). The act was ordered to be reported in the House in April 2021.
 Restraining Russian Imperialism Act (H.R. 3144). This act would impose “al
available sanctions” under existing authorities with respect to Russia until the
President “determines that the Government of Russia has removed al of its
armed forces from the Donbas region of Ukraine.”
 An amendment to the House-passed version of the FY2022 National Defense
Authorization Act (H.Amdt. 110 to H.R. 4350) would require the President to
impose sanctions related to the planning, construction, or operation of the Nord
Stream 2 pipeline and would repeal PEESA’s national interest waiver.
 A resolution, S.Res. 360, introduced in September 2021, would celebrate the 30th
anniversary of Ukraine’s independence and affirm the United States’
“unwavering commitment” to support the Ukrainian government’s efforts to
restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
Sanctions Related to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine190
In 2014, the Obama Administration said it would impose increasing costs on Russia, in
coordination with the EU and others, until Russia “abides by its international obligations and
returns its military forces to their original bases and respects Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity.”191 As of the start of October 2021, the United States has imposed Ukraine-related
sanctions on about 735 individuals and entities.192
A series of executive orders issued in 2014 (E.O.s 13660, 13661, 13662, and 13685), based on
national emergency authorities and codified by CRIEEA, provides a framework for sanctions on
those the President determines have undermined Ukraine’s security, stability, sovereignty, or
territorial integrity, or have misappropriated state assets. The E.O.s also establish sanctions on
Russian government officials and persons who operate in the Russian arms sector, other key
sectors of the Russian economy, or occupied Crimea. In addition, they prohibit U.S. business,
trade, or investment in occupied Crimea. Among those designated are Ukrainian individuals and
entities, including former government officials and Russian proxy authorities in occupied Crimea
and Russia-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine. Sectoral sanctions imposed in response to
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine apply to certain kinds of transactions with specific entities in
Russia’s financial, energy, and defense sectors.
SSIDES and UFSA, signed into law in 2014, expanded on the actions the Obama Administration
took in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In 2018, President Trump cited SSIDES, as
amended by CRIEEA (§228), to designate two Ukrainian individuals and one entity for
committing serious human rights abuses in territories forcibly occupied or controlled by Russia.
SSIDES and UFSA contain additional provisions the executive branch could use, including
potential y wide-reaching secondary sanctions against foreign individuals and entities that
facilitate significant transactions for Russia sanctions designees.
Section 232 of CRIEEA authorizes sanctions on those who invest at least $1 mil ion, or $5
mil ion over 12 months, or provide goods, services, or support valued at the same amount for the

190 T his section draws on CRS In Focus IF10779, U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview, by Dianne E. Rennack and
Cory Welt . Also see CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia, coordinated by Cory Welt .
191 White House, “Fact Sheet: Ukraine-Related Sanctions,” March 17, 2014.
192 T hese designations include about 75 designations for a wider range of malign activities.
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construction of Russian energy export pipelines, including Nord Stream 2. On January 19, 2021,
the Trump Administration imposed sanctions on the Russian vessel Fortuna, which Gazprom was
using to complete construction of Nord Stream 2, and its corporate owner.
PEESA, as amended, establishes sanctions on foreign persons whom the President determines
have sold, leased, provided, or facilitated the provision of vessels for the purpose of subsea pipe-
laying activities related to the construction of Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream, or any successor
pipeline. As amended, PEESA also targets those who provide underwriting services or insurance,
or who provide certain upgrades or instal ation services. Sanctions do not apply to nonbusiness
entities of the EU, member states, or some other non-EU governments.
PEESA provides for exceptions and waivers and authorizes the President to terminate sanctions if
the Administration certifies to Congress “that appropriate safeguards have been put in place”
 to minimize Russia’s ability to use the sanctioned pipeline project “as a tool of
coercion and political leverage” and
 to ensure “that the project would not result in a decrease of more than 25 percent
in the volume of Russian energy exports transiting through existing pipelines in
other countries, particularly Ukraine.”
In February 2021, the Biden Administration identified the previously designated Fortuna and its
owner as also subject to sanctions under PEESA. In May 2021, the Administration designated 13
more vessels and 4 entities under PEESA; in August 2021, it designated another four entities and
vessels. However, the Administration has waived the application of new sanctions on Nord
Stream 2 AG, its chief executive officer, and corporate officers (Nord Stream 2 AG is a Swiss -
based company Gazprom established to construct and operate the pipeline). Some Members of
Congress have urged the Administration to impose additional sanctions to prevent the pipeline
from becoming operational.
Like the United States, the EU has imposed sanctions (“restrictive measures”) against Russia for
its invasion of Ukraine. EU sanctions are similar, although not identical, to U.S. sanctions. Most
EU sanctions are imposed for a defined period of time (usual y six months or a year) to
incentivize change and provide the EU with flexibility to adjust the sanctions as warranted.
Unanimity among EU member states is required to renew (i.e., extend) EU sanctions. Ukraine
and other countries, including Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, and Switzerland, also have
imposed sanctions on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine.
Outlook
More than seven years after Ukraine’s Euromaidan protests and Russia’s invasion, Ukraine
continues to grapple with a number of internal and external chal enges. Issues that Members of
Congress may consider in seeking to influence or shape U.S. relations with Ukraine could include
the following:
 How to assist Ukraine in its efforts to restore sovereignty over its territory,
achieve a sustainable political settlement, and promote security and humanitarian
needs in and around conflict-affected regions;
 Whether to consider measures to impose further costs on Russia for its ongoing
aggression against Ukraine;
 How to exercise oversight over the Biden Administration’s diplomatic efforts to
address Ukraine’s conflict with Russia, bolster Ukraine’s security, and manage
negative consequences resulting from Nord Stream 2 pipeline construction;
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 How to exercise oversight over the Biden Administration’s implementation of
several recently introduced U.S.-Ukraine bilateral initiatives;
 How to assess the effectiveness of current levels and kinds of economic and
security (including lethal) assistance to Ukraine;
 Whether and how to further assist Ukraine’s government in sustaining a
democratic and reform-minded trajectory;
 How to monitor Ukraine’s consolidation of governance and anti-corruption
reforms supported by the international community and Ukrainian civil society;
 How to further promote Ukraine’s energy and cyber security; and
 How to increase Ukraine’s benefits from its free trade agreement with the EU
and its security partnerships with NATO and the United States.

Author Information

Cory Welt

Specialist in Russian and European Affairs

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Congressional Research Service
R45008 · VERSION 12 · UPDATED
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