{ "id": "R44533", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "R", "number": "R44533", "active": true, "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov, EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "summary": null, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R44533", "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "type": "CRS Report", "formats": [ { "sha1": "cb7e649e0850120f3626e1ac98288fa828960c3d", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44533/71", "filename": "files/2022-04-11_R44533_cb7e649e0850120f3626e1ac98288fa828960c3d.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2022-04-11_R44533_cb7e649e0850120f3626e1ac98288fa828960c3d.html" } ], "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "retrieved": "2022-05-10T04:07:00.996507", "date": "2022-04-11", "typeId": "R", "id": "R44533_71_2022-04-11", "active": true }, { "summary": null, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R44533", "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "type": "CRS Report", "formats": [ { "sha1": "88e19dfcb829620662f0ac836a583e84788f42fb", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44533/69", "filename": "files/2021-10-06_R44533_88e19dfcb829620662f0ac836a583e84788f42fb.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2021-10-06_R44533_88e19dfcb829620662f0ac836a583e84788f42fb.html" } ], "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "retrieved": "2022-05-10T04:07:00.995251", "date": "2021-10-06", "typeId": "R", "id": "R44533_69_2021-10-06", "active": true }, { "summary": null, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R44533", "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "type": "CRS Report", "formats": [ { "sha1": "635113698ee70dc55aa7a553f93dc007e98f8139", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44533/67", "filename": "files/2021-08-27_R44533_635113698ee70dc55aa7a553f93dc007e98f8139.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2021-08-27_R44533_635113698ee70dc55aa7a553f93dc007e98f8139.html" } ], "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "retrieved": "2022-05-10T04:07:00.993768", "date": "2021-08-27", "typeId": "R", "id": "R44533_67_2021-08-27", "active": true }, { "summary": null, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R44533", "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "type": "CRS Report", "formats": [ { "sha1": "efd5e8f598316c6b7b65d3047a6ccf3ebff16a3e", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44533/65", "filename": "files/2021-04-07_R44533_efd5e8f598316c6b7b65d3047a6ccf3ebff16a3e.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2021-04-07_R44533_efd5e8f598316c6b7b65d3047a6ccf3ebff16a3e.html" } ], "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "retrieved": "2022-05-10T04:07:00.992546", "date": "2021-04-07", "typeId": "R", "id": "R44533_65_2021-04-07", "active": true }, { "summary": null, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R44533", "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "type": "CRS Report", "formats": [ { "sha1": "951a3247829757d4054b267276dab02b56e29e55", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44533/63", "filename": "files/2020-08-31_R44533_951a3247829757d4054b267276dab02b56e29e55.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2020-08-31_R44533_951a3247829757d4054b267276dab02b56e29e55.html" } ], "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "retrieved": "2022-05-10T04:07:00.990803", "date": "2020-08-31", "typeId": "R", "id": "R44533_63_2020-08-31", "active": true }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 619444, "date": "2020-03-11", "retrieved": "2020-03-13T13:12:36.038351", "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The State of Qatar has employed its ample financial resources to exert regional influence often independent of the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Oman), an alliance of six Gulf monarchies. While fostering a close defense and security alliance with the United States, Qatar has intervened in several regional conflicts and has maintained ties to a wide range of actors who are often at odds with each other, including Sunni Islamists, Iran and Iran-backed groups, and Israeli officials. Qatar has maintained consistent dialogue with Iran, but the country also hosts U.S. forces that are attempting to deter Iran and conducting combat against major regional terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State.\nQatar\u2019s support for regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and its Al Jazeera media network have contributed to a backlash against Qatar led by fellow GCC states Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The Trump Administration has sought a resolution of the dispute, in part because the rift is hindering U.S. efforts to formalize a \u201cMiddle East Strategic Alliance\u201d of the United States, the GCC, and other Sunni-led countries in the region to counter Iran. Qatar has countered the Saudi-led pressure with new arms purchases and deepening relations with Turkey and Iran. Some signs that the rift might be soon be resolved emerged in late 2019, but progress apparently stalled in January 2020. \nQatar\u2019s leaders have looked to the United States to guarantee their external security since the 1980s, as do the other GCC leaders. Since 1992, the United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that reportedly addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under the DCA, Qatar hosts up to 11,000 U.S. and coalition forces and the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) at various military facilities, including the large Al Udeid Air Base. These facilities help U.S. forces participate in operations throughout the region. Qatar is a significant buyer of U.S.-made weaponry, including combat aircraft. In January 2018, Qatar and the United States inaugurated a \u201cStrategic Dialogue\u201d and, in January 2019, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding to expand Al Udeid Air Base to improve and expand accommodation for U.S. military personnel. Qatar signed a broad memorandum of understanding with the United States in 2017 to cooperate against international terrorism, partly representing a joint effort to rebut claims that Qatar supports terrorist groups. \nThe voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar\u2019s former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. However, Qatar is the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet held elections for a legislative body. U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for not adhering to international standards of labor rights practices, but credit it for taking steps in 2018 to improve the conditions for expatriate workers. \nLike other GCC states, Qatar is wrestling with the fluctuations in global hydrocarbons prices that started in 2014 and are now compounded by the Saudi-led embargo. Qatar is positioned to weather these headwinds because of its small population, substantial financial reserves, and its favorable business conditions for entrepreneurs. But, Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products. On December 3, 2018, Qatar announced its withdrawal from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in order to focus on its natural gas export sector.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44533", "sha1": "004586735ebdc58e8fd38e25856be14a18757365", "filename": "files/20200311_R44533_004586735ebdc58e8fd38e25856be14a18757365.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44533", "sha1": "da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709", "filename": "files/20200311_R44533_da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 611072, "date": "2019-12-12", "retrieved": "2019-12-13T14:57:51.099003", "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The State of Qatar has employed its ample financial resources to exert regional influence separate from and independent of Saudi Arabia, the de facto leader of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman), an alliance of six Gulf monarchies. While fostering a close defense and security alliance with the United States, Qatar has intervened in several regional conflicts and has maintained ties to a wide range of actors who are often at odds with each other, including Sunni Islamists, Iran and Iran-backed groups, and Israeli officials. Qatar has maintained consistent dialogue with Iran, but the country also hosts U.S. forces that are attempting to deter Iran and conducting combat against major regional terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State.\nQatar\u2019s support for regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and its Al Jazeera media network have contributed to a backlash against Qatar led by fellow GCC states Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The Trump Administration has sought a resolution of the dispute, in part because the rift is hindering U.S. efforts to formalize a \u201cMiddle East Strategic Alliance\u201d of the United States, the GCC, and other Sunni-led countries in the region to counter Iran. Qatar has countered the Saudi-led pressure with new arms purchases and deepening relations with Turkey and Iran. Some signs that the rift might be soon be resolved have emerged in late 2019. \nQatar\u2019s leaders have looked to the United States to guarantee their external security since the 1980s, as do the other GCC leaders. Since 1992, the United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that reportedly addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under the DCA, Qatar hosts up to 11,000 U.S. and coalition forces and the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) at various military facilities, including the large Al Udeid Air Base. These facilities help U.S. forces participate in operations throughout the region. Qatar is a significant buyer of U.S.-made weaponry, including combat aircraft. In January 2018, Qatar and the United States inaugurated a \u201cStrategic Dialogue\u201d to strengthen the U.S.-Qatar defense partnership and, in January 2019, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding to expand Al Udeid Air Base to improve and expand accommodation for U.S. military personnel. Qatar signed a broad memorandum of understanding with the United States in 2017 to cooperate against international terrorism, representing at least in part a Qatari effort to counter accusations that Qatar supports terrorist groups. \nThe voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar\u2019s former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. However, Qatar is the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet held elections for a legislative body. U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for failing to adhere to international standards of labor rights practices, but credit it for taking steps in 2018 to improve the conditions for expatriate workers. \nLike other GCC states, Qatar is wrestling with the fluctuations in global hydrocarbons prices that started in 2014 and are now compounded by the Saudi-led embargo. Qatar is positioned to weather these headwinds because of its small population, substantial financial reserves, and its favorable business conditions for entrepreneurs. But, Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products. On December 3, 2018, Qatar announced it would withdraw from the OPEC oil cartel in order to focus on its natural gas export sector.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44533", "sha1": "ef977740d8436c78878a324811062beb2dc2d744", "filename": "files/20191212_R44533_ef977740d8436c78878a324811062beb2dc2d744.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/0.png": "files/20191212_R44533_images_98f0e1afbf3a13e679f0f4bddce362f91e2c1634.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/2.png": "files/20191212_R44533_images_86ca2430b17e16011fffb6afffcf022d0204db63.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/1.png": "files/20191212_R44533_images_9a0676926a20a641cc9503a1366cce2940ae2442.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/3.png": "files/20191212_R44533_images_195a177f4ada8400d7f0ad64b390096844da9e8c.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44533", "sha1": "c3ee3f4e183e7fb642390253c54134bad90e3f65", "filename": "files/20191212_R44533_c3ee3f4e183e7fb642390253c54134bad90e3f65.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 605643, "date": "2019-09-25", "retrieved": "2019-10-10T22:26:17.264195", "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The State of Qatar has employed its ample financial resources to exert regional influence separate from and independent of Saudi Arabia, the de facto leader of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman), an alliance of six Gulf monarchies. While fostering a close defense and security alliance with the United States, Qatar has intervened in several regional conflicts and has, at times, engaged Sunni Islamists, Iran and Iran-backed groups, and Israeli officials. Qatar has maintained consistent dialogue with Iran while also supporting U.S. efforts to limit Iran\u2019s regional influence and U.S. combat against major regional terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State organization.\nQatar\u2019s support for regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and its Al Jazeera media network have contributed to a backlash against Qatar led by fellow GCC states Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The Trump Administration has sought, unsuccessfully to date, to mediate a resolution of the dispute, hindering U.S. efforts to formalize a \u201cMiddle East Strategic Alliance\u201d of the United States, the GCC, and other Sunni-led countries in the region to counter Iran. Qatar has countered the Saudi-led pressure with new arms buys and deepening relations with Turkey and Iran. \nAs do the other GCC leaders, Qatar\u2019s leaders have looked to the United States to guarantee their external security since the 1980s. Since 1992, the United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that reportedly addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under the DCA, Qatar hosts up to 11,000 U.S. forces and the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) at various military facilities, including the large Al Udeid Air Base. These facilities help U.S. forces participate in operations throughout the region. Qatar is a significant buyer of U.S.-made weaponry, including combat aircraft. In January 2018, Qatar and the United States inaugurated a \u201cStrategic Dialogue\u201d to strengthen the U.S.-Qatar defense partnership. The second session of the dialogue, in January 2019, resulted in a U.S.-Qatar memorandum of understanding to expand Al Udeid Air Base to improve and expand accommodation for U.S. military personnel. Qatar signed a broad memorandum of understanding with the United States in 2017 to cooperate against international terrorism\u2014apparently at least in part to counter accusations that Qatar supports terrorist groups. \nThe voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar\u2019s former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. However, Qatar is the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet held elections for a legislative body. U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for failing to adhere to international standards of labor rights practices, but credit it for taking steps in 2018 to improve the conditions for expatriate workers. \nAs are the other GCC states, Qatar is wrestling with the fluctuations in global hydrocarbons prices since 2014, now compounded by the Saudi-led embargo. Qatar is positioned to weather these headwinds because of its small population, substantial financial reserves, and reported hospitality for young Qatari and expatriate entrepreneurs. But, Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products. On December 3, 2018, Qatar announced it would withdraw from the OPEC oil cartel in order to focus on its natural gas export sector.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44533", "sha1": "70a26deab704ff18fd8c92cbaf32f50bb0d3b5df", "filename": "files/20190925_R44533_70a26deab704ff18fd8c92cbaf32f50bb0d3b5df.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/0.png": "files/20190925_R44533_images_98f0e1afbf3a13e679f0f4bddce362f91e2c1634.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/2.png": "files/20190925_R44533_images_86ca2430b17e16011fffb6afffcf022d0204db63.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/1.png": "files/20190925_R44533_images_9a0676926a20a641cc9503a1366cce2940ae2442.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/3.png": "files/20190925_R44533_images_195a177f4ada8400d7f0ad64b390096844da9e8c.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44533", "sha1": "ca5b22a467371c4e984654d970f4fe169690f28e", "filename": "files/20190925_R44533_ca5b22a467371c4e984654d970f4fe169690f28e.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] }, { "summary": null, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R44533", "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "type": "CRS Report", "formats": [ { "sha1": "e086c6b779355d971f8235fe463f02c332123402", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44533/50", "filename": "files/2019-09-24_R44533_e086c6b779355d971f8235fe463f02c332123402.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2019-09-24_R44533_e086c6b779355d971f8235fe463f02c332123402.html" } ], "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "retrieved": "2022-05-10T04:07:00.983673", "date": "2019-09-24", "typeId": "R", "id": "R44533_50_2019-09-24", "active": true }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 600399, "date": "2019-06-13", "retrieved": "2019-07-02T22:16:00.474739", "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The State of Qatar has employed its ample financial resources to exert regional influence separate from and independent of Saudi Arabia, the de facto leader of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman), an alliance of six Gulf monarchies. Qatar has intervened in several regional conflicts, including in Syria and Libya, and has engaged both Sunni Islamist and Iran-backed Shiite groups in Lebanon, Sudan, the Gaza Strip, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Qatar has maintained consistent dialogue with Iran while also supporting U.S. and GCC efforts to limit Iran\u2019s regional influence.\nQatar\u2019s independent policies, which include supporting regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and hosting a global media network often critical of Arab leaders called Al Jazeera, have caused a backlash against Qatar by Saudi Arabia and some other GCC members. A rift within the GCC opened on June 5, 2017, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The Trump Administration has sought, unsuccessfully to date, to mediate a resolution of the dispute. The rift has hindered U.S. efforts to hold another U.S.-GCC summit that would formalize a new \u201cMiddle East Strategic Alliance\u201d of the United States, the GCC, and other Sunni-led countries in the region to counter Iran. Qatar has countered the Saudi-led pressure with new arms buys and deepening relations with Turkey and Iran. \nAs do the other GCC leaders, Qatar\u2019s leaders have looked to the United States to guarantee their external security since the 1980s. Since 1992, the United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that reportedly addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under the DCA, Qatar hosts up to 13,000 U.S. forces and the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) at various military facilities, including the large Al Udeid Air Base. U.S. forces in Qatar participate in all U.S. operations in the region. Qatar is a significant buyer of U.S.-made weaponry, including combat aircraft. In January 2018, Qatar and the United States inaugurated a \u201cStrategic Dialogue\u201d to strengthen the U.S.-Qatar defense partnership, which Qatar says might include permanent U.S. basing there. The second iteration of the dialogue, in January 2019, resulted in a U.S.-Qatar memorandum of understanding to expand Al Udeid Air Base to improve and expand accommodation for U.S. military personnel. Qatar signed a broad memorandum of understanding with the United States in 2017 to cooperate against international terrorism \u2013 apparently at least in part to counter accusations that Qatar supports terrorist groups. \nThe voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar\u2019s former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. However, Qatar is the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet held elections for a legislative body. U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for failing to adhere to international standards of labor rights practices, but credit it for taking steps in 2018 to improve the conditions for expatriate workers. \nAs are the other GCC states, Qatar is wrestling with the fluctuations in global hydrocarbons prices since 2014, now compounded by the Saudi-led embargo. Qatar is positioned to weather these headwinds because of its small population and substantial financial reserves. But, Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products. On December 3, 2018, Qatar announced it would withdraw from the OPEC oil cartel in order to focus on its natural gas export sector.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44533", "sha1": "e23233f098caf0e2341307f3ddee758578656b9b", "filename": "files/20190613_R44533_e23233f098caf0e2341307f3ddee758578656b9b.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/0.png": "files/20190613_R44533_images_98f0e1afbf3a13e679f0f4bddce362f91e2c1634.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/2.png": "files/20190613_R44533_images_86ca2430b17e16011fffb6afffcf022d0204db63.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/1.png": "files/20190613_R44533_images_9a0676926a20a641cc9503a1366cce2940ae2442.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/3.png": "files/20190613_R44533_images_195a177f4ada8400d7f0ad64b390096844da9e8c.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44533", "sha1": "b2ddef1adb1f26fbe5b3f261276d4cc7ba3b7e81", "filename": "files/20190613_R44533_b2ddef1adb1f26fbe5b3f261276d4cc7ba3b7e81.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 596490, "date": "2019-04-11", "retrieved": "2019-04-18T13:07:20.494359", "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The State of Qatar has employed its ample financial resources to exert regional influence separate from and independent of Saudi Arabia, the de facto leader of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman), an alliance of six Gulf monarchies. Qatar has intervened in several regional conflicts, including in Syria and Libya, and has engaged both Sunni Islamist and Iran-backed Shiite groups in Lebanon, Sudan, the Gaza Strip, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Qatar has maintained consistent dialogue with Iran while also supporting U.S. and GCC efforts to limit Iran\u2019s regional influence.\nQatar\u2019s independent policies, which include supporting regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and hosting a global media network often critical of Arab leaders called Al Jazeera, have caused a backlash against Qatar by Saudi Arabia and some other GCC members. A rift within the GCC opened on June 5, 2017, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The Trump Administration has sought, unsuccessfully to date, to mediate a resolution of the dispute. The rift has hindered U.S. efforts to hold another U.S.-GCC summit that would formalize a new \u201cMiddle East Strategic Alliance\u201d of the United States, the GCC, and other Sunni-led countries in the region to counter Iran and other regional threats. Qatar has countered the Saudi-led pressure with new arms buys and deepening relations with Turkey and Iran. \nAs do the other GCC leaders, Qatar\u2019s leaders have looked to the United States to guarantee their external security since the 1980s. Since 1992, the United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that reportedly addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under the DCA, Qatar hosts about 13,000 U.S. forces and the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) at various military facilities, including the large Al Udeid Air Base. U.S. forces in Qatar participate in all U.S. operations in the region. Qatar is a significant buyer of U.S.-made weaponry, including combat aircraft. In January 2018, Qatar and the United States inaugurated a \u201cStrategic Dialogue\u201d to strengthen the U.S.-Qatar defense partnership, which Qatar says might include permanent U.S. basing there. The second iteration of the dialogue, in January 2019, resulted in a U.S.-Qatar memorandum of understanding to expand Al Udeid Air Base to improve and expand accommodation for U.S. military personnel. Qatar signed a broad memorandum of understanding with the United States in 2017 to cooperate against international terrorism. That MOU appeared intended to counter assertions that Qatar\u2019s ties to regional Islamist movements support terrorism. \nThe voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar\u2019s former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. However, Qatar is the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet held elections for a legislative body. U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for failing to adhere to international standards of labor rights practices, but credit it for taking steps in 2018 to improve the conditions for expatriate workers. \nAs are the other GCC states, Qatar is wrestling with the fluctuations in global hydrocarbons prices since 2014, now compounded by the Saudi-led embargo. Qatar is positioned to weather these headwinds because of its small population and substantial financial reserves. But, Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products. On December 3, 2018, Qatar announced it would withdraw from the OPEC oil cartel in order to focus on its natural gas export sector.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44533", "sha1": "f82d5972750ec45d8c3a1247c3defa7f43e1dce4", "filename": "files/20190411_R44533_f82d5972750ec45d8c3a1247c3defa7f43e1dce4.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/0.png": "files/20190411_R44533_images_98f0e1afbf3a13e679f0f4bddce362f91e2c1634.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/2.png": "files/20190411_R44533_images_86ca2430b17e16011fffb6afffcf022d0204db63.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/1.png": "files/20190411_R44533_images_9a0676926a20a641cc9503a1366cce2940ae2442.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/3.png": "files/20190411_R44533_images_195a177f4ada8400d7f0ad64b390096844da9e8c.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44533", "sha1": "28896e94889611a8d9c949c9497c0a18921f08f2", "filename": "files/20190411_R44533_28896e94889611a8d9c949c9497c0a18921f08f2.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] }, { "summary": null, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R44533", "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "type": "CRS Report", "formats": [ { "sha1": "2917f5d5aea3590b8d05e7596d00f3cd15949747", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44533/43", "filename": "files/2019-02-11_R44533_2917f5d5aea3590b8d05e7596d00f3cd15949747.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2019-02-11_R44533_2917f5d5aea3590b8d05e7596d00f3cd15949747.html" } ], "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "retrieved": "2022-05-10T04:07:00.977737", "date": "2019-02-11", "typeId": "R", "id": "R44533_43_2019-02-11", "active": true }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 588211, "date": "2018-12-04", "retrieved": "2018-12-06T14:21:50.858045", "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The State of Qatar has employed its ample financial resources to exert regional influence separate from and independent of Saudi Arabia, the de facto leader of the alliance of six Gulf monarchies called the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman). Qatar has intervened in several regional conflicts, including in Syria and Libya, and has engaged both Sunni Islamist and Iran-backed Shiite groups in Lebanon, Sudan, the Gaza Strip, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Qatar has maintained consistent dialogue with Iran while also supporting U.S. and GCC efforts to limit Iran\u2019s regional influence.\nHowever, Qatar\u2019s independent policies, which include supporting regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and establishing a global media network called Al Jazeera, have caused a backlash against Qatar by Saudi Arabia and some other GCC members. The GCC has been on the verge of dissolution since June 5, 2017, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The Trump Administration has sought, unsuccessfully to date\u2014and despite presidential intercession with Gulf leaders\u2014to mediate a resolution of the dispute. The rift threatens U.S efforts to assemble the GCC, Jordan, and Egypt into a new \u201cMiddle East Strategic Alliance\u201d to counter Iran and regional terrorist groups. This alliance concept is reportedly to be discussed at a long planned U.S.-GCC summit, now postponed until early 2019. Qatar has countered the Saudi-led pressure with new arms buys and deepening relations with Turkey and Iran. \nAs do the other GCC leaders, Qatar\u2019s leaders have looked to the United States to guarantee their external security since the 1980s. Since 1992, the United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that reportedly addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under the DCA, Qatar hosts about 10,000 U.S. forces and the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) at various military facilities, including the large Al Udeid Air Base. U.S. forces in Qatar participate in all U.S. operations in the region. Qatar is a significant buyer of U.S.-made weaponry, including combat aircraft. In January 2018, Qatar and the United States inaugurated a \u201cStrategic Dialogue\u201d to strengthen the U.S.-Qatar defense partnership, which Qatar says might include permanent U.S. basing there. Qatar signed a broad memorandum of understanding with the United States in 2017 to cooperate against international terrorism. That MOU appeared intended to counter assertions that Qatar\u2019s ties to regional Islamist movements support terrorism. \nThe voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar\u2019s former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. However, Qatar is also the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet formed a legislative body that is at least partly elected, even though such elections have long been promised. Further, U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for failing to adhere to international standards of human and labor rights practices, and for failing to protect expatriate workers from abuses by Qatari employers. \nAs are the other GCC states, Qatar is wrestling with the fluctuations in global hydrocarbons prices since 2014, now compounded by the Saudi-led embargo. Qatar is positioned to weather these headwinds because of its small population and substantial financial reserves. But, Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products. On December 3, Qatar announced it would withdraw from the OPEC oil cartel in order to focus on its natural gas export sector.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44533", "sha1": "f971cbd8ceb5c3dbf89ba65d29b9d1d3bcbea7da", "filename": "files/20181204_R44533_f971cbd8ceb5c3dbf89ba65d29b9d1d3bcbea7da.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/0.png": "files/20181204_R44533_images_98f0e1afbf3a13e679f0f4bddce362f91e2c1634.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/2.png": "files/20181204_R44533_images_86ca2430b17e16011fffb6afffcf022d0204db63.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/1.png": "files/20181204_R44533_images_9a0676926a20a641cc9503a1366cce2940ae2442.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/3.png": "files/20181204_R44533_images_195a177f4ada8400d7f0ad64b390096844da9e8c.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44533", "sha1": "431ad318ad88761d8c0a764b81e8f6d3ab5fa249", "filename": "files/20181204_R44533_431ad318ad88761d8c0a764b81e8f6d3ab5fa249.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 586148, "date": "2018-10-04", "retrieved": "2018-10-05T22:07:52.679938", "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The State of Qatar has employed its ample financial resources to exert regional influence separate from and independent of Saudi Arabia, the de facto leader of the alliance of six Gulf monarchies called the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman). Qatar has intervened in several regional conflicts, including in Syria and Libya, and has engaged both Sunni Islamist and Iran-backed Shiite groups in Lebanon, Sudan, the Gaza Strip, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Qatar has maintained consistent dialogue with Iran while also supporting U.S. and GCC efforts to limit Iran\u2019s regional influence.\nHowever, Qatar\u2019s independent policies, which include supporting regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and establishing a global media network called Al Jazeera, have caused a backlash against Qatar by Saudi Arabia and some other GCC members. The GCC has been on the verge of dissolution since June 5, 2017, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The Trump Administration has sought, unsuccessfully to date\u2014and despite presidential intercession with Gulf leaders\u2014to mediate a resolution of the dispute. The rift threatens U.S efforts to assemble the GCC, Jordan, and Egypt into a new \u201cMiddle East Strategic Alliance\u201d to counter Iran and regional terrorist groups. This alliance concept is reportedly to be discussed at a long planned U.S.-GCC summit, now postponed until early 2019. Qatar has countered the Saudi-led pressure with new arms buys and deepening relations with Turkey and Iran. \nAs do the other GCC leaders, Qatar\u2019s leaders have looked to the United States to guarantee their external security since the 1980s. Since 1992, the United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that reportedly addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under the DCA, Qatar hosts about 10,000 U.S. forces and the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) at various military facilities, including the large Al Udeid Air Base. U.S. forces in Qatar participate in all U.S. operations in the region. Qatar is a significant buyer of U.S.-made weaponry, including combat aircraft. In late January 2018, Qatar and the United States held the inaugural \u201cStrategic Dialogue\u201d in Washington, DC, in which U.S. officials hailed a strong U.S.-Qatar partnership on many fronts and signaled the potential for permanent U.S. basing there. Qatar signed a broad memorandum of understanding with the United States in 2017 to cooperate against international terrorism. That MOU appeared intended to counter assertions that Qatar\u2019s ties to regional Islamist movements support terrorism. \nThe voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar\u2019s former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. However, Qatar is also the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet formed a legislative body that is at least partly elected, even though such elections have long been promised. Further, U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for failing to adhere to international standards of human and labor rights practices, and for failing to protect expatriate workers from abuses by Qatari employers. \nAs are the other GCC states, Qatar is wrestling with the fluctuations in global hydrocarbons prices since 2014, now compounded by the Saudi-led embargo. Qatar is positioned to weather these headwinds because of its small population and substantial financial reserves. But, Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44533", "sha1": "d52f880f701eb80668f9b37e00d4eca4fe9fb240", "filename": "files/20181004_R44533_d52f880f701eb80668f9b37e00d4eca4fe9fb240.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/0.png": "files/20181004_R44533_images_98f0e1afbf3a13e679f0f4bddce362f91e2c1634.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/2.png": "files/20181004_R44533_images_86ca2430b17e16011fffb6afffcf022d0204db63.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/1.png": "files/20181004_R44533_images_9a0676926a20a641cc9503a1366cce2940ae2442.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/3.png": "files/20181004_R44533_images_195a177f4ada8400d7f0ad64b390096844da9e8c.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44533", "sha1": "c6069632c949d45a6d2c1478da27333f754dad05", "filename": "files/20181004_R44533_c6069632c949d45a6d2c1478da27333f754dad05.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 583808, "date": "2018-08-13", "retrieved": "2018-08-16T17:02:38.091765", "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The State of Qatar has employed its ample financial resources to exert regional influence and avoid domination by Saudi Arabia, the de facto leader of the alliance of six Gulf monarchies called the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman). Qatar has intervened in several regional conflicts, including in Syria and Libya, and has engaged both Sunni Islamist and Iran-backed Shiite groups in Lebanon, Sudan, the Gaza Strip, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Qatar has maintained consistent dialogue with Iran while also supporting U.S. and GCC efforts to limit Iran\u2019s regional influence.\nHowever, Qatar\u2019s independent policies, which include supporting regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and establishing a global media network called Al Jazeera, have caused a backlash against Qatar by Saudi Arabia and some other GCC members. The GCC has been on the verge of dissolution since June 5, 2017, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The Trump Administration has sought, unsuccessfully to date\u2014and despite presidential intercession with Gulf leaders\u2014to mediate a resolution of the dispute. The rift threatens U.S.efforts to assemble the GCC, Jordan, and Egypt into a new \u201cMiddle East Strategic Alliance\u201d to counter Iran and regional terrorist groups. This alliance concept is reportedly to be discussed at a U.S.-GCC summit planned for October 12-13, 2018. Qatar has countered the Saudi-led pressure with new arms buys and deepening relations with Turkey and Iran. \nAs do the other GCC leaders, Qatar\u2019s leaders have looked to the United States to guarantee their external security since the 1980s. Since 1992, the United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that reportedly addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under the DCA, Qatar hosts about 10,000 U.S. forces and the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) at various military facilities, including the large Al Udeid Air Base. U.S. forces in Qatar participate in all U.S. operations in the region. Qatar is a significant buyer of U.S.-made weaponry, including combat aircraft. In late January 2018, Qatar and the United States held the inaugural \u201cStrategic Dialogue\u201d in Washington, DC, in which U.S. officials hailed a strong U.S.-Qatar partnership on many fronts and signaled the potential for permanent U.S. basing there. Qatar signed a broad memorandum of understanding with the United States in 2017 to cooperate against international terrorism. That MOU appeared intended to counter assertions that Qatar\u2019s ties to regional Islamist movements support terrorism. \nThe voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar\u2019s former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. However, Qatar is also the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet formed a legislative body that is at least partly elected, even though such elections have long been promised. Further, U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for failing to adhere to international standards of human and labor rights practices, and for failing to protect expatriate workers from abuses by Qatari employers. \nAs are the other GCC states, Qatar is wrestling with the fluctuations in global hydrocarbons prices since 2014, now compounded by the Saudi-led embargo. Qatar is positioned to weather these headwinds because of its small population and substantial financial reserves. But, Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44533", "sha1": "0523d7c08a3cfeebd729cfdca769d5f7993cd36f", "filename": "files/20180813_R44533_0523d7c08a3cfeebd729cfdca769d5f7993cd36f.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/0.png": "files/20180813_R44533_images_98f0e1afbf3a13e679f0f4bddce362f91e2c1634.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/2.png": "files/20180813_R44533_images_86ca2430b17e16011fffb6afffcf022d0204db63.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/1.png": "files/20180813_R44533_images_9a0676926a20a641cc9503a1366cce2940ae2442.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/3.png": "files/20180813_R44533_images_195a177f4ada8400d7f0ad64b390096844da9e8c.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44533", "sha1": "01bcb444b154f3007afdf303113b47637d57ba6d", "filename": "files/20180813_R44533_01bcb444b154f3007afdf303113b47637d57ba6d.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 581885, "date": "2018-06-07", "retrieved": "2018-06-13T22:12:56.784550", "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The State of Qatar has employed its ample financial resources to exert regional influence and avoid domination by Saudi Arabia, the de facto leader of the alliance of six Gulf monarchies called the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman). Qatar has intervened in several regional conflicts, including in Syria and Libya, and has engaged both Sunni Islamist and Iran-backed Shiite groups in Lebanon, Sudan, the Gaza Strip, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Qatar has maintained consistent dialogue with Iran while also supporting U.S. and GCC efforts to limit Iran\u2019s regional influence.\nQatar\u2019s independent policies, which include supporting regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and establishing a global media network called Al Jazeera, have injured Qatar\u2019s relations with Saudi Arabia and some other GCC members. The differences erupted into a crisis on June 5, 2017, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The Trump Administration has sought, unsuccessfully to date\u2014and despite hosting visits by several Gulf leaders including that of Qatar in March and April 2018\u2014to mediate a resolution of the dispute. The Administration assesses that the prolonged rift threatens efforts to counter Iran and regional terrorist groups. Qatar has countered the Saudi-led pressure with new arms buys and deepening relations with Turkey and Iran. \nAs do the other GCC leaders, Qatar\u2019s leaders have looked to the United States to guarantee their external security since the 1980s. Since 1992, the United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that reportedly addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under the DCA, Qatar hosts about 10,000 U.S. forces and the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) at various military facilities, including the large Al Udeid Air Base. U.S. forces in Qatar participate in all U.S. operations in the region. In conjunction with the U.S.-Qatar security partnership, Qatar is a significant buyer of U.S.-made weaponry, including combat aircraft. In late January 2018, Qatar and the United States held the inaugural \u201cStrategic Dialogue\u201d in Washington, DC, in which U.S. officials hailed a strong U.S.-Qatar partnership on many fronts and signaled the potential for permanent U.S. basing there. Qatar signed a broad memorandum of understanding with the United States in 2017 to cooperate against international terrorism. That MOU appeared intended to counter assertions that Qatar\u2019s ties to regional Islamist movements support terrorism and that Qatari leaders condone private Qatari citizen contributions to Islamist extremist organizations. \nThe voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar\u2019s former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. However, Qatar is also the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet formed a legislative body that is at least partly elected, even though such elections have long been promised. Further, U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for failing to adhere to international standards of human and labor rights practices, and for failing to protect expatriate workers from abuses by Qatari employers. \nAs are the other GCC states, Qatar is wrestling with the downturn in global hydrocarbons prices since 2014, now compounded by the Saudi-led embargo. Qatar is positioned to weather these headwinds because of its small population and substantial financial reserves. But, Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44533", "sha1": "3a946ebff694a513e246cf6b4828206536e94b77", "filename": "files/20180607_R44533_3a946ebff694a513e246cf6b4828206536e94b77.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/0.png": "files/20180607_R44533_images_98f0e1afbf3a13e679f0f4bddce362f91e2c1634.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/2.png": "files/20180607_R44533_images_86ca2430b17e16011fffb6afffcf022d0204db63.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/1.png": "files/20180607_R44533_images_9a0676926a20a641cc9503a1366cce2940ae2442.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/3.png": "files/20180607_R44533_images_195a177f4ada8400d7f0ad64b390096844da9e8c.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44533", "sha1": "13f2f5a993ae47ff6639d55ba3e7bd40099859c2", "filename": "files/20180607_R44533_13f2f5a993ae47ff6639d55ba3e7bd40099859c2.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 578928, "date": "2018-03-01", "retrieved": "2018-03-09T00:05:37.411347", "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The State of Qatar has employed its ample financial resources to exert significant regional influence and avoid domination by Saudi Arabia, the de facto leader of the alliance of six Gulf monarchies called the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman). Qatar has intervened in several regional conflicts, including in Syria and Libya, and has engaged with both Sunni Islamist and Iran-backed Shiite groups in Lebanon, Sudan, the Gaza Strip, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Qatar has maintained consistent dialogue with Iran while also supporting U.S. and GCC efforts to limit Iran\u2019s regional influence.\nQatar\u2019s independent policies, which include supporting regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and establishing a global media network called Al Jazeera, have injured Qatar\u2019s relations with Saudi Arabia and some other GCC members. The differences erupted into a crisis on June 5, 2017, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The United States, as well as Kuwait and other countries, are attempting to mediate the dispute, in large part because the rift threatens efforts to counter Iran and regional terrorist groups. However, mediation efforts have not produced sustained direct talks between Qatar and its antagonists, let alone a full resolution. Qatar has countered the Saudi-led pressure with new arms buys and deepening relations with Turkey and Iran. \nAs do the other GCC leaders, Qatar\u2019s leaders apparently view the United States as the guarantor of Gulf security. Since 1992, the United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under the DCA, Qatar hosts about 10,000 U.S. forces and the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) at various military facilities, including the large Al Udeid Air Base. U.S. forces in Qatar participate in all U.S. operations in the region, including Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) against the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria. Members of Congress have taken into account a broad range of Qatar\u2019s policies in consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, such as a sale of F-15s signed in mid-2017. In late January 2018, Qatar and the United States held the inaugural \u201cStrategic Dialogue\u201d in Washington, DC, in which U.S. officials hailed a strong U.S.-Qatar partnership on many fronts and signaled the potential for permanent U.S. basing there. Qatar signed a broad memorandum of understanding with the United States in 2017 to cooperate against international terrorism. That MOU appeared intended to counter assertions that Qatar\u2019s ties to regional Islamist movements support terrorism and that Qatari leaders condone private Qatari citizen contributions to Islamist extremist organizations. \nThe voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar\u2019s former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. However, Qatar is also the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet formed a legislative body that is at least partly elected, even though such elections have long been promised. Further, U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for failing to adhere to international standards of human and labor rights practices, and for failing to protect expatriate workers from abuses by Qatari employers. \nAs are the other GCC states, Qatar is wrestling with the downturn in global hydrocarbons prices since 2014, now compounded by the Saudi-led embargo. Qatar is positioned to weather these headwinds because of its small population and substantial financial reserves. But, Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44533", "sha1": "6072357bbea5c650088d74955eb0be12ca1a2adc", "filename": "files/20180301_R44533_6072357bbea5c650088d74955eb0be12ca1a2adc.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/0.png": "files/20180301_R44533_images_98f0e1afbf3a13e679f0f4bddce362f91e2c1634.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/2.png": "files/20180301_R44533_images_86ca2430b17e16011fffb6afffcf022d0204db63.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/1.png": "files/20180301_R44533_images_9a0676926a20a641cc9503a1366cce2940ae2442.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/3.png": "files/20180301_R44533_images_195a177f4ada8400d7f0ad64b390096844da9e8c.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44533", "sha1": "c366081dc3fae7545e4bf13db6fcceb340f2714a", "filename": "files/20180301_R44533_c366081dc3fae7545e4bf13db6fcceb340f2714a.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 577258, "date": "2017-12-27", "retrieved": "2018-01-03T13:50:30.896879", "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The State of Qatar has employed its ample financial resources to exert significant regional influence and avoid domination by Saudi Arabia, the de-facto leader of the six Gulf monarchy alliance called the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman). Qatar has intervened in several regional conflicts, including in Syria and Libya, and has sought to mediate disputes in or involving Lebanon, Sudan, the Palestinian Islamist organization Hamas, and Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan. Qatar has maintained consistent dialogue with that country while also supporting U.S. and GCC efforts to limit Iran\u2019s regional influence.\nQatar\u2019s independent policies, which include supporting regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and establishing a global media network called Al Jazeera, have injured Qatar\u2019s relations with Saudi Arabia and some other GCC members. The differences erupted into a crisis on June 5, 2017, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The United States, as well as Kuwait and other countries, are attempting to mediate the dispute, in large part because the rift threatens efforts to counter Iran and regional terrorist groups. As part of the U.S. mediation effort, the United States and Qatar signed a memorandum of understanding to combat the financing of terrorist groups. However, mediation efforts have not produced sustained direct talks between Qatar and its antagonists, let alone a full resolution. Qatar has sought to counter the Saudi-led pressure with new arms buys and deepening relations with Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Iran. \nAs do the other GCC leaders, Qatar\u2019s leaders apparently view the United States as the guarantor of Gulf security. Since 1992, the United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under the DCA, Qatar hosts about 10,000 U.S. forces at its military facilities, including at the large Al Udeid Air Base, as well as the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). U.S. forces in Qatar participate in all U.S. operations in the region, including Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) against the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria, and in Afghanistan. \nThe Qatari government is helping the United States combat regional Islamist terrorist organizations. However, radical Islamist organizations profess ideologies that are attractive to some Qatari citizens, and there have been repeated accusations by international observers that Qatar\u2019s leaders condone contributions to these groups. Members of Congress generally have taken into account these and all the other aspects of Qatar\u2019s policies in consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, such as a sale of F-15s signed in mid-2017. \nThe voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar\u2019s former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. However, Qatar is also the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet formed a legislative body that is at least partly elected, even though such elections have long been promised. Further, U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for numerous human rights problems such as suppression of critics using social media and deprivation of labor rights. \nAs are the other GCC states, Qatar is wrestling with the downturn in global hydrocarbons prices since 2014. Qatar is positioned to weather the downturn because of its small population and substantial financial reserves. Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44533", "sha1": "0d278172796fb8156f02dcebedbbb58616ea885d", "filename": "files/20171227_R44533_0d278172796fb8156f02dcebedbbb58616ea885d.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/0.png": "files/20171227_R44533_images_98f0e1afbf3a13e679f0f4bddce362f91e2c1634.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/2.png": "files/20171227_R44533_images_86ca2430b17e16011fffb6afffcf022d0204db63.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/1.png": "files/20171227_R44533_images_9a0676926a20a641cc9503a1366cce2940ae2442.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/3.png": "files/20171227_R44533_images_195a177f4ada8400d7f0ad64b390096844da9e8c.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44533", "sha1": "79ae4f183dcf8854be13feca77342a35fad1c539", "filename": "files/20171227_R44533_79ae4f183dcf8854be13feca77342a35fad1c539.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 574636, "date": "2017-10-19", "retrieved": "2017-10-24T13:14:36.665104", "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The State of Qatar has employed its ample financial resources to exert significant regional influence and avoid domination by Saudi Arabia, the de-facto leader of the six Gulf monarchy alliance called the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman). Qatar has intervened in several regional conflicts, including in Syria and Libya, and has sought to mediate disputes in or involving Lebanon, Sudan, the Palestinian Islamist organization Hamas, and Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan. Qatar has maintaining consistent dialogue with that country while also supporting U.S. and GCC efforts to limit Iran\u2019s regional influence.\nQatar\u2019s independent policies, which include supporting regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and establishing a global media network called Al Jazeera, have injured Qatar\u2019s relations with Saudi Arabia and some other GCC members who assert that the Brotherhood is a threat to regional and domestic security. The differences erupted into a crisis on June 5, 2017, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The United States, as well as Kuwait and other countries, are attempting to mediate the dispute, in large part because the rift threatens efforts to counter Iran and regional terrorist groups. As part of the U.S. mediation effort, the United States and Qatar signed a memorandum of understanding to combat the financing of terrorist groups. However, mediation efforts have not produced sustained direct talks between Qatar and its antagonists, let alone a full resolution.\nAs do the other GCC leaders, Qatar\u2019s leaders apparently view the United States as the guarantor of Gulf security. Since 1992, the United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under the DCA, Qatar hosts about 10,000 U.S. forces at its military facilities, including at the large Al Udeid Air Base, as well as the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). U.S. forces in Qatar participate in all U.S. operations in the region, including Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) against the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria, and in Afghanistan. \nThe Qatari government is helping the United States combat regional Islamist terrorist organizations. However, radical Islamist organizations profess ideologies that are attractive to some Qatari citizens, and there have been repeated accusations by international observers that Qatar\u2019s leaders condone contributions to these groups. Members of Congress generally have taken into account these and all the other aspects of Qatar\u2019s policies in consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, such as a sale of F-15s signed in mid-2017. \nThe voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar\u2019s former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. However, Qatar is also the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet formed a legislative body that is at least partly elected, even though such elections have long been promised. Further, U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for numerous human rights problems such as suppression of critics using social media and deprivation of labor rights. \nAs are the other GCC states, Qatar is wrestling with the downturn in global hydrocarbons prices since 2014. Qatar is positioned to weather the downturn because of its small population and substantial financial reserves. Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44533", "sha1": "fa80a6c585c8be11f8312db4832c8696ae3fafc4", "filename": "files/20171019_R44533_fa80a6c585c8be11f8312db4832c8696ae3fafc4.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/0.png": "files/20171019_R44533_images_98f0e1afbf3a13e679f0f4bddce362f91e2c1634.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/2.png": "files/20171019_R44533_images_86ca2430b17e16011fffb6afffcf022d0204db63.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/1.png": "files/20171019_R44533_images_9a0676926a20a641cc9503a1366cce2940ae2442.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/3.png": "files/20171019_R44533_images_195a177f4ada8400d7f0ad64b390096844da9e8c.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44533", "sha1": "4fe89965cb0818048be6ca1827d25d62d244957f", "filename": "files/20171019_R44533_4fe89965cb0818048be6ca1827d25d62d244957f.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 463825, "date": "2017-09-01", "retrieved": "2017-10-02T22:33:42.390508", "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The State of Qatar has employed its ample financial resources to exert significant regional influence and avoid domination by Saudi Arabia, the de-facto leader of the six Gulf monarchy alliance called the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman). Qatar has intervened in several regional conflicts, including in Syria and Libya, and has sought to mediate disputes in or involving Lebanon, Sudan, the Palestinian Islamist organization Hamas, and Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan. Qatar has supported efforts to limit Iran\u2019s regional influence while maintaining dialogue with that country.\nQatar\u2019s independent policies, which include supporting regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and establishing a global media network called Al Jazeera, have injured Qatar\u2019s relations with Saudi Arabia and some other GCC members. Some GCC countries assert that the Brotherhood is a threat to regional and domestic security. The differences erupted into a crisis on June 5, 2017, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The United States, with the help of Kuwait, Germany, and other countries, has attempted to mediate the dispute, in large part because the rift threatens to fracture U.S. efforts to counter Iran and regional terrorist groups. As part of the U.S. effort, the United States and Qatar signed a memorandum of understanding to combat the financing of terrorist groups. However the efforts, including shuttle diplomacy by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and the appointment of an envoy, Gen. (ret.) Anthony Zinni, have produced direct talks between Qatar and its antagonists, let alone a full resolution.\nAs do the other GCC leaders, Qatar\u2019s leaders apparently view the United States as the guarantor of Gulf security. Since 1992, the United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under the DCA, Qatar hosts about 10,000 U.S. forces at its military facilities, including at the large Al Udeid Air Base, as well as the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). U.S. forces in Qatar participate in all U.S. operations in the region, including Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) against the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria, and in Afghanistan. \nThe Qatari government is helping the United States combat regional Islamist terrorist organizations. However, radical Islamist organizations profess ideologies that are attractive to some Qatari citizens, and there have been repeated accusations by international observers that Qatar\u2019s leaders condone contributions to these groups. Members of Congress generally have taken into account these and all the other aspects of Qatar\u2019s policies in consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, such as a recently signed sale of F-15s. \nThe voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar\u2019s former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed dramatically from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. However, Qatar is also the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet formed a legislative body that is at least partly elected, even though such elections have long been promised. Further, U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for numerous human rights problems such as suppression of critics using social media and deprivation of labor rights. \nQatar is wrestling with the downturn in global hydrocarbons prices since 2014, as are the other GCC states. Qatar is positioned to weather the downturn because of its small population and substantial financial reserves. Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44533", "sha1": "45d0dde231c24717dfdfa17fbe9fb67d8651a836", "filename": "files/20170901_R44533_45d0dde231c24717dfdfa17fbe9fb67d8651a836.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/0.png": "files/20170901_R44533_images_98f0e1afbf3a13e679f0f4bddce362f91e2c1634.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/2.png": "files/20170901_R44533_images_86ca2430b17e16011fffb6afffcf022d0204db63.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/1.png": "files/20170901_R44533_images_9a0676926a20a641cc9503a1366cce2940ae2442.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/3.png": "files/20170901_R44533_images_195a177f4ada8400d7f0ad64b390096844da9e8c.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44533", "sha1": "a4d3d1f365b7d64a211237c7aca5d24e1b8e04dc", "filename": "files/20170901_R44533_a4d3d1f365b7d64a211237c7aca5d24e1b8e04dc.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 462734, "date": "2017-07-19", "retrieved": "2017-08-22T13:49:28.751860", "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The state of Qatar has employed its ample financial resources to try to \u201cpunch above its weight\u201d on regional and international affairs and, in so doing, avoid domination by Saudi Arabia, the de-facto leader of the six Gulf monarchy alliance called the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman). Qatar has intervened, directly and indirectly, in several regional conflicts, including in Syria and Libya, and has sought to mediate disputes in or involving Lebanon, Sudan, the Palestinian Islamist organization Hamas, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and some Syrian rebel groups. Qatar has supported efforts to limit Iran\u2019s regional influence while maintaining dialogue with Iran\u2019s senior officials.\nQatar\u2019s independent policies, which include supporting regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and establishing a global media network called Al Jazeera, have injured Qatar\u2019s relations with Saudi Arabia and some other GCC members. Qatar\u2019s critics in the GCC assert, in particular, that the Brotherhood is a threat to regional and domestic security. The differences erupted into a crisis on June 5, 2017, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The United States, with the help of Kuwait, is attempting to mediate the dispute, including through shuttle diplomacy by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in July, in large part because the rift threatens to fracture U.S. efforts to counter Iran and regional terrorist groups. During Secretary Tillerson\u2019s mission, the United States and Qatar signed a bilateral memorandum of understanding to combat the financing of terrorist groups. \nAs do the other GCC leaders, Qatar\u2019s leaders apparently view the United States as the guarantor of Gulf security. Since 1992, the United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under the DCA, Qatar hosts about 10,000 U.S. forces at its military facilities, including at the large Al Udeid Air Base, as well as the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). U.S. forces in Qatar participate in all U.S. operations in the region, including Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) against the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria, and in Afghanistan. \nThe Qatari government is helping the United States combat regional Islamist terrorist organizations. However, radical Islamist organizations profess ideologies that are attractive to some Qatari citizens, and there have been repeated accusations by international observers that Qatar\u2019s leaders condone contributions to these groups. Members of Congress generally have taken into account these and all the other aspects of Qatar\u2019s policies in consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, such as a recently signed sale of F-15s. \nThe voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar\u2019s former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed dramatically from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. However, Qatar is also the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet formed a legislative body that is at least partly elected, even though such elections have long been promised. Further, U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for numerous human rights problems such as suppression of critics using social media and deprivation of labor rights. \nQatar is wrestling with the downturn in global hydrocarbons prices since 2014, as are the other GCC states. Qatar is positioned to weather the downturn because of its small population and substantial financial reserves. Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44533", "sha1": "0d1468a4a50be193f336f70aa57f43a8ef49bc31", "filename": "files/20170719_R44533_0d1468a4a50be193f336f70aa57f43a8ef49bc31.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/0.png": "files/20170719_R44533_images_98f0e1afbf3a13e679f0f4bddce362f91e2c1634.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/2.png": "files/20170719_R44533_images_86ca2430b17e16011fffb6afffcf022d0204db63.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/1.png": "files/20170719_R44533_images_9a0676926a20a641cc9503a1366cce2940ae2442.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44533_files&id=/3.png": "files/20170719_R44533_images_195a177f4ada8400d7f0ad64b390096844da9e8c.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44533", "sha1": "a2fec87534efede9b1eba1d0e76eb5ff5b353878", "filename": "files/20170719_R44533_a2fec87534efede9b1eba1d0e76eb5ff5b353878.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 462429, "date": "2017-07-06", "retrieved": "2017-07-17T16:35:09.327934", "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The state of Qatar has employed its ample financial resources to try to \u201cpunch above its weight\u201d on regional and international affairs and in so doing, avoid domination by Saudi Arabia, the de-facto leader of the six Gulf monarchy alliance called the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman). Qatar has intervened, directly and indirectly, in several regional conflicts, including in Syria and Libya, and has sought to mediate disputes in or involving Lebanon, Sudan, the Palestinian Islamist organization Hamas, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and some Syrian rebel groups. Qatar has supported efforts to limit Iran\u2019s regional influence while maintaining dialogue with Iran\u2019s senior officials.\nQatar\u2019s independent policies\u2014which include supporting regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and establishing a global media network called Al Jazeera\u2014have injured Qatar\u2019s relations with Saudi Arabia and some other GCC members. Qatar\u2019s critics in the GCC assert, in particular, that the Brotherhood is a threat to regional and domestic security. The differences erupted into a crisis on June 5, 2017, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The United States, with the help of Kuwait, is attempting to mediate the dispute, which threatens to fracture U.S. efforts to counter Iran and regional terrorist groups. In early July, Qatar, whose ample financial resources have helped it weather the boycott, largely rejected a set of 13 demands put forward on June 22 by the anti-Qatar grouping, deflating U.S. hopes for a rapid end to the rift. \nAs do the other GCC leaders, Qatar\u2019s leaders apparently view the United States as the guarantor of Gulf security. Since 1992, the United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under the DCA, Qatar hosts about 10,000 U.S. forces at its military facilities, including at the large Al Udeid Air Base, as well as the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). U.S. forces in Qatar participate in all U.S. operations in the region, including Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) against the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria, and in Afghanistan. \nThe Qatari government is helping the United States combat regional Islamist terrorist organizations. However, radical Islamist organizations profess ideologies that are attractive to some Qatari citizens, and there have been repeated accusations by international observers that Qatar\u2019s leaders condone contributions to these groups. Members of Congress generally have taken into account these and all the other aspects of Qatar\u2019s policies in consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, such as a recently signed sale of F-15s. \nThe voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar\u2019s former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed dramatically from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. However, Qatar is also the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet formed a legislative body that is at least partly elected, even though such elections have long been promised. And, U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for numerous human rights problems such as suppression of critics using social media and deprivation of labor rights. \nQatar is wrestling with the downturn in global hydrocarbons prices since 2014, as are the other GCC states. Qatar is positioned to weather the downturn because of its small population and substantial financial reserves. Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44533", "sha1": "8c8b0a09671da7cfbc17897625f6161fe848aca3", "filename": "files/20170706_R44533_8c8b0a09671da7cfbc17897625f6161fe848aca3.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44533", "sha1": "513329c4fd80352bd657632b86f7c4c9f4f7e7fd", "filename": "files/20170706_R44533_513329c4fd80352bd657632b86f7c4c9f4f7e7fd.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 461891, "date": "2017-06-09", "retrieved": "2017-06-16T16:02:19.812806", "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The state of Qatar, a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman), has employed its ample financial resources to try to \u201cpunch above its weight\u201d on regional and international affairs. Qatar has intervened, directly and indirectly, in several regional conflicts, including in Syria and Libya. Qatar also has sought to establish itself as an indispensable interlocutor on some issues, such as those involving the Palestinian Islamist organization Hamas, the Taliban insurgent group in Afghanistan, some Al Qaeda-linked Syrian rebel groups, Lebanon, and Sudan. On Iran, Qatar has generally supported efforts to limit Iran\u2019s regional influence while maintaining dialogue with Iran\u2019s senior officials.\nHowever, Qatar\u2019s policies\u2014particularly its support for regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations as a positive example of \u201cpolitical Islam\u201d\u2014continue to plague relations between Qatar and some other GCC members. Saudi Arabia and the UAE assert that the Brotherhood is a threat to regional and domestic security and have taken generally opposed engaging Iran diplomatically. The differences erupted into a crisis on June 5, 2017, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The United States and several regional governments called for dialogue to resolve the rift and the United States is seeking to mediate the dispute, which threatens to fracture U.S. efforts to mobilize a regional coalition against Iran and against terrorist groups. \nAs do the other GCC leaders, Qatar\u2019s leaders apparently view the United States as the guarantor of Gulf security. The United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) since 1992, which addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under the DCA, Qatar hosts nearly 10,000 U.S. forces at its military facilities, including at the large Al Udeid Air Base, and Qatar also hosts the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). U.S. forces in Qatar participate in operations all over the region, including Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) against the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria, and in Afghanistan. \nThe Qatari government is helping the United States combat regional Islamist terrorist organizations. However, radical Islamist organizations profess ideologies that are attractive to some Qatari citizens, and there have been repeated accusations by international observers that wealthy Qataris have contributed funds and services to these groups. Members of Congress generally have taken into account these and all the other aspects of Qatar\u2019s policies in consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar.\nThe voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar\u2019s former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed sharply from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. Even though Qatar\u2019s former Amir stepped down voluntarily, U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for numerous human rights problems. Most of them, such as suppression of critics using social media and deprivation of labor rights, are common to the other GCC states. A recent Gulf-wide trend also apparent in Qatar has been a crackdown on dissent against the ruling establishment on social media networks. Qatar is also the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet formed a legislative body that is at least partly elected, even though such elections have long been promised. \nQatar is wrestling with the downturn in global hydrocarbons prices since 2014, as are the other GCC states. Qatar is positioned to weather the downturn because of its small population and substantial financial reserves. Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44533", "sha1": "5527cd038263534d65b75e5334cf9c55f49f22d8", "filename": "files/20170609_R44533_5527cd038263534d65b75e5334cf9c55f49f22d8.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44533", "sha1": "5eb1a9bd427149bc8449635a35f3536b292132fd", "filename": "files/20170609_R44533_5eb1a9bd427149bc8449635a35f3536b292132fd.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 459731, "date": "2017-03-15", "retrieved": "2017-03-22T18:27:56.220022", "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The state of Qatar, a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman), has employed its ample financial resources to try to \u201cpunch above its weight\u201d on regional and international affairs. Qatar has intervened, directly and indirectly, in several regional conflicts, including in Syria and Libya. Qatar also has sought to establish itself as an indispensable interlocutor on some issues, such as those involving the Palestinian Islamist organization Hamas, the Taliban insurgent group in Afghanistan, some Syrian rebel groups, Lebanon, and Sudan. \nQatar\u2019s efforts to promote what its officials assert are new models of Arab governance and relationships between Islam and the state have sometimes caused disputes with Qatar\u2019s GCC allies. The voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar\u2019s former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed sharply from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. Qatar\u2019s support for regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations, which Qatari leaders offer as a positive example of \u201cpolitical Islam,\u201d continues to plague relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which assert that the Brotherhood is a threat to regional and domestic security. Qatar has supported Brotherhood-linked groups in Egypt and which are involved in internal conflicts in Syria and Libya. On Iran, Qatar has generally adopted a middle ground within the GCC by supporting efforts to limit Iran\u2019s regional influence while maintaining dialogue with Iran\u2019s senior officials. \nAs do the other GCC leaders, Qatar\u2019s leaders apparently view the United States as the guarantor of Gulf security. Qatar hosts nearly 10,000 U.S. forces at its military facilities, including those that house the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). These forces are participating in operations all over the region, including Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) against the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria. The United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) since 1992, which provides for the U.S. troop presence, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. \nThe Qatari government is helping the United States combat regional Islamist terrorist organizations. However, radical Islamist organizations profess ideologies that are attractive to some Qatari citizens, and there have been repeated accusations by international observers that wealthy Qataris have contributed funds and services to these groups. Members of Congress generally have taken into account these and all the other aspects of Qatar\u2019s policies in consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar.\nEven though Qatar\u2019s former Amir stepped down voluntarily, U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for numerous human rights problems. Most of them, such as suppression of critics using social media and deprivation of labor rights, are common to the other GCC states. A recent Gulf-wide trend also apparent in Qatar has been a crackdown on dissent against the ruling establishment on social media networks. Qatar is also the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet formed a legislative body that is at least partly elected, even though such elections have long been promised. Qatar has held municipal elections, most recently in 2015. \nQatar is wrestling with the downturn in global hydrocarbons prices since 2014, as are the other GCC states. Qatar is positioned to weather the downturn because of its small population and substantial financial reserves. Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44533", "sha1": "e789563dfe3913e42701ec328b78cc7d73cc9f49", "filename": "files/20170315_R44533_e789563dfe3913e42701ec328b78cc7d73cc9f49.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44533", "sha1": "da856e6a4f53198b40a2fbc38ec3712a0815f0f7", "filename": "files/20170315_R44533_da856e6a4f53198b40a2fbc38ec3712a0815f0f7.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 457583, "date": "2016-12-09", "retrieved": "2016-12-22T16:33:53.445825", "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The state of Qatar, a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman), has employed its ample financial resources to try to \u201cpunch above its weight\u201d on regional and international affairs. Qatar has intervened, directly and indirectly, in several regional conflicts, including in Syria and Libya. Qatar also has sought to establish itself as an indispensable interlocutor on some issues, such as those involving the Palestinian Islamist organization Hamas, the Taliban insurgent group in Afghanistan, some Syrian rebel groups, Lebanon, and Sudan. \nQatar\u2019s efforts to promote what its officials assert are new models of Arab governance and relationships between Islam and the state have sometimes caused disputes with Qatar\u2019s GCC allies. The voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar\u2019s former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed sharply from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. Qatar\u2019s support for regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations\u2014which Qatar holds out as a positive example of \u201cpolitical Islam\u201d\u2014continues to widen differences between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which assert that the Brotherhood is a threat to regional and domestic security. Qatar has supported Brotherhood-linked groups in the Syria and Libya internal conflicts, and in Egypt. On Iran, Qatar has generally adopted a middle ground within the GCC by supporting efforts to limit Iran\u2019s regional influence while maintaining consistent dialogue with Iranian leaders. \nAs do the other GCC leaders, Qatar\u2019s leaders apparently view the United States as the guarantor of Gulf security. Qatar hosts nearly 10,000 U.S. forces at its military facilities, including those that house the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Some of these forces are involved in operations all over the region, including Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) against the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria. The United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) since 1992, which provides for the hosting, sales of U.S. arms to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. \nThe Qatari government is helping the United States combat Islamist terrorist organizations. However, radical Islamist organizations profess ideologies that are attractive to some Qatari citizens, and there have been repeated accusations by international observers that wealthy Qataris have contributed funds and services to these groups. Members of Congress generally have taken into account these and all the other aspects of Qatar\u2019s policies in consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar.\nEven though Qatar\u2019s former Amir stepped down voluntarily, U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for numerous human rights problems. Most of them, such as suppression of critics using social media and deprivation of labor rights, are common to the other GCC states. A recent Gulf-wide trend also apparent in Qatar has been a crackdown on dissent against the ruling establishment on social media networks. Qatar is also the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet formed a legislative body that is at least partly elected, even though such a body has been long promised. \nQatar is wrestling with the downturn in global crude oil prices since 2014, as are the other GCC states. Qatar appeared to be better positioned to weather the downturn than are most of the other GCC states because of its development of a large natural gas export infrastructure and its small population. However, natural gas prices are also down, and Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products. \nFor more, see CRS In Focus IF10351, Qatar, by Christopher M. Blanchard.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44533", "sha1": "1108841a9bb80b6f7597c8d8c4928151781f1c56", "filename": "files/20161209_R44533_1108841a9bb80b6f7597c8d8c4928151781f1c56.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44533", "sha1": "8dcdbd522f862a9b54e6a0e76a6e539f8236d186", "filename": "files/20161209_R44533_8dcdbd522f862a9b54e6a0e76a6e539f8236d186.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 455650, "date": "2016-09-07", "retrieved": "2016-11-28T21:38:25.256860", "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The state of Qatar, a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman), has employed its ample financial resources to try to \u201cpunch above its weight\u201d on regional and international affairs. Qatar has intervened, directly and indirectly, in several regional conflicts\u2014sometimes in partnership with the United States and sometimes along with other GCC states. It has also sought to establish itself as an indispensable interlocutor on some issues, such as those involving the Palestinian Islamist organization Hamas, the Taliban insurgent group in Afghanistan, some Syrian rebel groups, Lebanon, and Sudan. \nQatar\u2019s efforts to promote what they assert are new models of Arab governance and relationships between Islam and the state have sometimes caused disputes with Qatar\u2019s GCC allies. The voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar\u2019s former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed sharply from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. Qatar\u2019s support for regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations caused significant diplomatic confrontations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, in particular, which assert that the Brotherhood is a threat to regional security and to the domestic security of the GCC states themselves. On Iran, Qatar has generally adopted a middle ground within the GCC by supporting efforts to limit Iran\u2019s regional influence while maintaining dialogue with Iranian leaders. \nAs do the other GCC leaders, Qatar\u2019s leaders apparently view the United States as the guarantor of Gulf security. Qatar hosts about 10,000 U.S. forces at its largest military facilities, including the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Some of these forces are involved in operations all over the region, including Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) against the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria. The United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) since 1992, which provides for the hosting, sales of U.S. arms to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. \nThe Qatari government is helping the United States combat Islamist terrorist organizations. However, radical Islamist organizations profess ideologies that are attractive to some Qatari citizens, and there have been repeated accusations by international observers that wealthy Qataris have contributed funds and services to these groups. Members of Congress generally have taken into account these and all the other aspects of Qatar\u2019s policies in consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar.\nEven though Qatar\u2019s former Amir stepped down voluntarily, U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for numerous human rights problems, most of which are common to the other GCC states. A recent Gulf-wide trend also apparent in Qatar has been a crackdown on dissent against the ruling establishment on social media networks. Qatar is also the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet formed a legislative body, even though such a body, and elections for it, have been long promised. \nQatar is wrestling with the downturn in global crude oil prices since 2014, as are the other GCC states, Qatar appeared to be better positioned to weather the downturn than are most of the other GCC states because of its development of a large natural gas export infrastructure and its small population. However, natural gas prices are also down, and Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products. \nFor more, see CRS In Focus IF10351, Qatar, by Christopher M. Blanchard.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44533", "sha1": "7968894d381c8fb9c1641f3a042de8742757cf05", "filename": "files/20160907_R44533_7968894d381c8fb9c1641f3a042de8742757cf05.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44533", "sha1": "96ce7f27b2885217f0c79a7a000af2f743b7ea09", "filename": "files/20160907_R44533_96ce7f27b2885217f0c79a7a000af2f743b7ea09.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 453548, "date": "2016-06-20", "retrieved": "2016-06-21T20:57:55.704819", "title": "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The state of Qatar, a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman), has employed its ample financial resources to try to \u201cpunch above its weight\u201d on regional and international affairs. Qatar has intervened, directly and indirectly, in several regional conflicts\u2014sometimes in partnership with the United States and sometimes as part of a separate initiative of like-minded GCC states. It has also sought to establish itself as an indispensable interlocutor on some issues, such as those involving the Palestinian Islamist organization Hamas and the Taliban insurgent group in Afghanistan. \nQatar\u2019s leaders have also sought to promote what they assert are new models of Arab governance and relationships between Islam and the state\u2014in both cases causing strife and dispute with Qatar\u2019s GCC allies. The voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar\u2019s former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed sharply from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders remain in power until they die or are removed by rivals in their ruling families. Qatar\u2019s support for regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations caused significant diplomatic confrontations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, in particular, which assert that the Brotherhood is a threat to regional security and to the internal security of the GCC states themselves. On Iran, Qatar has generally struck a middle ground within the GCC by supporting efforts to limit Iran\u2019s regional influence while at the same time maintaining consistent channels of communication to Iranian leaders. \nAs do the other GCC leaders, Qatar\u2019s leaders apparently view the United States as the ultimate guarantor of Gulf security. Qatar hosts substantial numbers of U.S. forces at its most sensitive military facilities, including the forward headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) since 1992, which provides for the hosting and other aspects of U.S.-Qatar defense cooperation, including sales of U.S. arms to Qatar. U.S. forces in Qatar are involved in operations all over the region, including against the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria. At the same time, organizations such as the Islamic State and Al Qaeda profess ideologies that are apparently attractive to some in Qatar, particularly hardline Islamists and Arab nationalists, and there have been frequent accusations by international observers that some Qataris have contributed funds and services to these groups. Members of Congress generally have taken into account these and all the other aspects of Qatar\u2019s policies in consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar.\nEven though Qatar\u2019s former Amir stepped down voluntarily, U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for numerous human rights problems, most of which are common to the other GCC states. A recent Gulf-wide trend also apparent in Qatar has been a crackdown on dissent against the ruling establishment on social media networks. Qatar is also the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet formed a legislative body, although reportedly such a body, and elections for it, are planned. \nQatar is wrestling with the downturn in global crude oil prices since 2014, as are the other GCC states, Qatar appeared to be better positioned to weather the downturn than are most of the other GCC states because of its development of a large natural gas export infrastructure and its small population. However, natural gas prices are also down, and Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products. \nFor more, see CRS In Focus IF10351, Qatar, by Christopher M. Blanchard.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44533", "sha1": "3668475af8b88e1d9e40a48e9dffc35daac7bf06", "filename": "files/20160620_R44533_3668475af8b88e1d9e40a48e9dffc35daac7bf06.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44533", "sha1": "430243dac15ccb6fb39905978b511a1f5b2ec2b6", "filename": "files/20160620_R44533_430243dac15ccb6fb39905978b511a1f5b2ec2b6.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Foreign Affairs", "Intelligence and National Security", "Middle Eastern Affairs", "National Defense" ] }