{
  "id": "R44047",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "R44047",
  "active": true,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 441465,
      "date": "2015-05-22",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-06T19:01:32.753063",
      "title": "In Brief: Options to Help Meet a Congressional Requirement for Nuclear Weapon \u201cPit\u201d Production",
      "summary": "A pit is the plutonium core of a thermonuclear weapon. Imploding it with conventional explosives provides the energy to detonate the rest of the weapon. The Rocky Flats Plant made up to 2,000 pits per year (ppy) through 1989; since then, the United States has made 29 pits for the stockpile. Yet the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act requires the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which manages the nuclear weapons program, to produce at a rate of 80 ppy for 90 days in 2027. How can that requirement be met?\nPits are to be made at Los Alamos National Laboratory\u2019s main plutonium facility, PF-4. To manufacture pits, a facility must have enough laboratory floor space and a high enough limit for Material At Risk (MAR), the amount of radioactive material a worst-case accident could release. Producing 80 ppy requires enough \u201cmargin,\u201d the space or MAR available to produce pits minus space or MAR required for that production rate. While space and MAR available have been calculated, amounts required to produce 80 ppy have never been calculated rigorously, leaving space and MAR needs undefined. Although CRS cannot address whether certain options could meet the 2027 date because time to implement them cannot be determined, this report presents 16 options that seek to increase the feasibility of producing 80 ppy by 2027, including:\nThe radiation dose an individual would receive from a worst-case accident determines MAR permitted in PF-4. A ten-factor equation calculates dose as a function of MAR. NNSA uses worst-case values in this equation, yet median values may provide sufficient conservatism. Median values reduce calculated dose by orders of magnitude, permitting a large increase in PF-4 MAR. Yet merely doubling permitted MAR might suffice for producing 80 ppy. Providing this increase through construction at PF-4 could be costly and take years.\nIn determining MAR for PF-4, the closest offsite individual is at a nearby trailer park. Relocating it would place the next closest individual farther away. The added distance would reduce dose, permitting increased MAR in PF-4.\nUsing a different meteorological model and different assumptions would greatly reduce the currently calculated dose, perhaps permitting doubling PF-4 MAR.\nPlutonium decays radioactively, creating elements that various processes remove to purify plutonium. One process generates byproducts; plutonium is recovered from them with processes that take space and MAR. Since the United States has tons of plutonium surplus to defense needs, byproducts could be dispositioned as waste.\nPits use weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu). U.S. WGPu is about 50 years old. About nine-tenths of plutonium-241, a WGPu isotope, decays to americium-241 in that time. Since plutonium-241 is the source of americium-241 in WGPu, removing the current americium-241 would prevent WGPu from ever reaching its americium-241 limit, permitting reduction in equipment for that process and reducing worker radiation exposure.\nA plutonium isotope used in space probes, plutonium-238, is extremely radioactive. It accounts for a small quantity of PF-4 plutonium but a quarter of PF-4\u2019s MAR. Building a \u201cmodule\u201d near PF-4 for plutonium-238 work would free MAR and space in PF-4, so one module might suffice instead of two or three.\nTo reduce risk of collapse, loss of life, and radiation release from an earthquake, NNSA increased the seismic resilience of PF-4. More steps are planned; more could be taken.\nMany options may boost U.S. pit production capacity, but none by itself could meet capacity and schedule requirements. NNSA therefore faces the prospect of assembling a package of options, and Congress faces the prospect of evaluating, perhaps amending, and approving it. Arriving at a satisfactory package will require complex analyses to optimize among such goals as margin, cost, worker safety, and throughput. At issue for Congress: What are the risks, costs, and benefits of the options? What is the optimum package?\nThis report is a condensed version of CRS Report R44033, Nuclear Weapon \u201cPit\u201d Production: Options to Help Meet a Congressional Requirement, by Jonathan E. Medalia.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": true,
      "formats": [
        {
          "format": "HTML",
          "encoding": "utf-8",
          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44047",
          "sha1": "70ae22bfa4f12ff94aeb581e6d2ae047cab109ad",
          "filename": "files/20150522_R44047_70ae22bfa4f12ff94aeb581e6d2ae047cab109ad.html",
          "images": null
        },
        {
          "format": "PDF",
          "encoding": null,
          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44047",
          "sha1": "bbd7c17cc3ee95c25e24169d3c9da6c5cc38e937",
          "filename": "files/20150522_R44047_bbd7c17cc3ee95c25e24169d3c9da6c5cc38e937.pdf",
          "images": null
        }
      ],
      "topics": [
        {
          "source": "IBCList",
          "id": 3245,
          "name": "Nuclear Weapons: Capabilities and Nuclear Arms Control"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "National Defense"
  ]
}