{ "id": "R43608", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "R43608", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 434790, "date": "2014-06-19", "retrieved": "2016-04-06T20:19:47.404482", "title": "High-Frequency Trading: Background, Concerns, and Regulatory Developments", "summary": "High-frequency trading (HFT) is a broad term without a precise legal or regulatory definition. It is used to describe what many characterize as a subset of algorithmic trading that involves very rapid placement of orders, in the realm of tiny fractions of a second. Regulators have been scrutinizing HFT practices for years, but public concern about this form of trading intensified following the April 2014 publication of a book by author Michael Lewis. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Justice (DOJ), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Office of the New York Attorney General, and Massachusetts Secretary of Commerce have begun HFT-related probes.\nCritics of HFT have raised several concerns about its impact. One criticism relates to its generation of so-called phantom liquidity, in which market liquidity that appears to be provided by HFT may be fleeting and transient due to the posting and then almost immediate cancellation of trading orders. Another concern is that HFT firms may engage in manipulative strategies that involve the use of quote cancellations. In addition, some observers allege that HFT firms are often involved in front-running whereby the firms trade ahead of a large order to buy or sell stocks based on nonpublic market information about an imminent trade. Another criticism is that HFT has increased the level of potential market systemic risk whereby shocks to a small number of active HFT traders could then detrimentally affect the entire market. A related concern is whether HFT could exacerbate market volatility. These concerns have percolated since the \u201cFlash Crash\u201d of May 6, 2010, when the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) fell by roughly 1,000 points in intraday trading\u2014the largest one-day decline in the history of the DJIA. The crash was analyzed in an investigative report by the SEC and CFTC which, among other factors, looked at the role HFT may have played. The report determined that HFT was not the cause but may have exacerbated the crash. Another area of criticism is that HFT often involves two-tiered markets in which HFT firms pay extra for the right to access data feeds or to collocate their servers within exchanges\u2019 servers\u2014all of which is designed to give some traders an advantage over others.\nHFT\u2019s supporters argue that the increased trading provided by HFT adds market liquidity and reduces market volatility. They contend that HFT is a technological innovation that is the latest evolutionary stage in a long history of securities market making and assert that HFT has reduced the bid-ask spreads in stock trading, thereby lowering trading costs.\nCongressional interest in HFT and the Flash Crash has manifested itself in the 113th Congress both legislatively and in the congressional oversight of the SEC and CFTC. Legislatively, S. 410 (Harkin), H.R. 880 (DeFazio), and H.R. 1579 (Ellison) would levy taxes on various financial trades, including trades conducted by HFT traders. H.R. 2292 (Markey) would require the CFTC to provide a regulatory definition of HFT in the derivatives markets it oversees and require those who do HFT to register with the CFTC.\nIn June 2014, SEC Chairman Mary Jo White announced that in response to concerns over \u201caggressive, destabilizing trading strategies in vulnerable market conditions,\u201d the agency was pursuing several HFT-related reform proposals, including requiring unregistered HFT firms to register with the SEC.\nThis report provides an overview of HFT in the equities and derivatives markets regulated by the SEC and CFTC. It also examines the Flash Crash of 2010 and the role that HFT may have played as well as recent regulatory developments.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43608", "sha1": "49ae7c01a333c68f5dc54fa581491e6febf1faf9", "filename": "files/20140619_R43608_49ae7c01a333c68f5dc54fa581491e6febf1faf9.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43608", "sha1": "d829718e8c8ad3e3f27fc2a0791b2ac6bd0ca641", "filename": "files/20140619_R43608_d829718e8c8ad3e3f27fc2a0791b2ac6bd0ca641.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4575, "name": "Derivatives Regulation" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 562, "name": "Securities Regulation" } ] } ], "topics": [] }