{ "id": "R43391", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "R", "number": "R43391", "active": true, "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov, EveryCRSReport.com, University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "versions": [ { "summary": null, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R43391", "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "type": "CRS Report", "formats": [ { "sha1": "ad1a2692d235366e63e91ed1c873728544393cf1", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43391/15", "filename": "files/2023-08-03_R43391_ad1a2692d235366e63e91ed1c873728544393cf1.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2023-08-03_R43391_ad1a2692d235366e63e91ed1c873728544393cf1.html" } ], "title": "Independence of Federal Financial Regulators: Structure, Funding, and Other Issues", "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "retrieved": "2023-09-03T04:03:28.883693", "date": "2023-08-03", "typeId": "R", "id": "R43391_15_2023-08-03", "active": true }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 459271, "date": "2017-02-28", "retrieved": "2017-03-09T17:49:58.246968", "title": "Independence of Federal Financial Regulators: Structure, Funding, and Other Issues", "summary": "Conventional wisdom regarding regulators is that the structure and design of the organization matters for policy outcomes. Financial regulators conduct rulemaking and enforcement to implement law and supervise financial institutions. These agencies have been given certain characteristics that enhance their day-to-day independence from the President and Congress, which may make policymaking more technical and less \u201cpolitical\u201d or \u201cpartisan,\u201d for better or worse. Independence may also make regulators less accountable to elected officials and can reduce congressional influence, at least in the short term.\nAlthough independent agencies share many characteristics, there are notable differences. Some federal financial regulators are relatively more independent in some areas but relatively less so in others. Major structural characteristics of federal financial regulators that influence independence include\nagency head: the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Federal Reserve (Fed), National Credit Union Association (NCUA), and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have multi-member boards or commissions led by a chair, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) are led by single directors. \nparty affiliation: for multi-member boards or commissions, statute sets a party balance among members for all except the Fed.\nterm in office: terms in office are fixed in length, varying among the regulators from 5 years to 14 years, and do not coincide with the President\u2019s term. Terms for Fed governors and NCUA board members are not renewable.\ngrounds for removal: although not always specified in statute, it appears that the regulator heads can only be removed \u201cfor cause\u201d (e.g., malfeasance or neglect of duty), with the exception of the Comptroller of the Currency. \nexecutive oversight: rulemaking, testimony, legislative proposals, and budget requests are not subject to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review.\ncongressional oversight: agencies are statutorily required to submit periodic reports to Congress. Agency officials testify before Congress upon request; some are also statutorily required to do so periodically. Agencies are subject to Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits and investigations. Top leadership is subject to Senate confirmation. Agency rulemaking can be overturned under the Congressional Review Act.\nfunding: the SEC\u2019s and CFTC\u2019s budgets are set through congressional authorization and appropriations, whereas other regulators set their own budgets. These budgets are funded through the collection of fees or other revenues, with the exception of the CFTC and CFPB.\nFrom time to time, Congress has considered legislation that would alter the structure and design of some of the federal financial regulators, including changes to their leadership and funding structure, the Congressional Review Act, and cost-benefit analysis requirements.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43391", "sha1": "9ab3e761d8793ec9e421e0aba36d10451b7e961f", "filename": "files/20170228_R43391_9ab3e761d8793ec9e421e0aba36d10451b7e961f.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43391", "sha1": "9ca4f7cd444ecee3b1802341670241bfa1fdf5a3", "filename": "files/20170228_R43391_9ca4f7cd444ecee3b1802341670241bfa1fdf5a3.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 439152, "date": "2014-03-06", "retrieved": "2016-04-06T20:36:46.027334", "title": "Independence of Federal Financial Regulators", "summary": "Conventional wisdom regarding regulators is that the structure and design of the organization matters for policy outcomes. Financial regulators conduct rulemaking and enforcement to implement law and supervise financial institutions. These agencies have been given certain characteristics that enhance their day-to-day independence from the President or Congress, which may make policymaking more technical and less \u201cpolitical\u201d or \u201cpartisan,\u201d for better or worse. Independence may also make regulators less accountable to elected officials and can reduce congressional influence, at least in the short term.\nAlthough independent agencies share many characteristics, there are notable differences. Some federal financial regulators are relatively more independent in some areas but relatively less so in others. Major structural characteristics of federal financial regulators that influence independence include\nagency head: the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Federal Reserve (Fed), National Credit Union Association (NCUA), and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have multi-member boards or commissions led by a chair, while the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) are led by single directors. \nparty affiliation: for multi-member boards or commissions, statute sets a party balance among members for all except the Fed.\nterm in office: terms in office are fixed in length, varying among the regulators from 5 to 14 years, and do not coincide with the President\u2019s term. Terms for Fed governors and NCUA board members are not renewable.\ngrounds for removal: although not always specified in statute, it appears that the regulator heads can only be removed \u201cfor cause\u201d (e.g., malfeasance or neglect of duty), with the exception of the Comptroller of the Currency. \nexecutive oversight: rulemaking, testimony, legislative proposals, and budget requests are not subject to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review.\ncongressional oversight: agencies are statutorily required to submit periodic reports to Congress. Agency officials testify before Congress upon request; some are also statutorily required to do so periodically. Agencies are subject to Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits and investigations. Top leadership is subject to Senate confirmation. \nfunding: the SEC\u2019s and CFTC\u2019s budgets are set through congressional authorization and appropriations, while other regulators set their own budgets. These budgets are funded through the collection of fees or other revenues, with the exception of the CFTC and CFPB.\nFrom time to time, Congress has considered legislation that would alter the structure and design of some of the federal financial regulators. For example, in the 113th Congress, bills to increase their use of cost-benefit analysis (H.R. 1062, H.R. 1003, and H.R. 2804) and bills to change the organizational structure of the CFPB (H.R. 3193) have seen legislative action.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43391", "sha1": "d95e394a8af571e92020c3ecb4179469b513734d", "filename": "files/20140306_R43391_d95e394a8af571e92020c3ecb4179469b513734d.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43391", "sha1": "c4ba1e6ef83753ce3321853cfb2d80d103323bd7", "filename": "files/20140306_R43391_c4ba1e6ef83753ce3321853cfb2d80d103323bd7.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc282342/", "id": "R43391_2014Feb24", "date": "2014-02-24", "retrieved": "2014-04-02T19:38:14", "title": "Independence of Federal Financial Regulators", "summary": "This report discusses institutional features that make federal financial regulators (as well as other independent agencies) relatively independent from the President and Congress.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20140224_R43391_3f7e617342580425924bea4e2864f2c70a74b979.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20140224_R43391_3f7e617342580425924bea4e2864f2c70a74b979.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Finance", "name": "Finance" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Independent regulatory commissions", "name": "Independent regulatory commissions" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Government and business", "name": "Government and business" } ] } ], "topics": [ "American Law", "Economic Policy", "Foreign Affairs" ] }