{ "id": "R43377", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "R43377", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com, University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 457341, "date": "2016-12-01", "retrieved": "2016-12-09T19:08:28.705553", "title": "The Central African Republic: Background and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The Central African Republic (CAR) is emerging from a crisis that began when rebels overthrew the national government in 2013, ushering in a chaotic and violent period. A new president, Faustin Archange Touad\u00e9ra, was elected in 2016, but gains remain fragile. Militias that have targeted civilians on the basis of religious and ethnic identity continue to operate in much of the country, posing challenges to governance, reconciliation, and accountability. Violence has caused large population displacements, weakening an already tiny economy and placing strains on finite international aid and peacekeeping resources. \nU.S. responses to the crisis in CAR have included:\nhumanitarian assistance;\naid funding for conflict mitigation, peacebuilding, and rule-of-law programs;\ndiplomatic and financial support for a U.N. peacekeeping operation, MINUSCA;\nadditional support for African and French troops that have deployed to CAR;\npublic diplomacy initiatives; and\ntargeted financial and travel sanctions against actors viewed as fueling conflict.\nKey issues for the 115th Congress include the authorization, appropriation, and oversight of U.S. aid and peacekeeping funding and of U.S. policy toward CAR. The context for these considerations will depend to some extent on the approach of the incoming Donald Trump Administration to CAR and regional issues. The situation in CAR also has implications for several broad policy challenges in which Congress has displayed interest:\npolitical stability in the wider central Africa region;\nU.S. efforts to counter the Lord\u2019s Resistance Army (LRA), a small but brutal militia active in eastern CAR and neighboring countries;\nthe U.S. role in preventing and addressing \u201cmass atrocities\u201d in foreign countries;\ntrends in wildlife poaching and other cross-border criminal activity in the region;\nreligious freedom in Africa; and\nthe effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping and responses to peacekeeper abuses.\nThe FY2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 114-113) provided that funding appropriated for aid to CAR \u201cshall be made available for reconciliation and peacebuilding programs, including activities to promote inter-faith dialogue at the national and local levels, and for programs to prevent crimes against humanity.\u201d A similar provision is included in H.R. 5912 (Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2017), and similar provisions were enacted in prior foreign aid appropriations measures. The FY2016 Act also provided funding for assisting civilians in LRA-affected areas, such as southeastern CAR, as did prior aid appropriations measures. Other relevant legislation enacted in the 114th Congress includes the Eliminate, Neutralize, and Disrupt Wildlife Trafficking Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-231). The 113th Congress held several hearings on CAR in the House and Senate.\nThe Obama Administration allocated an estimated $14 million in bilateral aid for CAR in FY2016 and requested $18 million for FY2017\u2014not including emergency humanitarian aid and other regionally- and centrally-managed funds, such as conflict-mitigation and LRA-related assistance. The Administration also allocated an estimated $287 million from FY2016 appropriations for U.S. assessed contributions to MINUSCA\u2019s budget. The United States is by far the largest bilateral humanitarian donor in CAR, with over $99 million in funding provided in FY2016.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43377", "sha1": "f67a795ff47dfa5647012c8ee7aac6cb764b1a6a", "filename": "files/20161201_R43377_f67a795ff47dfa5647012c8ee7aac6cb764b1a6a.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43377", "sha1": "16a85a4f2da2dd504e5edce59edd83c0c3614a23", "filename": "files/20161201_R43377_16a85a4f2da2dd504e5edce59edd83c0c3614a23.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4879, "name": "Sub-Saharan Africa" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 444437, "date": "2015-08-17", "retrieved": "2016-04-06T18:35:29.498754", "title": "Crisis in the Central African Republic", "summary": "Congressional Research Service\n7-5700\nwww.crs.gov\nR43377\nSummary\nThis report provides background on the evolving political, security, and humanitarian crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR), a landlocked, sparsely inhabited, and extremely under-developed country. Violence in CAR since 2013 has displaced hundreds of thousands of people and placed strains on global humanitarian and peacekeeping resources. U.S. responses include:\nhumanitarian assistance;\ndiplomatic and financial support for a U.N. peacekeeping operation, MINUSCA;\nadditional bilateral support for African peacekeepers and French troops that have deployed to CAR;\nforeign aid for conflict mitigation and peacebuilding activities;\npublic diplomacy initiatives; and\nan Executive Order authorizing targeted sanctions.\nPossible issues for Congress include the authorization, appropriation, and oversight of U.S. humanitarian assistance and contributions to international stabilization efforts. The crisis in CAR also has implications for several broader issues of potential interest to Congress, including:\nstability in the surrounding region;\nthe prevention of \u201cmass atrocities\u201d;\nU.S. efforts to counter the Lord\u2019s Resistance Army (LRA), a small but brutal militia active in CAR and neighboring states; and\nthe impact of the conflict in CAR on wildlife poaching and other cross-border criminal activity in the region.\nCongress has monitored the crisis in CAR and the U.S. response, including related fiscal implications. The 113th Congress held hearings on CAR before the Africa subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (November 2013 and April 2014) and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (December 2013). The FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-235) states that \u201cfunds made available by this Act for [CAR] shall be made available for reconciliation and peacebuilding programs.\u201d A similar provision is included in FY2016 foreign aid appropriations bills (H.R. 2772 and S. 1725).\nOther relevant legislation introduced in the 114th Congress includes H.R. 2494 (Global Anti-Poaching Act), H.Res. 310 and S.Res. 211 (regarding genocide and mass atrocities), S.Res. 237 and H.Res. 394 (on the LRA), and S.Res. 204 (on \u201cWorld Refugee Day\u201d).\n\nContents\nOverview\t1\nMuslim Exodus\t3\nA Challenging Political Transition\t4\nAllegations of Sexual Abuse and Exploitation by Foreign Troops\t5\nThe Economy\t6\nRegional Actors\t7\nLord\u2019s Resistance Army Presence\t9\nU.S. Responses\t10\nRecent Legislation\t11\nOutlook and Issues for Congress\t11\n\nFigures\nFigure 1. CAR at a Glance\t3\n\nAppendixes\nAppendix.\t14\n\nContacts\nAuthor Contact Information\t15\n\nOverview\nThe Central African Republic (CAR) has never had an effective central government, and it has struggled with recurrent insurgencies and army mutinies since the 1990s. In March 2013, a rebel movement known as the Seleka seized control of the capital, Bangui, ousting President Fran\u00e7ois Boziz\u00e9, who had himself come to power in an armed rebellion 10 years earlier. The ensuing conflict has featured high levels of violence against civilians, often along ethno-religious lines, and large population displacements. A donor-backed transitional government replaced the Seleka-led regime in January 2014 but it has struggled to lead an effective response to the crisis. A range of CAR militia commanders and political and civic leaders participated in national consultations known as the \u201cBangui Forum\u201d in May 2015, which culminated in agreements on disarmament, governance reforms, and reconciliation. However, implementation and oversight remain in question. Elections have been repeatedly delayed. The United Nations (U.N.) has appealed for $613 million in humanitarian aid for CAR in 2015, on top of additional assistance for refugees.\nThe Seleka was founded in northeastern CAR and drew on grievances among members of the minority Muslim community\u2014many of whom hail from the northeast\u2014stemming from perceived exclusion and persecution by successive governments led by Christians from the south or northwest. (Prior to the conflict, CAR\u2019s population of 4-5 million was estimated at 15% Muslim and 85% Christian or followers of indigenous beliefs. There are no reliable figures on the current breakdown.) Once in power, Seleka leaders oversaw attacks on Christian communities, prompting the formation of largely Christian- and animist-led \u201canti-balaka\u201d militias (often translated as anti-bullets or anti-machetes) that have targeted Muslims and northeasterners. A U.N. commission of inquiry reported in December 2014 that all parties to the conflict were responsible for \u201cwar crimes and crimes against humanity\u201d and that abuses by anti-balaka groups amounted to \u201cethnic cleansing\u201d of CAR\u2019s Muslim community. Some anti-balaka groups have reportedly received support from former military officers and other networks sympathetic to ex-President Boziz\u00e9.\nOver 207,000 CAR nationals have fled to neighboring countries since December 2013 alone, bringing the total number of refugees to about 462,000 as of June 2015. Tens of thousands of third-party nationals, many of them Muslim traders and shopkeepers, have also fled since 2013. Some 369,000 more people are internally displaced within CAR. About 2.7 million people, or at least half of CAR\u2019s population, reportedly need humanitarian aid. The death toll in the conflict is unknown. Humanitarian conditions prior to the current crisis were already poor due to the legacy of past conflicts and a lack of basic social services. Harvests have decreased by nearly 58% from pre-conflict levels and food aid is routinely pillaged. Insecurity and repeated attacks on aid workers have further constrained humanitarian access, on top of logistical constraints. Separate in origin from the current crisis, the Lord\u2019s Resistance Army (LRA), a militia of Ugandan origin, continues to attack civilians in southeast CAR, creating additional humanitarian needs. \nCompared to 2014, violence has decreased in Bangui and much of the northwest amid international efforts to protect civilians, strengthen state institutions, and broker an inclusive peace process and political transition. However, clashes have increased in other parts of the country as militia groups have relocated, with the front-line receding from the northwest and south toward the center and east. Some observers have expressed concern that violent extremist organizations could seek safe-havens in CAR, given a potential de facto partition of the country along ethno-religious lines between Seleka- and anti-balaka-controlled areas (see Figure 1). \nInternational troops have deployed to CAR in an effort to stabilize the country, as has happened during past crises in CAR (see Figure A-1). There is also a U.N. arms embargo and sanctions regime, first imposed under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2134 (2014). A French military intervention known as Operation Sangaris began in December 2013 with the aim of disarming militias and securing Bangui. In September 2014, a U.N. peacekeeping operation, MINUSCA, replaced and largely absorbed a previous African Union (AU) stabilization force known as MISCA. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2217 (2015) authorizes MINUSCA through April 2016 to protect civilians, support the political transition process and extension of state authority, facilitate humanitarian aid delivery, and in some situations implement \u201curgent temporary measures ... to arrest and detain in order to maintain basic law and order and fight impunity.\u201d The European Union (EU) deployed some 700 soldiers between April 2014 and March 2015 to help secure Bangui, and has established an advisory mission to support military reform. \nIn August 2015, the head of MINUSCA resigned on the request of the U.N. Secretary-General, following a string of incidents involving MINUSCA peacekeepers that have drawn international concern\u2014in particular, severe sexual abuse allegations (see \u201cAllegations of Sexual Abuse and Exploitation by Foreign Troops,\u201d below). Also in August 2015, a Rwandan peacekeeper killed four colleagues and injured eight more at the Rwandan contingent\u2019s base in Bangui, for unknown reasons, before being shot and killed. MINUSCA also faces logistical and security challenges that have undermined its ability to establish an operational presence in conflict zones. Total troop deployment, which reached 10,800 uniformed personnel as of June 2015, out of a total authorized level of 12,870 (or 84%), is slightly behind schedule: the operation was previously expected to reach 90% of its full authorized strength by the end of April. \nFigure 1. CAR at a Glance\n/\nSource: Map created by CRS based on U.N., U.S. government, and non-government organization reports; data on recent LRA attacks from the LRA Crisis Tracker (http://www.lracrisistracker.com). Basemap generated by Hannah Fischer using data from Department of State, Esri, and Google Maps (all 2013). At-a-glance information is from CIA World Factbook and IMF (2015); figures are 2014 estimates unless otherwise indicated.\nMuslim Exodus\nWidespread anti-balaka attacks have forced tens of thousands of Muslims to flee their homes. Muslim-owned properties and businesses have been looted and seized, and mosques have been destroyed. In some locations, Muslims are confined to precarious enclaves where their survival depends on the protection of international troops. In 2014, thousands were evacuated, with international assistance, toward the northeast or to neighboring countries. The U.N. Secretary General reported in April 2015 that \u201cthe security and humanitarian situations remained critical in and around Muslim community enclaves,\u201d and Amnesty International has reported on the forcible suppression of Muslim religious practice, including through forced conversions.\nViolent attacks along ethnic and religious lines reflect, in part, complex tensions over access to resources, control over trade and financial networks, and national identity. Many non-Muslims and southerners refer to Muslims and northeasterners\u2014who often maintain cross-border family and economic ties\u2014as \u201cforeigners,\u201d even if they were born in CAR and consider the country their home. Politicization of religious identity also rose under Boziz\u00e9, who headed an evangelical church. So did popular anger at the perceived raiding of CAR\u2019s natural wealth by foreign actors, including mostly Muslim Chadian and Sudanese merchants and mineral traders. Neighboring Chad helped bring Boziz\u00e9 to power in 2003, and the impunity enjoyed by Chadian soldiers in CAR may have fed these sentiments. The result has been brutal collective punishment. \nMuslim-Christian Tensions\nMultiple factors appear to have contributed to ethno-religious tensions in CAR. These include:\nCAR's precolonial history of slave-raiding by northern and Muslim groups. \nResentment among northerners and Muslims who perceive neglect, discrimination, and a denial of full citizenship by successive governments led by Christian southerners or northwesterners. \nMuslim dominance over trade and rudimentary financial networks, often enabled by cross-border mobility and family ties\u2014and corresponding frustrations over Muslims' perceived control over prices and access to capital. \nThe fact that many Muslims trace their family origins (however distant) to neighboring Chad, whose government helped bring to power former President Boziz\u00e9 and was seen as complicit in Seleka\u2019s seizure of power.\nClaims by some CAR Christians that the vast majority of Seleka combatants in 2013 were foreign nationals are difficult to assess, in part because the alliance was a fluid, ad hoc grouping of fighters of diverse origins, and because borders in the region are porous and identities fluid. Moreover, many northeasterners\u2019 stated grievances center around the state\u2019s denial of citizenship rights, including national identity papers. Seleka leader Michel Djotodia was the country's first Muslim president and the first from northeastern CAR, which may have led some Muslims to support him and/or to view Seleka as protectors. However, there have also been clashes between combatants identified as Seleka and mostly Muslim Peul/Fulani nomadic herder groups, pointing to the diversity of CAR\u2019s Muslim community.\n\nA Challenging Political Transition\nInterim President Catherine Samba-Panza, a former businesswoman, civil society activist, and mayor of Bangui, was appointed in January 2014 by CAR\u2019s National Transition Council, an ad-hoc body constituted after the Seleka takeover. She replaced Seleka leader and self-declared President Michel Djotodia, who was forced out of office and into exile under pressure from African and French leaders. Samba-Panza has called for national reconciliation, appealed for international financial support, and attempted to reconstitute CAR\u2019s security forces\u2014including by calling for exemption from the U.N. arms embargo to reequip the military. Progress toward stabilization and reconciliation has been limited, however, and Samba-Panza\u2019s credibility has been undermined by nepotism and a series of corruption scandals. \nAs mentioned above, the May 2015 Bangui Forum produced agreements on disarmament, reforms, and reconciliation that could, if implemented, provide a way forward to greater peace. Previous attempts by regional leaders to broker political and security agreements among various CAR factions did not appear to have a significant impact on conflict dynamics. Talks convened outside of CAR have also been criticized for either excluding CAR civilians or for appearing to be aimed primarily at paving the way for the reentry of exiled former presidents Boziz\u00e9 and Djotodia into CAR politics, despite the fact that Boziz\u00e9 is under U.N. sanctions and Djotodia is additionally subject to U.S. sanctions. (See \u201cRegional Actors\u201d below).\nPresidential and parliamentary elections, initially scheduled for February 2015, have been repeatedly delayed amid signs of growing domestic and donor frustration with the Samba-Panza government. The current deadline for elections, December 2015, has been set by the designated regional mediator for CAR, President Denis Sassou-Nguesso of the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville). Accordingly, the transitional government has scheduled elections for October 2015 and indicated that they will be preceded by a constitutional referendum. Election preparations face stark logistical and security challenges, however, and it does not appear that a new draft constitution has been finalized. Electoral campaigning and unequal access to voting also could heighten the stakes of ethno-religious competition for power. \nVoter registration was nominally completed in July 2015 despite ongoing disputes about legal residency and citizenship, which are arguably at the heart of the conflict. U.N. officials and donors have also criticized the government\u2019s decision to deny refugees the right to vote, although there are indications the decision could be reversed. Although significant logistical challenges would need to be overcome to allow refugees to vote, U.N. Security Council Resolution 2217 (2015) calls for the transitional authorities to hold \u201cinclusive\u201d elections, \u201censuring the full, effective and equal participation of women, IDPs and CAR refugees, the return of whom should be an important objective.\u201d\nAllegations of Sexual Abuse and Exploitation by Foreign Troops\nFrench, African Union, and U.N. troops have been implicated in sexual abuse in CAR. U.N. human rights investigators documented the sexual abuse and exploitation of boys as young as nine by French soldiers in 2014. In May 2015, France launched a criminal investigation into the allegations, and French President Francois Hollande has vowed to \u201cshow no mercy\u201d towards the troops if they are found guilty. The Paris prosecutor\u2019s office has accused the U.N. of being uncooperative in its investigation, and the U.N. has received widespread criticism for its response to the scandal, which included the suspension of Anders Kompass, the director of field operations for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, for breach of protocol after he reportedly provided the investigators\u2019 findings directly to French officials. \nThe U.N. report also accused soldiers from Chad and Equatorial Guinea who were serving in the AU operation in CAR of sexual abuse in 2014. It is not clear whether those countries have initiated their own investigations into the alleged conduct, or whether any of the troops who were implicated were re-hatted as U.N. peacekeepers. In June 2015, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon established an independent panel to \u201creview the United Nations response to the allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse of children by foreign military forces not under United Nations command and assess the adequacy of the procedures in place.\u201d \nSeparately, U.N. peacekeepers from an unnamed African country have been accused of sexually abusing homeless children in Bangui. According to the U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), five MINUSCA soldiers and one MINUSCA police officer have been implicated in abuses in 2015. (Prosecution and punishment are the duty of the troop-contributing country or countries.) This number is among the highest for U.N. peacekeeping operations in 2015 to date, though comparable to those in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Haiti. In new allegations made in August 2015, Amnesty International accused MINUSCO troops of raping a 12-year-old girl and killing two civilians in separate incidents in Bangui. \nThe Economy\nCAR is one of the world\u2019s least developed countries. Agriculture, forestry, and mining are the most important economic sectors, but all are in disarray. Population displacements have severely disrupted the farming cycle and other livelihoods, leading to \u201ccrisis\u201d-level food insecurity throughout the country. The flight since 2013 of Muslim communities, who had previously dominated trade networks in much of the country, has contributed to economic collapse. \nCAR produces diamonds, but in 2013 was suspended from exporting them under the Kimberley Process\u2014an international certification initiative aimed at preventing \u201cconflict diamonds\u201d from entering legitimate international trade. Armed groups reportedly control mining sites in central CAR, and U.N. sanctions monitors reported that over $24 million worth of diamonds were smuggled out of the country between May 2013 and October 2014. In July 2015, citing \u201cprogress made to date\u201d by CAR, the Kimberley Process established a framework for the resumption of trade in rough diamonds from \u201ccompliant zones\u201d that meet the provisions of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). Criteria include sufficient state presence in mining zones and the absence of armed group activity affecting diamond production or trade processes. Efforts to create a monitoring team to determine compliant zones are underway.\nIllicit economic networks have flourished in many areas, leading some to describe CAR as a \u201cwarlord\u201d economy. According to a June 2015 report by the Enough Project, armed groups in CAR profit \u201cfrom forceful taxation and illicit trade with gold and diamonds that are smuggled across international borders or sold to Central African diamond companies. Moreover, armed groups use violence, attacks, and threats to collect revenue from civilians, businesses, and public institutions and to conduct widespread looting.\u201d Poaching of elephant ivory is reportedly another lucrative source of revenue for armed groups. Seleka fighters reportedly participated in several large-scale elephant killings in 2013, and while in control of Bangui in 2013, the Seleka reportedly looted the Ministry of Water and Forests for weapons and previously confiscated ivory tusks. As Seleka forces have departed from parts of CAR, poachers previously active in those areas may have returned. According to non-government reports, the LRA smuggles ivory poached from the Democratic Republic of Congo through eastern CAR to Kafia Kingi, a Sudanese enclave where the LRA has reportedly established a presence, for trafficking onward to Asia. \nSince 2013, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has approved $31.5 million in financial assistance in support of the transitional government\u2019s emergency economic recovery program, which aims to improve macroeconomic stability and government capacity. The IMF stated in a March 2015 press release that security conditions had held back the recovery, but projected growth in 2015 if the political transition is completed, security improves, and donor support increases. The World Bank has also committed at least $100 million in grants and loans to help restore key government services in CAR. In the meantime, humanitarian organizations remain the country\u2019s primary providers of basic services. \nRegional Actors\nThe Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), a sub-regional intergovernmental body, has played a front-line role in responding to the crisis in CAR, mediating peace accords, deploying troops, and influencing the selection of CAR\u2019s political leadership. However, its internal rivalries, divergent interests among regional heads of state, and a lack of capacity have also undermined some international stabilization efforts. \nRepublic of Congo President Denis Sassou-Nguesso has served as the primary regional mediator in the CAR conflict. In July 2014, he facilitated peace talks in Brazzaville that culminated in a \u201cCessation of Hostilities Agreement\u201d signed by Seleka and anti-balaka representatives, as well as some politicians and civil society representatives. However, armed groups violated the agreement almost immediately, and it was criticized for having been brokered outside the country and without sufficient participation of CAR civilian leaders. In February 2015, Sassou-Nguesso convened new peace negotiations between Seleka and anti-balaka leaders in Nairobi, which included former President Boziz\u00e9\u2014who is under U.N. sanctions and reportedly subject to an arrest warrant in CAR\u2014and, notably, excluded representatives of the transitional government in Bangui. The Nairobi talks drew strong criticism from the U.N. Secretary General\u2019s Special Representative for Central Africa, Abdoulaye Bathily, who warned that they violated resolutions by the U.N. Security Council and risked harming reconciliation efforts. \nChad\u2019s President, Idriss D\u00e9by, is widely viewed as wielding influence over CAR\u2019s politics and security arrangements. He is also viewed as a problematic actor, due to his role in bringing ex-President Boziz\u00e9 to power, allegations that he allowed Seleka to seize power (or even provided support) once he became dissatisfied with Boziz\u00e9, and the fact that some key Seleka figures are reportedly Chadian nationals or have other ties to Chad. Chadian troops, who served in the AU operation, MISCA, in 2013 and also deployed to CAR under national command, were accused of abetting or participating in Seleka abuses. Though Chad was one of the founding troop contributors to MISCA, it withdrew its roughly 800 troops from the AU force in April 2014 after they were criticized for shooting unarmed civilians.\nMany CAR Muslims trace their family origins to Chad, and these overlapping identities appear to have motivated some anti-Muslim violence, as discussed above. In early 2014, as attacks against Muslims, Arabic-speakers, and foreign nationals increased, neighboring states, including Chad, evacuated thousands of their own citizens with international assistance. In doing so, Chadian troops facilitated the evacuation of tens of thousands of CAR Muslims who faced the threat of violence, allowing them to travel to Seleka strongholds in the northeast or into Chad. As of July 2015, Chad housed over 90,000 refugees from CAR (i.e., individuals considered to be CAR nationals who have fled across an international border). Tens of thousands more who fled to Chad from CAR are considered by the Chadian government to be Chadian migrants returning to their ancestral home, rather than internationally recognized and protected refugees.\nCameroon, for its part, hosted former President Boziz\u00e9 when he first went into exile and is contending with an influx of refugees from CAR into its already fragile north. The flood of refugees from CAR into Cameroon\u2014UNHCR estimates there are nearly 250,000 CAR refugees in Cameroon, 128,000 of whom arrived since December 2013\u2014 is adding to Cameroonian concerns about regional security threats, including an expanding conflict with Boko Haram, a Nigerian-origin violent Islamist extremist group. \nLord\u2019s Resistance Army Presence\nSeparate in origin from the current crisis, the Lord\u2019s Resistance Army (LRA), a small militia of Ugandan origin, has operated in CAR\u2019s remote southeast since at least 2008 (see Figure 1 above). LRA attacks on rural communities have displaced hundreds of thousands of people in CAR, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and South Sudan. CAR appears to have attracted LRA commanders due to its remoteness, lack of an effective military, and location near territory previously familiar to the group. In 2013, then-President Djotodia claimed to be in contact with reclusive LRA leader Joseph Kony, but U.S. officials downplayed the claim.\nThe Ugandan military has conducted counter-LRA operations in CAR since 2009, with significant U.S. support, including logistical and intelligence assistance and the deployment of U.S. military advisors to the field since late 2011. Since 2012, these operations have been considered part of a Ugandan-led AU Regional Task Force (AU-RTF). The United States has also provided non-military aid for humanitarian assistance, early warning efforts, and reconciliation programs in LRA-affected areas, including in CAR.\nSoutheastern CAR, where U.S. military advisors are based, has been comparatively unaffected by the larger conflict sparked by the Seleka rebellion. However, LRA fighters appear to have taken advantage of instability in CAR to evade regional military operations. They have also reportedly leveraged opportunistic relationships with Seleka fighters and others to expand their involvement in illicit trafficking of gold and diamonds from CAR through parts of Sudan, and to garner food supplies and other assistance. \nIn January 2015, Dominic Ongwen, a top LRA commander, surrendered to U.S. forces in CAR\u2014reportedly after making contact with Seleka forces. He has since been delivered to The Hague, where he faces seven counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity before the International Criminal Court (ICC). In April, remains exhumed from a grave in southeastern CAR were confirmed to be those of LRA second-in-command Okot Odhiambo. Of the five LRA commanders sought by the ICC in 2005, only Kony remains active. Recent non-government estimates put the LRA\u2019s strength at about 200-300 fighters. Advocates of a continuing U.S. role in efforts to counter the LRA nevertheless warn that the group continues to pose a threat and could rebound, reporting that attacks and abductions attributed to the group increased in 2014, a trend that has continued into 2015, reversing a decline in 2011-2013.\nU.S. Responses\nU.S. engagement in CAR has historically been limited. However, the Obama Administration significantly scaled up U.S. humanitarian aid and diplomatic efforts in 2013 as part of its effort to elevate the prevention of \u201cmass atrocities\u201d as a core tenet of U.S. foreign policy. Visiting Bangui in April 2014, U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. Samantha Power stated, \u201cthe Rwandan genocide taught us the price of delay in responding to mass violence,\u201d adding, \u201cWe must do more; and we must do it now.\u201d \nIn April 2015, the Administration nominated career diplomat Jeffrey J. Hawkins to be ambassador to CAR. If confirmed, he would be the first U.S. ambassador since 2013. The U.S. Embassy in Bangui was evacuated in December 2012 as the Seleka rebellion reached the outskirts of Bangui. Then-Ambassador Lawrence Wohlers continued to fulfill his duties outside of the country until mid-2013, when he retired from the U.S. Foreign Service. In April 2014, the Administration appointed Ambassador W. Stuart Symington as a Washington, DC-based Special Representative for CAR. In September 2014, the Administration resumed diplomatic operations in Bangui, headed by a Charg\u00e9 d\u2019Affaires, David Brown. \nThe United States is now the leading bilateral humanitarian donor to CAR, having provided $150 million in FY2014 and over $92 million in FY2015 to date. U.S. targeted financial and travel sanctions are authorized under Executive Order 13667 (2014) and have been brought against five individuals\u2014three more than have been designated by the U.N. sanctions committee. The United States has provided diplomatic support to the transitional government and to the Bangui Forum (national consultations) in May 2015. The United States is also providing financial support to the U.N. peacekeeping operation, MINUSCA, through assessed contributions; additional voluntary assistance to African peacekeeping troop contributors and logistical support to French forces; and funding for aid programs to promote peace and stability, justice sector capacity, and the electoral process. The Administration has also engaged in public diplomacy initiatives to halt the violence, including a recorded message from President Obama to the people of CAR in December 2013 and a visit to CAR by an interfaith delegation of U.S. religious leaders. The United States wields influence within, and provides funding to, the international financial institutions that have provided assistance to the Samba-Panza government (see \u201cThe Economy\u201d).\nIn FY2016, the Administration is requesting $14.7 million in bilateral aid for CAR: $10 million in State Department Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funds for continuing support to African troop contributors to MINUSCA and for bilateral support to security sector reform in CAR; $2 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF) for peacebuilding programs; $2.5 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) to continue efforts to help reestablish a functioning criminal justice system in CAR; and $150,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) for military professionalization and to promote bilateral military ties. Emergency humanitarian assistance is not requested on a country-specific basis but is allocated during the year according to need.\nRecent Legislation\nThe FY2015 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (Division J of P.L. 113-235, \u00a77042[a]) stated that funds \u201cshall be made available for reconciliation and peacebuilding programs\u201d in CAR, \u201cincluding activities to promote inter-faith dialogue at the national and local levels, and for programs to prevent crimes against humanity.\u201d A similar provision was contained in the FY2014 foreign aid appropriations act (P.L. 113-76, Division K, \u00a77042[a]). Similar provisions are included in FY2016 foreign aid appropriations bills (H.R. 2772 and S. 1725). \nOther legislation introduced in the 114th Congress with implications for CAR includes H.R. 2494 (Global Anti-Poaching Act), H.Res. 310 and S.Res. 211 (regarding genocide and mass atrocities), S.Res. 237 and H.Res. 394 (on the Lord\u2019s Resistance Army), and S.Res. 204 (on \u201cWorld Refugee Day\u201d). In the 113th Congress, S.Res. 375, concerning the crisis in CAR and international efforts to address it, passed the Senate. \nThe Senate report accompanying the FY2015 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations bill (S.Rept. 113-195, accompanying S. 2499) expressed concern that violence between Christians and Muslims in CAR \u201ccould result in genocide\u201d and required the Secretary of State to report \u201con an interagency strategy to help promote stability\u201d in the country, including funding estimates. The State Department submitted a strategy document in April 2015 that defined U.S. \u201cnational interests\u201d in CAR as \u201cfirst, to prevent mass atrocities and genocide,\u201d and \u201csecond, to help CAR become a stable regional partner able to exercise effective governance throughout its territory, thereby preventing the use of CAR territory for international criminal or terrorist networks.\u201d It also outlined U.S. diplomatic and aid efforts.\nOutlook and Issues for Congress\nSome observers assert that U.S. and other international responses to the conflict in CAR since late 201", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43377", "sha1": "8a09b9cdadd277ef15796ae4c49c1a295a236ed0", "filename": "files/20150817_R43377_8a09b9cdadd277ef15796ae4c49c1a295a236ed0.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43377", "sha1": "6e415b8a02905684d4bb73ab9676c350b70a4d8b", "filename": "files/20150817_R43377_6e415b8a02905684d4bb73ab9676c350b70a4d8b.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 276, "name": "Sub-Saharan Africa" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 3241, "name": "Global Health, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Policy" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc306427/", "id": "R43377_2014May14", "date": "2014-05-14", "retrieved": "2014-07-08T21:53:44", "title": "Crisis in the Central African Republic", "summary": "This report provides background on the evolving political, security, and humanitarian crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR), which began when a fractious rebel coalition seized control of the central government in March 2013. 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